ML20078M193

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Ro:On 831018,drywell Equipment Drain Sump Pump 2G11-C006B Became Inoperable W/Redundant Pump Also Inoperable.Cause Not Stated.Increase of 1.9 Gpm Unidentified Leakage Into Sump Drain Requested for 30-day Period
ML20078M193
Person / Time
Site: Hatch Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 10/19/1983
From: Nix H
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To: Stolz J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NED-83-516, TAC-51407, NUDOCS 8310250061
Download: ML20078M193 (2)


Text

Georg a Pour Company 333 P edmon! Averue ASanta Georg a 30308 T& phone 404 526 6526 Ma+ng Adcess Post Omce Box 4545 Ananta Georg a 33302 GeorgiaPower Power Generation Department October 19, 1983 NED-83-516 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. John F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cm mission Washirgton, D. C.

20555 NBC DOQGT 50-366 OPERATI!G LICENSE NPF-5 EIMIN I. HNICH NUCLEAR PIANP UNIT 2 DRWELL B2UIPMENT DRAIN SLMP OPERABILITY Gentlemen:

On 0:tober 18, 1983, Drywell equipnent drain sump pump 2Gll-C006B became inoperable at Plant IIatch, Unit 2.

Since the redundant pump had previously failed, operability of the equipment sump and flow monitoring system (required by 'Itchnical Specification 3.4.3.1 b.)

was lost.

Since the reactor was in power operution, the ACTION statement for Technical Specification 3.4.3.1 was entered. This provides for up to 30 days of power operation with the equipment sump inoperable, provided that grab samples of the containment atmosphere are taken and analyzed. We intend to restore the equipment drain sump to operability during the 30 day LOO period.

This letter, as a follow-up to a telephone conversation held October 18, 1983, between Georgia Power Conpany, NRC-Region II, NRC-NRR, and NRC-Plant Hatch, discusses:

1)

Our methodology for evaluating unidentified and total leakage against the limits of Technical Specification 3.4.3.2, and 2) our inability to meet certain itents of the Confirmatory Order issued July 8, 1983, concerning augmented reactor coolant leak detection.

The Hatcri drywell equipnent drain sump is designed to overflow into the floor drain sump.

All sources of IDENTIFIED LEAKN3E accumulate in the equipment drain sanp.

UNIDENTIFIED LEAKN3E accumulates in the floor drain sump.

Technical Specification 3.4.3.2 b limits UNIDENTIFIED LEAKN3E to 5 gpm. Prior to the equipnent sunp failure, this Technical Specification was complied with by measuring the amount of leakage pumped out of the floor drain sunp.

However, since the equignent drain sung overflow will collect in the floor drain sump, the floor drain sump is collecting both IDENTIFIED and UNIDENTIFIED IEAKN3E.

Presently, this combined leakage is still below the 5 gpn '1Winical Specification limit for UNIDENTIFIED LEAKTGE. However, to assure continued operation until repairs can be made, and to assure that Technical Specification 3.4.3.2 b continues to be met, we propose that the average amount of equipnent sump leakage (IDEtTTIFIED LEAKN3E) measured in the month of October be subtracted from the floor drain leakage in order to yield the UNIDENTIFIED LEAKN3E value.

'Ite average equipnent sump leakage g

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l GeorgiaPbwerd Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. John F.-Stolz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing

. October 19, 1983 Page 2 measured during October has been 1.94 gpm.

Conservatively rounded to 1.9 gpm,uthis would allow a total of 6.9 gpm floor-drain leakage to be measured, 4

while retaining compliance with Technical Specification 3.4.3.2 b.

If the leakage rate.into the equipnent drain sump increases, this figure would remain conservative.-

Any new increase in leakage to the floor drain sump will : be assumed to be UNIDENTIFIED IEAIGGE.

The Flant Review Board has reviewed this course of action and determined that it does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

In addition to Technical Specification requirements, we are operating under a Confirmatory Order issued July 8,

1983.

This order described augmented leak detection requirements in regard to BWR recirculation pipe cracking.

Several items of this order address operability of the drywell

.equipnent sump.

Item 7 of Attachment A to the Order requires operablility of at least one of the leakage measurement instrtunents associated with each stnp.

This. requirement cannot be met. until the equipment sump is repaired.

Additionally, Items 5 and 8 of Attachment A to the Order, which require increased frequencies for monitoring and channel checks of both the

. equipnent and' floor drain steps, cannot be met since the equipnent drain stacp is - inoperable.

However, monitoring and channel checks of the still operable - floor drain system should meet the intent of the order under the methodology we have described.

Any change in cbserved leakage. will be

-quickly detected before crack growth could progress. - Any increase in total stnp leakage over the 6.9 gpm limit will result in plant shutdown, whether it is IDENTIFIED or UNIDENPIFIED LEAIGGE.

This represents a conservatism, j

since present Technical Specifications allow up to 25 gpm total leakage.

- As discussed with you in our. telephone conversation of October 18, 1983, we request 'your concurrence with - our proposed course of action. - Please contact this office if further information is required.

l Ve truly yours FC b

H. C. Nix, r.

Acting Vice President and i

General Manager, Nuclear Generation REB /rb xc:

J. T. Beckham, Jr.

J. 'P. O'Reilly (NRC-Region II)

Senior Resident Inspector, Plant Hatch roons 3