ML20041F770
| ML20041F770 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1982 |
| From: | Devincentis J PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Miraglia F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8203170399 | |
| Download: ML20041F770 (93) | |
Text
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l PUBLIC SERVICE m a su m
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L.v.:: '., Office:
(3 Companyof NewHampeNre 1671 Worcester Road
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Fromingham, Massachusetts 01701 (617). 872 - 8100 l
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March 12, :
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D United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 At tentio n :
Mr. Frank J. Miraglia, Chief Licensing Branch #3 Division of Licensing
References:
(a ) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 "q
(b) USNRC Letter, dated February 12, 1982, " Request for Q
Additional Information," F. J. Miraglia to W. C. Tallman Su bj ec t :
Responses to 410 Series RAIs; ( Auxiliary Systems Branch)
Dear Sir:
We have enclosed responses to the subject RAIs, which you forwarded in Re f e renc e (b), except 410.31 which will be forwarded by March 19, 1982.
Very truly yours, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY h
John DeVincentis Project Manager JDV : ALL: dad OO/
Enclosure f
cc:
R. H. Jaross Building 301
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l Argonne National Labs hJ Argonne, Illinois 60439 8203170399 820312 PDR ADOCK 05000443 A
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SB 1 & 2 FSAR RAI 410.8 (3.5.1.1)
Describe the provisions taken to assure that the turbine driven emergency feedwater (EFW) pump and turbine are not a missile source, or that missiles from the EFW turbine and pump will not damage the motor driven EFW train.
Describe the barrier between EFW pumps, the range of credible missile sizes, trajectory and impact effects of any part of the adjoining motor driven EFW pump system including electrical and piping lines.
Include consideration of indirect trajectory and impact effects on any part of the adjoining' motor driven EFW pump system including electrical and piping lines.
Include consideration of indirect trajectories.
RESPONSE
The turbine driven EFW pump is identical in size and design to the motor driven pump, and operates at the same speed. The turbine drive has an overspeed trip system to protect the pump and turbine from overspeed. The turbine is a solid wheel, single stage design, and is not a credible missile The motor driven pump is oriented perpendicular to the turbine source.
driven pump, so that i,n the unlikely event that pump or turbine missiles are generated, the other pump will not be affected.
The partition between the pumps provides protection against indirect trajectories.
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Your FSAR indicates that pressurized components designed to ASME Section III are not credible missile source but does not consider pressurized ccaponents not designed to ASME Section III. Therefore, for safety related areas ou: side containment describe what protection is given safety-related equipment from missiles generated by failures in nearby non-safety related Consider failures of pressurized components not designed to ASME sources.
Section III such as valves and accumulators.
RESPONSE
Section 3.5.1.1 describes the design cri*eria applied to components such as valves and pumps, both those that are teel.gned to ASME Section III and those that are not.
Hence, these components aa not considered credible missiles.
Accumulators not designed to ASME Sect in III are not considered a source of credible missiles since they are desigct d in accordance with ASME Section VIII. Various subsections of ass!E Section VIII, e.g. UG-22, UG-23 and UCS-66 delineate rtquirements for impact testing necessary to prevent brittle fracture. The Seabrook tankage (accumulators) designed to Section VIII have either appropriar.e impact test, or material-operating temperatures that preclude brittle fracture. Thus, missiles from this source is not considered probable.
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s SB 1 & 2 FSAR RAI 410.10 (3.5.2) (9.2.5)
With the exception of the SSE, the Atlantic Ocean is utilized as the ultimate heat sink. This requires that the transition structures connecting the intake and discharge tunnels to the service water pumphouse be protected from tornado missiles. However, the transition structur'es are not listed as tornado missile protected in Table 3.5-12.
Describe the provisions to prevent tornado missiles from blocking and/or damaging the 42" service water intake pipes that convey the service water to the service water pumps.
RESPONSE
Subsection 3.5.z and Table 3.5-12 have been revised in response to the above RAI, and will be incorporated into Amendment 45.
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FSAR TABLE 3.5-12 STRUCTURES AND BARRIEstS DESIGIIF.D _TO RESIST TORNADO-GE" ITERATED I
Main Steam and Feedwater Pipe Chase Contaiinment Structure I
(E6W)
ContainmenthaclosureventilationArea Electrical Tunnel I
ContainmentfquipmentHatchMissile Pipe Tunnel, between Unit 2 Fuel I
Shield Storage Eldg. and Wasta Processing Control and Diesel Cenerator Building Bldg.
I Farsonnel Match Area Control Room Hakaup Air Intake Structura f
Fre-Action Valve Building Dikas and Foundation for Unit 1 Refuel-ing Water l Storage Tank and Reactor Hakeup Water Storage Tank, walls Primary Auxiliary Building E.7-D.1 9 Col. line 0.5 and E-5 8 IQlR and Containment Spray Equipment Col. lina 4.5 vault l
Unit 2 Refuelins Water Storage Tank Service Water Pumphouse, including valle, Col. 5 to 2. Col. E.7-D.
O Electrical Room i
. East Panatration Area Waste Processing Building, external l
walle.and roof below Elev. 53'-0 haargency Yeedwatet Pump Building and including the following areas l
above Elev. 53'-0:
Enclosure for condensate Water storage
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- Tank, vertical walle Betw, Col.1 & 2, Col's A to D to Elav. 86'-0 Betw. Col. 4.9 & C, Col's B to E, Fuel Storage Building to Elev. 86'-0 1
Pipe Tunnel between Tank Para and g
Valve Pit Areas of the Intake and s
FAB DLecharge' Transition Structure i
Safety-Related Electrical Manholes i
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- Except where noted, all structures completely; enclose the equipment housed there1m.
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ansseesesiisteMTSEtsN00KSTATION-e763 P.ess (To be incor-
.33 1 & 2 Ps&R porated in Amendment 45) any blockage to the pipe. The utility pole would have to be siellarly directed, towever, it would pose ao blockage problem since it would float at water level considerably above the elevation of the pipe.
The cooling tower is only required to function in the event of a seismic disturbance of sufficient magnitude to interrupt the flow in the main circu-lating wate r tunnels. Accordingly, only those parts of the service water cooling tower structure which protect servi'ce water piping up to and including the cooling tower pump discharge valves require missile protection. Certain parts of the tower and its structure are not protected against missiles.
These include the tower air intakes, tower pump, fans and gear boxes and electrical lswitchgear. The remainder of the service water equipment and piping is Located within the missile-protected service water pumphouse, the primaryaufiliarybuilding,orburiedunderground. The sink safety function isassured{throughtheuseofthemissile-pro:ectedservicewatersystesand its seismic Category I cooling tower which provides an alternate source of cooling water. Refer to section 9.2.5 for further details concerning the ultimate helst sink.
l 3.5.3 Barrier Desian Procedures Thestructulresandbarrieraidentifiedinsubsection3.5.2aredesignedto withstand the local effects and overall effects of the applicabit missiles.
The followi'ag areas are discussed O
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3.5-24
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P. ass Jaw.es se siiss ont strofoox stattow - srss 331&2 (To be incot-Fs&R porated in Amendment 45) 3.5.2 5tructures, Systems and Components to b,e Protected from Esternally-Generated Missiles All plant s,tructures, sys'tems and consponents whose failure could lead to offsite radiological consequences, or which are required to shut down the reactor and' maintain it in a safe condition s ile assuming an additional single fall'ure, are designated ANS Safety Class 1, 2 or 3 and/or seismic Category I,'and are listed in Tables 3,.2-1 and 3.2-2.
safety-rela,ted components, including essential piping, instnaseistation and electrieelfquipeont,areprotectedagainstdamagefromexternallygenerated missiles by physical barriers or protective structures.
The atructutes protecting the systems and components important to safety are listed in Table 3.5-12; plan and elevation drawings pertinent to these struc-tures are fmind in Section 1.2.
Discussions,on design requirements d ich exempt the refueling water storage tank and spray additive tank free missile protection are presented in Section 6.2.2.
Fratection of the fuel storage building spent fuel pool cooling / cleanup system O
and storage l pool from utesiles d ich could penetrate the non-sissile-proof fuel shipping cask rail car access door is provided by an interior missile-proof wall, as shown in Figure 1.2-16.
