ML20081C245
| ML20081C245 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 03/07/1984 |
| From: | Sorensen G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20081C247 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-82-14, GO3-84-142, NUDOCS 8403120199 | |
| Download: ML20081C245 (71) | |
Text
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Washington Public Power Supply System Box 1223 Elma, Washington 98541 1223 (2061482-4428 Docket No. 50-508 March 7, 1984 G03-84-142 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN:
Mr. G. W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
Subject:
Nt", LEAR PROJECT 3 RESPONSES TO NRC QUESTIONS Refemnce:
a)
Letter #G03-83-0889, G. C. Sorensen to G. W. Knighton, dated November 18, 1983.
In accordance with tae guidance of Generic Letter 82-14, the Supply Systen hereby subaits 40 copies of responses to the NRC's requests for Additional Infonnation as shown.
In preparing this submittal it was necessary to include several full size drawings.
Since as a practical matter it is quite difficult to include a copy of each for each copy of this letter, the NRC Licensing Project Manager will receive three copies of each for Distribution.
In reference a) the Scpply System indicated that responses to the I
attached questions would not be forthcoming until March 31, 1984.
l However, since these responses are now complete, there seems to be no anod reason to hold them an extra month.
We consider that an early transmittal will actually be of benefit to both the Supply System and the NRC by reducing the size of the March 31 transmittal and allowing a longer lead time for NRC review.
This situation has been discussed with the NRC Licensing Project Manager for HNP-3.
l 8403120199 840307 O
'k, PDR ADOCK 05000508 A
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' fMr.G.W.Knighton Page 21
- NUCLEAR PROJECT 3 RESPONSES TO NRC QUESTIONS If. you require additional information or clarification, the Supply system Point of Contact.for this matter is Mr. D.'W. 'Coleman, Licensing Project Manager (206/482-4428 ext. 5436).
Sincerely,
(~
_2 G. C. Sorensen,. Manager
-Regulatory Programs AJM/tn-
-Attachments:
1.
NRC Question-No. 240.02-
- 2..NRC Question No. 240.03 3.-
NRC-Question No. 240.04-4.
NRC Question No. 240.08 5.
NRC Question'No. 240.13 6.
NRC-Question No. 240.14 7.
NRC Question No. 281.01
'8.
NRC-Question No. 410.20 9.
NRC-Question No. 410.39
- 10. NRC Question No. 410.42
- 11. NRC Question No. 430.14
- 12. NRC' Question No. 430.76
- 13. NRC Question No.'440.05
- 14. NRC Question No. 450.01
- 15. NRC Question No. 471.21
- 16. NRC Question No. 480.19 cci iJ. Porrovecchio - Ebasco NY0 N.iS. Reynolds.- (Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell and Reynolds)
- J. A. Adams - NESCO O. Smithpeter - BPA
-A. Vietti - NRC
.A. A.Tuzes - CE' Ebasco - Elma-WNP-3 Files b
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Status and Scieedule of Responses to NRC Safety Review Questions 3/84 Page 1 of 11
O Y
DIVISION OF LICENSING STRUCTURAL. ENGINEERING BRANCH Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 100.1 Partial Re-220.1 Complete 10/22/82 mainder Not 220.2 Complete 10/22/82 Scheduled 220.3 Complete 10/22/82
- 100.2 Complete 01/17/83 220.4 Complete 10/22/82 10/22/82 220.5 Complete 10/22/82 100.3 Complete ~
10/22/82 220.6 Complete 10/22/82 100.4 Complete 220.7 Complete 10/22/82 220.8 Complete 01/17/83 MECHANICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH 220.9 Complete 10/22/82 Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 Round One - 05/03/83 210.1 Complete 10/22/82 220.10 Complete 09/02/83 210.2 Complete 10/22/82 220.11 Complete 09/02/83 210.3 Partial 03/31/84 220.12-Complete 09/02/83 210.4 Complete 01/17/83 220.13 Scheduled 03/31/84
- 210.5 Complete 10/22/82 220.14 Complete 09/02/83 210.6 Complete 10/22/82 220.15 Scheduled 03/31/84 210.7 Complete 10/22/82-220.16 Scheduled 03/31/84 220.17 Complete 09/02/83 220.18 Complete 01/17/84 Stiff Clamps - 06/25/82 220.19 Partial Re-mainder Not 210.1 Complete 07/30/82 Scheduled
- 210.2 Complete 07/30/82 220.20 Complete 09/02/83
- 210.3 Complete 07/30/82 220.21 Complete 09/02/83 210.4 Complete 07/30/82 220.22 Scheduled 03/31/84 210.5 Complete 07/30/82.
220.23 Complete 09/02/83
- 210.6-Complete 07/30/82 220.24-Complete 09/02/83 210.7 Complete 07/30/82,
- 220.25 Complete 01/17/84
-210.8 Complete 07/30/82 220.26 Complete 01/17/84 210.9 Complete 07/30/82 220.27 Complete 09/02/83 210.10 Complete 07/30/82 220.28 Complete 09/02/83
- 210.11 Complete 07/30/82 220.29 Complete 09/02/83 210.12 Complete 07/30/82 220.30-Complete 01/17/84 210.13 Complete 09/14/82 220.31 Complete 09/02/83 220.32 Complete 09/02/83 220.33 Complete 07/15/83 Stiff Clamps - 04/04/83 220.34 Complete 09/02/83 220.35 Complete 09/02/83 210.14 Complete 06/15/83 220.36 Complete 09/02/83 210.15-Complete 06/15/83 220.37 Complete 01/17/84 210.16
-Not Scheduled 220.38 Complete 09/02/83 210.17 Complete 06/15/83 210.18-Complete 06/15/83 210.19 Complete 06/15/83 210.20 Complete 06/15/83 3/84 Page 2 of 11
r STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING BRANCH GEOSCIENCES BRANCH-GEOLOGY (Cont'd)
Audit - 11/02/83 Round One - 05/03/63 Item 1 Scheduled 03/31/84 231.1 Not Scheduled Item 2 Complete 11/02/83 231.2 Not Scheduled Item 3 Complete 11/02/83 231.3 Not Scheduled Item 4 Scheduled 12/31/84 231.4 Not Scheduled
- Item 5 Scheduled 03/31/84 231.5 Not Scheduled Item 6 Complete 11/02/83 231.6 Not Scheduled
- Item 7 Complete 11/02/83 231.7 Not 5cneduled
- Item 8 Complete 11/02/83 Item 9 Complete 11/03/83 Item 10 Complete 11/02/83 HYDROLOGIC AND GE0 TECHNICAL
- Item 11 Complete 11/02/83 ENGINEERING BRANCH-HYDROLOGICAL Item 12 Scheduled 03/31/84 Item'13 Complete 11/02/83 Item 14 Scheduled 03/31/84 Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 Item 15 Scheduled 03/31/84 Item 16 Complete' 11/02/83 240.1 Complete 11/30/82 Item 17 Scheduled 03/31/84 Item 18 Scheduled 03/31/84 Item 19 Scheduled 12/31/83 Round One - 07/08/83 Item 20 Scheduled 03/31/84 Item 21 Scheduled 03/31/84 240.2 Complete 03/07/84 Item 22 Scheduled 03/31/84 240.3 Complete 03/07/84 Item 23 Scheduled 03/31/84 240.4 Complete 03/07/84 Item 24 Scheduled 03/31/84 240.5 Scheduled 03/31/84 Item 25 Scheduled 03/31/84 240.6 Scheduled 03/31/84 240.7 Scheduled 03/31/84 240.8 Complete 03/07/84 GEOSCIENCES BRANCH-SEISMOLOGY 240.9 Scheduled 03/31/84 240.10 Scheduled 03/31/84 240.11 Complete 03/07/84 Round One - 05/03/83 240.12 Scheduled 03/31/84 240.13 Complete 03/07/84 230.1 Not Scheduled 240.14 Complete 03/07/84 230.2 Not Scheduled 230.3 Not Scheduled 230.4 Not Scheduled 230.5 Not Scheduled 230.6 Not Scheduled 3/84 Page 3 of 11
HYDROLOGIC AND GE0 TECHNICAL OVALITY ASSURANCE BRANCH ENGINEERING BRANCH-GE0 TECHNICAL (Cont'd)
Round One - 10/17/83 Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 260.1 Scheduled 03/31/84 241.1 Complete 10/22/82 241.2 Complete 10/22/82 241.3 Complete 10/22/82 EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION BRANCH-241.4 Complete 10/22/82 ENVIRONMENTAL 241.5 Complete 10/22/82 241.6 Complete 02/03/83 241.7 Complete 10/22/82 Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 241.8 Complete 10/22/82 241.9 Complete 10/22/82 270.1 Partial Next 241.10 Complete 10/22/82 Submittal
- 241.11 Complete 10/22/82 Scheduled 03/31/84 270.2 Complete 02/03/83 Round One - 04/12/83 EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION BRANCH-241.12 Complete 07/15/83 SEISMIC 241.13 Complete 07/15/83 241.14 Complete 07/15/83 241.15 Complete 07/15/83 Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 241.16 Complete 07/15/83 241.17 Complete 07/15/83 271.1 Partial Next 241.18 Complete 09/02/83 Submittal 241.19 Complete 09/02/83 Scheduled 03/31/84 241.20 Complete 01/17/84 241.21 Complete 09/02/83 241.22 Complete 09/02/83 CHEMICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH-241.23 Complete 11/03/83 FIRE PROTECTION 241.24 Complete 09/02/83 241.25 Complete 09/02/83 Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 MATERIALS ENGINEERING BRANCH-280.1 Complete 10/22/82 INSERVICE INSPECTION 280.2 Complete 10/22/82 280.3 Complete 10/22/82 280.4 Scheduled 03/31/84 Acceptance Review - 08/20/82
- 280.5 Complete 10/22/82 250.1 Complete 10/22/82 250.2
[Not Used]
250.3 Complete 10/22/82 QUALITY ASSURANCE BRANCH Round One - 05/03/83 260.0 Scheduled 03/31/84 3/84 Page 4 of 11
w CHEMICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH-EFFLUENT TREATMENT SYSTEMS CHEMICAL BRANCH Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 Round One - 04/12/83 281.1 Complete 03/07/84 321.1 Complete 09/02/83 281.2 Complete 10/22/82 321.2 Complete 09/02/83 281.3 Complete 10/22/82 321.3 Complete 11/03/83 281.4-Not Scheduled 321.4 Complete 09/02/83 321.5 Complete 07/15/83 Round One - 04/12/83 321.6 Complete 09/02/83 281.5 Complete 07/15/83
- 281.6 Complete 01/17/84 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH 281.7 Partial Re-mainder Not Scheduled Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 281.8 Complete 07/15/83 281.9 Complete 07/15/83 410.1 Complete 10/22/82 281.10 Complete 07/15/83 410.2 Complete 02/03/83 281.11 Complete 07/15/83 410.3 Not Scheduled 281.12 Complete 07/15/83 410.4 Not Scheduled 281.13 Complete 09/02/83 410.5 Complete 10/22/82 281.14 Partial Re-410.6 Complete 10/22/82 mainder Not 410.7 Complete 01/17/83 Scheduled 410.8 Complete 03/24/83 281.15 Complete 07/15/83 410.9 Complete 10/22/82 281.16 Complete 09/02/83 410.10 Complete 10/22/82 281.17 Complete 09/02/83 410.11 Complete 10/22/82 410.12 Complete 02/03/83 410.13 Complete 10/22/82 SITING ANALYSIS BRANCH-SITE IMPACT 410.14 Not Scheduled Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 311.1 Complete 10/22/82 311.2 Complete 10/22/82 311.3 Complete 01/17/84 3/84 Page 5 of 11
AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL (Cont'd)
SYSTEMS BRANCH Round One - 04/12/83 410.15 Complete 07/15/83
-Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 410.16 Partial Re-421.1 Complete 02/03/83 mainder Not 421.2 Complete 10/22/82 Scheduled 410.17 Complete 09/02/83 410.18 Complete 09/02/83 410.19 Complete 09/02/83 410.20 Complete 03/07/84 410.21 Scheduled 03/31/84 410.22 Scheduled 03/31/84 410.23 Complete 07/15/83 410.24 Complete 09/02/83 410.25 Complete 09/02/83 410.26 Scheduled 03/31/84 410.27 Complete 07/15/83 410.28 Complete 07/15/83 410.29 Complete 09/02/83 410.30 Complete 09/02/83 410.31 Complete 11/03/83 410.32 Complete 09/02/83 410.33 Complete 07/15/83 410.34 Not Scheduled 410.35 Complete 09/02/83 410.36 Complete 09/02/83 410.37 Complete 07/15/83 410.38 Complete 09/02/83 410.39 Complete 03/07/84 410.40 Complete 01/17/84
.omplete 07/15/83 410.41 C
410.42 Complete 03/07/84
- 410.43 Complete 07/15/83 410.44 Complete 07/15/83 410.45 Complete 09/02/83 410.46 Complete 07/15/83 410.47 Complete 09/02/83 410.48 Complete 07/15/83 410.49 Complete 07/15/83 410.50 Complete 09/02/83 410.51 Complete 07/15/83 410.52 Complete 09/02/83 410.53
-Scheduled 03/31/84 3/84 Page 6 of 11
POWER SYSTEMS BRANCH POWER SYSTEMS BRANCH (Cont'd)
Acceptance-Review - 08/20/82 Round One - 05/03/83 (Cont'd) 430.1 Complete 10/22/82 430.2 Complete 10/22/82 430.46 Not Scheduled
