ML20063J036

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Control Sys Failures Evaluation Rept
ML20063J036
Person / Time
Site: Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date: 08/31/1982
From: Eckert E, Scherer P, Wortham T
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20063J023 List:
References
7-0141, 7-141, NUDOCS 8209020260
Download: ML20063J036 (26)
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CONTROL SYSTEMS FAILURES EVALUATION REPORT AUGUST 1982 PREPARED FOR LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION PREPARED BY P. R. SCHERER GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, NUCLEAR ENERGY BUSINESS OPERATIONS San Jose, California 95125 Approved:

/

T. R. Wortham, Manager, Technical Licensing Nuclear Control and Instrumentation Department E. C._ E'kert, c Manager - Plant Transient Performance Engineering Nuclear Power Systems Engineering Department

\ Nbfb h- -

P. A. Bohm, Senior Licensing Engineer Safety and Licensing Operation 7-0141 8209020260 820827 PDR ADOCK 05000322 E PDR

CONTENTS PARAGRAPH PAGE 1.0 Object 1 2.0 Conclusions 1 3.0 Analysis Methodology 2 4.0 Bus Loss Summary Results and Chapter 15 Comparison 5 APPENDIX A Bus Tables A-1 APPENDIX B Elimination Criteria B-1 APPENDIX C Load Tables C-1 ILLUSTRATIONS Figure PAGE 1 DC Bus Tree 7 2 AC Bus Tree 8 1

I 7-0141

CONTROL SYSTEMS FAILURES EVALUATION REPORT FOR THE SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1.0 OBJECT This document constitutes:

  • An analysis in response to the NRC concern that the failures of power sources or sensors which provide power or electrical signals to multiple control systems could result in con-sequences outside the bounds of the Shoreham Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Chapter 15 analyses and beyond the cap-ability of operators or safety systems.
  • A positive demonstration that adequate review and analysis has been performed to ensure that despite such failure the Shoreham FSAR Chapter 15 analyses are bounding, and no consequence beyond the capability of operators on safety systems would result.

A comprehensive approach was developed to analyze the control systems capable of affecting reactor water level, pressure or power in the Shoreham plant.

This report with its attachments was prepared by the General Electric Company for the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) with a significant technical contribution from the Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC).

2.0 CONCLUSION

S This report, supplemented by the existing FSAR Chapter 15 transient analyses, documents an evaluation of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station for system interaction by electrical means. The conclusion of this evaluation is that previously reported limits of minimurn critical power ratio (MCPR), peak vessel and main steamline pressures, and peak fuel cladding temperature for the expected operational occurrence category of events would not be exceeded as a result of common power source or sensor failures. Although new transient category events have been postulated as a result of this study, the net effects have been positively determined to be less severe than those of the original, conservative, Chapter 15 events. It should be noted that this study uses the event - consequence logic of the Chapter 15 analysis, but starts the logic chain from a specific source (e.g., a single bus failure) rather than a system condition (e.g., feedwater runout). By approaching the study in this manner, a great deal of confidence can be placed in the study conclusions.

The approach validated itself by uncovering previously unanalyzed interactions. The soundness of the total plant design is demonstrated by its being tolerant of these interactions.

7-0141 1

f 3.0 ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY The electrical control systems failure analysis was conducted in the following manner by GE and the SWEC:

ACTIVITY ASSIGNED TO

  • DEFINS BUS STRUCTURE SWEC
  • DEFINE CONTROL SYSTEMS SWEC & GE
  • DETERMINE CRITICAL LOADS SWEC & GE
  • SUMMARIZE CRITICAL LOADS GE
  • ANALYZE COMBINED EFFECTS GE
  • COMPARE RESULTS TO CHAPTER 15 GE
  • ANALYZE EXCEPTIONS GE
  • MODIFY / AUGMENT CHAPTER 15 IF NECESSARY GE 3.1 DEFINE BUS STRUCTURE This step established the potential sources for system interaction by electrical means. Bus trees (see Figures 1 and 2) were constructed using one-line diagram information to show power distribution from the highest level not previously analyzed (the highest level previously analyzed is the loss of offsite power) down to the lowest level of plant distribution (Motor Control Center's, instrument busses, etc.).

3.2 DEFINE CONTROL SYSTEMS This step established the scope of control systems to be analyzed. A complete list of Shoreham plant systems and subsystems was compiled. This i

list was then reviewed to confine the analysis to only those systems with the potential to affect reactor pressure, water level, or power.

To ensure that all necessary systems were considered, certain elimination criteria were established that documented the justification for not analysing that system further. If there was any uncertainty as to whether or not a system met the criteria, it was retained for further analysis.

