ML20064C914

Ucs Brief Re Acceptability of Permitting Operation of Facility in Face of Unresolved Safety Issues,Including Adequacy of Protection from Damage Caused by Missiles Generated in or Out of Plant

ML20064C914
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	10/16/1978
From:	Weiss E SHELDON, HARMON & WEISS
To:
Shared Package
ML20064C906	List: ML20064C901 ML20064C910 ML20064C914
References
NUDOCS 7810300065
Download: ML20064C914 (8)

Text

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD f

)

In the Matter of )

i

)

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER )

COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-338 (ML

) 50-339.0L (North Anna Nuclear Power )

Station, Units 1 and 2) ) >

) ,

b BRIEF OF THE UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, AMICUS CURIAE I

I. Summary & Introduction In ALAB-491, the Appeal Board retained jurisdiction of ..

question: whether and why it is acceptable to. permit 1

this ,

the North Anna units to operate in the face of unresolved ,

safety issues concerning the adequacy of protection against damage caused by missiles generated either inside or outside ,

the plant.~1/ The Staff was ordered to file sworn statements with the Board addressing this issue.  ;

The Staff's pocition, contained in its response, dated September 15, 1978, is as follows:

The basis for allowing continued operation of the existing LWR's, pending completion of i i

this task (resolving the turbine missile problem]

is the low probability of unacceptable damage to i an essential system by turbine missiles. The j Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) assessed the ,

! turbine missile accident risk and concluded that i

[

LWR designs have a considerable degree of protec-

' tion provided by plant design and layout such that the public risk associated with large turbine missiles is insignificant compared to risks from  ;

l other accident causes. .

t 7Plo 30 0o65- .

1/ ALAB-491 (Aug. 25, 1978) S1.op. at 8. ,

. n2-l

' i For plants with less favorable turbine orientation and placement,2/ the current ,

licensing requirements, coupled with the low ,

probability of unacceptable damage to essen-tial systems by turbine missiles, provide ,

reasonable assurance that operation will not  ;

present undue risk to the health and safety of the public pending completion of this task.3/

The Staff's position is insupportable for the following i

reasons-

1. It is inappropriate to base licensing decisions on WASH-1400. First, the Commiss. ion specifically-announced at r the time of release of the draft of WASH-1400 that its contents I were "not an, appropriate basis for licensing actions."4/ We

- 7 are aware of no official modification of this policy. Further- ;

i more, the Risk Assessment Review Group, established by the ,

Commission on July 1, 1977 to review WASH-1400 and report to ,

the NRC, has just published its final report, NUREG/CR-0400, ,

t which concludes that WASH-1400 is seriously flawed in ways which make its use in this manner wholly inappropriata. f

2. General Design Criterion 4 requires that structures,  !

( systems and components important to safety "shall be appropriately j i

protected against dynamic effects, including the effects of j that may result from equipment failures and  !

missiles . . .

I t from events and conditions outside the nuclear power unit."

10 CFR Part 50, App. A, GDC 4.

1 i 2/ North Anna has "less favorable" turbine orientation.

3/ Staff's " Response to Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal  ;

Eoard's Request for Information on North Anna Units 1 and 2  :

Pegarding Missiles," Enclosure 2, " Task Action Plan for Task A-37, p. A-37/9. (Hereinafter " Enclosure 2")

4/ 39 Fed. Reg. 30964. August 27, 1974.

l

t The Staff concedes that, with respect to the North ,

Anna units, it cannot find that safety systems are adequately protected from turbine missiles'Without relying on WASE-1400 - f derived probabilities. This represents a circumvention of the i

regulations of precisely the sort disallowed in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station),  ;

.. LAB-138, RAI-73-7, 520, 528-531. ,

II. Argument i

A. - The Staff's Use of Probabilities Derived.from ,

WASH-1400 As a Basis for Granting An Operating  !

