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p MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Carr Commissioner Roberts
. Connissioner Rogers Cosmissioner Curtiss Commissioner Remich FROM:-
James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations
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SUBJECT:
COMMISSION POLICY STATEMENT ON EXEMPTIONS FROM REGULATORY CONTROLS In SECY 89-360, the staff noted that there were areas of potential inconsistency between the policy statement on Exemptions from Regulatory
.[
Control and prior actions related to the regulation of nuclear power reactors. A discussion of these potential inconsistencies is enclosed. The
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i staff is providing this information in light of the increased emphasis upon a consistent-regulatory approach.
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James M. Taylor I
Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
As stated cc: SECY OGC
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DISTRIBUTION: [ COMMISSIONERS]
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DATE:./' /89
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t p p _,f($/ & A 01.~-f & W ' W POTENTIAL AREM H W=48100 ptMtMCY During the preparation of the final policy statement on Exemptions from &~'
u Regulatory Control, the staff noted that thre could be several areas of pete. tis-1 I
ete%
im..r.;hte cy between the final policy statement and th ~7" *419 <zw.r.
- ^= af lia^^ sed e tivities by th 0 RC. These areas include: 1)themagnitudeofthe. collective dose criterion v45-:4h tk 0 4h:tive ese-%, epareting nictrTrpower' feriliites, 2) the use of the 0.1 rem cutoff for collective dose calculations; and 3) the potential lack of finality for decommissioning actions. These topics are discussed individually below.
I.
Magnitcde of the Collective Dose Criterion The Staff Requirements Memorandum of October 13, 1989, directed the staff to include a collective dose criterion of 1,000 person-rem per year for exelnptions.
Under the final policy statement (SECY-89-360), this criterion would define a level of collective dose below which further efforts to reduce the collective dose would not be necessary. Thus, in the policy, statement the Commission would establish in essence, a lower Ek <M bound for ALARA efforts at 1,000 person-rem.4 It unimi, the Comission
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has, as part of its regulatory oversight of nuclear power reactors, pursued ALARA efforts to considerably lower levels.
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reactors in the United States in 1986 was 110 person-rem (NUREG/CR-2850, j
Vol.8).
In a similar manner, the collective doses from some pottulated accidents, as discussed in NUREG-1150, are on the order of 100 to 500 person-rom. %,4M"M/-~ a M~#[M'#fW 'ji.r...f w a;(ua ~ y/~ 4 ~4x.a w +, w ~,a- ~;
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further regulatory control will not be exercised than when continued regulation is required would appear to be inconsistent both in terms of the relative magnitudes of concern, and the philosophy of control of sources. The use of a 1,000 person-rem value could, for example, be construed as implying that the controls of effluents and containment systems for nuclear power reactors have been too stringent. The dichotorgy becomes even more apparent, however, when the number of decisions that l
may be made unde.r the exemption policy is taken in.to account. Although -
l practices ~M be broadly defined, the combined total of all consumer products, decommissioning activities, etc will be considerably greater than the number of nuclear power reactors.
In each of these decisions, the collective dose could, under the final policy statement, be considerably greater than that allowed for situations where we maintain regulatory control.
It could therefore, be argued that the collective dose criterion for exemptions should be less than or equal to t'he level required when the NRC continues to exercise control.
12/05/89 2
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II. Use of the 0.1 arem Collective Dose Cutoff The concept of collective dose was established a num6er of years ago as a mechanism for quantifying the societal impact of radiation sources or practices.
In its pure, theoretical form, the collective dose is an toewe4e representation of the societal impact only when all of the Y
contributions to the dose are included. However, as a practical matter, i.4,
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the collective dose has almost always been truncated in some manner.
In various decisions taken by the NRC, a cutoff in time (e.g.,10,000 years),
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Each'of the approaches to collective dose cutoff has advantages and i
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used, or considered appropriate, when a majority of the collective dose
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upon which a decision would be based is eliminated.
The distribution of doses from any practice is often characterized by a normal or log-nnrmal distribution.
In many cases, the average dose is an order of magnitude lower than the limit. The staff believes that for most l
exemption decisions this will be the case. However, because of the individual dose criterion and collective dose cutoff of 1 mrom and 0.1
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mrem respectively, there may be numerous circumstances where the majority l
of the collective dose will not be included in determining if a practice 12/05/89 3
POTENTIAL AREAS
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crit:ri; teir.i; inconsistent with previous actions, and with an environmental assessment of the exemption under NEPA.
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taking into account the societal impact.
!!I. Lack of Finality in Decisions During the August 3,1989, hearing before Congressman Synar Chairman Carr discussed the problems of decommissioning nuclear facilities. One problem related to the lack of definitive criteria. upor, which final L
decommissioning actions could be based. The exemption policy individual dose criterion of 10 mrom is contemplated as the basis for decommissioning decisions, and the staff is preparing guidance on soils l'
and structures to implement the dose criterion.
