ML20085L339
| ML20085L339 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 10/14/1983 |
| From: | ESSEX CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20085L338 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 PROC-831014, NUDOCS 8310240145 | |
| Download: ML20085L339 (52) | |
Text
CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW PROGRAM PLAN HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION Prepared for:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Prepared by Essex Corporation for:
Public Service Electric & Gas Company October 14,1983 i
8310240145 831017 DRADOCK05000g
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page i
1.0 REVIEW PLAN 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Background
1 1.3 Task Phasing 3
2.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING 16 2.1 Intreduction 16 2.2 Structure and Management of CRDR Team 16 2.3 Schedule 20 3.0 DOCUMENTATION AND DOCUMENT CONTROL 22 3.1 Introduction 22 3.2 Reference Documentation 22 3.3 Process and HED Documentation 22 3.4 CRDR Report 28 4.0 TECHNICAL APPROACH 29 4.1 Introduction 29 4.2 Task Plan Content 29 k.3 Review Phase 30
5.0 ASSESSMENT
AND DESIGN SOLUTION PHASE 44 l
5.1 Assessment 44 l
5.2 Correction 46 48 5.3 Implementation 5.4 Simulator Involvement in the Correction Phase 49 49 5.5 Reporting Phase 49 5.6 Summary l
l l
l l
1.0 REVIEW PLAN 1.1 Introduction This Program Plan report has been prepared in response to NUREG-0737, Certifi-cation of TMI Action Plan Requirements, para. I.D.I., and describes the Control Room Design Review that will be conducted for Hope Creek Generating Station, owned and operated by Public Service Electric & Gas Company. The format of this report follows that recommended by NUREG-0700, Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews, published September 1981, paragraph 5.1, as follows:
1.
Review Plan 2.
Management and Staffing 3.
Documentation and Document Control 4.
Technical Approach (Review Procedures) 5.
Assessment and Design Salutions.
This program plan addresses the acceptance guidelines stated in Section 2 of the October 1981 Draft of NUREG-0801, Evaluation Criteria for Detailed Control Room Design Review, and in Section 2 " Planning Phase" of NUREG-0700.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 General Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) is a 1067 Mwe net nuclear power plant with a boiling water reactor (BWR) owned by Public Service Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G).
HCGS is located in Lower Alloway's Creek Township approximately eight miles southwest of Salem, New Jersey. General Electric is the supplier for the HCGS reactor and turbine generator. Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC) is architect-engineer and constructor for HCGS, which is scheduled for commercial operation in 1986.
This Program Plan report describes how PSE&G plans to conduct a Control Room Design Review (CRDR) for HCGS. The CRDR is part of a broad effort within the nuclear l
Industry to evaluate the adequacy of control rooms to support safe and effective t
l operations. Although the CRDR is specifically directed toward evaluating the control l
room, PSE&G recognizes interfaces between the CRDR and other related activities, such as the design of a Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), development of Emergency l
Operating Procedures, operator training, and the inclusion of post-accident monitoring i
1
(PAM) instrumentation. The organization of this plan ensures coordination of the CRDR with related efforts.
Guidance for the CRDR has been provided by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the form of various NUREGs and regulatory guides. In addition, the utility industry has developed guidance suggesting how a specific utility should conduct a CRDR.
PSE&G has considered all relevant guidance in developing this HCGS CRDR Program Plan report. PSE&G has dedicated the necessary resources to this CRDR to ensure success of the project, including knowledgeable technical and management personnel from PSE&G and Bechtel Power Corporation.
In addition, PSE&G has contracted with Essex Corporation for specialized human factors support necessary to complete the CRDR.
1.2.2 Program Plan Report Objectives This Program Plan report has two purposes. First, it describes the. manner in which PSE&G intends to conduct the HCGS CRDR. Since HCGS is a near term operating license (NTOL) plant, PSE&G has developed a plan and a schedule for the CRDR that recognizes necessary coordination among related NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 initiatives and con-straints inherent in the HCGS construction schedule.
Secondly, this Program Plan provides a means to ensure that an adequate CRDR will be conducted. It is intended that this Program Plan be a baseline for any audit of PSE&G's CRDR by NRC personnel or contractors.
PSE&G therefore anticipates that any NRC comments or guidance regarding the Program Plan will be brought to PSE&G's attention in a timely manner. In conducting the HCGS CRDR, PSE&G will comply with NRC guidance and will develop an auditable documentation package for CRDR analysis and findings.
1.2.3 Control Room Complex Operability Analysis In 1977, a HCGS CR operability task analysis was conducted to finalize the basic design of the main control panels before authorizing the detailed design by the panel
- vendor, i
The analysis afforded an opportunity for experienced power plant operating person-i nel and other off-project specialists to verify the adequacy and acceptability of all system control and monitoring functions and'their location and arrangement on the main control panels.
Power plant operators simulated plant operation by using annotated operating procedures (obtained from Peach Bottom) and a full-scale mockup of the main control 2
panels.
The mockup consisted of pictorial representations (templates) of all panel-mounted devices which were. attached magnetically to structural representatio.ns of the main control panel mounting surfaces.
As the analysis proceeded, changes were immediately incorporated to the extent practicable into the mockup, were redlined onto appropriate drawings, and were recorded
' in a set of notes compiled during the analysis. The evolving mockup was reviewed by panel vendor representatives for constructability.
At the end of the analysis, details of the final panel arrangement, which evolved on the mockup, were recorded on photographs. The photographs, redlined drawings, and notes were the basis for revising the panel arrangement drawings which were to be submitted to the panel vendor for detailed panel design.
1.2.4 HCGS Control Room Layout The layout of the HCGS control room and locations of major systems are indicated by Figures 1 and 2 and Tables 1,2, and 3. The control room review evaluates items shown on the figures which are used by the operator. The Remote Shutdown Panel, although not shown in the figures, is also included in the review.
1.3 Task Phasing The review is to be conducted in four phases, as follows:
Phase 1 - Project Planning - During this phase, project milestones and schedules are developed, review methods are specified, and project
+
interfaces are defined. Submission of this document to the NRC culmi-nates the planning phase.
I Phase 2 - Control Room (CR) Review - This represents the period in which data collection, reduction, and analysis.will be conducted, result-ing in Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED) reports and draf t reports.
Phase 3 - Enhancement and Design Solutions - Discrepancies will be collated, alternate enhancements and design solutions are generated, and a course of action for resolution of HEDs will be identified.
Phase 4 - Reporting - Backfit schedules and CRDR results will be pro-vided to the NRC.
Figure 3 shows, in general, the phases and task flow for conducting the CRDR. A brief discussion of the activities conducted in each phase of the review follows this figure.
4 For more detailed descriptions of the objectives, approach, data collection methodology,
[
and specific evaluation methods, refer to Section 4.0, Technical Approach, of this PPR.
3
D t
J
/
C 8
5
/
[//
+
10568s 10C6'10 10C611 9
l 1AC63'3 5
10C608 10C609 10CG07 10C6 f
10C
]
l l
1BC633 Figure 1. Control room panel layout 4
l l
Table 1.
l Panel identification summary l
l PANEL NO.
CONTENTS 10C399 REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL 10C604 CLASS 1E RADIATION MON. INSTR. CAB.
10C607 TIP CONT. & MON. CABINET 10C609 RPS A/B LOGIC VB 10C610 CONT. ROD TEST INSTR. CAB.
10C611 RPS CID LOGIC VB 1AC633 POST LOCA H2 RECOMB. A CTRL. CAB.
1BC633 POST LOCA H2 RECOMB. B CTRL. CAB.
10C635 RAD. MONITOR A!B INSTR. CAB.
10C636 RAD. MONITOR CID INSTR. CAB.
10C649 OPERATORS MONITOR CONSOLE 10C650 MAIN VERTICAL BOARDS 10C651 UNIT OPERATORS CONSOLE 10C671 FIRE DETECTION STATUS CAB.
10C685 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIP. CAB.
10C800 OVERHEAD ANNUNCIATOR PANEL 10C605 SAFETY RELIEF VALVE MONITOR CAB.
i f
5
10C650 A,8 l
\\
C,D,E,F 10C651 r
l l
A,B,C,D SECTION A
10C 649 E,F,G,H,J,K H
SECTION A
L,M I
A
/
SECTION A
e i s
B,C C,D,E,F,G SECTION SECTION A,B,C,D,E,F E
C G
A,B B
SECTION D
E,F C
AI H,J,K,L,M SECTION D
SECTION C
D E
A B,C E,F,G t
SECTION H
A l
Panel subsections indicated by letters C'D A'B inside panel areas. See tables 2 & 3.
l i
l l
Figure 2. Plant systems layout l
l l
6
I l
Table 2.
