ML20079G746

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Scenarios
ML20079G746
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 02/27/2020
From: Gregory Roach
NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
To:
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
Roach G
Shared Package
ML19121A162 List:
References
Download: ML20079G746 (49)
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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 1 of 14 Facility:

Davis-Besse Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.:

DB NRC 2020 Examiners:

Operators:

SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: 100% Power Turnover: SFAS Ch 2 RCS Pressure LO and LOLO Bistables have been tripped due to an instrument failure last shift.

Planned:

Stop #1 HDP for maintenance I&C to repair failed instrument and restore to service Critical tasks:

1. Isolate overcooling SG (CT-17)
2. Restore Seal Return or Shutdown the Reactor Coolant Pumps (CT-B)

Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

N-BOP/SRO Stop #1 Heater Drain Pump for maintenance 2

C-ATC/SRO Makeup Filter High diff press 3

TS-SRO Containment Spray Pump Oil Leak (TS) 4 R-ATC/SRO C-BOP TS-SRO RCP 1-1 high vibrations - reduce power - trip RCP (TS) 5 C-BOP/SRO FW auto re-ratio fails when trip RCP 6

C-ATC/SRO Inadvertent SFAS Levels 1 through 3 - Trip reactor 7

Major OVCLG - Leaking Main Steam Safety Valve 8

C-BOP/SRO SFRCS fails to auto initiate on Low Steam Pressure (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Summary NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 2 of 14 DAVIS-BESSE 2020 NRC SCENARIO 3 The crew will take the watch with power at 100%. SFAS Ch 2 RCS Pressure LO and LOLO Bistables have been tripped due to an instrument failure last shift. I&C will commence troubleshooting later this shift.

EVENT 1: Stop #1 HDP for maintenance The crew will Stop #1 HDP IAW DB-OP-06227, Low Pressure Feedwater Heaters in preparation for planned PMs.

EVENT 2: Makeup Filter High diff press After #1 Heater Drain Pump (HDP) has been stopped, the Lead Evaluator will cue event 2.

Annunciator 2-4-A, Letdown or MU Filter Differential Pressure Hi, will alarm due to high differential pressure across the #1 Makeup Filter (PDI MU13 greater than 25 psid). The crew will implement alarm procedure DB-OP-02002, Letdown/Makeup Alarm Panel 2 Annunciators actions, validate #1 Makeup Filter differential pressure is high, and swap to #2 Makeup Filter using DB-OP-06006, Makeup and Purification System.

EVENT 3: Containment Spray Pump Oil Leak (TS)

The Lead Evaluator will then cue event 3. An EO performing normal rounds will call the control room and report the oil has leaked out of the Containment Spray Pump 1. The SRO will declare the Containment Spray Pump 1 Inoperable and enter TS 3.6.6 Condition A. The crew will direct disabling Containment Spray Pump 1 from starting.

EVENT 4 & 5: RCP 1-1 high vibrations-FW auto re-ratio fails when trip RCP The Lead Evaluator will then cue RCP 1-1 high vibrations. Annunciators 6-1-A, MOTOR VIB HI and 6-5-A, MONITOR SYSTEM TRBL will alarm. The SRO will implement DB-OP-02515, RCP Pump and Motor Abnormal. The SRO will implement DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown to reduce power. The ATC will reduce power to less than 72% and RCP 1-1 will be stopped. When the RCP is stopped FW will fail to auto re-ratio and the BOP will be required to take loop demands to hand and re-ratio. The CSRO will check RCS flow is greater than the flow required by TS 3.4.1, DNB Limits and Notify I&C to reduce the RPS High Flux Trip setpoints within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> IAW TS 3.4.4, RCS Loops.

EVENT 6: Inadvertent SFAS Levels 1 through 3 - Trip reactor After the plant has stabilized the Lead Evaluator will cue event 6. SFAS Channel 2 loses power causing SFAS levels 1 - 3 to actuate. An SFAS Level 3 inadvertent actuation is entry criteria for DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture. SFAS Level 3 inadvertent actuation causes a loss of Seal Return to the RCPs. The 30-minute timer to restore Seal Return or SD the RCPs starts when RCP Seal Return is lost (CT-3).

EVENT 7 & 8: OVCLG - Leaking Main Steam Safety Valve & SFRCS fails to auto initiate Following the reactor trip the crew will identify Overcooling due to a MSSV on SG 2 failing to reseat. The crew will implement attachment 20, lowering steam generator pressure attempting to seat the safety. The crew will recognize the Main Steam Safety Valve will not close and initiate and isolate SFRCS. SFRCS fails to automatically actuate on SG low pressure requiring manual re-positioning of the AFW valves. The crew will then isolate the OTSG and terminate the overcooling (CT-17). Due to the Inadvertent SFAS Actuation, Seal Return will be required to be restored within 30 minutes or the RCPs shutdown to prevent seal failure (CT-3).

When the overcooling steam generator is isolated, and Seal Return or RCPs shutdown is established the scenario can be terminated.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

3 Event #

1 Page 1

of 1

Event

Description:

Stop #1 HDP in preparation for planned PMs Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 3 of 14 Indications Available:

HIS318, LP HEATER DRAIN TANK PUMPS 1 indicating lights II318, HEATER DRAIN PUMP 1 (HDP 1) AMMETER TEAM Brief stopping Heater Drain Pump 1 IAW DB-OP-06227, Low Pressure Feedwater Heaters Section 3.5 TEAM Verify adequate condensate pump capacity exists for the loss of the Heater Drain Pump flow.

BOP Direct EO to adjust HC311, FAIRCHILD RELAY LY311 HAND CONTROL for HDP 1 discharge valve, until the DIAPHRAGM PRESSURE TO LV311, is approximately 15 PSIG BOOTH CUE Role play as EO, DIAPHRAGM PRESSURE TO LV311, is approximately 15 PSIG BOP Stop Heater Drain Pump 1, using HIS318, LP HEATER DRAIN TANK PUMPS 1 BOP Direct EO to Close HD 5, LOW PRESSURE HEATER DRAIN PUMP 1 DISCHARGE ISOLATION BOOTH CUE Role play as EO, HD 5, LOW PRESSURE HEATER DRAIN PUMP 1 DISCHARGE ISOLATION is Closed Role play as I&C, remove from service and drain LSH391, LP FW HEATER DRAIN TK 1 IAW DB-OP-06227 step 3.5.5.

TEAM Monitor Condensate Flow and Reactor Power.

TEAM Evaluate expected Annunciators At Lead Evaluators direction, cue Event 2, Makeup Filter High diff press

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

3 Event #

2 Page 1

of 1

Event

Description:

Makeup Filter High diff press Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 4 of 14 Indications Available:

PDI MU13 indicates >25 PSID 2-4-A LETDOWN OR MU FILT P HI CREW Recognize Makeup Filter high differential pressure for in service Makeup Filter 1 (indications available listed above)

ATC Implement DP-OP-02002 Letdown/Makeup Alarm Panel 2 Annunciators for 2-4-A LETDOWN OR MU FILT P HI ATC Validate Makeup Filter high differential pressure with PDI MU13 indicating >25 psid SRO Direct placing Makeup Filter 2 in service in accordance with DB-OP-06006, Makeup and Purification System SRO/ATC Verify Makeup Filter 2 is not aligned as the Purification Demin Filter SM CUE If necessary, Role-play Shift Manager and inform the SRO that Makeup Filter 2 has been verified NOT aligned as the Purification Demin Filter ATC Swap to Makeup Filter 2 ATC Open MU12B, MAKEUP FILTER 2 INLET ISOLATION, using HISMU12B.

ATC Close MU12A, MAKEUP FILTER 1 INLET ISOLATION, using HISMU12A.

