Text

Proposed Tech Specs 2.7,changing Calculations Performed to Support Design Basis Reconstruction Effort & Clarifying Requirements for 161 Kv Line & Making Administrative Changes
	ML20079C843
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	06/21/1991
From:	; OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	;
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ML20079C830	List: ML20079C829; ML20079C837; ML20079C843;
References
	NUDOCS 9106260191
	Download: ML20079C843 (32)
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2.0 LIMITING CONDITIOISS_EO.it OPERATION 2.7 li!cetrical Systems Applicability Applies to the availability of electrical power for the operation of plant components.

Objr_c1br To define those conditions of electrical power availability necessary to provide for safe reactor operation and the continuing availability of engineered safety features.

Sprejftcations (1) Minimum Requirements The reactor coolant shall not be heated or maintained at temperatures above 300F I unless the following electrical systems are operable:

a. Unit auxiliary power transformers Tl A-1 or -2 (4,160 V). I

b. House service transformers Tl A-3 and 4 (4,160 V). I

c. 4,160 V engineered safety feature buses l A3 and 1 A4.

d. 4,160 V/480 V Transformers TIB-3A, TIB-3B, TIB-3C, TIB-4 A, TIB- l 4B, TlB-4C. I

e. 480 V distribution buses 183A, IB3 ' B4 A, IB3B,183B-4B, IB48, IB3C, IB3C-4C, IB4C.

f. MCC No. 3Al,3B1, 3A2, 3Cl, 3C2,4Al,4A2,4Cl and 4C2.

g. 125 V d-c buses No. I and 2 (Panels EE-8F and EE-8G).

h. 125 V d-c distribution panels Al-41 A and Al-41B. l

i. 120V a-c instrument buses A, B, C, and D (Panels Al-40A, B, C and D). I

j. 120V a-c instrument panels Al-42A and AI-42B. I

k. Station batteries No. I and 2 (EE-8A and EE-8B) including one battery I charger on each 125V d-c bus No.1 and 2 (EE-8F and EE-8G). I

1. Both diesel generators. cach with an engine mounted tank and an auxiliary I tank containing a combined minimum volume of 550 gallons, and a i minimum of 16,000 gallons of fuel in the underground storage tank.

9106260191 910621 PDR ADOCK 0 3 0 0 0 2 8'5 P P Det

l I

2.0 IEllTJEG CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.7 Electrical Systems (Continued)

(2) MediEcation of hiinimum Requirements The minimum requirements may be modined to the extent that one of the following conditions will be allowed after the reactor coolant has been heated above 300'F. I liowever, the reactor shall not be made critical unless all minimum requirements are I met. If any of the provisions of these exceptions are violated, the reactor shall be placed l in a hot shutdown condition within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . If the violation is not I corrected within an additional 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , the reactor shall be placed in a cold shutdown I condition within an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . I

a. Both unit auxiliary power transformers TI A-1 and -2 (4.16 kV) may be I inoperable for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months provided the operability of both diesel generators is demonstrated immediately,

b. Either house service transformer TI A-3 or TI A-4 (4.16kV) may be I inoperable for up to 7 days provided the operability of the diesel generator I associated with the inoperable transformer is immediately verified. I Notincation by telephone shall be made to the Regional Administrator I within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . 1 Continued operation beyond 7 days is permissible provided a report is sent I to the NRC within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months outlining the plans for prompt restoration of I the transformer and the additional precautions to be taken while the I transformer is out of service, and until notified differently by the NRC. I

c. Both house service transformers TI A-3 and TI A-4 (4.16kV) may be I inoperable for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months provided the operability of both diesel I generators is immediately verified. The loss of the 161kV incoming line I renders both transformers inoperable. Notification by telephone shall be I made to the Regional Administrator within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . l Continued operation beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is permissible provided a report is I sent to the NRC within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months outlining the plans for prompt restoration I of the transformers and the additional precautions to be taken while the I transformers are out of service, and until notified differently by the NRC. I 2-33 Amendment No. 25

2.0 LIMIT _ING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIQli 2.7 Electrical Systems (Continued)

d. Either one of the 4.16 kV engineered safeguards buses, I A3 or I A4 may l be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided the operability of the diesel generator associated with the operable bus is demonstrated immediately and there are no inoperable engineered safeguards components associated with the operable bus,

e. One of each group of 4160 V/4SO V Transformers (TlB-3A or 4A), I (TIB-3B or 4B), and (TlB-3C or 4C) may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months l provided there are no inoperable engineered safeg'tards components which I are redundant to components on the inoperable transformer. l

f. One of the 480 V distribution buses connected to bus l A3 or connecteu I l to bus l A4 may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided there are no inoperable safeguards components which are redundant to components on I the inoperable bus. I j

g. Either Group of MCC No,'s (3Al, 3B1, 3A2, 3C1, 3C2,) or (4Al,4A2, l 4Cl,4C2) may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided there are no l 1

inoperable safeguards components which are redundant to components on l the inoperable MCC. MCC 3Cl may be inoperable in excess of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months I if battery chargers No. I and No. 2 are operable. I

h. One of the four 120V a-c instrument buses (A, B, C or D) may be l inoperable for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided the reactor protective and engineered safeguards systems instrument channels supplied by the remaining three buses are all operable.

i. Two battery chargers may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided I battery charger No.1 (EE-8C) or No. 2 (EE-8D) is operable. I

j. Either one of the emergency diesel generators (DG-1 or DG-2) may be 1 inoperable for up to seven days (total for both) during any month, provided the other diesel generator is started to verify operability, I shutdown and controls are left in the automatic mode and there are no inoperable engineered safeguards components associated with the operable diesel generator,

k. Island buses 1B3A-4A,1B3B-4B, and IB3C-4C may be inoperable for up l to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided there are no inoperable safeguards components which I are redundant to components on the inoperable bus (es). I

1. Either one of the 125V d-c buses No. I or 2 (Panels EE-8F or EE-8G) I may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

2-34 Amendment No. 60

~

2,0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.7 Electrical Systems (Continued)

m. Either one of the 125V d-c distribution panels Al-41 A or Al-41B may be l inoperable for up to 8 houra,

n. Either one of the 120V a-c instrument panels Al-42A or Al-42B may be I inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , i

Bas 11 The normal source of auxiliary power with the plant at power for the safeguards buses is from the house service power transformers being fed from the 161 kV incoming line with on-site emergency power from either one of two diesel generators and off-site standby power via the unit auxiliary transformers.* The loss of the 161kV incoming line I renders the house service transformers (TI A-3 and TIA-4) inoperable in that the I transformers cannot supply power to the 4.16kV safeguards buses l A3 and 1 A4. l The two emergency diesel generators on site do not require outside power for start up or operation.

