ML20058N812
| ML20058N812 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1993 |
| From: | SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058N810 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9310200346 | |
| Download: ML20058N812 (150) | |
Text
-
I i
l 1
.( ) ATTACHMENT 1 l PROPOSED CHANGED PAGES Unit 1 Revision Page 3/4 3-4 Replace Page 3/4 3-5 Replace Page 3/4 3-6 Replace Page 3/4 3-7 Replace Page 3/4 3-8 Replace Page 3/4 3-9 Replace Page 3/4 3-12 Replace Page 3/4 3-13 Replace Page 3/4 3-16 Replace Page 3/4 3-17 Replace Page 3/4 3-19 Replace Page 3/4 3-20 Replace Page 3/4 3-21 Replace Page 3/4 3-22 Replace Page 3/4 3-23 Replace Page 3/4 3-24 Replace Page 3/4 3-33 Replace
(T
~/ Page 3/4 3-34 Replace Page 3/4 3-35 Replace Page 3/4 3-36 Replace Page 3/4 3-37 Replace Page B3/4 3-1 Replace
()
9310200346 931014 E PDR ADOCK 05000348 y ,
p PDR h ~
~
i O PROPOSED CHANGED PAGES !
? ;
Page 2 Unit 2 Revision Page 3/4 3-4 Replace Page 3/4 3-5 Replace Page 3/4 3-6 Replace Page 3/4 3-7 Replace Page 3/4 3-8 Replace Page 3/4 3-9 Replace Page 3/4 3-12 Replace Page 3/4 3-13 Replace Page 3/4 3-16 Replace !
Page 3/4 3-17 Replace ,
Page 3/4 3-19 Replace Page 3/4 3-20 Replace Page 3/4 3-21 Replace Page 3/4 3-22 Replace Page 3/4 3-23 Replace '
Page 3/4 3-24 Replace Page 3/4 3-33 Replace '
Page 3/4 3-34 Replace
.O eese 3/4 3-as Page 3/4 3-36 aePiece Replace Page 3/4 3-37 Replace Page B3/4 3-1 Replace 1
e i
O I
-]
G O LO1 TA8LE 3.3-1 (Continued)
- 5 g REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRtMENTATION Cl MINIMLM
= TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FtMCTIONAL IMIT 0F CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERA 8tE MODES _ ACTION
- 17. Turbine Trip A. . Low Auto Stop Oil Pressure 3 1
- 8. Turbine Throttle Valve Closure .
4 4 f(i 3 1
G/
-o e
- 18. Safety Injection Input from ESF 2 2 1 1, 2
[l6
- 19. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker
) Position Trip A. Abova P-8 1/ breaker 1 1/ breaker
- 8. Above P 1 10, 1/ breaker 2 1/ breaker 1 11 R* Per oper- .
ating loop Y -
- 20.- Reactor Trip System Interlocks A. Intermediate Range -
Neutron' Flux, P-6 2 1 2 2, and* 8
- 8. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7, P-10 Input 4 2 3 1 8 P-13 Input- 2 1 2 1 8 R
g C.- Power Range Neutron-g Flux, P-8 4 2 3 1 8 D. Power Range Neutron 3 Flux, P-10 (Input to P-7) :4 2 3 1, 2 8 g E. Turbine Impulse Chamber *
~ Pressure. P-13 2 1 2 1 8
- F. Power Range Neutron 4 2 3 1 8-Flux, P-9 2'
._.__..__.__._._'__.,___._..___.___._..____.._... . m.
O
~
o O L
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)
REACIOR 1 RIP SYS1EM INSTNUMENIATION MINIMUM CllANNELS APPLICA8LE TOTAL NO. CilANNELS ACT10N OPERABLE MODES OF CHANNELS TO THIP FUNCI10NAL UNIT 2 1, 2 1, 14 2 - 1 21', ' Reactor Trip Breakers 3*,4*,5* 13 Automatic Irlp Logic 2 1 2 1, 2 3*,4*,5*
/13 22.
o- ,
6 e C
2 2
I .
s
.n
t TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)
TABLE' NOTATION
-With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position, tfit control rod drive system capaole of rod withdrawal, and fuel in the reactor vessel.
The channel (s) associated with the protective functions derived from the out of service Reactor Coolant Loop shall be placed in the tripped condition.
9 The provisions of Specification 3.0.4, are not applicable.
46 High voltage to detector may be de-energized above P-6. ;
let Indication only.
The provisions of Specif1 cation 3.0.3 are not app 11 cable if THERMAL POWER level ,> 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
,, i ACTION STATEMENTS l l
ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in JOT STAlOBY within 6 OJ hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1. 3 O ,
ACTION 2 - With the numoer of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number ;
of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the {
f allowing ccnditions 'are satisfied: )
i
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within j 4 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requiritment is r4 -!
1 met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to7 hours for surveillance testing of the other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.
- c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75%
of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux trip setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO from the remaining 3 detectors is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per Specification 4.2.4.2.
I I
O -
FARLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-6 AMEMOMENT NO. 61
l TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)
I O
V ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL .
POWER level: l
- a. Below the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint,
. restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setpoint. l
- b. Above the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint, l but below 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- c. Above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, POWER OPERATION may continue.
ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:
- a. Below the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setpoint.
- b. Above the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint, operation may continue. .
ACTION 5 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimus Channels OPERABLE requirement, verify compliance with
~
the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.i.1.2, as applicable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least once per
.. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter.
inse#E A-ACTION 6 E With-i.Le iiumper-of-OPERXBIE4danels-one-less-thart-the Total- Numbe r-of-Channel s ,-STARTUP - and/or- POWER -OP ERATION may-p roc e ed - prov i ded-the-foll owi ng - c ond i ti on s- a re- .
satistled:.
-a. The-inoperable channel is placed-in-the-tripped-
-condition-within -l- houre-b:-The Minimum-Channels-OPERABLE-requirement-is-met;-
om howeverr -one-additional-channel-may be bypassed-for-7 -up-to-2-hours-for- surveillance testing per-t n$cd D ) -Specification 4.3.-l.1.- --
1,/
IACTION7-WiththenumberofOPERABLEchannelsonelessthantheTotal)
- '7 Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed I until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped )
condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. _ , f FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 3-7 AMENDMENT NO. 26 l
i INSERT A s
ACTION 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may continue provided the inopctable channels are placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
i INSERT B l ACTION 7 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and
- b. The Minimum Channel 0PERABLE requirement is met; i however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.
O 6
9
~ . . . . - . -.
-t TA8LE 3.3-1 (Continued) ~
'O ACT= 8 - With the interi c= inoPerais to = -tent at a reactor trip which should not be blocked.in the current MODE is blocked,
{ !
. declare the trip function inoperable and follow the ACTION statements of Table 3.3-1 for the affected channel (s). -
Interlock Affected Channels on Table 3.3-1
- 1. P-6 a. Source Range, Neutron Flux l Startup Shutdown , l
- 2. P-7 a. Low Reactor Coolant Loop Flow (2 loops).
- b. Undervoltage - Reactor Coolant Pumps
- c. Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pumps
- d. Pressurizer Low Pressure
- e. Pressurizar High Level
- 3. P-8 a. Low Reactor Coolant Loop Flow (1 loop)
- 4. P-9 a. Turbine Trip l
- 5. P-10 a. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux . I
- b. Power Range, Neutron Flux - Low Setpoint . :
, c. Source Range, Neutron Flux , {
Startup j' );
Shutdown 'i
- d. P-7 (Item 2 above)
- 6. P-13 a. P-7 (Item 2 above)- -
I 4 -
ACTION 9 - With a channel associated with an operating loop inoperably restore the inoperable channel to OPERA 8LE status within i hours -j or be in HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one channel associated with an operating loop may be bypassed for up to X hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.:
't h ACTION 10 - With one channel inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERA 8LE status within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> or reduce THERMAL POWER to below the P-8 (Low Reactor Coolant Pump Flow and Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position) setpoint within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Operation l i
below the P-8 (Low Reactor Coolant Pump Flow and Reactor CooTant j Pump Breaker Position) setpoint may continue pursuant to- -
i ACTION 11.
1
.I
]'
O FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 3-8 AMENDMENT NO. 25' I
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) fs ACTICW 11 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition wi thin J hours.
ACTION 12 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than requireo by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the ;
inoperable channel to OPERABLE ~ status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, or De ;
in rt0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. -
r ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the ,
inoperable channel to OPERABLE status,within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, or open the Reactor Trip System breakers within the next hour.
ACTION 14 - With one of the diverse trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip attacament) inoperable, the breaker may be considered OPERABLE provided that the diverse trip feature is restored -
to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, or declare the breaker ;
inoperaole and apply ACTION 1. The breaker shall not be >
bypassed wn11e one of the diverse trio features is '
inoperable except for the time required for perfoming .
aaintenance to restore the areaker to OPERABLE status. j g
ACTION 15 - With the number of OPEPABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to O OPERABLE status within ti hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for I ,
up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE. j MSER r-FARLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-9 AMENDFENI NO O
, O ac m 3-i -o. q g'- REACTOR 1 RIP-SYSTEH INS 1HUMENTATION SilRVEILLANCE REqulHEMENTS CilANNEL MODES IN WHICH-g CilANNEL FUNCT10NAL SURVEILLANCE CilANNI:L M CAllBHATION TEST REQUIRED
~ FUNCTIONAL UNIT CllECK__ ,
H.A. N.A. R(ll), 1, 2
- l. Manual Reactor Trip 3*,4*,-6*
S/U(!)(12) s
- 2. Power Range, Neutron Flux A. lin gh S D(2),M(3) )V 7 1, 2 and Q(6)
- 8. Low S D(2),M(3) S/U(10) 2 and Q(6) .
u 3. Power Ra'nge, Neutron Flux, liigh N.A. R(6) /Q 1, 2
- h. Positive Rate w
- 4. Power Range, Neutron Flux. N.A. R(6) gQ 1, 2 liigh Negative Hate Interwiediate Range, Neutron 5 R(6) S/u p b N 1, 2 and-S.
- Flux Source Range -Neutron Flux S(7) R(6) g and S/u k b O) 2, 3, 4. -
- 6. 5,'and *
- 7. Overtemperatureki S R ,Wh 1, 2 11.-overpowerbT S R -)t'Q- 1, 2
=g 9. Pressurizer Pressur ow S R " /G 1
,( Q 1, 2 b 10. Pressurizer Pressure--liigh S R M ,( Q - 1-F~i 11. Pressurizer Water Level--High S R jQ y
- 12. . A. ' Loss of Flow - Single Loop
.. <oss o, , low . Two <oo,s S-R N N...
1 4
__ - __ _ _ _. ___ ._ . r
@- O, iAlittCr-1(Centioued) c~r v
REACTOR TRIP SYSTEN INSTilUMENTATION SultVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS t
CllANNEL HODES IN WillCil k
-' CilANNEL CilAHNEL FUNCT10NAL SURVEILLANCE CAlllillATION TEST REQUIRED
- CilECK FUNCTlHNAL UNIT S 11 M' Q 1, 2
- 13. Steam Generator Water Level--
Low-Low I, 2
- 14. Steam /Feedwater Flow Hismatch S 11
/( L?
and Low Steam Generator Water Level
- 15. Undervoltage - Reactor Coolant N.A, R gk 1 Pumps
- 16. Underfrequency - Reactor N.A. R JV k 1 M Coolant Yum s o
- 17. Turbine Trip N.A.
i' C A. Low Auto Stop Oil Pressure N.A, R Ji: ( S/U(9)('(f0) S/U(9)p)-( lo) N.A. 11 . Turbine Throttle Valye N.A. g 3,AT Closure
- 18. Safety injection input from ESF N.A. N.A. 8/4) 1, 2 1
- 19. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker N.A. N.A. R Position Trip '
1 Reactor Trip System Interlocks N.A. R S/U(8) 20 N.A. N.A. H(5)(14)(15), 1, 2,
- 21. Reactor Trip Breaker 3*, 4*, 5*
S/U(1)(14)(15) 2E 9 N.A. N.A. H(5) 1, 2', E 22. Automatic Trip Logic 3*, 4*, 5*
"d '
- 23. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker N.A. N.A. (13),R(ll) I, 2, 5
3*, 4*, 5* 5
%3 m... . _ _ . . . .. _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _
p g. s. V V 1ABLE 3.3-3 h R ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSIEH INSTRUMENTATION '
.?
2 - M TOTAL NO. HINIMUH
- CilANNELS CilANNELS FUNCTIONAL. UNIT OF CilANNELS APPLICABLE 10 1 RIP OPERABLE H0 DES ACTION
- 1. SAFETY INJECTION, TURDINE 1 RIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION
- a. Manual Initiation 2 1 2 1, 2, 3, 4 18
- b. Automatic Actuation 2 1 2
. Logic 1, 2, 3, 4 13
- c. Containment 3
- 2 2 1,2,3 Pressure-liigh J4* )]4 u d. Pressuriz,r
';;; 3 2 Pressure - ow 2 1, 2, 3# J4* l9+
u
- 1. e. Differential Pressure Between 1, 2, 3 SteamLines@iligh Three Loops 3/ steam line Operating 2/ steam line 2/ steam line twice and 1/3 14' l g
steam lines b Two Loops 3/ operating ### M Operating 2 / steam 2/ operating
$ steam line line twice steam line 15 2 in either P- operating steam line o"
1
L O- O O O %) N
)
TA8tE 3.3-3 (Continued) h ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATIoll SYSTEM INSTA M NTATION F., f E NINilSSI ' y -
' .i . .'c TOTAL NO. CH40elELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE m- FINICTIONAL telli OF CHAleIELS TO TRIP
, _ , OPERABLE MODES ~ ACTIoff
- f. Steam Lies press. sw ##
1,2, 3 . Three Leaps 1 pressure /- Operating leep 1 pressure any 2 leaps 1 pressure asty 2 loops NI-Tuo Leops 1 pressure /* 1 " pressure 1 pressure Operating 15 leap in any oper- any operating ating loop loop
- 2. ColliAINNT SPRAY w a. flanual 2 1 2 1,2,3.4 '
2 . 18 w b. Automatic Actantien 2 Logic 1 2 1,2,3,4 13 w
- c. Centefament pressure-- 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 16 Nip-Nigh-Nigh l
5 N 06
- e 1 -
.,,,-.-~..+,2.. - - . . . . . . ~+~.m_. . - .-- .,.-.,-,- ,,+ .. < --
~ - - , ~e.-.- ,,-.-,+....-,..~m,ws.~~,.r-.---.*4
--r-- . . . . . . .. -.. - * .,.--.-.+r ,-,w.,m# - ,,
O E- O^ .,/ O
./ ,
TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) , ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION Q e
- z MINIMUM M TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERA 8LE MODES ACTION
- 4. STEAM LINE ISOLATION
- a. Manual 1/ steam lina 1/ steam line 1/ operating 1, 28*, 3** 22 steam Ifne
- b. Automatic 2 1 2 1, 2**, 3** 21 Actuation Logic p
- c. Containment Pressure--
High-High 3 2 [g 1, 28*, 3** J4 b
- d. Steam Flow in Two 1,.2**, 3**
, Steam Lines--High ,
N Three Loops 2/ steam line [ L Operating 1/ steam ifne any 2 steam 1/ steam 1.ine J[19
- e lines Two Loops 2/ operating 1 ###/any 1/ operating 15 Operating steam line operating steam line steam line w COINCIDENT WITH -
g T,,g--Low-Low 1* 2*** 3** E #- Three Loops any h Operating 1 T,,g/ loop 1 T,,, 1 T,,g any 34 2 loops 2 loops Two loops in any g . Operating 1 T,,g/ ope r 1 T,,, 1 T,,, M ating loop in any oper- operating loop. ating loop __ -- ,. --. =c r-g .=
- p . y ,,
O N O
- l A
I T M 5 1 a*) C A E # L 3 BS AE , CD
- IO
- LM 2 2 N P O P , ,
I A 1 1 T A T g N E s i n M ep et p t ro ra nro R T SE MLL uo ur i eo S sl se pl UEB s sp po N NNA e2 eo o g I INR r r p ohn NAE py pyo l ci
)
M IHP n no / at d E T MCO 1 a 1 al 2ea e S u Y e n S r-i t N ep s ur sep p n O ro spo no o I S uo eoo i ro C T LP sl r l el ( A EI s py pp U NR e2 ng oog 3 T NT r # an o n O33
- C A
E R A HO CT py# 1 a n # nt 1i a i l yi
/ nt 2as
( E U L T B A S / / A T E F OE
.L e r
e rg NN u un Y N s si T LA s' st p E AH e ea o F TC rp rrp o A O po peo l S TF o po / O 1l 1 ol 3 D E M E E ' N I - G . N u E s s s p r e og sg N o P r on pn O t - Li t oi I a-ot T rl e ea La A ee n er r &L nvh i L re hp oe wp O eeg PS GLi TO TO II H T I m a R TR mr-aeh N U ew t o E et g ET t ai L SL NA SWH A IW 8D N RE O . UE . I e TF a T C N s U O F 5 Q *" R* Y@ '
- 5. N
4 O- O?. O!. [ TA8LE 3.3-3 (Continued) 5
- je - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION Q ~
E- MINIMUM U TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE
- - FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS- TO TRIP OPERA 8LE MODES ACTION
- 6. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER
- a. Automatic Actuation logic 2 1 2 1,2,3 21
- b. Sta. n. Water Leve ow-Low Start Motor
[IS* l. Driven Pumps 3/sta. gen. 2/sta, gen. 2/sta. gen. 1, 2, 3 R any sta gen.