CREW Ensure work request initiated to have filter replaced (alarm procedure guidance)

On Lead Evaluators discretion proceed to Event 3, MDFP Oil Leak

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

3 Event #

3 Page 1

of 1

Event

Description:

Containment Spray Pump 1 Oil Leak (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 5 of 14 Indications Available:

Local indication only, Equipment Operator report Booth Cue Role-play EO and report: While performing my zone tour, I noticed that all the oil has drained out of Containment Spray Pump 1 inboard bearing reservoir. The sight glass is broken and will need replaced.

SRO Declare Containment Spray Pump 1 Inoperable and enter TS 3.6.6, Condition A SRO May contact Maintenance and/or Work Week Manager Note Crew may discuss/direct disabling Containment Spray Pump 1 from starting Crew May discuss/review plant risk with Containment Spray Pump 1 unavailable and discuss protecting equipment (Containment Spray Pump 2)

Booth Cue If necessary, role play as maintenance and report Containment Spray Pump 1 will be required to be removed from service to repair broken sight glass BOP Turn on CS Pump Blue Operability Light Booth Cue If necessary, role play as EO to disable CSP IAW DB-OP-01000, OPERATION OF STATION BREAKERS:

Remove the emergency close control power fuses behind the CSP 1 Emergency Control Transfer Switch on E1 upper right cubicle Place Emergency Control Transfer Switch for CSP 1 on E1 in EMERGENCY On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 4 & 5, RCP High Vibrations

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

3 Event #

4 & 5 Page 1

of 3

Event

Description:

RCP High Vibrations and Auto FW Reratio Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 6 of 14 Indications Available:

6-1-A MOTOR VIB HI 6-5-A MONITOR SYSTEM TRBL CREW Recognize RCP 1-1 high vibrations SRO Implement DB-OP-02515, RCP and Motor Abnormal procedure CREW Verify the RCP 1-1 motor conditions exceed operational limits using the PPC or SPDS SRO Implement DB-OP-02515 Attachment 1, Reactor Coolant Pump Shutdown SRO Implement DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown

  • Commence a power reduction to 72% or less ATC ULD with ICS in Automatic
  • At the LOAD CONTROL Panel, set the rate of change to the rate specified by the Command SRO
  • Select the target RTP as determined by the Command SRO CREW Monitor Reactor Power to confirm power is being reduced at approximately the expected rate (NI vs. HBP)

ATC Monitor Regulating Rod Insertion Limits during the Shutdown per Technical Specification 3.2.1 ATC Attempt to maintain Axial Power Imbalance between 0 and negative 20 percent using APSRs BOP Perform Attachment 6, Balance of Plant Actions for Rapid Shutdown

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

3 Event #

4 & 5 Page 3

of 3

Event

Description:

RCP High Vibrations and Auto FW Reratio Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 7 of 14 BOP At approximately 90 percent power, notify the Field Supervisor to remove the Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Main Steam Minimum flow lines from service BOP When Condensate flow is less than 7.0 MPPH (FI578), then establish two Condensate pumps in operation SRO Notify the System Control Center (SCC) Load Dispatcher of the unit load reduction BOP Place the SG Load Ratio (Tc) in Auto ATC Reduce reactor power to < 72 percent ATC Stop RCP 1-1 BOP Verify proper Feedwater flow ratios of 2.4 to 1 BOP Recognize auto re-ratio is not occurring:

Take both FW Loop Demands to Hand Ratio FW to approximately 2.38 MPPH on SG1 Ratio FW to approximately 5.74 MPPH on SG2 ATC Verify Tave control is on RCS Loop 2 ATC Monitor Pressurizer level due to Tave transient 4-2-E (Lo LVL) may alarm reduce MU-32 Setpoint to ~180 4-3-E (Hi LVL) may alarm refer to TS 3.4.9 SRO Check RCS flow is greater than the flow required by TS 3.4.1, DNB Limits. REFER TO DB-OP-03006, Miscellaneous Instrument Shift Checks. (Computer Point F744)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

3 Event #

4 & 5 Page 3

of 3

Event

Description:

RCP High Vibrations and Auto FW Reratio Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 8 of 14 SRO Notify I&C reduce RPS High Flux Trip setpoints within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> SRO Enter TS 3.4.4 Condition A Proceed to Event 6, Inadvertent Actuation of SFAS Levels 1 through 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

3 Event #

6 Page 1

of 1

Event

Description:

Inadvertent Actuation of SFAS Levels 1 through 3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 9 of 14 Indications Available:

SFAS annunciators SFAS components repositioning SAM lights lit

  • Critical Task (CT-B)

TEAM Recognize an actuation of SFAS Levels 1 through 3

  • Time of SFAS (Loss of RCP Seal Return) _________

ATC Perform DB-OP-02000 Immediate Actions Trip the reactor VERIFY Reactor Power is lowering on the Intermediate Range Trip the turbine VERIFY all Turbine Stop Valves OR Control Valves are closed US Route to DB-OP-02000, Section 3 US/ATC Verify Immediate Actions TEAM Implement any necessary Specific Rules Actions ACTIONS FOR LOSS OF SUBCOOLING MARGIN STEAM GENERATOR CONTROL POWER FOR C1 AND D1 BUSES OR EDG START ATC Implement Specific Rule 6 Verify both EDGs are running Verify C1 and D1 are energized Verify both CCW Pumps are running Verify both Service Water Pumps are running TEAM Implement any necessary Symptom Mitigation Sections LACK OF ADEQUATE SUBCOOLING MARGIN LACK OF HEAT TRANSFER OVERCOOLING Proceed to Events 7 & 8, Partially Stuck Open Main Steam Safety Valve and SFRCS failure to actuate on Low Steam Generator Pressure

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

3 Event #

7 & 8 Page 1

of 3

Event

Description:

Partially Stuck Open Main Steam Safety Valve and SFRCS failure to actuate on Low Steam Generator Pressure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 10 of 14 Indications Available:

Lowering Steam Generator Pressure SFRCS Low Steam Pressure Actuation Fails BOP Recognize Overcooling due to SG 2 less than 960 psig SRO Route to DB-OP-02000, Section 7 for Overcooling ATC Implement Attachment 8, Place MU/HPI/LPI in Service

  • Start/Verify running both CCW Pumps
  • Start both HPI Pumps
  • Start both LPI Pumps
  • Open DH 64 and DH 63
  • Transfer Makeup Pump suctions, MU6405 & MU3971, to the BWST (depress off)
  • Set Pressurizer Level Controller to 100 inches
  • Start Standby Makeup Pump 2 IF AT ANY TIME Pressurizer Level is less than 40 inches
  • Lock MU Pump suctions, MU6405 & MU3971, on the BWST
  • Verify Pressurizer heaters are off
  • Isolate Letdown by closing MU2B
  • Open MU6421
  • Throttle open MU6419 as needed (Alternate Injection Line)
  • Direct EO to open MU6423B Booth Cue If security is called inform that steam continues to issue from aux building roof steam relief exhaust pipe BOP Perform Attachment 20 to attempt to reseat the MSSV
  • Lower SG pressure toward 700 psig using the TBVs
  • Recognize the MSSV has NOT reseated BOP Initiate AND Isolate SFRCS using SFRCS MANUAL ACTUATION switches BOP Verify proper SFRCS alignment

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

3 Event #

7 & 8 Page 2

of 3

Event

Description:

Partially Stuck Open Main Steam Safety Valve and SFRCS failure to actuate on Low Steam Generator Pressure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 11 of 14 CREW Determine the overcooling cannot be isolated CREW Determine SG 2 is causing the overcooling Critical Task (CT-17)

NOTE: Overcooling must be isolated <10 minutes from the time SG 2 is less than 630 psig If applicable, Time SG 2 less than 630 psig_________

Critical Task (CT-17)

BOP Close AF 599 (isolate FW flow SG 2)