The ultimate heat sink complex (section 9.2.5), which consists of the mechan-ical draft 'ooling towers and the Atlantic Ocean service water system, has appropriate portions protected against all credible missiles. The ultimate heat sink e plan (Section 9.2.5), d ich consists of the mechanical draft cooling towdra and the Atisatic Ocean service water system, has appropriate portions pr4tected against all credible missiles. Those portions of the intake and discharge transition structures which house the safety-related service water valves (valve pit area) are designed to withstand tornado generated uf,ssiles. Since the safety-related portions of the piping entering the transit (on structures are enclosed and protected as they pass through this area, caly the pipe entrance to the structure is exposed. However, the pipes are located under water at or below elevation (-)35'-0".
The pipes are therefore not exposed to credible tornado generated alssiles.
Enferring to standard Review Plan 3.5.1.4, " Missiles Cenerated by Natural Phenomena",'the largest missiles d ich might be considered to potentially block the y pe entrance are the 35 foot long utility pole and the 4000 lb automobile. In order to block the pipe entrance, the automobile would have to be directed through the top of the transition structure, missing the concrete cro,es-bracing, and drop exactly at the pips location, sinking to the elevation of the pipe. Since the pipe is located at elevation (-)40'-0" (in the intike transition structure), and the floor is at elevation (-)S)'-0" the automobile would continua to sink to the floor where it could nat pose O
3.5-23
i SB 1 & 2 FSAR iO RAI 410.11 We require that the pipe chases which house the safety related portion of the main steam and feedwater lines, and the safety, relief and isolation valves for those lines to be designed to consider the jet impingement and environmental effects (pressure, temperature and humidity) and potential flooding consequences from an assumed longitudinal crack one square foot in area.
(
Reference:
BTP ASB 3-1, Section B.1.a(1) for portions of the lines meeting the break exclusion requirements of BTP MEB 3-1, Item B.1.6.)
For other portions of the lines, assume standard high energy pipe breaks per BTPs ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1.
We require that the essential equipment including valve operators and instrumentation located within structures communicating with such lines, be capable of operating in the environment resulting from i
the assumed failure described above, and that structural failures resulting from such failures should not jeopardize the safe shutdown of the plant.
RESPONSE
Refer to FSAR Amendment 44 pages 3.6(B)-5,
-6, -6a, Appendix 3A, Summary Pages, 3A-1 thru 3A-5 and Appendix 31.
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- O RAI 410.12 f
Figures 3.6(B)-1 and 2 indicate that the main steam and feedwater lines i
between the turbine building and the main steam and feedvater pipe chases j
are routed in close proximity to the control building. These lines are neither seismic Category I nor nuclear safety grade. Therefore, provide the l
results of an analysis and drawings as necessary to demonstrate that a 1
failure of these lines will not result in damage to any essential systems and components in the control building, including the essential switchgear and batteries, due to pipe whip, jet effect and environmental effects.
RESPONSE
Refer to FSAR Amendment 44 pages 3.6(B)-5,
-6, -6a, Appendix 3A, Summary Pages, 3A-1 thru 3A-5 and Appendix 31.
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410.13 In conformance with Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 4.6, discuss how f ailure of the non-safety-related control rod drive
' /^^g mechanism cooling system would be detected and whether a failure
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of this system would affect the safety functions of the reactivity control systems.
-RESPONSE 5 During reactor operation, the CRDM operating coils are cooled by a flow of + containment air provided by fans dedicated to that duty only.
Spare capacity is available from the four installed fans.
liigh terperature alarms in the cooling air outlet are provided to alert the operator to inadequate CRDM cooling. Additionally, an alarm is provided should a CRDM cooling fan motor trip or if an insuf ficient numbers of cooling fans are not running. Even if all i
cooling capability were lost, the reactor could be tripped and safely shutdown. The cooling function does not influence the safety of the CRDMs in their ability to trip the reactor when required.
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FCAR O
1 RAI 410.14 (5.2.5)
SRP Section 5,2.5 Table 1 provider a list of systema connected to the reactorcoolahtsystemthatrequireintersystemleakagemonitoring capability. The FSAR does not indicate that the majority of systems listed in the SRP Taple posses this capability. Therefore, discuss your conformance with this requirement.
RESPONSE
Refer to new Table 410.14-1.
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SB 1 & 2 FSAR TABLE 410.14-1 SYSTEM AND COMPONENTS CONNECTED TO THE RCS WITH ASSOCIATED LEAKAGE MONITORING CAPABILITIES System or Component Monitored By 1.
Accumulator Containment Drainage Sump Inventory Monitoring 2.
Safety Injection System PCCW Liquid Radiation Monitor 3.
Pressurizer Relief Tank Temperature & Pressure Indicatiors on Relief Tank 4.
Secondary Side of Steam Condenser Air Evacuation Generators Monitors & Steam Generator Blowdown Sample Monitors 5.
Residual Heat Removal PCCW Liquid Radiation Monitors O
System 6.
Secondary Side of Reactor Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Leakoff Coolant Pump Thermal Monitoring Barriers 7.
Secondary Side of Residual PCCW Liquid Radiation Monitors or Decay Heat Removal Heat Exchangers J
8.
Secondary Side of Letdown PCCW Liquid Radiation Monitors Heat Exchangers 9.
Secondary Side of Residual PCCW Liquid Radiation Monitors Heat Removal Heat Exchangers O
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l 410.15 Provide either the specific effective neutron multiplication (Keff) values ' determined in your criticality analysis for the new fuel storage arrangement under optimum moderation conditions assuming the presence of foam, small droplets, spray or fogged materials, or identify the means provided for preventing such conditions in the new fuel storage area.
RESPONSE
This criticality analysis will be provided by June 1982, for the new fuel storage arrangement.
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p 410.16 Discuss whether the new and spent fuel storage racks can withstand V
(9.1.1 maximum uplift forces without an increase in Keff.
and 9.1.2)
RESPONSE
Spent fuel racks will be designed for a postulated stock fuel ssembly load that causes an upward drag force of 3500 pounds to
. exerted on the assembly upon attempted withdrawal.
(Approximately two times combined weight of a fuel assembly and control rod. )
Racks shall also be designed to preclude excessive deflections which would reduce spacing between assemblies or prevent removal of a spent fuel assembly.
Provisions will be made in the spent fuel crane handling system by providing load limit switches to insure that the maximum uplift force specified for the fuel rack design is not exceeded, thus, averting any increase in Keff.
Appropriate FSAR sections will be revised at a later date to reflect these spent fuel crane handling system changes.
NEW FUEL RACK The fuel assemblies are stored at a minimum spacing of 21 inches. The 21
'nch center-to-center spacing between assemblies provides sufficient nuclear isolation to maintain K gg for the entire array essentially the same as that e
of a single flooded assembly; for Seabrook fuel this is computed to be 0.90.
New fuel racks will be designed for a postulated stuck fuel assembly load that causes an upward drag force of 3500 pounds (approximately two times the combined weight of a fuel assembly and control rod) to be exerted on the assembly upon attempted withdrawal. New fuel rack design also requires that the deformation of the impacted storage cells not adversely affect the minimum spacng requirements of 21 inches.
Provisions will be made in the crane handling system by providing load limit switches to insure that the maximum uplift force specified for the design of new fuel rack is not exceeded, thus, averting any increase in K gg.
e Appropriate FSAR sections will be revised at a later date (after discussions with the crane vendor) to reflect these crane handling system changes.
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SB 1 & 2 FSAR RAI 410.17 (9.1.2)
Verify that the spent fuel pool liner is seismic Category I, or that it is designed so that a failure of the liner plate as a result of an SSE will not cause either:
(1) significant release of radioactivity due to mechanical damage to the fuel, (2) significant loss of water from the pool which could uncover fuel and lead to the release of radioactivity due to,heatup, or (3) loss of the ability to cool the fuel due to flow blockage caused by all part of a liner plate falling on top of the fuel racks.
RESPONSE
Spent fuel pool liner is not designed as seismic Category I.
However, it has been designed to preclude conditions (1) through (3) as noted above from occurring as a result Of an SSE.
The liner essentially acts as a membrane between the fuel racks and the fuel pool concrete walls, and has been designed for thermal loads. During an SSE condition, hydrostatic forces will be transmitted to the concrete walls through the liner plate (liner plate always being in compression). Concrete walls to which these hydrostatic loads are transmitted, and to which also the equipment embedments are attached, are designed as seismic Category I.