Upon loss of normal and standby power sources, the 4.16 kV buses IA3 and 1 A4 are energized from the diesel generators Bus load shedding, transfer to the diesel generator and pickup of critical loads are carried out automatically.*

When the turbine generator is out of service for an extended period, the generator can be isolated by opening motor operated disconnect switch DS-Tl in the bus between the generator and the main transformer, allowing the main transformer and the unit auxiliary power transformers (TI A-1 and TI A-2) to be returned to service.* The auxiliary power I transformers are not considered inoperable during these normal plant startup/ shutdown I realignments.

l 2-35 Amendment No. 76

~

. 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPEllATION 2.7 Electrical Systems (Continued)

Equipment served by 4.16 kV and 480 V auxiliary buses and MCC's is arranged so that loss of an entire 4.16 kV bus does not compromise safety of the plant during DBA conditions. For example, if 4.16 kV bus I A3 is lost, two raw water pumps, one low pressure safety injection pump, two high pressure safety injection pumps, one auxiliary I feedwater pump, two component cooling water pumps, one containment spray pump and I two containment air fans are lost. This leaves two raw water pumps, one low pressure safety injection pump, one high pressure safety injection pump, one component cooling I water pump, two containment spray pumps and two containment air fans which is more I than sufficient to control containment pressure below the design value during the DBA.

The electrical system equipment is arranged so that no single failure can inactivate enough engineered safeguards tojeopardize the plant safety. The 480 V safeguards are arranged on nine bus sections. The 4.16 kV safeguards are supplied from two buses.

The total fuel oil engine mounted tank capacity of 550 gallons on each diesel assures I considered more than 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months running time (maximum rated loading) is available I before transfer of fuel oil from the 18,000 gallon underground storage tank is mandatory. I Two 13 gpm fuel oil transfer pumps per diesel, each being fed from the diesel it is I associated with, are available for transferring fuel oil from the storage tank. The i minimum 16,000 gallons of fuel oil in the storage tank, in addition to the engine-mounted I tanks will provide diesel operation under the required loading conditions for a minimum i period of 3.5 days should only one diesel be in operation. It is considered incredible not I to be able to procure fuel oil from one of several sources in the vicinity of the Fort i Calhoun Station in less than three days under the worst of weather conditions. l One battery charger on each battery shall be operating so that the batteries will always be at full charge; this ensures that adequate d-c power will be available for all emergency I uses. Each battery has one battery charger permanently connected with a third charger capable of being connected to either battery bus. The chargers are each rated for 400 l amperes at 130 volts. Following a DBA the batteries and the charger will handle all I required loads. Each of the reactor protective system in:trumentation channels is i supplied by one of the a-c instrument buses. The removal of one of the a-c instrument buses is permitted as the 2-of-4 logic may be manually changed to a 2-of-3 logic without compromising safety.

The engineered safeguards instrument channels use a-c instrument buses (one redundant bus for each channel) and d-c buses (one redundant bus for each logic circuit). The removal of one of the a-c instrument buses is permitted as the two of four logic automatically becomes a two of three logic.

References (1) USAR Section 8.3.1.2 I (2) USAR Section 8.4.1 l (3) USAR Section 8.2.2 1 2-36 I

1 TABLE A-10 I POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING LIMITS Minimum Operable Instrument Citannds AIllon

1. Containment Wide Range Radiation 2 (a) ;

Monitors (RM-091 A & B) ,

1

2. Wide Range Noble Gas Stack Monitor RM-063L (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)

RM-063M (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)

RM-063H (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)

3. Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor 1 (a)

(RM-064) l

4. Containment Hydrogen Monitor l (VA-81 A & B) 2 (b)(c)

5. Containment Water Level Narrow Range (LT-599 & LT-600) 1 (d) I Wide Range (LT-387 & LT-388) 2 (b)(c)

6. Containment Wide Range Pressure 2 (b)(c)

7. Reactor Coolant System Subcooled Margin Monitor 2 (e)(f) !

l i

8. Core Exit Thermocouples (i) 2/ Core Quadrant (g)(h) !

l

9. Reactor Vessel Level (HJTC) (j) 2 (k)(1)

(a) With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum channels operable requirements, initiate the pre-planned alternate method of monitoring the l appropriate parameter (s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , and l

1. either restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or

! 2. prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to specification l 5.9.3 within 14 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of j the inoperability, and the plans and schedules for restoring the system to l OPERABLE status.

(b) With one channel inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

2-98 Amendment No. 84,82,83,87,410 l

TABLE 2-10 (Continued) l POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION OPEllATING I IMITS (c) With both channels inoperable, restore at least one channel to OPERABLE status within I 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(d) With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum channels operable requirements, operation may continue until the next cold shutdown, at which time the required channel (s) shall be made operable.

(c) With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the minimum channels operable requirement, either

1. restore the inoperable channel (0 to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or

2. initiate an alternate means of monitoring the subcooled margin, or

3. be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(f) With both channels inoperable,

1. restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , or

2. initiate an alternate means of monitoring the subcooled margin, or

3. be in at least HOT SHOTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(g) With the number of OPERABLE Core Exit Thermocouples per core quadrant one less I than the minimum operable requirement, either restore the inoperable Core Exit i Thermocouple (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT I SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(h) With all Core Exit Thermocouples within a core quadrant inoperable, either restore the 1 inoperable Core Exit Thermocouple (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at I least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(i) With the number of OPERABLE Core Exit Thermocouples less than the four per core l quadrant required by NUREG-0737, either restore to at least four OPERABLE Core Exit I Thermocouples per core quadrant within seven days of discovery ofloss of operability, !

or prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 5.9.3 within 30 days, outlining the actions taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans for restoring the inoperable Core Exit Thermocouple (s) to OPERABLE status. l (j) A channel is eight sensors in a probe. A channel is OPERABLE if four or more sensors, two or more in the upper four and two or more in the lower four, are OPERABLE.