Time AF 599 is closed_________

BOP Recognize AFW is not properly aligned for a low pressure trip on SG 2 and

  • Realign AFW components as required BOP Stabilize RCS temperature using the AVV on SG 1 ATC Initiate RCS depressurization to minimum adequate SCM ATC Throttle MU/HPI as necessary to control Pressurizer level ATC Restore Seal Injection using Attachment 10
  • Close MU 19
  • Block and open MU 66A, MU 66B, MU 66C and MU 66D
  • Open MU 19 to obtain 12 - 15 gpm Seal Injection flow BOP Recognize SFRCS SG level setpoint on High due to inadvertent SFAS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

3 Event #

7 & 8 Page 3

of 3

Event

Description:

Partially Stuck Open Main Steam Safety Valve and SFRCS failure to actuate on Low Steam Generator Pressure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 12 of 14

  • Critical Task (CT-B)

ATC Restore RCP Seal Return using Attachment 10

  • Verify MU 59A, MU 59B, MU 59C and MU 59D are closed
  • *Block and open MU 38
  • *Block and open MU 59A, MU 59B, MU 59C and MU 59D OR
  • Stop RCPs Time MU38, MU59A, MU59B, MU59C and MU59D are opened or RCPs are stopped _

BOP Verify proper SFRCS actuation CREW Check for PTS criteria CREW Check for adequate SCM When Overcooling Steam Generator is isolated, and either Seal Return is restored or the Reactor Coolant Pumps are shutdown the scenario can be terminated

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 13 of 14 Justification for Critical Tasks The term Critical Task, is defined in NUREG-1021, OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINER STANDARDS FOR POWER REACTORS. The listed critical tasks were compiled based on a review of Areva Technical Document 47-1229003-06, EOP Technical Bases Document, and additional CTs were added based on established DB Operations expectations and standards for previously identified Critical Task.

CT-17: Isolate Overcooling SG

1. Safety Significance:

The partially open Main Steam Safety Valve on Steam Generator 2 will cause an uncontrollable overcooling

2. Cues:

Lowering Pressure on Steam Generator 2 DB-OP-02000 Section 7 Overcooling

3. Measured by:

Time zero for CT-17 is when Steam Generator 2 is less than 630 psig The required action to complete the critical task is to Close AF 599 (isolate FW flow SG 2)

The required end time for completion of CT-17 is 10 minutes from when SG 2 is less than 630 psig

4. Feedback:

Feedwater flow lowering AF599 indicates closed CT-B: Protect RCP Seals

1. Safety Significance:

The inadvertent actuation of SFAS levels 1-3 will result in a loss of seal return flowpath. Extended operation without a RCP Seal Return flowpath may result in seal failure and unisolable RCS leakage.

2. Cues:

Loss of seal return flow as indicated by MU38 closed and RCPs running DB-OP-02515, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP AND MOTOR ABNORMAL OPERATION and DB-OP-02000 Attachment 10

3. Measured by:

Time zero for CT-B is when MU38 goes closed (inadvertent actuation of SFAS levels 1-3)

The required action to complete CT-B is to restore Seal Return or shutdown RCPs The required end time for completion of CT-B is 30 minutes

4. Feedback:

MU38, MU59A, MU59B, MU59C and MU59D are opened or RCPs are stopped

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 14 of 14 SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Simulator Setup:

100% Power Fail SFRCS low pressure trip on SG 2 automatic actuation Establish SG 2 unisolable steam leak following reactor trip Procedures:

DB-OP-06227, Low Pressure Feedwater Heaters DB-OP-02002, Letdown/Makeup Alarm Panel 2 Annunciators DB-OP-06006, Makeup and Purification System DB-OP-02006, RCP Alarm Panel 6 Annunciators DB OP 02515, RCP and Motor Abnormal DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture DB-OP-01000, Operation of Station Breakers For Simulator Instructor:

DB-OP-06227, Low Pressure Feedwater Heaters Simulator Commands for disabling Containment Spray Pump 1 if required BDP3H CSP1 LOCAL/REMOTE fuses TRUE BDP3D CSP1 CLOSE FUSE 242 remove BDP3E CSP1 CLOSE FUSE 243 remove

Page 1 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST DATE: Today SHIFT: NIGHTS MODE: 1 POWER: 100%

PLANT ONLINE RISK: GREEN SECURITY RISK: GREEN PROTECTED TRAIN: 2 PLANT CONDITION: 1 ACTIVE ALERTS: NONE GRID CONDITION: NORMAL SHUTDOWN DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH:

N/A ADDITIONAL PROTECTED EQUIPMENT - None CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR OPERABILITY/AVAIL IN EFFECT - None OUTSTANDING PROMPT OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS - None SHIFT ACTIVITIES -

Entered T.S. 3.3.5 Condition A.1 Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Instrumentation due to a failed RCS Pressure Transmitter I&C will commence troubleshooting on Day Shift Stop #1 HDP for maintenance ALARM STATUS -None ZONE 1 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS -None ZONE 1 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 1 - BURDENS - None ZONE 2 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS -None ZONE 2 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 2 - BURDENS - None ZONE 3 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS -None ZONE 3 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 3 - BURDENS - None CONTROL ROOM - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS-None CONTROL ROOM - WORKAROUNDS-None CONTROL ROOM - BURDENS - None CONTROL ROOM - DEFICIENCIES -None OUTAGE-RELATED repairs in the CTRM GENERAL STATUS

Page 2 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST Intake Chlorination (Primary Oxidant) - OOS Intake Actibrom (Oxidant enhancer) - OOS Circwater Chlorination (Primary Oxidant) - Pumps 1 & 3 Circwater Actibrom (Oxidant Enhancer) - I/S Circwater Trasar (Scale inhibitor) - I/S Pumps 1 & 3 Collection Box Sodium Bisulfite (Dechlorinator) - I/S RCS Zinc Injection (Crud Layer Enhancement) - I/S Polishers I/S: 1, 2, 3, 4 MUT press band: 30-40 psig MSD Skid #1: I/S MSR 1 Drains: Forward MSD Skid #2: I/S MSR 2 Drains: Forward

                              • Screen Wash Catch Basin aligned to the North Settling Basin 5/18/2016 ***************

EVOLUTIONS IN PROGRESS - None FOLLOW-UP ITEMS-None

Page 3 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST ACTIVE DB LICENSE REQUIREMENTS (TS, TRM, FHAR, ODCM, FLEX)

Date &

Time Entered Equipment Affected Specification Action Required Next Action Due Responsible Individual Issue Owner/

Test Leader Today 0100 SFAS Ch 2 RCS Pressure Transmitter T.S. 3.3.5 Condition A A.1 One or more Parameters with one channel inoperable. Place channel in trip within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Action Completed I&C FUNCTIONAL EP RELATED EQUIPMENT REQUIRING COMPENSATORY ACTIONS

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 1 of 15 Facility:

Davis-Besse Scenario No.:

4 Op Test No.:

DB NRC 2020 Examiners:

Operators:

SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: 100% Power Turnover: Maintain 100% Power Planned: Shift routines Critical tasks:

1. Shutdown the Reactor - ATWS (CT-24)
2. Control HPI (CT-5)

Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

N-BOP/SRO Swap Cooling Tower Makeup Pumps 2

TS-SRO RC TE3A6 Hot Leg temp to SCM meter (TS) 3 C-ATC/SRO MU32 fails closed (use alt inj line) 4 C-BOP/SRO TS-SRO Startup Transformer 02 Lockout (TS) 5 C-BOP/SRO MFP low oil pressure - trip MFP - runback works 6

R-ATC/SRO C-BOP SG Tube Rupture 7

Major ATWS - Key Switch Works 8

C-ATC/SRO PZR Spray valve fails closed (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Summary NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 2 of 15 DAVIS-BESSE 2020 NRC SCENARIO 4 The crew will take the watch with the plant at 100% power.

