ML20056H090

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SALP Rept 50-346/93-01 for 911201-930630
ML20056H090
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 08/27/1993
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20056H089 List:
References
50-346-93-01, 50-346-93-1, NUDOCS 9309080214
Download: ML20056H090 (17)


See also: IR 05000346/1993001

Text

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SALP 10

INITIAL SALP REPORT

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE

Inspection Report No. 50-346/93001

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Toledo Edison Company

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

December 1, 1991, through June 30, 1993

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9309080214 930827~

PDR ADOCK 05000346

G ppg

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CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION ............................ 1

II. SUMMARY OF RESULTS ......................... 2

A. Overview ........................... 2

III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ........................ 3

A. Plant Operations ....................... 3

B. Radiological Controls .................... 5

C. Maintenance / Surveillance ................... 6

D. Emergency Preparedness .................... 7

E. Security ........................... 8

F. Engineering / Technical Support ................ 9

G. Safety Assessment / Quality Verification . . . . . . . . . . . 11

IV. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES .................. 12

A. Major Licensee Activities .................12

B. Major Inspection Activities ................13

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program is an

integrated U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Nr.C) staff effort to collect

available observations and data on a periodic basis and to evaluate licensee

performance on the basis of this information. The program is supplemental to

normal regulatory processes used to ensure compliance with NRC rules and

regulations. It is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide a

rational basis for allocating NRC resources and to provide meaningful feedback

to the licensee's management regarding the NRC's assessment of the facility's

performance in each functional area.

This report is the NRC's assessment of the licensee's safety performance at

the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station for the period December 1,1991, through

June 30, 1993.

An NRC SALP Board, comprised of the staff members listed below, met on August

11, 1993, to review the observations and data on performance and to assess

licensee performance in accordance with the guidance in NRC Manual Chapter 0516, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance."

Board Chairman

W. L. Forney, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region III

Board Members

T. O. Martin, Acting Director, DRS

C. E. Norelius, Director, DRSS

J. N. Hannon, Project Director, NRR

L. R. Greger, Chief, Branch 3, DRP

J. B. Hopkins, Sr. Project Manager, NRR

S. Stasek, Senior Resident Inspector, RIII

Other Attendees at the SALP Board Meetino

M. A. Ring, Chief, Operations Branch, DRS

J. W. McCormick-Barger, Chief, EP & NPR Section

J. R. Creed, Chief, Safeguards Section

R. K. Walton, Resident Inspector, RIII

J. M. Shine, Resident Inspector, RIII

C. E. Brown, Reactor Engineer, DRP

E. R. Duncan, Reactor Engineer, DRP

M. K. Khanna, Reactor Engineer, DRP

R. A. Westberg, Team Leader, DRS

T. J. Ploski, Emergency Preparedness Analyst, DRSS

R. A. Paul, Senior Radiation Specialist, DRSS

M. A. Kunowski, Senior Radiation Specialist, DRSS

G. D. Replogle, Reactor Inspector, DRS

R. A. Langstaff, Reactor Inspector, DRS

J. R. Kniceley, Physical Security Inspector, DRSS

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II. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Overview

During this assessment period, overall performance improved from the previous

assessment period and was excellent. A strong management team continued to

provide sufficient direction and oversight to ensure effective implementation

of a conservative, safety conscious approach to plant operation. Strengths

noted included the ample staffing, qualifications, and dedication of personnel

in all areas, teamwork and communications between organizations onsite, and

management support for programs and initiatives impacting safety.

Performance in the Plant Operations area remained constant and received a

Category 2 rating. Performance was characterized by a conservative operating

, philosophy with good involvement and support by management. However, there

5 were some continuing problems in the conduct of operations. These included

instances of failure to follow procedures, inad?quate attention to detail, and

equipment misoperation.

Performance in the Radiological Controls area again received a Category 2

rating; however, an improving trend was noted. The good performance was a

direct result of strong management support and a competent radiological

controls staff. Some weaknesses were noted in the control of contamination,

particularly during outage activities.