Those systems that met the criteria for elimination were removed from the complete system list to produce the final list of control systems for analysis. This final list, reviewed by GE and SWEC, is shown as follows:

7-0141 2

w 3.2 DEFINE CONTROL SYSTEMS (Continued)

MPL SYSTEMS MPL SYSTEMS B21 Nuclear Boiler System N42 Hydrogen Seal System B31 Reactor Recirculation N43 Generator Cooling C11 CRD Hydraulic Control System N44 Air Removal C32 Feedwater Turbine N45 Generator Hydrogen &

CSI Neutron Monitoring CO2 Purge D11 Process Radiation Monitor System N51 Main Generator Excitation D21 Area Radiation Monitor System N62 Off Gas G33 Reactor Water Cleanup N71 Circulating Water N11 Main Steam P41 Service Water N21 Condensate P42 RB Closed Cooling Water System N32 Turbine Control P43 TB Closed Cooling Water System N34 Lube Oil P50 Compressed Air N35 Moisture Extraction P71 Low Conductivity Drains Z93 Primary Containment Instrumentation 3.3 IDENTIFY LOADS This step provided the data base necessary to determine which electrical loads were to be analyzed. A set of load tables comprised of all elec-trical loads of the control systems in Paragraph 3.2 was assembled by GE and SWEC, each providing information on the loads within their respective scope of supply.

Each load was listed with its power bus source, its unique Master Parts List number, circuit description, and failure mode on power loss with primary and secondary effects. A sample of a load table is included in Appendis C.

3.4 DETERMINE CRITICAL LOADS This step constituted the first analytical step in sorting out the loads with the potential for initiating events affecting reactor pressure, water level and power. The elimination criteria established earlier for the system list was refined in Appendix B for use in the component review for I

determining which individual loads were worthy of further consideration er

! could be deleted from the analysis. If there was any uncertainty as to whether or not a load met the elimination criteria it was retained for further analysis. The code associated with an elimination criterion was I assigned to each eliminated load in the load tables discussed in the previous step.

3.5 SUMMARIZE CRITICAL LOADS The non-critical loads were deleted from the load tables, and the remaining loads are grouped together by their common power busses. These l tables are shown in Appendix A.

l 7-0141 3 l

3.6 ANALYZE COMBINED EFFECTS This step provided the basis for determining the worst case combinations of load and system failures that are credible events considering the interconnection by power distribution. Using the combined effects at the lowest level bus as a starting point, the next higher bus was postulated to fail and the total effects at that level analyzed. This process was continued up to the highest bus level. The combined effects at the lowest bus level are included in the Appendix A tables. Worst case effects at the higher levels are summarized in Section 4. The combined effects at intermediate bus levels less severe than their associated higher bus combined effects were analyzed but not included in Section 4. The inter-mediate level combined effect analysis is already represented in the higher bus analysis.

3.7 COMPARE RESULTS TO CHAPTER 15 This step evaluated the consequences of all potential system interaction events initiated by electrical means. A review of the information in the Appendix A tables was conducted in the course of developing the bus summaries of Section 4. At each bus level of the combined effects analysis, the review evaluated the effects as being bounded by a specific Chapter 15 transient analysis or not. Section 4 includes these evaluations considering the worst case effects.

3.8 ANALYZE EXCEPTIONS The purpose of this step was to determine if a failure scenario not directly covered by a Chapter 15 transient analysis would be bounded by one with more severe effects. The cases of this type are included in the Section 4 descriptions of worst case failures. .

3.9 MODIFY / AUGMENT CHAPTER 15 IF NECESSARY This step was not necessary in the Shoreham analysis.

l l

7-0141 4

4.0 BUS LOSS

SUMMARY

RESULTS AND CHAPTER 15 COMPARISONS AC Bus IA Loss of this bus causes the loss of power to condensate (4.16KV) booster pump A and reactor recirculation pump A. There is also a potential main turbine trip due to the c1rtulating water pump A loss and its subsequent effect on condenser vacuum.

Since a reduction of reactor recirculation flow would immediately start reducing reactor power, an immediate or delayed turbine trip would produce an equal or less severe transient than the turbine trip event of Chapter 15. Therefore this event is bounded.

IB The effects of the loss of this bus are similar to those of the (4.16KV) loss of Bus 1A.

11 Loss of this bus will cause condensate pump A and circulating (4.16KV) water pump C to be inoperative. The loss of the condensate pump will initiate reactor recirculation flow to run back and reduce reactor power corresponding to 67 percent of rated feed-water flow. In addition, a loss of feedwater heating of less than 10*F will occur, but this effect will be nullified by the recirculation runback. In the event that circulating water pump A or B is in the backwash operation, the loss of circulating water pump C may cause pump D to flow back and effectively reduce the circulating water flow to a one pump operation; and the con-denser back pressure may rise rapidly leading to a main turbine trip. The ensuing pressure excursion may even reach the bypass closure trip setpoint. However, this event will take place at reduced reactor power and it is bounded by the turbine trip without bypass transient already analyzed in FSAR Chapter 15.

