ML20086A772

Proposed Tech Specs Reflecting Installation of New Containment Isolation Valves in Reactor Bldg Closed Loop Cooling Water Sys & Exclusion of Valves from Quarterly Surveillance Requirements

ML20086A772
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	11/10/1983
From:	POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:
Shared Package
ML20086A759	List: ML20086A756 ML20086A768 ML20086A772
References
NUDOCS 8311160107
Download: ML20086A772 (9)

Text

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A ATTACHMENT I PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES RELATED TO RBCLCW SYSTEM CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES P

New York Power Authority. .

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant-James A'. -

Docket ho.~50-333 November 1983 es -

8311160107 931110  ;

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3.7 (cont'd) JAFNPP 4.7 (cont'd)

c. Secondary containment capa-bility to maintain a 1/4 in.

of water vacuum under calm wind conditions with a filter train flow rate of not more than 6,000 cfm, shall be dem-onstrated at each refueling outage prior to refueling.

D. Primary Containment Isolation Valves D. Primary Containment Isolation Valves

1. During reactor power operating 1. The primary containment isolation conditions, all isolation valves valves surveillance shall be per-listed in' Table 3.7-1 and all. formed as follows:

instrument line flow check

. valves shall be operable, except a. At least once per operating.

as specified in 3.7.D.2. cycle, the operable isolation valves that are power operated and automatically initiated I

, shall be tested for simulated i automatic initiation and clo- l sure times. j

b. At 1 cast once per operating cycle, the instrument line excess flow check valves shall be tested for proper operation.

c. At least once per quarter:

(1.) All normally open power-operated isolation valves (except for the main steam line and RBCLUW System l isolation valves) shall be 'j fully closed and reopened.

-Amendment No. 185

_ . . _ - = . . . . .

3.7 (cont'd) JAFNPP 4.7 (cont'd) ,

L (2.) With the reactor at reduced power level trip, main steam iso-lation valves and verify closure time.

2. In the event.any isolation valve d. At least twice per week, the specified in Table 3. 7-1. (except main steam line power-operated the. RBCLCW System Isolation Valves) isolation valves shall be become' inoperable,. reactor power exercised by partial closure operation may continue,.provided and subsequent reopening.

-at least one valve in each line having an! inoperable valve is in e. The RBCLCW System Isolation the mode corresponding to the Valves shall be fully closed isolated condition. . and reopened once per operating cycle.

' 3. If Specification 3.7.D.1 and 3.7.D.2.cannot be met, an orderly. 2. Whenever an isolation valve listed 5._  : shutdown shall.be' initiated and in Table 3.7-1 is inoperable, the

<the reactor shall be in the cold position of at least one other valve

-condition within 24 hrs. in each line having an inoperable valve shall be recorded daily.

Amendment.No.. 186

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JAFNPP NOTES FOR TABLE 3.7-1 (CONT'D)

1. Main steam isolation valves require that both solenoid pilots be de-energized to close valves. Accumulator air pressure plus spring force act together to close valves when both pilots are de-energized. Voltage failure at only one pilot does not cause valve closure. The valves are designed to fully close in less than 5 sec, but in no less than 3 sec with steam flow.

2. Primary containment spray and pressure suppression chamber cooling valves have interlocks that allow them ,

to be manually reopened after automatic closure. This provision permits containment spray, for high drywell pressure' conditions, and/or pressure suppression chamber water cooling. When automatic signals are not present '

these valves may be opened for test!or operating-con-venience.

3. Testable check' valves are designed for remote opening with zero differential pressure across the valve seat.

The velves close on reverse flow even though the test switches-may.be positioned for open. The valves open when pump pressure exceeds reactor pressure even though test switch.may be positioned for close.

4. Control rod hydraulic lines can be isolated-by the solenoid valves outside the primary containment. Lines that extend-outsice the primary containment are small and terminate'in a system;thatiis~ designed to. prevent' outleakage.-LSolenoid' valves normally are. closed, but they open on rod movement and during reactor scram.

5. A-c motor-operated valves are powered from the'a-c.

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emergency buses. ' D-c motor-operated isolation valves are powered from the plant' batteries.

16. All motor-operated isolation valves.remainEin'the' last positic.n upon failure of. valve power.- All' air-operated-valves, except RECLCW containmentcisolation valves, [

close on motive air: failure.- Allrair-operated valves, except main steam l isolation valves and RBCLCW-con-tainment, isolation valves,fclose on.powerifailure to'the <

solenoid pilots..

7. The standard minimum ~ closing rateffor automatic isola--

-tion valves is based on-a nominal:line size.of-12 in. -

'Using;the standard closing rate, a 12 in. line isjiso - ,

. lated,f60 sec.

2

8. ' Valves identified by-anfasterisk~in'the'" Normal Status"

- column can be. opened.or.closedeby: remote manual' switch; for: operating. convenience-during anyfmode of. reactor operation except'when:automaticfsignal'is)present.. ,"

" Amendment No.- . 208-  !