=
w 11. Start Turbine-b Driven Pumps 3/sta. gen. 2/sta. gen. 2/sta. gen 1, 2, 3 M I9* any 2 sta. gen.
- c. Undervoltage-RCP Start Turbine- '
Driven Pump 3-2/ bus
~
2 2 1- )( 13 g d. ' S. I. - m Start Motor-g Driven Pumps See 1 above (all' S.I. initiating functions and requirements). m "i e.. Trip of Main g Feedwater Pumps
. Start Motor- ,
-g Driven P g s 2/ pump 1/ pump 1/ pump -
23 I d
. - - . . . , , . , . . . . - - , _ _ . - . - . . _ _ , _ _ , . . _ _ . . _ . _ . - _ , - . . . . , _ . . . _ . . . - . . - __- . , ._ .. . . . . - . . ~ .t .. - - - . . _
O
~
O .O TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) 5 ' p ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 9 5 H HINIMUM TOTAL NO. CilANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CilANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
- 7. LOSS OF POWER
- a. 4 kw Bus Loss of Voltage 3/ Bus 2/ Bus 2/ Bus 1, 2, 3, 4 )f" 1y+$
- b. Grid Degraded Voltage 3/ Bus 2/ Bus 2/ Bus 1, 2, 3, 4 19*
- 8. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INTERLOCKS R a. Pressurizer Pressure, 3 2 2 1, 2, 3 20
- P-11 Y
g b. Low-Low T av0' ' '
- c. Steam Generator -
(See 5.a above) Level, P-14
- d. Reactor Trip, P-4 2 1 2 1,2,3 13 5
m 5 m .
\
i i TABLE 3.3-3 t' Continued) ('- TABLE NOTAT!CN b" # Trip function may be bypassed in this NCE below the P-11. (Pressurizer Pressure Blocx of Safety Injection) setpoint. ;
" Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below P-12 (T,yg Block of Safety Infection) setpoint.
The channel (s) associated with the protective functions derived from the out of service Reactor Coolant Leop shall be placed in the tripped mode.
*The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
**Not applicable if main steam isolation valves are closed.
restorr 06 '"*Peabk c yaJ ,< fo OPERA 6LF dM Y'
- ACTION STATEMENTS 46 o r- & next to ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE cha els one less than nimumthe Channels OPERABLE requirement,*be in HOT STANDBY within hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to hours for surveillance
- testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provi ed the other channel is OPE BLE.
(' '
)
ACTION 14 Dele } ith the - " er ef ope?f.SL chenucia woe k:;:-than U c Total Ni=har af Ch=ch, vec a;.icr, ::y pret rd =t" ;;r'ne=we of-th nst r;quir:d C "J't:CL tut:CTIOMAi. TE5T pi v iucu Ric inoperable-channe? 1 traar. h phred +2: tripp d wndl tier dein . . 4 ACTION 15 - With a channel associated with an operating loop inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within ] hours or be in at least HOT STANUBY within the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours; however, one channel associated with an operating loop may be bypassed for up to 7 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1. 4 ACTION 16 - With the number of CPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; one additional channel may be bypassed Specification for up to g hours for surveillance testing per 4.3.2.1. 4 ACTION 17 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue provided the containment purge and exhaust valves are maintained closed. {
}
O ' l FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 3-23 AMENDMENT NO. 25
TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued i ACTION 18 - With the number of CPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum Channels CPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable enannel to l QPERABLE status within 48 hou'rs or be in at least HOT STANDSY *~ within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUT 00W within the following 30 hours. y ACTICN 19 - Number With the number of CPERABLE Channels one less than the Total of Channels, STARTUP and/or PCWER OPERATION say proceed. provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in~the tripped. condition j within/ hour $3 a. nd -
b The Minimus Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, l b. the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up'to hours ., for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1. .l ACTION 20 - With the interlock inoperable'to the extant that a safeguards I function which should not be blocked in the current MODE is blocked, declare the safeguard function (s) inoperable and follow : the appropriata ACTION statament(s) of Table ' 3.3-3 for the affected function (s). , O Intarioca Afracted Channeis on Tee 3.3-3 ,
/ ;
- 1. P- 11 a... Pressurizer Pressure 2 Law' ;
- 2. P-12 a. Staan Line Pressure - Low ,
- b. Staan Flow in Two Staam Lines Nigh 1
Coincident With 7 -Low-Low. *r csbreAle moperAble. ekAansA 4. CertAli.k sh Jd44 6 AwtS ACTION 21 -lWith the number of CPERf.3LE Channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement,ebe in at least HOT STANDBY within
.Se, nut 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the followinsi 6 hours; however; one channel may be bypassed for up to hours for surveillance tasting provided the other channel s CPERABLE.
4 ACTION 22 - With the number of CPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE
'l status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STAN08Y within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. l l
ACTION 23 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the ; Minimum Number of Channels, operation say proceed until ; performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
)
1
,l
.O mar c . N
-- s ie s.u AMENDMENT NO. 33 .l
)
. - , _ _ _ .J
INSERT C ACTION 24 - With the number of OPERABLE channels-one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER 0PERATION may : proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied: l
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the the tripped l condition within 6 hours, and -
- b. The Minimum Channel OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing of other channels ;
per Specification 4.3.2.1. I s t O l I t O 1 i i
)
OC- O7 .- . Om ; TABLE 4.3-2 h ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEN INSTRUMENTATION l~, SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
?
- E y- CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL MODES IN WHICH
- FUNCTIONAL UNIT SURVEILLANCE CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED
- 1. SAFETY INJECTION, TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION ,
- a. Manual Initiation M.A. N.A. R ,M(1) 1, 2, 3, 4
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic M. A. N.A. N(2) 1, 2, 3, 4
- c. Containment Pressu igh S -
R /Q 1,2,3
- d. Pressurtz,er Pressure--Low gQ S -
,R 1, 2, 3 w e. Differential Pressure '-
~
) 8etween Steam Lines--High S
R XQ 1, 2, 3
- f. Steam Line Pressure--Low S R (G 1, 2, 3
- 2. CONTAIMENT SPRAY
- a. Manual Intt1atton M.A. R jf(1)
N. A. 1, 2, 3, 4
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. N(2) 1, 2, 3, 4
- c. Containment Pressure-- S, R gQ 1, 2, 3 g High-High-High m
5.- D: -
.%c-,-..----- ,e ~ ,.w. , . . , - - . . ..m.. --=.*-4 e -.v- e m - en - e,---. ---.-. . , . . . -, .w,-
O O
~
O m TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) D ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION h SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS U CHANNEL MODES IN milch CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED
- 3. CONTAIMENT ISOLATION
- a. Phase "A" Isolation
- 1) Manual N.A. N.A. NMI) 1, 2, 3, 4
- 2) From Safety Injection N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3, 4 Automatic Actuation Logic .
- b. Phase "8" Isolation
- 1) Manual N.A. H.A. & /(1) 1, 2, 3, 4 y 2) Automatic Actuation N.A. N.A. N(2) 1, 2, 3, 4 g Logic
- 3) Containment Pressure-- S R g4 1,2,3 High-High-High
- c. Purge and Exhaust Isolation g 1) Manual N.A. N.A. b4(1) 1, 2, 3, 4
- 2) Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3, 4 m
E L... ._. - _ . . . _ _ . , _. -~_ - - . . , ,- -- . . . . . .-4 -_ . ~ . . . . , . . , . , , . - , ~ . - -
'% r'
{J t
- ~
J J TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) n y ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION Q SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS E: CHANNEL H0 DES IN WlICH h CilANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE m FUNCTIONAL UNIT CilECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED
- 4. STEAM LINE ISOLATION
- a. Manual . N.A. N.A. N ,((1) 1, 2, 3
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2,' 3
- c. Containment Pressure-- S High-High R Fq 1, 2, 3
- d. Steam Flow in Two Steam
. Lines--High CoJncident with S R KQ 1, 2, 3 T,,g--Low-Low
- e. Steam i .75 rressure--Lw S g g.Q 1, 2, 3
- 5. TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION
- a. Steam Generator Water Level--High-High S R 7Q 1,2,3 N
h w
-n 8
4 4
1 O O O . TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) h
}
E ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUNENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 2 . CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH M CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL a FUNCTIONAL UNIT SURVEILLANCE CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED
- 6. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER
- a. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. N(2)(6) 1, 2, 3
- b. Steam Generator Water 5 Level--Low-Low R .(Q 1, 2, 3
- c. Undervoltage - RCP N.A. R Jt"Q 1 d.
S. I.. See 1 above (all SI survelliance requirements) w e. Trip of Main Feedwater N.A. N. A.
% Pumps S/U(S) 1 i w
a 7. LOSS OF POWER
- a. 4.16 kw Emergency Bus N.A.
R(3) M(4) 1, 2, 3, 4
.Undervoltage (Loss of
. Voltage)
- b. 4.16 kv Emergency Bus N.A. R(3) M(4) 1,2,34 g Ur.dervoltage - (Degraded g Voltage)
-4
- 8. ENGINEERED' SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INTERLOCKS N.A. &M fr'N.$. N.A.
2 O ' L 0 1 l
-..;__. . . _ . . - . . . . . - . _ _.. u .. . c _ _
TABLE 4.3-2 (Centinuad) TABLE NOTATION' ; (1) Manual actuation switches shall be tested at least once'per 18 months - durino shutdown;,f ^l' eine- c?rcuitry ::s;;1 te: with :::::! ::::;; rds - . l ~ (setuation :he.. receive-a-CM.^?MEL FUNCTIOM^1 TEST et I;;;t ;;,;; p;7 ?! fry:. (2) Each train or logic channel sha111be tested'at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. (3) Channel calibration shall exclude actuation of the final trip actuation re1ay.* (4) Functional testing shall consist of verification of relay operation upon-removal of input voltage and operation of 2-out-of-3 logic excluding _the - final trip actuation relay.* , (5) If not performed in the previous 92 days. ; (6) Excluding automatic actuation logic for trip of main feedwater pumps. 6
?
O e k i
" Actuation of the final trip actuation relay shall be included in response -
time testing. AMENDMENT NO. 26 () FARLEY-UNIT 3 3/4 3-37 l t _m____.E
-[ consistent u% matdass An appr,prbte. leaf of 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION relioWly of ne Teacf r Trip 5pfe* ond Sjwered 3
Sde43 Feature Aetodeon S3sic In4rume.ata4toa . BASES
^d l 4 l 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTORTRIPSYSTEMandENGINEEREDSAFETYFEAT5RE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION j 1
~The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensurfthat 1) the associated :
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter. monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic te nircired. O ; ; o.nd ! sdficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testina or maintenancedend-4-) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters. The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The i integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the i assumptions used in the accident analyses. The surveillane requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capa-bility is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The v periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are t _ sufficient to demonstrate this capability. g} g . ,
/ The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation ystem interlocks perform the functions indicated below on increasing the required parametar, consistent with the setpoints listed in Table 3.3-4: .
P-11 Defeats the manual block of safety injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure. P-12 Defeats the manual block of safety injection actuation on low steam line pressure. P-14 Trip of all feedwater pumps, turbine trip, closure of feedwater isolation valves and inhibits feedwater control valve modulation. On decreasing the required parameter the opposite function is performed at reset setpoints, with the exception of P-12 as noted below: P-12 Allows manual block of safety injection actuation on low steam line pressure. Causes steam line isolation on high steam flow. Affects steam dump blocks (i.e., prevents premature block of the noted function).
- 1. ,
FARLEY-UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT NO. 26 mm_ _
INSERT E O Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with WCAP-10271, " Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," and supplements to that report as approved by the NRC and documented in . the SERs and SSER (letters to J. J. Sheppard from Cecil 0. Thomas dated February 21, 1985; Roger A. Newton from Charles E. Rossi dated February 22, 1989; and Gerard T. Goering from Charles E. Rossi dated April 30, 1990). I 1 0 '
-l 1
O ,
.O O O TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)
,, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION R
MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION E Z 17. Turbine Trip
- A. Low Auto Stop Oil Pressure 3 2 2 1 7#
B. Turbine Throttle Valve 4 4 1 1 6# l Closure
- 18. Safety Injection Input from ESF 2 1 2 1, 2 15 l
- 19. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip A. Above P-8 1/ breaker 1 1/ breaker 1 10 B. Above P-7 1/ breaker 2 1/ breaker 1 11#
R per oper-ating loop
- 20. Reactor Trip System Interlocks A. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 2 1 2 2, and* 8 B. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7 P-10 Input 4 2 3 1 8 P-13 Input 2 1 2 1 8 C. Power Range Neutron
> Flux, P-8 4 2 3 .1 8 4
5 D. Power Range Neutron M Flux, P-10 (Input to P-7) 4 2 3 1, 2 8 5
= E. Turbine Impulse Chamber
. Pressure, P-13 2 1 2 1 8 F. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9 4 2 3 1 8
O O O TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) 5 E2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION Q
-d MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
- 21. Reactor Trip Breakers 2 1 2 1, 2 1, 14 .,
3*, 4*, 5* 13
- 22. Automatic Trip Logic 2 1 2 1, 2 15 l 1
, 3*, 4*, 5* 13 i w Y w 9 5! E 6
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) TABLE NOTATION ; O -* With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position, the , control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal, and fuel in the reactor vessel.
** The channel (s) associated with the protective functions derived from the out of service Reactor Coolant Loop shall be placed in the tripped condition.
# The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. ,
## High voltage to detector may be de-energized above P-6.
(
### Indication only.
#### The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable if THERMAL :
POWER level 2: 10% of RATED Th'5RMAL POWER. ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the , Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 : hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for ! surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1. : ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the i following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours. l ,
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the i inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for l :'
surveillance testing of the other channels per Specification
- i 4.3.1.1.
- c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% !'
- i of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux trip setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO from the' remaining 3 detectors is monitored at least once per 12 hours per Specification 4.2.4.2.
t i O FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 3-6 AMENDMENT NO.
i' TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL j POWER level:
- a. Below the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoini.,
restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 setpoint.
- b. Above the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint, but below 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the inoperable i channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- c. Above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, POWER OPERATION may i continue.
ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:
- a. Below the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to .
increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 setpoint. i
- b. Above the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint, :
O over t'o" =ar co"ti"ue- : ACTION 5 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by ; the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, within I hour and at least once per 12 ' ! hours thereafter. , ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channel; less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may continue provided the inoperable channels are placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours. ACTION 7 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channei:. STARTUr* and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied: l_
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition I within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, }
the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for j surveillance testing of other channels per Specification . 4.3.1.1. o l FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 3-7 AMENDMENT NO. !
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) ACTION 8 - With the interlock inoperable to the extent that a reactor trip O- which should not be blocked in the current MODE is blocked, declare the trip function inoperable and follow the ACTION statements of Table 3.3-1 for the affected channel (s). Interloc_t Affected Channels on Table 3.3-1
- 1. P-6 a. Source Range, Neutron Flux Startup Shutdown
- 2. P-7 a. Low Reactor Coolant Loop Flow (2 loops)
- b. Undervoltage - Reactor Coolant Pumps
- c. Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pumps
- d. Pressurizer Low Pressure
- e. Pressurizer High Level
- 3. P-8 a. Low Reactor Coolant Loop Flow (1 loop)
- 4. P-9 a. Turbine Trip e
- 5. P-10 a. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux
- b. Power Range, Neutron Flux - Low Setpoint
- c. Source Range, Neutron Flux Startup Shutdown O d- e-7 ('te= 2 >bove)
- 6. P-13 a. P-7 (Item 2 above)
ACTION 9 - With a channel associated with an operating loop inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours l or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; however, one channel associated with an operating loop may be bypassed for up to 4 l , hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1. < ACTION 10 - With one channel inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to below l the P-8 (Low Reactor Coolant Pump Flc,t and Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position) setpoint within tk next 2 hours. Operation : below the P-8 (Low Reactor Coolant Pump Flow and Reactor Coolant-Pump Breaker Position) setpoint may continue pursuant to ACTION 11. , t
.f O
FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 3-8 AMENDMENT NO.
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) , ACTION 11 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, fT operation may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours. l ACTION 12 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. , ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours, or oper the Reactor Trip System breakers within the next hour. ACTION 14 - With one of the diverse trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable, the breaker may be considered OPERABLE provided that the diverse trip feature is restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours, or declare the breaker inoperable and apply ACTION 1. The breaker shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status.
