ML20062M400

Comment Supporting NUMARC Position on Proposed Rule 10CFR73 Re Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at NPPs

ML20062M400
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	12/30/1993
From:	Antony D NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
To:	Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
References
FRN-58FR58804, FRN-59FR38889, RULE-PR-73 58FR58804-00015, 58FR58804-15, AE81-2, AE81-2-102, NUDOCS 9401070051
Download: ML20062M400 (4)

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'% J/d -3 P~'23 . Telepnone (612) 330 5500 December 30,1993 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTENTION: DOCKETING AND SERVICE BRANCH RE: Proposed Rule - Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants 58FR58804 to 58807 (November 4,1993) Reauest for Comments Northern States Power Company appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the proposed rule for Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants. We fully understand and accept our obligation to protect the health and safety of the general public and the following comments are supportive of that obligation. .

Northern States Power Company generally endorses the comments submitted by NUMARC in response to the proposed rule. Specifically the items below from.the NUMARC comments are of concern to Northern States Power Company.~ -

1) The Three Mile Island and World Trade Center events should not' be link' ed

- together. The FBI has not connected these two separate events and testified to this "non-linkage" during a March 19,.1993 U.S. Senate Hearing.- Further, neither the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) or Department of Defense (DOD) .

have linked these two incidents.

2) The size of explosive proposed by.the NRC is significantly larger than any .

explosive ever detonated in the United States. The Design Basis Explosive

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should be comparable to the largest explosive previously used in the' United. i States.

3) There have been no previous instances of vehicle bombs being driven in the United States. A~ suicidal vehicle bombing or any kind'of moving vehicle bomb has never occurred in the United States.~ Instead, the norm for vehicle bombings:

worldwide, is to park the explosive laden vehicle and remotely detonate. the. ,

explosives. <

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S. Chilk December 30,1993 Page 2

4) The Backfit Analysis performed by the NRC does not objectively provide >

sufficient justification to support the determination that the requirements of the proposed rule provide a significant increase in the protection of the public health and safety. In fact, in the analysis of the TMI event, the NRC concluded in NUREG-1485, conclusion 6.1, that: "The event resulted in no actual adverse reactor safety consequences and was of minimal safety significance".' Existing security measures and the " defense in depth" approach of nuclear plant safety systems are sufficient, as concluded in NUREG-1485 and .as: previously ' ,

determined during the Gulf War, to ensure the public health and safety.-

5) The NUMARC comments recommend that the DBT be augmented with' a specified kinetic energy that would allow for the use of active barriers with documented performance satisfying the specified energy requirements. With a specified energy in place, the need to perform costly independent testing to  ;

demonstrate performance would be eliminated.

6) We need additional time to perform an analysis. The current 90 days proposed by the NRC is not sufficient for those licensees. proposing alternative methods of -  ;

protection to perform the required supporting analysis. . NUMARC has proposed  :

180 days for the study of alternative methods, Northern States Power Company  ;

fully supports the 180 day time frame.

7) The requirement for licensees to objectively demonstrate- the satisfactory performance of alternative measures is unfair. The NRC is asking licensees to objectively demonstrate satisfactory compliance with subjectively determined criteria it is not reasonable for the NRC to require licensees to perform analysis  ;

beyond what the NRC has done in support of the proposed rule.

a In addition to the above discussion of the NUMARC industry comments, Northem ,

States Power Company would like to provide the following comments on the proposed  ;;

rule which appears in the November 4,1993 Federal Register (58FR 58804 to 58807).

1 High explosives, technologically sophisticated and capable of causing significant  ;

1) damage to nuclear power plants, are not readily available in the United States. ,

2) According to FBI testimony, terrorists will hit only " soft targets".- The' FBI ]

considers nuclear power plants to be " hardened _ targets" The FBI has not -j determined any linkage between the World Trade Center and Three Mile _lsland j events. The proposed rule should take into consideration the fact that a nuclear  !

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S. Chilk December 30,1993 Page 3 plant is a hardened target, (e.g. armed guards available- for response).

According to the FBI, DOE, and DOD, the threat proposed by the NRC does not appear realistic. Any revision to the Design Basis Threat should be based on a realistic threat.

3) DOE and DOD have not modified their design basis threat based on these two events. DOE addresses the LVI from a significantly less prescriptive approach.

It is recommended that the NRC further coordinate a more realistic approach.

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4) If the LVI is to be included in the DBT, further evaluation of the entire DBT is -

needed. The NRC has not made a reduction commitment of the insider threat -

due to the implementation of the FFD and Access Authorization Rules by.all' Nuclear licensees. This reduction should be part of the revised DBT.

5) More time is needed for implementation than is currently provided for in the .-

proposed rule. Those licensees that will be required to provide analysis to justify - R alternative measures will also need a larger window in which to prepare for and construct Vehicle Barrier Systems. Plant safety (e.g. assuring ingress and egress of emergency vehicles) is a primary concern.

6) Any Land Vehicle Threat added to the Design Basis Threat should be based on terroristic history in the continental United States. Currently,- terroristic history does not support the threat presently being proposed. The FBI has publicly stated that, " state sponsored" terrorism is steadily declining worldwide and is non-existent in the United States.

7) The NRC should implement a program of " Threat'or Alert" similar to DOD's-  ;

"DEFCON" (Defense Condition) program. Under this program, when information is received from the intelligence community, c' an impending security alert, the NRC would immediately notify the industry and provide a recommended level of =

action. The industry, in turn, would be required to develop security response plans based on these threat levels. These licensee plans'would in turn require-close coordination with local and state law enforcement authorities.

8) If the NRC considers a foreign country-sponsored paramilitary attack on a nuclear power plant credible, such as terroristic acts, the federal government.  !

should be prepared to protect nuclear power plants in accordance with 10 CFR j 50.13.  ;

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.S. Chilk December 30,1993 ,

Page 4

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Please contact us if you have any questions concerning our comments related to the proposed Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants

rule.  ;

Sincerely, D.D. Antony '

Vice President Nuclear Generation c: NUMARC 1

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