Text

Forwards Proposed Resolution for Specific Equipment Environ Qualification Deficiencies,Per 831013 Meeting.Master List of safety-related Electrical Equipment & Methodology to Identify Equipment Per 10CFR50.49(b)(2) Also Encl
	ML20082F182
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	11/23/1983
From:	Fay C; WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:	Harold Denton, John Miller; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	NUDOCS 8311280459
	Download: ML20082F182 (57)
	v • d • e

4 Wisconsin Electnc m coune 231 W. MICHIGAN, P.O. BOX 2046. MILWAUKEE, WI 53201 November 23, 1983 Mr. H. R. Denton, Ditector Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0f1 MISSION Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Mr. J. R. Miller, Chief Operating Reactors, Branch 3 Gentlemen:

DOCKET NOS. 5_0-266 AND 50-301 RESOLUTION OF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLAlli, UNITS 1 AND 2 On December 27, 1982, Wisconsin Electric received the Safety Evalua-tion Reports (SERs) reaarding the Environnental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2(PBNP). The SERs each contained a Technical Evaluation Report (TER), written by Franklin Research Center under contract to the NRC, which noted a number of environ-mental qualification documentation deficiencies for safety-related electrical equipment at PBNP. On October 13, 1983, a meeting was held with member _s of your Staff to discuss Wisconsin Electric's proposed method of resolution for each of those deficiencies. The proposed resolution, as discussed with your Staff, for each of the environmental qualification documentation deficiencies listed in the TERs is summarized in Enclosure 1 to this letter. Discussions also took place at the meeting regarding Wisconsin Electric's general metho-dology for compliance with 10 CFR 50.49, " Environmental Oualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants," which became effective February 22, 1983. The purpose of this letter is to provide documen-tation of the discussions held at the October 13 meeting.

The only generic deficiency listed in the SER and the attached TER for each Point Beach Nuclear Plant unit was that " control [ room] habitability and safety equipment area ventilation should be part of the general equipment listed with the supporting systems" (TER, Appendix C, page C-5) and " subject to the above verification by the Licensee, this item is considered resolved."

The control room habitability and safety equipment area ventilation at PBNP was evaluated as part of the review of the heating and ventilation system.

This equipment is located in a mild environment as defined in 10 CFR 50.49.

Therefore, environmental qualification of this equipment is not required.

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8311280459 B31123 r8 gi PDR ADOCK 05000266 P PDR

a Mr. H. R. Denton November 23, 1983 Enclosure 2 to this letter contains a revised " Master List of Electrical Equipment Important To Safety to be Environmentally Qualified" which lists all equipment at Point Beach within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49. The

" Master List" contains a sunnary description of the method of environmental qualification for each equipment item as discussed with your Staff at the October 13, 1983 meeting. The equipment list is identical to the list of equipment submitted in response to Paragraph (g) of 10 CFR 50.49 by our letter dated May 20, 1983 (revised October 10,1983) regarding " Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety Within the Scope of 10 CFR 50.49." For those equipment items for which the documentation of environmental qualification is not yet conpleted, an updated justification for continued operation (JC0) is also provided in the footnotes of Enclosure 2.

At the October 13, 1983 meeting, your Staff also requested con-firmation that all design-basis events at PBNP which could result in a potentially harsh environment, including flooding outside containment, were addressed in identifying safety-related electrical equipment at PBNP which was to be environmentally qualified. The flocaing and environnental effects resulting from all postulated design-basis accidents documented in Chapter 14 of the PBNP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), including the Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) and the Stean-Line Break Accident (SLBA) inside containment, were considered in the identification of safety-related electrical equipment which was to be environmentally qualified. The flooding and environmental effects resulting from High-Energy Line Breaks (HELBs) outside containment, as documented in Appendix E of the FSAR, were also considered in the identifica-tion of this equipment. The effects of flooding outside containment from sources other than HELBs were analyzed at PBNP in 1975 as documented in our letters to the NRC dated February 17 and October 24, 1975, regarding "Poten-tial for Flooding of Safety-Related Equipment." Certain protective measures implemented at that time, including the erection of barrier walls, preclude adverse flooding effects to safety-related equipment required for safe shut-down or mitigation of the consequences of postulated accidents. Therefore, all design-basis events including accidents at PBNP were considered in the 1 identification of electrical equipment within the scope of Paragraph (b)(1) of 10 CFR 50.49 (i.e. , " Safety-related electric equipment... relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events...").

The method of identification of electrical equipment within the A scope of Paragraph (t)(2) of 10 CFR 50.49 (i.e., "Nonsafety-related electric M. $ equipment whose failure under postulated environmental conditions could pre-Of vent satisfactory accomplishment of safety functions...") is described in 4 Enclosure 3 to this letter. No additional electrical equipment at PBNP was

,; identified during this review, which was not previously included in the " Mas-

. y, ( ter List." The method used to identify electrical equipnent within the scope

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of Paragraph (b)(3) of 10 CFR 50.49 (i.e., "Certain post-accident monitoring

,. equipment") involved a variable-by-variable comparison of the specific require-

.ft ments of Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation.. .to Assess Plant and Environs

.hl% Conditions During and Following an Accident," to the design of PBNP. An E.4 evaluation of this comparison was then conducted to determine which instrumen-

.%8 tation and sempling equipment at PSNP required environmental qualification.

M- The results of this evaluation are described in our September 1, 1983 letter regarding " Implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.97 for Energency Response Capability." All instrumentation and sampling equipment identified in our

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4 Mr. H. R. Denton November 23, 1983 September 1, 1983 letter which requires environmental qualification to meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.97, is included in the " Master List" con-tained in Enclosure 2 to this letter. In conclusion, we believe that the "flaster List of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety to be Environmentally Qualified Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2" attached hereto, complies with the scope requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 50.49.

He believe the environmental qualification documentation maintained in the PBNP Equipment Qualification (EQ) File, which is summarized in Enclo-sure 2 to this letter, complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.

The PBNP EQ File is available for NRC audit at any time. We also believe that 1 PBNP can continue to operate without undue risk to the public health and safety l based on the JC0s provided in the footnotes of Enclosure 2.

As we discussed at the October 13 meeting, it is requested that sup-plemental SERs be issued to indicate that Wisconsin Electric's Equipment Qual-ification Program, as described in this letter, meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 and that the deficiencies noted in the SERs dated December 22, 1982 are considered resolved.

We would be pleased to answer any questions you may have regarding the enclosed information or our request for the supplemental SERs.

Very truly yours,

[

C. W. Fay Vice President-Nuclear Power Enclosure cc: NRC Resident Inspector

4 ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED RESOLUTION FOR SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION DEFICIENCIES AT POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 November 23, 1983

Proposed Resolution for Specific Equipment Environmental Page 1 of 10 Qualification Deficiencies at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 November 23, 1983 I. Pressure, D/P, and Level Transmitters TER NRC Item No. Description Category Deficiencies Proposed Resolution 1 1&2-PT922&923 I.B Adequate Evaluation of Replacement with qualified Foxboro (SI Pump Discharge Pressure) Aging Degradation: Estab- A-E10 Series transmitters lishment of a Qualified Life or Replacement Schedule 2,3,4 1&2-LT931 I.B Adequate Documentation Peplacement with qualified Foxboro (Containment Spray Additive Tank N-E10 Series transmitters Level) 1&2-FT928 (Low-Head SI [ Train B] Flow) 1&2-FT924 & 925 (High-Head SI Flow) 5 1&2-LC942A&B, 943A&B I.B Adequate Documentation Replacement with qualified Gems (Containment Sump B Level) Delaval level transmitters 6,7,8 ~&2-FT619 I.B Adequate Similarity; Replacement with qualified Foxboro (Component Cooling Flow) Adequate Evaluation of N-E10 Series transnitters 1&2-FT626 Aging Degradation (Low-Head SI [ Train A] & RHR Flow) 182-PT628 & 629 (RHR Pump Discharge Pressure) 9 1&2-PT945 thru 950 I.B Adequate Documentation Replacement with qualified Foxboro (Containment Narrow and Intermediate- N-E10 Series transmitters Range Pressure) 10, 11 1&2-PT429, 430, 431, & 449 I.B Adequate Similarity; Replacement with qualified Foxboro (Pressurizer Narrow-Range Pressure) Adequate Evaluation of N-E10 Series transmitters 1&2-LT426, 427, 428, & 433 Aging Degradation; (Pressurizer Water Level) Satisfying Radiation Criteria; Satisfying Test Sequence Criteria 12 1&2-LT106, 172, 190; LT102, 171, & 189 I.B Adequate Similarity; Replacement with qualified Foxboro (BAST Water Level) Adequate Evaluation of N-E10 Series transmitters Aging Degradation

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Proposed Resolution for Specific Equipment Environmental Page 2 of 10 Qualification Deficiencies at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 November 23, 1983 I. Pressure, D/P, and Level Transmitters (continued)

TER NRC Item No. Description Category Deficiencies Proposed Resolution 13, 14 182-PT420 I.B Adequate Similarity; Replacement with qualified Foxboro (RCS Wide-Range Pressure) Adequate Evaluation N-E10 Series transmitters 1&2-LT461, 462, 463, 471, 472, & 473 of Aging Degradation; (S/G Narrow-Range Water Level) Satisfyino Radiation 1&2-LT460 & 470 Criteria; Satisfying Test (S/G Wide-Range Water Level) Sequence Criteria 15 1&2-FT464, 465, 474, & 475 I.B Adequate Documentation Replacement with qualified Foxboro (Main Steam Line Flow) N-E10 Series transmitters 16, 17 1&2-PT468, 469, 478, 479, 482, & 483 I.B Adequate Similarity; Replacement with qualified Foxboro (Main Steam Line Pressure) Adequate Evaluation N-E10 Series transnitters LT4025 & 4031 of Aging Degradation (CST Water Level)

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ProposedResolutionfor) Specific.Eqdipment' Environmental : Paga 3 of 10; .

- Oualification Deficiencies at' Point Beach' Nuclear Plant, . Units 1. & 2 . November;23,1983 .

II. SolenoidValves'forAir-Operated' Valves (dOVs)

.TER NRC Item No. Description- Category Deficiencies Proposed Resolution :

18,19,20 1&2-SV966C -I.B Adequate Documentation - Replacement with qualified ASCO NP~ Series solenoid valves )

21,22,23 (Solenoid Valves for RCS Hot Leg Sample Line A0Vs) .

1&2-RC430 & 431C (Solenoid Valves for Pressurizer PORVs) 182-HV3213 & 3245 (Solenoid Valves for Containment Purge Supply & Exhaust Line A0Vs) 1&2-HV3200C (Solenoid Valves for Cor.tainment RMS Sampling Line A0Vs) 182-CV1296 (Solenoid Valves for Auxiliary i Charging Line A0Vs) 1&2-SV951,'953,~& 955 l (Pressurizer Steam & Liquid-Space.

and RCS Hot Leg Sample Line A0Vs) l 5

Proposed Resolution for Specific' Equipment Environmental- Page.4 of 10 Qualification Deficienciestat Point. Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 November 23,'1983 -

III. Motors Including Motor-to-Lead Splices.and Bearing Lubricants

-TER NRC' Item No. Description , Category Deficiencies Proposed Resolution.

24, 50 1&2-P15A & B II.A Adequate Documentation; Additional analysis and-(Safety Injection Pump Motors, Adequate Similarity; documentation.

Splices, and Bearing Lubricants). Adequate Evaluation of 25,52,55 1&2-P14A & B Aging Degradation; Establish-(Containment Spray Pump Motors,

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ment of a, Qualified Life or '

Splices, and Bearing Lubricants) Replacement Schedule; Estab-

.26 051,55 1&2-P11A & B lishment of a Program to (Component Cooling Pump Motors, Identify Aging Degradation; Splices, and Bearing Lubricants) Satisfying Aging Simulation

'27,52,55 1&2-P10A & B Criteria; Satisfying' Peak (Residual Heat' Removal [ Low-Head SI) . Temperature Criteria;~ Satisfy-Pump Motors,. Splices, and ing Radiation Criteria Bearing Lubricants) 28,29,53 182-W1A1, B1, C1, & D1 .II.A Adequate Documentation;- Additional analysis and (Containment Emergency Fan Cooler Adequate Similarity; documentation-Motors, Splices, and Bearing Adequate Evaluation of Lubricants) Aging Degradation; Estab-

-lishment of a Qualified Life or Replacement Schedule; Satisfying Aging Simulation Criteria; Satisfying Peak Temperature Criteria; Satisfy-l ing Radiation Criteria;

' Addressing Beta-emitter Plateout

Proposed Resolution"for Specific, Equipment Environmental ..Page 5 of 10 .-

. Qualification Deficiencies at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units.1 & 2 November.23, 1983 e

IV. - Temcerature-Measurement Devices TER NRC .

Item No. Description Category -Deficiencies Proposed Resolution-30 1&2-TE621, 627,.& 630 II.C~ Adequate Documentation; Replacement'with qualified Conax (Component Cooling HX Outlet and RHR Adequate. Evaluation of RTDs for TE621. ' Installation of HX Outlet and Inlet RTDs) Aging Degradation new qualified Conax RTDs,(TE622 &

623) for post-accident monitoring of RHR HX outlet ' temperatures.

