ML20056H090
ML20056H090 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Davis Besse |
Issue date: | 08/27/1993 |
From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20056H089 | List: |
References | |
50-346-93-01, 50-346-93-1, NUDOCS 9309080214 | |
Download: ML20056H090 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000346/1993001
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SALP 10
INITIAL SALP REPORT
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
Inspection Report No. 50-346/93001
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Toledo Edison Company
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
December 1, 1991, through June 30, 1993
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9309080214 930827~
PDR ADOCK 05000346
G ppg
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CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION ............................ 1
II. SUMMARY OF RESULTS ......................... 2
A. Overview ........................... 2
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ........................ 3
A. Plant Operations ....................... 3
B. Radiological Controls .................... 5
C. Maintenance / Surveillance ................... 6
D. Emergency Preparedness .................... 7
E. Security ........................... 8
F. Engineering / Technical Support ................ 9
G. Safety Assessment / Quality Verification . . . . . . . . . . . 11
IV. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES .................. 12
A. Major Licensee Activities .................12
B. Major Inspection Activities ................13
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program is an
integrated U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Nr.C) staff effort to collect
available observations and data on a periodic basis and to evaluate licensee
performance on the basis of this information. The program is supplemental to
normal regulatory processes used to ensure compliance with NRC rules and
regulations. It is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide a
rational basis for allocating NRC resources and to provide meaningful feedback
to the licensee's management regarding the NRC's assessment of the facility's
performance in each functional area.
This report is the NRC's assessment of the licensee's safety performance at
the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station for the period December 1,1991, through
June 30, 1993.
An NRC SALP Board, comprised of the staff members listed below, met on August
11, 1993, to review the observations and data on performance and to assess
licensee performance in accordance with the guidance in NRC Manual Chapter 0516, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance."
Board Chairman
W. L. Forney, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region III
Board Members
T. O. Martin, Acting Director, DRS
C. E. Norelius, Director, DRSS
J. N. Hannon, Project Director, NRR
L. R. Greger, Chief, Branch 3, DRP
J. B. Hopkins, Sr. Project Manager, NRR
S. Stasek, Senior Resident Inspector, RIII
Other Attendees at the SALP Board Meetino
M. A. Ring, Chief, Operations Branch, DRS
J. W. McCormick-Barger, Chief, EP & NPR Section
J. R. Creed, Chief, Safeguards Section
R. K. Walton, Resident Inspector, RIII
J. M. Shine, Resident Inspector, RIII
C. E. Brown, Reactor Engineer, DRP
E. R. Duncan, Reactor Engineer, DRP
M. K. Khanna, Reactor Engineer, DRP
R. A. Westberg, Team Leader, DRS
T. J. Ploski, Emergency Preparedness Analyst, DRSS
R. A. Paul, Senior Radiation Specialist, DRSS
M. A. Kunowski, Senior Radiation Specialist, DRSS
G. D. Replogle, Reactor Inspector, DRS
R. A. Langstaff, Reactor Inspector, DRS
J. R. Kniceley, Physical Security Inspector, DRSS
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II. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Overview
During this assessment period, overall performance improved from the previous
assessment period and was excellent. A strong management team continued to
provide sufficient direction and oversight to ensure effective implementation
of a conservative, safety conscious approach to plant operation. Strengths
noted included the ample staffing, qualifications, and dedication of personnel
in all areas, teamwork and communications between organizations onsite, and
management support for programs and initiatives impacting safety.
Performance in the Plant Operations area remained constant and received a
Category 2 rating. Performance was characterized by a conservative operating
, philosophy with good involvement and support by management. However, there
5 were some continuing problems in the conduct of operations. These included
instances of failure to follow procedures, inad?quate attention to detail, and
equipment misoperation.
Performance in the Radiological Controls area again received a Category 2
rating; however, an improving trend was noted. The good performance was a
direct result of strong management support and a competent radiological
controls staff. Some weaknesses were noted in the control of contamination,
particularly during outage activities.
Performance in the Maintenance / Surveillance area was once again excellent and
received a Category I rating. High quality programs and procedures maintained
plant equipment in an excellent state of repair.
