ML20079S011

Response Opposing Lilco & NRC Objections to Intervenor Proposed Emergency Planning Contentions Modified to Reflect Rev 3 to Lilco Plan.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20079S011
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	01/30/1984
From:	Letsche K KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20079S010	List: ML20079S006 ML20079S011
References
ISSUANCES-OL-3, NUDOCS 8402030148
Download: ML20079S011 (72)

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a a UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

)

In the Matter of )

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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3

) (Emergency Planning)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY RESPONSE TO LILCO AND NRC STAFF OBJECTIONS TO INTERVENORS ' PROPOSED EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS MODIFIED TO REFLECT REVISION 3 OF THE LILCO PLAN Suffolk County hereby responds to the objections and comments of LILCO and the NRC Staff concerning Intervenors' Proposed Emergency Planning Contentions Modified to Reflect Re-vision 3 of the LILCO Plan (the " Proposed Modified Conten-tions"). See LILCO's Objections to Intervenors' Proposed Emer-gency Planning Contentions Modified to Reflect Revision 3 of the LILCO Plan, dated January 19, 1984 (" Objections"); NRC Staft Objections to Suffolk County's Revised Emergency Planning Contentions, dated January 19, 1984 ("NRC Objections").

Section I below contains the County's general response to the objections made by LILCO and the Staff.Section II contains the County's responses to specific objections made by LILCO and the Staff to particular contentions.

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The County. repeats the statement made in.the County's Mem-4.

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orandum which/ accompanied these Proposed Modified Contentions.

The County believes all-the modifications are proper. However, a

if any objection is sustained regarding a particular proposed modification to-a contention, .the County, insofar as that con-tention is concerned, will continue to rely on the previous version of the contention. See Memorandum Accompanying Pro-posed Modified Emergency Planning Contentions at 15.

The County also notes the following at the outset in order to keep the LILCO and Staff Objections and this Response in proper context. The. proposed modifications are, in almost every instance, intended to do nothing more than reflect factu-al changes to already admitted contentions. The changes are necessitated solely by the tnree substantial revisions LILCO has made in its Plan since issuance of the original Revision O which was submitted to-the Board in late May, 1983, and upon which the original contentions were based. Thus, it is impor-tant to keep in mind that LILCO cannot claim surprise or preju-dice with respect to any of the. proposed modifications, since the reasons for the changes are Plan modifications instituted by LILCO.

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- In addition, a reading of LILCO's objections leaves the.

-G clear - -but false -- impression that the Intervenors are impermissibly 1 submitting ~ new, late-filed contentions, or are attempting _ unfairly to . broaden the scope of the- issues to be litigated in this proceeding. Neither suggestion is correct.

< The format in which the Proposed Modified- Contentions were sub-

_ mitted'makes it easy to compare each proposed modified conten-tion with the original contention admitted by the Board. The County submits that a simple comparison of the two indicates the frivolous nature of the vast majority of LILCO's Objections.

. I. General Response A. Lack of Basis With respect to.several of the Proposed Modified Conten-tions, LILCO (but not the Staff) objected because of an alleged

" lack of basis." This objection was made in a similarly wholesale fashion by LILCO in its Objections to Intervenors' "Pevised Emergency Planning Contentions," dated August 2, 1983 (the " August Objections"). The County's general response to LILCO's lack of basis objection was stated in Suffolk County's Response to LILCO's Objections to Intervenors' Consolidated ,

Emergency Planning Contentions and to NRC Staff Response to p 9- , ,,-,w y w y - --,v

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< Draft; Emergency: Planning Contentions, dated July 12, 1983 (the-

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" July Response") , 'at ~ pages 7-11.

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The discussion of legal

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. authorities contained in the July Response is incorporated by -

l reference'and thus w'ill not be repeated in full here. In its Objections to'the Proposed Modified

• Contentions, LILCO again relies.upon an-inaccurate'and-improper interpretation of the basis requirement.

To' satisfy the requirement that a basis be stated for pro-posed contentions, an intervenor must assert the factual reasons for its belief that its contention is true. It is well

-established that an intervenor'need not state in its conten-

. tions the underpinnings for, or the bases of, the factual as-sertions in the contentions in order to satisfy the basis re-quirement. See Houston Lighting and Power Company (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1),'ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542

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• (1980); Mississippi Power and Light Company (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-130, 6 AEC 423 (1973). Each of ,

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-the Proposed Modified Contentions sets forth the factual reasons which form the basis for the conclusions stated in the contention. It is settled NRC law that no more is required.1/

1/ In fact, in its contentions the County has in many in-stances gone further and set forth the underpinnings for the factual assertions.

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.r Accordingly, the Proposed Modified Contentions satisfy the'

' basis requirement.

LILCO's " lack of basis" objections uniformly ignore the factual bases.that appear on the face of the contentions. Thus, the " lack of basis" L objections which have been asserted by i

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LILCO, in almost every instance, are in fact either a disa' gree-ment with the factual assertion set forth in the contention, or an_ argument that bases should be provided for the factual as-

{t sertions that are themselves the bases of the contention. How-ever, a challenge to .the correctness of a factual assertion which forms the' basis of a contentien goes to the merits of the contention and is irrelevant to the issue of admissibility.

That-is an issue to be decided either through summary disposi-tion or at the hearing. Whether the stated basis of a conten-4 tion is itself correct is not a proper. subject for a ruling on the a'dmissibilityfof the contention. See Grand Gulf, supra, 6

j. AEC at-426;'Allens Creek, supra, 11 NRC at 551.

'Furthermore, in Allens Creek, supra, the Appeals Board ex-i

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pressly rejected the argument made by LILCO in several of its

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objections, that in addition to stating the factual assertions that form the. bases of its contentions, an intervenor also must fprovide in the contention reasons for those factu'hl assertions.

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I d, . , 11 NRC at 546-48. That is, intervenors are under no obligation- to provide bases for the bases of their contentions in order to meet admissibility requirements.

Because LILCO's " lack of basis" objections either purport to challence the correctntes_or_the merits of the factual as-sertions which form the bases for the contentions or merely assert that Intervenors have some obligation to provide in the contentions (as opposed to testimony) factual support for those factual. assertions, LILCO's " lack of basis" objections must be rejected.

B. Lack of Specificity

.LILCO also bases three of its objections (to Contentions 67.D, 72.D and 81.A) on an alleged " luck of specificity" in the Proposed Modified Contentions. The Staff invokes no such objection. As with the lack of basis objection, the County responded to LILCO's views concerning requisite specificity in its July Response. The legal discussion contained on pages 11-15 of the County's July Response is incorporated here by reference.

If a contention sets forth the issue raised with suffi-cient specificity to put the parties on notice of what will be l

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litigated, that contention meets the specificity requirements of 10 C.F.R. $ 2.714 and is admissible. See Allens Creek, supra; Philadelphia Electric Company (Peach Bottom Atoalic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216, 8 AEC 13, 20 (1974); Grand Gulf, supra. In every instance, the Proposed Modified Conten-tions make clear the issue to be litigated, and thus satisfy the specificity requirement. Moreover, in no instance does LILCO even attempt to explain why, in its view, a particular contention " lacks specificity" or fails to put LILCO on notice of what will be litigated; LILCO does nothing more than make the conclusory assertion. LILCO's " lack of specificity" objections should also be rejected.

C. The "No Legal Requirement" Objection LILCO invokes a "no legal requirement" objection to certain of the Proposed Modified Contentions. The Staff in-vokes no such objection. These objections are discussed indi-vidually in the context of specific contentions. However, the following comments are generally applicable to such objections.

First, the modifications to contentions and subparts must be viewed in their entirety -- that is, including the preamble, if any, and, in the case of a subpart, the contention proper -- ,

I since the regulatory bases are frequently set forth in l

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preambles or contention introductions to avoid repeating citations. Thus, it is usually inappropriate to look at a particular. modification or, for that matter, a particular con-tantion or subpart in isolation as LILCO does in its Objections, and then to assert that there is no stated applica-ble regulatory requirement. Most of the "no legal requirement" objections asserted by LILCO are without foundation when the contention or portion of the contention objected to is viewed 4

in the proper context.

Second, many of LILCO's "no legal requirement" objections in fact are arguments that what would be necessary to correct the deficiency identified in the contention is, in the view of LILCO, not required by the regulations. Such an argument does not constitute an appropriate admissibility objection. In determining the admissibility of a contention, this Board must look at the contention, not at what may be necessary, in J

LILCO's view, to correct an identified problem. If the conten-tion is stated with the requisite specificity and regulatory basis, the contention is admissible.

Moreover, in most instances this type of "no legal re-quirement" objection is asserted when the clear intent of a contention is to challenge LILCO's ability to implement an l

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T aspect of its Plan, as required by 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(a)(1).2/ The objectio,ns are a transparent attempt by LILCO to focas on one reason that implementation is asserted to be impossible, rather than to deal with the ultimate -- and essential -- fact: that a particular aspect of the LILCO Plan cannot and will not be implemented. The "no legal requirement" objections that thus blatantly ignore the legal requirement of implementability which is a stated basis for the contention, should be dismissed out of hand.

Third, LILCO's "no legal requirement" objections are, in every instance, nothing more than a naked assertion, without explanation, legal argument, or legal citation, that the regu-lations do not require a particular action. Such an unsupported " objection" to a contention that contains citations to regulations and thus meets a prima facie test of stating a regulatory basis, is clearly insufficient to justify a ruling that the contention is inadmissible.

2/ In the County's view, many of the deficiencies in the LILCO Plan are not capable of being corrected. Rather, they represent fundamental defects which support the Coun-ty's overall view that LILCO cannot meet the requirements of 10 CFR $ 50.47.

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LILCO may disagree with Intervenors' interpretation of a regulation and thus, at the appropriate time, may argue that the particular regulatory requirements cited in a contention are satisfied without LILCO's having to address the problem identified in that contention. (See e.g., LB P-82 -2 2, slip. op.

at 62). Indeed, resolving that basic dispute between the parties is the purpose of this litigation. The Board will make its findings on that matter, however, after the parties present their evidence, not in deciding the admissibility of conten-tions based on unsupported assertions made by the parties.