Loss of the associated lower busses fed by Bus 11 will produce some or all of the following effects: Decrease in condenser vacuum, delayed main turbine trip, reduction in feedwater flow, and reduction in reactor recirculation flow.

The worst case reduction in feedwater temperature has been deter-mined to be no more than 10*F. This reduction in feedwater heating will increase reactor power by less than three percent nuclear boiler rated (NBR) power.

The worst case scenario is the unlikely event of a loss of feed-water heating and a delayed turbine trip. A computer analysis was performed to determine the reactor parameters as a conse-quence of a turbine trip at approximately 103 percent of initial power. The results yielded a minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) of 1.10 and a maximum dome pressure of 1197 psia which is less severe than the most limiting transient analyzed in FSAR Chapter 15.

This event is then, although previously not analyzed for the Shoreham plant, still bounded by existing analyses.

7-0141 5

4.0 BUS LOSS

SUMMARY

RESULTS AND CHAPTER 15 COMPARISONS (Continued)

AC Bus 12 The effects of the loss of this bus are similar to those of the (4.16KV) loss of Bus 11.

101/102 The loss of either of these busses will cause a single channel (4.16KV) trip from the APRM circuitry to the reactor protection system Emergency which produces no transient.

103 Loss of this bus will cause a decrease in reactor recirculation (4.16KV) flow and a lock of the feedwater pumps at-last-speed setting. An Emergency increase in level would ensue terminated by the level 8 feedwater pump and main turbine trip. This event is similar to and bounded by the feedwater runout event analyzed in Chapter 15.

DC Bus The worst case effect of the loss of either of these battery 1R42- buses is a main turbine trip with no additional complications BA N1 which is bounded by Chapter 15 load rejection analysis,

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l PAGE A1 APPENDIX A - BUS TABLES ,

SHOREHAM CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT PR6 MARY SEO.,NDARY l COM61NED SYSTE M DESCRIPTION EFFECT EFFECT EFFECTS

/

AC BUS 1A RECtRC GENERATOR DRIVE MOTOR - LOSE GENERATOR DRIVE RUN BACK TO 65% POWER REDUCTION OF FEEDWATER S001A MOTOR - S001 A FLOW TO 67% OF RATED CIRC. WTR CIRCULATilNG WATER PUMP A DECRE ASE CONDENSER V ACUUN SLIGHT DECRE ASE IN CON- RECIRCULATION RUNBACK

--H (PUMP B BUS 188 DENSER VACUUM TO 65% RE ACTOR POWER (PUMP C BUS 113 (PUMP O BUS 12) SLIGHT DECREASE IN CONDEN-SER VACUUM CONDENSATE CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP A REDUCT80N OF FEEDWATER RUNBACK TO 65% REACTOR (PUMP B BUS 18) TO 67%OF R ATED POWER

\

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G APPENDIX A-BUS TABLES SHOREHAM CONTROL GYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT PRIMARY SECONDARY \ COMBINED SYSTEM DESCRIPTION EFFECT EFFECT EFFECTS e

AC BUS 18 RECIRC GENERATOR ORIVE MOTOR - LOSE GENERATOR DRIVE HUN BACK TO 65% POWER REDUCTION OF FEEDWATER S001B MOTOR - S0018 FLOW TO 67% OF RATED CIRC. WTR CIRCULATING WA1 ER PUMP 8 DECREASE CONDENSER VACUUM SLIGHT DECREASE IN CON-

~--y (PUMP A - BUS l Al DENSE R VACUUM RECBRCULATION RUN8ACK TO 66% REACTOR POWER (PUMP C BUS 11)

(PUMP D BUS 12) SLIGHT DECREASE IN CONDEN-SER VACUUM CONDENSATE CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP 8 REDUCTION OF I(EDWATER RUN8ACK TO 65% REACTOR (PUMP A. BUS l A) FLOW TO 67% OF RATED POWE R I

I

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h PAGE A3 APPENOlX A-BUSTABLES .

^[3 y , SHOREHAM CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT PRIMARY SECONDARY l COMetNED SYSTEM DESCRIPTION EFFECT EFFECT EFFECTS f

CONDENSATE CONDENSATE PUMP A (PUMP B BUS FEEDWATER REDUCED TO 87% REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (SEE SECTION 41

12) OF RATED WATER LEVEL LOWER AND A1 66% POWE R COMP. AIR AIR COMPRESSOR A (COMPRESSOR COMPRESSOR AINOPERATIVE NONE - SACKEP UP SY

~ ~~ *' ~ '

-( 8 & C BUS 12) COMPRESSORS 8 & C CIRC WTR CIRCULATION WATER PUMP C PUMP ANOPERATIVE DECRE ASE CONDENSEN (PUMP A SUS lA) VACUUM MAIN TURSINE (PUMP B - BUS Ist T RIP, (PUMP D BUS 12)