~430.47 Not Scheduled 430.48 Not Scheduled Round One - 05/03/83 430.49 Complete 09/02/83 430.50 Not Scheduled 430.3 Complete 09/02/83 430.51 Complete 09/02/83 430.4 Complete 09/02/83 430.52 Not Scheduled 430.5 Complete 09/02/83 430.53 Not Scheduled 430.6 Complete 09/02/83 430.54 Complete 09/02/83 430.7 Complete 09/02/83 430.55 Complete 09/02/83 430.8 Complete 09/02/83 430.56 Complete 09/02/83 430.9 Complete 09/02/83 430.57 Complete 09/02/83 430.10 Complete 09/02/83 430.58 Not Scheduled 430.11 Not Scheduled 430.59 Not Scheduled 430.12 Complete 09/02/83 430.60 Complete 09/02/83 430.13 Complete 09/02/83 430.61 Complete 11/22/83
- 430.14 Complete 03/07/84 430.62 Complete 09/02/83 430.15 Complete 09/02/83 430.63 Complete 09/02/83 430.16 Complete 09/02/83 430.64 Complete 11/22/83
- 430.17 Complete 07/15/83 430.65 Complete 09/02/83 430.18 Complete 09/02/83 430.66 Complete 09/02/83 430.19 Complete 09/02/83 430.67 Complete 09/02/83 430.20 Complete 09/02/83 430.68 Complete 09/02/83 430.21
-Complete 11/22/83 430.22 Complete 09/02/83
- 430.23 Complete 01/17/84 430.24 Complete 09/02/83 430.25 Complete 09/02/83 430.26 Not Sch duled 430.27 Not Scheduled 430.28 Not Scheduled 430.29 Not Scheduled 430.30 Not Scheduled 430.31 Not Scheduled 430.32 Complete 09/02/83 430.33 Not Scheduled 430.34 Complete 09/02/83 430.35 Complete 09/02/83 430.36 Complete 11/22/83 430.37 Complete 11/22/83 430.38 Not Scheduled 430.39 Not Scheduled 430.40 Complete 09/02/83 430.41 Complete 09/02/83 430.42 Not-Scheduled 430.43 Not Scheduled 430.44 Not Scheduled 430.45 Not Scheduled 3/84 Page 7 of 11
POWER SYSTEMS BRANCH REACTOR SYSTEMS BRANCH (Cont'd)
(Cont'd)
Round'One - 05/11/83 Round One - 05/11/83 430.69 Scheduled 03/31/84 440.2 Not Scheduled 430.70 Scheduled 03/31/84 440.3 Not Scheduled 430.71 Not Scheduled 440.4 Not Scheduled 430,72 Not Scheduled 440.5 Complete 03/07/84 430.73 Scheduled 03/31/84 440.6 Not Scheduled 430.74 Not Scheduled 440.7 Not Scheduled 430.75 Not Scheduled 440.8 Not Scheduled 430.76 Complete 03/07/84 440.9 Not Scheduled 430.77 Not Scheduled 440.10 Not Scheduled 430.78 Not Scheduled 440.11 Not Scheduled
'430.79 Not Scheduled 440.12 Not Scheduled 430.80 Not Scheduled 440.13 Not Scheduled 430.81 Scheduled 03/31/84 440.14 Not Scheduled 430.82 Scheduled 03/31/84 440.15 Not Scheduled 430.83 Not Scheduled 440.16 Not Scheduled 430.84 Not Scheduled 440.17 Not Scheduled 430.85 Not Scheduled 440.18 Not Scheduled 430.86 Scheduled 03/31/84 440.19 Not Scheduled 430.87 Scheduled 03/31/84 440.20 Not Scheduled 430.88 Scheduled 03/31/84 440.21 Not Scheduled 430.89 Not Scheduled 440.22 Not Scheduled 430.90 Not Scheduled 440.23 Not Scheduled 430.91 Not Scheduled 440.24' Not Scheduled 430.92 Not-Scheduled 440.25 Not Scheduled 430.93 Not Scheduled 440.26 Not Scheduled 430.94 Scheduled 03/31/84 440.27 Not Scheduled 430.95 Scheduled 03/31/84 440.28 Not Scheduled 430.96-Not Scheduled 440.29 Not Scheduled 430.97 Scheduled 03/31/84 440.30 Not Scheduled 430.98 Not Scheduled 440.31 Not Schedulev 440.32 Not Scheduled 440.33 Not Scheduled REACTOR SYSTEMS BRANCH 440.34 Not Scheduled Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 440.1 Complete 01/17/83 3/84 Page 8 of 11 L
r ACCIDENT EVALUATION BRANCH-RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT BRANCH-
~~
SYS. AND RAD. ANALYSIS RADIATION PROTECTION Round One - 04/12/83 Acceptance-Review - 08/20/82 450.1 Complete 03/07/84 471.1 Complete 01/17/84 450.2 Complete 07/15/83 471.2 Complete 10/22/82 450.3 Complete 07/15/83 471.3 Complete 10/22/82 450.4 Complete 09/02/83 471.4 Complete 10/22/82 450.5 Complete 11/03/83 471.5 Complete 10/22/82 450.6 Complete 11/22/83 471.6 Complete 11/22/83 450.7 Complete 09/02/83 471.7 Complete 10/22/82 450.8 Scheduled 03/31/84 471.8 Complete 10/22/82 450.9 Complete 09/02/83 471.9
[NotUsed]
450.10 Complete 11/03/83 450.11 Complete 09/02/83 450.12 Complete 11/22/83 Round One - 04/12/83 471.10 Complete 07/15/83 ACCIDENT EVALUATION BRANCH-471.11 Complete 09/02/83 METEOROLOGY
- 471.12 Complete 01/17/84 471.13 Complete 09/02/83 471.14 Not Scheduled Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 471.15 Complete 09/02/83 471.16 Complete 09/02/83 451.1 Complete 10/22/82 471.17 Complete 07/15/83 451.2 Complete 10/22/82
- 471.18 Complete 07/15/83 471.19 Complete 09/02/83 471.20 Complete 11/03/83 Round One - 04/12/83 471.21 Complete 03/07/84 471.22 Complete 09/02/83
- 451.3 Complete 07/15/83 471.23 Complete 01/17/84 451.4 Complete 09/02/83 471.24 Complete 07/15/83 451.5 Complete 07/15/83 471.25 Complete 01/17/84 451.6 Scheduled 03/31/84 l-451.7 Complete 07/15/83 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BRANCH l
EFFLUENT TREATMENT SYSTEMS BRANCH Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 480.1 Complete 10/22/82 480.2 Complete 01/17/83 l
460.1 Complete 11/22/83 480.3 Not Scheduled 480.4 Complete 10/22/82 480.5 Partial Re-mainder Not Scheduled 480.6 Partial Re-mainder Not Scheduled 3/84 Page 9 of 11
P 5
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~
at CONTAI'NMENT SYSTEMS BRANCH HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING BRANCH Kont'd):
i Rouhdfane - 05/03/83 Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 d
480.7 '. Colaplete 09/02/83 620.1 Complete 10/22/82 480.8 Complete 05/02/83 p
' 480.9 Scheduled 03/31/84
, ^
480.10 Complete 09/02/83 LICENSEE QUALIFICATIONS BRANCH 480.11 ' Complete 09/02/83 T
4 80.12 Complete 01/17/84 480.13 Complete 11/22/83 Acceptance Review - 08/20/82
~
. 480.14' Complete 09/02/83 f-480.15.
Complete 09/02/83 630.1 Complete 10/22/82 480.16'~ Not Scheduled 630.2 Complete 10/22/82
/.. -
480.17 Complete 11/22/83 480.18 Complete 11/22/83 3
- 480.19 Complete 03/07/84 Round One - 04/12/83
- s
^ ~.
480.20 Scheduled 03/31/84 h
480.21
-Complete 11/22/83 630.3 Complete 07/15/83 480.22 ~ Complete 11/03/83 630.4 Partial Re-480.23, Complete 09/02/83 mainder Not 480.24' ' Complete 01/17/84 Scheduled 480.25 Complete 09/02/83 630.5 Complete 09/02/83 s
480.26 Complete 01/17/84 630.6 Complete 09/02/83 630.7 Complete 07/15/83 630.8 Complete 07/15/83 CORE PERFORMANCE BRANCH-FUELS 630.9 Complete 09/02/83
- 630.10 Complete 09/02/83 630.11 Complete 09/02/83 Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 630.12 Complete 07/15/83 s
49d.1 Not Scheduled PROCEDURES AND TEST REVIEW BRANCH Round One - 05/03/83 490 2-
-Not Scheduled Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 9
- 640.1 Complete 10/22/82
' CORE PERFORMANCE BRANCH-
- 640.2 Complete 10/22/82
~ THERMAL HYDRAULICS
- 640.3 Complete 10/22/82 Round One - 05/03/83 492.1 - Complete 09/02/83 492.2 - Partial s
Sche'duled 03/31/84 492.3 Par tial Scheduled 03/31/84 3/84 L.
Page 10 of 11 i
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PROCEDURES AND TEST REVIEW ACCEPTANCE REVIEW LETTER BRANCH ENCLOSURE 4 (Cont'd)
Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 Round One - 06/01/83 1
Complete 02/03/83 640.1 Complete 09/02/83 2
Not Scheduled 640.2 Complete 09/02/83 3
Scheduled 03/31/84 640.3 Complete 09/02/83 4
Complete 10/22/82 640.4 Complete 09/02/83
- 5 Scheduled 03/31/84 640.5 Complete 09/02/83
- 6 Complete 01/17/83 640.6 Complete 09/02/83 7
Complete 10/22/82 640.7 Complete 09/02/83 8
Not Scheduled 640.8 Complete 09/02/83 9
Not Scheduled 640.9 Complete 09/02/83
- 10 Partial Re-640.10 Complete 09/02/83 mainder Not 640.11 Complete 09/02/83 Scheduled 640.12 Complete 09/02/83 11 Scheduled 03/31/84 640.13 Complete 09/02/83 12 Complete 10/22/82 640.14 Complete 11/03/83 13 Complete 10/22/82 640.15 Complete 11/03/83
- 14 Complete 10/22/82 Round One - 10/14/83 640.16 Not Scheduled GENERIC ISSUES BRANCH Round One - 06/01/83 730.0 Not Scheduled EMERGENCY PREPARE 0 NESS LICENSING BRANCH Acceptance Review - 08/20/82 810.1 Not Scheduled
- Response to question resulted in further commitment.
3/84 Page 11 of 11
r n
Question No.
240.02 I n Section 2.4.1.1, you state that nominal plant grade is
. -SAR 2.4.1.1 3'.0 ft MSL. Figure 3.4.1-2 also shows grade level at this SRP 2.4.1 ele vation. However, in Section 2.4.2.2 you state that plant gri.de is 389.5 ft fiSL. Please explain and correct this l
inc7ns;stency.
Respohse
~
. In' Subsection 2.4.1.1, the term " nominal plant grade" is used in the general context of an approximate plant grade, which is not
'the exact piant grade Therefore, the distance of 390 ft MSL is used in this s'ubsection, thus avoiding the use of fractions.
3 Nevertheless, it is defined clearly as " nominal plant grade".
The exact plant grade, as' stated in Subsection 2.4.2.2, remains r
389.5 ft MSL.
In order to avoid any confusion, Subsection 3.4.1.2.2 and Figure
. 3.4.1-2 will be revised to reflect this clarification.
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2.4.2 FLOODS
/q66 2.4.2.1 Flood History Floods occur in the site region primarily in December and January, but damag-ing floods may occur as early as the beginning of November and as late as the
. end of April.
A synopsized flood history.f or three gaging stations is given in Tabl e 2.4.2-1.
The gaging ststions on the Chehalis River at Porter and naar Grand Mound are, respectively, about 10 and 38 river miles upstream of the site. The gaging station on the Satsop River is near Satsop, about three river miles f rom the site.
The estimated momentary maximum flood flow in the Chehalis River near the site, 97100 cf s, occujred on December 21, 1933. The corresponding yearly values f rom 1930 to 1979 are listed in Table 2.4.2-2.
The estimated value is based on the sum of the flows in the Satsop River a'nd the Chehalis. River either at Porter or at Grand Mound, adjusted to the confluence of the Chehalis t
and Satsop Rivers by drainage area ratio.
In case the two maximum momentary flows do not occur on the scue date, then the combiced maximum value of the momentary and daily flows in the two rivers is adopted. The frequency analysis (Ref erence 2.4.2-1) of these data is presented on Figure 2.4-13.
2.4.2.1 Flood Design Consideration The WNP-3/5 saf ety-related f acilities are located at least 300 f eet above all floods and flood waves caused by probable maximum events, such as probable maximum flood (FMF), probable maximum tsunamis (PMT), etc.
In determining the probable maximum water level at the site, the precipitation produced floods in Chehalis River were determined, and the water levels in the river were estimated by a backwater profile computation with a starting point located at the mouth of the Chehalis River when the water level elevation at that point is the highest tide recorded. The combined events considered are summarized below and are' in compliance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.59, (Design Basis Floods f or Nuclear Power Plants):
a)
PNF in Chehalis River, highest recorded tide level in Grays Harbor and two year extreme wind-wave activity.
b)
Das f ailure coincident with peak of one-half PMF.
c)
Probable maximum surge and seiche.
d)
Probable maximum tsunami.
The above items will be discussed in Subsections 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6. respectively. The maximum. water level is reached by item above and its value is estimated to be 76.2 f MSL,.(see Subsection 2.4.3.6.2),
including wind-wave runup.
In item he maximum stillwater level is 61)
L,(b) 2.4-18 Amendment No. 1, (10/82) b
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I 39.6 f t M.,, compared with 53.1 f t MSL f or the PMF (bef ore wave runup).
Ites ( nor Itea (is expected to produce any significant increase in Neithat river stage a(the site. NN (c) plant grada of 389.5 f t MSL, Since all the saf ety-related f estures are abov j the site is considered " flood-dry
- with respect to the above avents, by the definition of Reference 2.4.3-1.