- Thus, the " lack of legal requirement" objections, based on bald assertions that in the view of LILCO the regulations do not require the acticns which Intervenors assert-are required by specified regulations, should fail as admissibility objections.

D. Untimeliness LILCO (and again not the Staff) objects to many of the Proposed Modified Contentions by asserting that particular modifications to contentions are, in LILCO's view, " untimely."

The County finds LILCO's " untimeliness" objection totally inex- ,

j plicable in light of the discussions and agreements among -

counsel that led to the Intervenors' filing of the Proposed Modified Contentions.

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As the Board and all parties know, the original Conten-5 tions were submitted in June, 1983, based upon Revision 0 of the LILCO Plan. During the period between June and the end of December 1983, the LILCO Plan underwent three substantial revi-siens. All parties recognized that, as a' result of the many revisions and substantive additions to the Plan that were made subsequent to the preparation of the original contentions, it would be useful to modify the contentions so they correctly identified the issues which were subject to litigation in light of the LILCO proposals being considered by the Board as of January 1984, as opposed to June 1983. Indeed, in the Joint Motion for Adjustment of Schedule, submitted by LILCO and the County on January 3, 1984, counsel for LILCO and the County stated that on January 12, 1984 the parties would " file any re-visions to current consolidated Group II contentions to reflect changes in the Emergency Plan." Joint Motion, at 3 (emphasis supplied). Suffolk County understood this statement to mean that the mutually agreed purpose of the new County submittal was to mmend the contentions so that they reflect Revision 3, that is, the current version of the Plan and procedures, which I incorporates all changes, additions and deletions that have l

been made to the Plan by LILCO since Revision 0 was published.

As stated by Mr. Irwin, counsel for LILCO: "What we're talking T

about is basically bringing the changes of the plan or the contentionsLinto conformance with.the plan as it now exists."

(See Transcript of January 4, 1984 Conference of Counsel at

~2217).

i Notwithstanding its clear agre'ement that the purpose of .

. modifying the contentions' was to bring them into conformance "with the plan as it now exists," in its Objections, LILCO inexplicably argues several variations on the theme that any.

revisions to the contentions that are based on Revisions 1 or 2 i

are untimely. Objections at 2. See e.g., LILCO's Objections to Contentions 24.P, 26.F, 27, 33, 34, 66.D. LILCO agreed that

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the Proposed- Modified Contentions were to conform the conten-tions to the current version of the Plan; LILCO cannot be heard

. now to complain that modifications which reflect Plan changes I that may have been made for the first time in Revisions 1 or 2 1

but are nonetheless incorporated in Revision 3 which is now l before the Board, are untimely.3/

! 3/ This point was directly addressed in recent discussions between counsel for the County and LILCO counsel Ms .

!' McClesky. During those discussions, Ms. McClesky re-quested that the County's Response reflect that despite the statement contained in the Joist Motion and, appar-ently, despite this statement of LILCO's Counsel (Mr.

Irwin) at the January 4, 1984 Conference of Counsel and the related discussions upon which the agreement that the Intervenors would file modified contentions was based, Mr.

Irwin believes that modifications to contentions based (Footnote cont'd next page)

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The fact of the matter is that all the substantive modifi-

's cations contained in the Proposed Modified Contentions were made to reflect changes that LILCO has made to its Plan since the release of Revision O. See Memorandum Accompanying Pro-posed Modified Emergency Planning Contentions, dated January 12, 1984, which sets forth"in detail the reasons for each m'odi-fication. All the modifications are in keeping with the terms of the Joint Motion for Adjustment of Schedule, and LILCO's

" untimeliness" objections should be rejected out of hand.4/

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(Footnote cont'd from previous page) _

upon changes made by LILCO in Revisions 1 and 2, despite the fact that they are contained in Revision 3, are nonethel.ess untimely. As is clear from the discussion in the text above, Suffolk County believes that this position is contrary to the agreements of counsel, representations made to the Board, and plain logic.

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Even if LILCO could make a colorable argument that certain modifications contained in the Proposed Mcdified Conten-tions were untimely, (no such argument appears in the Objections), LILCO's legal analysis of the consequences of the alleged untimeliness is wrong. The Proposed Modified Contentions are not late filed contentions; they are revi-sions to contentions that have already been admitted by l this Board. The admitted contentions have merely been re-vised to reflect the proposals now being made by LILCO as l opposed to the ones being made in June 1983. Therefore the l instant situation is completely different from those presented in Duke Power Company, (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041 (1983), and Public I Service Company of New Hampshire, et al. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-23, 18 NRC , slip.op.

(Sept. 20, 1983), cited by LILCO, in which intervenors sought admission of completely new contentions, and in Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power (Footnote cont'd next page)

4 Furthermore, it should be clear from even a cursory review

> t of the_e",nts which have taken place in this proceeding, that all the County's changes are timely. Firsti Revision 2 of the

. Plan became available only in mid-November. However, before anyone even could complete review of Revision 2, LILCO informed the' Board and parties that Revision 3 would be issued shortly.

Given those facts, the County delayed the submission of amended

- and supplemental testimony based on the Revision 2 changes,

- since the County could not know whether the pertinent matters in Revision 2Lwould be changed again. (In many instances, they, were). Similarly, the Board revised the Group II schedule in early December because of the changes expected in Revision 3.

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For the same reasons, it would have been absurd to have revised contentions in early December based on Revision 2 knowing that Revision 3 was forthcoming. Thus, LILCO's untimeliness argument on Revision 2 is clearly ~ frivolous.

i With respect to Revision 1, the parties did, in effect, agree to changes in the contentions to reflect the Revision.1 changes.- Thus, the original testimony submitted on Group I (Footno.te cont'd from previous page) h Station, Unit 1), LB P-8 3 -42, 18 NRC 112 (1983), which in-i - volved an untimely petition to intervene.

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issues -addressed Revision 1 of the Plan, even though the e

contentions had not been formally niodified. No one objected on that basis to any of the submitted Group I testimony.

It is absurd for LILCO now to interject this objection when all parties had been treating the original contentions in light of Revision 1 changes.

In short, LILCO wants the best of all worlds. It wants to force Intervenors to litigate obsolete facts in contentions based on Revision 0, while at the same time, asserting that LILCO should be free to change the facts in the Plan at will.

That, of course, would make a mockery out of due process.

Finally, LILCO's " untimeliness" objections are, almost without exception, directed at proposed modifications that do nothing but change descriptive statements of LILCO Plan propos-als. They are not directed to changes. in the substantive allegations contained in the contentions -- because those alle-gations have not changed. A LILCO " objection" to a factual de .

scription of LILCO's own document is patently absurd.

D. Res Judicata

'o Many of LILCO's objections to particular Proposed Modified Contentions were also made by LILCO or the Staff to the same contentions in their August Objections. These objections, as will be discussed below, were rejected by the Board in its Spe-cial Prehearing Conference Order (Ruling on Contentions and Establishing Schedule for Discovery, Motions, Briefs, Confer-

. ence of Counsel, and Hearing), dated August 19, 1983 (hereinaf-ter, " Order"). LILCO did not seek reconsideration after the

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Order, as it might have under 10 CFR $ 2.751a(d). It is com-

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pletely improper for LILCO now to ,try to raise those rejected arguments again. Accordingly, the LILCO objections that have already been rejected by the Board must he rejected.

II. Response to Objections to Particular Contentions A. Contention 15.E

1. General Objection to Contention 15.E.

LILCO's first objection to Proposed Modified Contention 15.E is a general assertion that the proposed modifications "do not bear on the issue of LILCO's credibility, but rather on the content of the EBS messages." LILCO thus asserts the modifi-cations " broaden the contention beyond the scope of its original concern with LILCO's credibility." (Objections at 4).

The credibility issued raised by contention 15 is clearly

-.4 stated in the preamble and introductory portions of that con-tention. As the Board recognized in its Order, the contention

" deals.with possible adverse-impacts of LILCO's alleged lack of credibility among the public in Suffolk County." (Order at 6.)

Such " adverse impacts," as stated in the admitted contentions, include the following:

"whether LILCO/LERO recommendations for protective actions . . . will be believed and followed . . . .

-- " persons are . . . likely to question, refuse to believe, disobey or ignore orders, recommendations, or information that come from persons whom they do not believe . . . .

-- " people will be likely to disregard or disobey pro-tective action recommendations or other emergency instructions disseminated by LILCO during an emergen-cy."

"the LILCO Plan cannot and will not be implemented . . . .

As the Board also recognized in the Order, the subparts of Con-tention 15, including 15.E, "may be treated as reasons in l support" of the main contention.

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Contention 15.E, prior lto the'propos'ed modifications, alleged that LILCO's sample ljBS messages will not be obeyed by the- public because a LILCO employee is identified as the source of the information and recommendations contained in the

I metsages. The proposed modifications merely state some additional reasons that the EBS messages will not be obeyed or perceived by the public as credible. Each such reason arises out of a revision to LILCO's proposed EBS messages made subse-quent to Revision O.

Further, LILCO's objection to modified Contention 15.E is inconsistent with the position on credibility and EBS messages taken by LILCO itself in this proceeding. Thus LILCO's own witnesses have testified that the content of EBS messages is an important factor contributing to the credibility of such mes-sages. Indeed, Drs. Dynes, Mileti and Sorensen all testified' that the consistency, accuracy, certainty and detail "of the information affect believability." (Testimony of Matthew C.

Cordaro, et al. on Behalf of the Long Island Lighting Company on Phase II Emergency Planning Contentions 23 (Shadow Phenome-non) and 65.C.2 and 65.F (Panicked Drivers) at 45). In light of LILCO's own position, its objection that the content of the EBS messages "do not Dear" on the issue of whether the recom-mendations or information contained in the messages will be believed or followed is inconsistent and should be rejected.

l The NRC Staff makes a similar objection to the modifi-cations to Contention 15.E. Its objection should also be rejected for the reasons stated above.