O Embedments are also designed as seismic Category I.
Since liner will not experience any load other than compression during an SSE, liner plate will not fail, thus precluding conditions (1) through (3) from happening. Fuel racks will be designed as either free standing or laterally supported such that no anchoring to the liner is required, and the only load imposed on the liner is a compressive load.
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410.18 Provide drawings of the spent fuel modular storage racks and specific inf ormation indicating the rack arrangement. Indicate the interfacing dimensions between the racks and spent fuel storage pool. Provide information describing the basis and assumptions used in your Keff analysis. (Note:
It is suggested that you utilize the acceptance criteria in the NRC letter of April 14, 1978, from Brian Grimes to Power Reactor Licensees,
" Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications" for guidance in preparing your response.)
RES PONSE:
Same response as RAI 220.35.
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RAI 410.19 (9.1.3)
Your FSAR states that for the case of spent fuel pool inventory of thirteen spent fuel ' core regions plus an additional full core with only one fuel pool pump operable, the resulting pool temperature would be 1790F. Discuss whether the resulting temperature is compatible with operation of the fuel pool cleanup system, the fuel building ventilation system, and fuel pool Provide a similar discussion, including the resulting fuel pool access.
reaperature for the above fuel pool inventory with both fuel pool pumps operable.
RESPONSE
Supplementary hydraulic analysis demonstrates that sufficient flow margin exists in the system, to permit increased spent fuel pool flow to assure that pool temperatures will not exceed 1580F under these conditions.
In addition, the fuel building ventilation system is designed to maintain temperatures at levels which will permit building access assuming pool temperatures is in excess of 1750F. Operation of the fuel pool cleanup system is limited by maximum demineralized resin temperatures of 1300F.
However, with both fuel pool pumps operating, temperatures can be limited to 1300F for the specified fuel pool inventory.
See revised FSAR Table 9.1-3.
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SB1&2 Amendment 44 F3As February 1942 e.
Aminimum of 10'-6" of water above the highest fuel element position is provided to permit fuel handling without exceeding a radiation dost of 2.5 ar/hr at the surface of the pool. The concrete walls pro 4fde adequate radiation protection from irradiated fuel assemblies, f.
The impact load for the design of the racks is based on a 17 x 17 fuel assembly, 8.426 inches square, 167 inches long, we!3hing 146 pounds, and falling a distance of 30 feet to the racks at the worst possible orientation. All other lighter loads have associated energies less than the fuel assembly den dropped over thej fuel pool from their maximum normal elevation and would therefore cause less damage than a dropped fuel assembly. Fo's example, the spent fuel handling tool, which weighs 376 pounsa, wouId not be capable of developing the same energy when dropped from any elevation in the fuel storage building.
Thelfacilityandthebuildinginwhichitishoustdiscapable 3
of withstanding the effects of extreme natural phenomena, auch as the SSE, tornadoes, hurricanes, missiles and floods.
h.
The spent fuel storage racks and their anchorages have been designed to kithstand an SSE, impact, handling loads, and dead lor' of the fuel assemblies, and meet ANSI N18.2 requirements.
i.
The pool walls, fuel storage racks and other critical components whos, e failure could cause criticality, loss of cooling or physical damage to fuel, are classified as seismic Category I.
I j.
Failure of non-safety-related systems or structures located in the vicinity of the spent fuel storage facility which are act des gned to seismic Category I requirements will not cause an inctease in K gg to exceed the siaximum allowable.
a Thel spent fuel pool bridge and hoist is designed to remain on k.
its rails during an SSE and, therefore, cannot damage stored fuel.
l 1.
The, crane handling system is designed to prevent excessive forces L
froe being applied to the spent fuel storage racks.
9.1.2.2 Facilities Description i
The spent fue3 storage and handling facility consists of four major areast l
- 1) the spent fuel pool, 2) the fuel transfer canal, 3) the spent fuel cask l
loading are. and 4) a decontamination area. This arrangement is shown in Figures 1.2-11 througl. 1.2-21.
The spent fuel, pool is a water-filled cavity designed to safely store irradiated l
fuoi aeroublies. This pool to esassvuoted of reinforced senerese, wish l
all interior ourfaces lined with stainless steel.
9.1-4
- m..
RAI 410.20 (9.1.4)
Verify that light loads (those that weigh less than a fuel assembly) when dropped over the fuel pool from their maximum normal elevation would cause less damage than a dropped fuel assembly (note:
the damage is assumed to be in proportion to the kinetic energy of impact).
RESPONSE
See revised FSAR Subsection 9.1.2.lf.
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'tw RAI 410.21 (9.1.5)
(1) Commit to implement the interim actions of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" prior to recc!pt of your operating license.
(2) Provide the results of an analysis of the effects of dropping heavy loads other than the spent fuel cask. The analysis should satisfy the evaluation criteria of NUREG - 0612, Section 5.1, and consider the consequences of dropping the reactor vessel head and vessel internals during preparation for or completion of fuel handliag.
In addition, the lower load block of both the containment building polar gantry crane and the fuel building cask handling crane should be considered as a heavy load and an analysis of the consequences of their falling included in this analysis,
RESPONSE
This request will be addressed in our final report / covering letter to be issued following completion of the " Control of Heavy Loads - NUREG - 0612" evaluation presently under way. The schedule for this report has been provided separately to the NRC(June list).
O O
SB 1 & 2 FSAR iO RAI 410.22 (1) Provide a justification for your position that the non-seismic Category I polar gantry crane in the containment building will not fail in such a manner as to damage safety-related equipment or in any way prevent the performance of their safety function in the event of a safe shutdown l
earthquake (SSE). Describe in detail the design of the kickback plates I
used to ensure that the crane will remain on its rail during an SSE and describe any other mechanism to prevent the crane from tipping.
(2) Provide the results of an analysis of the worst case tipping forces encountered in an SSE.
Should it be found that the crane does tip over or leave its rails, describe the various displacement positions and protection afforded safety related equipment.
RESPONSE
Although this crane is not classified as seismic Category I equipment, the design does include consideration of SSE and OBE seismic response spectra applicable to the containment operating floor. The modal seismic design analysis of the crane load bearing elements assumed that the crane and trolley were both in the parked positions and that the crane was unloaded. Due to the infrequent use anticipated for this crane, this assumption is valid.
The crane rail is anchored to the foundation with a custom designed system of rail clip and anchor bolts. The system is designed to resist the uplift and overturning forces of the unloaded crane under SSE conditions with the crane and trolley in the parked positions.
The up-kick lugs consist of two (2) sets of lugs for each truck; a total of eight (8) sets of lugs for each crane assembly (see Figure 410.22-1). Each set of lugs has been designed for adequacy under up-thrust loads of 332,300 pounds (SSE) and 161,000 pounds (OBE). Each set of lugs consists of four (4) 4" thick plates shaped to fit around the top of the rail section (see Figure 410.22-2).
Two (2) pairs of plates are secured to the truck frame by two (2) 2-15/16" diameter pins. The spacing of the pins prevents rotation of the plates about the pin and away from the rail. The pins are free to move laterally as a. pair to allow the set of lugs to follow the curvature of the track without binding (see Figure 410.22-1). These up-kick lugs prevent the crane truck wheels from leaving the track during an SSE.
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RAI 410.23 (9.2.1)
(1) Discuse whether in the event of the SSE, a failure of the circulating water system (CWS) and other non-seismic Category I pipes, including non-seismic Category I station service water system (SSWS) lines in the vicinity of
~
the primary auxiliary building (PAB), the SSWS pipe chases and other safety related areas can result in a failure of the safety related SSWS piping due to erosion of the structure and supports, and describe the design provisions to prevent or mitigate damage to safety related piping. In this connection, show the rou, ting of the SSWS and CWS on a station layout drawing, and provide drawings and information as necessary of subgrade areas (pipe chases, tunnels, etc.) where essential SSWS piping is located in close proximity to large non-seismic Category I pipes.
(2) Discuss he,: safety related areas of the PAB are pr'otected from flooding due to a failure of the non-seismic Category I SSWS lines inside or in close proximity to the PAB (e.g., 1821-3-1-LI-24") due to the SSE. Assume the most severe single active failure of a safety related component (e.g., failure of a seismic Category I isolation valve in the open position).