2-98a Amendment No M0

,: . 0 LDf1 TING COVDITIONS FOR OPERATTON 3.7 Elee'neal Svstems Acclicabilitv Applies to the availability of electncal power for the operation of plant components.

Obiective To define those conditions of electncal power availability necessary to provide for safe reactor operation and the continuing availability of engmeered safety features.

Speci6 cations (1) Minimum Recuirements The reactor coolant shall not be heated up or maintained at temperatures above 300 F unless tne followmg electrical systems are operable:

a.

Unit auxiliary power transformers T11A-1 or -2 (4,160 V).

b. House service transformers T11A-3 and 4 (4,160 V).

c. 4,160 V engineered safety feature buses IA3 and 1A4 d.

4,160 V/480 V Transformers T1IB-3A, T1IB 3B, T11B-3C, T1IB-4A.

T11B-4B, T11B-4C.

e.

480 V distribution buses IB3A, IB3 A-4A, IB4A, IB3B, IB3B-48, IB48, IB3C, IB3C-4C, IB4C.

f. MCC No. 3 A1. 3B1, 3A2, 3Cl, 3C2, 4A1, 4A2, 4Cl and 4C2.

g.

125 V d-c buses No. I and 2 (Panels EE-8F and EE-8G).

h. 125 V d-c distribution panels A41-al A and A11-41B.

i. 120V a-c Fear instrument a-e buses A, B, C, and D (Panels AI-40A. B, C and D).

! j. 120V a-c instrument canels AI-42A and AI-42B.

(

k.

' Two Station batteries No. I and ? (EE-8A and EE-8B) including at-leasi one battery charger on each 125V d-c D-G bus No. I and 2 (EE-8F and EE-8G).

1.

Both diesel generators, g_ ash with an fuH engine base-mounted day tank and an auxiliarv tank containine a combined minimum volume of 550 l gallons. and a minimum of 16,000 gallons of fuel in the underground l storage tank.

2-32

.. - 2.0 LB11 TING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.7 Electrical Sy11cm3 (Continued)

(2) Modincation of Minimum Requirements l The minimum requirements may be modified to the extent that one of the following conditions will be allowed after the reactor coolant has been heated above 300"F made l critical. However. the reactor shall not be made critical unless all minimum requirements are met. If any of the provisions of these exceptions are violated, the reactor shall be placed in a hot shutdown condition within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . if the ,

violation is not corrected within an additional 12 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , the reactor shall be placed in I a cold shutdown condition within an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ,

a. Both unit auxiliary power transformers T11A-1 and -2 (4.16 kV) may be inoperable for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months provided the operability of both diesel generators is demonstrated immediately.

b. Hou se service 4ransfo r mers -T4A-3-or--TI A-4 {4:16-kVFmay-be4noperable--

foe up toone-weekt--House-service 4ransformers-T4A-3-and--4{4r16-kVF-may- be-i nope rable - for-up - to-24-hou rs--provi ded-< he- operabil i t y- o f- bo t h--

diesel-generaters 4+<lemonstrate64mmediately;-end-the-NRG-is-notified -

im mediat ely-and-a-report-is-sub mitted 4o 4he-NRC-es-specified-irteeetion--

5.6 - wi t h- an- ou t lin e- o f 4h e-plans -for- p rompt -restoration -of- o ff-s ite -power--

and-the-additional-preca ution s-to4e-takert-while-the dransfo rmers-araeut--

of+ervicer Either house service transformer Tl A-3 or Tl A-4 (4.16kV) may be inonerable for un to 7 days provided the operability of the diesel generator associated with the inoperable transformer is immediatelv veri 6ed.

Notincation by telephone shall be made to the Recional Administrator within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Continued operation beyond 7 days is aermissible provided a report is sent to the NRC within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months outlining the olans for oromot restoration of the transformer and the additional crecautions to be taken while the transformer is out of service. and until noti 6ed differently by the NRC.

g. Both house service transformers Tl A-3 and TI A-4 (4.16kVi may be inoperable for un to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months provided the coerability of both diesel generators is immediately verified. The loss of the 161kV incoming line renders both transformers inonerable. Notification by tele _chone shall be made to the Regional Administrator within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Continued operation beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is oermissible orovided a reoort is sent to the NRC within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months outlining the _ olans for orom_ot restoration of the transformers and the additional precautions to be taken while the transformers are out of service. and until notified differently by the NRC, 2-33 Amendment No. 25

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

, 2.7 Electrical Systems (Continued) e.d. Either one of the 4.16 kV engineered safeguards busti, l A3 or l A4 may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided the operability of the diesel generator associated with the operable bus is demonstrated immediately and there are no inoperable engineered safeguards components associated with the operable bus.

d. t One of each group of 4160 V/480 V Transformers (TilB-3A or 4A),

(TI1B-3B or 4B), and (TI1B-3C or 4C) may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided there are no inoperable engineered safeguards components associated--with-4he--opemble-4ransformers--which are redundant to components on the inoperable transformer.

e.f. One of the 480 V distribetion buses connected to bus l A3 or connected to bus I A: may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided there are no inoperable safeguards components associated-with4he-operable-bust-which are redur. dant to compone01s_on the inoperable bus.

f, g, Either Group of MCC No.'s (3Al,3B1,3A2, 3C1, 3C2,1 or (4Al,4A2, 4Cl, 4C2) may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided there are no inoperable safeguards components associated-with4he-operable-MCC's r which are redundant to components on the inoperable MCC. MCC 3C1 may be inoperable in excess of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months if battery chargers No. I and No.