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LILCO also argues that there is no basis for the factual  ;

assertion in Subpart 15.E that the identification of officials, engineers and scientists who are LILCO employees will not in-crease the credibility of LILCO's EBS messages. (Objections at 5.) In making this unfounded and unexplained conclusory asser-tion, LILCO apparently attempts to challenge the merits of the fact statement which forms part of the basis of the contention that LILCO's EBS messages will not be believed or obeyed. As discussed in Part I. A above, Intervenors are under no obliga-tion to provide bases for the bases of their contentions.

Furthermore, in light of testimony already submitted by its own witnesses, LILCO cannot be heard to complain that in Rdding the challenged sentence to Contention 15.E, Intervenors have somehow improperly, or without " basis," added an issue to this proceeding. LILCO witnesses Dynes, Mileti and Sorensen testified that the source of a message affects its believability. (Testimony of Matthew Cordaro, et al., supra, at 45.) Further, it was this opinion of LILCO's consultants that led to the post-Revision 0 addition of the referenced statement to LILCO's EBS messages. Id. at 27. Thus, this modification to Contention 15.E in no way prejudices LILCO or changes the issue to be litigated; it merely results in a statement that accurately reflects the EBS messages now being proposed by LILCO. This LILCO objection should be rejected.

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2. Subpsrt-15.E.1.

LILCO asserts that the modifications to Subpart 15.E.1 should not be. admitted because, according to LILCO, they put.

forward 'the same idea' as Contention 16.F, which was denied ad-mission by the Board.. This LILCO argument is incorrect. Con-tantion 16.F alleged that because LILCO's public information brochure did not explain the identity of. LILCO with LERO, the brochure-failed to comply with regulatory requirements dealing with public information materials. Subpart 15.E.1, by con-

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'trast, alleges that because the EBS messages do not contain 4

adequate explanatory or descriptive information about the Local Emergency ' Response Organization which is referenced in the mes-sages, the messages will not be credible. The points made in the two contentions clearly are not the same. Accordingly, the Board's earlier ruling that there was no basis for the Conten-tion 16.F allegation that the regulations required that the brochure contain information about LERO is not applicable to the credib'ility issue presented in Contention 15.E.1.

It is clear that LILCO's objection to Subpart 15.E.1 is really nothing but a disagreement with the factual assertion contained in that subpart, because LILCO argues that the infor-mation referenced in the contention is " unnecessary," and that

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, l its inclusion in EBS messages would " complicate the messages and lengthen the time necessary to read them on the air."

(Objections at 5.) That is precisely the type of factual dis-pute, going to the merits of a contention, which is irrelevant

- to' the issue of the admissibility of a contention. See Part I.A,"above. LILCO's factual disagreement with the merits of Subpart-15.E.1 is no grounds for denying admission to Subpart 15.E.1.

LILCO's second objection to Subpart .15.E.1 is LILCO's

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unsupported and inaccurate statement that "a review of the sam-ple EBS messages in Revision 0 of the LILCO Transition Plan 're-

• veals that, since Revision 0, the sample EBS messages have'made reference to activation of the Local Emergency Response Organi-zation." (Objections at 5-6.) While it is true that some of the Revision 0 EBS messages stated that the Emergency i

Operations Center of the Local Emergency Response Organization y had been activated, the contents of the EBS messages have been l

I substantially revised to give much more prominence to the Local r

Emergency Response Organization. Thus, sample EBS messages D through G contained in Revision 3 state:

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The Local Emergency Response Organiza-tion for residents living in the 10-mile emergency planning zone around Shoreham has been activated and is responding to the i incident. >

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(OPIP 3. 8. 2, Attachment *, at 7, 9; 11, 13, 16.)

This is an explicit statement, not contained in Revision 0, that LERO was created for the benefit of residents of the lO-mile EPZ and that that organization is taking affirmative actions to protect them. It is obvicusly designed to create confidence in', and lend credibility to, LILCO's EBS messages.

By contrast, the sample EBS messages contained in Revision 0 never suggested that the Local Emergency Response Organiza-tion existed to protect the residents of the 10-mile EPZ, or that it was taking affirmative response actions.5/ The Revi-sion 0 General Emergency Evacuation announcement did not even mention LERO at all.

The point of Subpart 15.E.1 is that LILCO's EBS messages as they appear in Revision 3, now expressly attempt to create a sense of confidence among' the public and increase the credibil-ity of -the messages by stating that an organization 5/ For example, the Alert message in Revision 0 stated that ,

"[t]he Local Energency Response Organization has activated its Emergency Operations" Center and will continue to moni-tor the incident . . . . (Rev. O, Attachment 3.8.1 at 2.) The Site Area Emergency (Radioactive Release) message also stated that the EOC had been activated and added that the " Local Emergency Response Organization Health Services Coordinator" would monitor the release and meteorological conditions and provide updates. (Id. at 4.)

r specifically created for the benefit of the residents of the EPZ is responding to the accident. However, the messages do not supply the public with any information about this organiza-tion. Therefore the public is unlikely to find the conclusory statement in the messages credible. Contrary to LILCO's asser-tion, the allegation contained in Subpart 15.E.1 could not have been made based on the contents of Revision O. LILCO's untimeliness objection should be denied.

3. Subpart 15.E.2.

LILCO objects t _Subpart 15.E.2 on two grounds. First, LILCO flatly asserts, again without explanation, that there l's "no basis for believing" the factual assertion contained in Subpart 15.E.2 that inadequate explanation of the emergency classification scheme detracts from the credibility of mes-sages. In making this so-called " objection," LILCO is clearly challenging the merits of the contention by disagreeing with the stated factual basis of the contention. Because Interve-nors are under no obligation to supply the underpinnings for the bases of their contentions, LILCO's objection should be overruled. See Part I . A, supra.

LILCO's second argument concerning Subpart 15.E.2 is the bald assertion that there is no legal requirement for the t

explanation of event classifications in EBS messages.

(Objections at 6.) First, this unsupported assertion com-pletely. misses the point of Subpart 15.E.2 -- that is, the credibility of LILCO's EBS messages. The legal basis for the contention -- 10 CFR $50. 47(b) (5 ) , and NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.5, 6 and 7 -- follows Subpart E.6. in that portion of Subpart 15.E already admitted by the Board. If its EBS mes-sages are not credible because, among other things, they do not explain event classifications, then, as stated in the portion of the contention already admitted by the Soard, "these mes-sages will not accomplish their intended purpose of providing clear instructions to the public" and LILCO's protective action recommendations will not be obeyed. This conclusory LILCO objection therefore is without foundation and should be rejected.

4._ subpart 15.E.3.

LILCO objects to Subpart 15.E. 3, because, in LILCO's view, it raises the same matter as Contention 19, which was not ad-mitted by the Board. (Objections at 6-7.) LILCO is mistaken; Subpart 15.E. 3 and Contention 19 do not make the same point at all. Contention 19 alleged that because almost all LILCO's original EBS messages were inaccurate in stating that a release

~. n - - - . ,, -

y . 9' "is not expected'to pose a serious health hazard" without stating that uncertainties make precise prediction impossible, people would?not take the emergency message seriously. Subpart ,

15.E.3, on the other hand,~ states that the new LILCO EBS mes-sages are not meaningful, and not understandable, and therefore will not be believed because they use technical language such as " millirems" and do not explain the. health consequences of exposure to the projected radiation doses. Because the two contentions are not the same, the Board's ruling on Contention 19 has no applicability to Subpart 15.E.3.6/

LILCO also asserts the Subpart 15.E. 3 "would broaden the scope of Contention 15 beyond its original concern of credibil-ity." (Objections at 7.) This is again a transparent dis-agreement with the factual assertion contained in the conten-

-tion -- that _the information contained in the proposed EBS mes-sages d_og render them not credible. This LILCO " objection" is a factual dispute which is properly. addressed in testimony. It.

is not a basis . for a ruling that the subpart is inadmissible.

p

-6/ LILCO's suggestion that Subpart 15.E. 3 should be consoli-dated with Contention 16.E (Objections at 7), while not an objection, makes no sense since Contention 16.E concerns LILCO's public information brochure and has no bearing on the EBS messages.

c 1

4 2

. _ . - . . _ - . _ _ _ . . ~ _ . . . . . . - . _ , , , , _ , , _ _ _ _ , -....._..__.._.. . _ . . . . . _ . . _ . . _ , . _ . _ . . _ . . _ . _ , . . _ . , _ . . . . . . _ . . _ .

c .

.g Finally, LILCO objects to Subpart 15.E.3 because it pur-portedly "goes beyond the emergency planning regulations."

Here again, it is clear that LILCO is real-

~

_( Objections at 7.)

ly just asserting its view that its EBS messages already are clear, understandable and credible. The fact that LILCO's evaluation of its EBS messages is different from the Interve-nors' goes to the merits of Subpart 15.E.3 and is not a basis for denying its admission.

5. Subpart 15.E.4.

In its objections to Subpart 15.E.4, LILCO mischaracterizes and misconstrues that subpart. Because Subpart 15.E.4 asserts that the EBS messages offer no assurance that the school districts have agreed to implement LILCO's pro-tective action recommendations, LILCO asserts that it " implies that LILCO cannot show adequate emergency planning unless it proves that the public will follow its protective action recom-mendations," and therefore is "beyond the scope of emergency planning regulations." (Objections at 7.) In fact, Subpart 15.E.4 alleges that EBS messages E, F, G and H state that

" schools are being advised" to shelter or evacuate children (emphasis added). The point of the contention is that a state-ment that advice has been given, without or in lieu of a

9 statement that the advised action _is being taken or can _be.

taken, will raise doubts in the minds of listeners. Again, the subpart goes directly to the believability of the EBS messages.

Tsus, LILCO's objection is based on a mistaken reading of Subpart 15.E.4.