Performance in the Maintenance / Surveillance area was once again excellent and

received a Category I rating. High quality programs and procedures maintained

plant equipment in an excellent state of repair.

Performance in the area of Emergency Preparedness ended the previously noted

declining trend and continued to receive a Category I rating. In addition to

excellent maintenance of the program and excellent interactions with State and

county agencies, improvements to the annual exercise program contributed to

, the reversal of this declining trend.

Performance in the area of Security remained constant and received a Category

1 rating. Excellent management attention and support resulted in the

continued effective implementation of this program.

Performance in the areas of Safety Assessment / Quality Verification and

Engineering / Technical Support improved and received Category I ratings. In

the Engineering / Technical support area, this rating was the restlt of strong

management and an experienced and well trained staff which provided excellent

support to operations and maintenance. In the Safety Assessment / Quality

Verification area, a major contributor to this rating was management support

for pt ograms that identified, tracked, and resolved safety issues through

effective self-assessment aadits and surveillances.

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The performance ratings during the previous assessment period and this i

assessment period according to functional areas are given below:

Rating Last Rating This '

1 Functional Area Period Period Trend

Plant Operations 2 2 ,

Radiological Controls 2 2 Improving

, Maintenance / Surveillance 1 1

Emergency Preparedness 1 Declining 1

Security 1 1 ,

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Engineering / Technical

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Safety Assessment / Quality

Verification 2 Improving 1 l

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III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

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1. Analysis i

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Performance was characterized by a conservative operating philosophy with good

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involvement and support by management. The conduct of operations was well

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defined; however, some implementation errors continued to occur.

l Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was good. A conservative and l

safety-conscious approach was consistently evident in management decisions. i

, Management continued development of initiatives to minimize risk during l

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shutdown conditions. A procedure, issued before the refueling outage,  :

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specified systems and equipment combinations necessary to minimize risk during

shutdown conditions. Effective implementation of this procedure directly I

resulted in an increased level of command and control during the outage. I

Nonroutine, complex evolutions were well planned and properly executed.

Pre-job briefs were routinely conducted for those evolutions that had the

potential to adversely affect operation. Reactor shutdowns and startups were

conducted well with operators maintaining a high level of control.

However, some problems occurred in the conduct of operations. On occasion,

operators failed to follow procedures. Examples included performing

procedural steps out of sequence such snat an inadvertent transfer of

approximately 13,500 gallons of reactor coolant system inventory to the

borated water storage tank occurred, and failing to obtain a required senior

reactor operator sign-off upon completion of a valve lineup, which contributed

to running a clean waste monitor tank pump with its suction valve closed for

about 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. Additionally, two instances occurred during new fuel receipt

operations when operators failed to maintain proper control due to poor

attention to detail. Also, instances of equipment misoperation occasionally

occurred. An example was improper operation of valves in the control room

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ventilation system. Although somewhat improved, improper equipment operation l

has been a concern discussed in previous SALPs.  ;

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The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety

standpoint was good. The operations department employed a critical self-

assessment philosophy with management conducting ongoing observations and  !

reviews of operator performance. The fire brigade responded well to fire i

alarms and indications of fire. Shift team response to operational events at

power was excellent with one exception. Control room operators, responding to

a failure in the integrated control system late in the assessment period, took

action that inadvertently caused reactor coolant system pressure to increase

to its high pressure trip setpoint, causing the reactor to trip.

Operator cognizance of panel ind; cations and equipment status was good.

However, there were a few instances where operator cognizance was inadequate.

For example, early in the assessment period, a hydrogen analyzer was

inoperable for about 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> and a makeup pump was inoperable during a mode

change near the end of the assessment period. Additionally, during the

refueling outage, reactor vessel water level was allowed to increase, which

resulted in borated water leaking past the reactor vessel head o-ring seals

and wetting vessel head stud holes resulting in additional unplanned radiation

exposure.

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The onshift crews continued to conduct themselves in a professional manner.

Access to the operating areas of the control room was controlled and

extraneous activities were kept to a minimum. Although improved, noise levels

in the control room from overhead steam piping continued to detract f.om

communications. Log keeping improved, and the information in the. log provided

sufficient detail to reconstruct shift activities. Plant housekeeping and

control of combustible materials was good.