System identification for panel 10C650 l
SECRON CONTENTS oo, l
SECTION SECTION l
A A
INSTRUMENT GAS l
B COMPRESSED AIR l
C FIRE PROTECTION D
CONDENSATE l
E STATION SERVICE WATER F
MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE SEALING SYSTEM G
B A
REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING B
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION i
C CORE SPRAY C
A CORE SPRAY B
AUTO DEPRESS. SYSTEM, SAFETYlRELIEF VALVES C
REACTOR AND MISCELLANEOUS INDICATORS D
ROD AND DETECTOR DISPLAY E
LPRM LEVEL AND STATUS F
MISCELLANEOUS MAIN STEAM INDICATORS G
SEISMIC ANNUNCIATOR DISPLAY H
A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DISPLAY B
SYSTEM BYPASS STATUS INDICATION C
FUEL POOL COOLING AND TORUS WATER CLEANUP D
LIQUID RADWASTE E
EMERGENCY BATTERIES AND INVERTERS E
A TURBINE GENERATOR AUXlLIARIES B
ELECTRICAL GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTION C
CONTAINMENT HYDROGENIOXYGEN ANALYZERS D
CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE E
NON CLASS lE LOAD ISLN CIR. BRKR. STATUS & CNTRL F
REACTOR BLDG. FILTRATION, RECIRC. & VENTILATION i
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Table 3.
System identification for panel 10C651
)
l SECTION CONTENTS l
-~
so.
i SECTION SECTION A
B STATION SERVICE WATER C
SAFETY AUXILIARIES COOLING l
D REACTOR AUXILIARIES COOLING E
CIRCULATING WATER F
CONDENSERS G
AIR REMOVAL H
CONDENSATE STORAGE AND TRANSFER J
OFF GAS K
CONDENSATE L
REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE AUXILIARIES B
A FEEDWATER C
A REACTOR WTR SAMPLE AND REACTOR HEAD VENT B
REACTOR LEVEL CONTROL AND REACTOR HEAD VENT C
REACTOR WATER CLEAN UP E
REACTOR RECIRCULATION F
REACTOR PROTECTION AND NEUTRON MONITORING G
REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL H
CONTROL ROD DRIVE J
NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUTOFF K
MAINSTEAM L
MAIN TURBINE AUXILIARIES M
TURBINE SEALING STEAM AND DRAINS D
A MAIN TURBINE EHC E
A ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION B
EMERGENCY GENERATORS C
CHILLED WATER D
DRYWELL COOLING E
AUXILIARY BUILDING CONTROL AREA HVAQ F
AUXILIARY BUILDING DIESEL AREA HVAC
'G REACTOR BUILDING 8
PHASEI PHASE Ill PROJECT ASSESSMENT AND 5
4 CR R VI W REPOR I G PLANNING DESIGN SOLUTIONS II YER FY SYSTEM REVIEW T
FUNCTI NS
+
. OPERATING +
+
PERFOR-EXPERIENCE MANCE ANALYSIS CAPABILITY DEVELOP
+
F;NAL REPORT g
V ANALYZE e
ASSESS AND DEVELOP PROGRAM A
b-DISCRE-
+
SELECT
+
4 PANCIES CORRECTIVE PLAN ACTION l
JL DEVELOP l
l
+
BACKFIT ASSEMBLE CONDUCT VALIDATE SCHEDULE CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL ROOM
+
ROOM
+
ROOM DOCUMEN-SURVEYS FUNCTIONS TATION
/k I
1 Figure 3. The four phases and the task flowIrelationships of the CR review.
The HCGS CRDR will be conducted on a schedule to ensure that potential human factors problems are identified early to provide maximum opportunity to effectively eddress identified problems. Conducting the CRDR at this relatively early date on the j
plant construction schedule, however, will require deferring certain tasks until later.
Specifically, operator interviews must be deferred until trained operators familiar with the HCGS CR are available, and certain environmental surveys (e.g., noise) must be l
deferred until actual operational conditions exist. A Summary Report will be sumbitted to document CRDR results excluding deferred surveys, and a Supplemental Report will be submitted later to document the results of deferred surveys.
1.3.1 Phase 1 - Project Planning The contents of this report document the Project Planning Phase. Acceptance of this document essentially concludes Project Planning. The guidelines provided in MUREG-0700 and NUREG-0801 form the primary basis of this document.
1.3.2 Phase 2 - Control Room (CR) Review The CR review phase is subdivided into six tasks as described below:
1.3.2.1 Review Operating Experience - This task is composed of two sub-tasks.
Review of LERs from similar plants, since HCGS is not operational o
Operator interviews (to be conducted in mid-1985 when trained o
operators become available).
1.3.2.2 Assemble CR Documentation - In this task, a CR data base is established to sup' ort the subsequent evaluation. A library is established with CR-related docu-p mentation (tech specs, drawings, etc.), CR components are photo-documented, and a photomosaic is constructed. In addition to the library and photographic documentation, a CR inventory of components is developed, identifying each component's location, system relationships, functions, and characteristics. Inventory data are filed for subsequent use.
1.3.2.3 Conduct CR Surveys - Much of the detailed assessment of the control room is conducted via a total of 14 surveys. The surveys to be conducted are:
o Ambient Noise - Direct measurements of noise levels are taken and compared to individual checklists items (to be conducted by March 1986 when all equipment is in operation and other sound level conditions are typical).
10
o 111umination - Measurements are taken under various ambient con-ditions (e.g., emergency lighting) and are compared to individual checklist items.
o CR Environment (HVAC) - Assessments are made by direct measurement of the parameters listed below and comparison of the data to the 0700 guidelines
- Temperature Hamidity
- Ventilation Workspace - The CR workspace is evaluated by checklist survey r
o Workspace Arrangement
- Document Organization, Use, and Storage
- CR Access.
o Conventions - The CR is evaluated by survey for the conventions listed below and data are subsequently compared to 0700 guidelines coding methods (color, shape, pattern, etc.)
- standardization of abbreviations and acronyms
- consistency of control use
- consistency of display movement of indication.
o Controls - Controls are evaluated by checklist survey.
]
o Displays - Displays are evaluated by checklist survey.
o Computer System - Computer systems are assessed by checklist.
o Emergency Equipment - Data are collected by walk-thrcugns, emer-gency garment use, speech intelligibility analysis, and checklist application.
o Labels and Location Aids - Labels and location aids are evaluated by checklist application.
o Annunciator System - The _ annunciator system is evaluated by checklist survey.
i o Anthropometrics - Reach and visual access to CR components are
~
analyzed, given physical configuration of boards, panels, layout, etc.
The data are subsequently comptred to checklist item requirements.
o Communications. - Communications systems are evaluated by check-l list and speech intelligibility of communications modes is analyzed.
i o Maintainability - Checklist and questionnaire data concerning l
operator-maintained components (trend recorders, bulbs, etc.) are
(
collected.
Survey data are collected from preconstructed checklists, interview forms, and direct measurements of CR parameters, such as noise levels, light levels, etc.
The guidance for the survey criteria is found in NUREG-0700. For each survey, a draft report (summarizing HEDs) is prepared for subsequent inclusion into a final report.
11
Some of the surveys will be conducted in mid-1985 when the control room is expected to be in operation.
These surveys are Noise, Illumination, Control Room Environment, Workspace, and Emergency Equipment.
1.3.2.4 Review System Ftmetions and Task Analysis (SFTA) - System functions and l
tasks are identified and evaluated in this task. A 4-step procedure is employed:
o Identification of systems and subsystems by review of plant documen-
- tation, o Identification of normal and emergency operating procedures to undergo task analysis o Identification of system / subsystem functions through document reviev. and operator interviews.
o Identification and analysis of CR operational tasks.
Task analysis data are used as input for the verification of task performance capability and the validation of CR functions (see paragraph:; 1.3.2.5 and 1.3.2.6).
There are two basic types of products produced by this analysis. The first product is a tabular listing of major operating systems and subsystems. This listing, when taken in conjunction with the group of selected procedures, is used to develop tables and/or functional flow block diagrams showing specific operator functions required to complete the procedures.
The second product records the actual task analysis of the required operator functions. The result is a description of specific tasks associated with the operator functions in terms of operator input-output and decision requirements.
1.3.2.5 Verify Task Performance Capability - This analysis is composed of two subtasks:
Verification of instrument / control availability, and verification of human engineering suitability. The first, verification of availability, determines whether the instrumentation and controls required by the control room oper& tor are actually available to the operator for completion of the tasks identified in the task analysis. The control l
room inventory and the task descriptions from the SFTA are the two major inputs to this l
task.
The SFTA documentation describes the instruments and controls which are necessary for the required tasks, whereas the control room inventory lists the components which are actually available. A cc,mparison of these lists will determine if a required l
Instrument or control is not available; The second subtask, verification of human engineering suitability, will examine the components for characteristics which may degrade operator task performance, and which are not necessarily apparent in a control room survey. This analysis will focus on the practical availability considerations such as control-display relationships.