Furthermore, LILCO offers no explanation or justification whatsoever for its bald assertion that "at a mir.imum" the last sentence of Subpart 15.E.4 should be denied ndmission as lacking basis. (Objections at 8.) The objection should be rejected for the resons stated in Part I. A above. No basis need be stated for the factual assertions which form the basis of a contention.

6. Subpart 15.E.5.

LILCO makes two objections to Subpart 15.E.5. First, LILCO argues that the subpart has "no bearing on the issue of credibility." But, as LILCO's witnesses have testified, for messages to be credible they must contain " sufficient informa-tion," and they "must contain a clear statement of guidance."

Testimony of Matthew Cordaro, et al., supra, at 31-32. In addition, this so-called " objection" is another example of a LILCO disagreement with the factual assertion contained in a contention. The contention states that the referenced lack of information renders the messages non-credible. If LILCO disagrees, it should say so in testimony, not in an unfounded objection to the admission of the contention.

In addition,. LILCO is simply mistaken When it character-ize s Subpart 15.E. 5 as " untimely. " LILCO incorrectly asserts that "the sample EBS messages in Revision 0 of' the LILCO Tran-sition Plan did not describe the bus routes or inform the public Where to obtain a description of the routes."

(Objections at 8.) In fact, the evacuation related EBS mes-sages in Revision 0 plainly did include information about bus routes. They stated:

"If you have been advised to evacuate and do not have your own transportation to your designated relocation center, buses that will taken you there will soon be parked at the bus stops listed in your Shoreham Bro-chure. The stops are less than one half mile from your home."

(Rev. O, Attachment 3. 8.1 at 8 and 10) .1/ The Revision 3 7/ The EBS messages contained in Revision 0 of OPIP 3.8.2 stated:

If you have been advised to evacuate and do not have your own transporta-tion to your designated relocation center, buses that will take you there will be driving the routes listed in your Shoreham Brochure. -

Rev. O, OPIP 3.8.2 at 18 and 20.

._ , ._.. __,_ _ _ _ - . _ . . ~

version of the EBS messages states:

If you have been advised to evact. ate but do not have your own transporta-tion and cannot obtain a ride from a neighbor or someone else, special buses will travel along emergency routes to transport you to a reloca-tion center. ,

(Rev. 3, OPIP 3.8.2 at 24 and 27) .

Clearly, when the original Contentions were drafted in June, 1983, there was no reason to criticize the Revision 0 EBS mes-sages for omitting bus route information. The omission is reflected in Revision 3, however. There is thus no basis for LILCO's " untimeliness" objection to Subpart 15.E.5.

B. Contention 18 LILCO's so-called " objection" to the County's statement that it will modify Contention 18, if necessary, after it receives Revision 3 of the LILCO Brochure, neither requires, nor is susceptible to a ruling by the Board. There are no pro-j ,

posed modifications before the Board to which LILCO's i

" objection" can be applied. Moreover, LILCO's assertion that Contention 18 "is not affected by the Brochure" is factually incorrect. The previous versions of the Brochure included copies of the proposed LILCO posters, which are directly addressed in Contention 18.

l

C. ' Contention 24.E

.LILCO's only objection to the proposed modifications to Contention 24.E is the assertion that '"there is no legal re-quirement" . v. hat LILCO obtain- the agreements asserted - to be nec-essary in the modification to Contention 24.E. LILCO'made .

. precisely the'same argument with respect to Contention 24.E.in its August Objections, at 38. That LILCO objection was rejected by the Board.- (Order at 14.) LILCO's reas,sertion of

. the same objection should similarly be rejected.

The objected to modification to Contention 24.E is the addition .of " nursery schools or parents of children in nursery schools" to " schools and _ school districts" as the entities with which 'LILCO does not have agreements. Now, as before, the

- entities listed are those which must agree to, and participate in LILCO's proposed protective actions for school chi.ldren if those actions are to be implemented. The modification was ne-cessitated by LILCO's new -Revision 3 provision that LILCO em-ployees,will drive buses to be used by nursery schools in evacuating nursery school students.

'Furthermore, LILCO's objection ignores the fact that there is a regulatory requirement that'the LILCO Plan provide reason-able' assurance that adequate protective measures can and will a

1 I

i f

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be implemented. 10 CFR $50.47(a) (1) . Without the consent of nursery schools or parents to the LILCO proposal that LILCO em-ployees transpor t children on buses, there can be no assurance i

that LILCO's proposed protective actions for nursery schools could or would be implemented. LILCO's "no legal requirement" objection has already been rejected by the Board and should be rejected once again.

D. Contention 24.J.

LILCO has not objected to the modifications to Contention 24.J. However, LILCO's characterization of the County's repre-sentation concerning the modifications made to Contention 24.J must be corrected. The words "and near" were added to the de-scription of facilities in that Contention in order to include within the scope of the contention those facilities right outside the EPZ boundaries that LILCO has identified and in-cluded in its Plan. Thus, the modification was intended to merely conform this conte tion to reflect the fact that LILCO's Plan already concerns, in some instances, special facilities located outside, but near the EPZ boundaries.

b A

E. Contention 24.M The County is unable to respond to LILCO's comment regarding Contention 24.M. There dces not appear to be any objection to.-the County's proposed modifications.

F. Contention 24.P LILCO objects to the modification made to Contention 24.P as " untimely. " However, it is apparent from its face that LILCO's objection is groundless. Although LILCO claims that the role of the American Red Cross (" ARC") has not changed since Revision 0 (Objections at 11), LILCO nontheless admits that LILCO had no agreement of any sort with the ARC until Re-vision 1. As stated in the Memorandum Accompanying Proposed Modified Emergency Planning Contentions, the modification to Contention 24.P was necessitated by LILCO's addition o'fa purported " agreement" with the ARC to the Plan. That agreement however, as stated in the proposed modification, fails to l

address the specific requirements assumed in the Plan. Clear-ly, the proposed modification could not have been made prior to LILCO's inclusion in the Plan of a purported " agreement" with the ARC. As discussed above, in the Joint Motion, LILCO and the Intervenors agreed that the modified contentions would reflect all changes made in the Plan subsequent to Revision 0,

• 3

. x '

4 g _

y

^ s ..

. s

., s

' including those made in Revision 1. LILCO's untimeliness objection is unfounded.8/

G. Contention 26.C LILCO makes two objections, in the alternative, to a por-tion of the modifications to Contention 26.C.

First, LILCO apparently objects to the following clause:

"the Plan does not adequately describe this system or how it

, works," in the sentence which reflects that in Revision 3 LILCO makes reference to an " automated verification system." LILCO asserts that there is no regulatory requirement that " specific details of the verification process be included" in the plan.

(Objections at 12.) LILCO supplies no legal support for this bald assertion; and the preamble and main part of Contention 26 set forth the regulatory basis for Contention 26.C. More im-portantly, in seizing upon one clause of the proposed mofidication and discussing it in isolation, LILCO completely

~8/

As a result of discussions among counsel, Intervenors have decided not to modify Subpart 1 of Contention 24.F and Contention 24.T. There fore , the proposed modifications to Subparts 24.F.1 and 24.T, which appear on pages 66 and 77, respectively, of the Proposed Modified Contentions sub-mitted January 12, 1984, should be deleted, and the con--

tentions should continue to read as they did in their original form admitted by the Board.

s I

missas -- or deliberately ignores -- the point of Contention 26.C, which has not changed from its pre-modification form.

~

Prior to Revision 3 the LILCO Plan contained no provisions at all for verification of pager messages. Revision 3 added a statement that people with pagers are to call into a so-called

" automated verification system." As the sentence Which follows

.the clause seized upon by LILCO goes on to explain, however, "the limited information provided by LILCO about the system and how it works does not permit a determination that there will be adequate means for LILCO to determine Whether emergency person-nel in fact receive paged messages / notifications." Thus, the proposed modification reflects the plan change made by LILCO but restates the point of the contention already admitted by the Board: that there can be-no determination that the LILCO Plan satisfies the regulatory requirements regarding a'lerting,

. notifying and mobilizing repsonse personnel including message verification. See Preamble to Contention 26 and NUREG 0654 Sections II.E and II.F.

In addition, both the above'"no legal requirement" objection and LILCO's alternative " lack of basis" objection to another isolated sentence in the proposed modification to I

e LContention 26.C (see Objections.at 12), in reality constitute disagreements with the factual assertions which form the basis

'of the contention. As discussed in Part I.A above, such an objection is improper and should be rejected.

H. Contention 26.E. .

LILCO makes two objections to the proposed modifications to contention 26.E. The first, that the proposed modifications are an attempt to revive an issue rejected by the Board in the Order, is simply wrong. Contention 26.B, which was not admit-I ted by the Board, concerned potential overload,of the

. commercial telephone sys, tem. ,

By contrast, Contention 26.E --

which was admitted by the Board -- does not deal with that issue at all. As is clear from a review of that contention, it concerns other problems created by LILCO's reliance vpon commercial telephones, such as the fact that personnel might be away from their, telephones, using their telephones, or for other reasons inaccessible by telephone. Moreover, in August, 1983, the NRC~ Staff objected to the original Contention 26.E alleging that -it was redundant to Contention 26.B. 5. NRC Staff Response to Revised Emergency Planning Contenticas (" Staff Re-sponse") at 24. That Staff objection to Contention 26.E was overruled by the Board. Order at 16. Thus, in admitting l

/U i \

Contention 26.E., the Board considered and rejected the j l

argument that Contentions 26.E and 26.B made the same point. i I

Because Contention 26.E as modified continues to address only the concerns about reliance on commercial telephones that were  :

contained in Contention 26.E as admitted by the Board, LILCO's

~

i objection should be denied.

Even a cursory reading of Contention 26.E reveals that LILCO's second objection to Contention 26.E is also clearly in-correct. LILCO asserts that the proposed modification which mentions the Federal Telephone System "is without basis."