License Pending Resolution of the Turbine Missile Issue is Inappropriate.

i The Staff's response to the-Board's directive-in ALAB-491 l i

f to justify the issuance of an operating license to North Anna

- i

> pending resolution of the turbine missile question, although l

scarcely a model of clarity, does reveal that tha 14="hrin of the Staff's rationale is the alleged low probability, ,

derived from WASH-1400 of a turbine missile event. This is l explicit in the language quoted above. There is no showing i that.the regulations have been met by providing adequate t i protection against turbine missiles.- The orientation of the j turbines at North Anna is not " favorable." The Staff is  !

j

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still in the process of analyzing the "overall probability"

, i j of damage to safety systems and of determining what measures j will reduce the probability to an acceptably low level."-5/ {

In the interim, it proposes to issue operating licenses to .

5/ Enclosure 2 to Staff's Response of Sept. 15, 1978,.p. A-37/9. )

i l

North Anna on the basis of probabilities derived from NASH-1400.

When WASH-1400 was first issued in draft form, the Commission.

issued a Policy Statement in which it stated that the contents of the draft study "are not an appropriate basis for licensing 6/

decisions."~ The Commission noted that no changes in its safety or environmental requirements could be considered until WASH-1400 was fully analyzed and evaluated. We are aware of no On this basis alone, the Staff's modification to this policy.

unsupported use of WASH-1400 should be disallowed.

In July, 1977 the NRC established the Risk Assessment i Review Group to analyze WASH-1400 and the public comments thereon and to make recommendation to the NRC on whether and how risk assessment methodology can be used in the regulatory and licensing process.

The Risk Assessment Review Group has completed its report, published as NUREG/CR-0400. Its analysis and conclusions severely undermine WASH-1400 and particularly recommend. against its use in'the way the Staff has done in its reponse to the

(~ Appeal Board.

i

! The following findings from NUREG/CR-0400 are particularly l pertinent:

e The statistical analysis in WASH-1400 leaves much to be desired. It suffers from a-spectrum of problems, ranging from lack of data on which 1

l 6/ 39 Fed. Reg. 30964, Aug. 27, 1974.

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. _ , , . . . = _ . - - - _ _ . _ , _ . . . . _ . . . . - _

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-S-4 to base input distributions to the invention  ;

and use of wrong statistical methods. . . l I

e WASH-1400 was directed to make a realistic estimate of risk. In the regulatory process, the usual conservatisms must be incorporated. j e There have been instances in which WASH-1400 l has been misused as a vehicle to judge the  ;

acceptability of reactor risks. In other cases it may have been used prematurely as an estimate of the absolute risk of reactor accidents without full realization of the

! wide band of uncertainties involved. Such use should be discouraged.7/  ;

Among the three major conclusions of the Report is the I

( following: ,

WASH-1400 is defective in many important ways.

Many of the calculations are deficient when subjected to careful and probing analysis, with the result that the accuracy of many of the absolute probabilities calculated therein is not as good as-claimed. One key deficiency is .

the use by the study team of some methodological i and statistical assumptions that lack credibility.

Therefore, the absolute values of the risks presented by the Report should not be used uncri- l

+

tically either in the regulatory process or for public policy purposes.8/

) UCS believes that the Staff has used absolute risk figures

( i i

from WASH-1400 concerning the probability of turbine missiles I

damage in precisely the manner which the Risk Assessment Review '

O Group disapproves.

The Staff has offered its " view" that, eventually, i completion of the analysis of the turbine missile problem will i i

. i

7/ NUREG/CR-0400, p. IX-X. Emphasis added. l 8/ Id, p. 3. Emphasis added.

ll L  :

l l t 1

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.~ _ --, .- --

-s-show that no additional requirements are,necessary for ,

North Anna because of the inservice inspection, mainte-nance and. testing procedures which have been included in the technical specifications.-9/The Staff may_believe that 4 this will be the case but, it must be noted that the Staff l concedes that it presently has no way to evaluate the ,

10/ l effectiveness of these measures - Therefore, the Staff's ,

view falls far short of a certainty - or of reasonable t

assurance. .