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POWER LOCATIO DRYWELL VALVE TYPE TO OPEN REF. TO E

5 RYWELL g Vacuum Breaker x-202A AO Butterfly Vacuum B Outside g

Reactor Building . .

to Suppression E Chanber E

g Vacuum Breaker x-202B Vacuum Vacuum B Outside g Reactor Euilding Breaker Suppres to Suppression Chambe r J Cha mbe r Reactor Building x-23, x-24 AO Air /DC C Outside

{ Closed Cooling x-63, x-67 Globe E Water In E

E F

Reactor Building x-68, x-66 AO Air /DC C Outside Closed Cooling x-64, x-62 Globe Water Out x-65

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[ Energency x-24, x-23 Cheek End Flow C Outside NE Service Water x-63, x-67 to Drywell ~

F In st ru ment x-30A Hand Globe Hand A Outside f Sensing Steam

Flow -

T Inst ru men t

. x-30A Flow Check Spring A Outside -

f Sensing Steam --

Flow 0

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Inst rument x-50C Hand Globe Hand B Outside Sensing Drywell

{ Pressure Torus Pressure x-21B AO Valves Air /DC B 1A Sensing Outside j s- 9 E2 -

A Amend ent No. 40, 48 204 l b ..

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L JAFNPP

.7-1 (Cont'd)

IRATING PRIMARY CONTAINMENT Lowing pages; signal codes are listed on following pages)

POWER TO CLOSE ISOLATION CLOSING NORMAL REMARKS AND (5) (6) SIGNAL TIME (7) 'iTATUS Spring EXCEPTIONS Not Applicable Closed Valve opens when suppression chamber pressure is 0.5 psi below reactor build-ing pressure.

Suppression Rev. Flow Not applicable Closed ion Cha mber Pressure Air /DC HM Not applicable Open The RBCLCW isolation valves remain in their last position on loss of air supply and open or loss of electrical power.

Air /Dc RM Not applicaole Open Process Rev. Flow Not applicable Closed

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Hand ~~~

Not applicable Open I?;'t f. g _ 4;y ..? .' c Typical all Class A "W,.J.J4 . ., ?'; ,y i Instrument Lines

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Process Excess Not applicable Open Typical all Class A

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. ATTACHMENT II l~

SAFETY EVILUATION RELATED TO REACTOR BUILDING

- CLOSED LOOP COOLING WATER SYSTEM CONTAINMENT' ISOLATION VALVES I

1 I

~New York Power Authority James A.'FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 November 1983 1

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I. Description of the Changes The proposed changes to the FitzPatrick Technical Specifications reflect the installation of the new containment isolation valves in the RBCLCW System and exclusion of these valves from quarterly surveillance requirements.

Specifically, nine (9) remote manually operated con-tainment isolation valves were added to the RBCLCWS piping in order to comply with 10CFR50 Appendix A GDC

57. These valves are air operated (with solenoid pilot valves) . These valves are normally open, and are designed to fail open on loss of electrical power, and to fail as is on loss of air supply.

As a result of this modification, the following Technical Specifications changes are being proposed.

1. In section 4. 7. D. l. c. (1. ) on page 185, the phrase "and RBCLCW System" is inserted.

2. Section 4.7.D.l.e is inserted on page 186 to read, "The RBCLCW System isolation valves shall be fully closed and reopened once per operating cycle." In section 3.7.D.2 on that page, the phrase "(except the RBCLCW System Isolation Valves)" is inserted.

3. In Table 3.7-1 on page 204, for the. Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water In and Out lines,.

Valve Type is changed to AO globe, Power to Open is changed to Air /DC; Power to Close is changed to Air /DC; Isolation Signal is changed to RM; and under " Remarks" the follow-ing item is inserted: "The RBCLCW isolation valves. remain in their last position on loss of air supply and open on loss of electrical power."

4. Note 6 on page 208 is revised to read, "All motor-operated isolation valves remain in the' last. position upon failure of valve power. All air-operated valves, except RBCLCW containment-isolation valves, close on motive air failure.

All air-operated valves except main steam-isolation valves and RBCLCW containment isolation valves, close on power failure to the solenoid pilots." 1 II. Purpose of the Changes The'nine (9) remote. manual containment isolation valves were added to.the RBCLCWS piping in order to' comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix A GDC. 57 and' to bring the plant into conformance with the'FSAR.

l The exclusion from quarterly surveillance requirements l is necessary. Closure of the RBCLCWS containment iso-lation valves will eliminate the coolant flow to the drywell air and recirculation coolers. Without cooling water, the drywell air and equipment temperature limits will be exceeded during normal plant operations. It is unacceptable, therefore, to close these valves four times per yaar. The RBCLCWS lines are part of a closed system, as det.ned in GDC 57, and therefore do not communicate with either the primary system or the containment. Since the piping itself comprises an isolation boundary, it is justifiable not to close the single isolation valve if it should become inoperable.

III. Impact of the Changes The modifications of the FitzPatrick RBCLCWS and the accompanying proposed Technical Specification changes will have a positive impact on plant safety.

The Authority considers that this proposed amendment can be classified as not likely to involve signifi-cant hazards considerations since it is a change to make a license conform to regulations and FSAR commitments which is similar to Example (vii), Federal register, Vol. 48 No. 67 dated April 6, 1983, page 14870, "A change to make a licenea conform to changes in the regulations, where the license change results in very minor changes to facility operations clearly in keeping with the regulations."

Thus, the proposed Technical Specification changes involve no significant hazards considerations as defined in 10 CFR 50.92.

IV. Implementation of the Changes Implementation of the changes, as proposed, will not impact the fire protection program at FitzPatrick; nor will the changes impact the environment.

V. Conclusion The incorporation of these changes: a) will not in-crease the probability or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report; b) will not increase the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type other than that evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report; c) will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification; d) does not constitute an unreviewed safety question, and e) involves no Significant Hazards Considerations, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92.

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