(Objections at 13.) The reference to the Federal Telephone System follows a listing in the original admitted portion of the contention of several reasons why commercial telephones are an inadequate means of notification of non-LILCO emergency support organizations such as hospitals and bus and ambulance companies. The statement concerning the Federal Telephone System begins with the clause: " Fur the r , these same problems make ineffective _LILCO's reliance on the Federal Telephone System . . . .

(emphasis added.) Thus, the basis for the as-sertion is stated clearly in the contention.

Furthermore, in August 1983, the NRC Staff objected to the assertion that personnel would not be available to be contacted e

=.-

lh by telephone as lacking basis with respect to the original Contention 26.E.. NRC Staff Response at 24-25.- In admitting

(- Contention 26.E the' Board rejected this argument. Order at 16.

'Therefore LILCO's second objection' should -_ be denied. .

. I. Contention 26.F. .

Intervenors .have decided to withdraw Proposed Modified Contention 26.F.

1 J. Contention 27 LILCO's objection to the proposed modification to Subpart C of . Contention 2 7 is _ specious. Contention 27, already admit-ted by-the Board, alleges that the various activities which emergency workers must complete. prior to their being available to begin their emergency functions will take a substantial amount of time. As a result of the extended mobilization times, the contention alleges that the Plan and the proposed protective actions contemplated'therein cannot and will not be

' implemented in a timely. manner necessary to provide adequate

i. protection to the public. The subparts of the contention set forth specific reasons for extended mobilization times. Thus, t

Subparts C and'D, as admitted by the Board, allege that many of the emergency response workers relied upon by LILCO must report e

I -

Lfirst to staging areas or dispatch' locations before travelling to their field posts, and that many must obtain various types of equipment and prepare the equipment for use before they are able to begin to perform their assigned functions.

The proposed modification to Subpart C in no wa_y changes or expands.the scope of Contention 27. If anything, the pro-posed. addition makes the contention even more specific than it was in its original form. Thus, the proposed modification merely describes.two more specific types of equipment that many _ _

LERO workers.will have to obtain and install -- i.e., personnel dosimetry equipment and mobile radios. Clearly, a discussica of such items was already within -the scope of admitted Subpart 27.D's reference to the need to obtain and install equipment.

The County has difficulty imagining any reason that could justify an objection to the proposed modification. It certain-ly cannot be argued that it makes any new allegation of regula-i-

tory noncompliance, or other substantive allegation. It dces

-nothing but reflect facts, contained in the Plan, that further i

specify the concern raised in the admitted contention. Clear-lh,anytestimonyaddressingContention27,withorwithoutthe i

proposed modification, would deal with the facts as set forth in the Plan, regardless whether every one of such facts was g.

l i

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specifically mentioned in the contention. Ther e fo re , there is no point to LILCO's objection because the proposed modifi-cations'have no operative effect on the substantive issue to be addressed in testimony on Contention 27.

Fur thermore, LILCO's timeliness objection is without basis. Revision 0 of the Plan made no mention of the need for workers to install mobile radios, and the mobilization proce-dures describing the distribution of personnel dosimetry equip-ment and staging area briefings have been substantially revised subsequent to Revision O. LILCO a so called " objection" to the proposed modifications to Contention 27.C is without merit and should be rejected.

- K. Contention 30 LILCO objects to the modifications made by Intervenors to Contention 30, because in LILCO's view, they add a new issue in an untimely manner. (Objections at 15.) This objection should be denied, because its factual premise is simply mistaken. The

! fact is that the only modification to Contention 30 is the deletion of references to portable radios, (since subsequent to Revision 0, LILCO decided to use mobile rathe'r than portable

! radios), and a further specification of the reason for the lack

~

l of assurance that transmission and reception of radio messages l

l t

! l m

F

. will be possible, as stated in the Contention admitted by the Board.

As support for its objection, LILCO incorrectly suggests that Intervenors have added new issues concerning mobile radios. This. assertion is simply wrong. Contrary to LILCO's assertion, Contention 30 has always asserted that mobile radios would be beset by problems related to their batteries. In Re-vision 0, LILCO's Plan was unclear because it failed to specify whether LILCO personnel would utilize portable or mobile radios. There fore, the Intervenors could not focus the original Contention 30 on specific problems peculiar to either type, and wrote the contention in the alternative. It is clear from a reading of the original Contention admitted by the Board that the proposed modification to Content' ion 30 does not in any sense add any new issues. Instead, by listing problems peculiar to mobile radios, the proposed modification simply adds. increased specificity to an issue that has always been in Contention 30. Accordingly, LILCO's objection is without foun-dation and should be rejected.

L. Contention 34.C.-

LILCO objects to one sentence in the proposed modification to Subpart C o f Contention 34. LILCO alleges that the sentence adds a new " irrelevant" and untimely allegation to the Conten-tiun. (Objections at 15.) LILCO's objection is meritless.

The objected to sentence is the following:

LILCO has advised Suf folk County that fire / rescue organizations (i.e . , fire departments and fire / rescue vehicles) are not part of LERO,.even though they are relied upon for "their normal response functions during an emergency."

~

(Plan at 2.2-4)

The sentence was added to reflect a change in the facts from those stated in Revision O. As can be seen from a review of Contention 34 in its entirety, it originally referred throughout to fire / rescue vehicles as well as ambulance vehi-cles. That was done because Revision 0 of the Plan specifical-ly discusced and relied upon fire / rescue organization dispatch stations. (Rev. O, Plan 3.4-3). In Revision 2, LILCO deleted all reference to fire / rescue dispatch stations, necessitating the proposed modification to Contention 34. Clearly, LILC O ' s

" untimeliness" objection is meritless, and should be denied.

4 y.

.Furthermore, LILCO's assertion that the referenced

-sentence in the proposed modification impermissibly adds new

" allegations concerning LILCO's ability to communicate with fire / rescue organizations" which are, according to LILCO, "ir-relevant" because Contention 34.C " concerns the coordinated communications link between field and mobile medical support facilities," (Objections at 15) is plainly wrong. First, as noted above and is plain from a review of the contention, in its original form the contention did explicitly address commu-nications with fire / rescue organizations, as well as other non-LILCO groups. 'Second, it is precisely because Contention 34.C concerns communications between field and mobile medical support facilities that the proposed modification is relevant.

Since, as stated in the proposed modification, LILCO relies upon fire / rescue organizations for "their normal response f unc tions" during an emergency (which includes responding to medical emergencies), but there is no communications link between LILCO and those organizations, the statement in the original admitted contention is true: "there is no assurance that ' a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists,' as required by NUREG 0654,Section II.F.2." In sum, LILCO's objections are groundless.

The objected to sentence once again merely reflects a fact 9

^ _ . . _ , - _ _,, -r .c, -_y.._ __ - . . , _ _ . _ . _ . _

contained in the LILCO Plan. It does not raise any new issue and it certainly cannot be said to be untimely or irrelevant.

M. Contentions 39.A and 39.B The proposed modification to Contention 39. A states that LILCO's training program is insufficient to deal with the problem of attrition and therefore will not assure that trained LILCO employees will be available to fill positions in LERO as the need arises. LILCO " objects" to this proposed modification by asserting, without explanation or discussion, that "it lacks basis." (Objections at 16.) LILCO makes the same totally conclusory " lack of basis" ~ objection to that portion of the proposed modification to Contention 39.B which asserts that the Coast Guard and private ambulance companies are under no obli-gation to maintain necessary staffing for LERO or notify LILCO of understaffing. (ld.) These groundless " objections" should be rejected out of hand because, like almost all of LILCO's

" lack of basis" objections, they amount to an assertion that Intervenors should be required to support the factual asser-tions which form the bases for their contentions with evidenti-I ary materials. The point of Contention 39 is that the LILCO Plan fails to deal effectively with attrition among LILCO and non-LILCO personnel. The contention, and subparts A and B, j .

+

.were admitted by the Board. Both of the statements. to which

- LILCO now', objects are factual assertions that constit'Ite part sof the bases of the Contention and reflect changes in the LILCO

- training proposals made subsequent.to Revision 0.- LILCO ' s objections to the proposed modifications are really disagree-ments with the factual assertions in those modifications. Such

- .. disputes are not properly raised.as objections to the admissi-bility of contentions. -LILCO's objections should be denied.

N. Contention 44.D.

LILCO's objection to the proposed modification to Conten-tion 44.D. is absolutely inexplicable. LILCO has objected to the deletion of one of the two issues raised in the original i- version of Contention 44.D. As originally admitted, Contention 44.D asserted that the drills and exercises proposed in the LILCO Plan were inadequate because the Plan (1) did not provide

~

for the quarterly testing of communications with federal re-sponse organizations and states within the ingestion pathway

. EPZ, and (2) did not provide for testing whether the content of messages is understood by emergency response personnel. The

(

proposed modification of Contention 44.D deletes the first al- 5 i . l egation . LILCO's objection makes no sense.

1 l

O. Contention 44. F.

LILCO objects to the statement contained in the proposed modification-to Contention 44.F that "there is no indication in the Plan that any [ Federal, State or local governments] have agreed to send observers as required by NUREG 0654 . . ., " on two grounds: (1) "no legal requirement," and (2) according to LILCO "there is no basis on which to assume that Federal, State and loca). governments would, contrary to their normal proce-dures, rufuse ' to provide official observers . . . .

'(Objections at 17).

LILCO's "no legal requirement" objection ignores the regu-latory basis set forth in the contention itself. NUREG 0654,Section II.N.4' requires that governmental representatives observe, evaluate and critique the required exercises. Obvi-ously, if the Federal, State and local governmental entities refuse to send observers, LILCO cannot satisfy the requirements j of NUREG 0654,Section II.N.4. LILCO must assure that observ-ers will in fact appear; otherwise there can be no finding of reasonable assurance that the regulatory requirements will be I f ul filled . The crux of the section of Contention 44.F to which LILCO objects is that the LILCO Plan is inadequate, because it provides no such assurance that Federal, State and local U ,

governmental representatives will observe the required annual exercises, except LILCO's unsupported and conclusory statement in the Plan that they will do so.