TE627 and TE630 are only required for cold shutdown and are not within the scope of 10 FR 50.49.

31, 46, 1&2-TE 1 thru 39 I.B Adequate Documentation Additional' analysis and document-47 (RCS Incore [ Core Exit] Thermocouples, ation of the T/Cs themselves; Connectors, and Reference Junction Replacement of connectors, cables, Boxes) . splices, and penetrations with qualified. components; Replacement of reference junction-boxes and relocation in a mild environment ~ l outside containment (no longer within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49)..

32, 69 1&2-450A & B and 451A & B I.B Adequate Documentation; Replacement with qualified Conax (Unit 2 (RCS Hot and Cold Leg Wide-Range Adequate Similarity; dual-element RTDs ;

i only) Loop RTDs) Adequate Evaluation of Aging Degradation; Estab . ;

lishment of a Qualified Life or Replacement Schedule; Satisfying Chemical Spray Criteria; Satisfying Radia-tion Criteria, Satisfying Functional Testing Criteria; Satisfying Instrument Accuracy Criteria

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Proposed Resolution for Specific ~ Equipment. Environmental. Page.6 of 10:

Qualification Deficiencies at Point-Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2: Novemb::r 23,.1983 V. Electro-Pneumatic. Transducers for Air-0perate'd Valves _(A0Vs)l TER.' NRC . .

Item No. Description- Category ' Deficiencies ' Proposed Resolution 33 1&2-AC624,~625,-& 626;- I.A None N/A

-(Electro-Pneumatic Transducers for RHR HX Outlet' and Bypass Line A0Vs) 182-SI836A & B (Electro-Pneumatic Transducers for CS Additive Line f0Vs) l l l l -

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Proposed Resolution for Specific EquipmedDEnvironmental .

Page$of10 Qualification Deficiencies at Point Brach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 November 23, 1983 x .

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VI. Electrical Distribution Devices Including Cables' -

TER .

NRC .

' Item No. Description Category - Deficiencies '7H ,

~ Proposed Resolution ~ -

34 1&2-B32 I.B- Adequate Documentation Radiation shieldin'g instal. led; (ftotor Control Centers) -(Radiation only) MCCs are now located in a

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mild environment and.are no longer within the scope of.

10 CFR 50.49.

35 , Containment Electrical Penetration I.A None N/A Assemblies (Westinghouse /Crouse-Hinds Welded 3aniste - Type) 36 Electrical Cable Splices Inside Con- I.A None N/A.

tainment (Bechtel Dwg. SK-E-165/Raychem TypeSFR) 37 182-TE 1 thru 39 (BIW Bostrad 7 I.B Adequate Documentation Replacement with qualified Thermccouple Extension Cable for Incore Anaconda T/C Extension Cable Thermocouples) 38 Sec Section VII, Item 48 39 2-RC515,1&2-RC516 (Rome 600 V Control I.B Adequate Documentation Additional analysis and docu-Cable for PORV Blocking Valves Located mentation (Note: PORV blocking Inside Containment) valves may be operated and are simultaneously subjected ,

to a harsh environment only 1 during a Small-Break LOCA resulting from stuck-open PORV).

1&2-LC942A & B 943A & B (Rome 600 V. I.B Adequate Documentation Replacement of level switches.

Control Cable for Containment Sump and cable with qualified com-Level Switches) ponents.(See Section I, Item 5).

Various Plant ids (Rome 600 V. Control I.B Adequate Documentation Additional analysis and Cable Located Outside Containment) documentation 40 Various Plant ids (BIW Bostrad 7 TSP I.A None N/A Instrument Cable Located Inside and Outside Containment)

Proposed Resolution for Specific Equipment' Environmental Page 8 of 10 Qualification Deficiencies at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 November 23, 1983 VI. Electrical Distribution Devices Including Cables (continued)

TER NRC Iten No. Description Category Deficiencies Proposed Resolution 41 1&2-P15A & B (0konite 0konex-Insulated, I.A None N/A Okoprene-Jacketed 5 KV Power Cable for SI Pump Motors Located Outside Containment) 42 Various Plant ids (Okonite Okotherm- II.A Adequate Similarity Additional documentction Insulated, Okoseal-Jacketed TSP Instru-ment Cable Located Inside and Outside Containment) 43 Various Plant ids (Kerite HTK-Insulated, I. A None N/A FR-Jacketed 600 7 Power and FR-Insulated and Jacketed 600 V Control Cables located Inside and Outside Containment) 44, 45 1&2-TIC & D III.A & B None Cold shutdown equipment only (Pressurizer Safeguards-Powered Backup and not within the scope of Heaters and Cable Connectors) 10 CFR 50.49 46, 47 Sec 3ection IV, Item 31 a

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-1 Proposed Resolution for Specific. Equipment Environmental Page 9 of 10 Qualification Deficiencies'at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2_ November 23, 1983 VII. Limit Switches for Air.0perated Valves (A0Vs) and Acoustical-Monitors -

TER NRC Item No. Description- Category Deficiencies Proposed Resolution 48,49,38 182-PCY434 & 435 I.B Adequate Doccmentation Replacement with qualified i (Acoustical Monitor Accelerometers, Crosby Lift Indicating Switch Signal Cables and Connectors for Fluid Assemblies and qualified cables Leak Detection on ' Pressurizer Code Safety Valves)

> 50,51,52 See Sections III and VIII 53,54,55 56 57 1&2-SV966C, AC624, 625, & 626, & I.B Adequate Documentation Replacement with qualified i SI836A & B (Limit Switches on A0Vs NAMC0 EA-180 limit switches and Located Outside Containment) Conax ECSAs l 58,59,60 1&2-RC430 & 431C; 182-SV951, 953, & 955 I.B' Adequate Documentation; Replacement with qualified HAMC0 1&2-CV1296; 1&2-HV3200C, 3213, & 3245 Adequate Similarity EA-180_ limit switches and Conax (Limit switches on A0Vs Located Inside ECSAs Contairment) ,

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Page 10 of 10'

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Proposed Resolution for Specific Equipment Environmental

-Qualification Deficiencies at Point' Beach Nuclear. Plant, Units 1 & 2_ -

November 23, 1983L VIII. Operators for Motor-0perate'd Valves (MOVs)

TER NRC Item No. Description Category Deficiencies Proposed Resolution 61,54,56 .182-RC515 & 516 II.A Adequate Documentation; Additional analysis and (Linitorque Operators and Lubricants Adequate Similarity;- documentation ifor PORV Blocking MOVs Located Inside Adequate Evaluation of Containment) Aging Degradation; Estab-62,54,56 .1&2-SI878A & C II.A lishment of a Qualified -

(Limitorque Operators and' Lubricants Life ar Replacement-for Reactor Vessel SI Line MOVs Located Schedule; Establishment-Inside Containment) of a Program to Identify-63,54,56 1&2-SI852A & B and 8763 & D II.A Aging Degradation; Satisfy- 1 (Limitorque Operators and Lubricants ing Aging Simulation for Low-Head SI and. Cold-Leg SI Line Criteria; Satisfying Peak MOVs Located Inside Containnent) Temperature Criteria; 64,54,56 1&2-SI871A & B and SI860A, B, C & D II.A = C Satisfying Radiation (Limitorque Operators and Lubricants Criteria for RHR/CS X-connect and CS. Discharge Line MOVs Located Outside Containment) 65,54,56 182-MS2019 & 2020 II.A (Limitorque Operators and Lubricants for AFW Pump Turbine Steam Supply Line MOVs Located Outside Containment) 66, 70 1&2-AC738A & B and SI851A & B II.A & C (Unit (Limitorque Operators and Lubricants 2 only) for Component Cooling to RHR HX Line 54,56 & Containment Sump Suction to RHR Backup MOVs Located Outside Containment) 67, 68 1&2-AC700, 701, & 720 III.B None Cold shutdown equiprent only 54, 56 (Limitorque Operators and Lubricants and not within the scope of for RHR Suction and Discharge Lines 10 CFR 50.49.

Isolation MOVs Located Inside Contain-ment) 69 (Unit See Section IV, Item 39 2cnly) 70 (Unit See Section VIII, Item 66 2 only)

4 ENCLOSURE 2 MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EOUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 & 2 November 23, 1983

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Novarber 23, 1983 l Page 1 of 2 l GENERAL t!0TES

'1. A request for an extension of the environmental qualification l deadline imposed by 10 CFR 50.49(g) (i.e., "the end of the second refueling outage after March 31,1982") was requested for the final environmental qualification documentation only (not installation or l operation) of this equipment in our letter to Mr. H. R. Denton dated llay 4,1983. The end of the second refueling outage after March 31, 1982 was June 30, 1983 for PBNP, Unit 2, and is expected to be !

March 30, 1984 for PBNP, Unit 1. The requested deadline extension was granted until March 30, 1984 by Mr. H. R. Denton's letter to l Mr. C. W. Fay dated July 22, 1983.

2. These equipment items were lis hd in NRC Qualification Category II.A

(" Equipment Qualification Not Established") or II.C (" Equipment Satisfies All Requirements Except Qualified Life or Replacement Schedule Justified") in the Technical Evaluation Report (TER) attached to the PBNP Safety Evaluation Report dated December 22, 1982 regarding " Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment." A meeting was held with the NRC Staff on October 13, 1983 to resolve the documentation questions raised in the TER. As discussed with the NRC Staff at this meeting, Wisconsin Electric considers this equipment to be environmentally oualified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49 (i.e., 00R Guidelines).

3. This equipment is within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49(b)(3) (i.e.,

"Certain post-accident monitoring equipment"). An extension of the environmental qualification deadline imposed by 10 CFR 50.49(g)

(i.e., "the end of the second refueling outage after March 31, 1982") was requested until November 1,1984 in our letter to Mr. H. 't. Denton dated May 4,1983. The requested deadline exten-sion wa., granted until November 1, 1984 by Mr. H. R. Denton's letter to Mr. 2. W. Fay dated July 22, 1983.

4. A request for extension of the environmental qualification deadline was requested for this equipnent in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49(g) by our letter to Mr. H. R. Denton dated May 20, 1983. The requested deadline extension was granted until November 1, 1984 by Mr. H. R. Denton's letter to Mr. C. W. Fay dated July 22, 1983.

5. A request for an additional extension of the environmental qualifica-tion deadline has been requested for this equipment until May 24, 1985 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49(g) by our letter to Mr. H. R. Denton dated October 10, 1983 regarding " Resolution of Safety Evaluation Reports for Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment."

November 23, 1983 Page 2 of 2 GENERAL NOTES (continued)

6. The " installation / operation" date is the date by which the environ-mentally qualified equipment was turned over to the Operations group for operation. The final official turnover for newly installed equipment may not be completed by the specified date due to the lack of certain formal quality assuranca documentation. The final system configuration of certain control and instrumentation may also not be complete due to various power supply, instrumentation loop, control board, and computer modifications being inplemented at PBNP. For more detailed information on the implementation schedule for the final system configurations, see our September 1,1983 letter to lir. H. R. Denton regarding " Implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.97 for Emergency Response Capability."

7. A new Uisconsin Electric Power Company Nuclear Engineerine Adminis-tration Manual section regarding equipment qualification cocumen-tation has recently been approved for Point Beach Nuclear Plant.

This section contains an Equipment Qualification Documentation Checklist which is to be used to document the environmental quali-fication of PBNP equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.

Equipment for which the colur.n labeled " Expected Date of Environ-nental Qualification Documentation" is marked " Complete" has docu-mentation in the PBNP EQ File which meets the requirements of the D0R Guidelines or NUREG-0588 (Category I), as aporopriate, but nay not be recorded in accordance with the above checklist. It is our intention to document all environmental qualification in the future in accordance with this checklist and to conplete this checklist for all previously qualified equipment by March 30, 1984.

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 .