EVENT 1: Swap Cooling Tower Makeup (CTMU) Pumps The BOP will swap CTMU Pumps IAW DB-OP-06232, Circ Water and Cooling Tower Operation to support planned maintenance.

EVENT 2: RC TE3A6 Hot Leg temp to SCM meter fails high (TS)

The Lead Evaluator will cue event 2, RC TE3A6 Hot Leg temperature to SCM meter failure high.

The crew will respond to annunciator 4-1-B, Sub Cooling Margin LO, and indications of RC TE3A6 failure, and SCM meter of 0 degrees. The SRO will identify this as a Tech Spec required Post Accident Monitoring instrument and enter TS 3.3.17 Condition A (TS).

EVENT 3: MU32 fails closed (use alt inj line)

When the Tech Spec 3.3.17 is entered the Lead Evaluator will cue MU32, Pressurizer Level Control Valve to fail closed. The crew will diagnose the failure with indications of low makeup flow and Pressurizer level lowering with MUT level rising. Manual control of MU32 demand signal will not affect makeup flow. The Unit Supervisor will implement abnormal procedure DB-OP-02512, Loss of RCS Makeup. MU32 will be isolated IAW DB-OP-06006. The alternate injection line may be placed in service at this time.

EVENT 4: Startup Transformer 02 Lockout (TS)

After letdown is in service, the Lead Evaluator will cue the Startup Transformer 02 Lockout.

Annunciator 1-1-G, SU XFMR 02 LOCKOUT will alarm and the SRO will implement DB-OP-02001, Electrical Distribution Alarm Panel 1 Annunciators and enter T.S. 3.8.1 Off-Site AC Sources.

EVENT 5: MFP low oil pressure - trip MFP - runback works When the T.S 3.8.1 is entered the Lead Evaluator will cue MFP low oil pressure. The BOP will implement DB-OP-02010, Feedwater Alarm Panel 10 Annunciators. The standby oil pump will fail to start which will require MFPT 2 to be tripped. The plant will runback to 55% power.

EVENT 6: SG Tube Rupture At Lead Evaluators discretion a Steam Generator Tube Rupture will be cued. DB-OP-02000, Section 8 will be implemented. The Plant will be reduced to low level limits and steam flow will be transferred from the Turbine to the Turbine Bypass Valves.

EVENT 7: ATWS - Key Switch Works After Steam Loads are transferred the Reactor Trip Buttons will fail resulting in an ATWS (CT-24). The ATC will activate the key switch which will shut down the reactor.

EVENT 8: PZR Spray valve fails closed The ATC will be directed to reduce RCS pressure to minimum subcooling margin. When this is attempted it will be recognized that the PZR spray valve is failed closed and the alternate PZR Vent Line method will be used. The ATC will control HPI to maintain RCS inventory (CT-5)

When the pressure reduction has begun and HPI has been throttled the scenario can be terminated.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

4 Event #

1 Page 1

of 1

Event

Description:

Swap CTMU Pumps for maintenance Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 3 of 15 Indications Available:

HIS922, COOLING TOWER MAKEUP PUMP 1 indicating lights HIS923, COOLING TOWER MAKEUP PUMP 2 indicating lights II922 COOLING TOWER MAKE-UP PUMP 1 AMMETER II923 COOLING TOWER MAKE-UP PUMP 2 AMMETER SRO Direct BOP to Start #2 CTMU Pump and Stop #1 CTMU Pump BOP Start Cooling Tower Makeup Pump 2 using HIS923, COOLING TOWER MAKEUP PUMP 2 BOP Stop Cooling Tower Makeup Pump 1 using HIS922, COOLING TOWER MAKEUP PUMP 1 TEAM Monitor:

Motor amps Cooling Tower Basin Level Cooling Tower Make-up Flow BOOTH CUE If required, role play as EO, pump indications are normal, pump discharge pressure is 34 psig and steady.

At Lead Evaluators direction, proceed to Event 2, RC TE3A6 Hot Leg temp to SCM meter failure (TS)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

4 Event #

2 Page 1

of 1

Event

Description:

RC TE3A6 Hot Leg temp to SCM meter (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 4 of 15 Indications Available:

4-1-B, SUB COOLING MARGIN LO RC TE3A6 indicates 899 °F Subcooling margin meter indicates 0 °F TEAM Recognize indications of RC TE3A6 loop 2 Thot PAM failure.

TEAM Refer to DB-OP-02004, Reactor Coolant Alarm Panel 4 Annunciators, for 4-1-B Determines subcooling margin is satisfactory Determines RC TE3A6 loop 2 Thot instrument failure (TI RC3A6, Channel 2 Loop 2 Thot, fails high)

SRO Enter TS 3.3.17 Function 2, Condition A for RC TE3A6 Inoperable Action - Restore within 30 days SRO May refer to TRM 8.3.7 for SCM meter - only 1 channel is required NOTE:

There is no procedure direction to reference TS 3.3.17. If necessary, ask this TS reference as a follow-up.

May refer to the following surveillance tests to evaluate operability of RC TE3A6 DB-SC-03180, REMOTE SHUTDOWN, POST ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION MONTHLY CHANNEL CHECK DB-SC-03165, PSAT/TSAT MONTHLY TEST On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 3, MU32 Fails closed

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

4 Event #

3 Page 1

of 2

Event

Description:

MU32 Fails closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 5 of 15 Indications Available:

  • MU32 demand rising with no increase in makeup flow
  • PZR level lowering CREW Recognize MU flow inappropriate for existing PZR level and MU32 demand signal CREW Dispatch EO and/or I&C to MU32 BOOTH CUE After 2 minutes EO reports MU32 local position indicates closed, all other indications look normal.

I&C does not see anything obvious, will get a work order started to troubleshoot SRO Implement DB-OP-02512, Loss of RCS Makeup ATC IF level is below set point by 20 inches then close MU2B using HISMU2B ATC Reduce Letdown flow to a minimum of 25 gpm by throttling MU6 using HCMU6 and verify MU4 is closed ATC Place MU32 in hand (LICRC14) and reduce demand to zero NOTE:

The crew may elect to use the guidance in DB-OP-02512 Attachment 4 to isolate MU32 and place the alternate injection line in service.

SRO REFER TO DB-OP-06006, Makeup and Purification System, Section 4.20, Removal of MU32 from Service for Maintenance.

ATC Throttle MU6, LETDOWN FLOW CONTROL, as necessary to maintain a Pressurizer Level band of 210 to 220 inches.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

4 Event #

3 Page 2

of 2

Event

Description:

MU32 Fails closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 6 of 15 ATC Contact EO to Close MU209, NORMAL MAKE-UP FLOW CONTROLLER INLET ISOLATION.

BOOTH CUE Role play as EO after 3 minutes, MU209, NORMAL MAKE-UP FLOW CONTROLLER INLET ISOLATION is closed.