Moreover, LILCO's "no legal requirement" objection is nothing more than a bald assertion unsupported by reference to any legal authority. Indeed, LILCO does not even attempt to construe the obvious requirements of NUREG 0654,Section II.N.4 in a manner that supports LILCO's position, and thus offers the Board no legal theory on which to grant LILCO's objection.

LILCO's "no legal requirement" objection must be denied.

LILCO's lack of basis objection is premised solely on i -LILCO's conclusory assertion that in its view,-there is no reason to believe that governments would refuse to send observ-l era. (Objections at 17.) This argument is not a proper objection to the admission of a Contention, because it is nothing more than a factual disagreement with one of the bases of Contention 44.F. See Part I.A above. In addition, there is substantial reason in this record for believing that at least ,

State and local governments would refuse to participate in ob- -

s

-7 servation, and critiques of drills and exercises of an illegal Plan.

1 l

Moreover, LILCO's reference to the decision of the Board concerning Contention 24 0 is inappropriate. The modification to Contention 44.F to which LILCO objects does not concern the

" normal duties" of a governmental entity. The Board denied ad-mission of Contention 24.0, because it interpreted that conten-tion as dealing with " normal duties" of the Suf folk County Police Department. (Order at 15.) Contrary to LILCO's asser-tion, sending observers to LILCO's drills and exercises does not involve the normal procedur3 of Federal, State and local governmental entities. Both the State of New York and Suffolk County oppose NRC approval of the LILCO Plan, for, among other reasons, its illegality. Similarly, FEMA has expressed concern over the legality of many of LILCO's proposals. It is not part of the " normal procedures" of the State, the County, or FEMA to take part in activities that violate the law. Moreover, the law of Suffolk County specifically prohibits County employees from such participation. See County Legislative Resolutions 456-1982 and 111-1983. Th er e fore , LILCO's assertion of an analogy to the Board's ruling on Contention 24.0 is simply wrong. LILCO's objections to the proposed modifications to Contention 44.F should be rejected.

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[

r:

'P. Co'ntention 61.C. 2 LILCO purports to object to Contention 61.C.2 on three grounds. The first is not really an objection, but in any event is simply incorrect. LILCO asserts that Contention 61.C.2'is_" repetitive" of Contention 24.J because, according to

- LIIC O, both " allege that the LILCO Transition Plan should include agreements with'special faci .ities to implement

[LILCO's] evacuation procedures . . . (Objections at 17,)

.Even a cursory review of the two contentions reveals that LILCO

' ~ ~ ~

.is wrong. Con tion 61. C. 2' asserts "thait theI LILCO P1'aE"is in-

. adequate, because LILCO lacks agreements with special

-~

' facilities to develop _ or to implement sheltering procedures.

-Contention 24.J alleges that the Plan is inadequate, because LILCO lacks agreements with special facilities concerning evacuation procedures.

Second, LILCO asserts that there is "no legal requirement"

) that it have agreements with special facilities to develop and Enplement sheltering procedures. (Objections at 17.) In its August Objections, LILCO repeatedly argued that it did not need agreements with non-LILCO organizations, including special l

facilities, to implement emergency procedures that, like shel-tering, -are clearly outside the normal routines of those i

i i

non-LILCO organizations. The Board rejected this argument.with respect to agreements with' school- districts to evacuate and tc1 shelter their students, (Contention 24.E), and with special

' facilities (Contention 24.K). Order at 14. There is no sub-stantive difference between LILCO's previously rejected "no legal requirement" objections to those contentions and its abnilar objection to proposed modified Contention 61.C.2. Ac-cordingly, LILCO's objection is an attempt to resurrect an t'

argument this Board has already rejected, and it should be de-

) nied. e

-Finally, LILCO asserts, without explanation or discussion, that Intervenors' " suggestion that sheltering could not be im-plemented by - a -special facility lacks basis. " (Objections at 18.) However, even a cursory reading of Proposed Modified Con-i tention 61.1.2 reveals that once again LILCO is wrong. The contention states:

Furthermore sheltering could not in actuality be impl emented because of numerous practical problems apparently not considered by LILCO, including lack of adequate hallways, basements and other common areas, lack of equipment and facilities, inability to shut down ventilation and air conditioning syst em s ,

inability to reinforce or relieve personnel or replenish expendcd supplies. (Emphasis supplied.)

e

rz LILCO may disagree with the reasons stated in the contention to 4

support 'the assertion that a special facility could not imple-ment a LILCO sheltering recommendation, but there can be no dispute that factual bases for that assertion are stated in the contention. LILCO's objection constitutes an attack on the merits of the contention and is therefore not a proper admissi-bility objection. Accordingly, the objection should be rejected.

.Q. Contention 66.D Contantion 66.D as admitted by the' Board alleged that the 3

LILCO Plan does not provide for snow removal during a radiological emergency in violation of NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.k. The proposed modifications to subpart D of Conten-tion 66 were necessitated by LILCO's addition to the Plan, s ub-sequent to Revision 0, of the explicit assumption that " snow removal will be provided by local organizations in their normal fashion during an emergency." (Plan at 2.2-5). Both LILCO and the NRC Staff apparectly object only to the following portion of one sentence of the proposed modification:

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! "LILCO has no agreements with local ju-

' risdictions or other entities within and around the EPZ to provide snow removal services during an energency . . . . "

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No objection is made to the remaining proposed modifications.

The LILCO and Staff " lack of basis" objections and their references to the Board's ruling on Contention 24.0 are

- premised on a false assumption and mischaracterization of the

- proposed modification. LILCO asserts that "it is inconceivable that, in a [ radiological] emergency local jursidictions would not provide their normal [ snow removal] services," and analogizes the relevant entities to the Suffolk County Police who were referenced in Contention 24.Q. This unsupported and conclusory LILCO assertion assumes, without basis, that govern-mental bodies, as. opposed to private contractors, normally per-form snow removal functions. The Staff makes a similar assump-

. tion. (See Staff Objections at 3). The proposed modification to Contention. 66.D explicitly covers entities other than gov-ernmental bodies in alleging that LILCO's assumption concerning radiological emergency is unwarranted. Thus, even accepting the Board's characterization of Contention 24 0 as involving l

" normal dutics" of the Suffolk County Police, that characteri-zation is not analogous to the subject raised in Contention 66.D.2/

9/ In its objections, the NRC Staff not only ignores the fact that non-governmental entities perform snow removal, but also ignores the fact that governmental entities other than Su f folk County -- i .e . , the State and town s and vil-lages -- may be involved.

1 In addition, clearing snow covered rocds in a manner that would benefit an evacuation of the lO-mile EPZ would not be

- within the normal routines of snow removal organizations. The need to give priority to the roads selected by LILCO as evacua-tion routes instead of following normal priorities, the need to-cleariall the evacuation routes quickly enough to facilitate an evacuation regardless of the amount of snow on the roads, and the need to conduct snow removal operations when needed by LILCO instead of pursuant to normal schedules, clearly distin-guish the snow removal services LILCO must have from those that are normally performed. As a result, LILCO and the Staff are mistaken in asserting that the Board's rejection of Contention 24 0 is relevant to their objections to the proposed modifi-cation to. Contention 66.D. Indeed, LILCO's need for snow re-moval entities to act contrary to their normal procedures makes Contention 66.D analogous to Contentions 24.E, 24.J, and 2 4. K-and 24.R, which the Board did admit. Accordingly, the objections should be denied.

The " lack of basis" objection asserted by both LILCO and the Staff should also be denied. LILCO explicitly states in l

its Objections that it is disputing the merits of the " lack of ag reements" portion of Contention 66.D as follows: "subpart j 66.D rainas no real issue and should be denied admission as L

i r- , ~ e e- , ,e, - - - . . -- --- ,-- , ,-- - -

Ab lacking basis." (Objections at 18.) Obviously, LILCO's real objection is that it disagrees with the factual premise that local entities would not respond as LILCO expects during a radiological emergency. However, this is no basis for objecting to the admission of a contention. Whether or not a contention " raises a real issue" goes to the merits.

LILCO also ignores the contents of the main part of admit-ted Centention 66 which explicitly' states the rquirement of NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.k that an offsite plan provide

"[i]dentification of and means for dealing with potential impediments . . . to use of evacuation routes, and contingency measures." LILCO neither interprets this regulatory require-ment in a manner supportive of its position, nor does LILCO cite any authority- for its contrary position. LILCO 's "no legal requirement" object should be rejected.

Finally, LILCO asserts that the referenced portion of the proposed modification to Contention 66.D is untimely. Once again, LILCO is simply wrong. Revision 0 contained no mention whatsoever of snow removal. The LILCO Plan provision stating LILCO's asumption that local organizations would perform snow removal services during a Shoreham accident first appeared in Revision 1. Clearly, the Intervenors' allegations that the

(9 -

LILCO assumption is unwarranted, as stated in the proposed

= modification, could not have been raised based on Revision O.

LILCO's timeliness objection should be denied.

R. Contention 67.A.3 LILCO makes a " lack of basis" objection to the portion of the proposed modification to Subpart 3 of Contention 67. A which states "the route capacity factors are likely to be signifi-cantly lower than 75% . . . ." (Objections at 19. ) The

" objection" is without merit. First, Subpart 3 of Subpart A of Contention 67 is not a contention, but rather one of the reasons which forms the bases for the allegation in Subpart

67. A that LILCO will need more buses than it anticipates to evacuate able-bodied persons without access to automobiles.

There is no requirement that intervenors provide in contentions bases for the bases of those contentions. See Part I.A above.

Furthermore, whether or not LILCO's estimate that buses will be filled to 75% of their capacity is accurate, is a fac-tual dispute to be determined on the evidence presented. It is irrelevant to admissibility. Intervenors are under no obliga-tion to provide evidentiary support for such factual assertions in their contentions, and, accordingly, LILCO's lack of basis objection should be denied.