However, the 10 mrem dose level is potentially inconsistent with recommendations of EPA, and the NRC may@be faced with reexamination and reopening of decisio ar
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g unlessjjome pe of " grandfather" dose,11r=4wW4eded,7 some future date The problems of a lack of finality will be discussed in greater detail in staff paper on decommissioning.
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12/05/89.
4 POTENTIAL AREAS
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Carr e
Commissioner Roberts 1
Commissioner Rogers Commissioner. Curtiss
- t Commissioner Remick James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations FROM:
COMMISSION POLICY STATEMENT ON EXEMPTIONS FROM REGULATORY
SUBJECT:
CONTROLS-1 In SECY 89-360, the staff noted that there were areas of potential inconsistency between-the policy statement on Exemptions from Regulatory Control and prior a:tions related to the regulation of nuclear power The A discussion of these potential inconsistencies is enclosed.
. reactors.
staff is providing this information in light of the increased emphasis upon a P
consistent regulatory approach.
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Janes M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations I
Enclosure:
As stated cc: SECY OGC GP DISTRIBUTION:- [ COMMISSIONERS)
RPHEB R/F - DCool Circ./Chron.
JMTaylor
.EDO R/F EBeckjord Dross l-WHouston TSpeis L
BMorris ZRosztoczy DCool 0FFC:RPHE8:DRA :DD:DRA
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/ /89
/ /89
/ /89 :
/ /89 :
/ 89 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
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Document Name:
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MENDIOLA Author's Name:
i dcool Document Comments:
Potential areas of inconsistency t
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i POTENTIAL AREAS OF INCONSISTENCY k
During the preparation of the final policy statement on Exemptions from Regulatory Control, the staff noted that thre could be several areas of potential inconsistency between the final policy statement and the regulation of Itcensed activities by the'NRC.
These areas include:
- 1) the magnitude of the collective.
do'se criteria vis-a-vis the collective dose from operating nuclear power facilities; 2) the use of the 0.1 rem cutoff for collective dose calculations; and 3) the potential lack of finality for decommissioning actions. These topics I
are disc 0ssed individually below.
L i
I.
Magnitude of the Collective Dose Criterion The Staff Requirements Memorandum of October 13, 1989, directed the staff to include a collective dose criterion of 1,000 person-rem per year for l
exemptions.
Under the final policy statement (SECY-89-360), this criterion would define a level of collective dose below which further i
efforts to reduce the collective dose would not be necessary. Thus, in the policy statement the Comission would establish in essence, a lower bound for ALARA efforts at 1,000 person-rem.
In contract, the Comission has, as part of its regulatory oversight of nuclear power reactors, pursued ALARA efforts to considerably lower levels.
For example, the total collective dose from effluents from all operating nuclear power
'/
J 12/05/89 1
POTENTIAL AREAS
.. e e
reactors in the United States in 1986 was 110 person rem (NUREG/CR-2850, Vol.8).
In a similar manner, the collective doses from some postulated accidents, as discussed in NUREG-1150, are on the order of 100 to 500 person-rem.
The use of a larger collective dose criterion in circumstances where further regulatory control will not be exercised than when continued regulation is required would appear to be inconsistent both in terms of the relative magnitudes of concern, and the philosophy of control of i
sources. The use of a 1,000 person-rem value could, for example, be L
construed as implying that the controis of effluents and containment systems for nuclear power reactors have been too stringent. The dichotoiny I
becomes even more apparent, however, when the number of decisions that may be made under the exemption policy is taken into account. Although l
practices are to be broadly defined, the combined total of all consumer j
J products, decommissioning activities, etc wf11 be considerably greater than the number of nuclear power reactors.
In each of these decisions, the collective dose could, under the final policy statement, be considerably greater than that allowed for situations where we maintain regulatory control.
It could therefore, be argued that the collective dose criterion for exemptions should be less than or equal to the level j
required when the NRC continues to exercise control.
l 12/05/89 2
POTENTIAL. AREAS
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..-'f II. Use of the 0.1 arem Collective Dose Cutoff i
The concept of collective dose was established a number of ' years ago as a mechanism for quantifying the societal impact of radiation sources or practi.ces.
Initspure,theoreticalfore,thecollectivedostisap c:
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-acm ae6e representation of the societal impact only when all of the t-j.c contributions to the dose are incluAd.
However, as a practical matter, the collective dose has almost always bean truncated in some manner.
In various decisions taken by the NRC, a cutoff in time (e.g.,10,000 years),
j distance (e.g., 50 miles), or dose has been proposed or used.
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Each of the approaches to collective dose cutoff has advantt.ges and disadvantages.
However, in each case the cutoff was applied so that the truncated portion was considered to be insignificant in relation to the
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total collective dose from the practice. A cutof'f has generally not been used, or considered appropriate, when a majority of the collective dose upon which a decision would be based is eliminated.