Staffing was acple. A six-shift rotation continued to be effectively

implemented. Control room staffing greatly exceeded technical specification

requirements. In addition to the shift supervisor and assistant shift

supervisor, a shift manager who is a licensed senior reactor operator

continued to be assigned to support administrative and maintenance interface

activities. Use of overtime was not excessive and technical specification

overtime requirements were routinely met. Operator initial qualification pass

rate was 94 percent; operator requalification pass rate was 88 percent.

However, some weaknesses, relating to operator knowledge of equipment and

system response during shutdown conditions, were self-identified.

2. Performance ratina

Performance is rated Category 2 in this area. Performance was rated Category

2 during the previous assessment period.

3. Recommendations

None.

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1. Analysis

Good performance in the radiation safety program was a result of strong

management support and a competent radiological controls staff.

Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was good. A commitment to

source-term reduction was evidenced by early boration and hydrogen peroxide

addition during refueling shutdowns. Efforts to maintain exposure as-low-as-

reasonably-achievable were excellent as demonstrated by the use of a new

reactor head shield, upgrading of the plant video tour program, and the use of

a specially designed high integrity waste container for shipping high activity

filters. Management was also involved in ensuring continued good water ,

quality and upgrading facilities such as the new portable demineralizer and

hot machine shop. Additional initiatives included continued support for the

National Registry of Radiation Protection Technicians (NRRPT), an aggressive

self-assessment program, and the implementation of the revised 10 CFR Part 20,

1 year before the deadline.

However, there were instances when management was less effective in ensuring

quality. Examples included: (1) the failure to use the liquid radwaste

discharge monitor during a release, (2) the failure to complete

decontamination in containment before commencing outage work, and (3) the

failure to properly evaluate the radiological consequences before opening the

equipment hatch which resulted in the spread of contamination and increased

personnel contaminations. In addition, radiation work permits and local

survey maps occasionally did not accurately reflect actual working and plant

conditions.

The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety

standpoint was very good. The overall exposure history was very good.

! Cumulative dose in 1992 (no refueling outage) was about 20 person-rem (0.2

l person-Sieverts), and the dose for the 1993 60-day refueling outage (RFO-8)

was about 330 person-rem (3.3 person-Sieverts). Although the dose for RF0-8

was higher than anticipated, it was reasonable given the scope of RF0-8. The

scope involved emergent work on the reactor head vent line; steam generator

tube sleeving; and replacement of the feedwater nozzles, one reactor coolant

pump motor, and both letdown coolers. Comparisons of cold chemistry

measurements with the NRC remained good (26 agreements in 29 comparisons), and

l the station maintained a satisfactory cross-check program with vendors.

Radioactivity in liquid and gaseous effluents remained well below regulatory

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limits. Efforts to reduce solid radwaste and contaminated areas continued

with good success. Improvements were also made in reducing radwaste monitor

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operability problems. A performance weakness was noted when the containment

! emergency airlock access door was improperly secured resulting in inadequate

l controls over a high radiation area (containment).

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Overall, staff levels, training, and qualifications were excellent. For

example, about half of the radiological protection (RP) technicians and staff

were certified by the NRRPT at the end of the assessment period. Sufficient

staff was available to provide coverage during routine and refueling outage

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operations. Training was provided to onsite personnel before implementation l

of the revised 10 CFR Part 20 requirements and was generally effective. l

2. Performance Ratinq l

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Performance is rated Category 2 with an improving trend in this area.

Performance was rated Category 2 during the previous assessment period.

3. Recommendations

None.

C. Maintenance / Surveillance

1. Analysis

Performance was characterized by an effective management team. The level of

attention and resources allocated ensured plant equipment was maintained in an ,

excellent state of repair. Personnel were well-trained and attentive to their I

tasks; however, occasional implementation problems occurred.