-(3) Describe the provisions to direct the water flow from the SSWS discharge atmospheric overflow out of the yard area without flooding of safety related areas of the PAB and other structures and pip'.ng, or erosion of safety related structures and piping.
RESPONSE
(1) As shown in Figure 410.23-1, service water piping is not routed in the vicinity of the large non-scismic Category I circulating water piping. However, portions of buried service water system piping, Figure 410.23-2, which are non-seismic Category I are routed in the vicinity of safety-related piping. The non-seismic Category I piping runs in the same general path as the safety-related piping and, therefore, will experience no higher stress levels than the buried safety-related piping in the event of an SSE.
In addition, analysis indicates that water jets from a postulated crack in tha non-seismic Category I piping would not cause sufficient erosion to compromise the support of adjacent safety-related piping.
(2) There are four NNS service water lines within the PAB and pipe tunnel adjacent to the PAB, identified as lines 1821-1-LI-24", 1821-2-LI-24", 1806-3-LI-12" and 1827-3-LI-12" (see Figure 9.2.1, Sheet 2). These lines were analyzed in conjunction with the safety-class portion of these lines. The results of this analysis show that the maximum stresses occurring under seismic conditions are less than the allowable stress levels for Safety Class 3 piping. Accordingly, these lines will not fail as the result of a seismic event.
(3) Flow from the service water discharge atmospheric vent has essentially an unre-As stricted path to the open areas which dump into the storm drainage system.
noted in FSAR Subsection 2.4.2.3, all building entrances to areas housing safety-related equipment are at least one foot above grade. Thus, the areas covered by the storm drainage system would have to accummulate more than one foot of y
water before safety-related areas of the PAB and other structures would be affected.
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a 410.24 An examination of Figure 9.2-3 indicates that a single active
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f ailure (e.g., spurious closure' of a containment isolation valve) can result in loss cf primary component cooling water (PCCW) flow to two reactor coolant pumps (RCP's).
It is our position that loss of cooling to the RCP's must not result in unacceptable 4
damage to RCP bearings and/or seals that could _ result in fuel damage or excessive reactor. coolant leakage within a period of time compatible with operator action. We require that you demonstrate compliance with one of the following alternatives:
1.
Demonstrate by test data that the RCPs will withstand a complete _ loss of cooling water for 20 minutes and that instrumentation, designed in accordance with IEEE 279 that alarms in the control room, is provided to detect a loss of cooling water to ensure a period of 20 minutes is available so that the operator would have sufficient time to initiate manual protection of the plant; or 2.
Provide instrumentation in accordance with IEEE 279 consistent with the criteria for the protection system to I
initiate automatic protection of the plant upon loss of cooling water to a pump.
(Note: A minimum of 10 minutes for operator action is acceptable if it'can be demonstrated that the proper operator action can be taken within that time pe riod. )
RESPONSE
Primary component cooling water (PCCW) supplies cooling to the reactor coolant pumps (RCP's) for the following areas:
g, a.
Thermal barrier heat exchanger, b.
Upper and lower motor bearing oil coolers, and c.
Motor air coolers.
(See FSAR Section 9.2.2 and Figures 9.2-2, Sheet 2 and 9.2-3, Sheet 2.)
Additionally, seal water injection flow is supplied to the thermal barrier area of the RCP's to provide a source of filtered, cool water for the controlled leak-off through the RCP seal assembly (see FS AR Sections 5.4 and 9.3.4).
In discussing the potential consequences associated with a loss of PCCW cooling to the RCP's, the cooling concerns can be broken down into two areas:
- 1) loss of thermal barrier cooling, and 2) loss of cooling to the RCP motor (bearings and motor windings). Each f
of these areas will be discussed individually.
I.
Thermal T 2rrier System 1
The thermal barrier is a welded assembly consisting of a flanged cylindrical shell, a series of concentric stainless steel cans, a heat exchanger coil assembly, and two flanged water connections. Component cooling water enters the thermal barrier through a flanged connection on the thermal j
barrier flange. The cooling water flows through the inside
of the coiled stainless steel tubing in the heat exchanger
(,_/
and exits through another flanged connection on the thermal f
barrier flange. During normal operation, the thermal barrier limits the heat transf er from the reactor coolant to the pump internals.
Seal injection flow, at a slightly higher pressure and at a lower temperature than the reactor coolant system, enters the pump through a pipe connection on the thermal barrier flange and is directed to a point between the pump radial bearing and the thermal barrier heat exchanger. Here the flow splits with a portion flowing down through the thermal barrier labyrinth (where it acts as a buffer to prevent reactor coolant from entering the radial bearing and seal section of the pump) and into the reactor coolant system. The remainder of the seal injection water flows up through the pump radial bearing and the shaft seals and is discharged via the seal leakoffs.
Should a loss of seal injection to the RCP's occur, the pump radial bearing and seals are lubricated by reactor coolant flowing up through the pump. Under these conditions, the PCCW continues to provide flow to the thermal barrier heat exchanger and the heat exchanger, functioning in its backup capacity, cools the reactor coolant before it enters the pump radial bearing and the shaft seal area. The loss of seal injection flow may result in a temperature increase in the
()
pump bearing area, a temperature increase in the seal area, and a resultant increase in the number one seal leak rate; however, pump operation can be continued (for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />), provided these parameters remain within the allowable limits.
Should a loss of PCCW to the RCP's occur, the chemical and volume control system continues to provide seal injection flow to the RCP's; the seal injection flow is sufficient to prevent damage to the seals with a loss of thermal barrier cooling. Thus it can be seen that a single failure, resulting in a loss of PCCW to the RCP's will result in minimum adverse affects (relative to the thermal barrier and seal assemblies), none of which require immediate or automatic corrective action.
II.
Motor Bearing and Winding Cooling The reactor coolant pump motor bearings are of conventional design. The radial bearings are the segmented pad type, and the thrust bearing is a double-acting Kingsbury type. All are oil-lubricated. Component cooling water is supplied to the external upper bearing oil. cooler and to the integral lower bearing oil cooler.
The motor is a water / air cooled, Class B thermalastic epoxy
,s()
insulated, squirrel cage induction motor. The rotor and stator are of standard construction and are cooled by air.
Six resistance temperature detectors are imbedded in the stator windings to sense stator temperature.
The internal parts of the motor are cooled by air.
Integral vanes on each end of the rotor draw air in through cooling slots in the motor frame. This air passes through the motor with particular emphasis on the stator end turns.
It is then routed to the external water / air heat exchangers, which are supplied with component cooling water. Each motor has two such coolers, mounted diametrically opposed to each other.
In passing through the coolers, the air is cooled and then directed back to the motor air inlets through external ducts on the motor so that no air is discharged into the containment from the motors.
A loss of PCCW cooling to the RCP bearing oil and motor cooler will result in an increase in oil temperature and a corresponding rise in motor bearing metal temperature.
In a Westinghouse test program, two RCP motors were tested with interrupted PCCW flow. These tests were conducted at the Westinghouse Electro Mechanical Division.
In both cases, the reactor coolant pumps were operated to achieve " hot" f-~s (2230 psia, 5520F) equilibrium conditions. After the
(,,)
bearing temperatures stabilized, the cooling water flow to the upper and lower motor bearing oil coolers was terminated and bearing (upper thrust, lower thrust, upper guide and lower guide) temperatures were monitored. A bearing metal temperature of 185 F was established as the maximum test temperature. When that temperature was reached, the cooling _
water flow was restored.
In both tests, the upper thrust bearing exhibited the limiting temperatures, and 185 F was reached in approximately 10 minutes. The average heatup rates experienced in these tests were less than 3.3 F/ minute and were basically linear throughout the range of the test.
Because absolute test data is not available beyond the test termination point of 185 F, an extrapolation of this heatup rate would be inappropriate. Ilowever, considering that the melting point of the babbitt bearing metal is greater than 4000F, it appears likely that considerable time remains, beyond the 10 minute time frame for the bearing temperature to reach 1850F, until bearing damage is incurred.