Performance in the area of Emergency Preparedness ended the previously noted
declining trend and continued to receive a Category I rating. In addition to
excellent maintenance of the program and excellent interactions with State and
county agencies, improvements to the annual exercise program contributed to
, the reversal of this declining trend.
Performance in the area of Security remained constant and received a Category
1 rating. Excellent management attention and support resulted in the
continued effective implementation of this program.
Performance in the areas of Safety Assessment / Quality Verification and
Engineering / Technical Support improved and received Category I ratings. In
the Engineering / Technical support area, this rating was the restlt of strong
management and an experienced and well trained staff which provided excellent
support to operations and maintenance. In the Safety Assessment / Quality
Verification area, a major contributor to this rating was management support
for pt ograms that identified, tracked, and resolved safety issues through
effective self-assessment aadits and surveillances.
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The performance ratings during the previous assessment period and this i
assessment period according to functional areas are given below:
Rating Last Rating This '
1 Functional Area Period Period Trend
Plant Operations 2 2 ,
Radiological Controls 2 2 Improving
, Maintenance / Surveillance 1 1
Emergency Preparedness 1 Declining 1
Security 1 1 ,
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Engineering / Technical
l Support 2 Improving 1 -
Safety Assessment / Quality
Verification 2 Improving 1 l
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III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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i A. Plant Operations l
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1. Analysis i
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- Performance was characterized by a conservative operating philosophy with good
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involvement and support by management. The conduct of operations was well
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defined; however, some implementation errors continued to occur.
l Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was good. A conservative and l
safety-conscious approach was consistently evident in management decisions. i
, Management continued development of initiatives to minimize risk during l
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shutdown conditions. A procedure, issued before the refueling outage, :
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specified systems and equipment combinations necessary to minimize risk during
shutdown conditions. Effective implementation of this procedure directly I
resulted in an increased level of command and control during the outage. I
Nonroutine, complex evolutions were well planned and properly executed.
Pre-job briefs were routinely conducted for those evolutions that had the
potential to adversely affect operation. Reactor shutdowns and startups were
conducted well with operators maintaining a high level of control.
However, some problems occurred in the conduct of operations. On occasion,
operators failed to follow procedures. Examples included performing
procedural steps out of sequence such snat an inadvertent transfer of
approximately 13,500 gallons of reactor coolant system inventory to the
borated water storage tank occurred, and failing to obtain a required senior
reactor operator sign-off upon completion of a valve lineup, which contributed
to running a clean waste monitor tank pump with its suction valve closed for
about 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. Additionally, two instances occurred during new fuel receipt
operations when operators failed to maintain proper control due to poor
attention to detail. Also, instances of equipment misoperation occasionally
occurred. An example was improper operation of valves in the control room
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ventilation system. Although somewhat improved, improper equipment operation l
has been a concern discussed in previous SALPs. ;
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The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety
standpoint was good. The operations department employed a critical self-
assessment philosophy with management conducting ongoing observations and !
reviews of operator performance. The fire brigade responded well to fire i
alarms and indications of fire. Shift team response to operational events at
power was excellent with one exception. Control room operators, responding to
a failure in the integrated control system late in the assessment period, took
action that inadvertently caused reactor coolant system pressure to increase
to its high pressure trip setpoint, causing the reactor to trip.
Operator cognizance of panel ind; cations and equipment status was good.
However, there were a few instances where operator cognizance was inadequate.
For example, early in the assessment period, a hydrogen analyzer was
inoperable for about 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> and a makeup pump was inoperable during a mode
change near the end of the assessment period. Additionally, during the
refueling outage, reactor vessel water level was allowed to increase, which
resulted in borated water leaking past the reactor vessel head o-ring seals
and wetting vessel head stud holes resulting in additional unplanned radiation
exposure.
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The onshift crews continued to conduct themselves in a professional manner.
Access to the operating areas of the control room was controlled and
extraneous activities were kept to a minimum. Although improved, noise levels
in the control room from overhead steam piping continued to detract f.om
communications. Log keeping improved, and the information in the. log provided
sufficient detail to reconstruct shift activities. Plant housekeeping and
control of combustible materials was good.