Conseq'uently, Subsections 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 present " minimum analyses" susficient to illustrate the magnitude of the margin of safety.
Detailed flood design basis is addressed in Subsection 2.4.10.
2.4.2.3 Ef f ects of 1.ocal Intense Precipitation The site watershed, which covers about 0.28 square miles, as shown on Figure 2.4-2, is susceptible to local, intense precipitation.
The National Weather Service defines Probable Maximuca Precipitation as that which " represents the critical depth-duration-area rainf all relations f or a particular area'during various seasons of the year that would result if conditions during an actual stora in the region were increased to represent the most critical meteorological conditions that are considered probable of The critical meteorological conditions are based on an analysir occurrence.
of air-mass properties (ef f ective precipitable water, depth of inflow layer, temperatures, winds, etc), synoptic situations prevailing during the recorded g3 storms in the region, topographical f escures, season of occurrence, and
- c..
The rainf all values thus derived location of the respective areas involvea.
are designated as the probable maximum precipitation since they are determined within the limitations of current meteorological theory ar.d available data and are based on the most effective combination of factors controlling intensity."
(Raf erence 2.4.3-3).
1 The local probable maximum precipitation (PMP) depths are shown in These depths were obtained f rom Ref erence 2.4.2-2, in which Table 2.4.2-3.
Chart 31 shows that the ratio of six-hour PMP to the 100 year six-hour This ratio is assumed to be valid f or raintall for 10 square ailes is 2.9.Since the site drainage area is much smaller durations other than six hours.
than 10 square miles, the point rainf all intensity should be considered.
Figure 15 of Ref erence 2.4.2-2 shows that a 10 percent increase in the values The applicable to 10 square miles f or the duration of 30 minute
= 3.2) f or all durations to obtain the PMP values in Table 2.4.2-3, which constitute a more conservative estimate than that obtained by Ref erence 2.4.3-4, which is used f or the Chehalis basin PMP (Note also that Ref erecee 2.4.2-2 provides more conservative values than Ref erence 2.4.2-3, which is a For example, the more recent precipitation atlas applicable to Washington.
six-hour,100-year rainf all f rom the latter ref erence is 3.1 inches while the 1
2.4-t9 Amendment No. 1, (10/82)
aw~
3 FSAR G l'lO.1.
7 depth used in Table 2.4.2-3 is 4.G inches.
Ref erence 2.4.2-2 provides PMP intensities for very short durations.)
The time distribution of the maximum rainf all is also shown in Table 2.4.2-3.
This distribution was derived based on the assumption that the concentration time of runof f is shorter than 30 minutes.
The rainf all distribution derived f rom this assumption provides the greatest potential for flocding.
Since the drainage area is small, the area distribution of rainf all is assumed to be unif orm.
The site topography and stora drainage system are shown on Figure 2.4-3.
Cut slopes to the east and southwest of the plant island are drained by bara ditches and pipes. Filled areas to the north and south are sloped downward f rom the. plant island as shown.
The paved perimeter road is sloped toward the adjacent grassed areas. These grassed areas are in turn drained by a system of catch basins, drainpipes, and ditches.
The roof storm drain system dischargas into the surf ace drain system at numerous points around the exteri' ors of the buildings.
The maximum elevation of the grassed areas within the perimeter road is 389.5 f t MS *end the minimum elevation of the openings into the safety-related areas is 3 0.5 ft MSL The st::.rm drain system of both the roofs and the site grounds is designed to arry the 100 year recurrence setra with pipes flowing half-f ull.
Peak rai all intensities f or ' drainage area concentration times of less than one hou are determined as prescribed in Reference 2.4.2-2.
For a typical conce on time of 15 minu
, tp,
intensity is 2.9 inches per hour.
gg g
Gince the drair sge system is sized f or the peak intensiti s of the 100 year storm, the will exceed the system capacity f or a brief period.
The PHP distribution of Table 2.4.2-3 was used in the drainage analysis without taking credit f or the 100 percent surplus capacity, in order to allow f or possible drain blockage by such rare events as heavy snow and ice storms or volcanic ashf all.
Under the PMP condition, the maximum depth of standing unter in the grassed areas would be 2.0 inches at the end of a typical concentration time of 15 minutes.
Since safety-related openings are a minimum of 1.0 f oot above the plant grade, the openings 'would not be subject to l1
. flooding.
In the unlikely event that any drain is completely blocked, rainwater in the contributing area could pond to EL. 390.0, the elevation of the crown of the surrounding access road.
Subseduent rainf all and any possible overflow f rom roof areas would flow over the road to lower-lying areas.
l.11. e.
r
--= W-t: :;' ;., rel;;.2.:.;; ;; ple;; ;::d: h;;; q *-
- --k
~e--e te#.L L.h Theref ore, water cannot enter the buildingfrom the site grounds.
f,
-x J spp,f.//4tfL, Overland flow on the remaining plant areas' and surrounding slopes during the PMP will not cause any significant erosion or flooding.
Slopes are protected by paving, beras or landscaping; the ditches and pipes are designed f ollowing j
the same criteria used for those adjacent to the plant.
2.4-20 Amendment No. 1, (10/82)
o i
1
- 3 0444W-2 FSAR O AdC. L.
4 j
The safety-related facilities will be unaffected by any type of flooding or t{;'
erosion caused by the probable maximum flood.
Subsections 2.4.3 through 2.4.6 discuss the probable maximum flood elevation and thr, water level at the plant site.
Access to all safety-related facilities is locate above the plant grade of 389.5 f MSL which is 313 feet above the le maximum ood elevation.
N-b kooding eseeed by local. intense precipitation will not affect safety-related facilities. Water levels produced by the local probable maximum precipitation and the design criteria of the roof and site drainage facilities are discussed in Subsection 2.4.2.3.
~
e raised to all safety-ed f acilities of x
ches above
. 390. will pr act the s etures om short-ce floodin of t si o u uring a sto ro -
ng local prob mum precipita n.
Flood protection for safety-related components and systems is discussed in Subsection 3.4.1.
M 8
O
. u sa
C.5 d yyp 3 FSAR F
G M O. 2.
7 5
3.4 WATER LEVEL (FID0D) DESIGN f
3.4.1 FID0D PROTECTION 3.4.1.1 Flood Protection Measures for Seismic Category I Structures The Reactor Auxiliary Building, Fuel Handling Building, Reactor Building, Ultimate Heat Sink (UBS) Cooling Tower, Condensate and Refueling Water Tank Structure, including their respective tank enclosures and Storage Tank structures are designed to Cstegory I requirements.
These structures are located above maximum flood. elevation, and as such, do not require flood protection. Grade elevation for the aforementioned Category I Structures is 389.5 f eet MSL.
The water level at the site vicinity resulting from Probable Maximus Flood (PMF) in 'the Chehalis River is EL. 76.2 f t MSL, approximately 313 feet below plant grade (see Subsection 2.4.3).
Flood protection measures for WNF-3/5 seismic Category I structures are consistent with the CE interface requirements described in CESSAR-F Subsections 4.2.5.3.1, 5.1.4.3.1, 5.4.7.1.3.5.1, 9.1.4.6.B.1, and 9.3.4.6.B.2.
Internal flooding due to pipe breaks is discussed in Appendix 3.6A.3.
3.4.1.2 Permanent Dewatering System
- 3. 4.1". 2.1 Introduction d
A permanent Groundwater Drainage System (GWDS) has been installed around the WNP-3/5 Reactor Auxiliary Buildings, which performs solely by gravity drainage. The intent of the GWDS was to uncomplicate construction activities by 1) sinimizing excavation quantities, 2) eliminating the use of outside forework and waterproofing 3) permitting placement of conerste directly
' egainst the vertical excavated rock faces, and 4) ainimizing the hydrostatic pressure against the RAB walls by permanently lowering the groundwater local to the plant via the GiDS.
3.4.1.2.2 Description g g. g gg f/q
/ g g 3 g g & Nf4 The GWDS consists of vertical six inch diameter half round drain pipes spaced et nominal 8.5 feet intervals around the RAB at the interface of the rock face and the building exterior concrete walls.
(See Figure 3.4.1-1).
The vertical m.,,[
drains extend froah to tht base of the foundation mat,sedatashrdthe outrounding rock.
This drainage is discharged to an 8 inch diameter horizontal header along the periphery of the sat (see Figure 3.4.1-2).
The runoff is then routed to 6 f ast disann drainage tunnels that drain into a small tributary to Workmen's Creek, south of the plant island (see Figures 3.4.1-3, 4 and 6).
In addition, perforated undemac drains (UNDS) placed on a l
diagonal pattern are provided benuth the mat (see Figure 3.4.1-1).
These L
undermat drains are also connected to the drainage tunnel. Manholes f rom grade level are provided at each corner of the RAB to allow for periodic Laspection and cleanout cf the horizontal collector pipes and drainage tunnel, if required.
Radiation monitoring of system discharge is provided as discussed in Section 11.5.
Groundwater monitoring instrumentation was installed around the WNP-3 and 5 3
cxcavations (Figures 3.4.1-Se and 3.4.1-6e).
Table 3.4.1-1 lists the locations and top elevations of all the instrumentation.
l 3.4-1 Amendment No. 3, (4/83)
Q
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r4 l
CAULKING (TYP) gl,,
l nasawm:-. :::
_-nz:_ nw= =-
Y~ a 1"SHOTCRETE kh i
aI l
A 1/2 ROUND 8" MPE I
TYP.PART PLAN v
(,STRAPg 8"(STL MPE I
(OuAtrTY CLASS I)*
$nstrucibn: {hvs bla.no qant yl ap 4
--w_=
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=
l
,r '8"-
6*'$ nan _SQ s
,l, Instruenn : Ada!e j
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8 j
l 8"(STL MPE b
1/2 ROUND 1/2 ROUND 8"(PIPE 8"( MPE r_
TOP OF MAT EL 33.00 p
SECT. A A (TUR81NE BLDG ONLY)
L j
CONC. FILL AROUND 3
307. OF MAT -
EL VARIES EL 328,80 3"(COLLECTOR PfPE
>- a - - -' i
%SHOTCRETE 4" WORK SLAS
- w..wmovya=,n MAT TYP.SECTION A-A
'ALL OTHER PORTIONS OF THE SYSTEM DETAILED ON THIS DRAWING ARE O* 1 WPPSS QUALITY GROUP G, SEISMIC jf CATEGORY N/A
@v r:.
WASHINGTON PUSLIC FIGURE ER S YnmM DETAILS OF GROUNDWATER DRAINAGE Nuclear Projects 3 & 5 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
Question No.
240.03 A security fence surrounds the power-block area. What is the ground elevation at the base of this fence with respect to the adjacent ground?
Is there a berm of other obstruction at the base of.the fence which could cause ponding of the local PMP to an elevation higher than the surrounding access road?
Response
The ground elevation at the base of the fence is the same as that of the adjacent ground. There is no berm or other obstruc-tion at the base of the fence that could cause ponding of the local PMP to an elevation higher than the surrounding access road.
t
,m.
Question No.
240.04 You state that roofs of safety-related structures generally FSAR 2.4.2.3 have parapets 12 inches above the roof high points and 18 SRP 2.4.2 inches above the low points. You then state that one roof section located adjacent to the Steam Tunnel at elevation 417.5 ft MSL is surrounded by walls to elevation 443.5 ft MSL.
Is this the only roof that does not have parapet walls 12 to 18 inches above the roof? If not, identify all other structures that do not meet this design criterion and describe how roofs were designed to withstand to local PMP.
Response
The roofs of all safety related structures have parapets 12 inches above the roof high point, and a maximum of 18 inches above the roof low points.
The only exception is the two roof section:; adjacent to the Steam Tunnels at elevation 417.5 ft MSL, as outlined in the FSAR Subsection 2.4.2 3. Page 2.4-21.
Question No.
240.08 In your analysis of a postulated failure of the Hold-up Tank, you state that although leakage from the RAB is not anticipated, the highest creditable leakage rate is estimated to be less than 189 gpd for a maximum duration of five days. Provide the basis for this estimate.
Response
The bases for the estimate of 189 gpd leakage rate for a postu-lated failure of the Hold-up Tank were presented in PSAR Subsec-tion 3.4.5.7.
The estimate was derived from application of the Darcy-Weisbach formula to flow through ten cracks in a 6-ft RAB wall under 10 feet of initial head. Crack width (0.006 inches at wall / floor interface) and spacing (4 feet) were calculated based on the amount and distribution of reinforcing bar and ten-sile stresses resulting from thermally-induced concrete shrink-age. Although the as-built wall is 5 feet thick, as opposed to 6 feet,.the difference has little significance when the conser-vative assumptions listed in PSAR Subsection 3.4.5.7 are con-sidered. These included:
a) Cracks go all the way through the wall, whereas some actual cracks would be intermittent.
b) Cracks are straight and smooth, whereas most cracks are rough and meandering. Actual flow length could be twice wall thickness.
c) Pressure on the outside of the wall is atmospheric. Active compression loads by the sandstone are ignored.
The five-day duration is not estimated but is assumed, for the purposes of estimating doses in Subsection 15.7.3, to be the period during which the tank failure, and leakage, went without corrective action.
FSAR Subsection 2.4.12.2 will be amended accordingly.
1719W-1 WN P-3 FSAR 2.4.12 DISPERSION, DILUTION, AND TRAVEL TIMES OF ACCIDENTAL RELEASES OF q
/
LIQUID EFFLUENTS IN SURFACE WATERS For normal operational conditions, the releases f rou the Radioactive Liquid Treatment Systems are discussed in Section 11.2.
Under postulated accident conditions, there exists only one pathway f or release of liquid radioactise ef fluent to surf ace waters. This pathway has been evaluated, and the doses calculated to the r.ea rest surf ace water user. The accident conditions and calculations of doses to water users are discussed in Subsection 15.7.3.