ATC IF additional MU flow is needed to control Pressurizer level THEN Raise the setpoint on FICMU19, RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW CONTROL MU19, not to exceed a maximum of 10 GPM on any Reactor Coolant Pump SRO Provide PZR level band for manual level control - May refer to DB-PF-06703 curve CC4.3 SRO REFER TO TRM 8.1.1, Boration Systems - Operating - No entry is required SRO Notify SM to perform required notifications and Fleet Updates SRO Direct restoration of Letdown flow to 70 gpm ATC Throttle MU6 using controller HCMU6 to restore Letdown flow to 70 gpm When letdown is in service and at Lead Evaluators direction, proceed to Event 4, Startup Transformer Lockout

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

4 Event #

4 Page 1

of 2

Event

Description:

Startup Transformer Lockout Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 7 of 15 Indications Available:

1-1-G SU XFMR 02 LOCKOUT 1-2-G SU XFMR 02 DNGR ACB 34562 Open 81-B-65 Open & 81-B-67 Open BOP Implement DB-OP-02001, Electrical Distribution Panel 1 CREW Recognize Startup Transformer 02 Lockout and loss of K bus BOP Check Bus A and B are energized ATC/BOP Verify the following are open:

  • 34562
  • 81-B-65
  • 81-B-67
  • HX02A
  • HX02B SRO Notify the Load Dispatcher K Bus is de-energized Booth Cue Role play as Load Dispatcher: We are sending a crew to investigate SRO Direct Isolation of SU Transformer 02 Refer to DB-OP-06311, 345KV Switchyard Procedure Booth Cue Role Play as the Field Supervisor, Isolate SU Transformer 02 IAW DB-OP-06311 BOP/ATC Dispatch Equipment Operator to investigate S/U Xfmr 02

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

4 Event #

4 Page 2

of 2

Event

Description:

Startup Transformer Lockout Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 8 of 15 Booth Cue Role play as Equipment Operator: Local Annunciator Alarm (102-7-A) SUDDEN PRESSURE is in alarm. SU Transformer 02 has no visible damage.

SRO Implement DB-OP-02521, Loss of AC Bus Power Sources SRO Notify the Shift Manager to perform the following:

  • REFER TO RA-EP-01500, Emergency Classification.
  • REFER TO NOP-OP1003, Grid Reliability Protocol.
  • REFER TO NOP-OP-1015, Event Notifications.
  • REFER TO NOBP-OP-0011, Fleet Reporting and Updates.

SRO Refer to Tech Spec 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating Enter TS 3.8.1, Condition A Direct performance of DB-SC-03023, Off-Site Sources SM Cue Another Operator will ensure completion and review of DB-SC-03023, Off-Site Sources SRO Inform the System Dispatcher to take all necessary steps to restore power to 02 Startup Transformer ATC/BOP Refer to DB-OP-02102, Startup Transformer 02 Alarm Panel 102 Annunciators for alarm 102-7-A (same actions as transformer lockout)

BOP Transfer B bus reserve source selector switch to X01 Booth Cue If necessary, role play as the Field Supervisor, IAW DB-OP-06311, Step 3.17.A, verify HS6295, BUS B RESERVE SOURCE, in the X01 position.

When Tech Spec is entered and On Lead Evaluators direction, proceed to Event 5, MFP low oil pressure - trip MFP, runback works

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

4 Event #

5 Page 1

of 1

Event

Description:

MFPT low oil pressure - trip MFP, runback works Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 9 of 15 Indications Available:

  • PI1256, HDR PRESS BOP Implement DB-OP-02010, Feedwater Alarm Panel 10 Annunciators BOP Determine Bearing Pressure is low using PI1256, HDR PRESS BOP Attempt to start standby MFPT 2 Main Oil Pump BOP Start MFPT 2 Emergency Bearing Oil Pump using HIS1188, EMER BEARING OIL PUMP BOP Trip MFPT 2 using HS798, TURBINE TRIP CREW Monitor Plant Runback to 55% power SRO REFER TO DB-OP-06401, Integrated Control System Operating Procedure for plant runback SRO REFER TO DB-OP-06902, Power Operations, for guidance to operate plant equipment for the current power level BOP Dispatch Zone 1 Operator Booth Cue No Indication of oil leaks at MFPT 2 SRO Enter TS 3.4.9 Condition A IF Pressurizer water level > 228 inches When the plant has stabilized and at Lead Evaluators direction, proceed to Event 6, Steam Generator Tube Rupture with ATWS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

4 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 1

of 4

Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture with ATWS and Spray valve failed closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 10 of 15 Indications Available:

12-1-B MN STM LINE 2 RAD HI 9-4-A VAC SYS DISCH RAD HI High activity on condenser off-gas radiation monitors High activity on either main steam line radiation monitor Increasing Makeup flow CREW Recognize indications of a tube leak #2 Steam Generator SRO Implement DB-OP-02531, Steam Generator Tube Leak ATC Calculate the RCS Leak rate using the computer calculation for RCS Leakage. (5 minute average preferred)

SRO Route to DB-OP-02000, SFAS, RPS, SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture, Section 8 ATC Monitor Pressurizer level Anytime Pressurizer level is <100 inches - trip Reactor SRO Notify the Shift Manager to refer to RA-EP-01500, Emergency Classification BOP Implement Attachment 8, Place MU/HPI/LPI in Service

  • Start the STBY CCW Pump
  • Start both HPI Pumps
  • Start both LPI Pumps
  • Open DH 64 and DH 63
  • Transfer MU Pump suctions to the BWST AND press OFF
  • Start the STBY Makeup pump
  • May place Alternate Injection Line in-service ATC If Pressurizer <200 inches isolate Letdown - Close MU2B

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

4 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 2

of 4

Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture with ATWS and Spray valve failed closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 11 of 15 ATC Place SG/RX in Hand and reduce power to place both SGs on low level limits SRO Direct Chemistry to perform Attachment 2 SRO Direct Radiation Protection to perform Attachment 3 SRO Direct an Equipment Operator/Field Supervisor to perform SRO Direct startup of the Auxiliary Boiler on Demineralized water and then transfer Auxiliary Steam to the Auxiliary Boiler Booth Cue If necessary, role play as EO, Aux Boiler start-up in progress.

NOTE: Booth operator to prevent Aux Boiler Trip ATC/BOP When both SGs on low level limits Verify SG/RX Demand at zero demand (ATC)

Place BOTH SG Feedwater Demands ICS stations in HAND AND reduce the demands to zero Place Turbine Bypass valves in Hand Reduce Generator load to less than 50 MWe ATC Attempt to Trip Reactor at 50 MWe Critical Task (CT-24)

ATC Recognize the reactor does not trip and perform DB-OP-02000, Immediate Actions response not obtained At the Rod Control Panel, insert the Reactor Trip Test key AND rotate clockwise to depower the CRDMs

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

4 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 3

of 4

Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture with ATWS and Spray valve failed closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 12 of 15 ATC Complete DB-OP-02000 Immediate Actions

  • Verify power decreasing in the intermediate range
  • Manually trip the turbine CREW Implement Specific Rules CREW Check for Symptoms SRO Route to Section 8 for SG Tube Rupture BOP Verify Attachment 8 is complete ATC If Pressurizer Level is less than 40 inches:
  • Lock MU Pump suctions on the BWST
  • Isolate Letdown
  • Verify Pressurizer heaters are off ATC Verify Pressurizer level controller set at 100 inches NOTE: MU 32 failed closed, may use MU 32 Bypass and/or place Alternate Injection Line in service SRO Verify DB-OP-02531 Attachments are in progress
  • Direct Chemistry to perform Attachment 2
  • Direct Radiation Protection to perform Attachment 3
  • Direct an Equipment Operator/Field Supervisor to perform ATC Turn off all Pressurizer heaters ATC When directed use Pressurizer Spray to reduce RCS pressure Recognize the Spray valve is failed closed

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

4 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 4

of 4

Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture with ATWS and Spray valve failed closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 13 of 15 SRO Route to step 8.25 for using the Pressurizer Vent for RCS pressure reduction ATC Start the Quench Tank Circ Pump ATC Close DR2012A and DR2012B ATC Block SFAS low RCS pressure trips when Block Permits light ATC Reduce RCS pressure to close to the minimum adequate SCM:

Pressurizer Vent Line Method Open RC 200 Open RC 239A Cycle RC 239A and Pressurizer Heaters to control RCS Pressure Critical Task (CT-5)

ATC Throttle High Pressure Injection Control Pressurizer level by controlling MU and HPI CREW Check for PTS Criteria, REFER TO Specific Rule 5 BOP Begin an RCS cooldown AND depressurization at 100°F/hr, using both SGs When RCS Pressure Reduction and Cooldown have begun, and HPI has been throttled the scenario can be terminated

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 14 of 15 Justification for Critical Tasks The term Critical Task, is defined in NUREG-1021, OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINER STANDARDS FOR POWER REACTORS. The listed critical tasks were compiled based on a review of Areva Technical Document 47-1229003-06, EOP Technical Bases Document, and additional CTs were added based on established DB Operations expectations and standards for previously identified Critical Task.