Staffing was acple. A six-shift rotation continued to be effectively
implemented. Control room staffing greatly exceeded technical specification
requirements. In addition to the shift supervisor and assistant shift
supervisor, a shift manager who is a licensed senior reactor operator
continued to be assigned to support administrative and maintenance interface
activities. Use of overtime was not excessive and technical specification
overtime requirements were routinely met. Operator initial qualification pass
rate was 94 percent; operator requalification pass rate was 88 percent.
However, some weaknesses, relating to operator knowledge of equipment and
system response during shutdown conditions, were self-identified.
2. Performance ratina
Performance is rated Category 2 in this area. Performance was rated Category
2 during the previous assessment period.
3. Recommendations
None.
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l B. Radiological Controls -
1. Analysis
Good performance in the radiation safety program was a result of strong
management support and a competent radiological controls staff.
Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was good. A commitment to
source-term reduction was evidenced by early boration and hydrogen peroxide
addition during refueling shutdowns. Efforts to maintain exposure as-low-as-
reasonably-achievable were excellent as demonstrated by the use of a new
reactor head shield, upgrading of the plant video tour program, and the use of
a specially designed high integrity waste container for shipping high activity
filters. Management was also involved in ensuring continued good water ,
quality and upgrading facilities such as the new portable demineralizer and
hot machine shop. Additional initiatives included continued support for the
National Registry of Radiation Protection Technicians (NRRPT), an aggressive
self-assessment program, and the implementation of the revised 10 CFR Part 20,
1 year before the deadline.
However, there were instances when management was less effective in ensuring
quality. Examples included: (1) the failure to use the liquid radwaste
discharge monitor during a release, (2) the failure to complete
decontamination in containment before commencing outage work, and (3) the
failure to properly evaluate the radiological consequences before opening the
equipment hatch which resulted in the spread of contamination and increased
personnel contaminations. In addition, radiation work permits and local
survey maps occasionally did not accurately reflect actual working and plant
conditions.
The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety
standpoint was very good. The overall exposure history was very good.
! Cumulative dose in 1992 (no refueling outage) was about 20 person-rem (0.2
l person-Sieverts), and the dose for the 1993 60-day refueling outage (RFO-8)
was about 330 person-rem (3.3 person-Sieverts). Although the dose for RF0-8
was higher than anticipated, it was reasonable given the scope of RF0-8. The
scope involved emergent work on the reactor head vent line; steam generator
tube sleeving; and replacement of the feedwater nozzles, one reactor coolant
pump motor, and both letdown coolers. Comparisons of cold chemistry
measurements with the NRC remained good (26 agreements in 29 comparisons), and
l the station maintained a satisfactory cross-check program with vendors.
Radioactivity in liquid and gaseous effluents remained well below regulatory
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limits. Efforts to reduce solid radwaste and contaminated areas continued
with good success. Improvements were also made in reducing radwaste monitor
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operability problems. A performance weakness was noted when the containment
! emergency airlock access door was improperly secured resulting in inadequate
l controls over a high radiation area (containment).
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Overall, staff levels, training, and qualifications were excellent. For
example, about half of the radiological protection (RP) technicians and staff
were certified by the NRRPT at the end of the assessment period. Sufficient
staff was available to provide coverage during routine and refueling outage
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operations. Training was provided to onsite personnel before implementation l
of the revised 10 CFR Part 20 requirements and was generally effective. l
2. Performance Ratinq l
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Performance is rated Category 2 with an improving trend in this area.
Performance was rated Category 2 during the previous assessment period.
3. Recommendations
None.
C. Maintenance / Surveillance
1. Analysis
Performance was characterized by an effective management team. The level of
attention and resources allocated ensured plant equipment was maintained in an ,
excellent state of repair. Personnel were well-trained and attentive to their I
tasks; however, occasional implementation problems occurred.