2.4.12.1 Releases From Liquid Waste Systems As discussed in Subsection 11.2.1, the Liquid Waste Systems are designed to collect, accumulate, store, process, monitor, and recycle all radioactive and potentially radioactive liquid wastes which are generated. All features of 1
the Liquid Waste System are designed to meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.43.
All potentially radioactive tanks are located inside the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB), with the exception of the reactor makeup water tank, plant water reuse tank, and the demineralized water storage tank. These outdoor tanks a re surrounded by a ma t-on grade reinforced concrete structure with walls to EL. 400.0 f t. MSL to retain gross spills f rom the tanks. The drainage f som this structure is routed to the Liquid Radwaste Treatment System. The floor drains f or all the indeor radwaste tanks are also rerouted to the Liquid Radwaste Treatment System.
gew 2.4.12.2 Accident Conditions Accidents which might result in the release of radioactive liquid effluents are discussed in Subsection 15.7.3.
In the event of f ailure of any portion of the Liquid Radwaste System, the liquids released would be contained within the RAB.
The critical case postulated to release liquid ef fluents to surface waters involves the release of the contents of a Hold-up Tank within its cubicle in the RAB at EL. 335.0 f t. MSL.
Although leakage f rom the RAB is not anticipated, the highest credible le9 age rate is estimated to be less k
than 189 gallons per day (2.92 x 10-4 cf sk f:: - _exirr: du r :icr. of f i v: -
da4H>r The leakage would be collected in the dewatering system and discharged to a tributary of Workman Creek. At the point of discharge, the leakage would be combined with the groundwater flow of 3.6 gpm (subsr tion 3.4.2.1).
The nearest surf ace water users af f ected by this release are located near the mouth of Workman Creek, 4.4 miles f rom the point of release, as shown on Figure 2,4-11 (Water Users Nos.12 and 13). This distance is suf ficient f or the effluent to become completely mixed with the flow of Workman Creek.
l s_a]
2.4-55 Amendment No. 1 (10/82)
Question No.
~240.13 In addition to considering the effects of a break in the CWS FSAR 3.4.1.2 pipe, did you consider breakes in other pipes such as the con-SRP 2.4.12 densate storage line? Provide discussion of all other pipes which could have an effect on groundwater levels in the event of a pipe break and what that effect would be.
Response
t In terms of the volume of water available for release following a hypothetical pipe break, the CWS pipe presents the most severe condition for potentially affecting the groundwater level on a short-term basis. This is addressed in Subsection 3.4.1.2.3 and the response to Question 240.12. Additionally, the condensate storage tank, the refueling water storage tanks, the tank enclosure, and the associated piping are seismic category I com-ponents (Subsections 3.5.2.1 and 3.7.3.12).
Buried piping is located in Class I fill and is built to withstand events which could sever the CWS pipe.
k
Question No.
240.14 Provide the following information in regard to your groundwater FSAR 3.4.1.2 recharge test.
SRP 2.4.12 a) Where and how were the groundwater seepage rates, given in Table 3.4.2-1, measured?
b) You state that you used a pre-recharge test discharge rate of 2.6 gpm. Explain how this was determined.
c)
In the equation used to compute the storage coefficient of the Astoria For. nation, the term "r" is defined as radius.
Explain the basis for using the value of 150 f t for "r".
d) FSAR Figure 3.4.2-2 shows that water levels in the piezo-meters surrounding RAB-3 did not rise as would normally be expected during a groundwater recharge test.
Instead, water levels fluctuated up and down. Provide an explanation of why this occured.
e) FSAR Figure 3.4.2-1 shows a typical water level elevation-vs-time curve for the half-rounds measured during the re-charge test. Explain how this typical curve was derived and how it relates to water levels in each individual half-rount.
D d water levels in the half-rounds fluctuate up and down uuring the recharge test in a manner similar to the piezometers?
f) How were the points used to plot the Recovery-vs-Tine curves on FSAR Figure 3.4.2-11 determined?
If water level data from the piezometers were used, explain how this was done when water levels fluctuated up and down.
g) How was the groundwater discharge area shown on Figure 3.4.2-8 determined?
h) You state that Figure 3.4.2.7 shows that the average wet season groundwater base flow was approximately 7.45 gpm during January through March 1980. Figure 3.4.2.7 does not show this.
Please explain how a value of 7.45 gpm was obtained from this Figure.
- 1) You state that 64 percent of the Unit 3 RAB. groundwater drainage area will be covered by impermeable surfaces.
Provide additional information regarding the location of these impermeable areas and a description of the impermeable material to be used.
Question-No.
240.14 (Cont'd) rangingfrom39.1ftz/dayto3.83ftgsoftransmissivity On Figure 3.4.2-11 yqu computed valu j)
/ day. Since Trans-missivity is defined as the product of permeability and thickness of the aquifer,' provide assurances that these transmissivity values are conservative when compared with the permeability values you determined from packgr tests which ranged from > 7 x 10-6 cm/sec to < 1 x 10-/
cm/sec'(>2 x 10-2 ft/ day to < 2.8 x 10-4 ft/ day).
Response-a) The groundwater seepage rates given in Table 3.4.2-1 were measured by placing a temporary weir at the discharge face of the concrete plug in the drataage tunnel. Measurements of the volume of water flowing over the weir per unit time were recorded..
b) Figure 3.4.2-12 shows the drainage from the Groundwater Drainage System (GWDS) and from the Undermat Drainage System (UMDS) for RAB-3 for the dry period of 1979. The 2.6 gpm discharge of the system for the dry period (April through September) was estimated from this Figure and represente the sum of discharges from GWDS and UMDS. The. Figure demon-strates that the error or-estimation of the discharge should be small because discharge is reasonably constant during the dry period.
c) Figure'3.4.2-11 shows the' drawdown-vs-time curve for Half-Round No. 4, which is located 85 feet south of the northeast corner _of the excavation. 'This ccrresponds to a distance of
-163.5 feet from %e center of the excavation. For parameter estimation purposes, a distance of 150 feet (half width of the excavation) was used as an approximation for the actual distance of the half round from the center of the excavation.
d) The fluctuatie*s of water levels in the piezometers occurred as a result of construction related activities in the vicin-ity of the piezometers requiring the use of water. Whenever these activities were discovered, the responsible construc-tion personnel, who were unaware of the in-progress field test of the Groundwater Drainage System (GWDS), were noti-fied to refrain from_this activity.
e) Figure 3.4.2-1 shows the water-level measurements made in Half-Round Number 8 located on the West Face (112.5 feet north of the southwest e,orner). The water-level measure-ments made during the recharge test in other half-rounds
. were similar to those shown in the Figure. A comparison of Figures 3.4.2-1 and 3.4.2-2 shows that the water level fluc-tuations similar to_those shown in the piezometers were not detected in half-rounds.
m
.uestion-No.
- 240.14 Response (Cont'd) f) The recovery-vs-time curve shown in Figure 3.4.2-11 is for Half-Round Number 4, which did not show fluctuations corre-sponding to those observed in piezometers. The water-level data obtained from the piezometers was plotted by ignoring the data corresponding to the abrupt changes such as those shown in Figure 3.4.2-2 and following the points along the trends showing gradual changes.
g) Available groundwater head from piezometers surrounding the Rt.B-3 excavation during the drainage period combined with the drawdown cones of influence calculated from adjacent site surface drainage were used to determine the groundwater drainage boundary shown in Figure 3.4.2-8.
h) Figure 3.4.2 7 shows the estimated groundwater drainage from the GWDS and UMOS by the " dot-dash" curves. The combined groundwater drainage from both systems ranges from about 2.85 gpm to 7.45 gpm and the average drainage is estimated to be about 4.75 gpm for the wet season months and not 7.45 gpm as printed. The text will be amended to reflect the response to this question.
- 1) The location and description of impermeable areas are pro-vided on the attached Drawing No. WPPS-3240 G-2050, Plant Roads, Sheet 1.
j) Figure 3.4.2-11 shows transmissivity values of 39.1 2
2 ftz/ day, 3.83 ft / day', and 8.28 ft / day for the A, B, and C slopes. ' Assuming a conservative value of 100 meters for the effective thickness of the formation involved in the shut '.n test, the above transmissivities correspond to per-meability values of 4.2 x 10-5 cm/sec, 4.1 x 10-6 cm/sec, and 8.8 x 10-6 cm/sec, respectively. These values are probably higher than actual values due to surface water infiltration.into the drainage system during the test period. The permeabilities determined from packer tests
~
represent portions of the formation in close proximity to the holes and may not be representative of the entire forma-tion. However, permeabilities determined from packer tests are reasonably close to values obtained from analyses of data from half-rounds and piezometers (Table 3.4.2-2).
It should be noted that the Slope C (Figure 3.4.2-11) repre-sents the long-term transmissivity of the system.
4 n
=r r,
=-, w, w s--
a m-
-m
--own
-e
- - - ~
--s--,-v--vve-m-w----
--*wr--
r
- -- - *- * -~
ge40.H yp_3 g
i 1470W-3 FSAR f
)
where:
s = recovery,it 3
Q = recharge rate, f t / day r
2 T = transmissivity, f t / day W(u) = well function of u r = radius, f t S = storage coefficient t = time since recovery started, days The groundwater recovery at any location on the grid (Figure 3.4.2-3) is the result of the summation of the recovery or withdrawal from each well.
The recovery under test, or dry season, ccaditions at periods of 0, 10, 50, 100, 150 and 200 days were calculated for four cross-sections.
The pre-tes t discharge rate was 2.6 spa. Figure 3.4.2-4 shows the cross-section locations 4
and Figures 3.4.2-5 and 3.4.2-6 show the recovery at different time periods.
Under these dry season conditions, water levels at the excavation face will increase approximately 18 feet above the top of the sat in 250 days.
Figure 3.4.2-7 is a hydrograph of precipitation and o? drainage from the CWDS and UNDS during the high precipitation months of January, February and March, 1980. Althout.h the drainage measurements are fragmentary, a conservatively high approximation of the total discharge caused only by groundwater is re;re sented by the " dot-dash" curve. During this three month period the combined groundwater flow from both systems range from about 2.85 spa to 7.45 s pa.
The part of flow caused by direct surf ace infiltration f ato the drainage system is superimposed upon the normal groundwater discharges and is, during periods of heavy rainf all, several times greater than the actual groundwater drainage. Both the higher, base groundwater flow during the winter months and the auch higher flow attributable to surf ace water infiltration have obvious impact on the length of time between an accidental stoppage of the Unit-3 RAB drainage system and the point when water reaches the design elevation on the Unit-3 RAB walls. The surface infiltration will be progressively reduced as l
construction proceeds, and therefore need not 6 g--tdered f urther.
p l
4.75 t-i The recorded discharges (see Figure 3.4.2-7 e w that the average wet season groundwater base flow was approximately spa during January through March 1980. During this period approximately 15 percent of the Unit-3 RAB groundwater drainage area (see Figure 3.4.2-8) was covered by impermeable surfaces. For conservatism, it will be assumed that 25 percent of the area was covered by impermeable surf aces. This would give an estimated wet season recharge rate of 9.9 spa if the entire drainage area surface were permeable.
As designed, 64 percent of the Unit-3 RAB groundwater drainage area will be covered by impermeable surfaces.
This will reduce the wet season recharge rate to 3.6 spa when the discharge from the roofs and paved areas is wasted to stora drains or nearby creeks below EL. 375.00 f t.
thder these conditions, the groundwater level would rise to design maximum EL. 365.00 f t. MSL in approximately 115 days.
3.4-8 l
i 1
Question No.
281.1 For all postulated design basis accidents involving release of (6.1.1.2) water into the containment building, estimate the time-history f
of the pH of the aqueous phase in each drainage area of the building.
Identify and quantify all soluble acids and bases within the containment.
Respcase t'
AS comitted to in letter i G03-83-333, dated April 20, 1983, i
the following is a complete response to the subject question.
l The time-history of the pH of the aqueous phase in the contain-ment sump for postulated design basis accidents involving re-lease of water into the Containment Building is discussed in Section 6.5.2.
The only dead volume in the containment, where water will be trapped, is the reactor vessel cavity.
Significant leakage into the reactor vessel cavity is not expected to take place. How-ever, in order to determine the effects on the SIS sump pH, the pH transients were calculated assuming a maximum leakage equal to 4% of CS pump flow rate. The 4% leakage rate was established by multiplying the spray intensity (i.e., CS flow rate divided by the Containment cross sectional area) with the annular area between the reactor vessel and refueling pool wall (assuming no obstruction). This product was divided by the total containment spray flow rate and multipliad !;y 100. The results of the pH transients-in the containment SIS sump and the reactor cavity are shown in Figure 6.5-5.
The reactor cavity leakage rate only produces small changes in the containment spray and sump pH.
Continued leakage will. bring the pH of the reactor cavity closer to the pH of the SIS sump. For details of the pH transient analysis, refer to Section 6.5.2.
The sources and quantitts of all soluble acids and bases (in-side and outside the containment) used for the containment spray sump pH calculations are as follows:
Concentration, System / Component Volume. Gallons opm boron Reactor Coolant System 93,858 - 97,224 0 - 1600 (including pressurizer)
Safety Injection Tanks 53,600 - 57,600 4,200 - 6,200 Refueling Water Storage 664,000 - 826,800 4,000 - 4,400 Tank (RWST)
Spray Chemical Tank 9,000 - 10,000 0
(40%NaOH) i
.--,---.,,,rm-
.rve,
-er-
-c 1-
-- +,
.-.w.-
t-,-r-v.,,--.wr.-r,-,-mvv
-.-r e v
-e,y y
ve w r
4 I
Question No.