System: I. Safety Injection Page: I-1 Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Item PBNP NRC Installation / Qualificati:n No. Tag No. 'TER No. Description Operation Date(0) Documentation ( )

1. 1-P15A&B 24 a. Westinghouse Motors - High-Head Safety Original Equipment 2-P15A&B Injection Pumps Complete (2)

None b. Motor-to-Lead Splices - Scotch #70 (See Footnote a)

Silicon Rubber Tape Insulation with Vinyl Tape Overall or Equivalent 41 c. Power Cables - Okonite Okoncx-Insulated and Okoprene-Jacketed 5000 Volt Power 50 d. Motor & Pump Bearing Lubricant - American Oil Co. No. 68 Oil i

2. 1&2-SI878 63 a. Limitorque Valve Motor Operators - High- Original Equipment Complete (2)

B&D Head Cold Leg Injection Line Isolation (See Footnote b)

Yelves 43 b. Power Cable - Kerite 600 Volt Power Cable 43 c. Control Cable - Kerite 600 Volt Control Cable None d. Motor-to-Lead Splices - Scotch #70 Silicon Rubber Tape Insulation with Vinyl Tape Overall or Equivalent 36 e. Electrical Penetration Splices - Bechtel Dwg. ho. SK-E-165/Raychem Type SFR 35 f. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse /

Crouse Hinds Welded Canister Penetration 1 54 g. Main Gear Case Lubricant - American Oil Co. l Amolith #1 EP or AMDEX #2 EP Greases 56 h. Geared Limit Switch Assembly Lubricant -

Mobil Oil Co. No. 28 Grease

3. 1&2-SI878 62 a. Limitorque Valve Motor Operators - High-Head Original Equipment Complete (2)

A&C Reactor Vessel Injection Line Isolation Valves (See Footnote b) 43 b. Power Cable (see Item 2.b) 43 c. Control Cable (see Item 2.c)

None d. Motor-to-Lead Splices (see Item 2.d) 36 e. Electrical Penetration Splices (see Item 2.e) 35 f. Electric?_1 Penetration Assembly (see Item 2.f) 54 g. Main Gear Case Lubricant (see Item 2.g) 56 h. Geared Limit Switch Assembly Lubricant (see Item 2.h)

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIR0f#1ENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -

System: I. Safety Injection Page: I-2 Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmenta!

Item PBNP NRC Installation /

No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(6) Qualification Documentation ( )

4. 1&2-SI852 63 a. Limitorque Valve Mot r Operators - Low-Head Original Equipment Complete (2)

A&B Reactor Vessel Injection Line Isolation Valves (See Footnote b) 43 b. Power Cable (see Item 2.b) 43 c. Control Cable (see Item 2.c)

None d. Motor-to-Lead Splices (see Item 2.d) 36 e. Electrical Penetration Splices (see Item 2.e) 35 f. Electrical Penetration Assembly (see Item 2.f) 54 g. Main Gear Case Lubricant (see Item 2.g) 56 h. Geared Limit Switch Assemb?y Lubricant (see Item 2.h)

5. 1&2-SI851 66 (Unit 1) a. Limitorque Valve Motor Orerators - Low-Head Original Equipment Complete (2)

A&B 70 (Unit 2.) Safety Injection Suction from Containment Sump B (See Footnote c)

Isolation Valves 43 b. Power Cable (see Item 2.b) 39 c. Control Cable - Rome 600 Volt Control Cable None d. Motor-to-Lead Splices (see Item 2.d) 54 e. Main Gear Case Lubricant (see Item 2.g) 56 f. Geared Limit Switch Assembly Lubricant (see Item 2.h)

6. 1&2-PT922 1 a. Foxboro Pressure Transmitters - Safety Injection 12/10/82 (Unit 1) 3/30/84(1)

& 923 Pump Discharge Pressure 6/30/83 (Unit 2) (See Footnote d)

None b. Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N Original Equipment 40 c. Instrumentation Cable - Boston Insulated Wire & for Cables Cable Co. Bostrad 7 Twisted Shielded Pair

7. 1&2-FT924 4 a. Foxboro Differential Pressure Transmitters - 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 3/30/84(1)

& 925 High-Head Safety Injection Line Flow 3/30/84-(Unit 1) (See Footnote d)

None b. Instrumentation Cable - Anaconda, Rockbestos, or Brand Rex Twisted, Shielded Pair

8. 1&2-FT928 3 a. Foxboro Differential Pressure Transmitters - 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 3/30/84(1)

Low-Head Safety Injection Line (Train B) Flow 3/30/84 (Unit-1) (See Footnote d)

None b. Instrumentation Cable - Anaconda, Rockbestos, or

, Brand Rex Twisted, Shielded Pair

, s j

- MASTER LIST OF' ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT-TO SAFETY;TO BE ENVIR0fetENTALLY QUALIFIED i

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 .

System: I. Safety Injection- Page: I-3 Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of-Expected lor' Actual Environmental

.' Item _PBNP NRC Installation /

No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(6) Qualification Documentation ( )

i

9. 1&2-PT936, _None a. Foxboro Pressure Transmitters - Safety Injec- '12/10/32 (Unit 1) '11/1/84(3) 937, 940, tion Accumulator Pressure 6/30/83'(Unit 2). (See Footnote d)

. & 941 42 b. Instrumentation Cable.- Okonite Okotherm-Insul- Original Equipment

ated and Okoseal-Jacketed-Twisted, Shielded Pair for Cables, Splices,

! or Okonite PVC-Insulated and Jacketed Twisted, and Penetrations Shielded Pair (1-PT937.only) 36 c. Electrical Penetration Splices - Bechtel Dwg.

4 No. SK-E-165/Raychem Type SFR

35 d. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse /-

, Crcuse Hinds Welded Canister Penetration 4

10. 1&2-LT960

$ a. Gems Delaval Level Transmitter - Containment 12/10/82 (Unit'1) 3/30/84(1)

} & 961 Sump B Water Level 6/30/83 (Unit 2)- (See Footnote e) i' None b. Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assembly (ECSA)

None c. ECSA-to-Cable Splice'- Raychem Type WCSF-N None d. Instrumentation Cable - Anaconda, Rockbestos, or j Brand Rex Twisted, Shielded Triple

None e. Cable-to-Penetration Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N l None f. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse j Modular Penetrations 1

1 1

?

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 .

System: II. Centainment Spray Page: II-1 Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Item PBNP NRC Installation / Qualification No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date b) Documentation ( )

1. 1-P14A&B 25 a. Westinghouse Motors - Containment Spray Pumps Original Equipment Complete (2) l 2-P14A&B (See Footnote a)

None b. Mator-to-Lead Splices - Scotch #70 Silicon Rubber Tape Insulation with Vinyl Tape Overall or Equivalent 43 c. Power Cables - Kerite 600 Volt Power 55 d. Motor Bearing Lubricant - American Oil Co. Amolith

2 Grease or Equivalent 52 e. Pump Bearing Lubricant - American Oil Co. Rykon Industrial No. 32 Oil

2. 1&2SI860 64 a. Limitorque Valve Motor Operators - Containment Original Equipment Complete (2)

A,B,C,& D Spray Pump Discharge Line Isolation Valves (See Footnote c) 43 b. Power Cables - Kerite 600 Volt Power 39 c. Control Cables - Rome 600 Volt Control None d. Motor-to-Lead Splices - Scotch #70 Silicon Rubber Tape Insulation with Vinyl Tape Overall or Equivalent 54 e. Main Gear Case Lubricant - American Oil Co.

Amolith #1 EP or Amdex #2 EP Greases 56 f. Geared Limit Switch Assembly Lubricant - Mobil Oil Co. No. 28 Grease

3. 1&251871 64 a. Limitorque Valve Motor Operators - Containment Original Equipment Complete (2)

A&B Spray Pump Suction from RHR Heat Exchange Outlet (See Footnote c)

Isolation Valves None b. Motor Brake- Dings Brake Model No. 2-6200 43 c. Power Cables (see Item 2.b) 39 d. Control Cables (see Item 2.c)

None e. Motor-to-Lead Splices (see Item 2.d) 54 f. Main Gear Case Lubricant (see Item 2.f) 56 g. Geared Limit Switch Assembly Lubricant (see Item 2.f) l

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -

System: II. Containment Spray Page: II-2 Date: November 23,1983 -

Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Item PBNP NRC Installation /

No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date( ) Qualification Documentation (7)

4. 1&2-SI836 33 a. Fisher Electro-Pneumatic (I/P) Transducers - 12/10/82 (Unit 1) Complete A&B Containment Spray Additive Tank Outlet Isolation 6/30/83 (Unit 2) (See Footnote f)

Valve Air Operators Original Equipment 57 b. NAMCO Limit Switches - Valve Position Indication for I/P Transducers None c. Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assemblies and Cables (ECSAs) for NAMCO Limit Switches None d. ECSA-to-Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N 39 e. Control Cable - Rome 600 Volt Control i None f. I/P Instrumentation Cable - Okonite PVC-Insulated and Jacketed Twisted, Shielded Pair

5. 1&2-LT931 2 a. Foxboro Differential Pressure Transmitter - 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 3/30/84(1) i Containment Spray Additive Tank Water Level 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote d)

None b. Instrumentation Cable - Anaconda, Rockbestos, or Brand Rex Twisted, Shielded Pair

6. 1&2-FT962 None a. Foxboro Differential Pressure Transmitter - 11/1/84 11/1/84(3)

& 963 Containment Spray Pump Discharge Line Flow (See Footnote d)

None b. Instrumentation Cable - Anaconda, Rockbestos, or Brand Rex Twisted Shielded Pair i

)

e i

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT -*

TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -

System: III. Auxiliary Coolant Page: III-l Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Itta PBNP NRC Installation /

No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(6) Qualification Documentation (7)

1. 1-P10A&B 27 a. Westinghouse Motors - Residual Heat Removal Original Equipment Complete ( )

2-P10A&B (Low-Head Safety Injection) Pumps (See Footnote a)

None b. Motor-to-Lead Splices - Scotch #70 Silicon Rubber Tape Insulation with Vinyl Tape Overall or Equivalent 43 c. Power Cables - Kerite 600 Volt Power 55 d. Motor Bearing Lubricant - American Oil Co.

Amolith # 2 Grease or Equivalent 52 e. Pump Bearing Lubricant - American Oil Co.

Rykon Industrial No. 32 Oil

2. 1-P11A&B 26 a. Westinghouse Motors - Component Cooling Water Original Equipment Complete (2) i 2-P11A&B Pumps (See Footnote a)

None b. Motor-to-Lead Splices - Scotch #70 Silicon Rubber Tape Insulation with Vinyl Tape Overall or Equivalent 43 c. Power Cables - Kerite 600 Volt Power 55 d. Motor Bearing Lubricant - American Oil Co.

Amolith #2 Grease or Equivalent 51 e. Pump Bearing Lubricant - American Oil Co.

Industrial No. 46 Oil I

3. 1&2-AC738 66 a. Limitorque Valve Motor Operators - Component Original Equipment Complete (2)

A&B Cooling Water to RHR Heat Exchanger Isolation (See Footrote c)

Valves 43 b. Power Cable - Kerite 600 Volt Power 39 c. Control Cable - Rome 600 Volt Control None d. Motor-to-Lead Splices - Scotch #70 Silicon 3 Rubber Tape Insulation with Vinyl Tape Overall i

or Equivalent 54 e. Main Gear Case Lubricant - American Oil Co.

Amolith #1 EP or AMDEX #2 EP Greases 56 f. Geared Limit Switch Assembly Lubricant - Mobil l Oil Co. No. 28 Grease

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 .

System: III. Auxiliary Coolant Page: III-2 Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Ita PBNP NRC Installation / Qualification No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(6) Documentation ( )

4. 1&2-AC624, 33 a. Fisher Electro-Pneumatic (I/P) Transducers - 12/10/82 (Unit 1) Complete 625, & 626 Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Discharge 6/30/83 (Unit 2) (See Footnote f) and Bypass Line Throttle Valves Original Equipment 57 b. NAMCO Limit Switches - Valve Position Indication for I/P Transducers 1 None c. Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assemblies and Cables l (ECSAs) for NAMCO Limit Switches

d. ECSA-to-Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N None 39 e. Control Cable - Rome 600 Volt Control None f. I/P Instrumentation Cable - Okonite PVC-Insulated and Jacketed Twisted, Shielded Pair

5. 1&2-FT626 7 a. Foxboro Differential Pressure Transmitters - 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 3/30/84(1)

Residual Heat Removal (Low-Head Safety - 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Foonote d)

Injection-Train A) Discharge Line Flow Original Equipment None b. Cable Splices .Raychem Type WCSF-N for Cables 40 c. Instrumentation Cable - Boston Insulated Wire

& Cable Co. Bostrad 7 Twisted, Shielded Pair

6. 1&2-PT628 8 a. Foxboro Pressure Transmitters - Residual Heat 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 3/30/84(1)

& 629 Removal (Low-Head Safety Injection) Pump 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote d)

Discharge Pressure Original Equipment None b. Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N for Cables 40 c. Instrumentation Cable - Boston Insulated Wire

& Cable Co. Bostrad 7 Twisted, Shielded Pair ,

(Unit 1) or Okonite PVC-Insulated and Jacketed !