Management effectiveness in ensuring quality associated with the maintenance )

and surveillance areas was excellent. Both programs were well defined and 1

used good procedures. Overall, the staff continued to successfully implement

the surveillance and maintenance programs with tests and preventive

maintenance work completed on time. Additionally, work planning was a

strength and plant material condition was excellent. System and plant outage ,

rates were very low. Maintenance activities were well performed as evidenced  !

by minimal rework. The maintenance work order backlog continued to be reduced

and was low. Resources were allocated to maintain equipment in an excellent

state of repair. For example, the material condition of the electrical

distribution system was noted as a strength.

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Planning, scheduling, and work implementation for major outages improved and

was effective. Overall, the refueling outage conducted late in the period,

was well-planned and emphasized minimizing shutdown risk. Control and

oversight of contractors were good.

Although extensive procedures and programs were in place, implementation 1

problems sometimes occurred in both the surveillance and maintenance areas.

Early in the assessment period, personnel performed work outside of the scope

of a work order and caused a reactor trip from power. Halfway through the

period, an inadequate independent verification was performed on a :,afety-

related pressure instrument, which caused it to be inoperable for nearly 3

days.

The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety

standpoint was excellent. Troubleshooting activities typically were well

planned and conducted in an orderly fashion. Maintenance personnel exhibited

both a questioning attitude and attention to detail during work activities.

Examples included: (1) stopping work when a drawing discrepancy, which would

have caused a circulating water pump trip, was identified in the work package

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and (2) identifying a freon leak in one train of the control room emergency

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ventilation system while working on the other train. Radiation monitor  !

related equipment problems were significantly reduced by improved preventive

maintenance activities. ,

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Alternatively, early in the assessment period, a reactor trip was generated l

during shutdown conditions (Group 1 rods were fully withdrawn in Mode 3) due '

to a personnel error while taking voltage readings on a non-vital electrical

bus.

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Staffing levels were ample and qualifications of personnel were good.  !

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Personnel performing maintenance and surveillance activities were qualified,

knowledgeable, and attentive to their tasks. The maintenance training program

was well implemented. However, deficiencies were noted in training personnel ,

to perform independent verification and tagging. j

2. Performance Rating

Performance is rated Category 1 in this area. Performance was rated Category

1 during the previous assessment period.

3. Recommendations

None.

D. Emergency Preparedness

1. Analysis *

Performance was characterized by excellent maintenance of the emergency i

preparedness (EP) program, excellent interactions with State and county

agencies, and improved exercise performance.

Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was excellent. The emergency 1

! response facilities and equipment were maintained in an excellent state of  ;

l readiness. The onsite meteorological monitoring program was significantly  !

upgraded to better ensure the availability of good data to emergency  :

responders. A notable achievement was the completion of an emergency radio

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communications system after several years of development. Additionally, the

public information brochure, developed in cooperation with county officials,

received a commendation from the Governor.

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The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety  ;

standpoint was good. After a thorough re-evaluation, planning for radiation

protection support during a fire response situation was acceptably revised.

Frequent remote circuit checks and monthly performance test results led to an

acceptable reduction in the frequency of preventive maintenance on the

emergency planning zone's (EPZ's) siren system. The impact of an impassable

bridge was thoroughly addressed in a temporary revision to the EPZ's

evacuation planning.

No actual activations of the emergency plan occurred during the assessment

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period. During the 1992 exercise, emergency declarations were correct and

prompt, while associated offsite agency notifications were timely. Concerns

identified during the 1991 exercise were corrected. Overall performance ,

during the 1992 exercise improved and was very good. Concerns were identified  !

regarding decision making on the need for issuing respiratory protection or '

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potassium iodide to some in-plant repair teams and the adequacy of documenting

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some in-plant radiological surveys. Challenging and successfully demonstrated i

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aspects of the exercise included an onsite medical response, assembly and

accounting of all onsite personnel, deployment of offsite survey teams, and

the first use of the control room simulator, which was electronically linked '

to displays in several response facilities for greater realism.

The emergency response organization's staffing levels remained excellent. ,

Effective mechanisms remained in place to ensure that only currently trained

persons were on the callout roster and that on call personnel were in the

local area. Periodic off-hours drills demonstrated the capability to augment

onshift staff in a timely manner. The EP group's expertise and staffing level

remained excellent.