Management effectiveness in ensuring quality associated with the maintenance )
and surveillance areas was excellent. Both programs were well defined and 1
used good procedures. Overall, the staff continued to successfully implement
the surveillance and maintenance programs with tests and preventive
maintenance work completed on time. Additionally, work planning was a
strength and plant material condition was excellent. System and plant outage ,
rates were very low. Maintenance activities were well performed as evidenced !
by minimal rework. The maintenance work order backlog continued to be reduced
and was low. Resources were allocated to maintain equipment in an excellent
state of repair. For example, the material condition of the electrical
distribution system was noted as a strength.
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Planning, scheduling, and work implementation for major outages improved and
was effective. Overall, the refueling outage conducted late in the period,
was well-planned and emphasized minimizing shutdown risk. Control and
oversight of contractors were good.
Although extensive procedures and programs were in place, implementation 1
problems sometimes occurred in both the surveillance and maintenance areas.
Early in the assessment period, personnel performed work outside of the scope
of a work order and caused a reactor trip from power. Halfway through the
period, an inadequate independent verification was performed on a :,afety-
related pressure instrument, which caused it to be inoperable for nearly 3
days.
The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety
standpoint was excellent. Troubleshooting activities typically were well
planned and conducted in an orderly fashion. Maintenance personnel exhibited
both a questioning attitude and attention to detail during work activities.
Examples included: (1) stopping work when a drawing discrepancy, which would
have caused a circulating water pump trip, was identified in the work package
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and (2) identifying a freon leak in one train of the control room emergency
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ventilation system while working on the other train. Radiation monitor !
related equipment problems were significantly reduced by improved preventive
maintenance activities. ,
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Alternatively, early in the assessment period, a reactor trip was generated l
during shutdown conditions (Group 1 rods were fully withdrawn in Mode 3) due '
to a personnel error while taking voltage readings on a non-vital electrical
bus.
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Staffing levels were ample and qualifications of personnel were good. !
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Personnel performing maintenance and surveillance activities were qualified,
knowledgeable, and attentive to their tasks. The maintenance training program
was well implemented. However, deficiencies were noted in training personnel ,
to perform independent verification and tagging. j
2. Performance Rating
Performance is rated Category 1 in this area. Performance was rated Category
1 during the previous assessment period.
3. Recommendations
None.
1. Analysis *
Performance was characterized by excellent maintenance of the emergency i
preparedness (EP) program, excellent interactions with State and county
agencies, and improved exercise performance.
Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was excellent. The emergency 1
! response facilities and equipment were maintained in an excellent state of ;
l readiness. The onsite meteorological monitoring program was significantly !
upgraded to better ensure the availability of good data to emergency :
responders. A notable achievement was the completion of an emergency radio
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communications system after several years of development. Additionally, the
public information brochure, developed in cooperation with county officials,
received a commendation from the Governor.
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The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety ;
standpoint was good. After a thorough re-evaluation, planning for radiation
protection support during a fire response situation was acceptably revised.
Frequent remote circuit checks and monthly performance test results led to an
acceptable reduction in the frequency of preventive maintenance on the
emergency planning zone's (EPZ's) siren system. The impact of an impassable
bridge was thoroughly addressed in a temporary revision to the EPZ's
evacuation planning.
No actual activations of the emergency plan occurred during the assessment
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period. During the 1992 exercise, emergency declarations were correct and
prompt, while associated offsite agency notifications were timely. Concerns
identified during the 1991 exercise were corrected. Overall performance ,
during the 1992 exercise improved and was very good. Concerns were identified !
regarding decision making on the need for issuing respiratory protection or '
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potassium iodide to some in-plant repair teams and the adequacy of documenting
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some in-plant radiological surveys. Challenging and successfully demonstrated i
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aspects of the exercise included an onsite medical response, assembly and
accounting of all onsite personnel, deployment of offsite survey teams, and
the first use of the control room simulator, which was electronically linked '
to displays in several response facilities for greater realism.
The emergency response organization's staffing levels remained excellent. ,
Effective mechanisms remained in place to ensure that only currently trained
persons were on the callout roster and that on call personnel were in the
local area. Periodic off-hours drills demonstrated the capability to augment
onshift staff in a timely manner. The EP group's expertise and staffing level
remained excellent.