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The distribution of doses from any practice is often characterized by a L
nomal or log-normal distribution.
In many cases, the average dose is an order of magnitude lower than the limit. The staff believes that for most exemption decisions this will be the case. However, because of the individual dose criterion and collective dose cutoff of 1 mrem and 0.1 mrem respectively, there may be numerous circumstances where the majority of the collective dose will not be included in determining if a practice 12/05/89 3
POTENTIAL AREAS
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1r meets the collective dose criterion.
In the most extreme case, a dose on the order of 10,000 person-rem would not be subject to consideration.
Cases such as this may result in the analysis for policy statement' l
criteria being inconsistent with~ previous actions, and with an environmental assessment of the exemption under NEPA. This type of case would also be inconsistent with the perception that NRC is examining and taking into account the societal impact.
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III. Lack of Finality in Decisions During the August 3,1989, hearing before Congressman Synar Chairman Carr discussed the problems of decomissioning nuclear facilities. One problem related to the lack of definitive criteria upon which final decomissioning actions could be based.
The exem'ption policy individual dose criterion of 10 mrem is contemplated as the basis for decomissioning decisions, and the staff is preparing guidance on soils and structures to implement the dose criterion. However, the 10 mrem
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dose level is potentially inconsistent with recome'ndations of' EPA, and the NRC may be faced with reexamination and reopening of decisions at some future date, unless some type of " grandfather" dose is included.
The problems of a lack of finality will be discussed in greater detail in staff paper on decomissioning.
12/05/89 4
POTENTIAL AREAS
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COMMISSION POLICY STATEMENT ON EXEMPTION FROM REG. CONTROL f
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1 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Carr Comissioner Roberts Commissioner Rogers Comissioner Curtiss Commissioner Remick FROM:
James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations f
SUBJECT:
COMMISSION POLICY STATEMENT ON EXEMPTIONS FROM REGULATORY CONTROLS In SECY-89-360, the staff noted that in recent comunications with both the Comission and the ACRS the issue of coherence in the regulatory process has been raised.
In light of the increased emphasis upon a consistent#^I* W regulatory approach, the staff has prepared a discussion of several inconsistencies between the policy statement on Exemptions from Regulatory L
Control and prior actions related to the regulation of nuclear power L
reactors. The discussion of these potential inconsistencies is enclosed.
1 James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
As-stated cc:
[ COMMISSIONERS]
RPHEB R/F - DCool Circ./Chron.
RECORD NOTE: This paper was reviewed JMTaylor EDO R/F by the staff of NRSS, EBeckjord Dross NRR, and OGC, and reflects WHouston TSpeis their input.
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/ /89
/ /89
/ /89
/ /89 :
/ /89
/ 89 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
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POTENTIAL AREAS Requestor's ID:
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POTENTIAL AREAS OF INCONSISTENCY During the preparation of the final policy statement on Exemptions from Regulatory Control, SECY-89-360, the staff noted that in recent communications with both the Commission and the ACRS the issue of coherence in the regulatory process has been raised.
In that regard, the staff has identified several areas of potential inconsistency between the final policy statement and other regulated activities, particularly with prior actions related to reactors.
These areas include:
- 1) the magnitude of the collective dose criterion; 2) the use of the 0.1 rem cutoff for collective dose calculations; and 3) the potential lack of finality for decomissioning actions. Other areas of potential inconsistency, such as with national and international recomendations, have been discussed previously with the Comission.
l l
1.
Meonitude of the Collective Dose Criterio_n The Staff Requirements Memorandum of October 13, 1989, directed the staff to include a collective dose criterion of 1,000 person-rem per year for 4
exemptions. Under the final policy statement (SECY-89-360), this criterion o
(
would define a level of collective dose below which further efforts to reduce the collective dose would not be necessary. Thus, in the policy 4
statement the Commission would establish in essence, a lower bound for J
ALARA efforts at 1,000 person-rem.
In theory, this dose would produce one cancer death every two years, based upon the risk conversion factors in collective dose is larger than the collective dose that SECY-y-@ff,.g ],h,1)other Lituations where the NRC has required an expenditure has h :r L;; A n of resources to analyze and further reduce the dose.
For example, the Commission has, as part of its regu14tfgr4 Qgrsight of nuclear power reacters, pursued ALARA efforts to -
'y lower levels. The total collective dose from effluents from all operating nuclear power rea lIr pk in the United S try,in 1986 was 110 person-rem (NUREG/CR-2850, Vol. 8).