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The primary products of the verification phase are the documentation of missing task related instrumentation and/or controls and the identification of problems regarding component suitability.
1.3.2.6 Validate CR Functions - This involves analysis of workload and distribution of workload for operators for specific task and event sequences. The primary means of I
analysis are traffic analysis and walk-and talk-through simulation of task sequences.
Checklists will be used to aid in the validation of CR functions.
1.3.3 Phase 3 - Assessment and Design Solutions The basic procedure to be employed in identifying and selecting enhancements and design solutions is based on NUREG-0700, Exhibit 4-2, reproduced here as Figure 4.
1.3.3.1 Assess Discrepancies - Assessment is discussed in Section 5.0 of this plan.
In general, the process follows that discussed in NUREG-0801 (draft, published in October 1981), and is as follows:
o Assess extent of deviation from NUREG-0700 guideline 3 o Estimate increase in human error for the discrepancy Determine if discrepant componerit(s) are safety function related o
Determine if errors in using discrepant component (s) could lead to o
violation of tech specs or unsafe operation Assignment of category and priority, based on the above.
o 1.3.3.2 Analysis of Correction by Enhancement - Discrepancies selected for cor-rection are first examined for possible correction by enhancement (labeling, demarcation, procedure aids, etc.). Each HED is considered and where such correction is possible, the discrepancy is reassessed for its effect on operator performance. As appropriate, HEDs are reevaluated via checklisting and task analysis until HE suitability is verified. Where it j
I-is determined that correction by enhancement is not possible, the discrepancy is analyzed for correction by design alternatives.
l 1.3.3.3 Analysis of Correction by Design Alternative - Design alternatives will be identified by examining the HED, referring to task analysis data, and identifying potential constraints (e.g., availability of equipment, Reg. Guide 1.75, etc.). The acceptability of design alternatives will be verified by reapplication of 0700 Guidelines and task analysis.
1.3.3.4. Assessment of Extent of Correction - For all HEDs selected for cor-l l
rection, the extent of correction (by enhancement or redesign) will undergo evaluation.
i l
13
HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES TO BE ANALYZED FOR CORRECTION (FROM THE HED SELECTION PROCESS) }
if 1
ANALYSIS FOR CORRECTION BY ENHANCEMENT I
If CORRECT WITH YES ENHANCEMENT?
If
/NO DESIGN AND VERIFY 1
If ANALYSIS TO IDENTIFY DESIGN if IMPROVEMENT ALTERNATIVES AND i
SELECT RECOMMENDED SOLUTION IMPLEMENT AND DOCUMENT
= FUNCTION ANALYSIS p _______________,
= ALLOCATION i
MAN i'
MACHINE k
I e VERIFY ALLOCATION -----+!'
I
- SELECT PREFERRED l
DESIGN ALTERNATIVE a
t i
e VALIDATE DESIGN ------ +1 Not Fully SCHEDULE i
Corrected if Corrected IMPLEMENTATION AND CU ENT +
ASSESS EXTENT OF CORRECTION if DOCUMENT l
l Partially Corrected y JUSTlFY SCHEDULE DOCUMENT AND DOCUMENT IMPLEMENTATION I
l Figure 4. Assessment: Selection of design improvements (from NUREG 0700) 14
The means to achieve the assessment is simply re' application of NUREG-0700 guidelines and verification of HE suitability.
i 1.3.4 Phase 4 - Reporting Two requirements of this phr.se are:
o Preparation of schedule for implementation of selected backfits o Preparation and submittal of the final report, t
1.3.4.1 Develop Backfit Schedules - Backfit schedules prepared as HEDs are identified, documented, and assessed. Scheduling of HED backfits wul be a function of:
HED category and pr,iority o
o Engineering and procurring lead time requirements'and constraints o Overall plant outage schedules.
Scheduies will be reviewed ano' updated as part of the implementation program.
1.3.4.2 Develop' Final Report - The CRDR report will closely follow the outline recommended in Section 5.2 of NUREG-0700. Specifically, the final report will address:
o The CRDR phases o The technical activities -
Review of Operating Experience Assembly of CR Documentation
- System /Functica/ Task Analysis
- Conduct of CR Swveys Verification of Taskyerformance Capability
- Validation of CR Functions Method of Assessment et Dis'crepancies o
Method of Identificatir n'and Select $n of Enhancement and Design o
Solutions o Review results of HEDs and HED Assessment. Selected enhancement' and design solutions will be organized into the following groups:
Su vey findings (annunciator, communications, etc.)
- Task analysis findings (oanel/workspace)
- HE suitability ar.d validanon of functions findings (CR traffic, workload distribution, man machine functional' allocations) s o Improvements to be made' t
t s
- Enhancements /justifie.atio'i/ extent of correction
- Design alternative / justification /Axt_eryt of correction o Schedule of implementation. 3 s
4 h
s
't j
g
_t;
2.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING 2.1 Introduction l
1 The quality of tne review effort and the results of the CRDR depend upon the composition, balance, and management of the review team.
This section provides a description of the structure and management of the HCGS CRDR team, including the f
names of key team members, their responsibilities, their estimated participation, and a r
brief statement of their qualifications.
2.2 Structure and Management of CRDR Team "Ihe HCGS CRDR team consis.s of a combination of PSE&G personnel and outside consultants and provides the necessary interdisciplinary expertise to conduct the review.
Figure 5 shows the review team organization. Individual review tasks or processes will be performed primarily by PSE&G and Essex Corporation personnel with the necessary expertise. BPC will also provide required support for the performance of all tasks and will review all plans, procedures, and reports associated with each task. A Technical Advisory Team (TAT), consisting of senior technical specialists from PSE&G, Bechtel Power Corporation, and Essex, will perform an independent check and review function on the project. They will assist in establishing the direction of the project and will actively participate in resolving any problems that arise.
The primary functions of the TAT, however, will be HED assessment.
The following is a brief description of the responsibilities and qualifications of the key review team members.
2.2.1 'Ihe PSE&G HCGS CRDR Program Manager The PSE&G HCGS CRDR Coordinator is the PSE&G representat:Je who has the overall responsibility for the CRDR. His responsibilities include, but are not limited to:
a.
The overall administration of the CRDR.
b.
Administration of vendor contracts associated with the performance of the CRDR.
c.
Integration and coordination of other human factors programs as described in other NRC publications; such as:
o NRC Task Action Plan NUREG-0660 and Supplement I to NUREG-0737 16
l Technical Advisory Team l
f
= PSE&G CRDR I
Project Manager
= Chairman, Technical J.A. Oliver, HTl - HF. Advisor.
(
Advisory Team G. Connor, PSE&G - Opns Advisor D. Russell, PSE&G - Engrg. Advisor T.R. McGuire J. Isaacs, BPC - I & C Advisor Bechtel Power Corp.
Essex HCGS CRDR HCGS CRDR Coordinator Project Manager K.V. Evans G.A. Ellif f HCGS CRDR Review Team PSE&G BPC Essex Operhtions Engineering HF l&C I&C Operations Engineering Figure S. HCGS CRDR project management organization 17
l o Aspects of the TMI-Related Requirements for New Operating Licenses, NUREG-0694 Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities, NUREG-0696 o
Implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.97 o
Human Factors Acceptance Criteria for the Safety Parameter Dis-o k
play System, Draft NUREG-0835.
d.
Coordination and development of the necessary administrative controls to support the organization controls of an implementation program.
f Interface with other department / divisions within PSE&G to provide the e.
necessary support of review team activities.
f.
Chairman of the Technical Advisory Team (see paragraph 2.2.2 below).
The PSE&G HCGS CRDR Program Manager will be Mr. T. R. McGuire. Mr. McGuire is a Senior Engineer with PSE&G. He holds a BSEE degree and has nine years experience with PSE&G. Mr. McGuire has been with the HCGS Project for the past four years. He supervises and performs technical activities associated with controls equipment for HCGS. Mr. McGuire is responsible for review and approval of A/E specifications, bid specifications, design and technical analyses, and schedules for vendor activities associ-ated with HCGS control systems.
2.2.2 The Technical Advisory Team (TAT)
The TAT shall be comprised of a minimum of five members. The function of the E
advisory team was discussed in paragraph 2.2. Mr. McGuire will serve as TAT Chairman.
The TAT Chairman is responsible for coordinating the TAT's effort. The chairman interfaces with the designated site operations representatives to arrange for access to:
plant information (records, documents, plans, procedures, drawings, etc.), required facili-ties (control room computers, word processing, cameras /VTR, etc.), and personnel with useful or necessary information (reactor operators, equipment designers or planners, or utility management).