2 are operable.

g. L One of the four 120V Va-c instrument buses ( A. B. C or D) may be inoperable for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided the reactor protective and engineered safeguards systems instrument channels supplied by the remaining three buses are all operable.

h, L Two battery chargers may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided battery charger No I (EE-8C) or No. 2 (EE-8D) is operable.

i, i, Either one of the emereency diesel generators (DG-1 or DG-2) may be inoperable for up to seven days (total for both) during any month, provided the other diesel generator is started to verify operability, shutdown and controls are left in the utomatic mode and there are no inoperable engineered safeguards componants associated with the oper'ble diesel generator,

j. L Island buses IB3A-4A, IB3B-4B, and IB3C-4C may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months provided there are no inoperable safeguards components associated-with-4he-operable 4us-which are redundant to comnonents on the inoperable bus (cl.

k.L Either one of the 125V d-c DG buses No.1 or 7, (Panels EE-8F gI and EE-8G) may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

2-34 Amendment No. 60

=

1

... 2.0 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIG S l

. 2.7_ Electrical-Systems (Continued) '

l. gt Either one of the 125V d-c DG distribution panels AI-41 A at and AI-41B may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ,

m. a. Either one of the 120V a-c AG instrument panels AI-42A or AI-42B may be inoperable for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

n.-------The -161-kV-transmission-line--may-be+ut ef-service-and-unit-operation--

may-<on tin ue -or-4he--reac tor-- may 4e-- restarted-- from -e -hot-s hu tdow n--

condition 4f(i)-operability ef-t he rem aining-source 4s-immediately-veri 6ed--

and-(ii)-immediate--notification-is-made4y-telephone-or-telegraph-to 4he--

Director-okhe-NRG-RegionaFOf6ee-in-Arlington -Texasref-the r loss-and--

ofthe-plans-unestoreahe-electrie-power-+ysten>404ts-full capability--

Basis The normal source of auxiliary power with the plant at power for the safeguards buses is from the house service power transformers being fed from the 161 kV incoming line '

with on site emergency power from either one of two diesel generators and off-site standby power via the unit auxiliary transformers.m The loss of the 161kV incoming line -

renders the house service- transformers (Tl A-3 and Tl A-4) inocerable in that the transformers cannot sunoly power to the 4.16kV safeguards buses 1 A3 and 1 A4.

The two emergency diesel generators on site do not require outside power for start up or operation.

L Upon loss of normal and standby power sources, the 4.16 kV buses I A3 and 1 A4 are l energized from the diesel generators. Bus load shedding, transfer to the diesel generator and pickup of critical loads are carried out automatically.m L

' When the turbine generator is out of service for an extended period, the generator can p be isolated by opening motor operated disconnect switch DS-Tl in the bus between the generator and the main transformer, allowing the main transformer and the unit auxiliary

_ power transformers (Tl A-1, and Tl A-2) to be returned to service.m The auxiliary oower ~

transformers are n'ot considered inoperable during th'ese normal clant startuo/ shutdown realienments.

L l

2-35 Amendment No. 76

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.7 Electrica' Systems (Continued)

Equipment served by 4.16 kV and 480 V auxiliary buses and MCC's is arranged so that loss of an entire 4.16 kV bus does not compromise safety of the plant during DBA conditions. For example, if 4.16 kV bus l A3 is lost, two raw water pumps, one low pressure safety injection pump, one in high pressure safety injection pumps, one auxiliary feedwater pump, two component cooling water pumps, one containment spray pumps and two containment air fans are lost. This leaves two raw water pumps, one low pressure safety injection pumps, two one high pressure safety injection pumps, one component cooling water pump, one in containment spray pumps and two containment air fans which is more than sufficient to control containment pressure below the design value during the DBA.

The electrical system equipment is arranged so that no single failure can inactivate enough engineered safeguards tojeopardize the plant safety. The 480 V safeguards are arranged on nine bus sections. The 4.16 kV safeguards are supplied from two buses.

The total fuel oil engine base mounted tank capacity of 550 gallons on each diesel assures is-considered more than adequate 4ince-approximately 5-M hours running time (worst maximum rated case loading) is available before transfer of fuel oil from the 18,000 gallon underground storage tank is mandatory. Two 13 gpm diesel fuel oil transfer pumps per diesel, with each being fed from the diesel it is associated with, are available for transferring fuel oil from the storage tank to 4he-day-4ank. The minimum 16,000 gallons of fuel oil in the storage tank, in addition to the day engine mounted tanks will provide diesel operation under the required loading conditions for a minimum period of 7 M days should only one diesel be in operation. It is considered incredible not to be able to secure procure fuel oil from one of several sources in the vicinity of the Fort Calhoun Station Omaha in less than three days under the worst of weather conditions.

One battery charger on each battery shall be operating so that the batteries will always be at full charge; this ensures that adequate d-c power will be avilible available for all emergency uses. Each battery has one battery charger permanently connected with a third charger capable of being connected to either battery bus. The chargers are each rated for 200 400 emperes at 130 volts. Except4or-the41rst-minute Following a DBA during-which the batteries and the charger aceemmodate all-the4oad,-the<apacityef4he-battery-charger- will handle allrequired loads. Each of the reactor protective system channels instrumentation channels is supplied by one of the a-c instrument buses. The removal of one of the a-c instrument buses is permitted as the 2-of-4 logic may be manually changed to a 2-of-3 logic without compromising safety.

The engineered safeguards instrument channels use a-c instrument buses (one redundant bus for each channel) and d-c buses (one redundant bus for each logic circuit). The removal of one of the a-c instrument buses is permitt-d as the two of four logic automatically becomes a two of three logic.

References (1) FSAR, IJSAR Section 8.3.1.2 (2) FSAR, USAR Section 8.4.1 (3) FSAR, US AR Section 8.2.2 2-36 i

.,, .' TABLE 2-10 POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION OPERATING LIMITS Minimum Operable Instrument Chnnnels Ac_ lien

1. Containment Wide Range Radiation 2 (a)

Monitors (RM-091 A & B)

2. Wide Range Noble Gas Stack Monitor

- RM-063L (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)

RM-063M (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)

RM-063H (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)

3. Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor 1 (a)

(RM-064) 4 Containment Hydrogen Monitor (VA-81A & B) 2 (b)(c)

5. Containment Water Level Narrow Range (LT459 599 & LT-600) 1 (d)

Wide Range (LT-387 & LT-388) 2 (b)(c)

6. Containment Wide Range Pressure 2 (b)(c)

7. Reactor Coolant System Subcooled Margin Monitor 2 (e)(f)

8. Core Exit Thermocouples (i) 2/ Core Quadrant- (g)(h)

9. Reactor Vessel Level (HJTC) (j) 2 (k)(1)

(a) With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum channels-operable requirements, initiate the pre-planned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter (s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , and l: 1. either restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or.

2. prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to specification 5.9.3 within 14 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedules for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

(b) With one channelinoperable, restore the inoperable monitor to OPERABLE status within

! 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

L 2-98 Amendment No. 84,82,83,87,110

TAl}LE 210 (Contlutedl POST-ACCIDENT MONIIDRING INSTRUSIENTATION OPERATING LIMITS (c) With hot bnth channels inoperable, rc., tore at least one channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least ilOT SilVTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(d) With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum channels operable requirements, operation may continue until the next cold shutdown, at which time the required channel (s) shall be made operable.

(c) With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the minimum channels operable requirement, either

1. restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or

2. Initiate an alternate means of monitoring the subcooled margin, or

3. be in at least 110T SilUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(f) With both channels inoperable,

1. restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , or 1

2. initiate an alternate means of monitoring the subcooled margin, or

3. be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(g) With the number of OPERABLE Core Exit Thermocouples per core cuadrant channels one less than the minimum channels operable requirement, either restore the inoperable Core Exit Thermocouple (s) channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(h) With all Core Exit Thermocouples within a core cuadrant botishannels inoperable, either restore the inoperable Core Exit Thermocouple (s) clonel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(i) With the number of OPERABLE Core Exit Thermocouples less than the four per core quadrant required by NUREG-0737, either restore to at least fo :r OPERABLE channels Core Exit Thermocot.nles per core cuadant within seven days of discovery of loss of operability, or prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 5.9.3 within 30 days, outlining the actions taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans for restoring the inoperable Core Exit Thermocouple (s) channel to OPERABLE status.

(j) A channel is eight sensors in a probe. A channel is OPERABLE if four or more sensors, two or more in the upper four and two or more in the lower four, are OPERABLE.

2 98a Amendment No.110

I ATTACHMENT B

. E,lSCUSSION, JUSllflCATION, AND NO SIGNiflCANI llA7ARDS CONSIDfRATION Omaha public power District (OPpD) is proposing to cht.nge Specification 2.7,

" Electrical Systems," to correct inconsistencies and to provide further guidance on equipment necessary for the 161kV power supply, and to reflect changes in the emergency diesel generator fuel oil calculations as a result of the Design Basis Reconstitution program. Additionally, administrative changes are proposed for Specification 2.7 and Table 2-10. Following is the discussion and justification for the proposed changes.

Specification 2.7 Electrical Systems Specification 2.7(1)

Minimum Requirements As currently written this specification applies above 300 degrees f:

however, the modification to minimum requirements only applies after the reactor is critical. If the reactor is above 300 degrees but not yet critical, and a listed system is ueclared inoperable, Specification 2.0.1 is invoked which requires the unit to be placed in hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , if the same system is declared inoperable at full power the modification to minimum requirements apply which contain an allowed outage time for the specific system and additionally allow 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to place the unit in hot shutdown if the system outage time cannot be met.

The proposed revision to Specification 2.7(2) as it applies to 2.7(1),

wculd allow the same modifications to minimum requirements above 300 degrees F as allowed after criticality. However, it would not allow the reactor to be made critical unless all rf the listed systems are operable.

The statement concerning minimum requirements is being revised to add the word " coolant" and delete the word "up" to be more consistant with Specification 2.5.

Administrative Changes Specifications 2.7(1)a.,2.7(1)b., and 2.7(1)d. contain typographical errors. The equipment designation for transformers is identified as "11" and is being corrected to read "T1."

Specification 2.7(1)i,j, and k are being revised to include the specific equipment designations.

Specification 2.7(1)h. contains typographical errors. The equipment designation for electrical panels is identified as "Al" and is being corrected to read "Al."

Specification 2.7(1)1. contains a statement concerning the " engine base day tank," which is misleading. The engine mounted " base tank" and the wall mounted " day tank" (auxiliary tank) are two separate tanks. This specification is being revised to more closely reflect the wording of the Standard Technical Specifications and to reflect the actual equipment nomenclature.

1

l

. Specification 2.7(2)

Modification of Minimum Requirements The proposed revision would allow the modification of minimum requirements to apply after the reactor is above 300 degrees F or after the reactor has been made critical. This revision will not allow the reactor to be made critical unless all systems listed in 2.7(1) are operable. Additional clarification is also proposed for the time limits contained in the action statement. This proposed change is consistent with the present specification and does not change the allowed outage time. The action statement allows a total of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months to reach the cold shutdown condition.

Specification 2.0.1, which would be invoked if systems in excess of the modification to minimum requirements are inoperable, allows a total of 42 hours4.861111e-4 days 0.0117 hours 6.944444e-5 weeks 1.5981e-5 months to reach the cold shutdown condition.

Proposed Specifications Concerning inoperability of Ilouse Service 1ransformers OPPD has reviewed Technical Specification 2.7(2)b house service transformers TIA-3 and 11A-4 and 2.7(2)n 161kV off-site power supply Limiting Conditions for Operation for that equipment using the guideline provided by the NRC in a Safety Evaluation Report dated January 30, 1990. (ACH No. 9002070242) lhe proposed Technical Specification will delete the present specification 2.7(2)n in its entirety and modify 2.7(2)b to provide direction on the 161kV supply.

The proposed specification will define time limits and reporting requirements.

ProposedSpecification2.7(2)b.

OnellouseServiceIransformer(11A-3or11A-4) Inoperable Thit specification would allow operation for seven (7) days with one house service transformer out of service and is consistent with the present specifications. Verbal notification of the transformer inoperability will be made within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Added to this portion of the specification is a clause which permits operation beyond the seven days provided OPPD submits a report to the NRC within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months detailing restoration plans and measures taken to prevent a plant trip and diesel generator inoperability while the transformer is out of service. Continued operation beyond 7 days would also require NRC concurrence.

Continued o>eration is considered desirable in that a unit shutdown would result in tie loss of cr.: of the 4.16kV safaguards buses resulting in challenges to the diese' safety system and ,rimary system transients. The proposed specification also directs the operability verification of the diesel generator associated with the inoperable House Service Transformer to be completed. This provides additional assurance that the plant can be safely shutdown, if required. Verification is defined as a reverification of the last monthly surveillance test. Demonstrating operability of the diesel generator by conducting the surveillance test is not desirable.