'r,The,olectfv,eTosesfromsomepostulatedaccide s discussed in NUREG-1150, are on the order of 100 to 500 person-rem /ynt l
t
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air.i':r I
u mennes,Taking into account the risk from a reactor accident (probability robability of death resulting from the collective of the event times the p$1,000 per person rem criterion, the NRC has dose) and employing the mA.<. g 4 W v.
required backfitting to reduce risk. %
The use of a larger collective dose criterion in circumstances where further regulatory control will not be exercised than when continued regulation is required fould appear to be inconsistent both in terms of the relative magnitudes of concern, and the philosophy of control of The use of a 1,000 person-rem value could.gfor example, be sources.
construed as implying that the controls of effluents & :: t;ir;;nt yh im nuclear power reactors have been too stringent. The dichotomy becomes even more apparent, however, when the number of decisions that may e made under t e g'enion policy is taken into account. Although products, decomissioning attivitief e~6, gogbgefjgg3." g - aQ1ppug practices
- e tIroacly defined t
m e en the number of nuclear power reactors.
In each of these decisions, agrmk 12/05/89.
1 POTENTI AL AREAS
i the collective dose could, under the final policy statement, be i
considerably greater than that allowed for situations where we maintain regulatory control.
It could therefore, be argued that the collective dose criterion for exemptions should be less than or equal to the level required when the NRC continues to exercise control.
l II. Use of the 0.1 mrem Collective Dose Cutoff The concept of collective dose was established a number of years ago as a mechanism for quantifying the societal impact of radiation sources or practices.
In its pure, theoretical fom, the collective dose is a representation of the societal impact only when all of the contributions to the dose are included. However, as a practical matter, the collective dose has almost always been truncated in some manner.
In various analyses, l
a cutof f in time (e.g.,10,000 years), distance (e.g., $0 miles), or dose has been used.
Each of the approaches to collective dose cutoff has advantages and 1
disadvantages. However, in each case the cutoff was applied so that the truncated portion was considered to be insignificant in relation to the
-total collective dose from the practice.
in general, the collective dose assessment has been carried out in time or space to the point necessary to distinguish among viable alternatives when applying the ALARA l
principle. A cutoff has generally not been used, or considered appropriate, when a majority of the collective dose upon which a decision would be based'is eliminated.
The distribution of doses from any practice is often characterized by a normal or log-normal distribution.
In many cases, the average dose is an order of magnitude lower than the limit.
The staff believes that for most exemption decisions this will be the case.
However, because of the individual dose criterion and collective dose cutoff of 1 mrem and 0.1 mrem respectively, there may be numerous circumstances where the rajority of the collective dose will not be included in determining if a practice meets the collective dose criterion.
In an extreme case, a dose on the order of 10.000 person-rem would not be subject to consideration.
Application of the policy statement criteria in cases such as this could be inconsistent with previous actions, and the use of a cutoff in a safety
. analysis determination would be inconsistent with an environmental assessment of the exemption under NEPA. This type of case would also be inconsistent with the expectation, given the collective dose criteria in the policy statement, that NRC is examining and taking into account the societal impact.
g&
i III. Lack of Finality in Decisions pM *-
During the August 3,1989, hearing before Congres n Synar, Chairman Carr discussed the problems of decomissioning nucle facilities. One problem related to the lack of definitive criteria up which final decomissioning actions could be based. The exemption polic individual dose criterion of 10 mrem is contemplated as the basis for decommissioning decisions, a I,
the staff is preparing guidance on soils and structures to implement the gr dose criterion.
However, the 10 mrem dose level is potentially inconsistent with recommendations or regulations of EPA, and the NRC may 12/05/89 2
POTENTIAL AREAS
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be faced with reexamination and reopening of decisions at some futureunless date -at a significant expense to both the government and licenseesEPA 4
i finality in area will be discussed in greater detail in staff paper l
on decomis ioning.
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12/05/89 3
POTENTIAL AREAS
1.
7 is' POTENTIAL AREAS OF INCONSISTENCY i
L During the preparation of the final policy statement on Exemptions from Regulatory Control SECY-89-360, the staff noted that in recent communications with both the ComIssion and the ACRS the issue of coherence in the regulatory process has been raised.
In that regard, the staff has identified several areas of potential inconsistency between the final policy statement and other regulated activities, particularly with prior actions related to reactors, These areas include:
- 1) the collective dose criterion; 2) the 0.1 rem cutoff for collective dose calculations; and 3) the potential lack of finality for decomissioning actions. Other areas of potential inconsistency, such as with national and international recommendations, have been discussed previously with the Comission.
l.
The Collective Dose Criterior.
The Staff Requirementt 'i randum of October 13, 1989, directed the staff to include a co11ect0 u je criterion of 1,000 person-rem per year for exemptions.
Under tfn ' ual policy statement (SECY-89-360), this criterion would define a level et collective dose below which further efforts to reduce the collective dose would not be necessary. Thus, in the policy statement the Comission would establish in essence, a lower bound for ALARA efforts at 1,000 person rem. This collective dose is larger than the collective cose that has resulted from other situations where the NRC or licensees have expended resources to analyze and. further reduce the dose.