All three teams of response personnel continued the excellent practice of

annual response facility walk-throughs and integrated facility drills. These

drills were in addition to functional drills and other training activities

specified in the emergency plan. The effectiveness of drills, drill

critiques, and other training activities was evidenced-by the improved

exercise performance.

2. Performance Rating

Performance is rated Category 1 in this area. Performance was rated Category

I with a declining trend during the previous assessment period.

3. Recommendations

None.

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l E. Security

I 1. Analysis

Performance was characterized by effective management attention and support

which resulted in excellent implementation of the program,

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! Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was excellent as evidenced by a

continued reduction in the personnel error and equipment events identified in

the safeguards event log. The security self-assessment, quality assurance

audits, and surveillances were effective in monitoring and evaluating program

implementation and has become a program strength. The Plant Manager's support

of the security program fostered a high level of awareness towards security by

the plant staff and security force personnel. An example of management

support was the procurement of an upgraded computerized badge fabrication

system and the closed circuit television camera video capture assessment

system. Liaison with local law enforcement agencies was excellent.

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The fitness-for-duty program satisfied the general performance objectives of

10 CFR Part 26. Management strongly supported and devoted ample resources to

the fitness-for-duty program.

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The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety

standpoint was excellent. The perimeter intrusion detection system and closed 5

circuit television camera replacement projects completed toward the end of the

previous assessment period have significantly reduced maintenance costs, false

alarm rates, and compensatory measures for this assessment period. Security

system performance and reliability have greatly improved.

Evaluation of logged events was excellent. These events were properly

identified, analyzed, and documented. No events were required to be reported

telephonically within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of discovery. 1

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i Staffing continued to be excellent, and resources were effectively used. The  :

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l experience level remained high due to a low turnover rate, and there was a

( high level of security awareness and performance. Communications between the ,

site security staff, the NRC staff, and regional security personnel were  !

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excellent.

The effectiveness of the training and qualification program was excellent.

Personnel observed were knowledgeable and proficient in performing their

assigned duties. Tactical response training was excellent. Armed response <

l drills involving defensive strategies greatly improved contingency response l

capabilities.

2. Performance Ratina

Performance is rated Category 1 in this area. Performance was rated Category

1 during the previous assessment period.

3. Recommendations

None.

F. Engineerina/ Technical Support

1. Analysis

Overall, engineering and technical support improved and was excellent, with a

well-trained and knowledgeable staff. Engineering support to operations,

maintenance, and other onsite organizations was excellent. However, some

weaknesses were noted in examination security and test reviews.

Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was excellent. Early in the

assessment period, management support of the motor operated valve (MOV)-

program was lacking in that few resources were dedicated to this effort.

However, in the second half of the assessment period, management effectiveness

was excellent with extensive attention and resources devoted to the MOV

program resulting in significant progress in design basis testing.

Engineering support to operations and maintenance was excellent as evidenced

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by the assistance provided in making operability determinations, '

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troubleshooting emergent problems, and supporting outages. Management

decisions regarding eddy current testing of steam generator tubes (100

percent) and sleeving and plugging criteria were considered conservative. '

During the previous assessment period, a large backlog of engineering issues

was identified as a weakness. This backlog was greatly reduced and is now

manageable. Management involvement was also evident in the implementation of

l an effective erosion / corrosion program. Management was not effective in

! implementing licensed operator examination security controls; however, the

l examination was not compromised.

The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety  ;

l standpoint was very good. In response to the station blackout generic issue,

l a dedicated diesel generator was installed onsite. Additionally, a leadership -

role was taken in the Electric Power Research Institute's valve stem

lubrication testing program for MOVs. Engineering personnel also identified

errors related to equipment qualifications in an existing analysis for high

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energy line breaks outside containment. The application of the ASME boiler

I and pressure vessel code, a weakness noted during the previous assessment

period, has improved as evidenced by an effective and conservative inservice

l inspection program, an acceptable and responsive inservice testing program,

and increased staff involvement in code organizations. During the previous

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assessment period, deficiencies were noted in the modification program. t

Although isolated weaknesses with specific modifications were identified <

during this assessment period, the overall assessrent of the modification

program was good. Temporary modifications were effectively controlled with

the exception of a temporary modification that incorrectly reversed the  ;

direction of a solenoid valve.  !