All three teams of response personnel continued the excellent practice of
annual response facility walk-throughs and integrated facility drills. These
drills were in addition to functional drills and other training activities
specified in the emergency plan. The effectiveness of drills, drill
critiques, and other training activities was evidenced-by the improved
exercise performance.
2. Performance Rating
Performance is rated Category 1 in this area. Performance was rated Category
I with a declining trend during the previous assessment period.
3. Recommendations
None.
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l E. Security
I 1. Analysis
Performance was characterized by effective management attention and support
which resulted in excellent implementation of the program,
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! Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was excellent as evidenced by a
continued reduction in the personnel error and equipment events identified in
the safeguards event log. The security self-assessment, quality assurance
audits, and surveillances were effective in monitoring and evaluating program
implementation and has become a program strength. The Plant Manager's support
of the security program fostered a high level of awareness towards security by
the plant staff and security force personnel. An example of management
support was the procurement of an upgraded computerized badge fabrication
system and the closed circuit television camera video capture assessment
system. Liaison with local law enforcement agencies was excellent.
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The fitness-for-duty program satisfied the general performance objectives of
10 CFR Part 26. Management strongly supported and devoted ample resources to
the fitness-for-duty program.
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The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety
standpoint was excellent. The perimeter intrusion detection system and closed 5
circuit television camera replacement projects completed toward the end of the
previous assessment period have significantly reduced maintenance costs, false
alarm rates, and compensatory measures for this assessment period. Security
system performance and reliability have greatly improved.
Evaluation of logged events was excellent. These events were properly
identified, analyzed, and documented. No events were required to be reported
telephonically within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of discovery. 1
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i Staffing continued to be excellent, and resources were effectively used. The :
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l experience level remained high due to a low turnover rate, and there was a
( high level of security awareness and performance. Communications between the ,
- site security staff, the NRC staff, and regional security personnel were !
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excellent.
The effectiveness of the training and qualification program was excellent.
Personnel observed were knowledgeable and proficient in performing their
assigned duties. Tactical response training was excellent. Armed response <
l drills involving defensive strategies greatly improved contingency response l
capabilities.
2. Performance Ratina
Performance is rated Category 1 in this area. Performance was rated Category
1 during the previous assessment period.
3. Recommendations
None.
F. Engineerina/ Technical Support
1. Analysis
Overall, engineering and technical support improved and was excellent, with a
well-trained and knowledgeable staff. Engineering support to operations,
maintenance, and other onsite organizations was excellent. However, some
weaknesses were noted in examination security and test reviews.
Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was excellent. Early in the
assessment period, management support of the motor operated valve (MOV)-
program was lacking in that few resources were dedicated to this effort.
However, in the second half of the assessment period, management effectiveness
was excellent with extensive attention and resources devoted to the MOV
program resulting in significant progress in design basis testing.
Engineering support to operations and maintenance was excellent as evidenced
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by the assistance provided in making operability determinations, '
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troubleshooting emergent problems, and supporting outages. Management
decisions regarding eddy current testing of steam generator tubes (100
percent) and sleeving and plugging criteria were considered conservative. '
During the previous assessment period, a large backlog of engineering issues
was identified as a weakness. This backlog was greatly reduced and is now
manageable. Management involvement was also evident in the implementation of
l an effective erosion / corrosion program. Management was not effective in
! implementing licensed operator examination security controls; however, the
l examination was not compromised.
The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety ;
l standpoint was very good. In response to the station blackout generic issue,
l a dedicated diesel generator was installed onsite. Additionally, a leadership -
role was taken in the Electric Power Research Institute's valve stem
lubrication testing program for MOVs. Engineering personnel also identified
errors related to equipment qualifications in an existing analysis for high
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energy line breaks outside containment. The application of the ASME boiler
I and pressure vessel code, a weakness noted during the previous assessment
period, has improved as evidenced by an effective and conservative inservice
l inspection program, an acceptable and responsive inservice testing program,
and increased staff involvement in code organizations. During the previous
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assessment period, deficiencies were noted in the modification program. t
Although isolated weaknesses with specific modifications were identified <
during this assessment period, the overall assessrent of the modification
program was good. Temporary modifications were effectively controlled with
the exception of a temporary modification that incorrectly reversed the ;
direction of a solenoid valve. !