Twisted, Shielded Pair (Unit 2) l

7. 1&2-FT619 6 a. Foxboro Differential Pressure Transmitters - 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 3/30/84(1)

Component Cooling Water Discharge Line Flow 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote d) l None b. Cable S'lices - Raychem Type WCSF-N Original Equipment ,

c. Inr '

tation Cable - Boston Insulated Wire for Cables l

& o. Bostrad 7 Twisted, Shielded Pair )

MASTER LIST OF' ELECTRICAL' EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO.BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -

System: III. Auxiliary Coolant Page: III-3 Date: November 23, 1983-i

' Expected Date Of' Expected or Actual Environmental Item PBNP NRC Installation /

, No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(0) ' Documentation Qualification ( )

8. 1&2-TE621 30 a. Conax Resistance Temperature Detectors - 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 3/30/84(1)

Component Cooling Heat Exchange Outlet Line 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote g) t Temperature Original Equipment

None b. Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N _

for Cables 40 c. Instrumentation Cable - Boston Insulated Wire &

Cable Co. Bostrad 7 Double Twisted, Shielded Pair

9. 1&2-TE622 30 a. Conax Resistance Temperature Detectors - 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 3/30/84(1)

& 623 Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote g)

! Line Temperature i None b. Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N i None c. Instrumentation Cable - Anaconda, Rockbestos, l or Brand Rex Twisted, Shielded Triple i

4 l

i i

}

i

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL-EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -

System: IV. Auxiliary Feedwater Page: IV-1 Date: November 23, 1983 ,

Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Item PBNP ~ NRC Installation /

No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(6) Qualification Documentation ( )

1. 1&2-FT4036 None a. Foxboro' Differential Pressure Transmitters - 7/5/81 11/1/84(3)

& 4037 Auxiliary Feedwater to Steam Generator Line Flow (See Footnote d)

b. Instrumentation Cable - Boston Insulated Wire &

Cable Co. Bostrad 7 Twisted, Shielded Pair

2. LT4038, 17 a. Foxboro Differential Pressure Transmitters - 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 3/30/84(1)(3) 4039, 4040, Condensate Storage Tank Water Level 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote d)

& 4041 b. Instrumentation Cable - Anaconda, Rockbestos, or Brand Rex Twisted, Shielded Pair

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -

System: V. Reactor Coolant Page: V-1 9 ate: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Item PBNP NRC Installation /

No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(6) Qualification Documentation ( )

1. 1&2-RC515 61 a. Limitorque Valve Motor Operators - Pressurizer Original Equipment Complete (2)

& 516 Power Operated Relief Valve Blocking Valves (See Footnote b) 43 b. Power Cables - Kerite 600 Volt Power 39 (43) c. Control Cables - Rome 600 Volt Control (Kerite for 1-RC515)

None d. Motor-to-Lead Splices - Scotch #70 Silicon Rubber Tape Insulation with Vinyl Tape Overall !

or Equivalent 36 e. Electrical Penetration Splices - Bechtel Dwg.

No. SK-E-165/Raychem Type SFR 35 f. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse /

Crouse Hinds Welded Canister Penetrations 54 g. Main Gear Case Lubricant - American Oil Co.

Amolith #1 EP or AMDEX #2 EP Greases 56 h. Geared Limit Switch Assembly Lubricant- Mobil Oil Co. No. 28 Grease

2. 1&2-RC430 19 a. ASCO Solenoid Valves - Pressurizer Power 12/10/82 (Unit 1) Complete

& 431C Operated Relief Valve Air Operator 6/30/83 (Unit 2) (See Footnote h) 58 b. NAMCO Limit Switches- Valve Position Indication Original Egipment None c. Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assemblies for Cables, Penetra-(ECSAs) for NAMCO Limit Switches tions, and Penetration None d. ECSA-to-Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N Splices 43 e. Control Cable - Kerite 600 Volt Control 36 f. Electrical Penetration Splices (see Item 1.e) 35 g. Electrical Penetration Assembly (see Item 1.f)

3. 1&2-RC None a. Target Rock Solenoid Valves - Reactor Coolant 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 3/30/84 570A&B System Gas Vent Line Isolation Valves 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote i) 575A&B, & None b. Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assemblies (ECSAs)

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PtANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 .

System: V. Reactor Coolant Page: V-2 Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Itta P8NP NRC Installation /

No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(6) Qualification Documentation (7) 580A&B None c. ECSA-to-Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N None d. Control Cable - Anaconda, Rockbestos, or Brand Rex 600 Volt Control None e. Electrical Penetration Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N None f. Electrical Penetration Assembly-Westinghouse Modular Penetrations

4. 1&2-PT420, 13 a. Foxboro Pressure Transmitters - Reactor Coolant 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 3/30/84(1)(3) 420A, & System Wide-Range Pressure 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote d) 420B None b. Instrumentation Cable - Anaconda, Rockbestos, or Brand Rex Twisted Shielded Pair None c. Electrical Penetratiion Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N None d. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse Modular Penetration

5. 1&2-LT 11 a. Foxboro Differential Pressure Transmitters - 6/30/83 (Jnit 2) 3/30/84(1) 426, 427, Pressurizer Water Level 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote d) 428, & 433 42 b. Instrumentation Cable - Okonite Okotherm - Original Ec.uipment Insulated and Okoseal-Jacketed Twisted, Shielded '.r Cables, Splices, Pair and Penetrations 36 c. Electrical Penetration Splices (see Item 1.e) 35 d. Electrical Penetration Assembly (see Item 1.f)

6. 1&2-PT 10 a. Foxboro Pressure Transmitters - Pressurizer 12/10/82 (Unit 1) 3/30/84(1) 429, 430, Narrow-Range Pressure 6/30/83 (Unit 2) (See Footnote d) 431, & 449 42 b. Instrumentation Cable (see Item 5.b) Original Equipment 36 c. Electrical Penetration Splices (see Item 1.e) for Cables, Splices, 35 d. Electrical Penetration Assembly (see Item 1.f) and Penetrations

7. 1&2-LT None a. Foxboro Differential Pressure Transmitters - 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 11/1/84(3) 494 & 495 Reactor Vessel Wide-Range Water Level 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote j)

None b. Instrumentation Cable (see Item 4.b)

None c. Electrical Penetration Splices (see Item 4.c)

None d. Electrical Penetration Assembly (see Item 4.d)

. . - - - . .- - . - -. - .. .- - - ~ _ . - - -. - _- -. . _ .

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT

.TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

L,.

I System: V. Reactor Coolant ~ Page: V-3 i Date: November 23, 1983

, Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental

! Item .PBNP NRC Installation /

No. TER No.

Qualification Tag No._ Description Operation Date Documentation

8. 1&2-LT None a. Foxboro Differential Pressure Transmitters - 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 496 & 497 Reactor Vessel Narrow-Range Water Level 3/30/84 (Unit 1) > 11/1/84(3) ,

None b. Instrumentation Cable (see Item 4.b) (See Footnote j) i

None c. Electrical Penetration Splices (see Item 4.c)

None d. Elec.trical Penetration Assembly (see Item 4.d) i 9. 1&2-PT498 None a. Foxboro Pressure Transmitters - Reactor 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 11/1/84(3)

Coolant System Gas Vent Discharge Line Pressure 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote d) ,

j None

' b. Instrumentation Cable (see Item 4.b)

None c. Electrical Penetration Splices (see Item 4.c) ;

None d. Electrical Penetration Assembly.(see (item 4.d)

] -10. 1&2-TE None a. Conax Thermocouples (T/C) - Reactor Vessel Level 6/1/85 11/1/84(3) j 499 thru Indicating System Reference Leg Temperature (See Footnote j)

{- 502, 506 None b. T/C-to-Ccble Splices (see Item 4.c) j thru 509 None c. T/C Extension Cable: Anaconda Type K T/C Exten-l and 1-TE sion Twisted, Shielded Pair i

503 & 510 None d. Electrical Penetration Splices (see Item 4.c) j None e. Electrical Penetration Assembly (see Item 4.d) 4

11. 1&2-TE1 31 a. Control Products Corp. Thermocouples (T/Cs) 11/1/84 (Unit 2) 11/1/84(3) thru 39 Incore (Core Exit) Thermocouples 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnotes 47 b. Veam Division of Litton T/C Connectors Original Equipment j and k) 37 c. Instrumentation Cable (see Item 10.c) for T/Cs only :

l None d. Electrical Penetration Splices (see Item 4.c)

None e. Electrical Penetration Assembly (see Item 4.d)

12. 1&2-TE 32 a. Conax Resistance Temperature Detectors (RTDs)- 3/30/84 (Unit 1)* 11/1/84(1)(3) 1 450A-D & 69 (Unit 2) Reactor Coolant System Hot & Cold Leg Loop Temp. 11/1/84 (Unit 2)* (See Footnote g) j 451A-D None b. RTD-to-Cable Splices (see Item 4.c)

None c. Instrumentation Cable - Anaconda, Rockbestos, i

or Brand Rex Twisted, Shielded Triple None d. Electrical Penetration Splices (see Item 4.c) y None e. Electrical Penetration Assembly (see Item 4.d) "

One element of each new dual element RTD is now operational through existing cables and instrumentatiun racks.

\

. - . _ . . _ _ ._ _ . _ _ _ .._= _ . . __ _ .. _ . . _ _ . _ _

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT

.TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED 4

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 .

j System: V. ReactorCoolabt 'Page: V-4

, Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Item PBNP NRC Installation /

Na. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(6) Qualification Documentation (7)

13. 1&2-PCV434 -None a. Crosby Lift Indicating Switch Assemblies - 11/1/84 (Unit.2)- 5/24/85(3)(5)

& 435 Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Code Safety- 5/24/85 (Unit 1) (See Footnote 1)-

) Valves l None b. Switch Assembly Pigtail-to-Cable Splices (see Item 4.c). '!

None c.. Control Cable - Anaconda, Rockbestos, or Brand Rex 600 Volt Control j None d. Electrical Penetration Splices (see-Item 4.c)

None e. Electrical Penetration Assembly (see Item 4.d) ,

i-l t

l a

i :

1 J G i 4

-- . __ .. . . _ = _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED

-POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 .

System: VI. Chemical & Volume Control Page: VI-1 Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Itcm PBNP NRC Installation /

No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(6) Qualifiestion(7)

Documentation

1. 1&2-CV1296 22 a. ASCO Solenoid Valves - Auxiliary Charging 12/10/82 (Unit 1) Complete Line Isolation Valve Air Operators 6/30/83 (Unit 2) (See Footnote h) 60 b. NAMC0 Limit Switches - Valve Position Indication Original Equipment None c. Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assemblies for Cables, Penetra-(ECSAs) for NAMCO Limit Switches tions and Penetration None d. ECSA-to-Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N Splices 43 e. Control Cable - Kerite 600 Volt Control 36 f. Electrical Penetration Splices - Bechtel Dwg.

No. SK-E-165/Raychem Type SFR ,

35 g. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse / l Crouse Hinds Welded Canister Penetration

2. 1&2CV313A None a. ASCO Solenoid Valves - Reactor Coolant Pump 6/30/83 (Unit 2) Complete l Seal Water Return Line Isolation Valve Air 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote h)

Operators l l

None b. NAMCO Limit Switches (see Item 1.b) l l None c. Conax ECSA (see Item 1.c) l None d. ECSA-to-Cable Splices (see Item 1.d) l Hone e. Control Cables - Anaconda, Rockbestos, or Brand Rex 600 Volt Control i

None f. Electrical Penetration Splices (see Item 1.d)

None g. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse l Modular Penetration l

3. 1&2-CV371A None a. ASCO Solenoid Valves - Reactor Coolant Letdown 6/30/83 (Unit 2) Complete Line Isolation Valve Air Operators 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote h)

None b. NAMCO Limit Switches (see Item 1.b)

None c. Conax ECSA (see Item 1.c)

None d. ECSA-to-Cable Splices (see Item 1.d)

None e. Control Cables - (see Item 2.e)

None f. Electrical Penetration Splices (see Item 1.d)

None g. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse Modular Penetration

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -

System: VI. Chemical & Volume Control Page: VI-2 Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Item PBNP NRC Installation / Qualification Na. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(0) Documentation ( )

4. 1&2-LT106, 12 a. Foxboro Differential Pressure Transmitters - 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 3/30/84(1) I 172, & 190 Boric Acid Storage Tank Water Level 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote d) I LT102, 171, None b. Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N Original Equipment

& 189 40 c. Instrumentation Cable - Boston Insulated Wire for Cables ;

& Cable Co. Bostrad 7 Twisted, Shielded Pair I or Okonite PVC-Insulated and Jacketed Twisted, Sheilded Pair (2-LT106 & 190)

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT T0 SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

System: .VII. Heating & Ventilation Page: VII-1.

Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Item PBNP NRC Installation /

No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(6) Qualification Documentation ( )

1. 1&2-W1A1 28 a. Westinghouse Motors - Containment Air Recircu- Original Equipment Complete (2)

B1, C1, & lation Emergency Cooling Fans (See Footnote m)

D1 29 b. Motor-to-Lead Splices - Westinghouse Drawing No. 206C391 43 c. Power Cable - Kerite 600 Volt Power 53 d. Motor and Fan Bearing Lubricant - Chevron Style SRI Grease None e. Fan Bearing Housing Labyrinth Seal Lubricant -

Westinghouse Style No. M-53701TT (E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. , Inc. Krytox 240 AC Florinated)

Grease 36 f. Electrical Penetration Splices - Bechtel Dwg. No.