The results of the test data along with the recommended bearing high temperature alarm setpoint of 185 F and suggested manual RCP trip at 1950F constitute the basis of the qualification for 10 minutes operative without PCCW with Os no resultant pump damage.
s I
As previously discussed, a loss of PCCW to the motor bearing l
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oil coolers will result in an increase in oil temperature and l
a corresponding rise in motor bearing temperature.
l Westinghouse contends that the loss of PCCW to the RCPs will not result in an instantaneous seizuro of a single pump and, further, that instantaneous seizure of two pumps simultaneously is not a credible ultimate consequence.
Instead, it is Westinghouse's technical opinion that a more 4
realistic ultimate consequence will be an abbreviated g
j coastdown. If a limiting condition of the babbitt metal is i
considered, an increasing coefficient of friction, as well as j
an increasing retarding torque is expected. However, in view of the large rotational inertia of the pump / motor assembly, i
Westinghouse maintains that an instantaneous seizure will not t
result.
-l Because an initial seizure is not expected, it is not possible to define a precise point in time at which a 1
l sequential seizure would be anticipated. Therefore, for the purpose of defining the time expected between sequential
)l seizures, the following discussion will be presented in terms 7
of sequential occurrences of reaching a "high" bearing temperature. As discussed before, the upper thrust bearing j
exhibits the limiting temperature; therefore, an upper thrust i
bearing temperature of 2400F has been chosen arbitrarily as the "high" temperature.
It should be noted that the use of this value does not imply pump seizure at this temperature.
Variables affecting the steady-state operating temperature of the bearings include the following
]
a.
Surf ace finish of the bearing and runner I
b.
Bearing (and oil pumping mechanism) clearances Inlet temperature of water-to-heat exchanger (oil cooler) c.
a-d.
Condition of oil-to-water heat exchanger (oil cooler) 1.e., extent of fouling e.
Condition of oil f.
Amount of oil in oil pot i
i g.
Oil temperature These variables would be expected to interact concurrently in a manner which individualizes the performance of the bearings during actual steady-state plant operation.
1 I
In order to quantify the resultant variation in performance, Westinghouse has collected data from an operating plant.
j This data demonstrates that the upper thrust bearings operate
' ()
at different steady-state temperatures (i.e., 1280F, 1320F, 1350F and 145 F).
- - - ~..
-.. _ __. ~ - --
Using these actual steady-state operating values (A-1280F, Ox B-1320F, C-1350F and D-1450F) and assuming a conservative SOF/ minute linear heatup rate after a loss of PCCW, sequential occurrences of reaching the high bearing temperature could be expected at' the time intervals tabulated below.
Operating Temperature Time Interval Sequential Motors
( F)
(minutes)
A and B 4
0.8 B and C 3
0.6 C and D 10 2.0 A and C 7
1.4 B and D 13 2.6 A and D 17 3.4 To summarize, two bearings sequentially reaching a temperature of 240 F could be expected at a minimum time 0
interval of 0.6 minutes and at a maximum time interval of 3.4 minutes.
(
Westinghouse has obtained motor bearing heatup data, as previously discussed. These test data show actual values of bearing temperatures following a loss of PCCW. The test runs, which were performed at dif ferent times using different motors, demonstrate similar heatup rates; this fact supports the assumption of identical linear heatup rates made in the previous discussion.
In addition, the aserage heatup rates evidenced in the test data are less than 3.3 F/ minute, which substantiates the use of SOF/ minute as a conservative value. The actual test data, although limited, ir supportive of the assumptions posed in defining the time intervals tabulated above.
In conclusion, Westinghouse contends that a single or multiple pump seizure as the result of a loss of PCCW to the RCPs is not a credible event. However, in our judgement and based on the above discussion, two RCP motor upper thrust bearings could sequentially reach a "high" bearing temperature of 2400F at a minimum time interval of 0.6 minutes (or approximately 40 seconds).
Section 15.3.3 of the FSAR presents the analysis of a single RCP locked rotor. It should be pointed out that the Section 15 analysis assumes an instantaneous seizure of a reactor coolant pump rotor on a non-mechanistic basis. As discussed
(~'/)
before, Westinghouse contends that a postulated mechanistic instantaneous seizure of a pump rotor due to a loss of PCCW to the RCP will not occur and is not a credible event.
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However,.n response to the NRC request, the results of a 1
second non-mechanistic instantaneous seizure occurring at 40 seconds after a first non-mechanistic instantaneous seizure have been evaluated.
It should be noted that this evaluation was performed for a three-loop plant. A sequential locked rotor loss of flow incident for a three-loop plant results in loss of 2/3 of total flow, whereas for a four-loop plant restics in loss of 1/2 of total flow. Therefore, this hypothetical incident would be more limiting for a three-loop plant than for Seabrook.
Although a Section 15 approach was utilized to evaluate this situation, Westinghouse does not recognize a postulated mechanistic instantaneous locked rotor as a credible consequence of the loss of PCCW to the RCP's.
Assuming that a second pump seizure occurs 40 seconds after a first pump seizure, no noticeable change is seen in the reactor coolant system pressure and the clad temperature transients. Furthermore, even if the time interval between the sequential seizures is reduced to 10 seconds, no noticeable change is seen in the reactor coolant system pressure and the clad temperature transients.
The hypothetical seizure of one RCP results in a low flow reactor trip approximately one second after the initiation of the event. As a result of the fast reactor trip and the coneequential decrease in core heat flux, the reactor coolant system pressure and the clad temperature reach the peak values at about 2.5 seconds and then start to decrease. The results for the Seabrook specific analysis as presented in FSAR Table 15.3-1 are as follows.
Event Time (Sec. )
Rotor on one pump locks 0.0 Low flow trip point reached 0.04 Rods begin to drop 0.04 Maximum RCS pressure 3.60 Maximum clad temperature 3.81 Because the core has been shut down, at 40 seconds - o even 10 seconds - after a pump seizure, the reactor coolant system pressure and the clad temperature transients have decreased to a point at which a second pump seizure results in no noticeable change in the transients.
O
a i
Available Instrumentation Several diverse and redundant means of indication and/or alarms 4
are available to the operator to alert him that a loss of PCCW to the RCP's has occurred. They includes t
i 1.
PCCW supply and return containment isolation valves - both inside and outside containment - valve position indication, 1.
2.
RCP seal cavity temperatures, and 3.
RCP motor bearing and stator temperatures.
In addition, two safety-related transmitters will be provided to 4
redundantly monitor the combined flow from the upper and lower bearing oil coolers and the motor air coolers. Two redundant transmitters will monitor each PCCW Icep providing cooling flow to the RCPs. These safety-related transmitters will provide flow l
indication and actuate low flow alarms in the control room.
Operating procedures will be provided for a loss of component cooling water and seal injection to the reactor coolant pumps and/or motors.
Included in these operating procedures will be the provision to trip the reactor if component cooling water flow, as j
indicated by the instrumentation discussed above, is lost to the reactor coolant pump motors, and cannot be restored within 10 minutes. The reactor coolant pumps will also be tripped following
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the reactor trip.
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It is seven de water supply. 'No permanent makeup system is provided.
The uit (1) our position, in accordance with Regulatory cuide 1.27, that the ultimata heat sink must have a continuous capability to maintata the Therefore plant 13 a safe shutdows condicios.for at least 30 days.
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tower th'roughout the 7-30 day period.
a detailed description of the (plan) to use portable pumping equipment to furnish makeup water to the cooling tower in the event o Providej Describe the capabilities of totsi Qockage of both ocean tunnels.these portable pumps to prov l
i In this water sources following depletion of the cooling tower b time for erection of the equipment including the restrictions to freedos,of movement following a seismic event of sufficient magnitude Describe the locations at which makeup to bloch both ocean tunnels.
levels or water could be taken free natural sources, the low tide w h of ile pumping portabid pipe used and pump section conditions imposed whYorify tha from these remote locations.
h portabis pipe is stored to reach a reliable water so O
FSAR Section 9 2.5 3 indicates that even after an es I
(2)
Discuss whether the 95perefotblockageofacirculatlagwatertunnel.
underground 41" 85V intake pipes that convey the water from the transit (onstructurestotheserviceandcirculatingwaterpumphouse i
could by damaged by erosion as a result of failure of the circulat ng ii this water syl stem sad describe any design provisions to m t operabijityofthesystemforatleast30 days.
damage.