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Weaknesses, identified by the NRC, were noted in testing and the evaluation of >

test results. An example was a safety features actuation system surveillance

that did not verify the start of several 480 Vac essential loads during bus

energization and failed to identify that several 4160 Vac/480 Vac loads .

appeared to start outside their designed sequencer step. A weakness was

identified in the testing of the safety-related battery chargers. The test

did not verify the charger's ability to support design conditions.

Staffing levels were excellent and ensured resources were available to deal

with emergent problem areas. System engineers spent substantial amounts of

time in the plant involved with the systems under their responsibility. In

addition, outside contractors were utilized effectively with sufficient

oversight being provided. Staffing to administer requalification examinations ,

and develop the required examination material was good. i

l The effectiveness of training in the engineering area was excellent, as

reflected in the support of, and credibility with, operations and maintenance  ;

organizations. The effectiveness of the operator licensing training program j

was good overall. All engineering groups were considered competent, '

experienced, and well-trained.

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2. Performance Rating  ;

Performance is rated Category 1 in this area. Performance was rated Category

2 with an improving trend during the previous assessment period.

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3. Recommendations i

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G. Safety Assessment /0uality Verification

1. Analysis

Performance was characterized by excellent nnagement support for programs

that identified, tracked, and resolved safety issues. Resolution of long-term >

issues was good.

I Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was excellent. Management

support of the Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Reporting (PCAQR) system .

was evident. The PCAQR system was effectively used as the primary means of

determining root causes and corrective actions to significant discrepant

conditions identified at the facility. Additionally, the commitment tracking

system was excellent, which resulted in quality updated safety analysis report ,

revisions, schedules being met, and commitments being implemented. Management

support of a quality radiation protection program was demonstrated by the use

of a contract industry expert to review the station's recent implementation of

l the revised 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. A program to address risk during

shutdown conditions was formalized into a controlled procedure in the latter

half of the assessment period. During shutdown conditions, the Inde r ient

Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) continuously monitored the outage scheaule and l

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in-plant activities to determine how well they adhered to the shutdown risk j

! program. Additionally, the proactive evaluations conducted by the ISEG were a '

I strength. The computerized tracking program implemented in the latter part of

I the assessment period was effectively used to trend the performance of

individual departments and program areas. This program has enhanced the

licensee's ability to identify weaknesses and improve performance. Another

good, continuing initiative was the Pursuit of Excellence program. Although

this program functioned well as a tool to identify and resolve several

weaknesses, it has not been fully effective in resolving problems related to

attention-to-detail and mispositioning events.

Quality Assurance (QA) audits and surveillances were performance-based and

thorough in nature. Quality Assurance issues were tracked and addressed in a

timely manner. Quality Assurance personnel interfaced well with other plant

organizations and promoted teamwork through identification and feedback

mechanisms such as statistical analysis to better identify process

deficiencies. Quality review groups were well staffed with qualified

individuals.

The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety

standpoint was excellent. Onsite material receipt activities identified i

discrepant conditions associated with new fuel received from Babcock and l

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Wilcox and a new reactor coolant pump motor received from Westinghouse. Also,

the licensee was proactive in researching and resolving an issue concerning

local leak rate testing of containment penetration bellows.

A high-energy-line-break equipment qualification issue was evaluated and acted

upon with compensatory and long-term corrective measures in a high quality

manner. Industry issues, such as Thermal Lag-330 fire barrier problems, were

adequately evaluated and compensatory measures appropriately implemented.

Staffing of the Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB) and the Station Review

Board was excellent. Member qualifications greatly exceeded minimum

regulatory requirements. Discussions in both forums were good, and all

members were actively involved. Of note was the CNRB's review and discussion i

of the new 10 CFR Part 20 program implementation.  !