^
ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY () within the next 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE. j J 4 i FANLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 3-9 AMENDMENT NO. O
IA 4.3-1 O REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH
,, CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED E FUNCTIONAL UNIT m"
- 1. Manual Reactor Trip N.A. N.A. R(11), 1, 2
' S/U(1)(12) 3*, 4*, 5*
E Z 2. Power Range, Neutron Flux A. High S D(2), M(3) Q 1, 2 l and Q(6) B. Low S O(2), M(3) S/U(10) 2 and Q(6)
- 3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High N.A. R(6) Q 1, 2 l Positive Rate
- 4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High N.A R(6) Q 1, 2 l Negative Rate
}
't' 5. Intermediate Range, Neutron S R(6) 5/U(10) 1, 2 and l Z Flux
- 6. Source Range, Neutron Flux S(7) R(6) Q and S/U(10) 2, 3, 4, l 5, and *
- 7. Overtemperature AT S R Q 1, 2
- 8. Overpower AT S R Q 1, 2
.W g 9. Pressurizer Pressure--Low- S R Q 1
$ 10. Pressurizer Pressure--High S R Q 1, 2
=
l P 11. Pressurizer Water Level--High S R Q l l l
- 12. A. Loss of Flow -'Sirigle Loop S R Q 1 B. Loss of-Flow .Two Loops S R N.A. 1
TABLE 4.3 (Continued) REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE g FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED
- 13. Steam Generator Water level-- S R Q 1, 2 l i Low-Low C
.$ 14. Steam /Feedwater Flt Mismatch S R Q 1, 2 l
~
and low Steam Generator Water Level
- 15. Undervoltage - Reactor Coolant N.A. R Q l - l-Pumps
- 16. Underfrequency - Reactor N.A. R Q 1 l Coolant Pumps-
- 17. Turbine Trip A. Low Auto Stop 011 Pressure N.A. R S/U(9)(10) N.A.
4 g B. Turbine Throttle Valve N.A. R S/U(9)(10) N.A.
- Closure
- 18. Safety Injection Input from ESF N.A. N.A. R(4) 1, 2 l
- 19. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker N.A. N.A. R 1 Position Trip
- 20. Reactor Trip System Interlocks N.A. R S/U(8) 1
- 21. Reactor Trip Breaker. N.A. N.A. M(5)(14)(15), 1, 2, S/U(1)(14)(15) -3*, 4*, 5*
3 22. Automatic Trip Logic -N.A. N.A. M(5) 1, 2, 2 .3*, 4*, 5* E G 23. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker N.A. N.A. (13), R(ll) 1, 2, 4*, 5*
-4 3*,
E
.* ., <mme.+e e . - , , e asw. s w== w< +--+*-c n - -r-- . - - - - - , - - - --i=w- ----r-., - m -, , ,m w - -.u.. m ---+.u ,- - --,i s , , --
O O O TABLE 3.3-3
, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION r-U MINIMUM
' TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION E FUNCTIONAL UNIT
- 1. SAFETY INJECTION, TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION
- a. Manual Initiation 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 18
- b. Automatic Actuation 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 13 Logic
- c. Containment 3 2 2 1,2,3 19*
Pressure--High-w d. Pressurizer 3 2 2 1, 2, 3# 19*
- Pressure--Low w
- e. Differential 1,2,3 h Pressure Between Steam Lines--High Three Loops */ steam line 2/ steam line 2/ steam line 19* l Operatirg twice and 1/3 steam lines Two Loops 3/ operating _ 2 8## /steam 2/ operating 15
, Operating steam line line twice steam line x in either operating 5 steam line g.
g e g-
- -w- _ - < , , , , m- n w ~-ee--,,,--,a e - - . ,n- --m -e, -ge- -
O O O TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) s ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION iE'
?
a MINIMUM 5 TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION [
- f. Steam Line Pressure--Low 1, 2, 3##
Three Loops 1 pressure / 1 pressure 1 pressure 19* l Operating loop any 2 loops any 2 loops Two Loops 1 pressure / 1### pressure 1 pressure 15 Operating loop in any oper- any operating ating loop loop
- 2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY w a. Manual 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 18 1
w b. Automatic Actuation 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 13
.L Logic
- c. Containment Pressure-- 4 2 3 1,2,3 16 High-High-High .
3E 5 x
-4 5
}:
m___.___.m_______________.__.______ _ _ _ . . .m . _ _ ._ _ _ -- - _ _ _ , , _ _- s . , ., ...w . - ._ w - av ,w
O O O TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 2
MINIMUM
-< TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE
' FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION C
$ 4. STEAM LINE ISOLATION
~
- a. Manual 1/ steam line 1/ steam line 1/ operating 1, 2**, 3** 22 steam line
- b. Automatic 2 1 2 1, 2* * , 3 *
- 21 Actuation Logic
- c. Containment Pressure-- 3 2 2 1, 2**, 3** 19* l High-High
- d. Steam Flow in Two 1, 2**, 3**
s w Steam Lines--High
=
y Three Loops 2/ steam line 1/ steam line 1/ steam line 19* 'l
~ Operating any 2 steam lines Two Loops 2/ operating 1 ###/any 1/ operating 15 Operating steam line operating steam line steam line COINCIDENT WITH Tavg--Low-Low 1, 2**, 3**
Three Loops 19* k 1 Tavg/ loop 1 Tavg any 2 loops 1 Tavg any 2 loops l g Operating 3: E [ Two Loops 1 Tavg/oper- 1### Tavg 1 Tav in any 15 Operating ating loop in any oper- opera $ingloop
% ating loop
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ __ . . . _ . .._ _ . . _ . _ __ _ _ _Jl
O O O TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM f
< TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE
' FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION C
- e. Steam Line Pressure-- 1, 2**, 3##,**
3 Low Three Loops 1 pressure / 1 pressure 1 pressure 19* l . Operating loop any 2 loops any 2 loops Two Loops 1 pressure / 18## pressure 1 pressure 15 Operating operating in any oper- any operating loop ating loop loop
- 5. TURBINE TRIP &
FEEDWATER ISOLATION
- a. Steam Generator 3/ loop 2/ loop in 2/ loop in 1, 2 19* l y Water Level-- any oper- each oper-g High-High ating loop ating loop E
5 x
.O r w -e- -tm- S-- - - - - * - = = = s- -w --v ---+,-w+- -
O O O TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) 9 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
# MINIMUM R CHANNELS APPLICABLE TOTAL NO. CHANNELS d- ACTION TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES 5 ~
FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS
~
- 6. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER
- a. Automatic Actuation 1, 2, 3 21 Logic 2 1 2
- b. Stm. Gen. Water Level--Low-Low
- i. Start Motor- 19*
Driven Pumps 3/stm. gen. 2/stm. gen. 2/stm. gen. 1, 2, 3 l any stm. gen. w ii. Start Turbine- 2/stm. gen. 1, 2, 3 19* 1 Driven Pumps 3/stm. gen. 2/stm. gen. l w any 2 stm. gen. 4
~
- c. Undervoltage-RCP Start Turbine- 19 Driven Pump 3-2/ bus 2 2 1 l'
- d. S.I.
Start Motor-Driven Pumps See 1 above (all S.I. initiating functions and requirements)
- e. Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps E . Start Motor- 23*
Driyen Pumps 2/ pump 1/ pump 1/ pump 1 9
,y,=+w g ayp,- g- u - nww wr- - w -
w w - = rp ,, g a+- ,a y , w wr m p w v-y ,-p.gw y 5- ,%,w w _3g-
O O O TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) 9 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION P O MINIMUM
& TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE
- FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
~
- 7. LOSS OF POWER
- a. 4 kv Bus 3/ Bus 2/ Bus 2/ Bus 1, 2, 3, 4 24* l Loss of Voltage
- b. Grid Degraded Voltage 3/ Bus 2/ Bus 2/ Bus 1, 2, 3, 4 24* l
- 8. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INTERLOCKS
- a. Pressurizer Pressure, 3 2 2 1,2,3 20 w P-11 1
w b. Low-Low Tavg, P-12 3 2 2 1,2,3 20
- c. Steam Generator (See S.a above)
Level, P-14
- d. Reactor Trip, P-4 2 1 2 1,2,3 13 3
5 x
~
.______m._____ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _+ _- -
< . . . . - - . , - ~ .- . . . . # . ,-6 .-- - ,
.w. .
TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) ; TABLE NOTATION O # Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Block of Safety Injection) setpoint. .
## Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below P-12 (Tavg Block of Safety Injection) setpoint. ### The channel (s) associated with the protective functions ~ derived from the out of service Reactor Coolant Loop shall be placed in the tripped mode.
- The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
** Not applicable if main steam isolation valves are closed.
ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; > however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillence testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE. ACTION 14 - Deleted. l ; ACTION 15 - With a channel associated with an operating loop inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours l or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours; however, one , channel associated with an operating loop may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1. l ACTION 16 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; one additional channel may be bypassed , for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification
~
l 4.3.2.1. ACTION 17 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue provided the containment purge and exhaust valves are maintained closed. ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum ; Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. O FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 3-23 AMENDMENT N0.
TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number O- of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied: .
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and l ,
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for l surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.
ACTION 20 - With the interlock inoperable to the extent that a safeguards function which should not be blocked in the current MODE is blocked, declare the safeguard function (s) inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement (s) of Table 3.3-3 for the affected function (s). Interlock Affected Channels on Table 3.3-3 ,
- 1. P-ll a. Pressurizer Pressure--Low
- 2. P-12 a. Steam Line Pressure--Low
- b. Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines High Coincident with T avg -~l0W-LOW ACTION 21 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to O- OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within >
the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other channel is OPERABLE. ACTION 22 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. 1 ACTION 23 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. ACTION 24 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channel 0PERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.
FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 3-24 AMENDMENT NO.
O O O TABLE 4.3-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS Y e"- m
- CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH
' CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE CHANNEL CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED E FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK C
- 1. SAFETY INJECTION, TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION N.A. N.A. R(I) 1, 2, 3, 4 l
- a. Manual Initiation Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3, 4 b.
Containment Pressure--High 1, 2, 3 l
- c. S R Q 1, 2, 3 l
- d. Pressurizer Pressure--Low S R Q 1, 2, 3 l
- e. Differential Pressure S R Q
' Between Steam Lines--High 1, 2, 3 l
- f. - Steam Line Pressure--Low S R Q
- 2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY N.A. 1, 2, 3, 4
- a. Manual Initiation N.A. R(1) l Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3, 4 b.
1, 2, 3 l
> c. Containment Pressure-- S R Q High-High-High =
5 e - w- r- - - - r -- w- , ~, . ves e- . w
O O O TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) A ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
.g SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS t
g MODES IN WHICH q CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE
- FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST RE0VIRED
- 3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
- a. Phase "A" Isolation
- 1) Manual N.A. N.A. R(1) 1, 2, 3, 4 l
- 2) From Safety Injection N.A N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3, 4 Automatic Actuation Logic g b. Phase "B" Isolation
{
^
- 1) Manual N.A. N.A. R(1) 1, 2, 3, 4 l
- 2) Automatic Actuation -N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3, 4 Logic
- 3) Containment Pressure-- S R Q 1,2,3 l High-High-High
- c. Purge and Exhaust Isolation
, 1) Manual N.A. N.A. R(1) 1, 2, 3, 4 l x
- 2) Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3, 4 9
,. . = , . 4 4
- w.- +w w 6- . w < .- . s-e-. y ,e ,.s.-
O O O-TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
,, SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS E
R
' CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH EE CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE El FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED
- 4. STEAM LINE ISOLATION
- a. Manual N.A. N.A. R(1) 1, 2, 3 l
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3
- c. Containment Pressure-- S R Q 1,2,3 l High-High
- d. Steam Flow in Two Steam S R Q 1, 2, 3 l Of Lines--High Coincident with
[ -T avg --LOW-LOW b e. Steam Line Pressure--Low- S R Q 1,2,3 l
- 5. TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION
- a. Steam Generator Water S R Q 1, 2, 3 l Level--High-High E
9 9 9
,.--c y+. . - .,_,r ,-wm..w-r. -
.,-- . . , - . - r, .,<,--r..ese . . . . . , . - ., ,. -.-.-.w.4 . - w -
~ . , , . . m -m- - - , - - -
O O O. TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued! ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTPUMENTATION g SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS iE'
?
CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH E CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE Z FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED
- 6. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER
- a. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(2)(6) 1, 2, 3
- b. Steam Generator Water S R Q 1,2,3 l Level--Low-low
- c. Undervoltage - RCP N.A. R Q l l
- d. S.I. See 1 above (all SI surveillance requirements) s
[ e. Trip of Main Feedwater N.A. N.A. S/U(5) 1 Pumps 4 a
- 7. LOSS OF POWER
- a. 4.16 kv Emergency Bus N.A. R(3) M(4) 1, 2, 3, 4 Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)
- b. 4.16 kv Emergency Bus N.A. R(3) M(4) 1, 2, 3, 4 Undervoltage (Degraded
> Voltage)
M 5 8. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE N.A. R N.A. N.A. l 6 y ACTUATION SYSTEM INTERLOCKS 5 u- e . -
-v- --
- v - ,
'l TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATION- I i (1) Manual actuation switches shall be tested at least.once per 18 months 4 during shutdown. l. (2) Each train or logic channel shall be tested at least every 62 days on
> STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
(3) Channel calibration shall exclude actuation of-the final trip actuation relay.* (4) Functional testing shall consist of verification of relay operation : upon removal of input voltage and operation of 2-out-of-3 logic excluding the final trip actuation relay.* ! (5) If not performed in the previous 92 days. ) (6) Excluding automatic actuation logic for trip of main feedwater pumps. l l O i 1 l 1 l I i i u I
- Actuation of the final trip actuation relay shall be included in response time testing.
O FARLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-37 AMENDMENT NO. k 1 - = 4 N it'ME'
i 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION i l Q BASES l 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATIOJ The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation , , System instrumentation and interlocks ensures that 1) the associated Engineered Safety Feature Actuation action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint,
- 2) the specified coincidence logic and sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testir.g or maintenance consistent with maintaining an appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Trip System and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System instrumentation and, 3) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.
The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consi~ stent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capa- bility is maintained ' comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this ' capability. Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance O. outage times have been determined in accordance with WCAP-10271, " Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," and supplements to that report as approved by the NRC and documented in the SERs and SSER (letters to J. J. Sheppard from Cecil 0. Thomas dated February 21, 1985; Roger A. Newton from Charles E. Rossi dated February 22, 1989; and Gerard T. Goering from Charles E. Rossi dated April 30, 1990). The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System interlocks perform the l functions indicated below on increasing the required parameter, consistent with the setpoints listed in Table 3.3-4: , P-11 Defeats the manual block of safety injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure. P-12 Defeats the manual block or safety injection actuation on low steam line pressure. P-14 Trip of all feedwater pumps, turbine trip, closure of feedwater ' isolation valves and inhibits feedwater control valve modulation. On decreasing the required parameter the opposite function is performed at reset setpoints, with the exception of P-12 as noted below: A P-12 Allows manual block of ' safety injection actuation on low steam line pressure. Causes steam line isolation on high steam flow. ' Affects steam dump blocks (i.e., prevents premature block' of the noted function). B 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT NO. FARLEY-UNIT 1 , a
O O O p 1 AllLE 3.3-1 (Continueill S HEACTOR TRIP SYSIEH INS 1HllMENIAll0N sj h ri av HINIHON TOTAL NO. CilANNELS CilANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCil0NAL UNIT Of CllANNELS 10 1 RIP OPERAllLE H0 DES ACilllN Reactor Trip Breakers 2- 2 1, 2 1, 14
- 21. , 1 3*,4*,$* 13.
- 22. - Autoimatic Trip Logic 2
- I 2 1, 2 Y 3*,4*,5* 13 t'
s Ul e 9 5ia 9 M SY , w - c r,.- e-m -vwre,+-, y - gm.-i - e- - , ,..._,-&. y eyve n.~ , + = -,-g
.. .. : . . ._, .. m_.:::. :. r .
t . TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) ) TABLE NOTATION With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position, the control rod drive system capaole of red withdrawal, and fuel in the reactor Tassel. The cnannel(s) rssociated with the protective functions derived from the out of service Reactor Coolant Loop shall be placed in the tripped condition. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. H Hign voltage to cet,ector may be de-energized above P-6. un Indication only. He# The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicaole if THERMAL POWER level 1 10: of RATED HERMAL POWER. ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - Witn the numoer of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE recuirement, be in HOT STANDBY witnin 5 nours; newever, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for
.)
- surveillance testing per specification 4.3.1.1. ACTION 2 W1:n :ne numoer of UPERAtiLE channeTs one'l'ess tnan the Total Nui::cer of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provicea tne l following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inocerable enannel is placed in the tripped concition within 4/ hours. F 4
- b. The Minimu:n Channels OPERABLE requirement is ' met; however, une I inoperaole channel may be bypassed for up toTnours for surveillance testing of tne otner channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.
I
- c. Ef tner, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less tnan or equal to 75%
of RATED THERMAL POWER ano the Power Range Neutron Flux trip setooint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO from tne remaining 3 detectors is monitored at least once per 12 nours per Specifi cation 4.2.4.2. .
.i "ARLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 3-6 AMENOMENT Nr 52
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:
- a. Below the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setpoint.
- b. Above the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint, but below 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- c. Above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, POWER OPERATION may continue.
ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:
- a. Below the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setpoint.