Conducting the surveillance test requires that the diesel be taken out of the automatic mode. This would create a situation whereby one division of safeguards equipment would be without any emergency power for the duration of the test.

2

. Pro >osed Specification 2.7(2)c.

Bot 1HouseServiceTransformers(T1A-3and11A-4) Inoperable The proposed specification would allow operation for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months with both house service transformers out of service. The specification has been clarified to indicate that the loss of the 151kV off-site power is considered to render both House Service Transformers inoperable.

Demonstrating operability of the diesel generators by conducting the surveillance test is not desirable. Consistent with the present specification, the operability of both die wi generators is to be verified, which is defined as a reverification of the last monthly surveillance test. Conducting the surveillance test requires that the diesel be taken out of the automatic mode. This would create a situation whereby one division of safeguards equipment would be without any emergency power for the duration of the test.

The reporting requirement specifies that a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months verbal notification be made to the NRC. If operation is to be continued beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months a report must be sent to the NRC within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months detailing restoration plans and additional measures to be taken while the transformers are out of service.

Continued operation beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months would also require NRC concurrence.

Continued operation is a preferred course of action rather than shutdown because a turbine generator trip would result in a loss of off-site power.

This loss of off-site power would cause the following:

1. Diesel generator start and energizing of the safety busses.

2. Natural circulation cooling of fuel to remove decay heat.

3. Decay heat removal from the steau generators via the main steam safety valves due to loss of the condenser.

4. A challenge to the automatic auxiliary feedwater system.

The plant cannot establish the normal hot sLitdown configuration until 345kV backfeed has been established after the turbine generator trip.

Condenser operations can then be reestablished and the reactor coolant pumps restarted.

Specification 2.7(2)t, This specification is to be deleted. The loss of the 161kV off-site supply will be specified in Technical Specification 2.7(2)c. The specification which permits reactor startup with the 161kV out of service will be deleted. The present Technical Specification is incorrect in that although the reactor could be taken to hot standby (critical), the generator could not be synchronized to the power grid or even supply house loads. This is because the disconnect switch DS-T1, is a manual / motor switch with no synchronization capability. The 345kV bus must be de-energized before closing DS-T1. Removal of the 345kV hus would de-ene ize all four Reactor Coolant Pumps and this would scram the reactor.

i

=

3 1

. Ad'Ilnistrative Changes Specification 2.7(2)d. is being revised to provide consistent wording and to clarify that either bus lA3 g 1A4 may be inoperable.

Specification 2.7(2)e. contains a typographical error. The equipment designation for transformers is identified as "11" and is being corrected to read "T1." This specification is also being clarified to indicate what components may be inoperable. Redundant components are not necessarily powered by the corresponding " redundant" transformer in the other electrical division, for example, if transformer ilD-3A is inoperable charging pump CH-1A is inoperable. The corresponding transformer on the other electrical division TIB-4A does not supply power to any charging pumps. This revision clarifies that there cannot be inoperable components redundant to those components powered by the inoperable transformer. ,

l Specification 2.7(2)f. is being revised to clarify that only one of the 480 l V buses may be inoperable at any given time and to clarify that there l cannot be inoperable components redundant to those components powered by I the inoperable bus. I Specification 2.7(2)g is being revised to clarify that either group of ;

Motor Control Centers (MCC) may be inoperable at the same time. This is '

consistent with the wording of the present specification. The specification maintains the additional requirement that redundant components be operable.

Specification 2.7(2)h, i, and j are being revised to add equipment designations.

Specification 2.7(2)k. is being revised to add equipment designations and clarify that there cannot be inoperable components redundant to those components powered by the inoperable buses.

Specification 2.7(2)l. and 2.7(2)m are being revised to add equipment designations and to indicate that either one g its redundant system may be inoperable. The inclusion of the word "and" in this specification is incorrect and is being deleted.

Specification 2.7(2)m. is being revised to indicate that either one system E its redundant system may be inoperable. The inclusion of the word "and" in this specification is incorrect and is being deleted.

Specification 2.7(2)n is being revised to provide consistent wording and to clarify that either AC instrument panel Al-42A E AI-428 may be inoperable.

4

. Basis of Specification 2.7 Changes to Emergency Diesel Generator funi Oil Storage Requirements Contained in the Basis OPPD is proposing to change the diesel generator fuel oil storage requirements as discussed in the basis for Technical Specification 2.7.

Specifically these changes are (1) changing the operating time of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG's) utilizing the engine mounted base tanks from five (5) to two and one half (2.5) hours; and (2) changing the minimum EDG operating underground time storage utilizing tank the eng(ine mounted base tanks and the7)daystoth from seven days.

Discussion In 1988 a concern was raised by an inspector regarding the lack of a diesel generator fuel oil consum) tion calculation. The Design Basis Reconstitution Project located tle original Gibbs and Hill (G&ll) load model but not the calculation. This model was used with the engine fuel consumation rates to determine the amount of fuel oil required to operate eitler diesel for 7 days. Rerunning the original model indicated that more than 19,000 gallons (versus the 16,000 gallon Technical Specification requirement) would be necessary. This resulted in fort Calhoun being unable to meet the requirement contained in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and the Technical Specification basis to maintain sufficient on-site fuel oil to operate a diesel for 7 days. This discrepancy was reported to the NRC in Licensee Event Report 50-285/88-020, dated October 3, 1988.

(LIC-88-870)

The model used to derive the present fuel oil requirements bounds several changes to the original G&H model:

(1) current strategy on long term core cooling and containment heat removal using expected loads as opposed to nameplate loads; (2) the addition of the auxiliary feedwater pump (FW-6) to the model along with the dead load on DG-1 and DG-2 to accommodate FW-6, and (3) a decrease in the amount of fuel available in the underground storage tank to account for an inaccessible 240 gallons due to the location of the fuel oil transfer pumps' foot valves.

Based on the revised EDG bounding loading model, the diesel generator's operating time was calculated for two situations, the operating time available prior to transferring fuel from the underground storage tank, and total operating time. The calculation l assumes only 15,760 gallons of fuel is accessible from the underground storage tank when the 16,000 gallons required by Technical l Specification 2.7(1)l. is maintained. In addition, the calculation l assumes that one diesel generator is secured within thirty (30) minutes of accident initiation.

