ML20070V287
| ML20070V287 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie, 05000000, Shoreham |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1982 |
| From: | Honma G, Chris Miller EG&G, INC. |
| To: | Rosztoczy Z Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082480769 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-6415 EGG-EA-5907, NUDOCS 8302170227 | |
| Download: ML20070V287 (16) | |
Text
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EGG-EA-5907 AUGUS 1982 AUDIT OF THE PUMP AND VALVES 0PERABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM AT THE ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2 C. F. Miller G. Hanma l
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Operated by the U.S. Department of Energy i N),
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1 This is an informal report intended for use as a preliminary or working document l
i Prepared for the U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM!SSION I
Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-761D01570 0
E Idaho FIN No. A6415 pg 8302170227 830202 PDR ADOCK 05000322 A
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INTERIM REPORT Accession No.
Report No. EGG-EA-5907 t
- I Contract Program or Project
Title:
Equipment Qualification Case Reviews y
.. Subject of this Document:
Audit of the Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Program at the St. Lucie Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Type of Document:
Technical Evaluation Report Author (s):
C. F. Miller G. Honma DLte of Document:
August 1982 RIponsible NRC Individual and NRC Office or Division:
Zoltan R. Rosztoczy, Division of Engineering This document was prepared primarily for preliminary orinternal use. it nas not received full review and approval. Since the,re may be substantive changes, this document should not be considered final.
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EG&G Idaho, Inc.
Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-761001570 NRC FIN No. A6415 INTERIM REPORT
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AUDIT OF THE PUMP AND VALVE OPERABILITY ASSURANCE
.f PROGRAM AT THE ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2
.s DOCKET NO. 50-389 C. F. Miller G. Honma Reliability and Statistics Branch Engineering Analysis Division 1.
August 1982 I
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ABSTRACT Tne St. Lucie Nuclear Station, Unit 2 was audited to determine the adequacy of their pump and valve operability assurance program. Results of the audit are summarized in this report.
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FOREWORO
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This report is supplied as part of the " Equipment Qualification Case Reviews" project that is being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Engineering, Equipment Qualification Branch by EG&G Idaho, Inc., Engineering Analysis Divisien, Reliability and Statistics Branen.
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The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded this work under the authorization, 6&R 20-19-40-41-2, FIN Nunber A6415.
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NRC FIN No. A6415, Equipment Qualificatior. Case Reviews 4
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SUMMARY
The pump and valve operability assurance review team (PVORT) comprised of two EG&G personnel and two members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff conducted an on-sita audit of the St. Lucie Unit 2 Pump and valve Operability Assurance Program during the week of May 9, 1982. Eleven j
active pumps and valves that perform a safety function were selected for review and evaluation. The components were categorized as either nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) or balance of plant (B0P) items based upon which organization was responsible for the purchase and installation of the component. Combustion Engineering is the NSSS wnile Ebasco, an architectural engineering firm, is responsible for the BOP components.
The process useo to evaluate the plant's overall Pump and Valve -
1 Operability Assurance Program includes (a) familiarization with the component and the system in which it is initalled, (b) understanding the component's normal and safety function (c) a visual inspection of the installeo component, and (d) a review of tnose documents relating to tne operability of the component.
-The results of this evaluation process were.two-fold. Deficiencies or areas of concern were identified for some of the eleven components. These are specific to the component and are documented in the report. Of greater importance is that plant specific areas of concern were identified. It is recommended that the four plant specific concerns identified and listed below be addressed.
l.
The licensee does not consider check valves as active components.
2.
The licensee has not included all active safety-related valves in his pre-operational testing program.
i 3.
The licensee does not have a complete and verified preventative maintenance program.
4 The licensee's central files may not contain all the required
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hydrostatic and ' leak rate test documents.
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CONTENTS A8STRACT..............................................................
ii FOREWORD..............................................................
11 5UMMARY...............................................................
iii
1.0 INTRODUCTION
l 2.0 EVALUATION OF SELECTED ITEMS.....................................
1 2.1 Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) Items....................
1 2.2 Balance of Plant (BOP) items................................
4 3.0 CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................
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4.0 REFERENCES
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AUDIT OF THE PUMP AND VALVE OPERABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM AT THE ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR-STATION, UNIT 2 l.0 INTRODUCTION During the period May 11-14, 1982, a Pump and Valve Operability s
Assurance Review Team (PV0RT) comprised of representatives of the
'N Reliability and Statistics Branch of EG&G Idaho, Inc., and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff conducted an audit at the St. Lucie Nuclear Station, Unit 2 to determine the adequacy of the licensee's Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Program. :The work effort consisted of (1) selecting a representative sampling of pumps and valves that perform a safety function, (2) identifying the precise safety function that eacn selected
't component must perform, (3) visually inspecting the installed configuration of the selected components and their-supports, and (4) auditing the qualification documentation for the selected components to determine the extent to which their overall operability assurance program conformed to the criteria in Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section.3.10, (NUREG-0800).