FSAR se tion 9.2.5.3 states that the entire ultimate heat sink cooling ySAR tower structure is designed to withstand tornado missiles.
(3) 84ction't.8 under Regulatory Guide 3.117 sad section 3.5 contradict Clarify this apparent discrepancy.
this at tenent.
RESPOW8E:
FSAR Subsection 9.2.3.Sc. has besa revised to reference a new ylgure 9 2-9 oti maximum askeup water demand of the cooling tower.
(1) ed description of the plan to use portable pumplug equiposut to furnisbl makeup water to the cooling tower in the event of total A dessit blockage of both ocean tunnels will be provided by July 1,1982.
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O (2) In the unlikely event of an Sat which resulted in damage to the circulading water system of sufficient severity to, in turn, cause damage r) the 42" service water supply lines to the pumphouse and eubsequent loss of suction to the service water pumps, the cooling tower wduld be automatically actuated to serve as the ultimate heat sink. Wence, any suspended sediment resulting from the brisk in these lines would have no effect on the operability of the system.
(3) This diderepancy will be greatly elarified if the reference to Section 3.3.2 (apparently a typographical error) is changed to read "See section !3.5 2" in the last paragraph of section p.2.5.3b.
The last paragraps of Section 3.5.2 contains information which etarifies the missile l protection provided. The entire structure is designed to withstand tornado generated missiles as qualified by the exceptions of Section'3.5.2.
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Tower Makeup Water sufficienttowermakeupwaterisstoredinthetowerbasinfor seven days of operation during accident conditions. During this tiefperiod,provisionscanbemadetotransportadditionalmakeup If necessary, water can be pumped into the watgr to the site.
tower basin from the nearby growns River or Hampton Narbor. Ttro port lable horisontal centrifugal pumps (see Table 9.2-12) are stored on (ite along with sufficient lengths of hose for this purpose (50
- 160 foot lengths of 4" 1.D. rubber lined polyester flexible base l
l and' associated couplings).
l The dose to station personnel filling the basin after 5 days is minimal. Direct radiation free the containment is less chan 1x 10-3 ar/br.
The level of the cloud dose is acceptable, and can be minimised or completely avoided by taking water from sources upwind of the con-tainment or by taking water from ths. -phouse.
Ttro additional and more convenient sources of makeup water are alsp avallable onsite (assuming city water is not available).
In thelunlikelyeventthattheintaketunneliscompletelyblocked, the,pumphouse bay could be flooded by transferring to the discharge tunnel. Makeup water could then be easily pumped from the pumphouse O
to 4:he tower basin. Assuming both tunnels are restricted due to a seianic occurrence, seepage through the tunnel blockage of less thaa 300 gym (after 7 days) would satisfy tower makeup requirements in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.27.
A curve of maximum nakeup watpr demand for the cooling tower throughout the 7-30 day period l
is shown on Figur~e' 9.2-9.
Cooling tower makeup water is required to account for losses of tower coolant due to evaporation, drift losses, and tower blowdown.
hose, evaporative losses consume the largest portion of the of required makeup water, and drift losses are relatively negligible.
Drift losses of 0.03% of the tower circulating water flow rate Sufficient makeup havh been conservatively assumed for the tower.
water is provided in the tower basin to account for this loss.
Evaporativelossesfromthetowerarebasedontheintegratedheat loads listed in Table 9.2-14.
These losses were calculated using analytical methods accounting for both the latent heat of vaporisa-tion of the coolant and sensible heat transfer from the coolant to thyairassumingsaturatedexitair. To assure adequate makeup supply, the basin capacity was also calculated using an alternate nepod which conservatively neglects sensible heat transfer and asquaes all of the heat transferred is used to evaporate tower This assures that sufficisnt makeup water is available j
coglant.
in;the tower basin for seven days of tower operation and that min-imas cooling tower pump submergence requirements are satisfied at O
all times.
9.2-23 i
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EAI 410.26 0.2.5)
Table 9.2-12 states that the ultimate heat sink cooling tower design we bulbtemperskureis75'F.
dry butt, temp' erature and demonstrate that it is sufficiently conservative to conform with, Regulatory Posit *. ion 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.17 with regard to design meteorological cocditions.
REPONSE_
The actual coollag tower design wet bulb of 75'F was based on a review of Subsequent meteorologic'ai data from Fesse AFB over a period of 10 years.
review of 29 years of Boston mis data revealed that the easinus 24-hour The results of average wet kulb at Boston for this period was 75.5'F.
supplementaryanalysisusingthecoolingtowerastheheatsink,incon-junction with the thermal inertia of the basin water inventory, demonstrate that cooling' water temperatures remain within acceptable limits St.en wet bulb temperatures in excess of 75.5'F are imposed on the tower under postu-This analysis is sufficiently conservative to lated accident conditions.
conform with'tegulatory Position 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.13 and assures the ability of the ultimate heat sink to perform its safety funecion under accident conditions.
l Although dry bulb temperature is not a eritical performance parameter for evaporativehoolingtowers,thedesigndrybulbtemperatureof90'Frepresents l
According to the 1981 ASHRAE Randbook, l
an autreme t,mperature for the region.this temperature has been esco e
Fease Air Force Base, Fortsmouth, New Hampshire. Imposing this dry bulb temperature dry bulb tesqperature in the area of 10407.on the tower',will not increa design conditions.
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RAI 410.27 (9.2.
Your reponse to our acceptance review Question 410.4 regarding the ultimate heat sink is incomplete.
You do not state whether you have utilized BTP ASB 9-2 for calculating residual decay heat energy. Your design heat loads appear low when compared with other reactors of similar power levels. Table 9.2 13 indicates a maximium heat load of 210 x 106 BTU /HR per unit for the LOCA case. On the other hand, the Byron-Braidwood FSAR indicates a maximum post LOCA heat rejection rate of 580 x 106 BTU /HR. The SNUPPS FSAR shows a maximum of 576 x 106 BTU /HR at about 0.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> after shutdown. The South Texas FSAR shows a maximum heat rejection rate of 547 x 106 BTU /HR at 0.42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br /> after shutdown for the LOCA unit. Utilizing the residual decay heat specified in BTP 9-2, provide the heat rejection rates for the LOCA and normal shutdown cases during the early part of the transient utilizing sufficiently small time increments, starting at 50-100 seconds after scram, and differentiating between different heat sources, to allow a good comparison with other plants.
RESPONSE
The discrepancy between the heat loads of the plants cited and'those specified for Seabrook is due to differences-in the containment heat removal systems.
Initial heat loads for the plants cited are inanediately rejected O
to the ultimate heat sink via means such as containment fan coolers.
However, in the case of Seabrook these peak loads are dissipated by the large water inventory in the refueling water storage tank which is sprayed into the containment atmosphere by the containment spray system. Heat is not removed from the containment building proper until post-LOCA recir-culation is initiated about a half hour into the accident. At that time, containment heat loads are imposed on the ultimate heat sink (cooling tower) via the RHR/CBS and PCCW heat rejection path. Heat loads are then at reduced levels.
Mass and energy release rates for the early part of the transient can be found in the tables of Section 6.2 (Containment Systems).
The residual decay heat rates specified in BTP ASB 9-2 were utilized to determine these energy release rates. However, as noted above, the early part of the transient is not seen by the ultimate heat sink.
For the shutdown case, the residusi decay heat values of BTP 9-2 were used exactly (based on a reactor power of 3411 megawatts).
It would be well to note at this point, that relative to containment pressure / temperature transients, the cooling tower is not the limiting case for the design of the ultimate heat sink.
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RAI 410.28 (9.2.6)
(1) In orde to demonstrate that the condensate storage tank (CST) will retain t e dedicated volume for EFW supply after the SSE, indicate on drawings the arrangement of both seismic and non-seismic Category I piping on the CST including the elevations of the connections relative to the vhlume of the tank, and demonstrate that a failure of the non-seismic piping will not affect the dedicated emergency feedwater (EFW) supply.
(2) Clarify whether the CST level transmitters shown in Figure 10.4-4, Sheet 1, are seismic Category I.
RESPONSE
(1) The chart below can be used with FSAR Figure 10.4-4, Sheet 1, to locate tank conb etions for non-nuclear or Safety Cla'as 3 piping. The center-line elekstion and wall thickness for each nossle is als; bdicated, so that the invert elevations of each nossle can be determined.