The TAT Chairman presides over the HED review meetings and coordinates the necessary personnel and resources required to support the assessment, disposition, and recommended backfits for HEDs submitted to the team for review by the contracted consultant CRDR Team. The TAT Chairman is responsible for signing the disposition block and signifying TAT concurrence or dissenting opinion. The HEDs are then reviewed for engineering scope, material requirements, and implementation schedule. The imple-mentation schedule will then be incorporated into the CRDR findings section of the final report for submittal to the NRC for review and approval.
I8
The following is a brief description of the qualifications of the other advisory team members:
2.2.2.1 Mr. 3. A. Oliver, Human Factors Advisor - Mr. Oliver is President of Human Technologies, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Essex Corporation. Mr. Oliver has participated in the design and test of 34 fossil and seven nuclear power plants. In addition to his work in advanced automation and safety control design, he provided the human factors input for the control rooms of the Salt River Project, Navajo Fossil Station; Pennsylvania Power & Light's Susquehannah Nuclear Station; and Philadelphia Electric's Peach Bottom and Limerick Nuclear Stations.
As an electrical engineer, he was associated in his early career with British Columbia Hydro, Ontario Hydro, and Brazilian Traction Light & Power. His initial electric utility experience was in system operations and maintenance with the Central 21ectricity Generating Board, England.
2.2.2.2 Mr. G. C. Connor, Operations Advisor - Mr. Connor is HCGS Operations Manager. He is responsible to the assistant general manager for all activities of the HCGS Operations Department. Mr. Connor has held increasingly responsible positions with Salem and HCGS projects since 1969. He has an SRO license obtained at the Salem Plant and has been HCGS Operations Manager since 1982.
2.2.2.3 Mr. D. Russell, Engineering Advisor - Mr. Russell is a Senior Design Engineer with the HCGS project.
He has 16 years experience with PSE&G Control Systems group. Approximately ten years of his experience was on the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, and the last four years have been with HCGS.
2.2.2.4 Mr. 3. Isaacs, I&C Engineering Advisor - Mr. Isaacs is a Senior Control System Engineer and Deputy Group Supervisor with the Control Systems Group, HCGS Project, Bechtel Power Corporation. Mr. Isaacs has been with the HCGS project for two years and is responsible for the control room design.
2.2.3 Bechtel Power Corporation HCGS CRDR Coordinator Bechtel Power Corporation, serving as a consultant to PSE&G, is responsible for providing appropriate technical expertise to the HCGS CRDR Team. The Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC) HCGS CRDR Coordinator is responsible for ensuring coordination of all BPC activities in support of the HCGS CRDR.
Mr. Kenneth V. Evans will be the BPC HCGS CRDR Coordinator. Mr. Evans has been a member of the Bechtel Power Corporation Control Room Design Group for the HCGS since April 1981. Mr. Evans is the responsible engineer for the plant annunciator system and for miscellaneous monitor and communication consoles for the main control 19
room, and has assisted with the design of the main operating equipment in the main control rooom.
l 2.2.4 Essex HCGS CRDR Project Manager f.
The Essex HCGS CRDR Project Manager (PM) reports to Mr. McGuire, the PSE&G HCGS CRDR Coord:nator. The Essex PM is responsible for directing and coorr'inating the necessary personnel, task teams, and review groups required to support the CRDR effort.
f This arrangement of administ ative responsibility allows the CRDR management team to quickly evaluate project priorities, and assign specialized key personnel based on the overall project schedule.
Dr. G. Allen Elliff will be the Essex HCGS CRDR Project Manager. Dr. Elliff holds B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees in industrial engineering. He has three years of teaching experience and ten years of professional services consulting experience. His experience includes application of human factors and related industrial engineering techniques for nuclear power plant utilities and other clients.
He was Project Manager for the Comanche Peak CRDR and is Project Manager for the D. C. Cook CRDR.
He has managed EOP development and technical rewrite projects, and has provided technical direction and review for Essex Corporation on several other nuclear power plant CRDRs.
2.2.5 HCGS CRDR Review Team The HCGS CRDR Review Team, under Dr. Elliff's coordination and guidance, will perform the bulk of the work required to assess the HCGS CR. The individuals assigned to the HCGS CRDR Review Team will represent all required disciplines and will meet or excee'd qualification and experience guidelines in NUREG-0801. PSE&G will ensure that appropriate, qualified personnel will be made available to conduct the HCGS CRDR.
2.3 Schedule
'lhe HCGS CRDR schedule is presented as Figure 6.
The activities represented in the schedule are discussed in detail in the following sections.
20
ACTIVITY SCHEDUL Phase 1 - Project Planning Completed October 1983 i
Phase 2 - Surveys Control Room Surveys October 1983 - March 1984 Operator Interviews
- June 1985 - July 1985 Environmental Surveys
- June 1985 - July 1985 Noise Survey
- March 1986 Phase 3 - Assessment and Design December 1983 - June 1984 Solutions Phase 4 - Reporting Summary Report Ongoing Through June 1984 Supplemental Report 1 Completed November 1985 Supplemental Report 2 Completed July 1986
- Results to be provided as Supplements to Summary Report.
Figure 6. HCGS CRDR project milestones 21
3.0 DOCUMENTATION AND DOCUMENT CONTROL 3.1 Introduction Three types of documentation will be addressed:
(1) reference documentation, (2) process and HED documentation, and (3) CRDR output findings and reports.
3.2 Reference Documentation A program library has been established with reference documents to support the CRDR tasks. When complete, this will contain documentation such as:
o Licensee Event Reports o Outage Analysis Reports o FSAR o Tech specs and system descriptions o P&lDs o Floor plans o Panel drawings and photographs o Software descriptions o Procedures Samples of computer printouts o
Various NRC and industry documents bearing on CR design (0700, o
0660, IEEE spec and standards, HF texts, etc.).
As needed, these will be referenced to support specific tasks within the CR evaluations.
3.3 Process and HED Cocumentation 3.3.1 Process The means by which data collection and reduction takes place will be documented for reporting purposes. The general flow of information management is presented in Figure 7. Individual task plans for the tasks discussed in Section 4.0, Technical Approach, will serve as the basic process documentation. Where deviations from the guidance in these task plans occur in the conduct of evaluations, task plans will be modified to reflect accurate data collection procedure.
22
l DATA COLLECTION DATA COLLECTION DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE 1 PROCEDURE 2 PROCEDURE N I
I I
COLLECT DATA COLLECT DATA COLLECT DATA I
I-1 IDENTIFY HEDs IDENTIFY HEDs IDENTIFY HEDs l
I I
DOCUMENT DOCUMENT e e
.e e e e e e DOCUMENT I
I I
FILE (M ANUAL)
FILE (M ANUAL FILE (M ANUAL
& ADP)
& ADP)
& ADP)
I ASSESS AND PRIORITIZE HEDs l
UPDATE FILES
, MANUAL & ADP)
(
l IDENTIFY RESOLUTIONS I
UPDATE FILES (MANUAL & ADP)
I DEVELOP SCHEDULESI RESOLUTIONS I
REPORT Figure 7. Information management process t
23
1 3.3.2 HEDs Data files for each task will be generated. For each task requiring a report, file space will be reserved for that report. HED information will be stored in a computer file wh:ch will contain the following information:
o HED number o Guideline number violated o HED description o HED assessment HED locations (components which are discrepant from the 0700 guidelines) o o Action to be taken on the HED.
The Human Engineering Discrepancy Report to be used is presented in Figure 8 and 9.
3.3.3 Component HED Reports A manually maintained file will be established which documents, for each com-ponent, all HEDs cited for that < omponent. In addition, the header for each component HED contains the following CR inventory information:
o Panel / work station o Unique location code o System relationship o Component function and use o Component type and characteristics.
The HEDs noted against a component, where appropriate, are listed on the bottom of the form, by HED number and with corresponding 0700 guideline number.
The category / priority for each HED will also be listed. The Component Level form used is presented in Figure 10.
3.3.4 Task Reports For each task in Section 4.0, a separate report section will be generated, detailing:
o Objectives of the task plan o The actual data collection and analysis methods employed o The criteria (guidelines) implemented o Summary of findings.
In short, the process followed for each survey or evaluation from inception to writing of HEDs, will be reported.
24
HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT NO:
PLANT UNIT:
DATE:
REVIEWER N ME:
a) HED TITLE:
i b) ITEMS INVOLVED:
ITEM TYPE NOMENCLATURE LOCATION PHOTO NO.
c) PROBLEM DESCRIPTION (GUIDELINES VIOLATED):
d) SPECIFIC OPERATOR ERROR (S) THAT COULD RESULT FROM HED:
Figure 8. Human Engineering Discrepancy report form 25
c) SU22ESTIONS FOR POTENTIAL BACKFITS i
I f) ESSEX REVIEW DATA COLLECTOR DATE DATA COLLECTION MGR DATE.