CT-24: Shutdown Reactor-ATWS

1. Safety Significance:

When the Reactor is tripped the reactor trip pushbuttons will fail to cause a reactor trip.

2. Cues:

Reactor power not lowering on the Intermediate Range DB-OP-02000, Perform RNO IAs for ATWS (Reactor Trip Test Key turned clockwise)

3. Measured by:

Continuing in EOP with mitigation strategy prior to reactor being tripped

4. Feedback:

Reactor Power is lowering on the Intermediate Range CT-5: Control High Pressure Injection

1. Safety Significance:

A Steam Generator Tube Rupture will require High Pressure Injection to be placed in service and throttled to prevent violating the RPV P-T Limit by maintaining RCS inventory and minimum subcooling margin

2. Cues:

SCM Meters HPI Flow DB-OP-02000 Specific Rule 3

3. Measured by:

HPI must be throttled prior to violating RV P-T Limit

4. Feedback:

SCM Meters Pressurizer level RCS MU Flow

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 15 of 15 SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

1.

Simulator Setup 100% Power ATWS (Key switch works)

PZR Spray valve failed closed on Rx trip

  1. 1 CTMU in service
2.

Procedures DB-OP-06232 Circ Water and Cooling Tower Operation DB-OP-02004, Reactor Coolant Alarm Panel 4 Annunciators DB-OP-02512 Makeup and Purification System Malfunctions DB-OP-02001, Electrical Distribution Alarm Panel 1 Annunciators DB-OP-02521, Loss of AC Bus Power Sources DB-OP-06311, 345KV Switchyard Procedure DB-OP-02102, Startup Transformer 02 Alarm Panel 102 Annunciators DB-OP-02010, Feedwater Alarm Panel 10 DB-OP-06401, Integrated Control System DB-OP-06902, Power Operations DB-OP-02531, Steam Generator Tube Leak DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture

3.

For Simulator Instructor:

None

EPE 104 Page 1 SHIFT MGR / UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/ SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST DATE: Today SHIFT: NIGHTS MODE: 1 POWER: 100 %

PROTECTED TRAIN: 2 PLANT RISK: GREEN SECURITY RISK: YELLOW GRID RISK: GREEN LICENSE REQUIREMENTS:

CONTINGENCY PLANS IN EFFECT:

OUTSTANDING OPERABILITY EVALUATIONS:

ALARM STATUS:

AT THE CONTROLS RO / ZONE 3 EO CONTROL ROOM LEVEL 1 WORK AROUNDS CONTROL ROOM LEVEL 2 WORK AROUNDS CTRM DEFICIENCIES GENERAL STATUS Maintain 100% power Shift Routines Swap CTMU in preparation for planned maintenance ZONE 3 - LEVEL 1 WORKAROUNDS ZONE 3 - LEVEL 2 WORKAROUNDS GENERAL NOTES BALANCE OF PLANT RO / ZONE 1 EO / ZONE 2 EO GENERAL STATUS ZONE 1 - LEVEL 1 WORKAROUNDS ZONE 1 - LEVEL 2 WORKAROUNDS ZONE 2 - LEVEL 1 WORKAROUNDS ZONE 2 - LEVEL 2 WORKAROUNDS GENERAL NOTES CCW 1 - 85 °F CCW 2 - 85 °F CCW 3 - 110 °F Command SRO / Field Supervisor / Shift Engineer Input CHEMISTRY - STATUS Intake Chlorination - Bays 2 & 3 Circwater Chlorination - 1 & 3 Circwater Dynacool - I/S Sodium Bisulfite - I/S MSD Skid I/S MSR Drains: #1 Forward #2 Forward Polishers I/S - 1,2,3,4 Evolutions in Progress Follow-up Items M&TE Issued for Testing-NOP-WM-5002 Compliance:

EPE 104 Page 2 SHIFT MGR / UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/ SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST Specification Equipment Affected Date

& Time Entered Action Required Issue Owner/

Test Leader Next Action Due/

Responsible Individual

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 1 of 13 Facility:

Davis-Besse Scenario No.:

5 Op Test No.:

DB NRC 2020 Examiners:

Operators:

SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: 100% Power Turnover: Maintain 100% Power Planned: Routine activities Critical tasks:

1. Isolate Overcooling SG (CT-17)
2. FW Flow Control (CT-16)
3. Control RCS Inventory (CT-30)

Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

R-ATC/SRO TS-SRO D2 Lockout - Power reduction (TS) 2 C-BOP/SRO SAC 2 trip (SAC 1 and EIAC Auto start fail) 3 I-ATC/SRO Power range (NI5) high failure 4

I-BOP/SRO TS-SRO Place RPS Channel 2 in Manual Bypass (TS) 5 C-ATC/SRO Turbine Vibration - trip Rx 6

Major/ALL OVCLG - MSR 2ND STG FAIL 7

C-BOP/SRO AFP Target rock fails open - SG overfeed 8

C-ATC/SRO MUP Trip - Loss of Both MUPs (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Summary NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 2 of 13 DAVIS-BESSE 2020 NRC SCENARIO 5 Direction for the crew is to maintain 100% power.

EVENT 1: D2 Lockout - Power reduction due to loss of Cond Pump (TS)

The lead evaluator will cue event 1, D2 Lockout. The CSRO will implement DB-OP-02521, Loss of AC Bus Sources. The crew will identify a loss of #2 Cond Pump. DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown will be utilized to lower power to within the capacity of two condensate pumps.

EVENT 2: SAC 2 trip (SAC 1 and EIAC Auto start fail) (TS)

SAC 2 trip will also lose power when Bus D2 is lost. SAC 1 and EIAC fail to Auto start causing entry into DB-OP-02528, Loss of Instrument Air. The BOP will manually start SAC 1 and verify IA pressure recovers. T.S. 3.7.5 for the Motor Driven Feed Pump will be entered.

EVENT 3: Power range (NI5) high failure When T.S. 3.7.5 has been entered, the lead evaluator will cue event 3, Power Range Nuclear Instrument NI-5 fails high, which will cause rods to insert due to the ICS system responding to the failed high signal. The crew will take actions to stabilize the plant per abnormal procedure DB-OP-02505, Nuclear Instrument Failures.

EVENT 4: Place RPS Channel 2 in Manual Bypass (TS)

When the plant is stable, the Unit Supervisor will direct placing RPS Channel 2 in Manual Bypass IAW DB-OP-06403, Reactor Protective System (RPS) and Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)

Operating Procedure, and the Power Range Test Module in Test Operate IAW DB-OP-02505, Nuclear Instrumentation Failures. The Unit Supervisor will enter applicable T.S. 3.3.1 for RPS Channel 2 in Manual Bypass.

EVENT 5: Turbine Vibration - trip Rx The Lead Evaluator will cue the Main Turbine bearing vibration increase. Annunciator 15-2-E, T-G BEARING VIB HI will alarm. The crew will respond in accordance with DB-OP-02015, Turbine Alarm Panel Annunciators, trip the reactor and GO TO DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture.