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Weaknesses, identified by the NRC, were noted in testing and the evaluation of >
test results. An example was a safety features actuation system surveillance
that did not verify the start of several 480 Vac essential loads during bus
energization and failed to identify that several 4160 Vac/480 Vac loads .
appeared to start outside their designed sequencer step. A weakness was
identified in the testing of the safety-related battery chargers. The test
did not verify the charger's ability to support design conditions.
Staffing levels were excellent and ensured resources were available to deal
with emergent problem areas. System engineers spent substantial amounts of
time in the plant involved with the systems under their responsibility. In
addition, outside contractors were utilized effectively with sufficient
oversight being provided. Staffing to administer requalification examinations ,
and develop the required examination material was good. i
l The effectiveness of training in the engineering area was excellent, as
reflected in the support of, and credibility with, operations and maintenance ;
organizations. The effectiveness of the operator licensing training program j
was good overall. All engineering groups were considered competent, '
experienced, and well-trained.
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2. Performance Rating ;
Performance is rated Category 1 in this area. Performance was rated Category
2 with an improving trend during the previous assessment period.
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3. Recommendations i
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G. Safety Assessment /0uality Verification
1. Analysis
Performance was characterized by excellent nnagement support for programs
that identified, tracked, and resolved safety issues. Resolution of long-term >
issues was good.
I Management effectiveness in ensuring quality was excellent. Management
support of the Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Reporting (PCAQR) system .
was evident. The PCAQR system was effectively used as the primary means of
determining root causes and corrective actions to significant discrepant
conditions identified at the facility. Additionally, the commitment tracking
system was excellent, which resulted in quality updated safety analysis report ,
revisions, schedules being met, and commitments being implemented. Management
support of a quality radiation protection program was demonstrated by the use
of a contract industry expert to review the station's recent implementation of
l the revised 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. A program to address risk during
shutdown conditions was formalized into a controlled procedure in the latter
half of the assessment period. During shutdown conditions, the Inde r ient
Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) continuously monitored the outage scheaule and l
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in-plant activities to determine how well they adhered to the shutdown risk j
! program. Additionally, the proactive evaluations conducted by the ISEG were a '
I strength. The computerized tracking program implemented in the latter part of
I the assessment period was effectively used to trend the performance of
individual departments and program areas. This program has enhanced the
licensee's ability to identify weaknesses and improve performance. Another
good, continuing initiative was the Pursuit of Excellence program. Although
this program functioned well as a tool to identify and resolve several
weaknesses, it has not been fully effective in resolving problems related to
attention-to-detail and mispositioning events.
Quality Assurance (QA) audits and surveillances were performance-based and
thorough in nature. Quality Assurance issues were tracked and addressed in a
timely manner. Quality Assurance personnel interfaced well with other plant
organizations and promoted teamwork through identification and feedback
mechanisms such as statistical analysis to better identify process
deficiencies. Quality review groups were well staffed with qualified
individuals.
The approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety
standpoint was excellent. Onsite material receipt activities identified i
discrepant conditions associated with new fuel received from Babcock and l
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Wilcox and a new reactor coolant pump motor received from Westinghouse. Also,
the licensee was proactive in researching and resolving an issue concerning
local leak rate testing of containment penetration bellows.
A high-energy-line-break equipment qualification issue was evaluated and acted
upon with compensatory and long-term corrective measures in a high quality
manner. Industry issues, such as Thermal Lag-330 fire barrier problems, were
adequately evaluated and compensatory measures appropriately implemented.
Staffing of the Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB) and the Station Review
Board was excellent. Member qualifications greatly exceeded minimum
regulatory requirements. Discussions in both forums were good, and all
members were actively involved. Of note was the CNRB's review and discussion i
of the new 10 CFR Part 20 program implementation. !