5 1

. The results indicate that, with a 550 gallon base tank and 16.000 gallon minimum in the underground storage tank, the diesel generators are capable of operating for the following amount of time Base Tank Plus Underaround Storace Tank Base Tank Min Req'd Calculated Design

Alone _.( 3.5 days) Operatino Marai n DG-1 2.8 hrs 84 hrs 85.8 hrs 1.8 hrs DG-2 2.8 hrs 84 hrs 85.8 hrs 1.8 hrs

Additional design margin exists beyond the 1.8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months shown. Fuel consumption is based on USAR Table 8.4-1 maximum loads at 90 degrees F.

This conservatively maximizes fuel consumption. These values are above the expected load profile and above the allowable loads for diesel operability at temperatures higher than 90 degrees F.

In addition to 550 gallons available in the engine mounted base tanks, each U an additional 300 gallon wall-mounted auxiliary tank which or feeds the base tank. The level in this auxiliary tank is ma; ,d by automatic operation of fuel oil transfer pumps in response to low and high level signals which are also alarmed in the control room. This additional volume of fuel oil extends the e r.ilchle time before the fuel oil transfer pumps would be required to transfer fuel from the underground storage tank to the engine mounted tank (s). No credit is taken for this additional fuel oil in the calculation. As shown above, adequate margin exists to assure that one of the diesel generators can be secured prior to the necessity to transfer any fuel from the underground storage tank. Therefore, the I change in operating time from 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months to 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months is considered to be of negligible consequence.

Fort Calhoun Station currently obtains its diesel generator fuel oil from a supplier in Omaha, Nebraska, approximately 26 miles from the Fort Calhoun Station. In addition, OPPD has received written l confirmation from a second supplier of fuel oil, located in fort I Calhoun, Nebraska (approximately 5 miles from the station), that barring severe weather, fuel can be delivereo to the station within one hour of recuest. The change from a seven 7) day to a three and on half (3.5) cay operating time stated above (is within the Technical Specification basis of being able to secure fuel oil within three (3) dayt Therefore, this change in operating time is considered to have negligicte L nsequences.

I Changes to Discusr. ions Concerning the ItilkV Power Supply Contained in the Basis Clarification concerning the loss of the 161kV line has been added to the basis of ipecification 2.7. This clarification indicates that the loss of the ir;oming 161kV line renders the house transformers inoperable due to their inability to suppl 3 the 4.16kV safeguards buses IA3 and 1A4. In order to restore off-site lower to the safeguards buse4 upon loss of the 161kV line, 345(V backfeed must be manually established. Therefore, upon the loss of the 161kV line, the house service tre.nsformers are considered inoperable.

6 l

l

Additional clarification has also been added concerning the

- o)erability of the auxiliary transformers. Normal )lant startup and

-slutdown requires manually transferring the 4.16kV auses 1A1 1A2, l 1A3, and 1A4 between the 345/22kV and the 161kV power sup)1y. During i the actual realignment manipulations, off-site power, altlough available, cannot power the transformers until completion of the '

manipulations. This clerification states that the transformers are 1 not considered inoperable during these startup and shutdown realignments. During normal power operations should the 161kV incoming line be lost, the auxiliary power transformers supply the 4.16kV buses lAl, lA2, IA3, and 1A4 from the 345/22kV system after ,

automatic fast transfer occurs. l Administrative Changes to the Basis A correction has been made to the example contained in the basis which discusses the results of losing bus IA3. In the normal electrical lineup bus lA3 (4.16kV) powers bus 183A (480 V) and island bus ID3A-4A (480V). This lineup would cause the loss of two high pressure safety injection (llPSI) pumps and one containment spray (CS) pump and leave one HpSI and two CS pumps available upon loss of bus lA3. This correction does not affect the number of pumps assumed to be available.

in a Design Basis Accident.

The rating of the battery chargers is being revised from "200" to "400" amperes to reflect an increase in rating as a result of modification MR-fC-84-119.

The word "avilible" is misspelled and is being corrected to read "available."

The discussion of obtaining fuel oil in the vicinity of Omaha is being revised to correctly state-in the vicinity of the fort Calhoun Station.

The discussion concerning the ability of the batterys to handle all loads following a DBA is being generalized to reflect the requirements of the batterys and chargers as discussed in USAR Section 8.4.2. The batterys are rated for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months and cannot handle all loads indefinitely as might be implied by this statement.

The word " channel" is being deleted as it is unnecessarily stated twice.

References 1, 2, and 3 are being revised from FSAR (final Safety Analysis Report) to reflect the updated version of this document which is designated the USAR. (Updated Safety Analysis Report) 7 N - , _ _ , _ . - _ , . _ - - -, - -. . . -- -. - - - - - - - -

. Specificaticn 2.21 Tabic 2-10 Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Operating Limits Administrative Changes Page 2-98 Table 2-10 Item 5, Containment Water Level Narrow Range (LT-559 &

LT-600), contains a typographical error. The equipment identification for level transmitter "LT-559" is incorrect and is being corrected to read "LT-599."

Page 2-98a Table 2-10 Note (c) contains a typographical error. Note (c) incorrectly states, "With hot channels inoperable..." and is being l corrected to read "With both channels inoperable,.." i l

Table 2-10 Note (i) is being revised to add the words "per core '

quadrant" to clarify that the number of Core Exit Thermocouples required by NUREG-0737 are four per core quadrant and not a tot 0 of four in the entire core. In addition, the word " channels" is revised to read " Core Exit Thermocouples." These proposed changes are l consistent with an interpretation of this specification from the :

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in a memorandum to NRC Region IV dated December 11, 1990. (TAC No. 75596)

Table 2-10 Notes (g) and (h) are being revised to reflect the guidance discussed on Note (i) for consistent wording.

8 l

Basis for No Significant Hazards Consideration The proposed changes do not involve significant hazards consideration because operation of Fort Calhoun Station in accordance with this change would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.