281.1 Response (Cont'd)
Only the RCS and Safety Injection Tanks are located inside the Containment. The spray chemical tank and RWST are located in the Reactor Auxiliary Building and the yard respectiJely. All of the above sources will be injected into the Containment after a DBA. A description is provided ir. Section 6.5.2.
i g-w w
- ~ -- - -
p w
1829W-1 ggp_3 b
Io FSAR lf 27 6.5.2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM The Containment Spray System (CSS), in addition to its post-accident suppression and heat removal function (see Cubsection 6.2.2) serves to remove the post-accident fission products from the containment atmosphere following a loss of coolant accident. The removal of f1ssion products is accomplished by using an additive subsystem which injects sodium hydroxide (NaOH) into the borated CSS flow and maintains the containment spray solution pH sufficiently high for rapid absorption of radioicdines. Furthermore, the additive subsystem helps maintain post accident containment sump pH control. The CSS conforms to CE interface requirements as described in CESSAR-F Subsection 5.4.7.1.3 p.3.
6.5.2.1 Design Bases The design bases for the CSS as a fission product cleanup system are as follows:
a)
Provide adequate capability for the fission product scrubbing of the containment atmosphere following the design basis LOCA so that the offsite dose and doses to operators are within the guidelines of i
10CFR100 and General Design Criteria 19 respectively. The radioactive material release assumptions of Regulatory Guide 1.4 " Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors" and simultaneous operation of other fission product removal systems are used in the determination of system capability (see Subsections 6.5.1 and 6.5.3).
The radioiodine and noble gas activity inventories in containment following accidents, are given in Chapter 15.
Refer to Appendix 151 for a discussion of radiological consequences of accidents.
b)
Maintain the containment spray solution pH sufficiently high to provide rapid absorption of radiciodines yet prevent caustic corrosion of materials ar.d protective coating within containment.
idinl /wa cd *M g' System h. spray pH.e4-+Q g,g a gg, c)
MaintaintheContainmentSpray-Q
_<___1 o -
- y -_
g This pH range is[fter-miniave-f-low-le-reachedi int:ined af ter CSAS initiation which is o.tsm,{
eg n. 1 :
three minutes after3 SIASkaad-+
to d Mb3<4 a
WLdb.
d)
Achieve a containment sump pH of between 8.5 and 11 af ter all the spray chemical has mixed with the available water inventory included in the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), safety injection tanks and Reactor Coolant System blowdown, taking into account the initial range of RWST A k boric acid concentrations and 1:- '-- n. Mny of RC kh W 4u in%Tc].
e)
Remove elemental and particulate iodines with the following minimum first order rencval coefficient $n accordance with WASH 1329:
6.5-22
1829W-2 WNP-3 Q Agl,l FSAR g
Iodine Form First Order Removal Coefficient.
Elemental 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />"1 Particulate 0.45 hour5.208333e-4 days <br />0.0125 hours <br />7.440476e-5 weeks <br />1.71225e-5 months <br />s-1 f)
Minimize the possibility of precipitation of sodium hydroxide.
g) he CSS will be capable of performing its function following a 1DCA, assuming a single active component f ailure.
h)
The GS is designed to seismic Category I requirements and in accordance with ASME Section III, SL.-
Class 2.
All system materials are chosen for compatibility with NaOH Subsection 6.2.2 describes additional design bases of the CSS including sizing of the system and components.
6.5.2.2 System De sign (for Fission Product Removal) skata\\
The CSS and the3 additive subsystem are shown on Figure 6.2-27.
1he CSS consists of two independent and redundant loops each consisting of a spray pump, shutdown heat exchanger, piping, valves, spray headers and nossles.
1he additive sub stem (shown separately on Figure 6.5-2) consists of one chemical storage ta wo independent and redundant piping loops (each connected to the suction of containment spray pump), one chemical storage tank tes t pump, o ne N2 supply line, chemical fill and drain connections, and associated
' valves. The additive subsystem is redundant and will function assuming a single active failure. Detail design parameters of the major components era given in Tabl 6.5.2-2.
~
dwaccd The design of the CSS with respect to effective airborne iodine removal and material compatibility is accomplished by the use of a buffered solution of borated water with the injection of sodium hydroxide (NaOH). 1he NaOH is l'
Mfstored in thh@emical Storage Tank located in the Esactor Auxiliay Buildiag a t El 362.50 f t.
A nitrogen cover gas is provided in thejfhemical Storage k9 Tank to preclude deterioration of the Nag and provide the drivingead of th.
tank contents to the containment s$EIy[Ianes.
Heating of thepenical Storage i
Tank in addition to continuous heat tracing of all the piping and instrumentation lines that handle NaOH is provided to prevent precipitati:rc. of NaOH in the event that ambient temperatures fall to within 10F of the Mg precipitation point.
ll
. jp j!>
d.
- 1
'n During the chemical injection phase, NaOH is njected into the suction of the containment spray pumps by thegmenical St age Tank cover gas to maintain the pH at i:he pump discharge between 8.5 and under the f ull range of Refueling l
Water Storage Tank level and boron concentration.
1he total quantity of NaOH stored and injected will ensure a containment sump pH of between 8.5 and 11 for long-term recirculation. Maintaining the pH of the containment sump and l
6.5-23 l
q G281. /
3 O Se_d h"
l jf) The spray chemical storage tank (SCST) is a stainless steel, horizontal cylindrical tank with elliptical heads. It has a total capacity of 19,783 gallons. The SCST tank is filled with approximately 10,000 gallons of 40 percent by weight NaOH solution. The remainder of the SCST volume is purged and filled with nitrogen. The nitrogen is added to maintain a tank pressure between 240 psig and 260 psig. Low and high tank pressure alarms are provided in the Control 3
' Room. The pressurized gas provides the driving force for injecting approximately 9,500 gallons of NaOH solution into the CS pump suction lines during the injection mode.
At the end of the chemical injection the pressure in the SCST decreases to approximately 84-92 psig. This pressure is higher than the maximum CS pump suction pressure during this mode (maximum pump suction pressure will be less than 52 psig).
Therefore, even at the lower tank pressure the N2 gas can provide enough driving force to inject the chemical into the Containment Spray System.
The SCST it, provided with a pressure relief valve (2CS-R003 SA/B) i for overpressure protection.
The size of the valve is selected based on the maximum N, supply flow rate. The maximum N supply flow 2
rate is determined by Kasuming that the N supply pressure control 9
valve (PCV-CS-0345 as shown in attached Figure 6.5-2) has failed in the fully open position. This condition results in the maximum N2 supply flow rate that the SCST.will be exposed to under failed conditions.
^
The capacity of' the relief valve is based on this value plus a'10~
~
percent margin.
In the WNP-3 design, the maximum N2 supply rate (control valve in failed open position) is slightly less than 1000 VS H5 scfm. The relief valve design capacity is 1100 scfm. In addition ca this, after the tank is fully purged the N, supply line is manually (remotely) isolated from the SCST by closing isolation valve 2CSg)
SA/B. - Thus, overpressurization of the SCST is entirely eliminated.
1 I
e
=.
spray water following a IDCA to a minimum value of 8.5 during the CSS injection mode and a maximum value of 11 during recirculation will reduce the probability of stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel components exposed to containment sump water and provide ef fective removal of post-1DCA airborne iodine in the containment atmosphere. he NaOH is injected at the suction of the containment spray pumps and it is assumed that sufficient turbulence is created in the passage of fluids through the pump, valves, and flow orifices to assure a complete and uniform mixing of NaOH within the spray solution at the discharge of the spray nozzles. 3: %%
fi;;.;;; i; 1 21..;.2 1
.... A LM he CSS has two modes of operation.
The source of water supply during the two modes of operation is as follows:
Injection mode: he containment spray pucps take auction from the Refueling Water Storage *ank.
De injection mode is automatically initiated upon receipt of a Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS).
Recirculation mode: he containment spray pumps take suction from the containment recirculation sump. The recirculation mode is automatically initiated by the recirculation actuation signal (RAS) af ter a predetermined low level is reached in the RWST.
Refer to Section 7.3 for a discussion of SIAS, CSAS and RAS.
The design of the spray headers conforms to the shape of the containment done.
De spray headers are located as high as practicable in the upper portion of the containment area. With this configuration, a maximum f all height of the sprayed droplets is attained, and as a result the heat removal function of the system is optimized. 1he spray nozzles located on the spray I
headers are spaced at equal distances from each other.
Nozzie orientations are selected to provide maximum spray coverage and achieve a uniform
- dis tribution of sprayed water in the containment space. Maximum containment space coverage will contribute to the effective iodine removal function of the system.
he number of nozzles per header, nozzle orientation, nozzle spacing as well as spray coverage distributions are shown on Figures 6.5-3 and 6.5-4.
k taineen y nozzles are of the open throat design with an orifice drameter of 3 inches and are not subject to clogging. The nossles are designed to pass a flow of 15.2 spa with a 40 psi pressure drop across the nozzle.
he nozzle produces a mean diameter spray droplet of approximately 2308, and when oriented to spray vertically downward, produces a circle of 14 f t diameter at a distance of 100 feet from the nozzle. he spray coverage distributions shown on Figures 6.5-3 and 6.5-4 are based on an effectiv'e fall height of spray droplets 100 feet from the spray nozzles.
he calculations of g
the spray coverage area were performed at post-accident conditions taking into account the coverage " shrinkage" of the spray patterns due to a higher density atmosphere.
Detailed spray nozzle parameters are given in Table 6.5.2-3.
A histogram of the observed drop size frequency for the spatial drop size 6.5-24 9
. ~. _
_.__~
t 182 9W-4 WNP-3 gg g,f FSAR S
distribution is shown on Figure 6.5-7.
Assumptions used in the calculation of the spray effectiveness for the conversion to a temporal drop size are j
presented in Subsection 6.5.2.3.
The CSS is automatically initiated upon receipt of the Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS).
During this mode (injection) the Containment Spray Pumps take suction from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) and inject borated water into containment through the spray nozzles./The additi e bsystem is a tomatically ' nitiated af te the Contain t S pr ay Pu ps reach a pre t minimu flow, he ad ' tive subs tem injection is tion d con trol valve open ad NaOH is inject into e suction of the Con i ent Spray yJM Pumps.
NaOH injection rate i c
trolled by the flow rat f th e ugl Contain pray Pumps. he rati f the N.30H flow to the onta' ent Spray Pumps f ow is eld constant to ma' tai the pH a t th e pum dis cha rg etween 8.5 a 9.5 durt the injectia ph ase of he CSS under he f ull range f RWST )
(leve and boron con neratioN, men the level on the RWST reaches a prehet low point, a Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS) is generated which initiates the recirculation mode.
Daring this mode, the suction of the Containment Spray Pumps is switched from the RWSI,to the containment sump. h e NaOH flow rate is automatically adjusted to maintain the same ratio of chemical to Containment Spray Pumps flow as established before. The pH of the spray flow increase s as the Containmen t S pray Pumps r. 2c n 's switched from the hi;;hly acidic RWST t o the alkaline containment sump
-A this mode, the maximum value of pH will be below 11 assuming all combinations o f cingle failures.
Injection of NaOH coni.inues until the level in Chemical Storage Tank reacnes a preset r
3 low poin t ; a t tha t point, the additive subsystem injection isolation valves y 1 are automatically closed to isolate the tank, thereby ending injection of NaOH.
u Q
rc,>%e The pH transients in the containment sump and CSP discharge are a function of possible single f ailures in the Emergency Core Cooling Sys em (ECCS),
Containment Spray Pumps, NaOH injection trains, RWST leve (664,000-826,800 gallons f or two tanks) and boron concentrations (4000-4400 ppm). The pH transients for the worst cases are discussed b low:
Figu 6.5-5 shows the varia on o f pH' 'n the ntainment su with respec to time for the mos extreme con ' tions.
Curve 1 re era to the conditio of all contain t spray and EC pumps operatin with the 5
1 f ailure o one NaOH inj tion train and a de ign NaOH flo o f 60 gpm,
LDSM L kconcurrent ' th th e h i est RWST level and bo 'c acid co centration.
I h is combinat'on res ts in the loves t sump pH th du ng injection
, )a I and recirculat n.
Curve Il refers to the condi *on f b oth
- containment spra umps and associated NaOH inject trains operating at a design Na0 ow of 60 gpm with both HPS1 pum and one LPSI pump, concurrent wi the owes t RST level and boric ac' d c ncentration.
l This combina on res ts in the highest sump pH o th ring injection 1
and recircu ation. E e curves envelope all p ssible alue s o f sump pH result
- g f rom variou s ingle f ailures, RW initial onditione and NaOH in' ction rate s, and u s show that des' gn basis Sub ction 6.5.2. d will be met.
Co nt inment spray an additive flow ates for erating conditions disu ssed above e shown in Table 6.5.2-5.
6.5-25
.t D81. l Thseri B"
% The time delay, from automatic initiation of the Containment Spray System (CSS) until chemical addition begins, is expected to be less than 10 seconds. This limitation is due to the length of time that the chemical injection isolation valve, Tag No. 2CS-VUO55SAR (2CS-VUO56 SBR), requires to reach the fully open position. Upon receipt of a Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS), the CS pump A (B), the chemical injection isolation valve, and the CSS isolation valve, Tag No. 2CS-VSO91SA (2CS-VSO92SB),
are activated. The pump reaches full operating ' speed in three (3) seconds, s
whereas, the CSS and chemical injectio. Isolation valves reach the fully open position in 5 and 10 seconds respectively. Since the above components are activated simultaneously, the limiting factor for beginning the chemical addition is assumed to be the longest operation time delay. Therefore, chemical addition is expected to start within 10 seconds following automatic initiation of the Containment Spray System.
g The method used for controlling the chemical injection flow rate is by maintaining the ratio of NaOH and containment spray flow rates at a constant value during the chemical injection phase.