SE RVBCE WATER SERVICE WATER PUMP A PUMP INOPERATIVE NONE - BACKED UP SY m TURBINE BUILDING (PUMPS B & C - SUS 12) PUMPS B & C BOS il A A

, COMP. AIR WASTE NEUTRAL TANK INLET AIR IF OPEN, WILL LOSE INSTRU- NONE NONE IR24 MCCll Al - -- MOV81 MENT AIR ICOMPRESSORS 8 & C SUS 82 AND IR36 PNL NSI 9

IR24 MCCll A2 - -

OFFGAS DRYER THAIN A EOSSOF DRYER TRA;N A NONE - BACKED UP SY NONE (TR AIN 8 - MCCl2A2) DRYER TRAIN S CONDENSATE HE ATER TRAIN SYPASS MOV 30 MOV FAILS AS IS liONE d

WORST CASE - DECRE ASE IN CONDENSER VACUUM 7

1R24 MCCll A3 - - - ( GEN. COOLING STATOR COOLING WATER PUMP A IF PUMP S NOT AVAILASLE, NONE - S ACKED UP SY (PUMP 8 - BUS 12) MAIN TURSINE TRIP PUMPS AIR REMOVAL AIR EJECTOR ISOLATION MOV*S F All AS IS 4F IN BACKWASH. SLIGHT ,

MOV 46A DECRE ASE IN CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR ISOLATION VACUUM MOV 46A CIRC. WATE R CONDENSE R INLET MOV 32A IF IN SACKWASH. REDUCE FLOW DECRE ASE CONDENSER g CONDENSER DISCHAr4GE TO 2 OUADR ANTS VACUUM MOV 33A CONDENSER SACKWASH VALVE IF IN BACKWASH. REDUCE FLOW DECREASE CONDENSER MOV 34A TO 2 OUADRANTS VACUUM I

I

PAGE A4 APPENDIX A-BUSTABLES AC SHOREHAM CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS BUS 11 COMPONENT PRIMARY SECONDARY l COMBINED SYSTEM DESCRIPTION EFFECT EFFECT EFFECTS e

BUStlA l COMP. AIR COMPRESSOR START UP AUXlLIARY AUX Olt PUMP INOPE RATIVE hMABL E TO S1 ART AIR COM- DECREASE CONDENSER Olt PUMP A PRESSOR A VACUUM AND FEEDWATER 1R24 MCCll A4 - - (

OFFGAS HOT GAS SYPASS SOV-40A SOVT,DE ENERG12ED MONE BACKED UP BY LIQUID FREON SOV 31A TRAIN B ITHAd4 8 - BUS 82Al CONDENSATE RE ACTOR FEEDWATER PUMP A SOV DE-ENERG42ED SLIGHT INCRE ASE IN DECRE ASE CONDENSER DISCHARGE SOV-42A REACTOR FEEDWATER VACUUM AND FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE SPEED TEMPERATURE MOISTURE EXTRACTION GLAND STE AM EVAPORATOR SOV-10L VALVE CLOSES BYPASS HEATER STEAM TO DRAIN SOV 10L CONDENSER STEAM SEAL EVAPORATOR SOV-10H VALVE OPENS ,

DRAIN SOV-10H DECREASE IN FEEDWATER RADWASTE STEAM GENERATOR SOV-11L VALVE CLOSES TEMPERATURE AND DRAIN SOV 11L CONDENSER VACUUM RADWASTE STEAM GENERATOR SOV 11H VALVE OPENS DRAIN SOV-11H IST POINT HEATER SOV41AH SOV-01 AH VALVE OPENS DECREASE F ELOWATER

. IST POINT HEATER SOV01AN SOV 01 AN VALVE Cl.OSES TEMPERATURE AND CON-1R35 PNL N7 - - -< 2ND POINT HEATER SOV42AH SOV 02 AH VALVE OPENS DENSER VACUUM 2ND PO!NT HEATER SOV02AN SOV42 AH VALVE CLOSES 3RD POINT HE ATE R SOV43AH SOVO3 AH VALVE OPENS 3RD POINT HEATER SOV 03 AN SOV43 AN VALVE CLOSES 4 TH POINT HE ATE R SOV 04 AH SOV-04 AH VALVE OPENS 4TH POINT HEATE R SOV04 AN SOV 04 AN VALVE CLOSES STH POINT HEATER SOV 05 AH SOVOS AH VALVE OPENS COMP. AIR AIR COMPRESSOR CONTROL LOSSOF INSTRUMENT AIR MONE - BACKED UP 8Y AlH CIPCUIT A (CIRCulTS B & C- COMPRESSOR A ;OMPRESSORS B & C 1R35 PNL N8)

/

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l l

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PAGE A5 APPENDIX A - BUS TABLES AC SHOREHAM CONTROL SYSTEM J-A' LURE ANALYSIS EUS 118 COMPONENT PRIMARY EE CONDARY l COM8tNED SYS TEM DESCRIPTION EFFECT EFFECT EFFECTS CIRC WATER CIRCULATION WATER CONDEN- IF IN BACKWASH, REDUCE FLOW DECREASE CONDENSER WORST CASE - DECREASE l INLET MOV 32C TO 2 OUADR ANTS VACUUM CIRCULATION WATER CONDEN- CGNDENSE R VACUUM.