. . _ . , _ , , , . ~ _ _ - . . - -_ , , . . _ _ - - - . , _ . . . - -

LILCO also asserts that Subpart 3 is untimely because,

-- according to LILCO, "it is not justified by any modification in Revision 3 . . . ." (Objections at 19.) LILCO is wrong. Re-vision O did not contain any estimate of bus capacity. LILCO's 75% capacity assumption was added to the Plan subsequent to Re-vision O. LILCO's timeliness objection should be rejected.

S. Contention 67.D LILCO objects to one sentence of the proposed. modification to Contention 67.D, which states:

The eleven new transfer points designated by LILCO do not appear to nave acequate structures which could provide shelter from adverse radiological or weather conditions for evacuees.while they are waiting to be transferred to relocation centers.

LILCO makes four arguments about this modification. None have any merit. First, LILCO asserts that the proposed modification

" changes the entire focus of the contention." (Objections at 19.) Reading Subpart 67.D as admitted by the Board reveals that in making this flat assertion, LILCO blatantly ignores the contents of the contention. The point of Subpart 67.D, as stated in the last two sentences in both its original form and as modified, is that LILCO's proposed transfer points "will not provide protection" for evacuees and "could result in l

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[ evacuees'] . . . receiving health-threatening radiation

• doses."- The modification objected to by LILCO is completely consistent with that point.

Second, LILCO asserts that the alleged " expansion" of Subpart 67.D "is not justified' by modification to Revision 3" and therefore untimely. (Objections at 20.) This LILCO

. argument is absurd and disingenuous on its face. Beginning with Revision 0 and in all revisions prior to Revision 3, LILCO's proposed transfer points were school buildings. (See original Contention 24. I. ) -In Revision 3, eleven new transfer points were identified. They include, among others, the fol-lowing:

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-- Miller - Place Road (a "LILCO Right-of-Way North of Rt 25A")

Coram Drive-In

-- LILCO Property ("between Norwood Ave and Nesconset Hwy. , We st of Terryville Rd")

-- North Bellport Restaurant

-- ' Shirley Drive-In (Appendix A at IV-74c.) Clearly, the fact that LILCO now pro-i l poses to use as transfer points drive-in movie theaters which, I

in essence, are nothing but parking lots, and places on the

(

road that according to the descriptions provided by LILCO do

,. - .m -

, , . -m , _ . . _ , _ . _ . , _ _ . , _ , . .....Q.. _ _ _ , , . _ , , - , . . . .

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- not appear to have any structures at all, rather than school

= buildings, " justifies" the proposed modification.

Third, LILCO asserts, without explanation, that Interve-nors "have provided no basis" for the allegation in the pro-posed modification that the new transfer points do not appear to have structures that could provide shelter. (Objections at 20.) Although Intervenors are under no obligation to provide the factual underpinnings for the factual assertions which form the basis of their contentions ( see Part I. A above) , the reasons for the referenced assertion are readily apparent from a reading of even the partial list of transfer points in Appen-dix A quoted'above.

LILCO also attempts to make a lack of specificity objection to the referenced sentence proposed to be added to Contention 67.D. Clearly, the contention puts the parties on notice of the issue to be litigated -- that is, whether the proposed transfer points provide adequate shelter for waiting i

I evacuees -- and therefore the specificity requirement is .-

satisfied. See Part I.B above.

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All of LILCO's so-called objections to the proposed modi-fications to Contention 67.D should be rejected out of hand.

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T. Contention 69 LILCO_does not object to the introductory portion of Con-tention 69 or 69.E; but merely observes that, in LILCO's view, they should be consolidated with Contention 61.C. l.

~(Objections at 20, 21.) No response is required to this non-

~~

objection.

LILCO also has not objected to the modifications to Con-tention 69.B. However, LILCO's characterization of the Coun-ty's representation concerning the modifications must be