PROGRAM MGR DATE g) DISPOSITION O FURTHER REVIEW BY DATE O TO BE CORRECTED BY DATE O REFER TO OPERATIONS O NO ACTION O OTHER 1
EVALUATION COMPLETED PSE&G PROJECT DIRECTOR DATE Figure 9. Human Engineering Discrepancy report form (cont'd) 26
COMPONENT REPORT teuPostsft) LABEL ASSOCIATED IgulPutBT NSittAT105 #
l UEI '
PAsft LOC CODI TYPI get 2 Def 3 SUBSYSTEM:
CONTROL MODES / DISPLAY RANGE:
USE:
{
l HED NUMBER CAT HED NUMBER CAT t
l 1
l 1
l I
l Figure 10. Component report form l
i i
i 27
3.4 CRDR Report This report is prepared at the conclusion of the CRDR, and consists primarily of the Process and HED reports previously prepared. The following will be used:
1.0 Methodology 1.1 Overview - Review Plan 1.2 Management and Staffing i
1.3 Documentation 1.4 Review Procedures Employed a) Operating Experience Review and Results Summary b) System Functions and Task Analysis (SFTA) c) Surveys of CR Equipment o Controls o Displays o Validation of CR Functions o etc.
1.5 Assesament Procedures
2.0 Findings
2.1 Survey Findings 2.2 SFTA Findings 3.0 Assessment, Recommendations, and Implementation 3.1 HED Assessment Results 3.2 Recommendation for HED Resolution 3.3 Implementation a) Completed Improvements b) Proposed Improvements.
28
4.0 TECHNICAL APPROACH 4.1 Introduction The technical approach to be employed is discussed briefly in Section 1.0. Detailed l
task plans have been developed which describe the activities for the following tasks:
o Review of operating experience o Assembly of CR documentation 1
o Review of system functions and task analysis 1
Surveys (one task plan for each) j o
ambient noise l
- Illumination
- CR environment (HVAC)
- workspace
- conventions controls
- displays computer system
- emergency equipment
- labels and location aids
- annunciator system anthropometrics
- communications maintainability o Verification of task performance capability o Validation of CR functions o Assessment of discrepancies.
These task plans are in accordance with the guidelines given in Section 3 of NUREG-0700 and the overall methodology conforms to Exhibit 2-2 of NUREG-0801. These task plans will be made available upon completion.
4.2 Task Plan Content Each task plan addresses:
Task Objectives - Type of data to be collected or human performance variables under analysis.
Review Team - Personnel required to conduct the task.
Ct iteria - Generally the NUREG-0700 guidelines appropriate to the task at hand.
Task Definition - Steps or procedures to be followed to conduct the task.
Equipment Requirements - List of any equipment required to conduct the task.
29 y--,_
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-, - - - -~ +
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+?w- - -. --
--w--
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--w---
Input and Data Forms - Task results. Often these are HEDs, but may be data which is drawn upon by subsequent tasks (e.g., task analysis).
4.3 Review Phase The objective of the PSE&G HCGS CRDR is to determine the extent to which the r
HCGS CR provides the operators with sufficient information to complete their required l
functions and task responsibilities efficiently under emergency. conditions. The review l
also will determine the human engineering suitability of the instrumentation and equip-ment design in the HCGS CR. This section of the implementation plan describes the process that will be used to accomplish those overall objectives.
4.3.1 Operating Experience Review The objective of the operating experience review is to identify CR design attributes that may contribute to or alleviate operator performance problems. The operating history of comparable plants will be reviewed since HCGS is not operating yet. In the latter stages of the CRDR, as operations personnel become available, interviews will also be conducted.
4.3.1.1 Historical Documentation Review - A preliminary CR data base will be established to support identification of HF issues to be addressed during the subsequent evaluation. While HCGS is not yet operational, documentation is available for review which may help identify potential problems or incidents which could contribute to operator error. Much of this documentation is identified in Section 3.0.
Since an operability task analysis was performed on the HCGS CR based on operating procedures obtained from Peach Bottom, additional Peach Bottom records may contribute to the overall document review. LERs from Peach Bottom and similar vintage BWRs will be reviewed to assess problem areas with potential generic applicability. All l
potential prc~ lems and documented anomolies will be confirmed with operations personnel o
in the personnel survey near the end of the CRDR.
Since INPO maintains a complete LER data base, they will be requested to provide HCGS with a printout of LERs sorted according to the following characteristics:
l o LERs from:
General Electric BWR 4, Mark I o Listing errors by: Licensed operators j
o Involving either:
Human error or procedural deficiency.
i 30
The reports obtained will be screened by a human factors specialist with the assistance of an operator to determine if the report describes and documents a CR problem. A CR l
problem is defined as one that relates to design features common to the HCGS CR and also meets one or more of the following criteria on the CR reported upon:
o Equipment referenced (valve / pump controls, displays, indicators, etc.) must be in the physical confines of the CR or remote shutdown panel o Procedure steps referenced should be accomplished within the physi-cal confines of the CR or remote shutdown panel o Personnel error referenced must have occurred within the control room or remote shutdown panel or entailed a deviation from proce-dures that were to be accomplished in the CR or remote shutdown panel.
Reports that pass the above selection criteria will be retained for further analysis.
In ad:'ition, the LER review will give special consideration to any identified problems with certain instrumentation, such as RZ modules, which are used frequently on the HCGS control board.
4.3.1.2 Operating Personnel Survey - A detailed survey of plant personnel, includ-ing use of both interviews and questionnaires, will be conducted during the latter stages of the CRDR when operators are available to identify recognized problems which exist with the HCGS CR design. Areas of review will include controls, displays, procedures, staffing and workload, work space design, environment, communications, annunciator warning systems, operator protective equipment, operations, and scheduling. A cross section of operations personnel will be interviewed, including CR operators, shift supervisors, shif t technical advisors, and operations engineers. Individual interviews, each approximately j
one hour in duration, will be conducted.
Following that, group interviews will be conducted. In these group interviews, responses to individual surveys will be presented and discussed to confirm the accuracy of the recorded results, resolve any differences of opinion, and allow all personnel to provide additional input.
The interviews will be conducted by Essex analysts trained and experienced in conducting operator interviews.
l 4.3.2 CR Evaluation 4.3.2.1 Develop CR Inventory and Build Photomosaic - Documentation of the CR l
review is an important function which needs to be addressed in the initial stages of data collection. Discrepancy information will be collected, assembled, and recorded so that all l
of the information relating tn a single component is available on one summary sheet, not l
31
only for reporting purposes, but also for supporting any necessary PSE&G backfitting effort after the review is completed. The CRDR documentation control approach is based on an inventory list, which will be updated throughout the review to form a complete data documentation file and serve as an audit trail for the CRDR.
The CR inventory will consist of a systematic search and listing of all instru-mentation, controls, and equipment within the CR and for the remote shutdown panel.
[
The basis for the inventory list will be existing instrument lists, engraving lists, or other l'
documentation made available to the CRDR Review Team.
In addition, the CRDR Review Team will construct a photomosaic of the MCGS CR for use in the Essex offices in Alexandria. Development of the CR inventory, including construction of the photomosaic, will consist of two subtasks.
4.3.2.1.1 Develop CR Inventory - Based on instrument lists and other documen-tation discussed above, the HCGS CR inventory will be developed by completing the
- initial section of the Coniponent Level HED Report and Inventory Form (Component Sheet) for all CR components. The component sheets, in addition to fulfilling the 'CR l
inventory requirement of NUREG-0700, will serve as a primary data record of all CRDR findings relevant to each component. As the CRDR progresses, information relating to the component will be added to the sheet. Information types and formats may be adjusted to some extent to streamline the process, but the final component sheet will contain the following basic information:
o Component nam.e and ID number o Panel /subpanel/ work station name Type of component (chart recorder, circular. meter, etc.)
o o Manufacturer information j
Photograph inventory information (if applicable)
L, o
Component characteristics (scale, scale markings, switch positions, o
I etc.)
o Systems and functions with which the component is identified o Location code o Surveys and checklists applied to the component during the review f
o Identification of HEDs written against the component.
1 4.3.2.1.2 Build Photomosaic - As discussed earlier, the CRDR Review Team will a
construct a photomosaic for use in the HCGS CRDR.
The photomosaic will be constructed using photographs of the Hope Creek simulator. The photomosaic will be i
i f
32
validated against the actual control room on a component-by-component basis and all differences will be documented. The photomosaic and documentation of differences from HCGS CR will serve as a permrf.ent record of the HCGS CR configuration that was the l
basis of the CRDR.
(
4.3.2.2 system Function and Task Analysis - The objective of the system function and task analysis (SFTA) is to establish the input and output requirements of CR operator tasks.
The results of this task are used to identify human engineering discrepancies I
associated with aspects of the man-machine interface such as:
The complement of components to support CR functions (control o
capability)
'lhe types of controls or displays for control actions or task infor-o mation needs (appropriate component design)
The layout of controls and displays to support CR functions (appro-o priate panel design)
The allocation of tasks to the operating crew (man-machine allo-o a
cation)
The assignment, communication, and coordination of task efforts o
among the operating crew (crew task loading).