! IF IN BACKWASH, REDUCE FLOW DECRE ASE CONDENSER DISCHARGE MOV 33D TO 2 00ADR ANTS VACUUM L~d CONDENSER 8ACKWASH VALVE MOVMC IF IN BACKWASH, REDUCE FLOW DECREASE CONDENSER RFPT A TRIP. FEEDWATER FLOW REDUCTION TO 67% OF TO 2 QUADRANTS VACUUM RATED. MINIMUM SPEED ON RECIRC A & B PUMPS - 60%

REACTOR POWER MAIN TURBINE CONTROL MAIN TURBINE EHC FLUID PUMP A PUMP A INOPERATIVE NONE - 8 ACK ED UP BY (PUMP 8 - MCC1281) PUMP 8 FEEDWATER CONTROL SIGNAL FAIL INITIATING LOSS OF REACTOR FEEDWATER SCRAM IF REACTOR FEED-CONTACT PUMP'S CONTROL SIGNAL WILL MINIMUM SPEED ON RECIRC WATER PUMP'S CONTROL A & 8 PUMPS - 50% POWE R NOT SET AT LAST SPEED- SIGNAL LOST 1R35 PNL N1 - - - RECIRC RECIRCULATION DIVISION 1 SPEED RECIRCULATION PUMPS A & 8 CONTROL REACTOR AT 60% POWER MINIMUM SPEED IF IN A'JTO MODE 1R35 PNL-N3 q CONDENSATE MINIMUM FLOW Br? ASS SOV-28A SOV DE-ENERGlZED g- FCV FAILS OPEN RFP TURBINE A TRIP. FEED- RFP TUR8tNE A TRIP. FEED-

. WATER FLOW REDUCTION WATER FLOW REDUCTION TO 67%OF RATED. <tECIRC TO 67%OF RATED. RECIRC SUNBACK TO 65% POWER RUN8ACK TO 66% POWER r

LOSS OF TURBINE BUILDING 7 SERVICE WATER STRAINER BACKWASH CAPABILITY 1R24 MCC1184 - - - ( CIRC. WATE R CIRCULATION WATER PUMP A MOV'S FAIL AS IS DISC'# iARGE MOV 3 t A FAILED CLOSED ~ UNABLE IF CIRC WATER DISCHARGE CIRCULATION WATER PUMP C . TO START PUMP (S) VALVES FAllOPEN AND MOV'S FAIL AS IS F AILED OPEN - NO EFFECT PUMPS STOP, UNABLE TO D4SCHARGE MOV-31C ON PUMP (S) PREVENT BACK FLOW, DE-CREASE CONDENSER VACUUM - MAIN TURBINE s TRIP IR24 MCC1186 - - - - SERVICE WATER TURBINE BUILDING SERVICE MOV FAILS AS IS - NORMALLY WATE R INLET WORST CASE - MAIN WORST CASE - MAIN TUR-MOV 113A CLOSED. LOSS OF STRAINER TURBINE AND RFP TUR81NE 8'NE AND RFP TURBINE TRIP 8ACKWASH CAPA81LITY TRIP AFTER MANY HOURS AFTER MANY HOURS l

i PAGE A6 APPENDIX A-BUSTABLES AC SHOREHAM CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS BUS 12 COMPONENT PRIMARY SECONDARY l COM81NED SYSTEM DESCRIPTION EFFECT EFFECT EFFECTS

/

CONDENSATE CONDENSATE PUMP S (PUMP A- FEEDWATER REDUCED TO 67% REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (SEE SECTION di BUS 11) OF RATED WATER LEVEL LOWER AND AT 65% POWE R COMP. AIR INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSOR 8 AIR COMPRESSORS 8 & C NONE - BACKED UP 8Y INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSOR C INOPERATIVE COMPRESSOR A

_____ (COMPRESSOR A ON BUS III CIRC. WATE R CIRCULATION WATER PUMP D PUMP INOPER ATIVE DECREASE CONDENSER VACUOM. MAIN TUR8tNE TRIP i SERVICE WATE R SERVICE WATER PUMP G PUMPS INOPERATIVE REDUCED TUR8tNE COOL.