Details and findings based on the evaluation of the eleven components selected for the audit are presented in Section 2.0.
Qualification deficiencies (i.e., open items) for individual components are provided in Table 1.
Section 3.0 presents additional concerns resulting from the audit' process and recommendations as to how these concerns should be addressed.
2.0 EVALUATION OF SELECTED ITEMS 2.1 Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) Items t
Item: Bingham-Willamette Co., High Pressure Safety Injection Pump 26 Model: 3x4x9 CP 7 Stage ID: HPSI Pump 2B I
This pump is locateo in the reactor auxiliary building at the 10 ft.
elevation.
It is a seven stage horizontal centrifugal pump driven by a I
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4000 VAC, 400 H.P. General Electric motor. The safety function of the pump is to start on a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) and inject borated water into the reactor coolant system in the event of a small i
break. Review of the documentation package concerning the operability of tnis pump assembly (i.e., the pump and prime mover including any functional accessories) identified one minor concern. The pump and valve operability assurance review form that the licensee filled out contained an error in tne serial number of the prime mover. This error was corrected during the aucit.
While on the plant walk down portion of the review for this pump a safety hazard was pointed out to the licensee; tne shaft coupling cover was not secured. The licensee acknowledged the hazard and agreed to secure tne cover upon completion of coupling adjustments.
4 Item: Jamesoury Corp., Shutdown Cooling Control Valve Model: 8966-DA-M00.8 ID: FCV-3301 This valve is located in the reacter auxiliary building at the 10 ft.
elevation. It is a 10 in butterfly valve with a Limitorque SMS-0002-HIBC variable speed DC motor actuator. The safety function of this valve is to maintain a constant shutdown cooling (SDC) flow to the reactor core in the SDC mode of the low pressure safety injection system. The documentation package concerning the operability of tnis valve assembly was not complete.
The hydrostatic and leakage tests were not aveilable for review, nor was any occumentation available to account for flow induced vibration over the life of the valve with empnasis on pin loads. The licensee was asked to provide the hycrostatic and leakage test reports as well as a flow vibration load analysis for the valve.
Item: Fisher Controls, Injection Header Isolation Valve Model: 667-DBQ Size 40 Actuator ID: HCV-3648 This valve is located in the reactor containment building at the 45 ft. elevation.
It is a one inch electro-pneumatic globe valve. The 2
safety function of the valve is to close on a :afety injection actuation signal (SIAS) to isolate the 2B2 injection header check valve leakage j
line. Several concerns were identified during tne review of this item.
These concerns and their status are listed celow.
j 1.
The seriai number on the PVORT review form did not match that of i
the valve name plate data. The form was corrected during the audit.
2.
Concerns about closure against full AP were resolved after learning that the valve hao been closed at full AP during a pre-operational test.
3.
A rigid conduit supplying electrical power to the valve actuator was pointed out to the seismic review team (SQRT) as a potential problem. The SQRT felt there were no concerns, however, involving possible interactions between the conduit and actuator, e
4.
As part of concerns involving maintenance procedures on the valve act sator air supply filters, tne li ensee was asked to supply confirmation that these filters are included in the plant's maintenance program. The licensee agreed to respond to this request at a later date.
l Item: Westinghouse, SDC Heat Exchanger Isolation Valve Model:
12000 GM84NCH27D s
ID: V-3517
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This valve is located in the reactor auxiliary building at the 10 ft.
elevation.
It is a 12 in, motor operated gate valve with a Limitorque SB-0 actuator. The safety function of this valve is to remain closed until the requirements are met for entering the shutdown cooling mode of operation.
At that time the valve will open allowing flow through the SDC heat exchanger. No concerns were identified upon reviewing the documentation package concerning operability for this valve assembly.
(Note: The valve ioentification tag was found unsecured during the in-plant inspection. The l
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licensee secureo tne tag prior to completion of the aucit.)
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i Item: Fisher Controls, BAMT Recirculation Isolation Valve Model: G67-ES, Size 34 Actuator 10; V-2650 t
This valve is locateo in the reactor auxiliary building at the 0.5 ft.