In order to address these issues, system functions (functions performed by system components) will be defined. From these system function descriptions, operator tasks will be defined to address appropriate man-machine design issues.
The procedure for accomplishing the SFTA consists of four subtasks decribed below. Verification of Task Performance Capabilities will integrate the results of SFTA and other analyses to verify the appropriateness of CR design.
4.3.2.2.1 Identification of Plant Systems - The objective of this subtask is to identify the major plant systems and subsystems to facilitate the definition of system functions and operator tasks.
f From the information contained in the HCGS plant description library (FSARs, i
technical specifications, system descriptions, or other available documentation which describes the reactor plant, power generation, and power distribution systems), systems, subsystems, and major components will be identified. Major systems will include reactor 3
i control and instrumentation systems, safety systems, feedwater systems, power genera-tion systems, and power distribution systems. Subsystems should be identified down to the major component level (i.e., reactor recirculation pump).
The CRDR team will interview available operations personnel to verify and/or to I
revise the system and subsystem divisions. Since the documentation necessary to support 33
the system description effort may not exist, the designer / engineer may have to supple-ment this information with the original design bases used in the construction of the plant.
Once the system and subsystem boundaries are revised to reflect the actual plant status and planned operating practices, operations personnel will be requested to provide the functions (or operations) and their variations associated with each subsystem and its r
componsits. For some functions, several approaches may be employed to gain the same i
effect. For example, in a BWR, core cooling may be accomplished by utilizing RHR, RCIC, HPCI, or LPCI, depending on specific conditions.
4.3.2.2.2 Selection of Event Sequences - The objective of this subtask is to select the event sequences to be analyzed for human interaction in later tasks. These event sequences will reflect the spectrum of plant operations.
1.
The event sequences for transient and accident conditions described in NUREG-0660 and NUREG-0737, items I.C.1 and I.C.9, will be addressed through analysis of the following typical symptom-based HCGS EOPs.
3
- Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Control Containment Control and Drywell Pressure Control
- RPV Water Level Restoration Emergency Dep:essurization Blow Down Cooling
- Spray Cooling
- Alternate Shutdown Cooling
- RPV Flooding Reactor Level / Power Control 2.
Plant startup or shutdown and significant operating power changes.
A list of the minimum criteria to be used in selection of event sequences to be analyzed is provided in NUREG-0700. These criteria include considerations important to plant safety, operational plant history (as appropriate), and required system interfaces l
with plant operators. Specialists from PSE&G, Bechtel. Power Corporation, and Essex j
with experience in BWR systems, transient analysis, and plant operations will develop the list of event sequences for the HCGS CRDR based on these criteria.
4.3.2.2.3 Identification of System and Subsystem Functions - The objective of this j
subtask is to identify all functions associated with the event sequence list determined in Subtask 4.3.2.2.2, Selection oi dvent Sequences. Experienced system and plant operations l
engineers will review P& ids, plant procedures, and logic and wiring diagrams to identify l
all functions associated with each sequence. For HCGS, Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs) will be used if HCGS EOPs are not available in time to support this task.
I i
I i
[
34
The first step of this subtask will be to analyze the procedures to identify relevant plant systems.
Next diagrams will be developed to indicate the functions and task requirements required by the procedures.
l Situations wherein different sets of components are utilized to perform the same desired function for a given event sequence will be classified as functional variations of the same system requirement (e.g., heat removal). These variations and the conditions under which they are employed will be documented as system function alternatives. BPC f
and PSE&G will supply the basis for original design organization and specification in order to ensure that all system capabilities and interrelationships are identified and defined.
The output of this subtark will contain a list of major plant systems, their corresponding subsystems / major components, and functions for each selected event sequenct.
Following this step, diagrams of operator functions encompassing all associated systems and subsystems will be developed to show the chronology of operator actions for a particular sequence. This will form the basis for operator task identification and analysis in Subtask 4.3.2.2.4, Operator Task Identification and Analysis.
4.3.2.2.4 Operator Task Identification and Analysis - As the functions associated with selected events are documented, the operator actions required in the performance of these activities will also be identified and analyzed. The rcgonse selection diagrams developed in Subtask 4.3.2.2.3, Identification of System and Subsystem Functions, will be used as the basis to determine detailed task requirements. Aspects of the operator task definition necessary for the task analysis include:
o Task objective o Task action / decision o Input information to the task action o Feedback information for the task action Output requirements (control actions) l o
o Task results/ system response l
o Performance criteria Consequences of task error / omission.
l o
Detailed task descriptions will then be analyzed and the following information assembled for each task analysis response selection diagram:
The control panel and the display or control code associated with the o
task l
i 35
o The display requirement, if applicable (i.e, binary, multi-discrete, or continuous scale) o Parameter ranges and control features necessary for task perform-l ance o The required control action, if applicable (i.e., binary, multi-discrete, or continuous)
Skills / knowledge demanded of the operator for task performance o
o Workload assessment.
In addition to any HED reports generated as a result of this task, additional products will include:
o Response Selection Diagrams Task Analysis of Functional' equence S
o o Information on Equipment Availability and Compatibility o Frequency of Use and Importance Data for CR equipment o Spatial-Operational Sequence Diagrams of Task Sequences o Traffic Pattern Diagrams.
Human engineering discrepancies will be prepared whenever human engineering problems associated with the man-machine interface definition are identified.
The results of the SFTA will serve as input for Task 4.3.2.4, Verification of Task Performance Capability, and Task 4.3.2.5, Validation of CR Functions.
4.3.2.3 Conduct CR Surveys - To satisfy the requirements of Section 3.6 in NUREG-0700, the CR environment, panels, instruments, controls, and equipment will be
(
surveyed to ensure compliance with accepted human engineering criteria. The approach to this task involves application of several task plans and surveys, implemented by collecting data frorn preconstructed checklists, interview forms, and direct measurement techniques.
Any discrepancies from human factors criteria will be noted on human engineering discrepancy (HED) forms to be analyzed and added to the CRDR documentatien file. For each survey, a draft report summarizing the HEDs will be prepared for subsequent inclusion in the final report.
l 4.3.2.3.1 Conduct CR Work Space Surveys - Control panels, instruments, controls, and equipment will be surveyed to ensure that the general design and layout of the CR l
work space are compatible with operator needs. The following surveys will be conducted to assess work space design and layout:
36
o Anthropometric Survey - The objective of this survey is to ensure that controls and displays are located in a manner which makes them highly visible, within reach, and which precludes inadvertent actuation. Anthropometric considerations for CR furniture and work space wil: also be evaluated.
Criteria for operability by the population bounded by the 5th and the 95th percentile person will be employed. Reach envelopes (that portion of the board accessible to human reach) and horizontal and vertical visual fields of view will be r
l developed for either the 5th percentile female or the 95th percentile male, whichever is the limiting factor. Component locations falling L
outside of the acceptable reach or visual access envelopes will be
- recorded, Conventions Survey - The objective of the conventions survey is to o
identify potential problems regarding the consistency and appropri-ateness of plant information coding techniques, operating conven-tions, and component discriminability. For this task, PSE&G person-nel will be surveyed to identify plant conventions for:
arrangement of systems and components for sequencing of related operations (lef t-to-right, top-to-bottom, etc.)
color, shape, position, and other kinds of coding techniques
- plant abbreviations and acronyms
- control operation (clockwise-on, counterclockwise-off, etc.)
The conventions identified will be evaluated for their correspondence to human expectancy (stereotypes) and information loading criteria.
Application of the conventions throughout the CR will be evaluated for consistency and appropriateness of use. Also included in the survey is the identification and evaluation of potential component confusions, such as strings of identical components and the inappro-priate use of similarly or identically shaped legend lights and legend pushbuttons.
o Emergency Equipment Survey -The cbjective of the emergency gar-ments survey is to identify potential human engineering problems associated with storage, donning, and use of the emergency garments and breathing apparatus. The accessibility, suit size compatibility i
with operators, ease of donning, and the ability to communicate and
~
perform control board operations with the suit on will be assessed.
(This survey will be conducted in the latter stages of the review.)
o Maintainability Survey -The objective of the maintainability survey is to evaluate the adequacy of the CR design to support maintenance activities performed by operations personnel. These major areas will be evaluated:
maintenance of components with integral lighting recognition of visual display failure spare parts, operating expendables, tool storage and on-hand l
supplies.
Ease of maintenance, elimination of hazards, safeguards against interchanging of components, recognition of component failures, and availability and accessibility of maintenance supplies will also be addressed in the survey.
i 37
o Work Space Survey - Other aspects of the CR work space will be evaluated for conformance to human engineering standards and criteria. Items addressed in this survey include:
- work space arrangement
- furniture and equipment layout
- document organization, use, and storage
- supervisor access to CR
- operator comfort.