This is accomplished by employing a flow control valve: Tag No.
j FCV-CS-0318AS (FCV-CS-0318BS) on the chemical injection line.
l This valve adjusts the NaOH flow rate when the CS pump flow rate changis. The flow ratio value (set point) is selected so that for all CS pump flow rates (in the system operating range), the resultant pH of the sprays is between 8.5-11.0.
The flow control valve is modulated by the ratio control loop. This loop establishes the desired NaOH flow rate by using the product of the CS pump flow signal and the ratio setpoint as the demand signal input to the NaOH flow controller.
'The NaOH flow controller compares actual NaOH flow rate with demand flow rate and adjusts the NaOH flow rate (if necessary) until any deviation
-is eliminated. This operation is fully automatic and no operator action is required to manipulate the control valve.
i t
GLMI.I h 5d f k = D 7
u Figures 6.5-566 show the results of the pH transient analysis.
Case I represents the values of the containment spray pH during the minimum spray pH transient. This is established with the following conditions:
1.
Maximum CS pump flow rate.
2.
Maximum boric acid concentration in RWST 3.
Corresponding NaOH flow rate bcacd cn %c prc4dT cf tL t 4(ow rdic set pd. # c,4 wxWum t:.%-4 J spung pwr,o 4 tow.
4.
Single failure of one chemical and one containment spray train 5.
Maximum RC system water inventory 6.
Maximum RC system boric acid concentration
?>Mee's;; inte :he Reec;er -V;;;;1-Gevity (R" C vity-dey; -
Case II represents the values of the containment spray pH during the maximum pH transient. This case is established ae follows:
1.
Minimum CS pump flow rate 2.
Minimum boric acid concentration in the RWST 3.
Corresponding NaOH flow rate bas-Q cn %c. %d cT tt c Jfow' (cWo set pod ed mW' m (44 sm(J sp,q pu p flow.
4.
Single failure of one HPSI and one LPSI train 5.
Minimum RC system water inventory 6.
Minimum RC system boric acid concentration
~4 r '_- ' age ir.:; the R ::ter V__:et-cavity:
s 1829W-5 3
gg g, y g
hgu 6.5-6 shows the varia 'on ohH *n the spray water wit re spect
's to time for the most extr conditions.
Grve I on Figure
.5-6 re fers to the same condi ons as Curve I on igure 6.5-5.
is combinatio results in e lowes t spray pH du ' g both i ection and re circ ulatio (until 1 the chemical is injecte Ou e II on Figure 6.5-6 refers t the ondition of all containment s a and ECCS pumps t
operating with t f ailure of one NaOH injection tra with a design NaOH flow of 60 concurrent with the lowest RW 1e 1 and boric acid concentra on.
Ourve III on Figure 6.5-6 re era to condition of all containee spray ad ECCS pumps and both N trains o rating with a tota design Ns0 flow of 120 spa, conc rent with the owest RWST level nd boric aci concentration. Bo of these conditi e result i the highest spra pH both during
- jection and recircul ion (until 1 the chemical is t jacted), but ich different time gansi nts.fthese curves envelope all po'esible values of spray pH resulting from various single failures, RWST initial conditions and NaOH injection rates and thus show that design basis Subsection 6.5.2.lc will be met.
Containment spray and additive flow rates for the operating conditions discusesd above are shown in Table 6.5.2-5.
";;11 m e'e A=d =Mc;; he; i;;; ::::ide ed in the det:-ie tier ;f p".
4eenesente.- 1he only dead volume in the containment, where the water will be y
trapped, is the reactor cavityg weve, since the react cav' y will be
+
Ffilled ow ver a long period o me (sprays will leak rough the seal 0 {
- J ool rbs e value of pH in the av y will be the e as e sump.
he length of time for additive injection as well as the time of initiation of s_
the CSS recirculation are shown on Figures 6 5-5 and 6.5-6 for the various V
modes of operation discussed above. The CSS is designed to operate continuously in thgecirculation mode.
1he time delays for starting the GS and time of first
l._ delivery through the nozzleg with and without s
y_
of fsite power are given in 1hble 6.5.2-6. % MM dAT.'o sk rts d b n
1 0 Loco,vts -follow % u c.1M.
The containment free volume is made up of two defined regions, one above the operating floor - EL. 425 f t. - and one below. 1he portions of sprayed and unsprayed volumes of these two regions are tabulated in Table 6.5.2-4 for both trains A and B.
It should be noted that train B provides a higher sprayed perc entage than train - A.
This is due to the different physical arrangement of the ' spray headers.
1he unsprayed volume above the operating floor is the free I
space above the spray headers and the containment vessel dome, and the space below the spray nossles before the sprays are fully developed and overlapped.
The unsprayed volume below the operating floor is basically the space which is not covered by the sprays due to the obstruction of the steel grating and equipment on the operating floor and lower elevations.
It is conservatively assumed that the steel grating creates a 30 percent obstruction to the free volume below EL. '425 f t.
Generally, the region below EL. 425 f t. is f ully covered by the sprays with the exception of the pressuriser cubical, the reactor vessel cavity and isolated pockeys of space created by the obstruction of equipment located at EL. 425 ft. andq1 ewer.
1he unsprayed volumes are bel-O 6.5-26
In serf. " E "
ggf,/
t c
9 Significant leakage into the reactor vessel cavity is not expected to take place.
However, in order to determine the effects on the sump pH, the pH transients were calculated assuming a maximum leakage equal to 4% of CS pump flow rate.7The results of the pH transient analysis (shown in parenthesis on Fig. 6.57 ) indicate that ths 5
impact of spray water trapped in the RV cavity is insignificant and that the value of the sump pH will be slightly lower than the value when no leakage is assumed.
However, even under these conditions the sump pH will be within the acceptable limits.
l4(k'u AsTt Qcs,sda fu&&(
o t
.dte i, N sit muettg y 4, k k i
N d
a.e. c s 4w am gn._, <- na ~.<
aum3 Mk A.t.u-en U( %
<um N
M' DQQ 4%Id=k d a m.c (N' n pa,we:r 1I
(-,q ~b uc~o Geh4 y h tRdL cuaa--T
@ g ffow ~Ctt c 4 J @ ct t00 s
s
- h.
. p,
- 4.2s e
\\i
- \\
s
?
j 3
b,[
t
- ,a'-g n
4 y
T r
M.
v' 3
, -, - _ -. ~ -
_4.
s 1829W-6 WNP-3 g gf, f FSAR
/0 b
expected to be at a higher temperature than the surroundin@ lace which would
. covered by the sprays. As a result, a natural convection would take p tend to move the air from the unsprayed volumes toward the surrounding volumes covered by the sprays. This process would provide mixing of the trapped air with the containment sprays thereby facilitating the removal of airborne iodine.
Table 6.5.2-1 provides the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the system.
6.5.2.3 Desian Evaluation The spray removal constant, A, for iodine is evaluated using the models described in ANS-56.5-1979. The model assumes a balance between iodine entering and leaving the containment atmosphere with first order removal produced by the spray. The resulting equation, as given in ANS-56.5-1979 for the removal rate is:
A=
FHE V
h -1 A = iodine removal rate $ r where:
F = spray flow rate, f t /hr -
E = absorption ef ficiency H = instantaneous partition coefficient V = net free volume of containment, ft3 For the removal of elemental iodine, the absorption efficiency is defined by:
c E = C-Co No -
where:
C = concentration of iodine in the drop Co = initial concentration of iodine in containment atmosphere C* = equilibt tum concentration of iodine in containment atmosphere C* is defined by:
1*
Co
[ =. N 4,DF' where:
DF = decontamination factor for sodium hydroxide, equal to:
H*
DF = 1 + VL 5
where:
VL=
volume of liquid in containment sump plus overflow from containment sump Vg =
net free containment volume minus VL equilibrium iodine partition coefficient H
=
__ x 6.5-27 m.
W 1829W-7 NP 3 (5 ;( g g
g It
' The inggantaneous iodine partition coef ficient given on Figure 8.3-1 of ANS 56.5 see used for H. With a sump solution pH of 8.5, the same figure gives
~.
a partition coefficient, H*,
of 5000.
i The use of the actual plant parameters in the above formulations yields DF, and iodine removal coefficients, A, higher than the values allowed in the
. plate-out model. Since the of fsite doses, given 2n Appendix 15,I, have been calculated using the 50 percent iodine instantaneous plate-out model, credit is only taken for spray removal until the initial iodine concentration has been reduced by a DF of 100. Elemental and particulate iodine removal coefficients are limited to 10 hr-1 and 0.45 hr-1, respectively. No credit for methyl iodide removal by the sprays is taken.
6.5.2.4 Tests and Inspections Pre-operational testing will be performed on the CSS and Additive Subsystem to confirm that the systems design wfl1 be capable of controlling NaOH injection f
tainmeqt5hra[jflow. To accomplish these objectives rate as a function ofago 4
1 '
pre-operational kea s will bs-pErfbrand under conditions which duplicate, as closely as practicable, the performance that is required in the event of an accident.
The pre-operational and periodic tests for the CSS are described in Chapter 14.-
Technical Sp'ecifications for the CSS are provided in Chapter 16.
6.5.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements The CSS is automatically actuated by the CSAS as described in Subsection
.7.3.1.1.2.5.
The CSAS is ini,tiated from two redundant channels, A and B with s
the instrumentation and. centrols for the equipment in Channel A, physically and electrically separated from the instrumentation and controls for the equipment in Channe1~B. Indication and control of the proper ratio of chemical injection and containment spray flows will enable the operator to monitor the fission product removal ~ f unction of the system. Design details
.and logic of the instrumentation is discussed in Section 7.3.
6.5.2.6 Meterials The materials used in the CSS' are compatible with the NaOH and boric acid solutions... Containment. Spray System component specifications restrict metals in contact with the spray'aolution and the Na0U'to be austenitic stainless steel type 304. None of the materials used are subject to decomposition by radiation"or. thermal environment. Specifications require that the materials be unaf fected when exposed to the equipment design temperature, total
~ integrated radiation dose, the caustic solution and the boric acid.
With respect to..the susceptibility of (NaOH) to pyrolytic decomposition, sodium hydroxide'is s, table.
4 6.5-28 l
4 l
a
+
WNP-3 1829W-8 FSAR g
/ 2.
s In WCAP-7153, Westinghouse reported that solutions of 3000 ppe Boron and 0.15 M NaOH irradiated in austenitic stainless steel vessels at 72F up to 8radeshowednosignificantpHchange(pH=9.5gersolids 1 6 x 10 Solutions irradiated at 150F up to 3.1 x 10 rads also showed deposition.-
no change.
Therefore, the spray solutions and the containment sump solutions are considered to be stable.
J 6.5-29
f i,
I WNP-3 18319-1 FSAR TABLE 6.5.2-1 FAllERE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (DNTAIMMENT WATER pH ADJUSTMENT SYSTEM
( ACilVE FAIUiltMNLY)
Me thod o f inherent Compensating Component Failure %de Effeet De t ec tion Provision Yf urt
/ 1) 2CS VS115 A/B Spurious opening a.
Righ Pressure nitrogen Pressere indicator Safety salve will vent overpressure.
flow into CST located in Control b.
Possible dep+essurisation Room.
Oseck valve in !!ne prevents N2 of CST N2 blanket flow out of CST.
/ 2) 2CS FOOLSA or a.
Fatto fully open High MaOH flow into one Class IE NaOH flow None required. High MaOH flow auto-2CS-F002SB due to mechanical /
containment spray line, leading switches enersteing natically closes valve 2CS-VUO55SAR motor fatture to high spray pH high flow stare in or 2CS-VUO56 SBR.
Control Room.
- b.. Fa t t o r
Full /Partist loss of NaOH Class IE MeOH flow Ene required - spray and sump pH partially closed flow to one CS line.
switches energining still remain within design ilmitw low flow stare in per Figures 6.5-5 and 6.5-6.
Control Room.
3) 2CS-VUO53SA or Falls fully or partially Full / Partial loss of MaOH Class IE Me0H flow None required - spray and sump pH 2 CS-VUO 54S B closed flow to one CS line switches energt:Ing at t!! remain within design liette low flow stare in per F!Rures 6 5-5 and 6.5-6.
Costrol Room.
]4) 2CS-VUO55SAR or a.
o Fe t t e.jstHpr Full / Partial loss of Ma0R Class IE Me0H flow Mone required - spray and sump pH 2 CSWUO 56S BR partially blosed flow to one CS line switches energining Jttil remain within design limits low flow alarm in per Figures 6.5-5 and 6.5-6.
Control Room.
b.
Falls open (after Ms0H Injection line le not Position bne required - The spray and sump MaOH injection)
Isolated when CST empties indication pH still remain within design limite per Figures 6.5-5 and 6.5-6 even t! the minimum tonk contents, which would normally stay in the tank af ter the chemical injection has g4gdg
( bg ended, are injected into the con-tainment sprays.
< 5)
Pressure IndicatorA Erroneously indicates Mone - Pl serves no safety Pressure indicator
.M on Itne 2(31-072S A/B htsh or low pressure control or monitorig function located in Control y ~D5 Room.
4 7
7
(
t c
(
-e WNP-3 1831w-2 FSAR TABLE 6 5.2-1 (Cont'd)
Nethod of inherent Compensating Component Fallure Mode Ef fec t_
Det ec t ton Fro vi sio n 6) tevet Switch CS0344AS.
a.
Does not send signal 9bne 1 out of 2 level switch Mone required CS0348AS, or CS0344BS, when low tank level is logic assures CST isolation CS03488S reached signal b.
Sende signal before One NaOH injection line Class IE NaOH injection continues thre low tank level is isolated before tank empties indicating lights on other line; pH still reesins within reached respective valve.
design limits per Figures 6.5-5 and 6.5-6.