6 elevation. It is a one inch pneumatically operated globe valve. The safety function of this valve is to close on a safety inji.ction actuation signal (SIAS), stopping recirculation of the boric acid makeup tank (BAMT) p so that tne cnarging pump can take a suction on the BAMT. Twa conce:rns were iaentified upon reviewing the documentation package for the valve assembly. Valve closure during full flow conaitions was not documented nor was sucn a test planned as part of the licensee's pre-operation testir.g
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program. The licensee agreed to include this valve in a periodic safeguard test program and in fact tested the valve for closure u' der full flow prior to the completion of the audit. Tne second concern involved hydrostatic and leak-rate test data not being available in tna documentation package.
The licensee agreed to supply this data at a later date.
2.2 Balance of Plant (B0P) Items Item: Rockwell, Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)
Model: 32" x 32" x 34" Fig. 312 GTMMTY ID:
I-HCV-08-1B This valve is in the open environment o' the main steam trestle area -
at the 36 ft elevation. It is an air-operated Y-type bi-directional balanced stop valve. Tne valve serves two safety functions; 1) to close on a containment isolation signal (CIS)-in the event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and 2) to clos's on a main steam isolation signal (MSIS)~in the event of a main steam line break (MSLB). Review of documentation concerning the operability of the valve assembly identified one concern involving the closure of the valve under full flow conditions. No prototype or model testing for full flow conditions was identified at the audit. The licensee could not demonstrate closure during pre-operation tests because no large cross-connect steam piping exists between Units 1 and 2.
(Even though the capability for testing the valve will exist during 4
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power-ascention tests,I the licensee considers such a test to be a severe o
. transient and woulo rather demonstrate closure in some other manner.) The licensee will attempt to locate documentation that will satisfy this concern.
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Item: MKM/ACF Industries, Containment Spray Isolation Valve l
Model: C-3 Saf-T-Seal i*
ID:
I-FCV-07-lA This valve is located in the reactor auxiliary building (penetration d
area) at the 28 ft. elevation.
It is a 12 in, air-operated gate valve.
The valves safety function is to open on a containment spray actuation i
signal (CSAS) allowing borated water to flow into the containment spray nozzle system. After conductir.g the in plant inspection and documentation review for this item, no concerns were identified involving the operability of this valve assembly.
Item: TRW Mission, Containment Spray Check Valve Model:
15 CEF-W 92 ID: 21-V-7172 This valve is locateo in the reactor auxiliary building (penetration area) ac the 9 ft. elevation. It is a double plate center hingeo spring loaded 24 in, eneck valve. The safa.ty function of this valve is to open when a suction is taken on tne containment sump,.(i.e., when recirculation is started after a LOCA). The normal function of the valve is to keep safety system water from leaking into the containment sump. The containment sump is designed to always be dry until a LOCA occurs;
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therefore, the upstream side of the check valve is also dry. Although the documentation package provided with the valve seemed adequate, it was not clear how the licensee was going to do a pre-operational test of the safety function since no suction could be taken on the containment sump. The licensee agreed to drain the downstream side of the check valve and to have someone crawl into tne piping to ensure that both plates of the valve will fully open. Confirmation of this action is to be supplied at a later date.
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s Item: Pacific, Auxiliary Feed Turoine Steam Inlet Isolation Valve Model: 4"650-7-WE(80)-E 3-ID:
I-MV-08 12
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This valve is located in the open environment of the main steam
- l; trestle area at the 29 ft.
- elevation. The valve is a 4 in. motor operated.
gate valve with a Limitorque SMS-000-5 actuator. Tne safety function of the valve is to open on an auxiliary feedwater a:tuation signal (AFAS) allowing steam flow to the auxiliary feed turbine. After reviewing the documentation for this valve, the only concern involved whether the valve
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would stroke against full differential pressure (aP). Tne licensee informed tne PVORT that pre-operational testing at full aP had been done on this valve using steam from Unit 1.
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Item:
Ingersoll-Rand, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (Motor-Driven)
Model: 2HMTA-10 ID: AFW PUMP--2A inis pump is located in the open environment of the main steam trestle area at the 70 ft. elevation.
It is a horizontally split multi-stage diffusor guide vane pump driven by a 4000 VAC, 3 phase, 60 Hz General Electric motor. The safety function of the pump is to start on an auxiliary feedwater actuation signal (AFAS) and provide water to the steam generators. Two minor concerns surfaced ouring the review process, 1) a bearing oil tag was found attached to the seal water line and 2) the l
interface between pump and motor was not addressed in the dynamic'model.
t These concerns were closed by having the tag changed to the proper line and l
discussing with Ebasco the magnitude of expected shaft deflection.