EVENT 6: OVCLG - MSR 2ND STG FAIL Event 6 will be automatically triggered when the reactor trips. The MSR Second Stage Reheat Valves fail to auto close. The crew will identify indications of Overcooling and the Unit Supervisor will route to section 7 for Overcooling. Implementation of attachment 20, Isolate or Control Potential Source of Overcooling, should identify the MSR Second Stage Reheat Valves failing to auto close. MS314 and 199 will not close if attempted to manually close. The crew will then Initiate and isolate SFRCS to terminate the overcooling. (CT-17)

EVENT 7: AFP Target rock fails open - SG overfeed AFPT 2 will start and feed at full flow with its discharge valve failed open. The BOP will be required to control SG2 level with AFPT 2 speed control. (CT-16)

EVENT 8: MUP Trip - Loss of Both MUPs The Makeup pump (MUP) will trip due to low lube oil pressure at the same time as the Reactor Trip. The STBY MUP will not start. RCS Pressure will be lowered to allow HPI flow to maintain RCS Inventory. (CT-30)

When SG2 level and the Pressurizer level are being controlled the scenario can be terminated.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

5 Event #

1 and 2 Page 1

of 2

Event

Description:

D2 Lockout Power Reduction SAC 1 fails to Auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 3 of 13 Indications Available:

0 volts on EI6261 All D2 Bus load and supply breakers open AD213 Open Team Recognize D2 bus has locked out SRO Route to DB-OP-02521, Loss of AC Bus Sources SRO Notify the Shift Manager to perform the following:

  • REFER TO RA-EP-01500, Emergency Classification.
  • REFER TO NOP-OP-1015, Event Notifications.
  • REFER TO NOBP-OP-0011, Fleet Reporting and Updates.

TEAM Review E-1040A, Electrical Distribution Manual to determine what loads have been lost TEAM Recognize loss of Condensate Pump 2 and Heater Drain Pump 2 SRO Refer to DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown SRO Determine the power reduction method, target power level, and rate of power reduction for 2 Condensate Pumps ATC Use DB-OP-02504 Attachment 1, Power Reduction Actions ICS Full Automatic to reduce power At the LOAD CONTROL Panel, set the rate of change to the rate specified by the Command SRO Select the target RTP as determined by the Command SRO Monitor Reactor Power to confirm power is being reduced at approximately the expected rate ATC Monitor Regulating Rod Insertion Limits during the Shutdown per Technical Specification 3.2.1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

5 Event #

1 and 2 Page 2

of 2

Event

Description:

D2 Lockout Power Reduction SAC 1 fails to Auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 4 of 13 ATC Attempt to maintain Axial Power Imbalance between 0 and negative 20 percent using APSRs BOP Control Condensate Flow at approximately 7 MPPH using LIC420 and LIC421 BOP At approximately 90 percent power, notify an Equipment Operator to remove the Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Main Steam Minimum flow lines from service. (Directed by Attachments 6 and 15)

Team Recognize SAC 1 and EIAC did not auto start SRO Refer to DB-OP-02528, Loss of Instrument Air for loss of SAC 2 BOP Start SAC 1 SRO Enter TS 3.7.5 Condition B due to loss of power to MDFP and TS 3.8.1 Condition A due to Bus Tie Transformer AC supplying both 4.16 kV Essential busses BOP Dispatch EOs to Bus D2 and SAC 1 When plant is stabilized at 85-90% power and Deaerator Levels are being controlled at ~8 ft and at Lead Evaluators discretion proceed to event 3, Power range (NI5) high failure

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

5 Event #

3 and 4 Page 1

of 2

Event

Description:

Power range (NI5) high failure and Place RPS Channel 2 in Manual Bypass (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 5 of 13 Indications Available:

  • Rods inserting Crew Recognize that NI5 has failed high SRO Implement DB-OP-02505, Nuclear Instrumentation Failures ATC Place the Rod Control Panel in MANUAL Place the Reactor Demand Hand Auto Station in HAND BOP IF proper RCS Tave control by Feedwater is NOT indicated, THEN, place BOTH Feedwater Loop Demands to HAND AND adjust FW Demand to stabilize RCS Tave Crew Determine which Power Range Nuclear Instrument(s) have failed SRO Enter TS 3.3.1, Condition A for function 1,7, and 8 Refer to TS 3.3.16 (only 3 ARTS Channels required)

SRO Notify SM to refer to reactivity management, event notifications, and Fleet Update requirements SRO Brief contingency actions for Power Range instrument failure

  • RFR will not actuate
  • Main FW block valves will not auto close SRO Enter TS 3.4.9 Condition A IF Pressurizer water level rises to 228 inches during the transient (Pressurizer Level Annunciator comes in at 226 inches)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

5 Event #

3 and 4 Page 2

of 2

Event

Description:

Power range (NI5) high failure and Place RPS Channel 2 in Manual Bypass (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 6 of 13 SRO Directs placing RPS Ch 2 in Manual Bypass per DB-OP-06403, Reactor Protective System (RPS) and Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) Operating Procedure Directs placing the Power Range Test Module for the affected channel in TEST OPERATE BOP Obtain RPS Manual Bypass key and RPS Ch 2 door key Rotate the MANUAL-BYPASS KEY SWITCH to actuate the manual bypass relay in RPS Channel 2 Check MANUAL-BYPASS light is BRIGHT Check SUB-SYSTEM light is DIM BOP Place the Power Range Test Module for NI5 in TEST OPERATE NOTE: ICS IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE IN AUTO TO CONTINUE SCENARIO SRO Directs placing ICS in Auto per DB-OP-06401, Integrated Control System Operating Procedure ATC Depress AUTO on HC NI44, ROD CONTROL PANEL Verify Tave at setpoint Depress AUTO on HIC ICS20, REACTOR DEMAND BOP If necessary, place Feedwater Loop Demands in auto Adjust FEEDWATER DEMAND to place measured variable on the caret Press AUTO on FIC ICS32B(A), FEEDWATER DEMAND(S)

On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 5, Turbine Vibration - Reactor Trip

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

5 Event #

5, 6, 7, 8 Page 1

of 4

Event

Description:

Turbine Vibration - Trip Rx, Overcooling, Overfeed, and Loss of MUPs Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 7 of 13 Indications Available:

15-2-E T-G BEARING VIB HI CREW Recognize Turbine Vibrations increasing BOP Refer to DB-OP-02015, Turbine Alarm panel 15 Annunciators BOP Identify Turbine bearing vibration above 12 mils ATC Trip the reactor GO TO DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture.

Manually trip the reactor Verify power decreasing in the intermediate range Manually trip the turbine Verify all Turbine Stop Valves OR Control Valves are closed.

SRO Route to DB-OP-02000, Section 3 SRO/ATC Verify immediate actions

  • Verify Reactor is tripped
  • Verify power decreasing in the intermediate range
  • Verify Turbine is Tripped
  • Verify all 4 Stop Valves or Control Valves are closed SRO Route to DB OP 02000, Section 4 Supplemental Actions CREW Implement any necessary Specific Rules Actions ACTIONS FOR LOSS OF SUBCOOLING MARGIN STEAM GENERATOR CONTROL POWER FOR C1 AND D1 BUSES OR EDG START

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

5 Event #

5, 6, 7, 8 Page 2

of 4

Event

Description:

Turbine Vibration - Trip Rx, Overcooling, Overfeed, and Loss of MUPs Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 8 of 13 CREW Implement any necessary Symptom Mitigation Sections Lack of Adequate Subcooling Margin Lack of Heat Transfer Overcooling Steam Generator Tube Rupture ATC Check for all Group 1-7 Control Rods fully inserted ATC Perform Attachment 1, Primary Inventory Control Actions.

ATC

1. Transfer MU Pump suctions to the BWST position AND press OFF for each switch.

MU 6405 MU3971

2. Set Pressurizer Level Controller to 100 inches ATC Recognize MUP 1 tripped Check Component Cooling water is available to the RCPs.

Close MU19.