's.3.2.3.2 Conduct Environmental Surveys of Control Room - The following surveys will be conducted in the latter stages of the review to assess compliance of the CR environment with accepted human factors engineering criteria:
CR Environment (HVAC) Survey - The objective of this survey is to o
ensure that the climate control system is capable of maintaining and supporting comfortable thermal work conditions. Temperature and humidity readings will be taken at two levels every hour for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.
Air velocity readings will also be taken at predetermined locations.
o Ambient Noise Survey - The objective of this survey is to ensure that noise levels within the CR do not interfere with voice communi-cations (aided and unaided) and with signal audibility. Noise, signa!,
and communication levels will be measured from various work stations over all working shifts in an attempt to sample the levels from many different operating conditions.
o Illumination Survey - The objective of the lighting survey is to identify potential human engineering problems associated with the control room lighting. Illumination levels will be measured at pre-established points in the CR and compared to acceptable human engineering standards. Panels and panel components will be evalua-ted for lighting problems such as glare, insufficient contrast, or absence of appropriate illumination for the operating requirements.
l 4.3.2.3.3 Conduct Communications Survey - The objective of the communications survey is to ensure that adequate communications equipment and procedures exist for CR l
operations. The criteria for equipment evaluation include operation under high ambient noise levels, accessibility to operator, quality of amplified communication, adequacy of auditory signals, and dedication of important communication links. All communication modes employed by CR operators will be assessed. Preliminary application of this survey can be accomplished using CR design documentation.
The majority of the survey, however, will require access to the CR in later stages of the review.
4.3.2.3.4 Conduct Annunciator System Survey - Due to their importance to CR l
operation and unique method of information presentation, annunciators will be surveyed separately. Analyses will be performed to identify and evaluate:
38
o Nuisance and/or unnecessary annunciators
.o False alarming conditions o l Coding and prioritization schemes I
o Functional grouping l
o Location of related controls and displays o Reflash, ringback, silence, and acknowledge functions i
o First out capability.
5 The readability (character size, font, strokewidth, and separation), visual alarm recognition, ease of maintainability, response procedures, and audible alarm features will t
1 also be evaluated for their conformance to human engineering criteria and standards.
l The results of this survey will be used to interface closely with two, and possibly three other surveys or subtasks.
f First, general placement and arrangement of annunciators with respect to the associated displays and controls will be evaluated in Subtasks 4.3.2.3.9, Panel Layout Survey, and 4.3.2.3.10, Control-Display Integration Survey.
}
Secondly, the text (abbreviations and nomenclature) used on the annunciator system
.will be compared to text for labels to ensure that a consistent nomenclature and abbreviation set is used throughout the CR. A constrained abbreviation dictionary will be developed for the HCGS CR as a result of this subtask.
4.3.2.3.5 Conduct Controls Survey - All controls will be evaluated for conform-f ance to acceptable human engineering criteria.
Included in the survey will be a force-torque analysis to identify and quantify operations which require excessive force for actuation. Additional criteria will include the adequacy of control switch direction of operation, control markings, switch position indication, and control dimensions.
l 4.3.2.3.6 Conduct Displays Survey - As with the controls survey, the displays in the HCGS CR will be assessed for compliance with human engineering criteria, including adequacy of scales and scale markings, compatibility of pointer movement with scale and
[
. human expectancy, pointer design, and design of recorder and counter displays.
4.3.2.3.7 Conduct Labels and Location Aids Survey - A labeling survey will be i
conducted to ensure that CR equipment is appropriately labeled (label position and content), the label content is consistent across CR usage and with procedure nomen-clature, and label character size, font, strokewidth, and separation comply with applicable.
guidelines for readability. Demarcation and mimic lines will also be analyzed during this survey.
s 39
- ~
4.3.2.3.8 Conduct Computer System Survey - The objective of this survey is to identify potential human engineering problems with the use of the computer display system. This survey will include an evaluation of CRT features such as character size, j
_ graphic coding, screen location, and viewing angle.
l 4.3.2.3.9 Ce duct Panet Layout Survey - Although listed as a separate source in n
NUREG-0700, evaluation of the control panel layout will be conducted during the Verification of Task Performance Capabilities (4.3.2.4) and Validation of Control Room 5
Functions (4.3.2.5).
In this subtask, panel layout will be evaluated to assess proper grouping by system function, task sequence, importance, and frequency of use.
Other factors to be considered include:
o Use of proper techniques for enhancing recognition and identification of groups of controls and displays o Logical arrangement without compromising functional integrity or sequence of operations o Layout consistency with regard to identical instrumentation at dif-ferent locations o Standardization with regard to similar functions on different panels o Appropriate separation of controls, arrangement of component strings, and lack of mirror-imaging.
4.3.2.3.10 Conduct Control-Display Integration Survey - Components will be l
evaluated to ensure that controls and displays which are frequently used together are located in close proximity to one another.
The survey will check to ensure that components are arranged so that displays are not obscured during operation, and that all associated controls and displays are easily identified as being related. Control-display integration will be assessed for multiple control and display groups as well as control and l
display pairs. This survey _is basically conducted in the Verification of Task Performance Capabilities (4.3.2.4) and Validation of Control Room Functions (4.3.2.5).
The operability task analysis for the HCGS control room was conducted in 1977 to finalize the basic design of the main control panels before beginning detailed control board design. A major emphasis of the operability analysis was ensuring proper control-c
_ display integration.
The product of this effort appears to have made significant contribution toward improving operator-panel interaction. The operability task analysis is therefore expected to make a major contribution in mitigating interface problems which may affect task performance, and the Verificat'on of Task Performance Capabilities task i
i 40 L
will be supplemented with the results obtained from the conduct of the operability task analysis.
In addition to satisfying the requirements of NUREG-0700, this approach ensures that the operator will be able to perform his tasks with a minimum potential for human error.
4.3.2.4 Verification of Task Performance Capabilities - As previously mentioned, this task is an extension of the SFTA of Task 4.3.2.2.4, Operator Task Identification and l
Analysis. The objective is to verify the appropriateness of CR equipment to support h
operator tasks in performing CR functions.
To adequately support CR functions, the design and layout of CR equipment must account for the requirements of the tasks to be performed as well as how the operators must perform the tasks. This task will add.ress the instruments and equipment in the CR which are necessary must perform CR functions. The two steps in this verification process involve verifying the presence of equipment necessary to implement each task, and determining whether man-machine interfaces previded by displays, controls, and other CR features are designed to support task accomplishment.
4.3.2.4.1 Verification of Availability - The objective of this task is to verify the presence of instruments and equipment that provide the information and control capa-bilities necessary to support each task. During the SFTA and CR curveys, the types, accuracy, and dimensional units of the necessary information to conduct plant operations are determined. These theoretical equipment requirements (design and type) will be compared with the plant equipment inventory developed during the CR inventory task in order to complete this verification process. HEDs will be prepared to document inventory discrepancies noted.
4.3.2.4.2 Verification of Human Engineering Suitability - The objective of this task is to assess the operability of the CR layout.
Using the operator task definitions generated in Task 4.3.2.2, System Function Review and Task Analysis, the efficiency of the layout to support CR functicas will be evaluated.
Criteria developed from NUREG-0700 will be employed to assess:
o The locations of associated controls and displays Panel layout of system / subsystem (functional) groups o
o The overall efficiency of the CR layout to support the selected operationai sequences.
41
The operability analysis performed for the HCGS will be used to verify the interface problems identified in this and previous tasks. HEDs will be generated to document discrepancies noted.
4.3.2.5 Validation of Control Room Functions - The objective of this task is to i
determine whether or not the functions assigned to the CR crew can be accomplished in terms of:
J The structure of the defined emergency operating procedures o
o The proposed CR design for the HCGS.
The following symptom-based emergency operating procedures have been selected to determine whether the functions assigned to the operating crew can be accomplished.
These procedures satisfy the concerns addressed in NUREG-0700, NUREG-0660, and NUREG-0737 concerning multiple and consequential failures.
o Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Control o Containment Control and Drywell Pressure Control o RPV Water Level Restoration o Emergency Depressurization o Blow Down Cooling o Spray Cooling o Alternate Shutdown Cooling o RPV Flooding o Reacter Level / Power Control.
Procedures walk-throughs by operators will be the major process by which the validation will be accomplished.
Qualified observers will assess the ability of the operators to ascertain and correctly evaluate plant status, particularly during transients,
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using the existing plant display systems. Walk-throughs will be carried out in both real time and with interruption for questions using a cross section of available operators (talk-throughs). It is desirable to use the simulator in these walk-through exercises; I
however, in the event that the simulator is not available, the walk-through can be conducted using the photomosaic mockup.