For example, the Comission has, as part of its regulatory oversight of nuclear power reactors, pursued ALARA efforts to somewhat lower levels.
The total collective dose from effluents from all operating nuclear power reactors in the United States in 1986 was 110 person-rem (NUREG/CR-2850 Vol.8). The exemption policy collective dose criterion could allow these effluent releases to be increased by about a factor of 5, if no margin for variability was taken into account.
On the other hand, it should be noted that if effluent releases were allowed at the 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix 1 design objective values, the collective dose for all operating nuclear power reactors could increase to several thousand person-rem per year.
In a second comparison, the risk of 50 mile population dose from the accidental release of radionuclides initiated by internal events in NUREG-1150 plants gives 95 percent person-rem per reactor-year collective doses on the order of 35 to 180 person-rem. Taking into account the risk from a reactor accident (probability of the event times the probability of death resulting f rom the collective dose) and employing the $1,000 per person-rem criterion, the NRC has required backfitting, on a reactor specific basis, to reduce risk for collective doses less than 1,000 person-rem. The 1,000 person-rem collective dose criterion could be considered to set some type of precedent in this area, although the policy statement on exemptions from regulatory control is not intended to apply to accident situations, j..u : l...
12/05/89.k,,
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The use of a larMr collective dose criterion in circumstances where further regulator / Control will not be exercised than when continued regulation is reauhed could appear to be inconsistent both in tems of the relative magnitudes of concern, and the philosophy of control of sources. The use of a 1,000 person-rem value could, for example, be construed as implying that the controls of effluents or containment systems for nuclear power reactors have been too stringent. A potential dichotomy i
'becomes apparent, however, when the number of decisions that may be made under the exemption policy is taken into account. Although most practices are expected to be broadly defined, the combined total of all consumer products, deconsnissioning activities, waste disposals, etc. could exceed the number of nuclear power reactors.
In each of these decisions, the collective dose could, under the final policy statement, be considerably greater than that allowed for situations where we maintain reguletory control.
It could therefore, be argued that the collective dose criterion for exemptions should be less than or equal to the level required when the NRC continues to exercise control.
It should also be noted that there is a potential inconsistency in approach between the policy statement on exemptions from regulatory control and the safety goal policy statement. When the safety goal policy statement was prepared, the use of a collective dose criterion was debated and rejected.
in the' case of the exemption policy, the collective dose criterion was included. The staff continues to support the use of the collective dose criterion in the context of the exemption policy.
l
- 11. The 0.1 mrem Collective Dose Cutoff The concept of collective dose was established a humber of years ago as a mechanism for quantifying the societal impact of radiation sources or practices.
In its pure, theoretical form, the collective dose is a representation of the societal impact only when all of the contributions to the dose are included.
However, as a practical matter, the collective i
dose has almost always been truncated ir. some manner.
In various analyses, a cutoff in time (e.g.,10,000 years), distance (e.g., 50 miles), or dose has been used.
1 L
Each of the approaches to collective dose cutoff has advantages and disadvantages.
However, in each case the cutoff was applied so that the a
truncated portion was considered to be insignificant in the decision process relative to the total collective dose from the practice.
In general, the collective dose assessment has been carried out in time or space to the point necessary to distinguish among viable alternatives when applying the ALARA principle.
The distribution of doses from any practice is of ten characterized by a normal or log-normal distribution.
In many cases, the average dose is an order of magnitude lower than the limit. The staff believes that for most exemption decisions this will be the case. However, because of the individual dose criterion and collective dose cutoff of 1 mrem and 0.1 mrem respectively, there may be numerous circumstances where the majority of the collective dose will not be included in determining if a practice meets the collective dose criterion, in an extreme case, a dose on the 12/05/89 2
POTENTIAL AREAS
.[
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order of 10,000 person-rem would not be subject to consideration. -
Application of the' policy statement criteria in cases such as this could
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be inconsistent with previous actions, and the use of a cutoff in a safety analysis determination would be inconsistent with an environmental assessment of the exemption under NEPA. This type of case would also be i
h llective dose criteria in inconsistent with the expectation, g ven t e co the policy statement, that,NRC is (xamining and taking into account the
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- PN 111. Lack of Finalit.y in Decisions
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z During the August 3,1989, hearing befort Congressman Synar Chainnan Carr discussed the problems of. decomissioning nuclear f acilities. One problem related to the lack of definitive criteria upon which final decomissioning i
s actions could be based. The exemption policy individual dose criterion of 10 mrom is contemplated as the basis for waste disposal and decom-e' missioning decisions, and, in the latter case, the staff is preparing i
guidance on soils and structures to implement the dose criterion. However, the 10 mrem dose level is potentially inconsistent with recommendations or regulations of EPA, and the NRC may be faced with reexamination and reopening of decisions at some future date, at a significant expense to
(
both the government and licensees, unless EPA included some type of
" grandfather" clause. The problems of a lack of finality in the decom-missioning area will be discussed in greater detail in staff paper on decommissioning, I
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12/05/89 3
POTENTIAL AREAS
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Document Name:
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COOL Author's Name:
dcool I
Document Comments:
COMMIS$10N POLICY STATEPENT ON EXEMPTION FROM REG. CONTROL h
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i MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairmen Carr Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Rogers Commissioner Curtiss Commissioner Remick FROM:.