TURBINE BUILDING SERVICE WATE R PUMP C ING WATER. MAIN TUR81NE 7 TRIP AFTER SOME TIME

, BUS 12A N h

1R24 MCC12A2 - - - -- OFFGAS DRYER TRAIN 8 (TRAIN A- LOSS OF DRYER TRAIN 8 NONE - BACKED UP BY NONE MCC11 A2) TRAIN A 1R24 MCC12A3 q GEN. COOLING STATOR COOLING WATER PUMP S PUMP INOPER ATIVE NONE - BACKED UP 8Y WORST CASE - DECRE ASE (PUMP A - SUS 11) IF PUMP A NOT AVAILABLE PUMP A CONDENSER VACUUM .

l MAIN TURBINE TRIP b -( CIRC. WATE R CIRCULATION WATER CONDENSATE 1F IN 8ACKWASH. REDUCE FLOW DECRE ASE IN CONDENSE R INLET MOV-328 TO 2 OUADRANTS VACUUM

  • CIRCULATION WATE R CONDENSAT E IF IN 8ACKWASH. REDUCE FLOW DECRE ASE IN CONDENSER

=

DISCHARGE MOV 338 TO 2 OUADR ANTS VACUUM CONDENSER 8ACKWASH VALVE IF IN 8ACKWASH. REDUCE FLOW DECRE ASE IN CONDENSE R MOV-348 TO 2 OUADRANTS VACUUM ,

IR24 MCC12A4 - COMP. AIR COMPRESSOR AUXILIARY OIL PUMPS INOPERATIVE COMPRESSORS S & C WILL WORST CASE - DECRENiE PUMPS NOT START IF DEMAND ON CONDENSER VACUUM I COMPRESSOR AUXILIARY OIL AIR SYSTEM REQUIRES PUMP C L_< AIR REMOVAL AIR EJECTOR ISOLATION MOV 458 MOV S Fall AS IS IF IN BACKWASH, SLIGHT AIR EJECTOR ISOLATION MOV-468 DECREASE IN CONDENSER OFFGAS HOT GAS SYPASS SOV-498 SOV*S DE-ENERG12E NONE - BACKED UP BY g LIOUID F REON SOV-318 TRAIN A (TRAIN A-SUS tlAl 4

PAGE A-7 APPENDIX A - BUS TABLES AC SHOREHAM CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS sus i2 --

COMPONENT PRIMARY SECONDARY l COM8tNED SYSTEM DESCRsPTION EFFECT EFFECT EFFECTS BUS'128 MAIN TURBINE CONTROL MAIN TURBINE EHC FLUID PUMP B PUMP INOPER ATIVE NONE - BACKED UP 8Y WORST CASE - DECRE ASE IPUMP A - MCC1181) PUMP A IN CONDENSER VACUUM RFP TUR8INE TRIP. FEEa 1R24 MCC1281 - - - - ( CIRC. W ATE R CONDENSER BACKWASH VALVE IF IN BACKWASH. REDUCE FLOW DECREASE CONDENSER WATER FLOW REDUCTION MOV-34D TO 2 OUADRANTS VACUUM TO 67% OF R ATED. MINIMUM SPEED ON REC 4RC A & B CIRCULATION WATER CONDEN- IF IN 8ACKWASH, REDUCF FLOW DECRE ASE CONDENSER SATEINLET PUMPS - 50% RE ACTOR MOV 32D TO 2 OUADR ANTS VACUUM POWER CIRCULATION WATER CONDEN- IF IN BACKWASH, REDUCE F LOW DECREASE CONDENSER SATE DISCHARGE MOV-33C TO 2 OUADRANTS VACUUM 1.135 PNL N2 - RECIRC RECIRCULATION DIVISION il RECIRCULATION A & 8

  • - - RUN 8ACK TO 50% POWER RECIRCULATION PUMPS SPEED CONT ROL MINIMUM SPEED IF IN AUTO A & 8 AT MINIMUM SPEED-MODE 50% REACTOR POWER I

1R35 PNL N4 - CONDENSATE MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS SOV 288 SOV DE ENERG1 ZED RFP TURBINE TRIP, FEED-L_ RFP TURBINE TRIP. FEED-FCV F AILS OPEN WATER FLOW REDUCTION WATER F LOW REDUCTION TO 67% OF RATED. RECIRC TO 67%OF RATED RECSRC RUNBACK TO 65% RE ACTOII RUNBACK TO 65% REACTOR POWER POWER

/

LOSS OF TURBtNE BUILDING SERVICE WATER STRAINER BACKWASH CAPABILITY 1824 MCC1284 - - - -( CIRC. WAT E R CIRCULATION WATER PUMP MOV*S F All AS IS F AILED CLOSED - UNABLE IF CIRC WATER DISCHARGE DISCHARGE MOV-318 TO START PUMP (S). FAILEI' VALVES F AllOPEN AND CIRCULA TION WATER PUMP MOV1s FAIL AS IS OPEN - NO EF FECT ON D1SCHARGE PUMPS STOP. UNABLE TO