- b. Above the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint,
.O oPeretio# y ce"ti""e-ACTION 5 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one'less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, within 1 hour and at least once per 12 hours thereaft inse d yA ACTION 6 4,WRh-+he-mtmber-o f- ERMEF-c h a nnel s-one-l es s-t h a n-the-Totel-Number-of-Channels -STARTUP-and/or.
r POWER-OPERATION. may-proceed-provided-the-following-conditions-are sat,isf.ied: - i
- e. The-inoperable-channel-is placed in-the-tripped.
. condition-within 1 hour.
The-Minimum-Channels OPERABLE requirement is.. met;
#s% $
4.
.however,.one additionalvchannel-may be bypassed for -
up-to 2 hours.. for.. surveillance. testing per--- ; (p3 / Specification-4.3.1.1 ~
/. , ACTION 7 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed A until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST i 3 provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped , ^ H condition within 1 hour.
_ _ _ _ . . - - - . ~ -- , . _s FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 3-7
~
INSERT A l ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, operation m;y continue provided the inoperable channels are placed in the tripped condition 1 within 6 hours. ' INSERT B ACTION 7 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total i Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may ) proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied: l
- a. The inoperable channel- is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channel 0PERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up -)
to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels l per Specification 4.3.1.1. j u O
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continu:d) ACTION 8 - With the-interlock inoperable to the extent that a reactor trip O a4ca sheeie mot de 8)ocxee se :" c=rre=t soot 4 diocxee. declare the trip function inoperable and follow the ACTION # statements of Table 3.3-1 for the affected channel (s). Interlock Affected Channels on Table 3.3-1
- 1. P-6 a. Source Range, Neutron Flux Startup Shutdown
- 2. P-7 Low Reactor Coolant Loop Flow (2 loops)
~
a.
- b. Undervoltage - Reactor Coolant Pumps
- c. Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pumps
- d. Pressurizer Low Pressure
- e. Pressurizer High Level
- 3. P-8 a. Low Reactor Coolant Loop Flow (1 loop) 4 P-9 a. Turbine Trip
- 5. P-10 a. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux
- b. Power Range, Neutron Flux - Low Setpoint
- c. Source Range, Neutron Flux
' Startup '
Shutdown ') O d. P-7 (Item 2 above) y'
- 6. P-13 a. P-7 (Item 2 above) ,t, ACTION 9 -restore With a the channel associated inoperable withtoan channel operating loop OPERABLE inoperablj,ours status within/ h
- or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; however, one channel associated with an operating loop may be bypassed for up to / hours for surveill ce testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.
ACTION 10 - With one channel inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to l OPERABLE status within7 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to below the P-8 (Low Reactor Coolant Pump Flow and Reactor Coolant Pump 1 Breaker Position) setpoint within the next 2 hours. Operation I below the P-8 (Low Reactor Coolant Pump Flow and Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position) setpoint may continue pursuant to , ACTION 11. O s l FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 3-8
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) , O aCT*CN 11 - Witn less tnan the Minimum Numcer of Channels CPERABLE, operation may continue provided the inoperacle channel is placed in the tripped condition within y nour3. Lo ACT ' - With the number of CPERABLE channels one less than required r by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE recuirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. ACT:' 13 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required i Dy the Minimum Channels OPERABLE recuirement, restore tne j inoperaDie cnannel to OPERABLE status within 18 hours, or i apen the Reactor Trip System breakers within the next hour. ACT;';N ;; - Witn one of the diverse trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable, the breaker may be considered CFERABLE provided that the diverse trip feature is restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours, or declare the breaker inoperable and acoly ACTION 1. The breaker shall not be oyoassec wnile one of the civerse trio features is l inoperable excect for the time recuired for performing + maintenance to restore the breaker to CPERABLE status. j O ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum ' Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, , g provided the other channel is OPERABLE. rasear i 1 t O i FARLEY - UNIT 2 3/a 3-9 AMENCHENT NC. ? 1
D E'4,3-L !.
- ,i g
y - - . . Hl:ACIOnt TRIP SYS1Eli INS 1HilMENTAT10N SURVEILLANCE REQlllHEMENTS h-CilANNEL MODES. IN WillCil CilANNEL FuriCTIONAL SilRVEILLANCE U CilANffil. CilECK CAtiliRATION IESI REQUIRI.li N FilNCT10NAL UNII
' ^
N.A. H(ll), 1, 2,
- 1. Manual Reactor Trip N.A.
S/U(1)(12) 3*, 4*, S* .. I
- 2. Power Range, Neutron Flux -
A. lii9 h 5 U(2),M(3) and Q(6) . ff k 1, 2 - i 11 . l.ow 5 D(2),M(3) S/U(10) 2 and Q(6) 1, 2 - l m 3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, liigh N.A. R(6) fr$ 3 Positive Rate [ N
- 4. Power Itange, Neutr'on Flux, liigh Negative Rate N.A. R(6) f( 1, 2 ,.
g y 1, 2 and S. Intermediate Range, Heutron S R(6) S/Il%[lb flux 2, 3, 4, 1
- 6. Source Hange. Neutron Flux S(7) R(6) and S/U M (l') 5, and
- t
- 1. Overtemperaturehi S R Ih 1, 2 II . .Uverpower k T S' R ffQ . 1, 2
- 9. Pressurizer Pressur w- S R [h - 1
)F 1, 2
- 10. Pressurizer Pressure--liigh R- .
5 1 1 '. Pressurizer Water level--liigli' 'S- H- gh. I-8
- 12. 'A. loss'of-Flow - Single Loop S. R JI 'I
- ,1 ,
1.uss of Ilow .Iwo.1 oops S. . R N.A. 1
;,1 .
5 6
.,,..mmm-_mzmm__ - _ _ _ _ . - - _ - _ - - -
_a2,w.m.,. m_ w.,mm.mu-,m.,%.~
- .-E.,,..we,,s.... ., . , . , . , . . - v-<. - . . - . ...w.w.. ...w .-m.-,v. . ,,,n.-m--... ,-,,~w.w.y.. .-.,,,4.r..w,
A
~
y ' '
,IAllLE(13 (
bi',
.Continueil) u 10 ACIOlt IHIP SYSTEll INSlRilHENI ATION SilRV1ILLANCE REQUlitEMENTS z HODES IN WillCil " CllANNEL ~t u CllANNEL CllANNt:L filNCilullAL SURVt.lLL ANCE CllLCK , CAllBRAfl0N II:SI REQtilHEll FilNCTIONAL UillT_
1, 2
- 13. Steam Generator Water f.evel-- S R Af' Q 1.ow-Low 1, 2
- 14. Steam /fe w - a ww Hismatch S lt )P Q anti iow .- s *% ;vator Water Level IS. linifervoltage - Reactor Coolant N.A. It Jr k 1 Pumps
- 16. Ilnilerfrequency - Reactor H.A. R ,W k 1 Coolant Pumps ,
u s a 11. Turbine T.lp N.A. Low Auto Stop Oil Pressure N.A. 8 #<A"
'f O
A. ll . Turblite ilirottle Valve N.A. JM S/ti(9)htf((Ib S/U(9)fL) 10) N.A. Closure N.A. 8,H14) 1, 2 1 11 . Safety injection input from ESF N.A.
- 19. Reactor Coolant Pump lireaker N.A. N.A. R 1 Position Trip
- 20. Iteactor Trip System Interlocks N.A. R S/ll(fi) 1 Reactor Trip lireaker N.A. N.A. M(b)(14)(15), I, 2,
- 21. 3*, 4*, b*
S/U(1)(14)(IS) , 9 .
- n. 2,.
Automatic Trip Logic H.A. N.A. H(b)
$* 22. 3*, 4*, 5*
g- ,
-i Ite.ict or Trip flypass lireaker N.A. H.A. (13),R(ll) 1, 2, a 23. 3*, 4*, 5*
y 0 .
i I, s2 .. 1ADLE 3.3-3 , i5' Q , ENGillEERED SAIETY FEA10RE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION E - T 1
" HINIHUM 10TAL NO. CilAfillELS CllANNELS FUNCTIONAL UNIT APPLICABLE OF CilANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE HODES ACTION
- 1. SAFETY INJECTION, TURDIrt:
TRIP AND FEEDWATER 150L L <1
- a. Manual Initiation 2 1 2 1, 2, 3, 4 18
- b. Automatic Actuation 2 1 2 1, 2, 3, 4 Logic 13
- c. Containment 3 2 a t w Pressure-liigh -
2 1,2,3 )4' l9 1 w
- d. Pressurizer 3 2 2 Y m Pressure $ ow 1, 2, 3# )4* [9
- e. Differential 1, 2, 3 Pressure Between Steam Lines O lgh Three Loops 3/ steam Ilne 2/ steam line 2/ steam line g
Operating 'twice and 1/3 [l9 steam 1,Ines Two Loops 3/ operating ### 2 / steam 2/ operating g Operating steam linee line twice 15 , c+ steam Ilne g in either g, operating o steam line 4 ( C e -
O O O s TABLE 3.5 Continued} $ y e .
, ENGlHEERED SAFETY TEAIURE ACTUAIIDH SYST[H INSTRtM[NIAll0N a '"'
5
- HINIMUM 10TAL NO. CilANNEL5 CilANNELS APPtiCABLE FUNCT!ONAL thii"
- OF CllANNELS 10 TRIP OPERABLE H0 DES ACTION
- r. slike'ttne Presso ow 1, 2, 3" Three loops I pressure / I pressure 1 pressure Operating, loop any 2 loops any 2 loops JA- (
Two Loops I pressure / # 1 pressure I pressure 15 Operating loop in any oper- any operating ating loop loop
- 2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY
^
w a. Manual 2 1 2 1, 2, 3, 4 18
) b. Automatic Actuation 2 1 2 1, 2, 3, 4 13 w logic ,e, . ~ " c. Containment Pressure-- 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 16 High-High-High f
k i , m. m h e
y .
, l
. c v
v
.)
~
,h *$ /
7 N i O Q(~ I T C A 2 2 1 2' 4 1, N 5 1 W 4 . m m m
, * * * *
- w E * * * *
- t 3 3 3 3 85 3 +
AE . , . . . - C0 * * * *
- I0 * * * *
- e LN 2 2 2 2 2 -
N P - O P . , . . . . I A 1 1 1 1 1
~
' T +
A p T - N E M U g ne i n f e n g ne y n wl o o ~ 4 I i n g + R MLL SE tf tl a hn T S N I UEB MNA I NR aI r em pa 2 / t m a e ai r em pa
,s
,o
,o p ,i
,t
,r a
- r w-M NAE oe s oe T l T e
)
I HP /t / /t P 4-E MCO 1 s 1 1 s 1 2 1 o-d T e S + u Y n S e e - i t N n ' nm r v n O i l l a gn e y ep . w o I S i e . n ,po .
'r C T LP m ms t yni a ,oo
( A U EI NR a e 1 2 a e2s nil at ,sp T, ng yl 3 T NT t t e / ae rn
,o ,-
an s y n E eo pt ,o N nt
=
' - C A s -
T l i w 1 3 .A ~ HO CT
/
1'
/nl 1 ai I os 1 2 ia w
3 E ,-
) 'E U R .
e* r. t T e re p 8 A S n n g p A E .L i l ne o T F OE l i i n o o NN 4,l tl l o Y N m m ai T LA a 2 3 a r
/,
E F AH TC t e e em pa
, ,g e
m A O s t s T, i n - T
. 5 TF O
/
1
/
2
/o te t =
D 2s 1 1 a r E v R ' ' E - E - s s
. N e p p I
r og sg - o8 sg , G N u s on pn o" pn
~
w oh Li oi LI oi E s wg t ot ot e" N c e Ti ea La e l a = O i r H er r r I T g P o i-n- re hp oe wp w o h r' oe wp A L L t n we s TO TO H t T U" TO . O S cn eh on io m g li
.TI a e -
I ti ni FL WL 4 w l at iN T I E N a u ma ou th aa a- mm .T N I n tt ng ee N w E , . D L a uc oi tt D . M AA CH SS IT . L A M C w A N E N w w I O T . . . . O I S s b c d C e . T -
*", C w ' N U .
l F 4 ~ w
+
*~ +
,kQ&=4 g
- ~
* $w {'. ;g
_ p3 r w A
=
+
e n e
n n-O(' * - Taair1 Cme ~J <a raie,ca) t> 5 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION . h MlHIHOM U TOTAL No. CHANNELS CilANNELS APPLICABLE N FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CllANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE HDDES ACTION
- e. SteamLinePressurh 1, 2**, 3 ##, **
Low 1 pressure / a $ Three Loops 1 pressure 1 pressure W 17 Operating loop any 2 loops any 2 loops Two Loops 1 pressure / 1### pressure i pressure 15 Operating operatlag in any oper- any operating loop ating loop loop R' 5. TURBINE IRIP &
- FEEDWATER ISOLATION
- a. Steam Generator Water Level--
3/ loop 2/ loop in any oper-2/ loop in each oper-1, 2 J[l liigh-High ating loop ating loop 3I R 3 - es
- c. \
e f '
r~n U i v('T TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) h ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION r-,
? MINIMUM E TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE
-Q TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS ro
- 6. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER
- a. Automatic Actuation 2 1,2,3 21 Logic 2 1
- b. Stm. Gen. Water Leve - ow-Low
- i. Start Motor / g*
3/stm. gen. 2/stm. gen. 2/stm. gen. 1,2,3 J4 t Driven Pumps
- any stm gen.
V _ ff 5 11. Start Turbine- 2/stm. gen. 2/stm. gen 1,2,3 J4 Driven Pumps 3/sta. gen. any 2 stm. gen.
- c. Undervoltage-RCP i Start Turbine- 2 2 1 Driven Pump 3-2/ bus
- d. S.I.
Start Motor- See 1 above (all S.I. initiating functions and requirements) Driven Pumps W
- e. Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps
- Start Motor- 1/ pump 1/ pump 1 23 Driven Pumps 2/ pump m
O O O TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) > h ENGlHEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEH INSL'lUMENTATION . 'J L i - HINIHUH 1 TOTAL NO. CilANNELS CilANNELS APPLICABLE o FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CilANNELS 10 TRIP OPERABLE H0 DES ACIl0N
- 7. LOSS OF POWER g
- a. 4 kv Bus 3/ Bus 2/ Bus 2/ Bus 1,2,3,4 39*
Loss of Voltage g
- b. Grid Degraded Voltage 3/ Bus 2/ Bus 2/ Bus 1, 2, 3, 4 )9* A
- 0. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE
, ACTUATION SYSTEH INTERLOCKS s
- a. Pressurizer Pressure, 3 2 2 1,2,3 20 f P-11
~i
- b. 3 2 2 1,2,3 Low-low T,yg, P-12 20
- c. Steam Generator (See'5.a above)
Level, P-14
~4 d. Reactor Trip, P-4 2 1 2 1,2,3 13
&_ Y. ;
G...).;-
, , . , , , , . , , . -. - . . . . . . .- -- - - - - - -- - ' ~ =
~ _ _
TABLE 3.3-3 (Centinued) m TABLE NOTATION
~~'T
#Trip function say be bypassed in this MODE below the P-11.
(d s (Pressurizar Pressure Block of Safety Injection) setpoint.
" Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below P-12.
(T,,g Block of Safety Injection) setpoint. The channel (s) associated with the protective functions derived from the out of service Reactor Coolant Loop shall be placed in the tripped mode.
*The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
**Not applicable if main steam isolation valves are closed. 3 4 OPEAMLE 5gAfd5rcStoreM '" '
o ACTION STATEMENTS (, bcs or d e r d N l# ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE chp nels one less than the 'nimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in HOT STANDBY within,6' hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to Ahours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provi8ed the other channel j is OPERABLE.