The lowe st invert elevations of NNS pipe CO-4097-01-D4-16" is 44'-4 3/8".
l The inve rt elevation of the EFW supply pipes CO-4081-01-151-8" and co-4082-)1-151-8" is 23'-11".
The difference in height is 20'-5 3/8".
The CST ins an inside diameter of 42'-0".
Postulating a NNS pipe rupture, approximately 211,900 gallons df EFW would remain in the CST. Therefore, a minimu m storage of 200,000 gallons is assured.
Nossle Size Wall Thickness Elevation Connecting Pipe Class l
A 24" 3/8" (0.375")
25' - 3" 3
B 16" 3/8" (0.375")-
45' - 0" NNS C
6" 405 (0.280")
47' - 0" NNS G
6" 805 (0.432")
638 - 21s" NNS H
8" 405 (0.432")
24' - 3" 3
J 8"
405 (0.322")
24' - 3" 3
L 2"
405 (0.154")
45' - 0" NNS E
4" 405 (0.237")
64' - 6" NNS 8
2" 405 (0.154")
24' - 6" 3
X 1"
405 (0.133")
28' - 6" 3 (Thoreovell)
Bottom of Tanht 23' - 6" (2) System p Lping from the condensate storage tank to the level transmit :ers is Safety Class 3, seismic Category 1.
Both level transmit':ers are redundant, provide level indication on the main control board, and are protected in a seismic Category I structure.
Should any seismic event cause both transmitters to fail, and additionally require the use of the EPW system, the 200,000 gallons reserved in the tank would provide at least 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> of ETV system operacion before an alternate water supply is necessary. This time O
frame provides ample time for the operators to recoanise the level indicatihn failure and provide an alternate means of level indication.
RAI 410.29 (9.2.6) (10.4.9)
The Seabrook CST is not protected from vertical tornado missiles. It is our position that the EFW supply must meet CDC 2 and CDC 4 with regard to the capability to withstand the effects of tornado missiles impacts. Therefore,
' demonstrate that penetration of the tank top by vertical tornado missiles with velocities as stated in FSAR Section 3.5 will not adversely affect the capability of the condensate storage facility to supply the EFE system.
Include the possibility of pipe blockage by the missiles or debris in your consideration.
RESPONSE
The reinforced concrete foundation design for the CST will prevent EFW from leaking out of the bottom of the structure should the bottom of the stainless steel tank become punctured by a vertical missile.
Should a missile enter the top of the CST and exit through the side, water lost from the tank will be contained in the annular space between the tank and the concrete missile shield wall. Assuming that the initial water volume is already at its minimum prior to an EFP start, the tank contains 211,900 gallons (refer to response to RAI 410.28, part 1).
Also, it is assumed that once water is displaced to the annular space, it cannot returr. to the EFW supply.
If the missile exits at the lowest possible elevation, at the tank base E1. 23-6", then the level in the annulus will approach the initial level in the CST and reach equilibrium. At this elevation (44'-4 3/8" per response to RAI 410.28), a total volume of 8675 gallons would be lost according to the assumptions stated above. Since, at the initial tank elevation, 211,900 gallons are available for EFW supply (per response to RAI 410.28) this leaves over 203,000 gallons for EFW supply, exceeding the 200,000 gallons designated for EFW use.
Each of the redundant EFW lines has at its origin inside the CST a piping tee.
This tee will give two possible flow paths to each of the redundant EFW lines. These EFW nozzles are located approximately 10 feet apart. There are no other components inside the CST, therefore debris must consist of the missile itself and/or material from the stainless steel tank. Debris would have to block more than 50% of both ends of each EFW connection in order to restrict sufficient flow from reaching the EFW pumps.
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Sa 1 & 2 FSAR O
i RAI 410.30 (9.2.6)(10.4.9) 1)
It is our position that the assured EW supply provide at least four hours at hot shutdown followed by cooldown to residual heat reshval (RHR) system cut-in based on the lonest time needed with eitheronlyon-siteoronlyoff-sitepoweravailablewithan assumed single failure. Demonstrate your confonsance with this requirement with regard to the dedicated E W supply in the CST.
2)
State what safety related and non-safety related backup sources are' provided for EW supply.
RESPONSES 1)
The EW system is designed to operate continuously to effect cooldown to RER system cut in. Based on a cooldown rate of 500/hr., this cooldown will require 4.85 hours9.837963e-4 days <br />0.0236 hours <br />1.405423e-4 weeks <br />3.23425e-5 months <br /> of operation, in addition to the four hour period at hot shutdown. The total quantity of decay heat integrated over a 9 hour1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> period following a posLulated accident is 1020 x 106 Btu. Considering pump heat, t
reactor coolant heat, metal heat, and steam generator inventory, 6
the total heat to be removed is 1460 x 10. Based on E N aupply at 1000, a total of 156,200 gallons is required. The dedicated O
E supply in the CST is 200,000 gallons. For a discussion of EW sy em operction with an assumed single failure, see F5AR sect.
6.
3 and Table 6.8.2.
2)
The entire volume of the CST (400,000 gal, if full) would be available for EW aupply. Also, the contents of the condenser hotwells for each unit, the comunon desineralized water storage tank (non-safety-related) and the other unit's CST (safety-rel'ated) could be utilised through non-safety-related transfer pumps and interconnecting piping.
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RAI 410.32 O
This Provide a P&I diagram of the containment compressed air subsystem.
drawing should indicate the physical division between classifications wherever interfaces between safety and non-safety related sections occur.
Also, show.the safety related accumulators listed on Page 9.3-2 in your P&I diagrams.
RESPONSE
Refer to new Figure 9.3-4A on the containment compressed air system.co be FSAR Subsection 9.3.1.1 will be revised provided in FSAR Amendment 45.accordingly in Amendment 45 to modify the safety Class-3 accumulators.
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1 I SB 1 & 2 FSAR RAI 410.33 (9.3.3) (1) State ther drain systems will be provided for the EFW pump room and control uilding and provide a description, drawings and a safety evalu-stion i accordance with the guidelines in SRP 9.3.3 for these systems. If thes drain systems are not provided, demonstrate that floodins; of safety related equipment will not occur due to high and moderate energy l pipe failures or sprinkler actuation. (2) FSAR Figure 9.3-8, 5heet 1, indicates that the floor drain lines from allcharpingpumproomsconnecttoacosanondrainheader(2055-1-A3-4"). Discuss the design features and administrative controls that would prevent flooding in all three charging pumps rooms, assuming a flood caused by a high or moderate energy pipe failure combined with blockste of the ~===n drain header.