~ ~ ~

~~~correcie~d. The words "or near" were added to the description of schools and school districts in order to reflect the fact that some schools outside the EPZ are identified and included in LILCO's Plan. Thus, the modification was intended merely to

, conform the contention to the fact that the LILCO Plan already concerns schools outside the EPZ boundaries.

U. Contention 71.A l

LILCO makes three objections to the proposed modifications

to Contention 71.A. None have any merit, and all reflect a serious misreading or misunderstanding of the contention.

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5 First, Contention 71 and its propased modifications must

' In Revision O of its Plan, LILCO be put in proper context.

proposed to' evacuate only those children Who attended schools

.in the Shoreham-Wading River School District. The evacuation would be accomplished by LILCO employees driving buses to des-

~

ignated relocation centers. These were no provisions of any kind in Revision 0 for evacuating children Who attended nursery or other schools in any of the other districts in the EPZ .

Consequently,' when originally written, Contention 71 only ap-plied to -Shoreham-Wading River Schools. However, in Revision 3, LILCO completely changed its proposed protective actions for schools. It eliminated the provision of evacuation assistance to the Shoreham-Wading River School District; it added a provision that LILCO employees woul.d drive buses to evacuate nursery school children; it. added a provision that all other non-nursery schools . would perform evacuations themselves and would relocate students to relocation centers; and it deleted the identification of relocation centers for any school chil-dren.

The proposed modifications to Contention 71 reflect the major Revision 3 changes to the LILCO Plan. Thus, since LILCO i

l now proposes to provide LILCO drivers only for nursery school buses, Subpart A.1, which focuses on bus availability to LILCO i

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employees, has been modified to reflect that fact. Subpart B

~

(not objected to by LILCO) has been modified to reflect the

. current proposal that schools, not LILCO drivers, are expected to evacuate children. Subpart C reflects the totally new Revi-sion 3 provision that schools outside the EPZ are expected to retain at school those children who reside in the EPZ .

LILCO's first argument -- that the proposed modification to Subpart 71.A changes "the entire focus of the contention from the availability of evacuation buses and relocation centers for school children to the availability of those facilities for nursary school children," and its characteri-zation of that observation as an " objection" is preposterous on ,

. -its face. If anything, the proposed modification limits the scope of the contention; the fact that it now reflects the cur-rent LILCO proposal rather than an obsolete proposal cannot

.possibily be said to make the modification improper or inadmis-sible.

(

Second, LILCO's statement that "nothing in Revision 3

. -. . supports such a change in focus and therefore the modifi-L cations are untbmely," is in the County's view totally inexpli-l j cable, given the identified changes in the Revision 3 of the l

LILCO Plan, i

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, , - + - - -.

F

-3 LILCO's third so-called " objection" can only be explained by assuming that LILCO failed to read the text of Subpart 71.A.1. LILCO asserts an objection to what its characterizes as "intervenors' assertion that LILCO must have agreements with schools or parents permitting children to ride buses." conten-tion 71. A asserts no such thing. It says: .

1. Even if LILCO had . . . agreements with schools or parents permitting children to ride in' buses driven by LILCO employees (emphasis added). The "even if LILCO had agreements" language is in the portion of the Contention already admitted by the Board.

LILCO's observation that the proposed modification to Subpart

71. A is repetitive of Contention 24.E is specious for the same reason -- Contention 71. A does not allege the need for agree-ments; rather, it assumes, for the sake of argument, that such agreements exist.

All the LILCO " objections to Contention 71. A are frivolous and should be rejected out of hand.

V. Contention 71.C LILCO apparently attempts to object to Subpart 1 of proposed modified Contention 71.C. LILCO asserts that Subpart 1 is inad-missible because, according to LILCO, "there is no legal f

Q requirement that offsite emergency plans include tha details of school emergency plans." (Objections at 22.) The objection is without merit. First, in making this objection LILCO, as usual, ignores .the regulatory basis for the contention that is stated in the Preamble to Contention 68-71 -- that is, that the proposed protective actions contained in the LILCO Plan must be demon- --

strated to be capable of implementation. 10 CFR $$ 50.47(a) (1),

50.47(b)(10) NUREG 0654, Sections II.J.9 and J.10. LILCO provides no legal authority or explanation for its unsupported

' conclusion that Subpart 71.C.1 is inadmissible. Its objection must be rejected. ~Moreover, LILCO's own Plan assumes the exis-tence of school plans, and, in fact, relies upon them. (See-OPrF 3.6.5 at 10a, referenced in Contention 70.) Thus, LILCO cannot be heard to complain about the substance of Subpart 71. A.1.12/

LILCO's purported " objection" should be denied.

W. . Contention 72.D LILCO makes a " lack of specificity" objection to proposed modified Subpart D of Contention 72. LILCO asserts that the 10/ .In addition, the objected to portion of Subpart 71.A.1 is .

'substantially the same -- except for its reference to the retention of students in schools outside the EP2 rather than early dismissal procedures -- as admitted Contention 69.B.

o propcsed modification should not be admitted because "it does not i specify in what way the procedures in the Plan are inadequate."

(Objections at 22.) As discussed in Part I.B above, the purpose of the specificity requirement is to put the parties on notice of the issue to be litigated. Contention 72.D adequately puts LILCO

~

on notice of the thrust of Intervenors' contention. Contention 72 alleges that the LILCO proposals for evacuation of special facilities cannot be implemented and subpart D states one reason.

It 'is not necessary for the Intervenors to set forth with any greater particularity the specific evidence they intend to present in testimony. There is no requirement that the bases for the contentions be stated in the contention. See Part I.A above.

X. Contentions 73.B.3 and 73.B.5 LILCO objects to that portion of Subpart 3 of Contention ,

73.B which asserts that the LILCO Plan does not indicate that communications and administrative personnel will be available to assist the Home Coordinator telephona the homebound residents of the EPZ on the ground that it lacks basis. (Objections at 23).

LILCO also objects for the same reason to the assertions contained in ~ Subpart 5 of Contention 73.B that deaf residents of the EPZ will not be notified in a timely manner, because route alert drivers will be delayed by mobilization traffic, and

O .

'because there will not be enough route alert drivers to perform the task. (Id.) LILCO objects to no other proposed modifica-tions to Contention 73.B. LILCO's " objections" clearly are nothing but a disagreement with the factual assertions singled out of the Subparts by LILCO. As noted above, such disagreements

- are not proper admissibility objections.

Contention 73.B alleges that LILC0's proposals for evacuating handicapped individuals living at home would not suc-ceed for several specific reasons, which are listed in the subparts to Contention 73.B. LILCO challenges these specific reasons. Thus, LILCO once again directs a " lack of basis" objection at the wrong element of a Contention. Contrary to LILCO's argument, there is no requirement that Intervenors prove at this stage of the proceeding the factual assertions contained in their contentions. It is sufficient that those factual premises be alleged. See Part I.A above. If, as is obviously the case, LlLCO believes that the Intervenors' factual assertions are incorrect, LILCO can present evidence supportive of its posi-tion and attempt to prove its point at hearing. However, LILCO ' s disagreement is not grounds for denying admission to the chal-lenged factual assertions, and LILCO's objections should be de-nied.

l

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.w Y. Contention 81 Although in its Objections, LILCO objects to .the modifi-cation to Contention 81 on the basis of " lack of specificity,"

(Objections at 23-24), counsel for LILCO informed the County on January 25 that this Objection has been withdrawn.

Z. Contention 81.A LILCO purports to make a " lack of specificity" objection to Contention 81.A, by alleging that "Intervenors do not specify

^

_ what procedures are inadequate."__(Objections at 24.) LILCO's armemment 4a incorrect,_as is apparent when one reads the conten-tion. Contention 81. A specifically asserts that the LILCO Plan does not " provide adequate procedures or guidance governing the disposition of contaminated lactating dairy animals, [and] the treatment of uncontaminated lactating dairy animala should uncontaminated stored feed not be available." Clearly, the con-tention does specify the procedures which are asserted to be in-adequate. There fore, LILCO's objection should be denied.

AA. Contention 81.C LILCO objects to the inclusion in Contention 81.C of the as-sertion that the Plan does not state "what the criteria are for a contaminated operations area and how to measure it . . .

on the

t 2

ground that-this' modification is not based on a modification made t

to the Plan in Revision 3. LILCO's objection is simply mistaken.

' The modification to which LILCO objects was necessitated by changes made to OPIP 3.6.6, reflected in Revision 3. Attachment

'7'to.OPIP 3.6.6, at 2, now specifically refers to "the area of possible contamination,'" but does not define that area. Because the challenged modificat".ons to Conention 81.C could not have been based on Revision 0, LILCO's '" untimeliness" objection is groundless and'must be denied.

BB. Contention 81.E LILCO objects to the proposed addition of the words "or

' Connecticut" to subpart 81'.E. Frankly, Suffolk County believes this 11s a frivolous objection which-barely merits a response. As LILCO .itself notes, all parties to this proceeding have from the beginning been aware that Connecticut is within the ingestion ex-l posure pathway, although it was subsequent to Revision 0 that LILCO recognized that fact in the Plan.ll/ The proposed addition l

l L 11/ In Revision 3 of OPIP 3. 6. 6, LILCO states (at le and lu):

.The Director of Local Response will contact

. .. . the Connecticut Department of Envi-ronmental Protection and provide the LERO

[ Ingestion Pathway recommendation. . . .

L (Footnote cont' d next page) l t

' - . . - ~ . - _

7.

v 1

of " Connecticut" to the admitted original Contention 81.E which references only Suffolk County, was intended merely to make the subpart accurate by reflecting the obvinus fact, recognized in other contentions, that Connecticut is also in the ingestion pathway zone. LILCO can claim no surprise or prejudice arising from this purely editorial proposed modification.

CC. Contention 85 LILCO objects to the revisions to Contention 85 on the grounds that there is no legal requirement for the " detailed [re-covery and reentry] plans of the sort intervenors suggest in Con-tention 85. . . . (Objections at 25).

LILCO's objection must be denied for two reasons. First, it mischaracterize s Contention 85. Contrary to LILCO's assertion,

.the Intervenors do not allege in Contention 85 that LILCO's plans for recovery and reentry are insufficiently detailed. Ra ther contention 85, as modified and in its original form, asserts that LILCO has no recovery and reentry plans at all. The proposed j

modification states that LILCO's Plan is inadequate because it i

! (Footnote cont'd from previous page)

If the state officials cannot be contacted or are unable or unwilling to implement protective actions . . . this section will be implemented by LERO.

(

r 3

"provides merely that planning for recovery and reentry will V*

commence after the appointment of the Recovery Action Committee."

NUREG 0654,Section II.M and 10 CFR $50.47(b) (13), both of which are cited in Contention 85, clearly require that plans for reen-try and recovery must be in existence. The LILCO Plan does not contain such plans and therefore it violates the cited regulatory requirements. Consequently, there is an obvious regulatory basis for the contention and LILCO's objection must be rejected.

3 Furthermore, LILCO's objection to Contention 85 is almost a verbatim repetition of its objection to Contentions 84 through 91, contained in ite August Objections, at 63. In admitting Con-tention 85, the Board overruled LILCO's objection with respect to Contention 85. Order Ruling on Objections to Special Prehearing Conference Crder, dated September 30, 1983, at 8. Because the fundamental assertion of Contention 85 -- that recovery and reen-try plans do not exist -- remains unchanged, LILCO's objection should be rejected.

DD. Contention 92 LILCO's objection to the proposed modification to Contention 92 is basically the same as its objection to the proposed modifi-cation to Contention 81. E. In the County's view, the objection is frivolous. The addition of the State of Connecticut to

y 4 s lO4

.# Contention 92 merely reflects the fact, acknowledged by everyone,

'/f that the ingestion exposure pathway includes portions of Connecticut. The proposed modification in no way changes or broadens the facts or issues which will be litigated in this pro-ceeding. It is intended merely to reflect accurately the facts.

There is no basis for an argument that the proposed modification prejudices LILCO in any way. The objection should be rejected.

Re spectfully submitted, Martin Bradley Ashare Suffolk County Department of Law Veterans Memorial Highway Ha uppa ug e , New York 11788 3 . . /

/

Ldwrgnce Coe 'pher E

Karld J. Le che John E. Bir enheier January 30, 1984 Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill, Christopher & Phillips 1900 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 l Attorneys for Suf folk County l

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._d

UNITED STATES OF. AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIUN

. Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

)

In the Matter of ).

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 0.L.

) (Emergency Planning)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of Suffolk County Response to LILCO~and NRC Staff Objections to Intervenors' Proposed Emergency Planning Contentions Modified to Reflect Revision 3 of the LILCO Plan have been served on.the following by U.S. mail, first class, -

except where noted, this 30th day of January, 1984.

• James A. Laurenson, Chairman Ralph Shapiro, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Camme'r and Shapiro U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9 East 40th Street Washington, D.C. 20555 c New York, New York 10016

• Dr. Jerry R. Kline Howard L. Blau, Esq.

Administrative Judge 217 Newbridge Road Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Hicksville, New York 11801 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ***W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.

Hunton & Williams

• Mr. Frederick J. Shon P.O. Box 1535 Administrative Judge 707 East Main Street Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Richmond, Virginia 23212 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Jay Dunkleberger New York State Energy Office Edward M. Barrett, Esq. Agency Building 2 General Counsel -

Empire State Plaza Long. Island Lighting Company Albany, New York 12223 250 Old Country Road Mineola, New York 11501 James B. Dougherty, Esq.

3045 Porter Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20008

• By Hand

• • By Federal Express

• • • By Computer

= .

Mr. Brian McCaffrey Stephen B. Latham, Esq'.

Twomey, Latham & Shea Long Island Lighting Company P.O. Box 393 175 East Old Country Road 33 West Second Street Hicksville, New York 11801 Riverhead, New York 11901

.Jeff Smith Marc W. Goldsmith Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Energy Research Group, Inc.

P.O. Box 618. 400-1 Totten Pond Road North Country Road . Waltham, Massachusetts 02154 Wading River, New York 11792 ,

Joel Blau, Esq. MHB Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue New York Public Service Commission Suite K The Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller San Jose, California 95125 Building Empire State Plaza Hon. Peter F. Cohalan Albany, New York 12223 Suffolk County Executive H. Lee Dennison Building Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq. Veterans Memorial Highway Suffolk County-Attorney Hauppauge, New York 11788 H. Lee Dennison Building Veterans Memorial Highway Ezra I. Bialik, Esq.

Hauppauge, New York 11788 Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Environmental Protection Bureau Board Panel New York State Department U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission of Law Washington, D.C. 20555 2 World Trade Center New York, New York 10047 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Appeal Board 1717 H Street, N.W.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

• Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.

David A. Repka, Esq. Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.

-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff Counsel Washington, D.C. 20555 New York State Public Service Commission

- Stuart Diamond 3 Rockefeller Plaza Environment / Energy Writer Albany, New York 12223 NEWSDAY Long Island, New York 11747 l

Stewart M. Glass, Esq. Nora Bredes Regional Counsel Executive Director Federal Emergency Management Shoreham Opponents Coalition Agency 195 East Main Street 26 Federal. Plaza, Room 1349 Smithtown, New York 11787 New York, New York 10278 Spence Perry, Esq.

• Eleanor L. Frucci, Esq. Associate General Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing Federal Emergency Management Board Panel Agency U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,'D.C. 20472 Washington, D.C. 20555 Ben Wiles, Esq.

Gerald C. Crotty Assistant Counsel to the Counsel to the Governor Governor Executive Chamber Executive Chamber State Capitol State Capitol Albany, New York 12224 Albany, New York 12224

• • Fabian Palomino, Esq.

Speci~al Counsel to the Governor Executive Chamber Room 229 -

State Capitol Albany, New York 12224

) / .

Kdlh J. Letsche /V KIRKPATRICK, LOC 4 HART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS ~

1900 M Street, N.W., Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20036 l Dated: January 30, 1984 l

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