In addition to the assessment of the ability of the operators to ascertain and cvaluate plant status, other operational aspects to be validated include:
i o Control and display requirements o Task allocation 42
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5.0 ASSESSMENT
AND DESIGN SOLUTION PHASE l
5.1 Assessment The review process described in Section 4.3 will result in the identification of departures from human engineering criteria.
Analysis and interpretation of these departures will be required to establish their potential safety implications. Means of r
correcting or minimizing the effects of the departures will be identified and documented.
A plan of action will be applied to improvement affecting operator performance under emergency and selected normal operating conditions.
The Assessment Phase of the CRDR program will achieve the following objectives:
o Analyze, evaluate, and prioritize the identified departures from human engineering criteria found during the Review Phase Recommend 'the means of correcting those departures which could o
impact safety or plant / operator performance o Define a plan of action which applies human factors principles to improve CR design, improve operator effectiveness and efficiency, and enhance plant safety through improved operator effectiveness o Ensure that the assessment process considers other CR-related projects which are concerned with, or may be affected by, the human factors review.
The assessment process involves identifying any discrepancies which can affect the
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operator's performance with a result of unacceptable consequences. This process also involves determining the extent of corrections and justifying any recommendations which do not completely correct the discrepancies.
All departures identified during the Review Phase will be processed according to the assessment methodology presented in Figure 11. These departures will be documented on checklist observation forms, and will be provided to the Technical Advisory Team (TAT) for analysis and assessment. Also, a survey of the operating personnel will be performed using the photomosaic to resolve any factors which could contribute to performance problems.
The TAT will review HEDs to determine the need for reassessment by the CRDR Review Team or their acceptance as 'HEDs. The disposition of each HED will be justified and/or documented by the TAT.
The TAT will evaluate and categorize each HED according to the prioritization methodology presented in Figure 11.
This approach accomplishes the assessment objectives of NUREG-0700 and NUREG-0801.
44
CRDR REVIEW TEAM i
t OBSERVA ON ORMS i t TECHNICAL ADVISORY TEAM i
i HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES i r EVALUATE FOR SAFETY CONSEQUENCE "8
ir 1r HIGH PROBABILITY ASSESS FOR YEs OF OPERATIONAL SIGNIFICANT peo ERRORISIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL DEVIATION IMPACTS 1r ir u
CATEGORY 11 CATEGORY 111 SIGNIFICANT peo REFEP TO REFER TO COST VERSUS FIGURE 12 FIGURE 12 OPERATOR BENEFIT I
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CATEGORY I IDENTIFY REFER TO CORRECTIONS AND COSTS TO FIX FIGURE 12 VEs ir SELECT RECOMMENDED BACKFIT CATEGORY IV DOCUMENT ASSESS FOR NEW DOCUMENT REFER TO DEPARTURES AND PREPARE FIGURE 12 FROM 0700 FOR IMPLEMENTATION Figure 11. Human Engineering Discrepancy evaluation flowchart.
45
All Category 1, II, and Ill HEDs will be analyzed for correction per Figure 12.
Category IV HEDs, while considered optional for correction, will be assessed for their cumulative and interactive effects on all other HEDs. Rose Category IV HEDs shown to l
possess the above effects will be recategorized to the appropriate Category II level.
I The initial step in this procedure is to identify those HEDs which can be corrected by enhancements, training of operators, and/or procedural revisions. The remaining HEDs f
will be analyzed to identify and provide design improvement alternatives. Since there is a ilmit to the number of changes which can be made as a result of this review, a cost-benefit analysis will also help determine which corrections are the most feasible and acceptable from a human engineering point of view.
Additionally, the CR review process will be reapplied as appropriate to ensure:
o The creation of new HEDs is identified o That other corrections are not invalidated o Compliance with human engineering guidelines.
5.2 Correction Regardless of the HED priority ranking, potential corrective action will be identi-fled for all HEDs identified in the HCGS CRDR. The basic procedure to be employed in identifying and selecting enhancements and solutions involves:
o Analysis for correction by enhancements o Analysis for correction by design alternatives o Assessment of the extent of correction.
5.2.1 Analysis for Correction by Enhancement Discrepancies selected for correction are first examined for possible correction by enhancement (labeling, demarcation, procedure aids, etc.). Each HED is considered and where such correction is possible, the discrepancy is reassessed for its effect on operator performance. As appropriate, HEDs are reevaluated via checklisting and task analysis until HF suitability is verified. Where it is determined that correction by enhancement is not possible, the discrepancy is analyzed for correction by design alternatives.
5.2.2 Analysis for Correction by Design Alternative Discrepancies not correctable by surface enhancement may require a design effort.
Corrective action may involve simple modification to the communication, lighting or 46
REVIEW PROCESS OSSERVATIONS i
i f HED AE8ESSMENTS ir ASSESSMENT CRITERIA ASSESSMENT IMPLEMENTATION CATEGORY FACTOR (RATING)
SAFETY (*)
EARLIEST CONSEQUENCES:
OPPORTUNITY HEDs (1,11,111) l DOCUMENTED (MAN DATORY)
ERRORS INCREASED EARLIEST ll POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITY FOR ERROR (HIGH PRIORITY)
LOW CONVENIENT 111 PROBABILITY OUTAGE OF ERROR (ACCEPTED)
NOT ASSOCIATED MAY OR MAY NOT WITH BE REQUIRED IY PROBABILITY (NOT OR ERROR MANDATORY)
CAT IV i r ANALYSIS RECOMMENDED YES FOR
(*) EXAMPLE: RECULTS IN UNSAFE OPERATION, VIOLATION NO OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DOCUMENT Figure 12. HED category guidelines.
l 47 1
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alarm system, or alterations to the control boards. In either case, identification of design alternatives will be achieved by examination of the HED, reference to task analysis data, and identification of potential constraints (e.g., availability of equipment. Reg. Guide 1.75). The backfit design development process, if used, will also consider the need to minimize cost of the change and its impact on the existing design. Multiple design alternatives will be considered, as appropriate. Cost and schedule estimates will also be considered for each proposed change. The impact of each proposed design change on operator training and plant maintenance and documentation will also be censidered, as will the reduction in probability of operator error.
The acceptability of design alternatives will be verified by further evaluation using functional analysis, task analysis, and reapplication of the 0700 guidelines.
5.2.3 Assessment of the Extent of Correction For all HEDs selected for correction, the degree to which each discrepancy will be corrected (by enhancement or redesign) will undergo evaluation. The basis for assessment simply involves reapplication of the guidelines in Section 6.0 in NUREG-0700. The solution should ideally bring the discrepancy into full compliance with the intent of the guideline. This is accomplished by verifying the human factors suitability of the proposed change (Subtask 6.2).
Discrepancies which are not corrected will be identified and documented by the review team. Justification will be prepared for discrepancies which are not fully corrected.
5.3 Implementation Approved solutions to HEDs by the TAT will be scheduled for irnplementation. The category guidelines established in Section 5.1 will be used as a basis for the corrective l
action schedule. Additional considerations in the development of the implementation schedule will be:
o Safety consequences of operator errors that could be caused by the discrepancy o Integration with other NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 programs o Plant operation constraints o Operator training / retraining requirements o Outage schedules o Equipment procurement schedules.
48
1 The following designations, identified in NUREG-0801, will be adopted for scheduling purposes:
Prompt Action - Correct promptly on an expedited schedule approved by the NRC.
Near Term - Correct on a schedule approved by the NRC.
Long Term (Optional)- Corrections of nonsignificant discrepancies may be imple-mented at any time.
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5.4 Simulator Involvement in the Correction Process Where appropriate the con' trol room simulator will be utilized to test corrections required on various panels (operator console, vertical panels, SPDS...).
In addition ()
evaluating the correction, this validation affords an opportunity to look for possible violations of other HF criteria resulting from.the original correction.
Finally, the simulator testing of the correction can function as a training phase for operators to become f amiliar with panel changes.
5.5 Reporting Phase A Program Summary Report will be prepared in accordance with NUREGs-0700 and
-0801 upon completion of the CRDR Program. This report will document the overall review process, describe and identify all of the human engineering discrepancies and findings, and summarize all CRDR activities, methodologies, and proposed CR improve-ments. It will also provide an implementation schedule for each corrective action.
The Program Summary Report, prepared using the recommended outline shown earlier in Section 1.3.4.2, will update the Program Plan report with any changes made during the CRDR Program.
5.6 Summary This Program Plan report defines the overall process by which the Hope Creek Generating Station CRDR Program will be performed. It is an effective and thorough design review which will ensure that the results of this effort meet the intent of all applicable government regulations and guidelines.
Public Services Electric & Gas Company has committed the necessary resources to perform the CRDR as detailed in this Program Plan report. The HCGS CRDR will be conducted based on the methodologies described in this Program Plan report. Public 49
Services Electric & Gas Company reserves the right to make changes, however, and will notify the NRC prior to the execution of any planned departures from the methodologies described herein.
Final acceptance of this document will culminate the planning phase.
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