  • MOV 31D PUMP (S) PBEVENT BACK FLOW, DE-CRE ASE CONDENSER VACOUM - MAIN TUR81NE I
  • TRIP 1R35 PNL N10 - , CIRC. WATE R STR AINE R - S SI A STR AINE R MOTOR INOPERATIVE UNABLE TO BACKWASH-L- -

STR AINE R - S 81B MAIN TURBINE TRIP MAIN TUR81NE TRlP I AFTER SEVERAL HOURS IR35 PNL N18 - CIRC. WATER CIRCULATION WATER PUMPS

- CIRCULATION WATER PUMPS NONE NONE CONTROL CIRCulT INTER LOCK A, B, C & D CANNOT RE-START IF ANY SHOULD STOP

PAGE AB APPENOlX A - BUS TABLES AC SHOREHAM CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS BUS 12 COMPONENT PRIM ARY SECONDARY l COMBINED SYSTEM DESCRIPTION EFFECT EFFECT EFFECTS IR24 MCCl2B4

~

, I IR24 MCCl286 - - - - SERVICE WATE R TUPBINE SERVICE WATER MOV FAILS AS IS - NORMALLY WORST CASE - MAIN TUR- WORST CASE - M AIN TUR-STR AINER INLET MOV Il36 CLOSED. LOSSOF STRAINER BINE AND RFP TURBINE BINE AND f.FP TURBINE BACKWASH CAPABILITY TRIP AFTER MANY HOURS TRIP AFTER M ANY HOURS

/

i l

1 PAGE A9 APPENDIX A-BUSTABLES AC SHOREHAM CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS BUS 12 COMPONENT PRIMARY SECONDARY l COM81NED SYSTEM DESCRIPTION EFFECT EFFECT EFFECTS BUS'12C '

i 1R24 MCCl2C3 1R35 P'NL N8 - - - < COMP. AIR AIR COMPRESSOR CONTROL LOSE INSTRUMENT COMPRES. NONE - BACKED UP BY DECRE ASE CONDENSE R CIRCulT PUMP B SORS B & C COMPRESSOR A VACUUM AND FEEDWATER AIR COMPRESSOR CONTROL TEMPE RATURE circuli PUMP C (CIRCUlf A - 1R35 PNL-N7)

STEAM SYSTEM STEAM SUPPLY RE ACTOR FEED. VALVESINOPERABLE NONE - STE AM FLOW TO WATER PUMP TURBINE SOV 30A

  • RFPT'S AT NORMAL STE AM SUPPLY REACTOR FEED- OPERATION UNAFFECTED WATER PUMP TUR8tNE SOV 308 CONDENSATE OPErtATES FEEDWATER DISr SCV DE ENERGlZED SLIGHT INCREASE IN CHARGE VALVE NRV 428 SOV-428 REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMP TUR81NE SPE ED MOISTURE EXTRACTION IST STAGE DRAIN SOV-7AH DUMPS STEAM TO CONDENSER DECREASE CONDENSER TANK DRAINS TO SOV-7AL VACUUM CONDENSE R SOV-78H SOV 78L 2ND STAGE DRAIN TANK SOV 8AH DECREASE CONDENSER DRAINS TO CONDENSE R SOV8AL VACUUM SOV 88H EOV 88L MOISTURE SEPARATOR SLVGAH

& REHEATERS DRAIN SOV 9AL TANK DRAINS TO SOV 98H CONDE NSER SOV 98L IST POINT HEATER

  • DRAIN SOV1BH 8YPASS HEATER STEAM TO DECREASE FEEDWATER IST POINT HEATER CONDENSER TEMPERATURE AND DRAIN SOV 18N CONDENSER VACUUM 2ND POINT HEATER DRAIN SOV-2BH 2ND POINT HEATER DRAIN SOV-2BN 3RD POINT HEATER DRAIN SOV-3BH 3RD POINT HEATE R N DRAIN 50V 38N

PAGE A-10 APPENDIX A - BUS TABLES

$3 ,, SHOREHAM CONTROL SYSTEM FAILUME ANALYSIS COMPONENT PRIMARY SECONDARY l COM81NED SYSTEM DESCRIPTION EFFECT EFFECT EFFECTS BUS 12C 1

1R24 MCC12C3 1R35'PNL N8 - - - - MOISTURE EXTRACTION 4TH POINT HEATER BYFASS HEATER STEAM TO DECRE ASE FEEDWATER DRAIN SOV-4BH CONDENSE R TEMPEHATURE AND 4TH POINT HEATER CONDENSER VACUUM DRAIN SOV 48N 6TH POINT HEATER DRAIN SOV68H i