SK-E-165/Raychem Type SFR or Raychem Type WCSF-N 35 g. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse /

Crouse Hinds Welded Canister or Westinghouse Modular Penetration

2. 1&2-HV 20 a. ASCO Solenoid Valves - Containment Purge Supply 12/10/82 (Unit 1) Complete 3213 & and Exhaust Line Isolation Valve Air Operators 6/30/83 (Unit 2) (See Footnote h) 3245 60 b. NAMCO Limit Switches - Valve Position Indication Original Equipment None c. Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assembly (ECSA) for Cables, Penetra-for NAMCO Limit Switches tions, and Penetration None d. ECSA-to-Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N Splices 43 e. Control Cables - Kerite 600 Volt Control 36 f. Electrical Penetration Splices - Bechtel Dwg.

No.SK-E-165/Raychem Type SFR 35 g. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse /

Crouse Hinds Welded Canister Penetration

3. 1&2-HV 21 a. ASCO Solenoid Valves - Containment Atmosphere 12/10/82 (Unit 1) Complete 3200C Sampling Line Isolation Valve Operators 6/30/83 (Unit 2) (See Footnote h) 60 b. NAMCO Limit Switches - Valve Position Indication Original Equipment None c. Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assembly (ECSA) for Cables. Penetrations for NAMCO Limit Switches and Penetration Splices

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 +

System: VII. Heating & Ventilation Page: VII-2 Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Item PBNP NRC Installation /

No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(6) Qualification Documentation ( )

None d. ECSA-to-Cable Splices (see Item 2.d) 39 e Control Cables - Kerite 600 Volt Control 36 f. Electrical Penetration Splices (see Item 2.f) 35 g. Electrical Penetration Assembly (see Item 2.g)

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS.1 AND 2

System: VIII. Main & Reheat Steam Page: VIII-1 Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Ites PBNP NRC Installation /

N 2. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date( } Qualification Documentation ( }

1. 1&2-MS 65 a. Limitorque Valve Motor Operator - Steam Supply Original Equipment Complete (2) 2019 & to Turbine - Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (See Footnote n) 2020 Isolation Valves 43 b. Power Cables - Kerite 600 Volt Power 39 c. Control Cables - Rome 600 Volt Control None d. Motor-to-Lead Splices - Scotch #70 Silicon Rubber Tape Insulation with Vinyl Tape Overall or Equivalent 54 e. Main Gear Case Lubricant - American Oil Co.

Amolith #1 EP or AMDEX #2 EP Greases 56 f. Geared Limit Switch Assembly Lubricant-Mobil Oil Co..No. 28 Grease

2. 1&2-FT 15 a. Foxboro Differential Pressure Transmitters - 12/10/82 (Unit 1) 3/30/84(1) 464, 465, Main Steam Line Flow 6/30/83 (Unit 2) (See Footnote d) 474, & 475 42 b. Instrumentation Cable - Okonite, Okotherm- Original Equipment Insulated, Okoseal-Jacketed Twisted, Shielded for Cables, Splices, Pair and Penetrations 36 c. Electrical Penetration Splices - Bechtel Dwg.

No. SK-E-165/Raychem Type SFR 35 d. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse /

Crouse Hinds Welded Canister Penetration

3. 1&2PT 16 a. Foxboro Pressure Transmitter - Main Steam Line 12/10/82 (Unit 1) 3/30/84(1) 468, 469, (Steam Generator) Pressure 6/30/83 (Unit 2) (See Footnote d) 482, 478, 42 b. Instrumentation Cable - Same as Item 2.b or Original Equipment 479, & 483 Okonite PVC-Insulated and Jacketed Twisted, for Cable (Item b Shielded Pair (2-PT478, 479, & 483) Only)

None c. Additional Instrumentation Cable - Anaconda, Rockbestos, or Brand Rex Twisted, Shielded Pair None d. Cable-to-Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -

System: IX. Main Feedwater Page: IX-1 Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Item PBNP NRC Installation /

No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(6) Qualification Documentation ( )

1. 1&2-CV None a. ASCO Solenoid Valves - Main Feedwater Regu- 3/30/84 (Unit 1) 11/1/84(4) 466 & 476 lating Valve Air Operator Trip on Safety 11/1/84 (Unit 2) (See Footnote h)

Injection Original Equipment None b. NAMCO Limit Switches - Valve Position Indication for Cables None c. Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assemblies (ECSAS) for NAMCO Limit Switches None d. ECSA-to-Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N 39 e. Control Cable -Rome 600 Volt Control

2. 1&2-CV 480 None a. ASCO Solenoid Valves - Main Feedwater Regu- 3/30/84 (Unit 1) 11/1/84(4)

& 481 lating Bypass Valve Air Operator Trip on Safety 11/1/84 (Unit 2) (See Footnote h)

Injection Original Equipment None b. NAMCO Limit Switches (see Item 1.b) for Cables None c. Conax ECSA (see Item 1.c)

None d. ECSA-to-Cable Splices (see Item 1.d) 39 e. Control Cable (see Item 1.e)

3. 1&2-LT461, 14 a. Foxboro Differential Pressure Transmitters - 12/10/82 (Unit 1) 3/30/84(1) 462, 463, Steam Generator Narrow-Range Water Level 6/30/83 (Unit 2) (See Footnote d) 471, 472, & 42 b. Instrumentation Cable - Okonite Okotherm- Original Equipment 473 Insulated, Okoseal-Jacketed Twisted, Shielded for Cables, Splices, Pair and Penetrations 36 c. Electrical Penetration Splices - Bechtel Dwg.

No. SK-E-165/Raychem Type SFR 35 d. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse /

Crouse Hinds Welded Canister Penetration

4. 1&2-LT 14 a. Foxboro Differential Pressure Transmitter - 12/10/82 (Unit 1 - 1 3/30/84(1)(3) 460A&B, Steam Generator Wide-Range Water Level temporary channel) (See Footnote d) 470A&B None b. Instrumentation Cable - Anaconda, Rockbestos, 3/30/84 (Unit 1 -

or Brand Rex Twisted, Shielded Pair final configuration)

None c. Electrical Penetration Splices - Raychem Type 6/30/83 (Unit 2 - 1 WCSF-N temporary channel)

None d. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse 11/1/f 4 (Unit 2 -

Modular Penetration final configuration)

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT-

.TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIR0 MENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

System: X. Electrical Page: X-1 Date: November 23,.1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Item PBNP NRC Installation /

No. Tag No. TER No. Description -

Operation Date(6) Qualification Documentation (7)

1. 1&2-B32 43 a. Power Cables to Safeguards Motor Control Original Equipment Complete

& 42 Center - Kerite 600 Volt Power (See Foonote o) 39 b. Control Cables to Safeguards Motor Control Centers - Rome 600 Volt Control

(

I

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -

System: XI. Containment Page: XI-1 Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Item PBNP NRC Installation / Qualification No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(0) Documentation ( )

1. 1&2-PT 9 a. Foxboro Pressure Transmitters - Containment 12/10/82 (Unit 1) 3/30/84(1) 945 thru Narrow-Range and Intermediate-Range Pressure 6/30/83 (Unit 2) (See Footnote d) 950 40 b. Instrumentation Cable - Boston Insulated Wire Original Equipment

& Cable Co. Bostrad 7 Twisted, Shielded Pair for Cables

2. 1&2-PT968 None a. Foxboro Pressure Transmitters - Containment 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 11/1/84 I)

& 969 Wide- Range Pressure 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote d) i None b. Instrumentation Cable - Anaconda, Rockbestos, or Brand Rex Twisted, Shielded Pair

3. 1&2-HA969 None a. Exo-Sensor Hydrogen Analyzers - Containment 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 11/1/84(3) thru 967 Hydrogen Concentracion 3/30/84 (Uait 1) (See Footnote p)

None b. Instrumentation Cable (see Item 2.b or Equivalent)

None c. Electrical Peretration Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N None d. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse Modular Penetrations

4. 1&2-TE3292 None a. Conax Resistance Temperature Detectors (RTDs) - 6/30/83 (Unit 2) r 11/1/84(3)

& 3293 Containment Atmosphere Temperature 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote p)

None b. RTD-to-Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N None c. Instrumentation Cable - Anaconda, Rockbestos, or Brand Rex Twisted, Shielded Triple None d. Electrical Penetration Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N None e. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse Modular Penetrations

5. 1&2-TE3294 None a. Conax Resistance Temperature Detectors (RIDS) - 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 11/1/84(3)

& 3295 Containment Sump B Water Temperature 3/30/84 (Unit' 1) (See Footnote p)

None b. RTD-to-Cable Splices (see Item 4.5)

None c. Instrumentation Cable (see Item 4.c)

None d. Electrical Penetration Splices (see Item 4.d)

None e. Electrical Penetration Assembly (see Item 4.e)

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTA?T j TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

System: XI. Containment ;Page: XI-2 Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual Environmental Item PBNP NRC Installation /

No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(6). Qualification Documentation ( )

6. 1&2-RE126, None z, General Atomic Radiation Monitor - Containment 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 11/1/84(3) 127, & 128 High-Range Gamma Radiation 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote p)

None b. Monitor-to-Cable Splices - Amphenol Coaxial Connectors /Raychem Type WCSF-N None c. Instrumentation Cable - Rockbestos Coaxial None d. Electrical Penetration Splices - Amphenol Coaxial Connectors /Raychem Type WCSF-N None e. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse Modular Penetration

7. 1&2-LT958 None a. Gems Delaval Level Transmitters - Containment 6/30/83 (Unit 2) 11/1/84(3)

& 959 Sump A Water Level 3/30/84 (Unit 1) (See Footnote p)

None b. Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assemblies (ECSAs) for Transmitter None c. ECSA-to-Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N None d. Instrumentation Cable (see Item 4.c)

None e. Electrical Penetration Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N None f. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse Modular Penetrations l

l i

1 I

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT'IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 System: XII. Sampling Page: XII-1 Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date'Of I

. Expected or Actual Environmental Item P8NP NRC Installation /' Qualification No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(0) Documentation (7)

1. 1&2-SV951, 23 a. ASCO Solenoid Valves - Pressurizer Steam Space, 12/10/82 (Unit 1) Complete 953, & 955 Pressurizer Liquid Space, and Reactor Coolant 6/30/83 (Unit 2) (See Footnote h) l I Hot Leg Sample Line Isolation Valve Air Operators Original Equipment !

i 59 b. NAMCO Limit Switches - Valve Position Indication for Cables, Penetra-None c. Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assemblies tion Splices, and l (ECSAs) for NAMCO Limit Switches Penetrations l None d. ECSA-to-Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N 43 e. Control Cable - Kerite 600 Volt Control 36 f. Electrical Penetration Splices .Bechtel Dwg.

No. SK-E-165/Raychem Type SFR 35 g. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse /

Crouse Hinds Welded Canister Penetration

2. 1&2-SV966C 18 a. ASCO Solenoid Valves - Reactor Coolant Hot Leg 12/10/82 (Unit 1) 11/1/84(3)

Sample Line Isolation Valve Air Operators 6/30/83 (Unit 2) (See Footnote h) 57 b. NAMCO Limit Switches - Valve Position Indicatial Original Equipment None c. Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assemblies for Cable (ECSAs) for NAMC0 Limit Switches None d. ECSA-to-Cable Splices - Raychem Typw WCSF-N 39 e. Control Cable - Rome 600 Volt Control

3. 1&2-SV959 None a. ASCO Solenoid Valves - Residual Heat Removal- 3/30/84_(Unit 1) 11/1/84(3)

Heat Exchanger Outlet Sample Line Isolation 11/1/84 (Unit 2) (See Footnote h)

Valve Air Operators Original Equipment None b. NAMCO Limit Switches - Valve Position Indication for Cables None c. Conax ECSAs (see Item 2.b)

None d. ECSA-to-Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N 39 e. Control Cable - Rome 600 Volt Control

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY'TO BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

System: XIII. Instrument Air Page: XIII-1 Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of Expected or Actual ~ Environmental It a PBNP NRC Installation /

No. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(6) Qualification Documentation (7)

1. 1&2-IA3047 None a. ASCO Solenoid Valves - Instrument Air to 3/30/84 (Unit 1) 11/1/84(3)~

& 3048 Containment Line Isolation Valve Air Operators 11/1/84 (Unit 2) (See Footnote h). t None b. NAMCO Limit Switches - Valve Position Indication Original Equipment None c. Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assemblies for Cables (ECSAs) for NAMCO Limit Switches None d. ECSA-to-Cable Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N 39 e. Control Cabla - Rome 600 Volt Control l

I

MASTER LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY-T0 BE ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR ' PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 System: .XIV. Steam Generator Blowdown Page: XIV-l' Date: November 23, 1983 Expected Date Of.

Expected or-Actual Environmental Item PBNP NRC Installation / Qualification N o. Tag No. TER No. Description Operation Date(6) Documentation ( )

1. 1&2-CV5958 None a. ASCO Solenoid Valves - Steam Generator 12/10/82 (Unit) Complete

& 5959 Blowdown Line Isolation Valve Air Operators 6/30/83 (Unit 2) (See Footnote h)

None b. NAMCO Limit Switches - Valve Position Indication "" 1 None c. Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assemblies (ECSAs) for NAMCO Limit Switches None d. ECSA-to-Cable Splices.- Raychem Type WCSF-N None e. Control Cable - Anaconda, Rockbestes, or Brand Rex 600 Volt Control None f. Electrical Penetration Splices - Raychem Type WCSF-N None g. Electrical Penetration Assembly - Westinghouse Modular Penetration l

t i

I

. November 23, 1983 Page 1 of 13 FOOTNOTES

a. Westinghouse Motors located Outside Containment These Westinghouse motors and the associated motor-to-lead splices, power cables, and motor and pump bearing / lubricant systems are located outside containmeni where the only potential harsh accident environmen-tal parameter is gamma radiation (<4.0E6 RADS TID). These equipment items were designated as " qualification not established" by the PBNP Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) regarding " Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment" dated December 22, 1982.