James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
COMMISSION POLICY STATEMENT ON EXEMPTIONS FROM REGULATORY
- CONTROL, In SECY-89-360, the staff noted that in recent communications with both the Commission and the ACRS the issue of coherence in the regulatory process has been raised.
In light of the increased emphasis upon a consistent regulatory approach, the staff has prepared a discussion of several perceived inconsistencies between the policy statement on Exemptions from Regulatory Control and prior actions related to the regulation of nuclear power The discussion of these potential inconsist'encies is enclosed.
reactors.
James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
As stated cc: SECY OGC GPA DISTRIBUTION: [ COMMISSIONERS]
RPHEB R/F
- DCool Circ./Chron.
RECORD NOTE: This paper was reviewed JMTaylor EDO R/F by the staff of NRSS, NRR, and OGC, and reflects EBeckjord Dross WHouston TSpeis their input.
BMorris 2Rosrtoc2y DCool OFFC:RPHEB:DRA :DD:DRA
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- EDO NAME:DCool:dm
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/ /89
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Carr Commissioner Roberts Comissioner Rogers Comissioner Curtiss Commissioner Remick FROM:
James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations COMMISSION POLICY STATEMENT ON EXEMPTIONS FROM REGULATORY
SUBJECT:
CONTROL In SECY-89-360, the staff noted that in recent communications with both
+
the Comission and the ACRS the issue of coherence in the regulatory process has been raised.
In light of the increased emphasis upon a consistent regulatory approach, the staff has prepared a discussion of several perceived inconsistencies between the policy statement on Exemptions from Regulatory Control and prior actions related to the regulation of nuclear power The discussion of these potential inconsistencies is enclosed.
reactors.
1 l
3 James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
As stated cc: SECY OGC GPA l
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.k Document Name:
Date: December 7, 1989 COMMIS$10NERS i
i-Requestor's ID:
MENDIOLA.
. Author's Name:
DC00L-
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Document Comnents:
~ COMMISSION POLICY STATEMENT ON EXEMPTIONS FROM REGULATORY CONTROL.
L REVIEWERS:
D. Cool
- 2. Rosztoczy B. Morris
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E. Beckjord i
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J. Taylor k
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i Do'cument Nas.e POTENTIAL AREAS l'
Reovestor's 10:
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Author's Name:
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Document Comments:
l Potential, areas of inconsistency
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POTENTIAL AREAS OF INCONSISTENCY During the preparation of the final policy statement on Exemptions from Regulatory Control, SECY-89-360, the staff noted that in recent comunications with both the Comission and the ACRS the issue of coherence in the regulatory In that regard, the staff has identified several process has been raised.
areas of potential inconsistency between the final policy statement and other regulated activities, particularly with prior actions related to reactors.
These areas include: 1) the collective dose criterion; 2) the 0.1 rem cutoff for collective dose calculations; and 3) the potential lack of finality for decomissioning actions. Other areas of potential inconsistency, such as with national and international recommendations, have been discussed previously with the Comission.
I.
The Collective Dose Criterion The Staff Requirements Memorandum of October 13, 1989, directed the staff l
to include a collective dose criterion of 1,000 person-rem per year for exemptions. Under the final policy statement (SECY-89-360), this criterion would define a level of collective dose below which further efforts to reduce the collective dose would not be necessary.
Thus, in the policy statement the Comission would establish in essenet, a lower bound for ALARA efforts at 1,000 person rem. This collectii' dose is larger than the collective dose that has resulted from other situations where the NRC or have expended resources to analyze and further reduce the dose.
licensees For example, the total collective dose from effluents from all operating nuclear power reactors in the United States in 1986 was 110 person-rem (NUREG/CR-2850,Vol.8). The exemption policy collective dose criterion could allow these effluent releases to be increased by about a factor of 5, if no margin for variability was taken into account, and provided that the release of effluents is defined as a separate practice. On the other hand, it should be noted that if effluent releases were allowed at the 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix ! design objective values, the collective dose for all operating nuclear power reactors could increase to several thousand person-rem per year.
In a second comparison, the risk of 50 mile population dose from the accidental release of radionuclides initiated by internal events in NUREG-1150 plants gives 95 percent person-rem per reactor-year collective doses on the order of 35 to 180 person-rem. The 1,000 person-rem collective dose criterion could be considered to set some type of precedent
.in this area, although the policy statement on exemptions from regulatory control is not intended to apply to accident situations.
l The use of a larger collective dose criterion in circumstances where further regulatory control will not be exercised than when continued regulation is required could appear to be inconsistent both in terms of the relative magnitudes of concern, and the philosophy of control of The use of a 1,000 person-rem value could, for example, be sources.