Close MU32 Attempt to Start the STBY MUP ATC

1. Perform Attachment 8, Place HPI/LPI/MU in service to start HPI and LPI.
2. Notify the CSRO to reduce RCS pressure using heaters AND spray to 1700 to 1800 psig to allow HPI injection to maintain PZR level.

ATC Verify both HPI Trains are in service as follows:

Verify both CCW Trains are in service Verify both HPI Pumps are running Verify all HPI Injection valves are open (HP2C HP2D HP2A HP2B)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

5 Event #

5, 6, 7, 8 Page 3

of 4

Event

Description:

Turbine Vibration - Trip Rx, Overcooling, Overfeed, and Loss of MUPs Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 9 of 13 ATC Verify both LPI Trains are in service as follows:

Verify both LPI Pumps are running Open both piggyback valves (DH64 DH63)

NOTE: May use guidance in DB-OP-02512, Makeup and Purification System Malfunctions Attachment 6, RCS Pressure Control After Reactor Trip

  • Critical Task (CT-30)

ATC Maintain Pressurizer Level Turn off all PZR Heaters.

  • Reduce RCS pressure to between 1700 and 1800 psig using RC 2, PZR SPRAY VALVE.
  • Throttle HPI flow to maintain Pressurizer level BOP Perform Attachment 2: SG Inventory and Pressure Control Actions BOP Verify Steam Generator Levels are being controlled per Specific Rule 4, Steam Generator Control.

BOP Verify Steam Generator Pressures are being controlled by automatic operation of the TBVs BOP Identify Overcooling SRO Route to Section 7.0 Overcooling ATC Verify Attachment 8, Place HPI/LPI/MU in service SRO Implement Attachment 20, Isolate or Control Potential Source of Overcooling BOP Identify MSR Second Stage Reheat Steam Valves are failed open MS199, MSR 1 REHEAT STEAM SOURCE MS195B, MSR 1 REHEAT STEAM HIGH LOAD

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2020 Scenario #

5 Event #

5, 6, 7, 8 Page 4

of 4

Event

Description:

Turbine Vibration - Trip Rx, Overcooling, Overfeed, and Loss of MUPs Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 10 of 13 BOP Attempt to close MSR Second Stage Reheat Steam Valves Booth Cue If called, role play as EO, MSR Second Stage Reheat Steam Valves cannot be closed locally MS199, MSR 1 REHEAT STEAM SOURCE MS195B, MSR 1 REHEAT STEAM HIGH LOAD Critical Task (CT-17)

BOP Terminate the overcooling. Manually Initiate and Isolate SFRCS BOP

  • Verify proper SFRCS actuation
  • Verify SG pressures are equal
  • Control AVVs to maintain RCS temperature constant or slowly decreasing
  • Verify proper SG level control BOP Recognize SG2 above setpoint with full Aux Feedwater flow Critical Task (CT-16)

BOP Control SG2 level by performing one or more of the following:

Reduce AFPT 2 speed Close AF599 When Pressurizer Level is being maintained in a band of 80-120 inches and SG2 level is being controlled IAW SR4, the Scenario can be terminated

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 11 of 13 Justification for Critical Tasks The term Critical Task, is defined in NUREG-1021, OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINER STANDARDS FOR POWER REACTORS. The listed critical tasks were compiled based on a review of Areva Technical Document 47-1229003-06, EOP Technical Bases Document, and additional CTs were added based on established DB Operations expectations and standards for previously identified Critical Task.

CT-17: Isolate Overcooling SG

1. Safety Significance:

The MSR Second Stage Reheat Valves fail to auto close which causes an overcooling

2. Cues:
  • SG Pressure lowering to less than post trip expected value
  • DB-OP-02000 Section 7, Overcooling
3. Measured by:

Manually I&I SFRCS or align valves per Table 1 DB-OP-02000 to isolate overcooling within 10 minutes of SG(s) pressure 630 psig

4. Feedback:
  • SG Pressure
  • Valve indication aligned per Table 1 of DB-OP-02000 such that MSIV of affected SG is closed.

CT-16: FW Flow Control

1. Safety Significance:

Control FW to mitigate excessive Pri/Sec heat transfer

2. Cues:

SG2 above level setpoint with full Aux Feedwater flow DB-OP-02000 Specific Rule 4

3. Measured by:

FW flow to the affected SG(s) must be controlled within 10 minutes of SG(s) pressure 630 psig

4. Feedback:

Lowering Aux Feedwater flow to SG 2 Reduce AFPT 2 speed or AF599 indicating Closed

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 12 of 13 Justification for Critical Tasks The term Critical Task, is defined in NUREG-1021, OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINER STANDARDS FOR POWER REACTORS. The listed critical tasks were compiled based on a review of Areva Technical Document 47-1229003-06, EOP Technical Bases Document, and additional CTs were added based on established DB Operations expectations and standards for previously identified Critical Task.

CT-30: Control RCS Inventory

1. Safety Significance:

Control RCS Pressure, HPI, and Letdown such that Pressurizer Level is being maintained to Prevent Degradation of Mitigative Capability of the Plant

2. Cues:

Makeup Pump Status DB-OP-02000 Attachments 1, 8 & 13, and Specific Rule 3

3. Measured by:

Lowering RCS Pressure to allow High Pressure Injection flow into the RCS

4. Feedback:

Rising Pressurizer level High Pressure Injection flow into the RCS

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 13 of 13 SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

1.

Simulator Setup 100% Power 1 and 3 TPCW Pumps in service SFRCS disabled MUP 1 in service

2.

Procedures DB-OP-02515, Nuclear Instrument Failures Abnormal DB-OP-02526, Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer Upset DB-OP-06403, Reactor Protective System (RPS) and Nuclear Instrumentation DB-OP-06401, Integrated Control System DB-OP-02002, Letdown/Makeup Alarm Panel DB-OP-02512, Makeup and Purification System Malfunctions DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture

EPE 104 Page 1 SHIFT MGR / UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/ SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST DATE: Today SHIFT: NIGHTS MODE: 1 POWER: 100 %

PROTECTED TRAIN: 2 PLANT RISK: GREEN SECURITY RISK: YELLOW GRID RISK: GREEN LICENSE REQUIREMENTS:

CONTINGENCY PLANS IN EFFECT:

OUTSTANDING OPERABILITY EVALUATIONS:

ALARM STATUS:

AT THE CONTROLS RO / ZONE 3 EO CONTROL ROOM LEVEL 1 WORK AROUNDS CONTROL ROOM LEVEL 2 WORK AROUNDS CTRM DEFICIENCIES GENERAL STATUS Maintain 100% power Shift Routines ZONE 3 - LEVEL 1 WORKAROUNDS ZONE 3 - LEVEL 2 WORKAROUNDS GENERAL NOTES BALANCE OF PLANT RO / ZONE 1 EO / ZONE 2 EO GENERAL STATUS ZONE 1 - LEVEL 1 WORKAROUNDS ZONE 1 - LEVEL 2 WORKAROUNDS ZONE 2 - LEVEL 1 WORKAROUNDS ZONE 2 - LEVEL 2 WORKAROUNDS GENERAL NOTES CCW 1 - 85 °F CCW 2 - 85 °F CCW 3 - 110 °F Command SRO / Field Supervisor / Shift Engineer Input CHEMISTRY - STATUS Intake Chlorination - Bays 2 & 3 Circwater Chlorination - 1 & 3 Circwater Dynacool - I/S Sodium Bisulfite - I/S MSD Skid I/S MSR Drains: #1 Forward #2 Forward Polishers I/S - 1,2,3,4 Evolutions in Progress Follow-up Items M&TE Issued for Testing-NOP-WM-5002 Compliance:

EPE 104 Page 2 SHIFT MGR / UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/ SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST Specification Equipment Affected Date

& Time Entered Action Required Issue Owner/

Test Leader Next Action Due/

Responsible Individual

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