Documentation now exists in the PBNP Equipment Qualification (EQ) File maintained by Wisconsin Electric (UE) to document the environmental qualification of this equipment for its specified safety function and its location-specific service conditions throughout the installed life of the equipment. This documentation, including Westinghouse and Ontario-Hydro test reports, was discussed with the NRC Staff at a meeting held on October 13, 1983. We believe that the WE documentation addresses and resolves each of the deficiencies noted in the SERs

.regarding these motors and their associated motor-to-lead splices and bearing / lubricant systems. The SER deficiencies discussed at the meeting for each equipment item included the areas of adequate documen-tation, adequete sinilarity, adequate evaluation of aging degradation, establishment of a qualified life or replacement schedule, establish-ment of a progran to identify aging degradation, satisfying aging simulation criteria, satisfying peak temperature criteria, and/or satisfying radiation criteria. The Okonite 5 KV or Kerite 600 V power cables used with these motors were already designated as qualified by the SERs. Therefore, the EQ documentation maintained by WE for this equipment is judged to neet the environmental qualification require-ments of the D0R Guidelines, as clarified by NRC Generic Letter 82-09, in accordance with the provisions of NRC Rule 10 CFR 50.49.

b. Limitorque Valve Motor Operators Located Inside Containment These Limitorque valve motor operators and the associated pcwer and control cables, motor-to-lead splices, electrical penetration splices, electrical penetration assemblies, main gear case lubricant, and geared limit switch lubricant are located inside containment and only are required to operate for a short time (< 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) after a LOCA or HELB accident inside containment. These equipment items were designated as

" qualification not established" and the Rome control cables designated

" qualification pending modification" by the PBNP Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) regarding " Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment" dated December 22, 1982. The PBNP Emergency Operating Procedures (E0Ps) are in the process of being revised in response to NUREG-0737 and the 4-hour operating time restrict ~ ion for these operators will be reflected in the revised E0Ps. Subsequent failure of these operators after four hours has been analyzed and could not prevent the achievencat or maintenance of safe shutdown conditions, prevent mitigation of design-basis accidents, or nislead the operators at PBNP. Documentation now exists in the PBNP Equipment Qualification (EQ) File maintained by Wisconsin Electric (WE) to document the envi-ronmental qualification of this equipment for its specified safety function and its location-specific service conditicns throughout the instai .ed life of the equipment. This documentation, including

1 o November 23,1!83 Page 2 of 13 Westinghouse, Limitorque, Mobil Oil, and Ontario-Hydro test reports, was discussed with the NRC Staff at a meeting held on October 13, 1983.

We believe that the WE documentation addresses and resolves each of the deficiencies noted in the SERs regarding these valve motor operators and their associated motor-to-lead splices and lubricants. The SER deficiencies discussed at the meeting for each equipment item included the areas of adequate documentation, adequate similarity, adequate evaluation of aging degradation, establishment of a qualified life or replacement schedule, establishment of a program to-identify aging degradation, satisfying aging simulation criteria, satisfying peak temperature criteria, and/or satisfying radiation criteria. The Kerite 600 V power and control cables used with these valve motor operators were already designdred as qualified by the SERs. The associated Westir.ghouse/Crouse Hinds welded-canister electrical penetration assemblies and the Bechtel/Raychem Type SFR electrical penetration splices were also designated as qualified by the SERs. The Rome 600 V control cable used only for the pressurizer PORV blocking valve motor operators has now been documented to be environmentally qualified for short-term use ( <4 hours) hr the environmental conditions resulting from a Small-BreaY Loss-of .,oolant Accident (SBLOCA). The only design-basis event for which the PORY blocking valves may be used and which may result in a harsh environment at the valves is a SBLOCA resulting from a stuck-open PORV. This accident can be mitigated, however, in a manner similar to any other postulated SBLOCA, even if these valves fail to operate. These valves are not required to operate following a laroe-break LOCA or HELB inside containment. We believe that the WE documentation, including Rome test results and an IEEE research paper on nuclear plant cables, is adequate to qualify the Rome 600 V PVC-insulated and jacketed control cable for the harsh environment resulting from a SBLOCA. In addition, the motor operators listed in the SERs for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)-to-Reactor Coolant System (RCS) suction and discharge isolation valves have been reviewed for the possibility of environmentally-induced electrical failure causing the inadvertent opening of these valves following a LOCA or HELB inside containment. These valves are required to remain closed during normal operation and postulated accidents to maintain the integrity of the RCS pressure boundary. The control circuit design for these motor opera-tors precludes the inadvertent opening of these valves due to any environnentally-induced electrical failure. Since these valves are only required to operate to achieve and maintain cold shutdown (i.e.,

for RHR systen operation) and are not within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49, their motor operators have been removed from the " Master List" of equipment to be environmentally qualified at PBNP. Therefore, the EQ documentation maintained by WE for this equipment is judged to meet the environmental qualification requirements of the D0R Guidelines, as clarified by NRC Generic Letter 82-09, in accordance with the provi-sions of NRC Rule 10 CFR 10.49.

c. Limitorque Valve Motor Operators Located Outside Containment (Radiation Only)

These Linitorque valve motor operators and the associated power and control cables, motor-to-lead splices, and main gear case and geared limit switch lubricants are located outside containment where the only potential harsh accident environnental parameter is gamma radiation

(<7.0E6 PADS TID). These equipment items were designated as "qualifi-cation nct established" or " satisfies all requirements except qualified

f .

November 23, 1983 -

Page 3 of 13 life or replacement schedule justified" and the Rome control cable was incorrectly designated " qualification pending modification" by the PBNP Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) regarding " Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment" dated December 22, 1982.

Documentation now exists in the PBNP Equipment Qualification (EQ) Filt maintained by Wisconsin Electric (UE) to document the environmental qualification of this equipment for its specified safety function and its location-specific service conditions throughout the installed life of the equipment. This documentation, including Limitorque, Westing-house, Mobil Oil, and Ontario-Hydro test reports, was discussed with the NRC Staff at a meeting held on October 13, 1983. We believe that the WE documentation addresses and resolves each of the deficiencies noted in the SERs regarding these valve motor operators and their associated motor-to-lead splices and lubricants. The SER deficiencies discussed at the meeting included the areas of adequate documentation, adequate similarity, adequate evaluation of aging degradation, estab-lishment of a qualified life or replacement schedule, establishment of a program to identify aging degradation, satisfying aging simulation criteria, satisfying peak temperature criteria, and/or satisfying radiation criteria. The Kerite 600 V power cables used with these valve motor operators were already designated as qualified by the SERs.

As discussed with the NRC Staff, WE documentation, including several references on the radiation and thermal aging resistance of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) insulation material, exists in the PBNP EQ File to environmentally qualify the Rome 600 V PVC-insulated and jacketed control cable used with these valve motor operators. The only valve notor operators within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49 which have motor brakes are 1&2-SI871A&B (the RHR-to-Containment Spray cross-connect isolation valves). These brakes are documented to be environmentally qualified for radiatiin exposure, their only potential harsh environ-mental parameter, by the use of a Westinghouse test report. Therefore, the EQ documentation maintained by WE for this equipment is judged to meet the environmental qualification requirements of the D0R Guide-lines, as clarified by NRC Generic Letter 82-09, in accordance with the provisions of NRC Rule 10 CFR 50.49,

d. Foxboro Presure Transmitters Located Inside and Outside Containment All pressure and differential pressure transnitters within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49 at PBNP are being replaced or will be newly installed using Foxboro U-E10 Series transmitters both inside and outside con-tainment. The transmitters were designated as " qualification pending modification" by the PBNP Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) regarding

" Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment" dated December 22, 1982. These transmitters have been successfully environmentally tested by the Utility Transmitter Oualification Group for use inside and outside pressurized water reactor containments. The results of this qualification test program are docunented in Wyle Laborateries Test Report No. 45592 4 which was submitted to the NRC Staff for review by our letter dated July 15, 1983. As discussed with the NRC Staff at the October 13, 1983 meeting, the test results indi-cate that the environmental qualification of all Foxbero N-E10 Series transnitters at PBNP will be able to be demonstrated by the use of this test report. We believe that the UE docunentation, including Okonite test reports, Rome test results, and an IEEE research paper on nuclear plant cables, addresses and resolves each of the SER deficiencies

November 23, 1983 Page 4 of 13 regarding Okonite silicon rubber-insulated instrumentation cable used inside containment and Okonite polyvinyl chloride (PVC)-insulated cable used outside containment at PBNP. The SER deficiencies discussed at the neeting for these cables included the' areas of adequate documenta-tion and adequate similarity. The Boston Insulated Wire Bostrad 7 instrumentation cable used both inside and outside containment at PBNP was already designated as qualified by the SERs. Documentation also exists in the PBNP EQ File to be able to environmentally qualify new instrumentation cable being installed at PBNP for some of these trans-mitters. The environmental qualification of the associated splices and electrical penetration assemblies for these transmitters are either already designated as qualified by the SERs (for original plant compo-nents) or documentation is available in the FBNP EQ File to be able to demonstrate environmental qualification (for newly installed compo-nents). The installation of all new Foxboro transmitters within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49, with one exception, has been completed at PBNP, Unit 2, and is scheduled to be completed at PBNP, Unit 1, before the end of the current outage. The only exception is the new containment spray flow transmitters recently committed to be installed at PBNP by our September 1,1983 letter to Mr. H. R. Denton regarding "Implementa-tion of Regulatory Guide 1.97 for Emergency Response Capability."

Alternative instruments, including motor breaker position and local cump discharge pressure gauges as well as environmentally qualified instruments to measure valve position indication and containment pressure and temperature, are available to monitor the operation of the containment spray system until the installation and environmental qualification of the new flow instruments are completed. Since the environmental qualification testing has been successfully completed for all the Foxboro transmitters and associated components, we believe that the continued safe operation of PBNP is justified until the final installations and the detailed qualification documentation can be completed for each specific transmitter application and location at PBNP. The EQ documentation for these transmitters and associated components is expected to be completed by the date noted in the table.

~

The documentation will be maintained in the PBNP EQ File to meet the environmental qualification requirements of NUREG-0588 (Category I) for the transmitters and other new components or the 00R Guidelines for original components, as clarified by NRC Generic Letter 82-09, in accordance with the provisions of NRC Rule 10 CFR 50.49.

e. Gems Delaval Water Level Transmitters for Containment Sump B The Containment Sump B (i.e., main sump) water level transmitters are being replaced using Gems Delaval Type XH-54854 transmitters. The transmitters were designated as " qualification pending modification" by the PBNP Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) regarding " Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment" dated December 22, 1982. These transmitters have been successfully environmentally tested by Bechtel Power Corporation for SNUPPS and by Gems Delaval. The results of those qualification test programs are documented in Wyle Laboratories Test Report Nos. 45700-1 and 2, respectively. As dis-cussed with the NRC Staff at the October 13, 1983 meeting, the test results indicate that the environmental qualification of the new Gems Delaval transmitters at PBNP will be able to be demonstrated by the use of these test reports. The environmental qualification of the associ-ated electrical conductor seal assemblies, instrumentation cables,

a Novemb:r23, 1983 Page 5'of 13

- splices, and electrical penetration ~ assemblies for these transnitters will also be able to.be demonstrated by documentation available in the PBNP EQ File. The EQ documentatio~n for these transmitters and associat-ed conponents is expected-to be: completed by the date noted in the table. Since the installation of-the Gems Delaval transmitters has been~ completed on both Units 1 and 2 at PBNP and since the environmen-tal qualification testing has been successfuly conpleted for these components, we believe that the-continued safe operation of PBNP is

, justified until the detailed qualification documentation can be com-pleted for each specific transmitter application and location. The documentation will be maintained in the PBNP EQ File to meet the:

environmental qualification-requirements of NUREG-0588 (Category I), as clarified by NRC Genaric Letter 82-09, in accordance with the provi-sions of'NRC Rule 10 CFR 50.49.

f. Air-0perated Throttle Valves located Outside Containment Fisher Electro-Pneumatic (I/P) Transducers, the NAMC0 Limit Switches, and the associated Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assenblies- (ECSAs),

Raychem splices, and control and instrumentation cables are used on these air-operated throttle valves located outside containnent at PBNP, where the only potential harsh accident environmental parameter is gamma radiation (<2 0E6 RADS TID). The linit switches were' designated as " qualification pending nodification" and the Rome control cables incorrectly designated as " qualification pending modification" by the

. PBNP Safety Evaluacion Reports (SERs) regarding " Environmental Qualifi-cation of Safety Related Electrical Equipment" dated December 22, 1982.