PAGE A-11 APPENDIX A - BUS TABLES AC SHOREHAM CONTROt. SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS BUS 101 COMPONENT PRIMARY SECONDARY l COM81NED SYSTEM DESCRIPTION EFFECT EFFECT EFFECTS BUSIll NEUT RON MONITORING AVERAGE POWER RANGE HALF SCRAM TRIP BF ALTERNATE CHANNELS  % AVf RAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR CHANNELS A C E ALSO TRIP, RE ACTOR MONITOR SCRAM - DIV. I

_ IR24 MCC1115 - < SCRAM (8ACK UP TO MGS 8) ROO BLOCK MONITOR CHANNEL A AC BUS 102  :

BUS 112 NEUTRON MONITORING AVERAGE POWER RANGE HALF SCRAM TRIP IF ALTERNATE CHANNELS  % AVERAGE POWER RAPNE HONITOR CHANNELS 8.D F ALSO TRIP, RE ACTOR MONITOR SCRAM - DIV, il 1R24 MCC1125 - < SCRAM

~(BACK UP TO MGS Al ROD BLOCK MONITOR CHANNEL 8 AC BUS 103 BUS 113 FEEDWATER REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMPS F E EDWATER PUMPS REMAIN LOAD FOLLOWING MIS- RECIRCULATION PUMPS

~ 1R24 MCC1133 CONTROL SIGN AL CIRCUlTRY AT LAST SPEED UNLESS MATCH WILL CAUSE MAIN A & 8 AT MINIMUM SPEFD-1R36 PNL-N1 IS LOST - THEN TURBINE TRIP 50% POWE R REACTOR F EEDWATER PUMP'S RUN DOWN -

1R36 INV 01 125 VDC F ROM INVERTER REACTOR REC 4RC RECIRCULATION CONTROL IF IN AUTO MODE, PUMPS (SEE REACTOR FEEDWATEI SIGNAL CIRCUITRY WILL RUN BAOK TO MIN 8'4UM CONTROL CIRCulT ABOVE)

SPEED (APPROXIMATELY 604 POWER) 1R36 PNL 01 - -(

(NO BATTERY 8ACK UP) s

PAGE A-12 APPENOlX A - BUS TABLES .

SHOREHAM CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT PRIMARY SECONDARY l COM8INED p SYSTE M DESCRIPTION EFFECT EFFECT EFFECTS DC BUS IR42 BA NI .

125 VDC I

I 1R42 PNL-A4 - - - RFPT CONTROL REACTOM FEEDWATER PUMP CONTINUESIF AT SPEED NONE,IF AT SPEED MAIN TURBINE TRIP TUR8INE A PANEL 2 EHC (RE ACTOR FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE 8 - PANEL 1R42 PNL-84) 1R42 PNI. C2 - - - - MAIN TUR8INE CONTROL MAIN TUR8INE PANEL 1 EHC MAIN TURBINE TRIP MAIN TUR8lNE THiP DCBUS 1R42 8A N2 125 VDC 1

1R42 PNt 64 - - - < FEEDWATER HIGH LEVEL 8 TRIPCIRCUIT 2 OF 3 HIGH LEVEL TRIP NONE INTACT, BUT 8 TRIPPED RFPT CONTROL RE ACTOR FEEDWATER PUMP CONTINUES IF NOT AT SPEED NONE,IF AT SPEED TURB8NE B PANEL 3 EHC s (REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMP TUR8INE A -PANEL 1R42 PNL A4) i l

l

APPENDIX B ELIMINATION CRITERIA Elimination Criterion

  • Basis N1 Components whose failure effects are clearly bounded by a domi-nant failure effect on the same bus can be eliminated by inspection.

An example would be the loss of several trips such as feedwater turbine overspeed trip on the same bus as the solenoid that controls all remote trips. The solenoid loss is clearly the dominant effect.

Also in the case of identical components, only one of the com-ponents on that bus need be listed.

N2 Instrumentation with no direct or indirect controlling function or passive input (such as a permissive) into control logic. Instrumenta-tion and other dedicated inputs to the process computer, as well as the computer itself, may be excluded. Operator actions as a result of indications are not considered control functions for the control systems failure analysis.

N3 Control systems and controlled components (pumps, valves) which have no direct or indirect interaction with reactor operation / para-meters. Examples are communications, most unit heaters and con-trols, lighting controls, ventilation control systems for exterior buildings, machine shop equipment, refueling or maintenance equipment controls, etc.

N4 Control systems and controlled components (pumps, valves) that do interact or interface with reactor operating systems but which can-not affect the reactor parameters (water level, pressure or reactiv-ity) either directly or indirectly. Examples are: some offgas compo-nents, area radiation monitors.

N5 Systems which are not used during normal power operation. For example, eliminate start-up, shutdown or refueling systems not used during normal operation.

N6 Some lube oil pumps are powered from AC busses but have a back up pump powered from a DC source. Since a single e!*ctrical failure cannot disable the tube oil function these components can be eliminated from the analysis.

Y Requires further analysis.

  • In some cases more than one of these criteria may apply.

B-1

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