?e 'DeSchsA Q t l
ACTION 14 g'ith the n Oer- ef-0M.TLE channel; ;ne les; ti.. ti,. Twi 1 k Aa.ter of Chenac1s, epecetion-eay prec::d until
, tu .--= e C==. = = = p=pedefsence 4eee 1s i
{ 1 inoperabtu~tM~nnei is yl.ced in- the isipp.d cendttie with.in ; 4 ACTION 15 - With a channel associated with an operating loop inoperal le, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 2' hours l or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours; however, one channel associated with an operating loop may be bypassed ; for up to J'heurs for surveillance testing per Specification l 4.3.2.1. 4 - ' ACTION 16 - With the number of CPERABLE chan'nels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation say proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels CPERABLE requirement is met; one additional channel may be bypassed for up to / }ours for surveillance testing per l
._ Specification 4.3.2.1. $
ACTION 17 - With less than the Minfeum Channels OPERABLE, operation may
- continue provided the containment purge and exhaust valves are
-,/
maintained closed. 3 .r . *:~ FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 3-23 Amendment No. 13
" - TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued 1
)
~
CION 18 - With the number of CPERABLE Channels one less then the Minimum- .Nl L Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to J l OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY l within the next 5 hours and in COLD SHUTCC%N .within the following
.- 30 hours. <
ACYid 19 - With the macer of CPERABLE Channels one less inan the Total l Muncer of -Channels, STARTUP and/or PC%1ER OPERATION say proceed 1 provided the following conditions are satisfied: j
.. 1
- a. The inoperabie channel is placed in the tripped condition ' l within hourJ, 0 n d
- b. however,- .i The Minimum channel the inoperable ChannelssayCPERABLE be bypassedMquirement for up to is set;/ hours i for surveillanca testing of other- channels per 4
5pecification 4.3.2.1. 3 ACTION 20 - With the interlock inoperable to the extant that a safeguards I function which should not be blocked in the current MCOE is i blocked, declare the safeguard function (s) inoperable and follow the appropriata ACTION statament(s) of Taele 3.3-3 for.the affacted function (s). p
^-
Interlock Affected channels on Table. 3.3-3 7'
,Q -
g-1 P-11 a. .. Pressurf ter Pressurs - Low ' ,
- 2. P-12 a. Staan Line Pnssure - Low b Staan Flow in Two Staan Lines Migh -
Coincident With Tay -Low-Low 4 ..resbre de umaraMc. ebel 4. OhntAed.s ug;, 9 g,o ,, ACTICN 21 - ;With the numser of CPERA8LE Channels 'one ess than the Minimum . j i Channels- cPERABLE requirement,+be in at least HOT STANCSY vitnin ne. next i hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN' within the following 5 ' hours; however; one channel say be bypassed for1up to hours for surveillanca tasting provided the other channel s CPERA8LE. 1 ACTION 22 - With the number of CPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number' of' Channels. restore the inoperable channel to OPERAILE , status within 48 hours or be in at least NOT STANCRY within 6 hours and in !ET SHUTDC%H within the following E hours. 3CTION 23 - With the number of CPERABLE channels one less than the Minimus Nuncer of Channels, operatien say proceed until . performanca of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTICNAL TEST. -- ; 1 hlSar C_ F r 4 ep. :- e I
i INSERT C s ACTION 24 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied: i
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the the tripped !
condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channel 0PERABLE requirement is met; 1 however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up i to 2 hours for surveillance testing of other channels :
per Specification 4.3.2.1. ' I [ f
'b i
O .
g'-
' ({-)
TABLE 4.# 2 i"
- =
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURL ACTUATION SYSTEH INSTRUMENTATION
@ SURVEIEFARCE REQUIREMENTS Q CHANNEL CilANNEL H0 DES IN WillCil '
m CilANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CilECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED
- 1. SAFETY INJECTION, TURBINE TR P AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION
- a. Manual Initiation N. A. ,
N.A. 8 44il) 1, 2, 3, 4
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic. N.A. N.A. H(2) 1, 2, 3, 4
- c. Containment Pressur gh 5 R f(Q 1,2,3
- d. Pressurizer Pressure--Low S R XQ 1,2,3 5 e. Dif ferential Pressure S Between Steam Lines--liigh R YQ 1, 2, 3
- f. Steam Line Pressure--Low S R gQ 1, 2, 3
- 2. CONTAINHENT SPRAY
- a. Manual Initiation N.A. H.A. RXI) 1, 2, 3, 4
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic H.A. N.A. N(2) 1, 2, 3, 4
- c. Containment Pressure-- S ,(Q R 1, 2, 3 l liigh-Nigh-Nigh '
i 1 6 'i l l h
O O O 1ABLE4.3-2(Continued} ENGINEERED SAFETY TEA 1URE AC10AIION SYSTEM INSTRilE NIATION 50RVE1EGHCE REQUIHEHERTS E CllANNEL H00f 5 IN WillCll Z CilANNE L CilANHLL IUNCi10NAL SilRVEili ANCE w FUNCTIONAL UNIT CllECK CAllBRATION lE51 REQtilRED _
- 3. CONTAINHLNT ISOLATION
- a. Phase "A" Isolation
- 1) Hanual H.A. N.A. 8.M(1) 1, 2, 3, 4
- 2) From Safety injection N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3, 4 Automatic Actuation Logic
- b. Phase "B" Isolation
- 1) Hanual N.A. N.A. 8 E(1) I , 2, 3, 4
- 2) Automatic Actuation N.A. N.A. M(2) I, 2, 3, 4 Logic .
- 3) Containment Pressure-- S R gQ 1, 2, 3 liigh-liigh-liigh
- c. Purge and Exhaust isolation
- 1) Hanual N.A. N.A. d jf(l) 1, 2, 3, 4
- 2) Automatic Actuation Logic H.A. N.A. H(2) 1, 2, 3, 4 V t ~
k . t 4
_ ) '; i TABLE 4.
]'
" s continued) "
o j ENGINEERED SAFETY FEAIURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILEANCE~REQUIREHERT!f g 1 CllANNEL H0 DES IN WillCil CilANNEL CilANNEL FUNCIl0NAL
# FUNCIIONAL UNIT SURVElliANCE CilECK CAllBRATION TESI REQUIRED
- 4. %],EAM LINE ISOLATION r, ,
- a. H2nu.a1 N.A. N.A. d >ft l) 1, 2, 3 '
~
- b. Automat 1c Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3
- c. Containment Pressure-- S til Dh-III 9h R Jt* Q 1, 2, 3
- d. Steam Flow in Two Steam S Jt' Q R
Lines--liigh Coincident with 1, 2, 3 T,yg--Low-Low
; e. Steam Line Pressure--Low 5 R /Q 1,-2, 3
- 5. 1DRBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION
- a. Steam Generator Water 5 Level--High-liigh' R
Eq 1, 2, 3
+
,g 1 9
~I v- m e op 9 ,e sw -- -e t sip'g 7 t' sq**a* -y ,r c'v ume + r y i T* +-v=F $ y Wy 9 -ve es " T-' 4 m
- t' 14 9e 4*W'-*=9 es"t--a-- **-4'w' ver 's
- e e v se esresn-'uuu- d--- - - ----saa----- - " - = ' ' ^ * ' *
'O O O?
TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) h ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYF. TEM INSTRUMENTATION { SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENEliTS l h CHANNEL M00ES IN WHICH Q CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE m FUNCTIONAL UNIT- CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED
'6. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER
- a. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(2)(6) 1, 2, 3 l
- b. Steam Generator Water 5 R /k 1, 2, 3 Level--Low-Low
- c. Undervoltage - RCP N.A. R yQ 1
- d. S.I. .See 1 above (all SI survelliance requirements) w e. Trip of Main Feedwater N.A. M.A. S/U(5) 1 1 Pumps u
4, 7. , LOSS OF POWER
- a. 4.16 kw Emergency Bus N.A. R(3) M(4) 1, 2, 3, 4 ,
Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)
- g b. 4.16 kw Emergency Bus M.A. R(3) M(4) 1, 2, 3, 4
! g .Undervoltage (Degraded ' j g Voltage) a 5 8. ' ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE N.A. f g.A. N.A. R Jkff._ g ACTUATION SYSTEM INTERLOCKS C ( 4
TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) TABLE NOTATION O (1) Manual actuation switches shall be tested at least once per 18 months dyrino shutdown. A" :th:r :f reer/ ::;;;ict:d rith ;;... ;l ;;7., .. us fc+"-thr.05:?!7:::h: : C".'rl:L FLHCTIO"".L TEST et 1...i. ..s. ,.. 21 iy , (2) Each train or logic channel shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. (3) Channel calibration shall exclude actuation of the final trip actuation relay." (4) Functional testing shall consist of verification of relay operation upon removal of input voltage and operation of 2-out-of-3-logic excluding the final trip actuation relay." (5) If not performed in the previous 92 days. (6) Excluding automatic actuation logic for trip of main feedwater pumps. O
" Actuation of the final trip actuation relay shall be incluatd in response time testing.
FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 3-37 Amendment No.13
i c.anident .% metainig A cpproprie.fe. leel of relWil;t3 m&' ne "Reaclor Trip Sjstem And , En nemd . So.Cet3 fenfare. Aeloalion 53 skm o
#" *^ " ' " ' #^d I 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION _
BASES , 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensure {that 1) the associated > Engineered Safety Feature Actuation action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic ic rht:i=d,--0) :ttf- 0.ad
$ dficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testino or maintena,,n_pefen+4) sufficient system functional capability is e
available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters. , The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The 1 integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. The surveillane requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capa-bility is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the__ minimum frequencies are { sufficient to demonstrate this capability. The Engineered Safety Featur Actuation System interlocks perform the l functions indicated below on increasing the required parameter, consistent with the setpoints listed in Table 3.3-4: P-11 Defeats the manual block of safety injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure. P-12 Defeats the manual block of safety injection actuation on low steam line pressure. P-14 Trip of all feedwater pumps, turbine trip, closure of feedwater isolation valves and inhibits feedwater control valve modulation. On decreasing the required parameter the opposite function is performed at reset setpoints, with the exception of P-12 as noted below: P-12 Allows manual block of safety injection actuation on low steam line pressure. Causes steam line isolation on high steam flow. Affects steam dump blocks (i.e., prevents premature block of the noted function). O FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-1 l
l l JNSERT D O Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with WCAP-10271, " Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," and supplements to that report as approved by the NRC and documented in the SERs and SSER (letters to J. J. Sheppard from Cecil 0. Thomas dated February , 21, 1985; Roger A. Newton from Charles E. Rossi dated February 22, 1989; and l Gerard T. Goering from Charles E. Rossi dated April _30,1990). < i l O . O : 4
r-
, O O O -
iF.; . 7 TAlltE 3.3-1 (Continued) 2 M REACTOR _fRIP SYSIEH INSTHtMENIATION MINIMUM 10 tai. NO. Cl!ANNELS CilANNELS APPtICABLE FUNCIl0NAL UNil 0F Cil%NNELS TO 1 RIP OPERABLE HDDES ACTION
- 17. Turbine Trip A. Low Auto Stop Oil Pressure 3 2 1 7,
- 8. Turbine lhrottle Valve 4 4 ,4( 1 1 6M)
Closure ^ ^
- 18. Safety injection loput from ESF 2 1 2 1, 2 ,P II
- 19. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip .
A. Above P-8 1/ breaker 1 1/ breaker 1 10,
- 8. Above P-7 1/ breaker 2 1/ breaker i 11 t' per oper-
- ating loop T'
** 20. Reactor Trip System Interlocks A. Intermediate Range .
Neutron Flux, P-6 2 1 2 2, and" 8
- 8. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7 P-10 loput 4 2 3 1 8 P-13 Input 2 1 2 1 8 i C. Power Range Neutron .
Flux, P-8 4 2 3 1 8 D. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 (Input to P-7) 4 2 3 1. 2 8 E. Turbine impulse Chamber Pressure, P-13 2 1 2 1 8 F. Power Range Neutron 4 g 3 1 8 Flux, P y
O O O TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM M
- CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE TOTAL NO.
' OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION FUNCTIONAL UNIT E
C 17. Turbine Trip 2 1 7#
~ A. Low Auto Stop Oil Pressure 3 2 4 1 1 6# l B. Turbine Throttle Valve 4
-Closure
- 18. Safety Injection Input 1, 2 IS 2 1 2 l from ESF
- 19. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip 1/ breaker 1 10 A. Above P-8 1/ breaker 1 11#
B. Acove P-7 1/ breaker 2 1/ breaker 1 R per oper-
- ating loop T* 20. Reactor Trip System Interlocks A. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 2 1 2 2, and* 8 B_ low Power Reactor 8 P-10 Input 3 1 Trips Block, P-7 4 2 8
P-13 Input 2 1 2 1 C. Power Range Neutron 3 1 8 Flux, P-8 4 2 5 D. Power Range Neutron 8 3 1, 2 y Flux, P-10 (Input to P-7) 4 2
+
2 E. Turbine Impulse Chamber 8 Pressure, P-13 2 1 2 1 P F. Power Range' Neutron 8 Flux,' P-9 4- 2 3 1
. - .~ ,
.O O Oi TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) 4 5
p2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 9 ~d MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CilANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
- 21. Reactor Trip Breakers 2 1 2 1, 2 1, 14 3*, 4* , 5* 13
- 22. Automatic Trip Logic 2 1 2 1, 2 15 l 3*, 4*, 5* 13 w
Jm u, 5 m 5 5
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) TABLE NOTATION , i
- With the reactor trip. system breakers in the closed position, the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal, and fuel in the reactor vessel. ,
** The channel (s) associated with the protective functions derived from the out of service Reactor Coolant Loop shall be placed in the tripped condition.
t
# The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. ## High voltage to detector may be de-energized above P-6. ### Indication only. #### The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable if THERMAL POWER level 2: 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1. ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in.the tripped condition within 6 hours. l
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for l ,
surveillance testing of the other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.
- c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75%
of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux trip setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO from the remaining 3 detectors is monitored at least once per 12 hours per Specification 4.2.4.2. l i l l O AMENDMENT NO. FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 3-6 i I
'I a .,
+
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) O ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:
- a. Below the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 setpoint. ,
- b. Above the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint, but below 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the inoperable ;
channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing TPERMAL POWER l t above 5% of :"TED THERMAL POWER.
- c. Above 5% of 94P.D THERMAL POWER, POWER OPERATION may ,
continue. ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:
- a. Below the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 setpoint.
- b. Above the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint, O operation may continue.
ACTION 5 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, verify compliance with the SHUIDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, within I hour and at least once per 12 hours thereafter. ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may continue provided the inoperable channels are placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours. ACTION 7 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied: l
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.
4 FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 3-7 AMENDMENT N0. i l
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) i With the interlock inoperable to the extent that a reactor trip j i (] . ACTION 8 - which should not be blocked in the current MODE is blocked, declare the trip function inoperable and follow the ACTION l J statements of Table 3.3-1 for the affected channel (s). 1 Interlock Affected Channels on Table 3.3-1
- 1. P-6 a. Source Range, Neutron Flux Startup Shutdown
- 2. P-7 a. Low Reactor Coolant Loop Flow (2 loops)
- b. Undervoltage - Reactor Coolant Pumps -
- c. Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pumps
- d. Pressurizer Low Pressure
- e. Pressurizer High Level
- 3. P-8 a. Low Reactor Coolant Loop Flow (1 loop)
- 4. P-9 a. Turbine Trip
- 5. P-10 a. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux
- b. Power Range, Neutron Flux - Low Setpoint
- c. Source Range, Neutron Flux Startup Shutdown O d. P-7 (Item 2 above)
- 6. P-13 a. P-7 (Item 2 above)
ACTION 9 - With a channel associated with an operating loop inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours l or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; however, one channel associated with an operating loop may be bypassed for up to 4 l hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1. ACTION 10 - With one channel inoperable, restore the inopeiable channel to l OPERABLE . status within 6 hours or reduce THERMA. POWER to below the P-8 (Low Reactor Coolant Pump Flow and Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position) setpoint within the next 2 hours. Operation below the P-8 (Low Reactor Coolant Pump Flow and Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position) setpoint may continue purstant to ACTION 11. O AMENDMENT NO. FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 3-8
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) l ACTION 11 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, (di A operation may continue provided the . inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours. l ACTION 12 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE' requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours, or open the Reactor Trip System breakers within the next hour. , ACTION 14 - With one of the diverse trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable, the breaker may be considered OPERABLE provided that the diverse trip feature is restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours, or declare the breaker inoperable and apply ACTION 1. The breaker shall not be , bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status. ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in at least H0T STANDBY O within the next 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE. F FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 3-9 AMENDMENT NO. . 1 i,
x:
$s?
.Qi& kht 0
$$>, ^3E8' IMAGE EVALUATION Yy j qf?f d[Dj q[' gf/* TEST TARGET (MT-3) #g,
\7/77 9s%
k% i l 1.0 FN M ! s.ma !m L Lee um l l l.1 :
~
j lol._ts ; I 1.25 1.4 I l _I.6_ ld > 150mm I >
- 6"
,h S
//fh
"& # yy ,sfQ y , Dr&p, s p * $\\
inyy. - y,y
,7-s o g p ,; 8 oy/ r o
, ' 4-'
g#g w;. ,
?ln :;* ?$W. . _Lwa:Q%._.3y_yg_.gg&h&GQ_;%5h _;__ _ , , , . _,
~.
7
, q).
A A e~v o (O c. ,
"I '
IMAGE EVALUATION (%
\ '
'I?
- TEST TARGET (MT-3) f/
[ ' ift ^ db
\s\'f// 4, ,
q',/, sy gg%,", g
%g/g ~
I.0 3
~"
J. 2= 2_ Oi 2.0 l,l l!WE fil=t8 l a , 1.2 5 l i.4 !l i.6
;_ w=
150mm > - 6" -- JT %). r ss;; %, Ay ,
+44 ffjxg\
/4 og,/
, //, ,
O,yue ge
.. c k __N___'____________. _ _ _ f_: _ .__________6***
, . , , , , , _,_,-g,,_ _ ,
e,l f
'q,'
IMAGE EVALUATION #
/ /
a. y, \[gf TEST TARGET (MT-3) s . 74, g x% + jy a
& fe ,
Q@p 5: 9 R}gy*' <$!f,
' ~ '
l.0 22
^20 l,j u ec-
.t L8 7n m ij l.25 !!Il IA R I.6 u ___
mm =s y=, 4 - ---- -- 1 5 0 m n . --- 6" - - - - - - - - - - - - l
^
ep & <
, 7 a $6 p/.s%
d, , c.s f g;p s \
\
'f.
x. o%,,, . 4
O a a a.