Documentation now exists in the PBNP E maintained by Wisconsin Electric (UE) quipment to document Qualification (20) the environmental File qualification.of this equipment for its specified safety function and its ' location-specific service conditions throughout the installed life of the equipment. This documentation, including WE engineering analy-sis and UMC0, Raychem, and Conax test reports, was discussed with the NRC Staff at a meeting held on October 13, 1983. We believe that the

-WE docunentation addresses and resolves each of the deficiencies noted in the SERs regarding this equipnent. The I/P transducers were already designated as qualified by the SERs. The limit switches, including associated ECSAs and splices, have been replaced by qualified compo-nents at both PBNP units. As discussed with the NRC Staff, documenta-tion, including severai references on the radiation and thernal aging resistance of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) insulation material, exists in the PBNP EQ File to environmentally qualify the Rome 600 V PVC-insulated and jacketed control cable and Okonite PVC-insulated and jacketed instrumentation cable used with these valve air operators. Therefore, the EQ documentation maintained by WE for this equipment is judged to

- meet the environmental qualification requirements of the 00R Guidelines for the I/P transducers and cables and NUREG-0588 (Category I) for all other components, as clarified by NRC Generic Letter 82-09, in accor-dance with the provisions of NRC Rule 10 CFR 50.49.

g. Conax Resistance Temperature Detectors Located Inside and Outside Containment Resistance Temperature Detectors (RTDs) at PBNP within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49 are all being replaced or will be newly installed using

. qualified Conax RTDs with Raychem splices for applications both inside and outside containment. The RTDs were designated as " qualification pending modification" or " satisfies all requirements except qualified

o November 23, 1983 i Page 6 of 13 l life or replacement schedule justified" by the PBNP Safety Evaluation l Reports (SERs) regarding " Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment" dated December 22, 1982. The RHR suction and discharge line RTDs (1&2-TE630 & 627, respectively) are now only required for cold shutdown and not within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.

New qualified RHR heat exchanger outlet RTDs (1&2-TE622 & 623) are l being installed for post-accident monitoring of the Emergency Core i Cooling System in the recirculation mode. The RTDs and splices have been successfully environmentally tested for use both inside and outside PWR containments by Conax and Raychem,.respectively. The instrumentation cable (30ston Insulated Wire Bostrad 7) which is used i only with the component cooling heat exchanger outlet line RTDs (1&2-TE621) l has already been designated as qualified by the SERs. The other RTDs have been newly installed using cable which has been successfully environmentally tested as documented in cable vendor test reports. The RTDs inside containment also use newly installed Westinghouse modular electrical penetration assemblies which have been successfully environ-mentally tested by the vendor. As discussed with the NRC Staff at the October 13, 1983 meeting, the test results indicate that the environ-mental qualification of these components for their specified safety functions and location-specific service condition will be able to be demonstrated by the use of these test reports. Since the installation of these RTDs have been conpleted at PBNP Unit 2 and is scheduled to be completed at PBNP Unit 1 before the end of the current outage and since the environmental qualification testing of all these components has been successfully completed, we believe that the continued safe opera-tion of PBNP is justified until the detailed qualification documenta-tion can be completed for each RTD application and location at PBNP.

The EQ documentation for these RTDs and associated component- is expected to be completed by the date noted in the table. TF document-ation will be maintained in the PBNP EQ File to meet the environmental qualification requirements of NUREG-0588 (Category I) or the DOR Guide-lines for original cable only, as clarified by NRC Generic Letter 82-09, in accordance with the provisions of NRC Rule 10 CFR 50.49.

h. Air-0perated Valves Located Inside and Outside Containment The ASCO solenoid valves, NAMC0 limit switches, and associated Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assemblies (ECSAs) and Raychen splices are being replaced or will be newly installed with nuclear-qualified components on these air-operated valves at PBNP, which are located both inside and outside containment. These components were designated as

" qualified pending modification" in the PBNP Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) regarding " Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Elec-trical Eouipment" dated December 22, 1982. Documentation now exists in the PBNP Equipment Oualification (EQ) File maintained by Wisconsin Electric (WE) to docunent the environmental qualification of this equipment for its specified safety function and its location-specific service conditions throughout the installed life of the equipment. The existing associated Kerite 600 V control cables, Bechtel/Raychtm Type SFR penetration splices, and Westinghouse welded-canister electri-cal penetration assemblies for the air-operated valves inside contain-ment have already been designated as qualified by the SERs. Several new air-operated containment isolation valves are being installed at 0 PBNP in response to NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2, " Containment Isolation

o November 23, 1983 Page 7 of 13 Dependability." These new valves use the sane qualified components as described above except that new qualified control cables, Raychem penetration splices, and Westinghouse modular penetration assemblies are used as required. The air operated valves outside containment use Rome 600 V PVC-insulated and jacketed control cable for the electrical ccmponents. WE documentation regarding the environmental qualification of this cable, inciuding Rome test results and an IEEE research paper on nuclear plant cables, was discussed with the NRC Staff at the October 13, 1983 meeting. We believe that the documentation addresses and resolves the only deficiency (i.e., adequate documented evidence of qualification) noted in the SERs regarding this cable. All of the above component replacements for safety-related valve air operators

[i.e., those within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49(b)(1)] have been complet-ed at both PBNP units with the exception of those for the main feedwater regulating valves and bypass valves. The solenoid valves for the feedwater regulating valves and bypass valves are deenergized and mechanically shift to their fail-safe position immediately upon initia-tion of a safety injection signal, to isolate main feedwater flow in the event of a postulated steam-line break accident (SLBA). Since in the event of a SLBA in the turbine hall where these valves are located, the valves would be subjected to a harsh steam environment for only a short time (less than 10 seconds) pricr to shif ting to the fail-safe position, they are expected to properly perform their safety function. In addition, the main feedwater pump motors are also automatically tripped on a safety injection signal followed by automatic closure of their respective discharge isolation valves. This provides a redundant means to isolate main feedwater flow to the steam generator s following a design-basis SLBA. Therefore, we believe that the continued safe operation of PBNP is justified until these equipment items can be re-placed with environmentally qualified equipment. The components for some sample ;alves and instrument air valves [i.e., those within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49(b)(3)] located outside containment are also planned to be replaced to enhance our capability for post-accident sampling. The sample and instrument air valves would only be opened to support a backup means of assessing containment radioactivity and as a means of assessing core damage to help predict the potential for offsite releases of radioactive material following a posteleted acci-dent. Environmentally qualified high-range radiation monitars are now available as an alternate source of information regarding the potential for offsite radioactivity released from the containment. Potential release paths are also directly monitored by the Radiation Monitoring System. Gamma radia !on (<7.0E6 Rads TID over one year) is the only potential harsh accident environment to which these valves could be subjected even assuming severe core damage, so the existing unqualified components are expected to be able to perform their design function, if desired, following any design-basis accident. In addition, these valves are not required to open to achieve or maintain cold shutdown conditions or to mitigate any design-basis accidents at PBNP. We believe that the continued safe operation of PBNP is justified until these components are replaced with qualified components and the detailed environmental qualification documentation is completed. Therefore, the EQ documentation maintained by WE for the upgraded equipment is judged to meet the environmental qualification requirements of the 00R Guide-lines for original plant equipment or NUREG-0588 (Category I) for

. November 23, 1983 Page 8 of 13 0 replacement or newly installed equipment, as clarified by NRC Generic Letter 82-09, in accordance with the provisions of NRC Rule 10 CFR 50.49.

i. Target Rock Solenoid' Valves Located Inside Containment The Target Rock solenoid valves and associated Conax Electrical Conduc-tor Seal ~ Assemblies (ECSAs), Raychem splices, control cable, and Westinghouse modular penetrations are being installed in the new Reactor Coolant System gas vent lines to meet NUREG-0737, Item II.B.1,

" Reactor Coolant Systen Vents.".These components were not evaluated in

-the.PBNP Safety Evaluation Reports regarding " Environmental Qualifica-tion of Safety Related Electrical Equipment"' dated December 22, 1982.

As discussed with the NRC Staff at the October 13, 1983 meeting, documentation exists in the PBNP EQ File to be able to environmentally qualify the above components for their design functions and location-specific service conditions throughout the installed life of the equipment. This equipment is not required to achieve or maintain safe shutdown or to mitigate design-basis accidents at PBNP. However, these gas vent line solenoid valves are installed and operational on both units at PBNP and they could be used, if desired, following a postulat-ed accident. Since the environmental qualification testing of these components has already been completed successfully, we believe that the continued safe operation of PBNP is justified until the detailed environmental qualification documentation can be completed for each specific valve application and location at PBNP. The EQ documentation, which is expected to be completed by the dates noted in the table, will meet the environmental qualification requirements of NUREG-0588 (Category I),

as clarified by NRC Generic Letter 82-09, in accordance with the provisions of NRC Rule 10 CFR 50.49.

j. Reactor Vessel Level Indication System These instruments are being installed as part of the Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) at PBNP in response to NUREG-0737, Iten II.F.2, " Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cool-ing." The wide-range and narrow-range water level differential pres-sure (D/P) transmitters are used to measure the D/P between a reference leg filled with water and the variable water level inside the reactor

vessel, with and without reactor coolant pumps running, respectively.

l These transmitters are Foxboro N-E10 Series Transmitters, which are

l. discussed in greater detail in Footnote d. Conax thermocouples (T/Cs) l are used to measure the temperature of the reference leg water so that the level D/P can be compensated for changes in reference leg fluid density. These T/Cs have already been successfully environmentally tested by Conax. In addition, the core-ed t T/Cs are used in a similar manner to compensate for changes in reactor vessel water and steam density. The core-exit T/Cs are discussed in greated detail in Footnote k.

The final display ' configuration including compensated reactor vessel water level is dependent on the operation of the new Auxiliary Safety Instrumentation Panels (ASIPs) and the Safety Assessment System (SAS) computers planned for installation at PBNP. This equipment, which will be located in a mild environment and is not within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49,

has not yet been delivered to the plant site. The NRC Staff has not

yet approved the PBNP RVLIS design for use by the plant operators, as specifically required by NUREG-0737, Item II.F.2, and the PBNP Emergen-cy Operating Procedures, therefore, do not reference this instrumenta-tion. Environmentally qualified Reactor Coolant Systen hot-leg,

4

.- November 23, 1983 Page 9 of 13

' wide-range loop RTDs and-an RCS subcooling nonitor are presently used

-to detect the approach to an inadequate core cooling condition at PBNP.

Therefore, we believe that the continued safe operation of PBNP is justified until the RVLIS system is operational and the 'letailed environmental qualification documentation is completed. The EQ docu-mentation, which is expected to be completed by the date noted in the

. table, will meet the environmental qualification requirenents of the

' DOR Guidelines for the core-exit T/Cs only and NUREG-0588 (Category I) for all other components, as clarified by NRC Generic Letter 82-09, in

-accordance with the provisions of NRC Rule 10 CFR 50.49.

k. Core-Exit Thermocouples and Connectors Located Inside Containment The core-exit thernoccuples (T/C's) and the associated T/C connectors, T/C extension cables, reference junction boxes, splices, and electrical-

. penetration assemblies are located inside containment at PBNP. This equipment was designated as " qualification pending modification' by the PBNP Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) regarding '" Environmental Qualifi-cation of Safety Related Electrical Equipment" dated December 22, 1982.

This system is being upgraded for environmental qualification and other safety-grade requirements to meet the requirements of NUREG-0737, Iten II.F.2, " Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cool-ing,". and Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation . . . to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident." As discussed with the NRC Staff at the October 13, 1983 meeting, documen-tation exists in the PBNP EQ File, except for the T/Cs and T/C connec-tors, to be able to environmentally qualify the above components for their design functions and location-specific service conditions through-out the installed life of the equipment. The T/Cs themselves cannot be replaced but can be analyzed and documented to withstand design-basis accident environments based on their construction with netallic and ceramic materials only. The T/C connectors are scheduled to begin environmental qualification testing this year in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0588 (Category I). The reference junction boxes associated with this system are being relocated outside containment in a mild environment and, therefore, are no longer within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49. The core-exit T/Cs are not required to achieva or maintain safe shutdown conditions or to mitigate design-basis accidents attPBNP. In addition to the new function described in Footnote j, however, these core-exit T/Cs are now intended to be used for post-accident monitoring to provide one of two inputs to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) subcooling monitor and to measure core-exit fluid tempera-ture to detect the approach to an inadequate core cooling condition at PLNP. Since redundant, environmentally qualified RCS hot-leg loop resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) are now installed and being used as the primary instruments to perform these two post-accident monitoring functions, we believe that continued safe operation of PBNP is justified until the final installation and the environmental quali-fic3 tion documentation for these upgraded components are completed.

The EQ documentation, which is expected to be completed by the date noted in the table, will meet the environmental qualification require-ments of the 00R Guidelines for the T/Cs only and NUREG-0588 (Category I) for all other corrponents, as clarified by NRC Generic Letter 82-09. in accordance with the provisions of NRC Rule 10 CFR 50.49.