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construed as iglying that the controls of effluents or containment systems for nuclear power reactors have been too stringent. Another potential dichotog becomes apparent when the number of decisions that may be made under the exemption policy is taken into account. Although most practices
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are expected to be broadly defined, the combined total of all consumer J
products, decommissioning activities, waste disposals, etc., could exceed the number of nuclear power reactors.
In each of these decisions, the collective dose could, under the final policy statement, be considerably greater than that allowed for situations where we maintain regulatory control.
It could therefore, be argued that the collective dose criterion for exemptions should be less than or equal to the level required when the
+
ERC continues to exercise control.
It should be noted that there is no inconsistency so long as the doses considered are only those mandated by the regulations.
It should also be noted that there is a potential inconsistency in approach between the policy statement on exemptions from regulatory control and the safety goal policy statement. When the safety goal policy statement was prepared, the use of a collective dose criterion was debated and
- rejected, in the case of the exemption policy, the collective dose criterion was included. The staff continues to support the use of the collective dose criterion in the context of the exemption policy, f
- 11. The 0.1 mrem Collective Dose Cutoff The concept of collective dose was established a number of years ago as 6 mechanism for quantifying the societal impact of radiation sources or practices.
In its pure, theoretical form, the collective dose is a representation of the societal impact only when a'11 of the contributions to the dose are included.
However, as a practical matter, the collective dose has almost always been truncated in some manner.
In various analyses, a cutoff in time (e.g.,10,000 years), distance (e.g., 50 miles), or dose has been used.
Each of the approaches to collective dose cutoff has advantages and disadvantages.
However, in each case the cutoff was applied so that the i
truncated portion was considered to be insignificant in the decision process relative to the total collective dose from the practice.
In general, the collective dose assessment has been carried out in time or space to the point necessary to distinguish among viable alternatives when applying the ALARA principle.
The distribution of doses from any practice is often characterized by a normal or log-normal distribution.
In many cases, the average dose is an i
order of magnitude lower than the limit.
The staff believes that for most exemption decisions this will be the case. However, because of the individual dose criterion and collective dose cutoff of 1 mrom and 0.1 mrem respectively, there may be numerous circumstances where the majority of the collective dose will not be included in determining if a practice meets the collective dose criterion, in an extreme case, a dose on the order of 10,000 person-rem would not be subject to consideration, provided that each individual received less than 0.1 mrem, in addition, the staff of OGC has indicated that the use of a cutoff, such as the 0.1 mrem value, would not be appropriate for an environmental assessment under NEPA.
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Actions 111. Lack of' Finality in Decomm ss on no During the August 3,:1989, hearing before Congressman Synar, Chairman CarrOne discussed the problems of decommissioning nuclear facilities.
related to the lack of definitive criteria upon which final decommissioning dose' criterion actions could be based. The exemption policy individual of 10 mrem is contemplated as the basis for waste disposal and'decom.
missioning decisions., e.nd, in the latter case, the staff is preparing
- However, guidance on soils and ?.itectures to= implement the dose criterion.
the 10 mrem dose level ' patentially inconsistent with recommendations or. regulations of EPA and the'NRC may be faced with reexamination and reopening of decisions at some future date, at a significant expense to both the government and licensees, unless EPA included some type of "grandf ather" clause. The problems of a lack of finality in the decom-missioning area will be discussed in greater detail in staff paper on deconnissioning.
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' Potential areas of inconsistency
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POTENTIAL AREAS OT INCONSISTENCY During the preparation of vbe 174 1 plicy statement on Exemptions from Regulatory Control, SECTS 36C, the staff noted that in recent comunications l
with both the Comis5100 ad the ACRS the issue of coherence in the regulatory process has been raised.
- n that regard, tM stsff has identified several areas of-potential inconsistency between the find? policy statement and other regulated activities, particularly with prior. actions related to reactors.
These areas include:
- 1) the collective dose criterion; 2) the 0.1 rem cutoff for collective dose calculations; and 3) the potential lack of finality for decomissioning actions. Other areas of potential inconsistency, such as with national and international recommendations, have been discussed previously with the Comission.
I.
The Collective Dose Criterion The Staff Requirements Memorandum of October 13, 1989, directed the staff to include a collective dose criterion of 1,000 person-rem per year for exemptions. Under the final policy statement (SECY-89-360), this criterion would define a level of collective dose below which further efforts to reduce the collective dose would not be necessary. Thus, in the policy statement the Comission would establish in essence, a lower bound for ALARA efforts at 1,000 person-rem. This collective dose is larger than the collective dose that has resulted from other situations where the NRC or l
licensees have expended resources to analyze and'further reduce the dose.