In addition the coupling between tne pump ano motor is self aligning, thus accounting for any small alignment problems.
Item: Byron Jackson, ntake Cooling Water (IWC) Pump Model: 37 KXL l-Stg VCT ID:
ICW Pump 2A This pump is located in the intake structure building at the 19 ft.
s elevation. It is a single-stage vertical pump (42.75 ft. x 3.5 ft.) driven 1
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g by a 4000 VAC 600 H.P. General Electric motor. There are tnree ICW pumps, normally two are running continuously and the thira is in stanoby. The safety function is for a second pump to start on a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) if unty one pump is running or for all three pumps to start on SIAS curing a loss of off-site power. These pumps supply cooling water to heat excnangers during both normal and post-accident conditions. One concern that surfaceo during the plant walk cown phase of the review involved a traveling screen used to filter the water entering the pumps. The traveling screen did not have an emergency power supply.
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The licensee justified tnis by showing that at tne flow rates for tne ICW i
pumps, the AP across the screen would not be high enough to hola debris against the screen. The review of documentation involving pump assembly operability identified no concern. The seismic review team, however, disagreed with the methodology involving displar.ement between the impeller and casing in a seismic report. The SQRT has requested additional data and the PVORT may have questions based upon the outccme of the SQRT review of tnat data. The fact that these pumps are now operational and have been for a considerable period of time, acds ccnfidence as to the qualification status of these pumps.
Table i summarizes the qualification status of all the items that were audited. If the status is open, the licensee action required to satisfy tne concerns for each item is presented.
3.0 CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Areas of concern resulting from tne audit are as follows:
l.
The licensee,does not consider check valves to be " active" l
valves. The staff however, does not exclude check valves from 6
the operability assurance program. The licensee should be asked to justify why all check valves in safety systems shold not be considered active valves.
2.
Three of the eleven components audited were not included in the licensee pre-operational testing program. Based upon this i
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apparent lack of pre-operational testing, it is recommended that-the licensee reevaluate his testing progran to insure that it I
includes all pumps and valves that perform a safety function.
l-3.
The licensee presented an overview of his Generation Equipment
'i Management System (GEMS) which is a computer program to aid in the scheduling of preventative maintenance and testing for all components. The licensee should verify tnat all pumps and valves providing a safety function are included in the GEMS, as work in that area is on-going at the present time.
4 Two of the eleven items failed to have hydrostatic and leakage test documents available. Additional central file reviews should be conoucted by the licensee that will verify tne existence of tnese documents in a representative sample of pump and valve documentation packages. Tne results of tnis review should be reported to the staff.
4.0 REFERENCES
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" Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants,"
Regulatory Guide 1.68, August 1978, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 5.u., Page 1.68-17.
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!I Table 1.
Summary of the Qualification Status of the Audit Items Item Qualification Date Final (I.D.)
Status Licensee Action Required Received Status 1.
HPSI Pump 2B Closed None 2.
SDC Control Valve Open Additional documentation required:
(FCV-3301)
- 1. Hydrostatic test documents.
6-17-82
- 2. Leakage test documents.
(hydro)
- 3. Flow vibration load analysis.
3.
Injection Header Open Licensee confirmation required:
Isolation Valve
- 1. Provide proof that this valves (HCV-3648) air supply filters are included in GEMS.
4.
SDC lleat Exchanger Closed None Isolation Valve l "'
(V-3517) 5.
BAMT Recirculation Open Additional documentation required:
Isolation Valve
- 1. Hydrostatic test documents.
6-17-82 (V-2650)
- 2. Leakage test documents.
(hydro) 6.
Main Steam Isolation Open Additional documentation required:
Val ve (I-HCV-08-1B)
- 1. Document (s) to confirm closure during full flow conditions.
7.
Containment Spray Closed None Isolation Valve (I-FCV-07-1A) 8.
Containment Spray Open Licensee confirmation required:
- 1. Provide proof that a pre-op test (21-V-7172) was conducted that assured the valve would open.
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(continued)
A Item Qualification Date Final (I.D.)
Status Licensee Action Required Received Status 9.
Auxiliary Feed Turbine Closed None Steam Inlet Isolation Valve (I-HV-08-12)
- 10. Auxiliary Feed Pump Closed None (Motor) (AFW Punp-2A)
.11. Intake Cooling Water Closed *
- Although the qualification of the Pump (ICW Pump-2A) pump assembly appears adequate, the j
PVORT is awaiting the results of a SQRT review of additional documenta-tion and reserves the right to re-evaluate this component.
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