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2. Performance Ratino
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Performance is rated Category 1 in this area. Performance was rated Category '
2 with an improving trend during the previous assessment period. . l
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3. Recommendations l
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None. i
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IV. SUPPORTING D,.A AND SUMMARIES '
A. Major Licensee Activities
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1. On December 6, 1991, the plant was shut down to repair a failed
emergency diesel generator (EDG) speed switch.
2. On December 11, 1991, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the l
grid after the EDG speed switch repairs were completed. !
3. On March 1,1992, a reactor trip occurred as a result of a maintenance
personnel error.
4. On March 2,1992, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid.
5. On February 28, 1993, the plant was shut down to commence the eighth
refueling outage.
6. On April 28, 1993, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid
following completion of the eighth refueling outage.
7. On May 20, 1993, a reactor trip occurred due to an input failure to the
integrated control system.
8. On May 21, 1993, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid.
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B. Major Inspection Activities
! The inspection reports discussed in this SALP are listed below:
Docket Number 50-346
Inspection Report Numbers 91022, 92002 through 92019, and 93002 through 93012.
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l. From May 5 through June 5, 1992, a special electrical distribution
l system functional inspection (EDSFI) was conducted (Inspection Report
l (IR) 50-346/92007).
2. From January 29 through October 6,1992, a special inspection was 1
conducted of the licensee's followup actions concerning fire protection '
(IR 50-346/92016).
3. From April 19 through April 30, 1993, a special inspection was conducted
of the licensee's check valve and inservice testing programs (IR 50- l
346/93009).
'
4. From April 19 through April 21, 1993, a special inspection was conducted ,
to evaluate two unplanned transfers of reactor coolant inventory (IR 50- l
,
346/93011). l
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Wilcox and a new reactor coolant pump motor received from Westinghouse. Also,
the licensee was proactive in researching and resolving an issue concerning
local leak rate testing of containment penetration bellows.
A high-energy-line-break equipment qualification issue was evaluated and acted
upon with compensatory and long-term corrective measures in a high quality
manner. Industry issues, such as Thermal Lag-330 fire barrier problems, were
adequately evaluated and compensatory measures appropriately implemented.
Staffing of the Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB) and the Station Review
Board was excellent. Member qualifications greatly exceeded minimum
regulatory requirements. Discussions in both forums were good, and all
members were actively involved. Of note was the CNRB's review and discussion
of the new 10 CFR Part 20 program implementation.
2. Performance Rating
Performance is rated Category 1 in this area. Performance was rated Category
2 with an improving trend during the previous assessment period. .
3. Recommendations
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None.
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IV. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES l
A. Major Licensee Activities
. 1. On December 6, 1991, the plant was shut down to repair a failed i
'
l emergency diesel generator (EDG) speed switch.
2. On December 11, 1991, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the
grid after the EDG speed switch repairs were completed.
3. On March 1,1992, a reactor trip occurred as a result of a maintenance
personnel error.
4. On March 2, 1992, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid.
5. On February 28, 1993, the plant was shut down to commence the eighth
refueling outage.
6. On April 28, 1993, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid
following completion of the eighth refueling outage.
7. On May 20, 1993, a reactor trip occurred due to an input failure to the
integrated control system.
8. On May 21, 1993, the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid.
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B. Major Inspection Activities j
The inspection reports discussed in this SALP are listed below: ,
Docket Number 50-346 l
Inspection Report Numbers 91022, 92002 through 92019, and 93002 through 93012. l
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1. From May 5 through June 5, 1992, a special electrical distribution j
system functionhl inspection (EDSFI) was conducted (Inspection Report
(IR) 50-346/92007).
!
2. From January 29 through October 6,1992, a special inspection was i
conducted of the licensee's followup actions concerning fire protection ;
(IR 50-346/92016). ;
!
l 3. From April 19 through April 30, 1993, a special inspection was conducted
of the licensee's check valve and inservice testing programs (IR 50- i
346/93009).
.
l 4. From April 19 through April 21, 1993, a special inspection was conducted
l to evaluate two unplanned transfers of reactor coolant inventory (IR 50- .
l 346/93011).
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