For example, the total collective dose from effluents from all operating l
nuclear power reactors in the United States in 1986 was 110 person-rem (NUREG/CR-2850,Vol.8). The exemption policy collective dose criterion could allow these effluent releases to be increased by about a factor of 5, if no margin for variability was taken into account, and provided that c
the release of effluents is defined as a separate practice. On the other hand, it should be noted that if effluent releases were allowed at the 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I design objective values, the collective dose for all operating nuclear power reactors could increase to several thousand person-rem per year.
Ap q
l In a second compari n, the risk ofg5 iile population dose from the j
accidental release f radionuclides nitiated by internal eventsollective NUREG-1150 plants 4.iees 95 percent p rter. r-P--
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' doses ( on the order of 35 to 180 person-rem /dhe 1,000 person-rem par collective dose criterion could be considered to set some type of precedent S.c biiL.'
in this area, although the policy statement on exemptions from regulatory y'
l bontrol is not intended to apply to accident situations.
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The use of a larger collective dose criterion in circumstances where further regulatory control will not be exercised than when continued l
regulation is required could appear to be inconsistent both in terms of the relative magnitudes of concern, and the philosophy of control of sources. The use of a 1,000 person-rem value could, for example, be l
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' construed as implying that the controls of effluents = : n W x =
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t for nuclear power _ reactors have been too stringent. Another potential
. dichotomy becomes apparent when the number of decisions that may be made under the exemption policy is taken into account. Although most practices are expected;to be broadly: defined, the combined total of all-consumer i
products, decommissioning activities, waste disposals, etc., could exceed the number of nuclear: power reactors.
In each of these decisions, the collective dose could, under the final policy statement, be considerably greater than-that allowed for situations where we maintain regulatory control.
It could therefore, be argued that the collective dose criterion for exemptions should be less than or equal to the level required when the NRC continues to exercise control.
It should be noted that there is no inconsistency so long as the doses considered are only those mandated by the regulations.
It should also be noted that there is a potential inconsistency in approach-between the policy statement on exemptions from regulatory control and the safety goal policy statement. When the safety goal policy statement was prepared, the use of a collective dose criterion was debated and rejected.
In the case of the exemption policy, the collective dose L
criterion was included, nEto suppor4-tha usep 3
cellectiye dose of the exemption _ps Mey.
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'II, The 0.1 mrem Collective Dose Cutoff i
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l The concept of collective dose was established a number of years ago as a mechanism for' quantifying the societal impact of radiation sources or practices.
In its pure, theoretical form, the co.11ective dose is a representation of the societal impact only when all of the contributions to the dose are. included. However, as a practical matter, the collective dose has.almost always been truncated in some manner.
In various analyses,-
L a cutoff in time (e.g.,10,000 years), distance (e.g., 50 miles), or dose l~
has been used.
Each of the approaches to collective dose cutoff has advantages and I
disadvantages. However, in each case the cutoff was applied so that the l
truncated portion was considered to be insignificant in the decision process,relatinr-te the totaLcoHect4ve dose free the prestke.
In general, the collective dose assessment has been carried out in time or space to the point necessary to distinguish among viable alternatives when L
applying the ALARA principle.
The distribution of doses from any practice is often characterized by a normal or log-normal distribution.
In many cases, the average dose is an order of magnitude lower than the limit. The staff believes that for most exemption decisions this will be the case. However, because of the individual dose criterion and collective dose cutoff of 1 mrem and 0.1 mrem respectively, there may be numerous circumstances where the majority of the collective dose will not be included in determining if a practice meets the collective dose criterion.
In an extreme case, a dose on the order of 10,000 person-rem would not be subject to consideration, provided that each individual received less than 0.1 mrem.
In addition, the stoff of-MC
- Wete Wt=the use of a cutoff, such as the 0.1 mrem value, westd not be appropriate for r r
= - assessment under NEPA.
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'41 o
111.= Lack of Finality in Decommissioning Actions
'~
During the August 3,1989, hearing before Congressman Synar, Chairman Carr d~fba66 discussed the _ problems of deconcissioning nuclear f acilities. One problem related to the lack of definitive criteria upon which final decosnissioning p< hic.gg actions could be based. The exemption policy individual dose criterion.
of 10 mrem is contemplated as the basis.for waste disposal and decom-missioning decisions, and, in the latter case,-the staff.is preparing-
- However, guidance on soils and structures to implement the dose criterion.
the 10 mrem dose level is potentially inconsistent with recommandations or regulations of EPA, and the NRC may be faced with reexamination and reopening of decisions at some future date, at a significant expense to both the government and licensees,~unless EPA included some-type of
" grandfather" clause. The problems of a lack of finality in the decom-
.missioning area will be discussed in greater detail in staff paper on decommissioning, u
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