'g ' IMAGE EVALUATION 1
/
e J'%
'} & /!g,- //// TEST TARGET (MT-3)
Rf/ f kQg ;$
~
l.0
, l: 2.2 ill2.0 l,l hMai M8-1.25 l.4 l;___ ! --
lglm.6 1 m i 4._ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ .__ 150mm > l - . _
& g'$
y n: p>,6 gg, fe sp Q ,. y y
/:///4 t' '
.l g
- t. lie ___ ' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __._
+Ds- _. 4 .t j____,...,,,,,
r- ' m TA 4.3-1 ,,- REACTOR 1 RIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED FUNCTIONAL UNIT [x N.A. N.A. R(ll), 1, 2
- 1. Manual Reactor Trip
' S/U(1)(12) 3 *, 4 *, 5*
E Z 2. Power Range, Neutron Flux m A. High S D(2), M(3) Q 1, I l and Q(6) B. Low S D(2),M(3) S/U(10) 2 and Q(6) N.A. 1, 2
- 3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High R(6) Q l Positive Rate 1, 2
- 4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High N.A R(6) Q l Negative Rate
}
- 5. Intermediate Range, Neutron R(6) S/U(10) 1, 2 and l Y S C Flux Q and S/U(10) 2, 3, 4,
- 6. Source Range, Neutron Flux S(7) R(6) 5, and
- l
- 7. Overtemperature AT S R Q 1, 2 R Q 1, 2
- 8. Overpower A " S 5 R l 5 9. Pressurizer Pressure--Low S Q M 1, 2 5 10. Pressurizer Pressure--High S R Q h 11. Pressurizer Water level--High S R Q l Loss of Flow - Single loop R Q l
- 12. A. S B. Loss of Flow - Two Leops S R N.A. 1
TABLE 4.3 (Continued) REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH m CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED $ FUNCTIONAL UNIT
- 13. Steam Generator Water Level-- S R Q 1, 2 l c low-Low 5
+ S R 1, 2 l
- 14. Steam /Feedwater Flow Mismatch Q N and Low Steam Generator Water Level
- 15. Undervoltage - Reactor Coolant N.A. R Q l l Pumps
- 16. Underfrequency - Reactor N.A. R Q l l Coolant Pumps
- 17. Turbine Trip A. Low Auto Stop 011 Pressure N.A. R S/U(9)(10) N.A.
- B. Turbine Throttle Valve N.A. R S/U(9)(10) N.A.
, Closure i U 18. Safety Injection Input from ESF N.A. N.A. R(4) 1, 2 l
- 19. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker N.A. N.A. R 1 Position Trip
- 20. Reactor Trip System Interlocks N.A. R S/U(8) 1
- 21. Reactor Trip Breaker N.A. N.A. M(5)(14)(15), 1, 2, S/U(1)(14)(15) 3*, 4*, 5*
- 22. Automatic Trip Logic N.A. N.A. M(5) 1 ,
- 23. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker N.A. N.A. (13), R(11) 1 ,
Ei
O O 0 TABLE 3.3-3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION E E-< MINIMUM
' TOTAL NO. CliANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION gi FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS CL n, 1. SAFETY INJECTION, TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION 2 1, 2, 3, 4 18
- a. Manual Initiation 2 1 Automatic Actuation 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 13 b.
Logic 3 2 2 1, 2, 3 19*
- c. Containment Pressure--High Pressurizer 3 2 2 1, 2, 3# 19*
2d d.
*- Pressure--Low w
- e. Differential 1, 2, 3 Pressure Between Steam Lines--High 2/ steam line 19* l Three Loops 3/ steam line 2/ steam line Operating twice and 1/3 steam lines 2/ operating 15 Two Loops 3/ operating 2 ### /steam Operating steam line line twice steam line
- gj in either gg operating gj steam line 5
, _ - ._-...,..m ._ .. . _ . _ . _ . . . _ . . _ _ - . . . _ , . . . . . _ _ . _ . . _ - , . - _ . _ _ . , , . , _ ..
O O O TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) , s ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION ie O MINIMUM
& CHANNELS APPLICABLE 5 TOTAL N0. CHANNELS
- OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION FUNCTIONAL UNIT N
Steam Line Pressure--Low 1, 2, 3## f. Three Loops 1 pressure / 1 pressure 1 pressure 19* l Operating loop any 2 loops any 2 loops Two Loops 1 pressure / 1### pressure 1 pressure 15 Operating loop in any oper- any operating ' ating loop loop
. 2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY
- a. Manual 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 18 w
1 2 1,2,3,4 13 w b. Automatic Actuation 2 1 g logic 2 3 1 , 2 ,- 3 16 c.- Containment Pressure-- 4 High-High-High 3E 5. x 5 n . -., .....sor
. , ~ . - - - ,
..m,,_,,,.-., . .,._..,w.,,,...,,....,y.~.e
+ , . , , _ , . . ,
. . _ . . , - , , . m.,. , .. . . , , . . . . . . . - , . , . , _ . , . , . . , . . . , . . .
O O O TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM k* TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE
' OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION FUNCTIONAL UNIT C
$ 4. STEAM LINE ISOLATION
~ 1, 2**, 3**
- a. Manual 1/ steam line 1/ steam line 1/ operating 22 steam line
- b. Automatic 2 1 2 1, 2**, 3** 21 Actuation Logic
- c. Containment Pressure-- 3 2 2 1, 2**, 3** 19* l High-High
- d. Steam Flow in Two 1, 2**, 3**
Steam Lines--High R. z Three Loops 2/ steam line 1/ steam line 1/ steam line 19* l 5f g Operating any 2 steam lines Two Loops 2/ operating 1 ###/any 1/ operating 15 Operating steam line operating steam line steam line COINCIDENT WITH Tavg--Low-low 1, 2**, 3** Three Loops 1 Tavg any 1 Tavg any 19* k 1 Tavg/ loop 2 loops 2 loops l g Operating a: G [ Two Loops 1 Tavg/oper- 188# Tavg 1 Tav in any 15 o Operating ating loop in any oper- operakingloop ating loop . . _ - _ _ , _ . - . _ _ _- _. ._- - - . . ~ _ . _ . . . - . _, _ _ ___ __ _ -~ . _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ .
O O O TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) m ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION i E R MINIMUM
- TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE
' FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION E
Z e. Steam Line Pressure-- 1, 2**, 38#,**
~ Low Three Loops 1 pressure / 1 pressure 1 pressure 19* l Operating loop any 2 loops any 2 loops Two Loops 1 pressure / 1### pressure 1 pressure 15 Operating operating in any oper- any operating .
loop ating loop loop , 5. TURBINE TRIP & FEEDWATER ISOLATION
- a. Steam Generator 3/ loop 2/ loop in 2/ loop in 1, 2 19* l Y Water Level-- any oper- each oper-0 High-High ating loop ating loop-N 5x 5
.-m__ - - _ , _ __ . _ _ _ . _ . . .s r , m. , -_ c., . , ,,.,.-yy.. , .,e y .., . ,,.__,,,y, , , , . , . . . , y _ . , , , , , . , ,,,,, . . , , . . ,,,,,,,y..
O O O TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) 9 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION , ie
? MINIMUM c- TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE
- OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION FUNCTIONAL UNIT
- 6. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER
- a. Automatic Actuation Logic 2 1 2 1,2,3 21
- b. Stm. Gen. Water level--Low-Low i . Start Motor-Driven Pumps 3/stm. gen. 2/stm. gen. 2/stm. gen. 1, 2, 3 19* l any stm. gen.
w i i. Start Turbine-1 Driven Pumps 3/stm. gen. 2/stm. gen. 2/stm. gen. 1, 2, 3 19* l w any 2 sim. gen. 4
~
- c. Undervoltage-RCP Start Turbine-Driven Pump 3-2/ bus 2 2 1 19 l
- d. S.I.
Start Motor-Driven Pumps See 1 above (all S.I. initiating functions and requirements)
- e. Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps 3E Start Motor-9 Driven Pumps 2/ pump 1/ pump 1/ pump 1 . 23*
5 m----_, nu. -- e- ar-- --n w- .-,,x- u .w w ~e em- -w> -a v.-- + - - - - , - . - - , - - -e- n = .;,~~+,-mams .wws- - r n -1mwN,,..me u e --o m a,- w --me,+,---e wm-- - - - - ~em. ,~e.<ew--
. O O O '
TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) s: ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
- ??
[2 MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE J: ACTION 25 FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES w
- 7. LOSS OF POWER
- a. 4 kv Bus 3/ Bus 2/ Bus 2/ Bus 1, 2, 3, 4 24* l Loss of Voltage
- b. Grid Degraded Voltage 3/ Bus 2/ Bus 2/ Bus 1, 2, 3, 4 24* l
- 8. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INTERLOCKS
- a. Pressurizer Pressure, 3 2 2 1,2,3 20 w P-11 1 2 1, 2, 3 20
- b. Low-Low Tavg, P-12 3 2 y,
- c. Steam Generator (See 5.a above)
Level, P-14
- d. Reactor Trip, P-4 2 1 2 1, 2, 3 13 B!
G e E 5 ew ~~. -e- . . * < . ,e,-> e, s - -.-, - , - ,-m-- .cr w ,--wr- ...,...%-w , , , . . -- % e w..,s., ., -. v.m-,--- -,,w-.- .+,,.4,w -- ,~.ee -i..-.-wam...e.4 --, - - . - ,
TABLE 3,3-3 (Continued) TABLE NOTATION .O # Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Block of Safety Injection) setpoint.
## Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below P-12 (Tayg Block of Safety Injection) setpoint. ### The channel (s) associated with the protective functions derived from the out of service Reactor Coolant Loop shall be placed in the tripped mode.
- The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
** Not applicable if main steam isolation valves are closed.
ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hour'. for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE. O action 24 - oeieted- 1 ACTION 15 - With a channel associated with an operating loop inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours l or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours; however, one channel associated with an operating loop may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1. l a ACTION 16 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel < is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels ' OPERABLE requirement is met; one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification l' ; 4.3.2.1. i ACTION 17 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue . provided the containment purge and exhaust valves are maintained l closed. J 1 ACTION 1B - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum ' Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within ; the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. l l FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 3-23 AMENDMEtT NO. l l A
a i TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) (~ ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number e
\ of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within !
6 hours, and l
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, th. .
inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for l : surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1. , ACTION 20 - With the interlock inoperable to the extent that a safeguards function which should not be blocked in the curro MODE is blocked, declare the safeguard function (s) inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement (s) of Table 3.3-3 for the affected function (s). Interlock Affected Channels on Table 3.3-3 -
- 1. P-ll a. Pressurizer Pressure--Low
- 2. P-12 a. Steam Line Pressure--Low :
- b. Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines High Coincident with T avg --LOW-LOW i ACTION 21 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum O Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in at least HOT STANDCY within the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other channel is OPEPABLE.
ACTION 22 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. ACTION 23 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TE5T. ACTION 24 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number af Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the , followng conditions are satisfied: I
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channel OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification !
4.3.2.1. FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 3-24 AMENDMENT NO.
O O O TABLE 4.3-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS - 5 is m
' CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE E FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED -4 N
- 1. SAFETY INJECTION, TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION
- a. Manual Initiation N.A. N.A. R(1) 1, 2, 3, 4 l
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3, 4
- c. Containment Pressure--High S R Q 1,2,3 l
- d. Pressurizer Pressure--Low S R Q 1, 2, 3 l
- e. Differential Pressure 'S R Q 1, 2, 3 l Between Steam Lines--High
- f. Steam Line Pressure--Low S R Q 1,2,3 l
- 2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY
- a. Manual Initiation N.A. N.A. R(1) 1, 2, 3, 4 .l
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3, 4
> c. Containment Pressure-- S R Q 1, 2, 3 l
.@ High-High-High 63 b 5
. . . . _ . -4 . . .#. .. , ~.. y - . . , . . , -.4 , . .-.. ~. . -. . .
, , . . . . , . -~,e,... , _ . . _ . . . ~ ,s, , ._..m....,_m . ,_#_,--
\
a: O O O TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)
!! ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION '
p; SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS i Ei MODES IN WHICH
- q CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE n, FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED
- 3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
- a. Phase "A" Isolation
- 1) Manual N.A. N.A. R(1) 1, 2, 3, 4 l
- 2) From Safety Injection N.A N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3, 4 Automatic Actuation Logic
- b. Phase "B" Isolation
}{
y> 1) Manual N.A. N.A. R(1) 1, 2, 3, 4 l
- 2) Automatic Actuation N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3, 4 Logic
- 3) Containment Pressure-- S R Q 1, 2, 3 l High-High-High
- c. Purge and Exhaust Isolation
,, 1) Manual N.A. N.A. R(1) 1, 2, 3, 4 l-2:
!! 2) Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3, 4 5
. - - - - - - _ _ . - _ _ _ - - - - . , . -- - - - - - - * ,..ns, , .- ~.e,.w ,e., .no ,. -n _.a, , , .,ya.. , _ _ , , , ,,
A O Il V U v TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION g SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS P Q CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH E CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE Z FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST RE0VIRED N
- 4. STEAM LINE ISOLATION
- a. Manual N.A. N.A. R(1) 1, 2, 3 l
- b. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3
- c. Containment Pressure-- S R Q 1, 2, 3 l High-High
- d. Steam Flow in Two Steam S R Q I, 2, 3 l M Lines--High Coincident with Tavg --LOW-LOW
$ e. Steam Line Pressure--Low S R Q 1,2,3 .l
- 5. TURBINF TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION
- a. Steam Generator Water S R Q 1, 2, 3 l Level--High-High E
2 E ' 2 5
O O O-TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION g SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS
?? ?
CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH E CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE Z FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED
~
- 6. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER
- a. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(2)(6) 1, 2, 3
- b. Steam Generator Water S R Q 1, . 2, 3 l Level--Low-Low
- c. Undervoltage - RCP N.A. R Q l l
- d. S.I. See 1 above (all SI surveillance requirements)
- e. Trip of Main Feedwater N.A. N.A. S/U(5) 1
{ e Pumps
- 7. LOSS OF POWER
- a. 4.16 kv Emergency Bus N.A. R(3) M(4) 1, 2, 3, 4 Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)
- b. 4.16 kv Emergency Bus N.A. R(3) M(4) 1, 2, 3, 4 Undervoltage (Degraded g Voltage) 5 8. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE N.A. R N.A. N.A. l M ACTUATION SYSTEM INTERLOCKS 5
5 , ,w-w+w. - - - e , - ,. - ---mt + + +,e e . - - - ..-,.-ww.w', - .. w.-+ , , + -w.w--
- w. - , - e-,~w. - ,-4,., ~ . - --.,v- . . ..- .. ,-
TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) 1 (]) , TABLE NOTATION l (1) Manual actuation switches shall be tested at least once per 18 months during shutdown. l ; (2) Each train or logic channel shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. (3) Channel calibration shall exclude actuation of the final trip actuation rel ay.* t (4) functional testing shall consist of verification of relay operation , upon removal of input voltage and operation of 2-out-of-3 logic > excluding the final trip actuation relay.* ; (5) If not performed in the previous 92 days. - (6) Excluding automatic actuation logic for trip of main feedwater pumps. l O . h i a I h r
- Actuation of the final trip actuation relay shall be included in response - !
time testing. ( l FARLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 3-37 AMENDMENT NO. P
3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION ; The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation l System instrumentation and interlocks ensures that 1) the associated Engineered : i Safety Feature Actuation action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the ' parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint,
- 2) the specified coincidence logic and sufficient redundancy is maintained to !
permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance consistent with i maintaining an appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Trip System and i Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System instrumentation and, 3) sufficient . system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from l diverse parameters. The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall
- reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The ,
integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capa- bility is maintained j comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance O outage times have been determined in accordance with WCAP-10271, " Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection , Instrumentation System," and supplements to that report as approved by the NRC and documented in the SERs and SSER (letters to J. J. Sheppard from Cecil 0. Thomas dated February 21, 1985; Roger A. Newton from Charles E. Rossi dated February 22, 1989; and Gerard T. Goering from Charles E. Rossi dated April 30, l 1990). The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System interlocks perform the l functions indicated below on increasing the required parameter, consistent with : the setpoints listed in Table 3.3-4: , P-11 Defeats the manual block of safety injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure. P-12 Defeats the manual block of safety injection actuation on low steam , line pressure. P-14 Trip of all feedwater pumps, turbine trip, closure of feedwater ! isolation valves and inhibits feedwater control valve modulation. On decreasing the required parameter the opposite function is performed at reset ' setpoints, with the exception of P-12 as noted below: P-12 Allows manual block of safety injection actuation on low steam line pressure. Causes steam line isolation on high steam flow. Affects : s steam dump blocks (i.e., prevents premature block of the noted function). FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT NO. ;
ATTACHMENT 2 T SAFETY ANALYSIS (s"J JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT > REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM AND , ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE FRE00ENCIES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES PROPOSED CHANGES: The proposed revisions to Technical Specification 3/4.3.1 for both units , include: (i) Increase in surveillance intervals for Reactor Trip System (RTS) CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS from once per month to once per quarter (Functional Units 2. A, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9,10,11,12. A,13,14,15, 16), (ii) Increase in the time that an inoperable RTS channel may be maintained in an untripped condition from ] hour to 6 hours (ACTIONS 2, 7, and 11). (iii) Increase in the time that an inoperable RTS channel may be bypassed to allow testing of another channel in the same function from 2 hours to 4 hours (ACTIONS 2, 7, 9, and new ACTION 15). (iv) New ACTION 15 to be added to allow 6 hours to restore an inoperable channel to operable status before requiring action to
'O be taken to achieve HOT STANDBY. The new ACTION 15 is now made applicable to Functional Units 18 (Safety Injection Input from ESF) and 22 (Automatic Trip Logic), rather than ACTION 1. ACTIONS 9 and 10 are also revised to allow 6 hours to restore an l inoperable channel to operable status before requiring action to be taken to achieve HOT STANDBY.