t B. The Use of WASH-1400 Probabilities In the Manner Proposed by the Staff As a Basis for I Granting Operating Licenses Represents an l l

Attack on the Regulations. -

The Staff's position here is strikingly similar to its position five years ago during the operating license proceedings t for the Vermont Yankee Station. In that case, althotagh the i I Staff could not demonstrate at the time that the ECCS met the .j interim criteria and would perform its function when needed, it ]

asked the commission to parmit the plant to go into operation l on the basis that the probability of an accident requiring use ,

1 r

i of the ECCS was remote. The Appeal Board unequivocally rejected. l the argument, correctly characterizing it as an impermissible i

- repudiation of and attack on the regulations. No party can i

9/ Staff Response of Sept. 15, 1978, p. 6.

10/ " Presently, there is no formal NRC guidance on how to evaluate- !

the effect of toughness of turbine disk materials or testing and  !

inspection of disks, overspeed control systems, and steam valves on the missile generation probability." Staff Response of Sept.  ;

15, 1978, Enclosure 2, p. A-37/1.

1 I I

l

. l justify the licensing of a reactor which does not fully comply with applicable standards. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power' Corp (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) , ALAB-138, RAI-73-7, 520, 528-531. (1973)

The language of that decision is despositive:

i It bears repetition that, . . . it cannot be argued that, even though the reactor does not comply with the criteria it should receive an unrestricted full-power, full-term license on the. ground that there is reasonable assurance that it can operate-without adversely affecting the public health and safety. Such an argument might be factually support-l able, but would constitute an indirect attack on the 4 applicable Commission regulations. Again, the point c

to'be made is a simple one: reactors may not be licensed unless they comply with all 'applicable standards.

. . . [W]e reject at the outset two of the Staff's arguments in support of continued facility-operations. The first is the factual.one . . .

that there is a low probability of a loss-of-coolant accident in the time required for the reopened proceeding. That argument may be factually sound, but it constitutes an indirect challenge to the applicable criteria, in that it would permit licens -

ing of a non-complying reactor. Consequently, we need not consider the factual question concerning the degree of probability of a LOCA in the next few 7

months. (Id at 529)

! III. Conclusion i

General Design Criteria 4 requires that structure, systems and components important to safety be protected against the effects of missiles that may result from equipment failures, Section 10.7 of the SER Supplement 2 for North Anna states i'

that the probability of a turbine missile striking.an essential part of the plant is about 20% or 2 x 10-1, a f actor 200 othnes '

greater than that established as acceptable by Regulatory Guide i

I

_ _ _. _ _ _ ~ _ _

-g-f ,

1.115.- The Staff has incorporat.ed technical specifications ,

l.

on turbine / valve inspection, maintenance and testing, but there is no. accepted-way to evaluate the effectiveness of these measures. Moreover, the turbine orientation for the 4

North Anna units is unfavorable.

4 The Staff's basis for urging the licensing of North 4

Anna in.the face of this is the alleged " low probability"  ;

of unacceptable turbine missile damage, which probability is derived from WASH-1400. This use of such probabilities to avoid the force of safety requirements at the operating i i

license stage is repugnant to the NRC's " overriding responsi-i bility for assuring public health and safety in the operation I

of nuclear power facilities." Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. ,

8 (Indian Point, Units 1, 2 and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, (1975).

The Appeal Board should reverse the Licensing Board and order the operating license of North Anna revoked until such time as the Applicant and Staff can demonstrate that they have  ;

implemented suitable measures, such as adequate shielding and/or {

reorientation of the turbines to provide appropriate protection.  ;

~

against turbine missiles.

t By the Union of Concerned Scientists By:

l E 13~

Ellyn Rd Weiss

\A.L IL

/ (J l*

Sheldon, Harmon, Roisman & Weiss 1025 15th Street, N.W. '

Suite 500 Washington, D.C.~20005 >

(202) 833-9070 i

DATED: October 16, 1978

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