7)
Invel Indicator A Indicates higher or Mone - level indicators serve Redundant level or 8 on CST lower level than actual no saf ety control or monitoring indicator function 8)
Temperature Indicator Indicates higher or Ibne - temperature indicators Class IE A or 8 on CST love +eeeJ than actual serve no safety control or temperature switch y
M4 monitoring f unction actuating alara.
9)
NaOH Flow Transmit ter a.
Senees higher NaOH Flow controller decreases None : required None required spray & sump FT-CS0318AS or FT-CS031865 flow than actual NaON injection to one CS If ne pH still remain within design Ilmits per Figures 6.5-5 and 6.5-6.
v.
i b.
Senses lower NaOH Flow controller increasesNaOH None required FS-0326AS or FS-032885 senses flow than actual injection to one CS line t.lgh NaOH flow and isolates NaOH injection !!nes spray & sump pH still temain within design limite per Figures 6.5-5 and 6.5-6.
,. 10)
Senses lower Me0H flow rate on affected Moue required None required - spray and sump pH Flow Transmitter FT-338Ai CS flow than actual er 33855 train will decrease.
still remain within design limite per Figures 6.5-5 and 6.5-6.
a.
Senses higher Mm0H flow rete on af fected Mone required None required - spray and sump pH CS flow than actual train will increase.
still remain within design limits Q
"W-:
_.J
'.- 3j i ll)
Diesel Generator Any which results in less of power to one NaOH Diesel Generator Redundant trotn provides 1001 A or 8 1 se s o f powe r to emerg ency injection train malf unction alaru NaOH injection capability.
bus.
4g 6
1831W-3 WNP-3 FSAR CQ M j,(
15~
TABLE 6.5.2-2 CONTAINMENT WArER pH ADJUSTMENT SYSTEM DESIGN par CETERS OF MAJOR COMPONENTS Chemical Storage Tank Number 1
Code ASME III, Class 2 Total Volume, gallons (Calc.)
19,783 Liquid Volume, gallons 10,000 Design Temperature, F 125 gkJ CgdC""If $"*g)
Design Pressure, psig 265 NaOH Concentration, 8 Q[.
40%
Injection Rate, gpm y 50- W Operating Temperature, F 70 - 85 Operating Pressure, psig 65 - 245 Material Stainless Steel Cover Gas Nitrogen Heater (6), kW-Total 30kw (Skw/ Heater)
Test Pump Type Ce ntrifugal Capacity, gpm 60 Head, ft 100 Horsepower 10 Injection Isolation Valves Type Globe Operator Moto r-Operated Size 3 inch Injection Control Valves Type Globe Operator Electro-H draulic y
Size 3 inch
.v 6.5-32
lls TABLE 6.5.2-3 s
IODINE REMOVAL RATE CALCULATION PARAMETERS Spray Nozzle s (perkrain)
Number 329 Type Spraco 1713A Droplet Sauter mean diameter 230 microns Flow per nozzle (.dlingw) 15.2 gpa (40 psi drop)
Initial Spray Velocity 44 76 f t/sec Op :; M 41a= rate re; a i e
s Co ntainment Portion Unsprayed (See Table 6.5.2-4)
Diameter 150 ft c}re q c
Re fueling Na ter,Re quirements Design Volume (total for two tanks) 664,000 gallons Maximum Volume (total for two tanks) 826,800 gallons Spray Solution pH 8.5 % bihim*)
- Iodine Partition coefficient 5000 6.5-33
WNP-3 18 31W-5 FSAR Q 2.g l, l 17 TABLE 6,5.2-4 SPRAYED AND UNSPRAYED ODNTAINMENT VOLUMES Contalment Free Volume, ft3 Train A Train B Above Operating Floor 2,630,033 2,630,033 S pra yed 2,352,327 2,499,935 Unsprayed 277,706 130,098
% Sprayed 89.44 95.05
% Unsprayed 10.56 4.95 Below Operating Floor 774,663 774,663 Sprayed 492,245 492,245 Unsprayed 282,418 282,418
% Sprayed 63.54 63.54
% Unsprayed 36.46 36.46 3
Total Containment Free Volume, f t 3,404,696 3,404,696 3
2,971,287 3,118,895 Total Containment Sprayed volume, f t 3
Total Containment Unsprayed Volume, f t 433,409 285,801 Percentage of Total Containment 87.27 91.60 Free Volume Sprayed Perc entage of To tal Containment 12.73 8.40 Free Volume Unsprayed m._
6.5-34
WNP-3 1831W-6 MEI* l FSAR l8 TABLE 6.5.2-5 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND ADDITIVE FLOW RATES FOR ~3E MOST EXTREME pH TRANSIENTS Containment Sump pH Transients _ (See Figure 6.5-5)
'u_1 ( LowcL+- P h - nisming mat. (tu)T level %d w. kom con <e.d C.r :
I Component in Service Flow / Train, gym To tal Fl ow, g pm, HPSI (2) 1130 2,260 5000 10,000 M
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COMThietEMT sMAY TIME DELAYS OF 4BfhmtftsitftEEiWiir 33000ft-TO REACH FULL SPRAY NOZZLE FIDW WAc6 Okik idNCfr?
Of A"
cd C S bp 1-CSAS Setpoint to Diesel start 0.9 sec.
g,9 g 2-Time Re quired f or Full Diesel Generator 10.0 sec.
M.
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- Question No.
410.20 Verify that analyses of potential missile sources inside contain-(3.5.1.2) ment have included the reactor head bolts in addition to the possible missile sources considered in your FSAR.
Response
The steel plates in the three decks of.the Head Equipment Sup-port Structure (HESS) were designed to perform as an integral missile shield against missiles which are postulated to be generated in the reactor vessel head area considered in the i
design are the closure head nut, the closure head nut and stud and the control rod drive assambly. The associated kinetic energy of each missile (see CESSAR-F Table 3.5-1) indicates that an ejection of the control rod drive assembly is the worst postulated missile event and therefore governs the missile shield plate thickness requirements. Refer to FSAR Subsection 3.5.3.1.3 for further details.
4
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- Question No.
_ 410.39' Describe the effect on the e.afety function of the esser tial HVAC
- (9.4)
Systems in the event of a single failure in a fire damper in the Ventilation System ducts.
It is our position that such a failure not compromise the safety function of the HVAC System.
Response-All fire dampers installed in essential HVAC systems are seismic category I and have low probability of inadvertent failure.
Every area housing essential equipment required for safe shut-down of the plant represents only one of two redundant essential equipment areas served by redundant active HVAC systems. The failure of a single fire damper does not affect both HVAC trains. However, the area affected can experience a rise in temperature resulting from the cut-off of supply air.
The area temperature is monitored in the control room which will enable the operator to detect the malfunction and take correc-
'tive action by starting the redundant train.
- The shift from one operating HVAC system train to the standby train serving redundant essential areas will assure that the safety function of the HVAC system is not compromised by a sin-gle fire damper failure.
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Question No.
410.42 Verify that a s' ingle failure in any safety-related damper or (9.4.1)'
total failure of all non-safety-related dampers and ducts in the ESF switchgear, ESF equipment and battery rooms HVAC System will
.not prevent at least one train of the essential ESF switchgear room HVAC' System from performing its safety function.
Response
The single failure in any safety related damper in the ESF switchgear, Electrical Equipment and Battery Rooms HVAC System is addressed in the Failure Modes and effects analysis shown on the FSAR Table 9.4.5-3.
Each safety related damper is one of two identical dampers pro-viding'a similar' function in separate HVAC subsystem trains. The two HVAC subsystems include redundant active components which will assure that at least one standby HVAC system train is avail-able to provide.a similar safety function in the event of a sin-gle failure of one. active component.
The ESF switchgear,7ESF equipment and battery rooms HVAC system does not include any non-safety related dampers or ducts. All dampers and duct: work are seismic category I.
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Question No.'
430.14 In FSAR Section 9.5.4.3, you state that the temperature of the
-(SRP 9.5.4) stored fuel oil will be maintained at temperatures between 400F
- and 1040F. Explain how this will be accomplished.
If electric heaters are to be used, describe the type of heater and its operation, and control including seismic classification and source of power.
Response
As noted in our response to NRC Question 430.20 (see letter
- G03-83-711 dated 9/2/83), WNP-3 complies with the guidance of ANSI standard N195-76 which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.137. The Supply System has indicated in FSAR table 1.8-1 that no exceptions are taken to Regulatory Guide 1.137 at WNP-3.
Refer to FSAR Section 9.5.4.2.1 for a description of the WNP-3 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Enclosures. The tanks operate at snbient temperaure.
WNP-3 has.no reason to maintain the Fuel Oil temperature above 40'F.
The lowest recorded minimums do not approach a point that would affect the System capability to provide serviceable fuel to the Diesel Generators.
A meteorological period of record exceeding 20 years has been established at stations located at Olympia Elma, Oakville and Aberdeen, Washington. The data from these stations are considered representative of that expected at the site and correlate well with the results of the on site meteorological monitoring program (Refer to FSAR Section 2.3.2.1.2).
The lowest recorded minimum temperatures are -7*F at Olympia, 0 F at Elma, -8*F at Oakville and 6*F at Aberdeen. Similarly, the average monthly minimum temperatures are 38.1 F at Olympia, 37.8'F at Elma, 38.4*F at Oakville and 39.7'F at Aberdeen.
Diesel Fuel can be ordered from various suppliers in the area as discussed in FSAR Section 9.5.4.2.1 and a range of physical and chemical properties can be specified. The diesel fuel procured by
- the Supply System for use in the WNP-3 Emergency Diesel Generators will have a cloud point below -20*F and a pour point below -40'F.
FSAR Section 9.5.4 will be revised as shown to reflect the response to this question.
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=
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q.= u 9.5.4.2.4-Piping and Tanks J
i Piping lines conform to pressure and temperature requiremer N outlined in 1
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) B31.1 or American Society o' Hechanical Engineers (ASME)Section III, Class 3.
Process' lines less than 2-1/2 inches in diameter are schedule 80 pipe, while lines 2-1/2 inches and larger are schedule 40.
All valves are carbon steel. Valves less than 2-1/2 inches in diameter have 600 lbs ANSI rating, valves 2-1/2 inches in diameter and larger have 150 lbs.
ANSI rating.
9.5.4.3-Safety Evaluation The diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system safety evaluation is as follows:
~
The diesel generator fuel oil storIge and transfer system provides two independent sources of diesel fuel oil supply having a low heating value (LHV) of approximately 19,000 Btu /lbA Cloud pp.h f bc /ctd,10 f ed,, go yo4f-fg/w -
~ 40 P-Ihe/ capacity'of each of the DGFOSTS storage tank is sufficient.for seven day operation plus a seven percent margin of each of the diesel generators, at the highest actual operating load.- Thus, a 14-day total plus a 'seven percent margin diesel fuel oil inventory'is available for operation of one diesel f
generator during a complete loss of offsite electrical power. Within this period, offsite power is expected to be restored and additional fuel can be delivered to the plant. site.
The system components are of seismic Category I design and are installed wi' thin the confines of Category I structures.- The diesel oil storage tanks and day tanks'are located in separate' cubicles and surrounded by a barrier 2
lwith'a minimum fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Complete' physical' redundancy of mechanical and electrical components is provided in the DGFOSTS, to assure it can withstand any single failure of an active component.. Although any failure may result in loss of fuel to one
-diesel generator, the other diesel ~ generator can provide sufficient capacity for emergency conditiions, including safe shutdown of the reactor coincident with loss of offsite power. Electrical power is supplied through two separate engineered safeguard features channels so a single failure will not result in loss of independent. sources of fuel supply. A failure mode and effects analysis of.the DGFOSTS is presented in Table 9.5.4-3.
Each diesel generator fuel oil storage tank is provided with a distribution
. pipe inside the tank as shown on Figure 9.5.4-1 to minimize creation of turbulence of. the sediment on the bottom of the fuel oil storage tank.
am o.w -
ScN Goq 9.5-23 Anendment No. 2, (12/82)
WNP-3 FSAR 1313g 7 All openings in the diesel generator and storage tank rooms such as vent lines, fill lines and drain lines are designed to block at.y externally generated missile from entering the Category I structures, and located such that any oil spills will be completely contained within the enclosure.
The diesel generator fuel oil storage tank, day tank, and fuel oil gravity drain tank vent lines terminate outs:de the structure and are equipped with flame arrestor devices.
The diesel generator enclosure is provided with fireproof doors and wall louvers for natural ventilation to the outside atmosphere to insure that any l2 diesel fuel vapors are maintained well below the combustible limit.
Fire hazards are minimized through an automatic Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) fire protection system located in each fuel oil storage tank structure. The fire protection system also permits manual activation from a local manual release station, see Subsection 9.5.1.
Backup fire protection is provided by fire hoses from the yard hydrant system.
Where possible, fuel oil piping is of welded construction to minimize leakage.
The fuel oil piping is routed away from possible ignition sources such as high energy electrical lines.
In addition, all hot surf aces in the diesel generator room are insulated. Due to the diesel generator design there are co open flames in the diesel 23;;;.
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generator room.
Selection cf suitable materials compatible with the type of fuel oil required to operate the diesel generators assures that the system will not be subject to material corrosion. The system design prevents any fuel oil contamination. 4he--temperature-of the-fuel vitl-be-maintminad at_ A0F-ta_104 9.5.4.4 Testing and Inspection All components of the diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system are inspected and cleaned prior to installation.