(v) Replacement of ACTION 6, which is not currently used at Farley, with new Action 6 applicable to Functional Unit 17.B. (vi) Revision to ACTION 7 to delete the provision that STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue until the next CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and to add the requirement that the minimum number of channels must be met. (vii) Revision to the requirement that the surveillance should be performed during STARTUP if not performed during the previous 31 days rather than the previous 7 days (Functional Units 5, 6,17.A and 17.B). (viii) Change the Minimum Channels Operable for the reactor trip functional unit Turbine Trip by Turbine Throttle Valve Closure from 4 to 1 (Functional Unit 17.8). (ix) Change the Channel Calibration for the reactor trip functional unit Turbine Trip by Low Auto 5 top Oil Pressure and Turbine O Throttle Valve Closure from N.A. to refueling (Functional Units 17.A and 17.B).
^
SAFETY ANALYSIS . j
. RTS AND ESFAS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES :
PAGE 2 (x) Change the Channel Functional Test for the reactor trip by Safety ! Injection Input from ESF from monthly to refueling (Functional l Unit 18). ;
~!
The proposed revisions to Technical Specification 3/4.3.2 for both units - include i (i) Increase in surveillance intervals for Engineered Safety Feature. l Actuation. System (ESFAS) CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS from once per ! month to once per quarter (Functional ~ Units 1.c, l.d, l.e, l.f, 2.c, 3.b.3, 4.c, 4.d, 4.e, 5.a, 6.b, and 6.c). 1 l (ii) Increase in the time that an inoperable ESFAS channel may be i maintained in an untripped condition from I hour to 6 hours 1 (ACTION 19 and new ACTION 24). (iii) Increase in the time that an inoperable ESFAS channel may be bypassed to allow testing of another channel in the same function from 2 hours to 4 hours (ACTIONS 13, 15, 16, 19, and 21). (iv) Revision to ACTIONS 13, 15 and 21 to allow 6 hours to restore an ; inoperable Channel to OPERABLE status before requiring shutdown to ; HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. ! O (v) Additien of new AC1 ION 24 te ellow STAR 1Ur eedfor e0wER OeERATION to proceed when the number of OPERABLE channels is one less than the Total Number of Channels provided certain conditions are met. Make new ACTION 24 applicable to Functional Units 7.a (Loss of Power - 4 kv Bus Loss of Voltage) and 7.b (Loss of Power - Degraded Grid Voltage), rather than ACTION 19. (vi) Delete ACTION 14 which is no longer used. Functional Units which used ACTION 14 are now applied to other ACTIONS. (vii) Change the Minimum Channels Operable for Steam Line Isolation by Containment Pressure--High-High from 3 to 2 (Functional Unit 4.c). (viii) Change the ESFAS Interlock Channel Calibration from N.A. to refueling and the Channel Functional Test from refueling to N.A. (Functional Unit 8). (ix) Change the Channel Functional Test for the Manual Initiation ESFAS functions from monthly to refueling (Functional Units 1.a, 2.a, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, and 4.a) and revise Table 4.3-2 Notation No.l. The proposed revisions also include revisions to the 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION Bases. O
SAFETY ANALYSIS r RTS AND ESFAS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES i Page 3 'i W , BACKGROUND: l In response to growing concerns of the impact of current testing and l maintenance requirements on plant operation, particularly as related to : instrumentation systems, the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) initiated a program to develop a justification to be used for revising generic and plant specific instrumentation Technical Specifications. Operating plants have experienced many inadvertent reactor trips and safeguards actuations during performance of instrumentation surveillance, causing unnecessary transients and challenges to safety systems. Significant time and effort on the part of ' the operating staff was devoted to performing, reviewing, documenting and ' tracking the various surveillance activities, which in many instances, seemed unwarranted based on the high reliability of the equipment. Significant i benefits for operating plants appeared to be achievable through revision of [ instrumentation test and maintenance requirements. As a result of these , concerns and potential benefits, analyses were performed which demonstrated t that relaxations in such items as surveillance intervals and Allowed Outage
- Times were achievable without compromising plant safety. The initial issue of ,
WCAP-10271 and its Supplement 1 addressed the potential relaxations for the i Reactor Trip System, while Supplement 2 addressed the potential relaxations for the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System. The NRC issued the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for WCAP-10271 and WCAP-10271 Supplement 1 on February 21, 1985. The SER approved quarterly O testing, 6 hours to place a failed channel in a tripped mode, increased Allowed Outage Time (A0T) for test and maintenance, and testing in bypass.for l RTS analog channels. The SER conditions required quarterly testing to be ; conducted on a staggered basis. Also, the approved relaxations could not be - applied to ESFAS functions in analog channels shared by the RTS. ' The NRC issued the SER for WCAP-10271 Supplement 2 and WCAP-10271 Supplement l 2, Revision 1 on February 22, 1989. This SER approved quarterly testing, 6 .; hours to place a failed channel in a tripped mode, increased A0T for test and maintenance, and testing in bypass for ESFAS analog channels. The ESFAS l functions approved in the SER were those presented in Appendix Al of the - referenced WCAPs. (These functions are all included in the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications.) The SER also approved extended A0T for the ESFAS logic. Staggered testing was not required for ESFAS analog ! channels. In addition, the staggered testing requirement was removed from the RTS analog channels. On April 30, 1990 the NRC issued the Supplemental SER. (SSER) for WCAP-10271 Supplement 2 and WCAP-10271 Supplement 2, Revision 1. The SSER approved ; Surveillance Time Interval (STI) and A0T extensions for the ESFAS f O ;
l SAFETY ANALYSIS- . RTS AND ESFAS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES Page 4 : O , functions which were included in Appendix A2 of WCAP-10271 Supplement 2, Revision 1. The functions approved are associated with the Safety Injection, Steam Line Isolation, Main Feedwater Isolation, and Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Start signals. The configurations contained in Appendix A2 are those that are ; not contained in the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications. The SSER also approved extended A0T for the RTS logic. With the issuance of the February 1989 SER and April 1990 SSER, the _ relaxations for the RTS and ESFAS analog channels are now the same and the special condition applied to shared analog channels is no longer applicable. In addition, the A0Ts for test and maintenance of RTS and ESFAS Automatic' - Actuation Logic are also now the same. No plant modifications are required to
- implement the items requested in this proposed technical specification change.
Increased A0T and allowed testing in bypass mode due to an inoperable channel will be accomplished with the present plant configuration. (At the present time FNP does not plan to implement the hardware modifications necessary to i allow routine testing in bypass as described in the referenced WCAPs.) DISCUSSION: In WCAP-10271 and its supplements, the WOG evaluated the impact of the ; proposed STI and A0T changes on Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and public risk. The NRC Staff concluded in its evaluations that an overall upper bound of the y CDF increase due to the proposed STI/A0T changes is less than 6 percent for Westinghouse PWRs. The NRC Staff also concluded that actual CDF increases for , individual plants are expected to be substantially less than 6 percent. The NRC Staff considered this CDF increase to be small compared to the range of , uncertainty in the CDF analyses and therefore acceptable. The NRC Staff concluded that implementation of a staggered test strategy for both the ESFAS , and RTS analog channels is not a requirement. This conclusion was based on the : small relative contribution of the analog channels to RTS/ESFAS ! unavailability, process parameter signal diversity, and normal operational testing sequencing. The proposed changes for Farley Nuclear Plant are consistent with the NRC letters dated February 21, 1985, February 22, 1989, and April 30, 1990 to the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) regarding the evaluation of WCAP-10271; WCAP-10271 Supplement 1; WCAP-10271 Supplement 2; and WCAP-10271 Supplement 2, Revision 1, wherein the Staff stated that approval of these changes is contingent upon confirmation that certain conditions are met. Several of the conditions were only applied to the RTS instrumentation in the NRC SER on WCAP-10271 and the corresponding Supplement 1, although these conditions , f O
w'
}
I SAFETY ANALYSIS RTS AND ESFAS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES ; Page 5 ! O ' might equally apply to the ESFAS instrumentation. Therefore, where appropriate, Southern Nuclear has also applied those conditions to the ESFAS i instrumentation. The Southern Nuclear response to each condition is provided
- in the following sections. j RTS SER Conditions (February 21. 1985) >
- 1. SER Condition - The RTS SER required the use of the staggered test plan for the RTS channels changed to the quarterly test frequency. In j the ESFAS SER, this requirement was removed for RTS channels.
Southern Nuclear Response - Since the extended RTS surveillance , frequencies and test and maintenance times have never been requested + for Farley, this condition is not applicable. -!
- 2. SER Condition - The RTS SER required implementation or confirmation of plant procedures that identify / evaluate common cause RPS channel l failures and specify additional testing for plausible common cause !
failures. ! i Southern Nuclear Response - Existing Farley procedures require l RTS/ESFAS failures to be evaluated for common cause. The evaluation ; considers other RTS/ESFAS channels which may be impacted by the ) O identified failure mechanism. Corrective action includes additional requirements to test other channels, if necessary. 1
- 3. SER Condition - NRC Staff stated in the RTS SER that approval of l routine channel testing in a bypassed condition is contingent on the !
capability of the RTS design to allow such testing without lifting i leads or installing tempcrary jumpers. ; Southern Nuclear Response - In the present Farley design configuration, only the NIS Source Range High Flux and Intermediate l Range High Flux Reactor Trip signals and the Containment Pressure-- - High-High-High Containment Spray Actuation signal incorporate a bypass l testing hardware feature. FNP does not plan to implement routine l testing in bypass of additional RTS/ESFAS functions at this time. ! However, due to the potential of having to perform periodic [ surveillance testing while one channel in the trip system is ' inoperable, ACTIONS 2, 7, 9 and 15 in Table 3.3-1 and ACTIONS 13,15, , 16,19, and 21 in Table 3.3-3 have been revised or added to allow a bypass time of 4 hours for surveillance testing of the remaining ! operable channels for a given trip function. This situation is ! non-routine and applies to' a failed channel which must be bypassed to ; facilitate surveillance of the other channels associated with a given ! trip system function. For this unique situation, the channel cannot be assumed operable and is therefore considered to be in a state of f' O bypass during the surveillance of the other associated channels, which is in accordance with the Standard Technical Specifications. - L
SAFETY ANALYSIS- i RTS AND ESFAS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES Page 6 t
- 4. SER Condition - The RTS SER indicated that the approval of items'which .
extend surveillance testing intervals and allowable outage times apply F only to the RTS functions for channels that provide dual inputs to i other safety-related systems such as ESFAS. i Southern Nuclear Response - The STI and A0T extensions approved.in the February 1989 and April 1990 ESFAS SERs for the ESFAS analog channels. l are now the same as the RTS extensions and thus this SER condition is ; no longer applicable. ; S. SER Condition - NRC Staff stated in the RTS SER that acceptance was ! contingent on confirmation that the instrument setpoint methodology : includes sufficient margin to offset the drift anticipated as a result of less frequent surveillance. l Southern Nuclear Response - Eighteen months (August 1989 - March 1991) l of Unit 1 RTS/ESFAS monthly surveillance test data was evaluated. The .) evaluation concluded the assumed rack drift uncertainty allowances .: used in the Farley specific RTS/ESFAS setpoint study will bound the ! expected rack drift which would be incurred by changing to a quarterly ; surveillance schedule. ESFAS SER and SSER Conditions (February 22. 1989 and Aoril 30. 1990) O 1. SER Condition - NRC Staff stated in the ESFAS SER that the licensee. l must confirm the applicability of the generic analyses to the plant. t i Southern Nuclear Response - The generic analyses used in WCAP-10271 l and its supplements are applicable to FNP. Farley is a three loop ; Westinghouse PWR that uses the Westinghouse 7300 Process Control l System and the Westinghouse Solid State Protection System (SSPS) for j both the ESFAS and the RTS.. Both of these systems were specifically ~ modeled in the generic analyses. The RTS and ESFAS functional units implemented at FNP are all addressed by the generic analyses. In addition, the Reactor Coolant Pump UF and UV, and Turbine Trip Reactor Trip functional units were included in the generic RTS models.
- 2. SER Condition - NRC Staff stated in the ESFAS SER that the licensee -l must confirm that any increase in instrument drift due to the extended '
STIs is properly accounted for in the setpoint calculation methodology. Southern Nuclear Response - As previously discussed, Southern Nuclear has determined the uncertainty allowances used in the plant setpoint study properly account for rack drift due to the extended STIs. O l l l
. .- _. -___________A
i I 1 SAFETY ANALYSIS t RTS AND ESFAS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES a L Page 7 I Safety Improvements , Implementation of the proposed changes is expected to result in an overall improvement in safety because: o less frequent testing will potentially result in fewer , inadvertent reactor trips and ESF component actuations; :; o longer allowed outage times provide for better problem ! assessments and easier repairs, ultimately resulting in better equipment performance; and 'l o less frequent distraction of the plant operators to attend to and to support instrumentation testing will improve the , effectiveness of the operating staff in monitoring and ; controlling plant operation. i MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE CHANGES: The proposed change to Table 3.3-1 Functional Unit 17.B, where the Minimum ' Channels Operable was revised from 4 to 1, is included to provide plant operating flexibility commensurate with the design basis for this diverse ' trip function, i.e., the turbine trip reactor trip function is not credited as a primary trip in the accident analyses. By design, 4 out of 4 channels ;
'O are required to trip to satisfy the RTS Turbine Throttle Valve Closure reactor trip logic. The current Farley Technical Specifications stipulate l
that an inoperable channel must be placed in trip; should a second channel : fail, the Farley specifications have no provisions. As a result, shutdown ' of the affected unit would be required. By implementing the proposed ; Minimum Channels Operable requirement of I channel, and new action No. 6, both of which are based on Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications, l any failed channel is required to be placed in the tripped condition within f 6 hours, thereby, maximizing plant operating flexibility consistent with ' the design basis. . The proposed change to Table 3.3-1 Functional Unit 4.c, where the Minimum Channels Operable was revised from 3.to 2, is included to correct a previous error. By design, any 2 out of 3 channels are required to trip to satisfy the ESFAS Containment Pressure--High-High actuation logic; therefore, two channels are required to be operable as a minimum, provided that a failed channel is placed in trip. This satisfies the single failure criteria for the function. Action No. 19 in the proposed specifications ! l requires a failed channel to be placed in trip within 6 hours. CHANNEL CALTBRATION AND CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST CHANGES: The proposed change to Table 4.3-1 Functional Units 17. A and 17.B, where the Channel Calibration requirement is revised from N.A. to refueling, reflects the assumptions in WCAP-10271, which defines a Channel Calibration each cycle for the turbine trip reactor trip function. This change O conforms to Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications. The change is also consistent with the current Farley calibration practice for turbine control oil pressure switches and throttle valve closure limit switches. l
SAFETY ANALYSIS RTS AND ESFAS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES PAGE 8 The proposed change to Table 4.3-1 Functional Unit 18, where the Channel Functional Test for the safety injection ESF input for reactor trip, is revised from monthly to refueling to clarify what testing is required and when the testing is performed. The manual safety injection input signal is provided by 1 of 2 main control board hand switches. As indicated by footnote No. 4, these switches can only be functionally tested during plant. shutdown conditions. The automatic safety injection ESF inputs for reactor trip are included in the SSPS logic circuits. These inputs are tested utilizing the SSPS semiautomatic tester in each train on a staggered bi-monthly basis as required by the Channel Functional Test surveillance of Functional Unit 22, which is the automatic trip logic test. This change is consistent with Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications and the assumptions of WCAP-10271. The proposed change to Table 4.3-2 Functional Unit 8, where the Channel Calibration requirement is revised from N.A. to refueling and the Channel Functional Test requirement is revised from refueling to N.A., clarifies what tests are required and when the tests are performed. The proposed changes are in concert with the NRC SER for WCAP-10271. A calibration frequency of once per cycle for the ESF interlocks P-11, P-12, and P-14 is consistent with Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications and Farley surveillance practices. By definition, a Channel Calibration includes the performance of a Channel Functional Test. In addition, FNP Technical Specification 4.3.2.2 explicitly requires the functional demonstration of O the total ESF interlock function once per eighteen months. These functional tests also include P-4, such that all ESF interlocks are tested once per cycle. Furthermore, specification 4.3.2.2 requires periodic surveillance of the ESF interlock actuation logic in conjunction with the bi-monthly SSPS logic testing. The proposed change to Table 4.3-2 Functional Units 1.a 2.a, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, ; 3.c.1, and 4.a, where the Channel Functional Test for the ESF manual : initiation functions (safety injection, containment spray, phase-A ' isolation, phase-B isolation, purge isolation, and steam line isolation) is revised from monthly to refueling, clarifies what testing is required and when the testing is performed. The manual ESF signals are initiated by i actuation of main control board hand switches. As indicated by footnote . No.1, these switches can only be functionally tested during plant shutdown conditions, which reflects the Farley as-built design. Footnote No. I and , the present functional test requirement also specify that all other circuitry associated with manual safeguards actuation must be tested once , per month; however, this requirement is not applicable to an SSPS plant i such as Farley, in that all other associated circuits are part of the ' automatic actuation logic which is tested on a staggered bi-monthly basis. l Therefore, footnote No. 1 is also revised, by deleting any reference to ' associated circuits, to ensure the proposed revisions from monthly to refueling surveillance for the ESF manual initiation functions are in agreement. This change is consistent with the surveillance requirements in the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications. l l I
ATTACHMENT 3 1 O SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION EVALUATION PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 50.92 ; JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT I REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM AND ! ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM : SURVEILLANCE FRE0VENCIES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES , PROPOSED CHANGES: The proposed revisions to Technical Specification 3/4.3.1 for both units include: (i) Increase in surveillance intervals for Reactor Trip System (RTS) CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS from once per month to once per quarter (Functional Units 2. A, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. A, 13, 14, 15, 16). t (ii) Increase in the time that an inoperable RTS channel may be maintained in an untripped condition from I hour to 6 hours (ACTIONS 2, 7, and 11). (iii) Increase in the time that an inoperable RTS channel may be bypassed to allow testing of another channel in the same function from 2 r hours to 4 hours (ACTIONS 2, 7, 9, and new ACTION 15). O <iv) New AC1 ION 15 to be edded to eliow 6 hours to restore an ieoPerebie channel to operable status before requiring action to be taken to achieve HOT STANDBY. The new ACTION 15 is now made applicable to Functional Units 18 (Safety Injection Input from ESF) and 22 (Automatic Trip Logic), rather than ACTION 1. ACTIONS 9 and 10 are also revised to allow 6 hours to restore an inoperable channel to operable status before requiring action to be taken to achieve HOT , STANDBY. ! (v) Replacement of ACTION 6, which is not currently used at Farley, , with new ACTION 6 applicable to Functional Unit 17.B. (vi) Revision to ACTION 7 to delete the provision that STARlVP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue until the next CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and to add the requirement that the minimum number of channels must be met. . (vii) Revision to the requirement that the surveillance should be :' performed during STARTUP if not performed during the previous 31 days rather than the previous 7 days (Functional Units 5, 6, 17.A and 17.8). (viii) Change the Minimum Channels Operable for the reactor trip functional unit Turbine Trip by Turbine Throttle Valve Closure from 4 to 1 (Functional Unit 17.B). (ix) Change the Channel Calibration for the reactor trip functional unit Turbine Trip by Low Auto Stop 011 Pressure and Turbine Throttle Valve Closure from N. A. to refueling (Functional Units 17.A and 17.B). I.
l SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION EVALUATION RTS AND ESFAS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES o Pag (x)e 2Change the Channel Functional Test for the reactor trip by Safety Injection Input from ESF from monthly to refueling (Functional Unit 18). The proposed revisions to Technical Specification 3/4.3.2 for both units include: (i) Increase in surveillance intervals for Engineered Safety Feature Actuat;on System (ESFAS) CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS from once per month to once per quarter (Functional Units 1.c,1.d,1.e,1.f, 2.c, 3.b.3, 4.c, 4.d, 4.e, 5.a. 6.b, and 6.c). (ii) Increase in the time that an inoperable ESFAS channel may be maintained in an untripped condition from I hour to 6 hours (ACTION 19 and new ACTION 24). (iii) Increase in the time that an inoperable ESFAS channel may be bypassed to allow testing of another channel in the same function i from 2 hours to 4 hours (ACTIONS 13, 15, 16, 19, and 21). (iv) Revision to ACTIONS 13, 15 and 21 to allow 6 hours to restore an inoperable Channel to OPERABLE status before requiring shutdown to HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. (v) Addition of new ACTION 24 to allow STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION O to proceed when the number of OPERABLE channels is one less than the Total Number of Channels provided certain conditions are met. Make new ACTION 24 applicable to Functional Units 7.a (Loss of Power - 4 kv Bus Loss of Voltage) and 7.b (Loss of Power - Degraded Grid Voltage), rather than ACTION 19. (vi) Delete ACTION 14 which is no longer used. Functional Units which , used ACTION 14 are now applied to other ACTIONS. (vii) Change the Minimum Channels Operable for Steam Line Isolation by l Containment Pressure--High-High from 3 to 2 (Functional Unit 4.c). l l (viii) Change the ESFAS Interlock Channel Calibration from N.A. to l refueling and the Channel Functional Test from refueling to N.A. (Functional Unit 8). (ix) Change the Channel Functional Test for the Manual Initiation ESFAS functions from monthly to refueling (Functional Units 1.a, 2.a. 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, and 4.a) and revise Table 4.3-2 Notation No.l. The proposed revisions also include revisions to the 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION Bases. O
7 j SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION EVALUATION -j RTS AND ESFAS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES j Page 3 l j i BACKGROUND: Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Outaae Times Chanaes In response to growing concerns of the impact of current testing and I maintenance requirements on plant operation, particularly as related to . instrumentation systems, the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) initiated a program to develop a justification to be used for revising generic. and plant specific instrumentation Technical Specifications. Operating plants have ; experienced many inadvertent reactor trips and safeguards actuation during -j performance of instrumentation surveillance, causing unnecessary transients and challenges to safety systems. Significant time and effort on the part of the operating staff was devoted to performing, reviewing, documenting and ; tracking the various surveillance activities, which in many instances, seemed unwarranted based on the high reliability of the equipment. Significant benefits for operating plants appeared to be achievable through revision of , instrumentation test and maintenance requirements. As a result of these : concerns and potential benefits, analyses were performed which demonstrated 1 that relaxations in such items as surveillance intervals and Allowed Outage ; Times were achievable without compromising plant safety. The initial issue of WCAP-10271 and its Supplement 1 addressed the potential relaxations for the Reactor Trip System, while Supplement 2 addressed the potential relaxations for the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System. O- The NRC issued the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for WCAP-10271 and . WCAP-10271 Supplement 1 on February 21, 1985. The SER approved quarterly testing, 6 hours to place a failed channel in a tripped mode, increased Allowed Outage Time'(A0T) for test and maintenance, and testing in bypass for : RTS analog channels. The SER conditions required quarterly testing to be :: conducted on a staggered basis. Also, the approved relaxations could not be j applied to ESFAS functions in analog channels shared by the RTS. The NRC issued the SER for WCAP-10271 Supplement 2 and WCAP-10271 Supplement .l 2, Revision 1 on February 22, 1989. This SER approved quarterly testing, 6 1 hours to place a failed channel in a tripped mode, increased A0T for test and maintenance, and testing in bypass for ESFAS analog channels. The ESFAS functions approved in the SER were those presented in Appendix Al of the , referenced WCAPs. (These functions are all included in the Westinghouse l Standard Technical Specifications.) The SER also approved extended A0T for I the ESFAS logic. Staggered testing was not required for ESFAS analog channels. In addition, the staggered testing requirement was removed from the RTS analog channels. ! On April 30, 1990 the NRC issuer' the Supplemental SER (SSER) for WCAP-10271 Supplement 2 and WCAP-10271 Supplement 2, Revision 1. The SSER approved Surveillance Time Interval (STI) and A0T extensions for the ESFAS ! i o - -
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION EVALUATION RTS AND ESFAS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES Page 4 functions which were included in Appendix A2 of WCAP-10271 Supplement 2, Revision 1. The functions approved are associated with the Safety Injection, Steam Line Isolation, Main Feedwater. Isolation, and Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Start signals. The configurations contained in Appendix A2 are those that are not contained in the Westinghouse Standard Technical' Specifications. The SSER also approved extended A0T for the RTS logic. With the issuance of the February 1989 SER and April 1990 SSER, the relaxations for the RTS and ESFAS analog channels are now the same and the special condition applied to shared analog channels is no longer applicable. In addition, the A0Ts for test and maintenance of RTS and ESFAS Automatic Actuation Logic are also now the same. No plant modifications are required to implement the items requested in this proposed technical specification change. Increased A0T and , allowed testing in bypass mode due to an inoperable channel will be accomplished , with the present plant configuration. (At the present time FNP does not plan to
- implement the hardware modifications necessary to allow routine testing in bypass as described in the referenced WCAPS.)
Minimum Channels Operable Chanaes The proposed change to Table 3.3-1 Functional Unit 17.B, where the Minimum Channels Operable was revised from 4 to 1, is included to provide plant - operating flexibility commensurate with the design basis for this diverse trip function, i.e., the turbine trip reactor trip function is not credited as a primary trip in the accident analyses. By design, 4 out of 4 channels are : t required to trip to satisfy the RTS Turbine Throttle Valve Closure reactor trip : logic. The current Farley Technical Specifications stipulate that an inoperable - channel must be placed in trip; should a second channel fail, the Farley ' specifications have no provisions. As a result, shutdown of the affected unit would be required. By implementing the proposed Minimum Channels Operable requirements of I channel, and new action No. 6, both of which are based on : Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications, any failed channel is required > to be placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, thereby, maximizing plant operating flexibility consistent with the design basis. The proposed change to Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 4.c, where the Minimum Channels Operable was revised from 3 to 2, is included to correct a previous ; error. By design, any 2 out of 3 channels are required to trip to satisfy the ESFAS Containment Pressure--High-High actuation logic; therefore, two channels are required to be operable as a minimum, provided that'a failed channel is placed in trip. This satisfies the single failure criteria for the function. Action No.19 'l the proposed specifications requires a failed channel to be placed in trip within 6 hours. This change conforms to Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications. Channel Calibration and Channel Functional Test Chanaes The proposed change to Table 4.3-1 Functional Units 17. A and 17.8, where the Channel Calibration requirement is revised from N.A. to refueling, reflects the ' assumptions in WCAP-10271, which defines a Channel Calibration each cycle for the' turbine trip reactor trip function. This change conforms to Westinghouse O Standard Technical Specifications. The change is also consistent with the current Farley calibration practice for turbine control oil pressure switches and throttle valve closure limit switches.
.i
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION EVALUATION RTS AND ESFAS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES { PAGE 5 The proposed change to Table 4.3-1 Functional Unit Id, where the Channel Functional Test for the safety injection ESF input for reactor trip, is revised from monthly i.o refueling to clarify what testing is required and when the testing is performed. The manual safety injection input signal is provided by 1 of 2 main control board hand switches. As indicated by footnote No. 4, these switches can only be functionally tested during plant shutdown i conditions. The automatic safety injection ESF inputs for reactor trip are { included in the SSPS logic circuits. These inputs are tested utilizing the 1 SSPS seminutomatic tester in each train on a staggered bi-monthly basis as required by the Channel Functional Test surveillance of Functional Unit 22, which is the automatic trip logic test. This change is consistent with Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications and the assumptions of WCAP- l 1 10271.
]
i The proposed change to Table 4.3-2 Functional Unit 8, whe e the Channel Calibration requirement is revised from N.A. to refueling and the Channel Functional Test requirement is revised from refueling to N.A., clarifies what tests are required and when the tests are performed. The proposed changes are L in concert with the NRC SER for WCAP-10271. A calibration frequency of once per cycle for the ESF interlocks P-11, P-12, and P-14 is consistent with Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications and Farley surveillance practices. By definition, a Channel Calibration includes the performance of a Channel Functional Test. In addition, FNP Technical Specification 4.3.2.2 er.;11citly requires the functional demonstration of the total ESF interlock O function once per eighteen months. These functional tests also include P-4, such that all ESF interlocks are tested once per cycle. Furthermore, specification 4.3.2.2 requires periodic surveillance of the ESF interlock actuation logic in conjunction with the bi-monthly SSPS logic testing. The proposed change to Table 4.3-2 Functional Units 1.a, 2.a, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, and 4.a, where the Channel Functional Test for the ESF manual initiation functions (safety injection, containment spray, phase-A isolation, phase-B isolation, purge isolation, and steam line isolation) is revised from monthly to refueling, clarifies wnat testing is required and when the testing is performed. The manual ESF signals are initiated _by actuation of main control board hand switches. As indicated by footnote No.1, these switches can only be functionally tested during plant shutdown conditions, which reflects the Farley as-built design. Footnote No. 1 and the present functional test requirement also specify that all other circuitry associated with manual safeguards actuation must be tested once per month; however, this requirement is not applicable to an SSPS plant such as Farley, in that all other associated circuits are part of the automatic actuation logic which is tested on a staggered bi-monthly basis. Therefore, footnote No.1 is also revised, by deleting any reference to associated circuits, to ensure the proposed revisions from monthly to refueling surveillance for the ESF manual initiation functions ate in agreement. This change is consistent with the surveillance requirements in tha Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications. O
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION EVALUATION ; RTS AND ESFAS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES Page 6 1-ANALYSIS: Southern ?!uclear has reviewed the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92 as they relate ! to the identified proposed changes to the Technical Specifications and f considers these changes L t to involve a significant hazards consideration. In support of this conclusion, the following analysis is provided. (1) The proposed changes to the RTS/ESFAS STIs and A0Ts, and Minimum . Channels Operable, Channel Calibration and Channel Functional Test l requirements will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. ! The determination that the result of the proposed changes associated with STI and A0T are within all acceptable criteria has been established in the SERs prepared for WCAP-10271; WCAP-10271 Supplement 1; WCAP-10271 Supplement 2; and WCAP-10271 Supplement 2, Revision 1. Implementation of the proposed changes results in a slight increase in the Reactor Trip System yearly unavailability. This slight increase, which is primarily due to less frequent surveillance, results in a slight increase in Core Damage Frequency ; (CDF) and public health risk. The values determined by the WOG and l presented in the WCAP for the increase in CDF were verified by t Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) as part of an audit and i sensitivity analyses for the NRC staff. Based on the small value , of the increase compared to the range of uncertainty in the CDF, 1 O the increase is considered acceptable. Increasing STIs and A0Ts is not expected to affect the probability or consequences of previously evaluated accidents. The change associated with the Minimum Channel Operable requirement for the RTS Turbine Trip by Turbine Throttle Valve Closure provides additional operating flexibility based on the Westinghouse Standard ! Technica' Specifications, Revision 5. The new action statement ensures that any inoperable channel is placed in trip, and the .i remaining operable channels fulfill the necessary reactor trip diversity function. The change associated with the ESFAS Minimum Channel Operable requirement fr 'u Minment Pressure--High-High ' assures that the Technical Spr ofice ans reflect the correct as-built design actuation log whil , ensuring the function continues to meet the single 1 %
.s criteria. The proposed change ;
to the turbine trip reactor trip function Channel Calibration :' reflects the assumptions in WCAP-10271 and current Farley calibration practices. The proposed change to the safety injection ESF input for the reactor trip Channel Functional Test is ; consistent with the assumptions in WCAP-10271 and current Farley i surveillance testing practices. The proposed changes to the ESF ! permissive interlocks Channel Calibration and Channel Functional Test requirements are in concert with the NRC SER for WCAP-10271 and Farley surveillance practices. The proposed change to the ESF i manual initiation functions Channel Functional Test reflects the i proper surveillance requirements for a Westinghouse Solid State. ^ Protection System (SSPS). The proposed changes to these RTS/ESFAS Channel Calibration and Channel Function Test requirements are also consistent with Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications. I
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION EVALUATION RTS AND ESFAS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES Page 7 \- The proposed changes will not create the possibility of a new or (2) different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed changes do not involve hardware changes and do not result in a change in the manner in which the RTS/ESFAS provides plant protection or the manner in which surveillance testing is-performed to demonstrate operability. Therefore, a new or different kind of accident will not occur as a result of these changes. (3) The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints, or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The impact of reduced testing, other than as addressed above, is to allow a longer time interval over which instrument uncertainties (e.g., drift) may act. Evaluations have been performed to assure that the plant setpoints properly account for these instrument uncertainties.over the longer time interval. RTS diversity is still provided by the Turbine Throttle Valve closure logic circuits. Steam Line Isolation diversity continues to be provided by the ESFAS Containment Pressure--High-High. Changes to certain RTS/ESFAS Channel Calibration and Channel Functional Test surveillances clarify what tests are required and when the tests are performed. Implementation of the proposed changes is expected to result in an overall improvement in safety as noted below. O e. tess frequent testine w m Potentieiiy resuit in fewer inadvertent reactor trips and ESF component actuation.
- b. Longer allowed outage times provide for better assessments of problems and easier repairs, ultimately resulting in better equipment performance.
- c. Less frequent distraction of the plant operator and shift supervisor to attend to and support instrumentation testing will improve the effectiveness of the operating staff in monitoring and controlling plant operation.
CONCLUSION: Based upon the analysis provided herein, Southern Nuclear Operating Company has determined that the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of:an accident previously evaluated, create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, Southern Nuclear Operating Company has determined that the proposed change meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and does not involve a significant hazards consideration. O}}