. November 23, 1983 Page 10 of 13

1. Crosby Lift Indicating Switch' Assemblies Valves Located Inside Containment The Crosby Lift Indicating Switch Assemblies and their associated splices, cables, and electrical penetration assemblies, which are planned for installation inside containment on the Pressurizer Code Safety Valves at PBNP, are being installed to meet the requirements of NUREG-0737, Item II.D.3.1, " Direct Indication of Relief and Safety Valve Position." This equipment was designated as " qualification pending modification" by the PBNP Safety Evaluation Reports regarding

" Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equiment" dated December 22, 1982. As stated in our letter dated April 26, 1982 regarding " Response to NUREG-0737, Update to Schedule Requirements and Implementation Status," the Westinghouse Acoustic Monitoring System previously installed to meet NUREG-0578, Item 2.1.3.a will continue to be used until the new assemblies are installed. The NRC Staff in a letter dated April 9,1980 regarding the evaluation of our implementa-tion of Lessons Learned requirements stated that "the direct indication system [i.e., Acoustic Monitoring Systen) for . . . the safety valves is in compliance with short term Lessons Learned requirements." Safety valve position indication is not a safety-related function and this indication is not required to achieve or maintain safe shutdown or to mitigate design-basis accidents at PBNP. An open safety valve is similar to other Small-Break Loss-of-Coolant Accidents (SBLOCAs) for which PBNP is designed. The PBNP Emergency Operating Procedures for SBLOCA do not require operator knowledge of break location. Knowledge that the " break" was a stuck-open safety valve would not-in any way change the operator response to mitigate that transient. Therefore, we believe that the continued safe operation of PBNP is justified until the Crosby Lift Indicating Switch Assemblies and associated components are installed and the environmental qualification documentation is completed. The qualification testing of the Crosby switch assemblies is scheduled to start this year. Crosby had planned to conduct the LOCA testing of these lift indicating switch assemblies using a method of electrical interface (i.e., the electrical conductors and the conductor port of the device isolated from the LOCA environment), which is incompatible with the electrical interface method designed for PBNP.

We have requested Crosby to test one of the two test specimen using the PBNP electrical interface design (i.e., physically protecting the

- electrical conductors with unsealed flexible conduit which has a weep hole at its lcw point to drain out chemical spray and condensate). Due to apparent difficulties with the electrical interface during the unsuccessful qualification tests conducted earlier, we are not certain that the PBNP interface design for this device can be successfully qualified. Therefore, we do not plan to install the Crosby switch assemblies on the safety valves at PBNP until the cualification testing of the devices is completed and the PBNP electrical interface design is confirmed to be adequate. The qualification testing by Crosby is not expected to be completed before approximately April 1984. The next scheduled PBNP outage after that date available for the installation of these devices is Fall 1984 for Unit 2 and Spring 1985 for Unit 1 as 0 noted in the table. As discussed with the NRC Staff at the October 13, 1983 meeting, documentation available in the PBNP E0 File indicates that the environmental qualification of the other components for their specified design function and location-specific service conditions throughout their installed life will be able to be demonstrated. The E0 documentation for this equipment is expected to be completed by the date noted in the table to meet the environmental qualification re-quirements of NUREG-0588 (Category I), as clarified by Generic Letter 82-09, in accordance with the provisions of NRC Rule 10 CFR 50.49. <

l

__ _ _ . . J

o November 230 1983 Page 11 of 13

m. Westinohouse Fan Cooler Motors Located Inside Containment These Westinghouse containment emergency fan cooler notors and associated motor-to-lead splices, power cables, penetration splices, electrical penetration splices, and motor and fan bearing / lubricant systems are located inside containment at PBNP. These motors and associated motor-to-lead splices and lubricants were designated as "aualification not established" by the PBNP Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) regarding " Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment" dated December 22, 1982. Documentation now exists in the PBNP Equipment Qualification (EQ) File maintained by Wisconsin Electric (WE) to documer.t the environmental qualification of this equipment for its specified safety function and its location-specific service conditions throughout the installed life of the er t ent. This documentation, including several Westinghouse test reports, was discussed with the NRC Staff at a meeting held on October 13, 1983. We believe that the WE documentation addresses and resolves each of the deficiencies noted in the SERs regarding these motors and their associated motor-to-lead splices and bearing / lubricant system. The SER deficiencies discussed at the meeting included the areas of adequate documentation, adequate similarity, adequate evaivation of aging degradation, establishment of a qualified life or replacement schedule,

-satisfying aging simulation criteria, satisfying peak temperature criteria, satisfying radiation criteria, and/or addressing Beta-enitter plateout. The Kerite 600 V power cables, original plant electrical penetration assemblies, and original plant penetration splices were already designated as qualified by the SERs. One of the electrical penetration assemblies and associated splices have been replaced at each PBNP unit with new Westinghouse modular penetrations and Raychem splices which are documented to be environmentally qualified in the PBNP EQ File. Therefore, E0 documentation maintained by WE for this equipment is judged to meet the environmental qualification require-ments of the D0R Guidelines for original plant equipment and NUREG-0588 (Category I) for replacement equipment, as clarified by NRC Generic Letter 82-09, in accordance with the provisions of NRC Rule 10 CFR 50.49.

n. Limitorque Valve Motor Operators located Outside Containment (Steam Only)

These Limitorque valve motor operators and the associated power and control cables, motor-to-lead splices, main gear case lubricant, and geared limit switch lubricant are located outside containment where the only potential harsh accident environmental parameter is short-duration high pressure and temperature steam from a steam-line break. These equipment items are designated as " qualification not established" and the Rome control cable is incorrectly designated as " qualification pending modification" by the PBNP Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) regarding " Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment" dated December 22, 1982. Documentation exists in the PBNP Equipment Qualification (EQ) File maintained by Wisconsin Electric (WE) to document the environmental qualification of this equipment for its specified safety function and its location-specific service conditions throughout the installed life of the equipment. This documentation, including Limitorque, Westinghouse, Mobil Oil, and Ontario Hydro test reports, was discussed with the NRC Staff at a meeting held on October 13, 1983. We believe that the WE documentation addresses and resolves each

. November 23, 1983 Page 12 of 13 of the deficiences noted in the SERs regarding these valve motor operators and their associated motor-to-lead splices and lubricants.

The SER deficiencies discussed at the meet a included the areas of adequate documentation, adequate similarity, adequate evaluation of aging degradation, establishment of a qualified life or replacement schedule, establishment of a program to identify aging degradation, satisfying aging simulation criteria, satisfying peak temperature criteria, and/or latisfying radiation criteria. The Kerite 600 V power cables used with these valve motor operators were already designated as qualified by the SERs. As discussed with the NRC Staff at the meeting, WE documentation, including several references on the high temperature steam and humidity resistance of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) insulation material. exists in the PBNP EQ File to environmentally qualify the Rome 600 V PVC-insulated and jacketed control cables used with these valve motor operators. Therefore, the EQ documentation maintained by WE for this equipment is judged to meet the environmental qualification requirements of the D0R Guidelines, as clarified by NRC Generic Letter 82-09, in accordance with the provisions of NRC Pule 10 CFR 50.49.

o. Safeguares Motor Control Centers Located Outside Containment These safeguards motor control centers (MCCs) and their associated power and control cables are located outside containment where the only potential harsh environmental parameter is gamma radiation (<4.0E5 RADS TID). These MCCs were designated as " qualification pending modification" by the PBNP Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) regarding

" Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment" dated December 22, 1982. Radiation shielding has subsequently been installed for these MCCs to reduce the potential radiation doses and dose rates to insignificant levels. The MCCs are now located in a mild environment which is accessible for maintenance or repair during or following a design-basis accident. The MCCs are no longer within the scope of NRC Rule 10 CFR 50.49 and have been removed from the " Master List" of E'uipment to be environmentally qualified. The Kerite 600 V power cab: .s used with these MCCs have already been designated as qualified by the SERs. As discussed with the NRC Staff at a meeting held on October 13, 1983, documentation exists in the PBNP EQ File, including several references on the radiation and thermal aging resis-tance of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) insulation material, to environment-ally qualify the Rene 600 V PVC-insulated and jacketed control cable used with these MCCs for aging and radiation. Therefore, the EQ documentation maintained by WE for this equipment is judged to meet the environmental qualification requirements of the D0R Guidelines, as clarified by NRC Generic Letter 82-09, in accordance with the provi-sions of NRC Rule 10 CFR 50.49.

p. Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Located Inside Containment This equipment, including hydrogen analyzers, resistance temperature detectors, high-range gamma radiation monitors, water level transmit-ters, and their associated cables, splices, connectors, and electrical penetration assemblies, are being installed inside containment at PBNP in response to NUREG-0737, Items II.F.1, " Accident Monitoring," and II.F.2, " Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling," and for Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation . . . to Assess Plant and

, November 23, 1983 Page 13 of 13 Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident." As discussed with the NRC Staff at the October 13, 1983 meeting, documentation exists in the PBNP EQ File, to be able to environmentally qualify the above components for their design functions and location-specific service conditions-throughout the installed life of the equipment. The above equipment was not listed in the PBNP Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) dated December 22, 1983 regarding " Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment." The equipment is not required to achieve or maintain safe shutdewn conditions or to mitigate design-basis accidents at PBNP. This instrumentation is already installed and

~

available for post-accident monitoring at PBNP, Unit 2, and is sched-uled to be installed and available for~ post-accident monitoring at PBNP, Unit 1, before the end of the current shutdown. The final display configuration for this instrumentation has not been completed, however, since the new Auxiliary Safety Instrumentation Panels (ASIPs) and the new Safety. Assessment System (SAS) and Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) computers planned for installation at PBNP have not yet been delivered to the plant site. The display equipment will be located in a mild environment and is not within the-scope of 10 CFR 50.49.

Since the environmental qualification testing of all the presently installed components has been successfully completed, we believe that the continued safe operation of PBNP is justified until the final display configurations and the detailed qualification documentation for each specific application and' location at PBNP are completed. The EQ documentation, which is expected to be completed by the dates noted in the table, will. meet -the environmental qualification requirements of NUREG-0588 (Categoy I), as clarified by NRC Generic Letter 82-09, in accordance with the provisions of NRC Rule 10 CFR 50.49.

~ . . . . - .

~

=:*

t k

ENCLOSURE 3 METHODOLOGY'TO IDENTIFY EQUIPMENT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 10 CFR 50.49(b)(2)

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 P

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A a

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4 i

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4 November 23, 1983 e

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November 23, 1983 METHODOLOGY TO IDENTIFY EQUIPMENT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 10 CFR 50.49(b)(2)

P'0lHT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 Paragraph (b)(2) of 10 CFR 50.49 requires that licensees identify "Nonsafety-related electric equipment whose failure under postulated environ-mental conditions could prevept satisfactory accomplishment of safety func-tions..." The methodology that was used to identify such equipment is sum-marized below:

1. A list was generated of safety-related electric equipment as defined in paragraph (b)(1) of 10 .CFR 50.49 required to remain functional during or following design-basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or High Energy Line Break (HELB) Accidents. The LOCA/HELB accidents are the only design-basis accidents which result in significantly adverse environments to electrical equipment which is required for safe shutdown or accident mitigation. The list was based on reviews of the PBNP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Technical Specifica-tions, Emergency Operating Procedures, Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P& ids), and electrical distribution diagrams;

2. The elementary wiring diagrams of the safety-related electrical equipment identified in Step 1 were reviewed to identify any auxiliary devices electrically connected directly into the control or power circuitry of the safety-related equipment (e.g., automatic trips) whose failure due to postulated environmental conditions could prevent the required operation of the safety-related equip-ment; and

3. The operation of the safety-related systems and equipment were reviewed to identify any directly mechanically connected auxiliary systems with electrical components which are necessary for the required operation of the safety-related equipment (e.g., cooling water or lubricating systems). This involved the review of P& ids, component technical manuals, and/or systems descriptions in the FSAR.

4. Nonsafety-related electrical circuits indirectly associated with the electrical equipment identified in Step 1 by common power supply or physical proximity were considered by a review of the original PBNP erectrical design including the use of applicable industry standards (e.g., IEEE, NEMA, ANSI, UL, and NEC) and the use of properly coordinated protective relays, circuit breakers, and fuses for electrical circuit fault protection.

The systems and equipment generated in Steps 2,3, or 4 above were then compared to the " Master List of Electrical Equipment at Point Beach Nuclear Plant for IE Bulletin 79-01B" (i.e., Enclosure 1 to our October 8,1981 letter to Mr. Harold R. Denton regarding " Supplemental Response to Safety Evaluation Report for Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Equip-nent, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2"). The results of the above review indicated that no additional electrical equipment was identified which was not previously included in the October 8, 1981 " Master List." Therefore, the list of electrical equipment provided in Enclosure 2 to this letter, is judged to address all electrical equipment within the scope of paragraph (b)(2) of 10 CFR 50.49.

_ __ ._________-___a

ML20082F182

Text

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