Changes to the Minimum Requirements and Modification to the Minimum Requirements The proposed changes to the minimum requirements and modification to minimum recuirements do not increase the probability or consequences of an accicent previously evaluated. This proposed change would allow the modification to minimum requirements that apply when the reactor 4s at full power to also apply when the reactor is above 300 degrees F but not critical. The cons.?quences of an accident at full power are significantly greater than when the reactor is not critical. By not allowing the unit to be made critical unless all of the systems listed in the minimum requirements are operable ensures that the consequences would not be increased.

Changes Concerning the Operation of the 161kV Line and Associated Equipment The proposed changes conceraing the operation of the 161kV off-site power line and essociated equipment does not adversely affect the consequences or probability of an accident or event previously evaluated. This change clarifies the operability requirements of the remaining power sources during times when the House Service Transformers are out-of-service, requires reporting of actions to restore the transformer (s) and other precautions to be taken while the transformer is out-of-service, and removes the permissive to restart with the 161kV line out-of-service. The present Specifications allow the 161kV line, and therefore the transformers, to be out-of-service for an_ indefinite time period. This change defines a consistent allowed outage time for both the 161kV line and the associated transformers, and requires NRC concurrence to continue to operate beyond the specified time.

Changes Concerning the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Requirements The changes to the basis of Specification 2.7 do not adversely affect the consequences or probability of an accident or event previously evaluated. The proposed changes correct errors in calculations and take into account additional electrical loadings, which affect the amount of time the emergency diesel generator can operate on its full engine mounted tank fuel oil supply and the amount of time one emergency diesel can run on its full engine mounted tank and the fuel available from the underground storage tank.

9

. The proposed change in operating time from 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months to 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months , utilizing only the engine mounted tank, does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. An additional 300 gallon auxiliary tank gravity feeds the 550 gallon engine mounted tank. The level in the auxiliary tank is maintained by automatic operation of the fuel oil transfer pumps in response to low and high level signals which are alarmed in the Control Room. This additional tank extends the available time before fuel oil transfer purrps would be required to operate in order to fill the engine mounted tank.

The proposed change from 7 days to 3.5 days of underground storage tank fuel oil capacity for one emergency diesel operating does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated. Additional fuel is available from several sources and can be delivered within the required 3 days as stated in the basis to Technical Specification 2.7. Therefore, this proposed change is within the present acceptance criterion for obtaining fuel.

Changes to Table 2-10 The proposed changes to Table 2-10 are administrative only. These changes consist of correcting typograahical errors and providing clarification wnich is consistent wit 1 an interpretation from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Therefore, the changes to Table 2-10 does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Changes to the Minimum Requirements and Modification to the Minimum Requirements The proposed changes to the minimum requirements and modification to minimum requirements do not create the possibility of a new of different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

This proposed change would allow the modification to minimum requirements that apply when the reactor is at full power to also apply when the reactor is above 300 degrees F, but not critical.

Changes Concerning the Operation of the 161kV Line and Associated Equipment It has been determined that no new or different type of accident is created because no new or different modes of operation are proposed for the plant. The proposed requirements to verify the operability of the remaining emergency power supply provides a higher level of assurance that alternative power sources are operable. Removal of the permissive to restart the plant when the 161kV line is out-of-service eliminates the possibility of an accident in a higher mode than that existing at the time the 161kV service was lost. There will be no electrical system configuration changes as a result of this change.

Plant response to transients will be the same as currently analyzed in the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

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.[ Changes Concerning the Diesel Generator fuel Oil Storage Requirements It has been determined that no new or different type of accident is created because no new or different modes of operation are pro)osed for the plant. The proposed change in operating time due to tle available on-site fuel oil storage capacity is within the present acceptance criterion for obtaining fuel.

Changes to Tab ~e 2-1C The proposed changts to Table 2-10 are administrative only. These changes consist of correcting typogra)hical errors and providing clarification which is consistent wit 1 an interpretation from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Therefore, the changes to Table 2-10 cannot create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Changes to the Minimum Requirements and Modification to the Minimum

Requirements The proposed changes to the minimum requirements ar.d modification to minimum requirements does not reduce the margin of safety. This proposed change would allow the modification to minimum requirements that apply when the reactor is at full power to also apply when the reactor is above 300 degrees F, but not critical. Eculpment necessary to be operable above 300 degrees F is specified in acditional Specifications. This proposed change would not alter the number of pumps or volves which are required to be operable.

Changes Concerning the Operation of the 161kV Line and Associated Equipment This change results in an increase in the margin of safety associated with the normal source of auxiliary power by eliminating _the permissive to restart with the 161kV line out-of-service.

Changes C(incerning the Diesel Generator fuel Oil Storage Requirements The proposed change in operating time due to the available on-site fuel oil storage capacity is within the present acceptance criterion for obtaining fuel as discussed in the basis to Technical Specification 2.7. Therefore, this channge does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Changes to Table 2-10 The proposed changes to Table 2-10 are administrative only. These changes consist of correcting typographical errors and providing clarification which is consistent with an interpretation from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Therefore, the changes to Table 2-10 do not reduce any margin of safety.

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. The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing certain examples (48 FR 14870) of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards consideration. Example (i) concerns a purely administrative change; for example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, correction of an error, or a change in nomenclature. Example (ii)concernsachangethat constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the technical specifications; for example, a more restrictive surveillance requirement. Example (vi)concernsachangewhicheithermay result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within acceptable criteria with respect to the system.

The proposed changes to Specification 2.7(1) and Table 2-10 are similar to example (i) in that the changes correct typegraphical errors and provide clarification only. The proposed changes concerning the availability of the 161kV power supply are similar to exampics (i) and (ii) in that the change deletes inconsistencies between Specification 2.7(2)b. and 2.7(2)n.,

and that additional restrictions are being proposed upon a loss of the 161kV off-site power supply. The proposed changes to the on-site fuel oil storage requirements are similar to exam)1es (i) and (vi) in that the changes correct an error discovered in t1e fuel consumption calculation and that the change is clearly within the acceptance criterion of being able to procure off-site fuel within three days.

Therefore, based on the above considerations, OPPD does not believe that this pro)osed amendment involves a significant hazards consideration as defined ay 10 CFR 50.92 and the proposed changes will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the Station on the environment. Thus, the proposed change meets the eli categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)gibility criteria and pursuant to 10for CFR 51.22(b) no environmental assessment need be prepared.

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ML20079C843

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