Instruments are calibrated during testing and automatic controls are tested for actuation at the proper setpoints. Alarm functions are checked for operability and limits during plant preoperational testing. Automatic
. actuation of system components is tested periodically, see Section 7.4 After installation all components of the system will undergo initial hydrostatic testing to applicable code test standards set forth in ASME Section III Codes Subsection ND-6000, and will be tested with regard to flow paths,. flow and head capacities and operability. Pumps, valves, and controls J
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s m co y 9.5-24 Amendment No. 2, (12782)
Question No.
430.76-It is not apparent from the FSAR if the WNP-3 design sequences (SRP 8.2) safety loads when preferred power is available.
If so, the staff requires the following additional information of this design:
1.
A full description of this design feature in the FSAR. This should include load sequencer components, power supplies, test features and alarms.
2.
A reliability study on the load sequencer.
3.
A detailed analysis to assure that there are no credible sneak circuits or common mode failures in the load sequencer design that could render both on-site and off-site power sources unavailable.
4.
A load sequencer logic diagram in the FSAR.
Response
The load sequencing does not operate when the safety buses are connected to the preferred power source. The sequencer is brought into operation only upon the coincidental open. status of the class IE breaker connecting the Class IE bus to the off-site sources and closed status of DG breaker. Under all other condi-tions when preferred off-site power is available there is no need for load sequencing, and therefore it is not provided.
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Question No.
440.5 In compliance with interface requiremer,t 5.4.7.1.31.2, the FSAR SRP 5.4.7 states that 227 hours0.00263 days <br />0.0631 hours <br />3.753307e-4 weeks <br />8.63735e-5 months <br /> would be required to bring the RCS to 130 F after reactor shutdown. CESSAR indicates that 97 hours0.00112 days <br />0.0269 hours <br />1.603836e-4 weeks <br />3.69085e-5 months <br /> are required. Explain the difference and justify why 227 hours0.00263 days <br />0.0631 hours <br />3.753307e-4 weeks <br />8.63735e-5 months <br /> is acceptable.
Response
.The design basis for the SDC system is (1) to bring the RCS to a refueling temperature of 135'F 271/2 hours after S/D using two operating trains; and (2) to limit the temperature rise across the core to 75'F while removing core decay heat and LPSI pump heat using only one SDC train.
1 The SDC H/X for WNP-3 is based on maintaining 135'F refueling temperature at 27 1/2 hours after shutdown using two H/X's, two LPSI, and two CS pumps with maximum 95'F component cooling water. This results in a' smaller size SDC H/X for WNP-3 than SYS 80, which is based on the same parameters above, except 105'F component cooling water.
During post LOCA conditions, the component cooling water maximum temperature allowed is 120*F for both WNP-3 and SYS 80. There-fore, with the SYS 80 SDC H/X being larger than WNP-3 SDC H/X, the time required to obtain-135*F refueling temperature using only one train is 97 hours0.00112 days <br />0.0269 hours <br />1.603836e-4 weeks <br />3.69085e-5 months <br /> and 227 nours respectively.
These time intervals to bring the RCS.to refueling conditions post-accident are not design bases but result from the fixed parameters of the SDC system, therefore 227 hours0.00263 days <br />0.0631 hours <br />3.753307e-4 weeks <br />8.63735e-5 months <br /> is considered acceptable for WNP-3.
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QuestioniNo.
450.1 FSAR Subsection 6.5.2 describes the operation of the Containment
,(SRP' Spray System as a fission product removal system.
In this 6.5.2)_
Section, the FSAR states that~a nitrogen cover gas is provided as c
"the driving. head for the tank contents to the containment spray lines." This subsection also states that the NaOH injection rate is controlled by the flow rate of the containment spray pumps.
Describe in greater detail the-Na0H Injection System including:
the mixture weight percent of NaOH, the design overpressure of the nitrogen cover gas, the method by which the pump flow rates con-trol the injection rate (including any operator actions necessary to manipulate the control valves), the time delay expected from automatic initiation of the spray system until the preset minimum flow is established and chemical addition begins, and how a Con-trol Room operator can determine if the Na0H addition rate will adjust the spray pH within the prescribed pH range.
i
Response
a) The' sodium hydroxide (NaOH) concentration in the spray chemical storage tank is 40 percent by weight.
b) The spray chemical storage tank (SCST).is a stainless steel, horizontal cylindrical tank with elliptical heads.
It has a total capacity of 19,783 gallons. The SCST is filled with approximately 10,000 gallons of 40 percent by weight NaOH solution. The remainder of the SCST. volume is purged and fil-led with nitrogen. The nitrogen is added to maintain a tank pressure between 240 psig and 260 psig. Low and high tank pressure alarms are provided in the Control Room..The pres-surized gas provides the driving force for injecting approxi-mately 9,500 gallons of_NaOH solution into the_ Containment Spray (CS) pump suction lines during the injection mode.
At the end of the chemical injection, the pressure in the SCST decreases to approximately 84-92 psig. This pressure is
' higher than the maximum CS pump suction pressure during_this mode'(maximum pump suction pressure will be less than 52 psig). Therefore, even at a lower tank pressure, the N2 gas can provide enough driving force to inject the chemical into 4
- the Containment. Spray System.
The SCST'is provided with a pressure relief valve (2CS-R003 SA/B) for overpressure protection. The size of the valve is
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selected based on the maximum N2 supply flow rate. The max-imum N2 supply flow rate is determined by assuming that the N2 supply pressure control valve (PCV-CS-0345 as-shown in attached Figure 6.5-2) has failed in the fully open position.
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4 Question No.
450.1 This condition results in the maximum N2 supply flow rate
. Re_sponse that the SCST will be exposed to under failed conditions.
(Cont'd)
The capacity of the relief valve is based on this value plus a 10 percent margin.
In the WNP-3 design, the maximum N2 sup-ply rate (control valve in failed open position) is slightly less than 1000 scfm. The relief valve design capacity is 1100 scfm.
In addition to this, after the tank is fully purged, the N2 supply line is manually (remotely) isolated from the y
SCST by closing isolation valve 2CS-VBSll5 SA/B. Thus, over-pressurization of the SCST is entirely eliminated.
c) The method used for controlling the chemical injection flow rate is by maintaining the ratio of Na0H and containment spray flow rates'at a constant value during the chemical injection phase.. This is accomplished by employing a flow control valve, Tag. No. FCV-CS-0318AS (FCV-CS-0318BS) on the chemical injection line. This valve adjusts the NaOH flow rate when the CS pump flow rate changes. The flow ratio value (set-point) is selected so that for all CS pump flow rates (in the system operating range), the resultant pH of the sprays is between'8.5-11.0. The flow control valve is modulated by the ratio control loop. This loop establishes the desired Na0H flow rate by using the product of the CS pump flow signal and the ratic setpoint as the demand signal input to the Na0H flow controller. The NaOH flow controller compares actual Na0H
- flow rate with demand flow rates and adjusts the Na0H flow rate (if necessary) until any deviation is eliminated. This operation is fully automatic and no operator. action is required to manipulate the control valve.
d) The time delay, from automatic initiation of the Containment Spray System (CSS) until chemical addition begins, is expected s
to be less than 10 seconds. This limitation is due to the length of time that the chemical injection isolation valve, Tag No. 2CS-VUO55SAR (2CS-VU056 SBR), requires to reach the L
fully open position. Upon receipt of a Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS), the CS pump A (B), the chemical ll injection isolation. valve, and the CSS. isolation valve, Tag -
No. 2CS-VS091SA (2CS-VS092SB), are activated. The pump l'
reaches full operatng speed in threeL(3) seconds, whereas, the-CSS and chemical injection isolation valves reach the fully open position in 5 and 10 seconds respectively. Sin::e the above components are activated simultaneously, the limiting factor for beginning the chemical addition is assumed to be I
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Question No.
450.1 the longest operation time delay. Therefore, chemical
Response
addition is expected to start within 10 seconds following (Cont'd) automatic initiation of the Containment Spray System.
e) The control room operator can determine whether the pH of the sprays is within the allowable limits by monitoring the Na0H and containment spray pump flow rates. Assurance is justi-fied as follows:
The setpoint of the flow ratio value is selected taking into account all the parameters which affect the pH transients during the entire chemical injection phase. This includes the following:
1.
Maximum CS pump flow rate (6075 gpm) 2.
Maximum boric acid concentration in RWST 3.
Corresponding Na0H flow rate of 55.12 gpm (55.98
.77 gpm maximum instrument loop tolerance) 4.
Single failure of one chemical and one containment spray train 5.
Maximum RC system water inventory 6.
Maximum RC system boric acid concentration 7.
No leakage into the Reactor Vessel Cavity (RV Cavity dry).
The plot for Case I shows that the spray pH value will be 8.62 during the CS injection phase and will vary from 9.0 to 9.7 during the recirculation phase. At the end of the chemical addition, the pH will reach an equilibrium point equal to 8.65. Therefore, it is obvious that if the chemical addition rate is equal to or greater than a flow rate of 55.12 gpm, the actual value of spray pH will be at least equal tc or higher than the values above. To determine the effect of control system failure, a spray pH transient analysis has been per-formed with a NaOH flow rate equal to 48.5 gpm. This fiow rate is an extreme condition and represents the lower flow limit of a low flow alarm (setpoint of alarm is at 50.00 gpm with a + l.5 gpm tolerance) to alert the operator that the Na0H flow rate is below the allowable range. Even with the lower flow rate condition the pH will be 8.45 (not shown).
The spray pH of 8.45 will only take place during the CS injec-tion phase. The pH value will immediately rise above 8.5 at e
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' =00estionNo.
,450.1 the' start of the recirculation phase and will again reach
Response
'the equilibrium point of 8.65 at the end of the chemical addi-(Cont'd) tion as before.
' Case ~II. represents the values of the containment spray pH
~ during the maximum pH transient. This case is established as
~follows:
1.
Minimum CS pump flow rate (5675 gpm) 2.
Minimum boric acid concentration in the RWST
- s 3.
Corresponding Na0H flow rate of 52.98 gpm (52.21
.77 gpm for instrument loop tolerance) 4.
Single failure of one HPSI and one LPSI train 5.
Maximum RC system water inventory 6.
Maxir.;um RC system boric acid concentration 7.
No leakage into the Reactor Vessel Cavity The plot for Case II shows that the spray pH value will be 8.8 during the CS injection phase and will vary from 9.65 to 10.7 during the recirculation phase. At the end of chemical addi-tion the value of the pH will reach an equilibrium point at 9.3.
Therefore, if the NaOH flow rate is equal to 52.98 gpm or less, the actual spray pH will be at most, equal to, or lower than the values shown in Case II. To determine the effect of control system failure, a spray pH transient analysis has been performed using the same boundary conditions as above, but with a NaOH flow rate equal to 59.5 gpm. This flow rate is an L
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extreme condition and represents the higher flow rate limit of a high flow alarm (setpoint of alarm is at 58.00 gpm with +
1.5 gpm tolerance) to alert the operator that the Na0H flow rate is'above the allowable range. The highest pH value, with this flow rate is 11.0 (not.shown), and it occurs just before th eend of the chemical addition phase. Again, as in the pre-
. vious case, the spray pH will reach a constant value of 9.3 when the' chemical injection has ended.
'Therefore, by combining Cases I and II above, the following conclusion can be drawn. A control room operator has a number
'of means available to verify that the spray pH will be within
.the specified limits. These are:
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L Question-No.
i 450.1.
1.
Monitor the flow rates of the CS pump and the chemical Responso injection system and determine that the value of the flow (Cont'd; ratio is equal to the setpoint.
i 2.
Monitor the flow rates of the CS and Na0H and verify that they I
are between the following. limits:
t 5675 - 6075 gpm CS Na0H - 52.98 - 55.12 gpm 3.
If the Na0H flow rate is less than 50 gpm or more than 58 gpm, a low or high flow alarm will be annunciated in the control
' room.
FSAR Subsection 6.5.2 will be amended to provide an updated description of the Na0H injection system to reflect the response to this question.
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471.21 As per the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800) Sections 12.3-12.4.II.4.b.1, describe how your Airborne Radioactivity Monitoring System will detect ten MPC-hours of radioactivity (particulate, iodine, and noble gases) from any compartment which has a possibility of containing airborne radioactivity and which normally may be occupied by personnel.
Response
The WNP-3 airborne radioactivity monitoring system as described in FSAR Subsections 11.5.2 and 12.3.4, continuously monitors exhausted air from locations within the facility during normal operation.
Calculations were performed to determine the adequacy of the air-
<a borne radiation monitors in detecting 10 MPC-hours of particu-late, iodine and noble gas activity. The radiation monitors
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involved.are:
4 RAB Particulate and Noble Gas Monitor
'N FHB Particulate and Noble Gas Monitor Administraticn Building Particulate and Noble Gas Monitor Machine Shop Discharge Sampler Based on the calculations, these monitors are capable of detect-ing 10 MPC of particulate and noble gas activity in air in one hour.
Iodine monitoring is accomplished via collection and sub-sequent laboratory analysis.
. In addition to the above fixed monitors, WNP-3 has available six (6) mobile air monitors which can be used to monitor specific areas during extended.naintenance. As such, normally occupied loations are adequately monitored and specific compartments can be monitored as required.
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Question No.
480.19 Section 6.2.1.6, 6.2.2.4, 6.2.3.4, 6.2.4.4, 6.2.5.4, 6.2.6, 9.4.6.6.4, describe various (i.e., preoperational, startup and surveillance) tests for containment systems. Discuss and justify the acceptance criteria proposed for these tests.
Response
In letter #G03-84-030, dated January 17, 1984, the Supply System provided its response to this question. Subsequently a dis-crepancy was detected in that response that requires correc-tion. The original response to this question states that the containment tett pressure (Pa) is 39.6 psig, this is incorrect.
The correct test pressure, as noted on page 6.2-173 of the FSAR, is 39.4 psig.
Additionally, we note that the response to question number 451.6 revises the containment leak rate values shown on FSAR page 6.2-173.
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