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2. Performance Ratino

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Performance is rated Category 1 in this area. Performance was rated Category '

2 with an improving trend during the previous assessment period. . l

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IV. SUPPORTING D,.A AND SUMMARIES '

A. Major Licensee Activities

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1. On December 6, 1991, the plant was shut down to repair a failed

emergency diesel generator (EDG) speed switch.

2. On December 11, 1991, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the l

grid after the EDG speed switch repairs were completed.  !

3. On March 1,1992, a reactor trip occurred as a result of a maintenance

personnel error.

4. On March 2,1992, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid.

5. On February 28, 1993, the plant was shut down to commence the eighth

refueling outage.

6. On April 28, 1993, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid

following completion of the eighth refueling outage.

7. On May 20, 1993, a reactor trip occurred due to an input failure to the

integrated control system.

8. On May 21, 1993, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid.

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B. Major Inspection Activities

! The inspection reports discussed in this SALP are listed below:

Docket Number 50-346

Inspection Report Numbers 91022, 92002 through 92019, and 93002 through 93012.

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l. From May 5 through June 5, 1992, a special electrical distribution

l system functional inspection (EDSFI) was conducted (Inspection Report

l (IR) 50-346/92007).

2. From January 29 through October 6,1992, a special inspection was 1

conducted of the licensee's followup actions concerning fire protection '

(IR 50-346/92016).

3. From April 19 through April 30, 1993, a special inspection was conducted

of the licensee's check valve and inservice testing programs (IR 50- l

346/93009).

'

4. From April 19 through April 21, 1993, a special inspection was conducted ,

to evaluate two unplanned transfers of reactor coolant inventory (IR 50- l

,

346/93011). l

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Wilcox and a new reactor coolant pump motor received from Westinghouse. Also,

the licensee was proactive in researching and resolving an issue concerning

local leak rate testing of containment penetration bellows.

A high-energy-line-break equipment qualification issue was evaluated and acted

upon with compensatory and long-term corrective measures in a high quality

manner. Industry issues, such as Thermal Lag-330 fire barrier problems, were

adequately evaluated and compensatory measures appropriately implemented.

Staffing of the Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB) and the Station Review

Board was excellent. Member qualifications greatly exceeded minimum

regulatory requirements. Discussions in both forums were good, and all

members were actively involved. Of note was the CNRB's review and discussion

of the new 10 CFR Part 20 program implementation.

2. Performance Rating

Performance is rated Category 1 in this area. Performance was rated Category

2 with an improving trend during the previous assessment period. .

3. Recommendations

l

None.

l

IV. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES l

A. Major Licensee Activities

. 1. On December 6, 1991, the plant was shut down to repair a failed i

'

l emergency diesel generator (EDG) speed switch.

2. On December 11, 1991, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the

grid after the EDG speed switch repairs were completed.

3. On March 1,1992, a reactor trip occurred as a result of a maintenance

personnel error.

4. On March 2, 1992, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid.

5. On February 28, 1993, the plant was shut down to commence the eighth

refueling outage.

6. On April 28, 1993, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid

following completion of the eighth refueling outage.

7. On May 20, 1993, a reactor trip occurred due to an input failure to the

integrated control system.

8. On May 21, 1993, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid.

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B. Major Inspection Activities j

The inspection reports discussed in this SALP are listed below: ,

Docket Number 50-346 l

Inspection Report Numbers 91022, 92002 through 92019, and 93002 through 93012. l

l

1. From May 5 through June 5, 1992, a special electrical distribution j

system functionhl inspection (EDSFI) was conducted (Inspection Report

(IR) 50-346/92007).

!

2. From January 29 through October 6,1992, a special inspection was i

conducted of the licensee's followup actions concerning fire protection  ;

(IR 50-346/92016).  ;

!

l 3. From April 19 through April 30, 1993, a special inspection was conducted

of the licensee's check valve and inservice testing programs (IR 50- i

346/93009).

.

l 4. From April 19 through April 21, 1993, a special inspection was conducted

l to evaluate two unplanned transfers of reactor coolant inventory (IR 50- .

l 346/93011).

l

.

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