RESPONSE
Part (1): a) of the various areas of the control building, only the cable spreading room has_ water lines present which, if failure occurred, cou,1d cause flooding. Two sources of water are present; the hot O water heating system and the fire protection sprinkler system. Of the two, the sprinkler system provides the greatese source of water. There are two 6" diameter drains in the cable spreading room. One drain is located in the northeast corner of the area; the other in the southeast corner. Considering worse case, 878 gallons per minute (gra) of water would be discharged from the 6" sprinkler su'ly line. The flooded area is 11,524 square feet. All pipe electrical floor penetrations are sealed watertight. With one an l de in line operating, it will take approximately 24 hours to reach a lood depth of one foot. This time and depth is conservative since no credit has been taken for outflow between doors and sills. There are four means of egress from the area; two doors leading into the diesel generator building, one to the turbine building and a fourth to a stair well at the south side of the control building. Therefore, considering the time to reach a one foot i' flood depth, plus the conservative assumptions relative to out-laahage, it la not considered credible to postulate flooding of safety-related equipment in this area. b) Should a total failure cccur in the main discharge line of feed-water pumpe, there would be a maximum water discharge of 700 spa. If a total break occura in one of the branch lines, then the flow ratp will be 235 gym. The maximum safe allowable flooding of emergency feedwater pump building is 8 inches; maximum flooding is one' foot. There are five 4 inch floor and two 211 inch floor drains which lead into a 4 inch drain line to an oil separator. Adqitionsidrainagewillberealisedthrutheunderdoorcrack aree which leads to the electrical tunnel areas below. The total water outflow is 460 gpu which will permit a flooded condition to
SB 1 & 2 FSAR O exigt for approximately forty minutes before action must be taken. ' Drains located in the electrical tunnels are sized to rid the area of' accumulated water. The, drain system can accommodate a 235 gpai flow from the branch lines without flooding. Should the postulate failure occur in the maihdischstgelineofthefeedwaterpumps, the operator would be aleyted to the condition by the lack of feedwater flow t.o the stejam generators concurrent with a decreasing condensate storage g l tanflevel. Forty minutes is considered sufficient time for i corrective operator action. Part (2): A moderate energy line break (assumed to be the charging pump suction line, 6" Sch. 40 pipe to the centrifugal pumps CS-P-2A&B) is defined as a crack where the length is 1/2 the pipe ID and the width is 1/2 of the pipe wall thickness. For 6" Sch. 40 pipe, the postulated crack dimensions are 3.032" x 0.140". The curb at the entry-way to each of the cubicles is 6" high. The nominal pad height for the charging pumps is 4". There will be a 3/4" gap left between the top of the curb and the boctos of the door. This l water outlet gap of 36" x 0 75" is sufficiently great to prevent a flooding condition in any or all of the charging pump cubicles from an unnoticed i moderate energy line in the cubicle. Under a worst case moderate energy line break in the 6" charging pump suction line, the resulting water level in,the cubicle with both drains plugged and an assumed crack width under the door of 3/8"lwould be less than 12". The bottoes surfaces of the pump motor mount pads are 24" above the floor elevation. For a high energy line break in the cubicle (the pump discharge line),,the loss of charging water flow would result in an immediate loss-of-flow alarm at the main control board from FT-121. A back-up alarm would also occur due to an over-temperature condition of the letdown flow, as sensed by TE-127. The maximum rated flow for the centrifugal charging pump is 550 gpm. Assuming that the no-flow alarm were inoperative and the slower response from the high temperature lat-down flow alarm initiated shut-down of the pump after fire minutes, a total of 2,750 gallone would have been released l in the cubicia. Assuming no outflow through either the drains or under the door, this would result in a maximum water depth,of 19.3". As noted above, l the motor mounting pads are 24" above the ficor. If the floor drains were open, but the common outlet from the three cubicles were plugged, flooding water from one cubicle could enter the other two. The amount of water to flood the cubicles up to the level of the 6" curb is: l Reciprocating Pump : 748 gal. Centrifugal Fump
- 853 gal.
Therefore, to flood all three cubicles to curb height would require a water ] / volume of 2,454 gallons. Should the water level reach 12" above floor v elevation, th's resultant flow out through a 3/8" crack under the three doors would be appraximately 577 gym, which is greater than the maximum pump output.
SB 1 & 2 FSAR O RAI 410.34 (9.3.3) In view of the fact that the equipment and floor drain system (EFDS) is not seismic Category I, demonstate that for the essential pump areas located in the PAB complex, including the RHR and Containment System (CS) equipment vault, the individual charging pump rooms and the common primary component cooling pump area, that in the event of the SSE a failure of non-seismic Category I tank, vessel or pipe located within or coimmunicating with the particular area will not result in disabling essential pumps and electric equipment. If operator action is necessary, we require that the sumps shall be equipped with redundant seismic Cateogory I safety grade level sensors and alarms which annunciate in the control rooms and that you demonstate that sufficient time is available to take the proper operator action.
RESPONSE
Each train of the RHR, SI and CBS pumps are located inside vaults. These two vaults for Train A and B are completely isolated from each other so that flooding of one vault can not flood the other. There are no non-seismic Category I tanks located within these vaults. Each vault is supplied by a 1" demineralized water line (P&ID 805030) which O is non-category I, but is seismically supported. In the event of leakage of this seismically supported piping as a result of an earthquake, this leakage or any other leakage will be detected by non-safety grade level sensors and alarus. Accordingly, early detection of vault flooding will occur before essential equipment is flooded. The three charging pumps are each located within individual pump cubicles at elevation 7'-0" of the PAB. The four component cooling water pumps are located on the 25'-0" elevation of the PAB, but are not enclosed. Non-seismic Category I tanks located at elevations of 7'-0" and above are listed below. Elevation Tank Tag No. Volume (gal.) 53'-0" Blowdown flash SK-TK-40 650 (Note 1) 53'-0" Boric acid batch CS-TK-5 1500 (Note 2) 25'-0" Chiller surge CS-TK-3 58 7 7'-0" Degasifier CS-SKD-32 370 7'-0" Chromated water WLD-SKD-64 94 (Note 3) Total 3200 gallons
SB 1 & 2 FSAR The floor drains and small quantity of water involved from the above tanks do not present a flooding problem at elevation 7'-0", or above, as the entire volume of water, if spread over the entire floor would represent a flooding depth of approximately 1/2". The drains from each of the three charging pump cubicles converge into a single line going directly to PAB sump A at (-)26'-)' elevation. Only one other drain line is connected into this line; that from drain 151 in the containment penetration area at (-)26'-0" elevation. (See Dwg. 9763-F-604992.),Thus, for a flooding accident to get water into the charging pump cubicles, the flooding depth over the entire floor at 7'-0" would have to be greater than the 6" high curb at the cubicle doors. This amounts to about 30,000 gallons, and requires that all leakage (doorways and stair wells, etc.) and drainage paths to the lower levels of the PAB be blocked, which is not considered realistic. Notes 1. The blowdown flash tank is operated at 55 psig and 3030F. Should the tank contents be released, the contents would flash and condense. Automatic isolation for protection against HELB will () limit mass released to this value. 2. Normally, this tank is empty. 3. At operating water level. The component cooling water pumps are located on the 25' elevation of the PAB, and this floor has numerous floor drains and openings (doorways, grating, etc.) to the lower levels of the PAB. The flooding of this floor to a depth required to damage the PCCW pumps is not possible. There are two non-seismic Cateogry I piping systems in the PAB that have large tanks located external to the building as possible sources of flood water, should a line break occur. The reactor make-up water storage tank has a design capacity of 112,000 gallons, while the demineralized water tank has a design capacity of 200,000 gallons. All drains in the PAB leak to Sump A on the (-)26'-0" elevation. If the lower level of the PAB were flooded up to the O'-0" elevation, the water volume contained in the flooded areas would be approximately 220,000 gallons., The floor elevation of the RAACT pipe tunnel is at O'-0" elevation. Therefore, a flooding incident in the PAB that pumped out the entire contents of either the RMW of DM tanks into the PAB would not create a water level sufficiently high to immerse safety class piping and valves in the RAACT pipe tunnel. Both the RMW pumps and DMW pumps have a maximum flow rate of 200 gpm; therefore, it would require 9 hours and 20 minutes to pump down the full RMW tank and 16 hours and 40 minutes to pump down the full DMW tank. Within this time frame, operator action to secure the leaking system is considered reasonable to prever.: damage to essential equipment.
Y SB 1 & 2 FSAR RAI 410.35 (9.4.1) In order to expedite a complete review of the control room complex heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system, provide a tabulation of the system's component performance information similar to that provided for the PAB HVAC system.
RESPONSE
Tables 9.4-18 and 9.4-19 have been added to Section 9.4. These tables provide, in tabular form, the control room HVAC system performance and component information. O O9 e
A8.17 '94 23854 SMT SEROI00K STATION - 9763
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_2 85 1 & 2 FEAR O 2ABLE 9.4-18 (Sheet 1 of 7) CONTROL EDON *" AIR CONDIT::0NING susHd FI1FSMANCE DIFORMAT"0N (Components and quantities ar'a'for one unit only) htuippant Trains A & 3 Control Room Air Conditioning Unit Type Borisontal, drar-thru consisting of a fan section, cooling coil seccion and filter section Quantity 2 Seismic Category I - all components Safety Class 3 - all components except filter Fan Centrifugal, non-overloading with backward curved blades Quantity (por unit) 1 Air Flow Rate 25.700 (afa) Static Pressure 1.7 (in. W. C.) Drive "V" Belt Motor Horsepower 40 Class 1E Tee i S.!Ll. Type Direct expansion, aldum fis, copper tube quantity 2 (per AC, unit) Cooling Capacity 833,000 0 6
as.:7 se aesse em sanswoon zTnT$ok 'r A&C^ ~ ' '~ SS 1 & 2 FEAR O TAELI 9.4-18 (Sheet 2 of 7) 10r!10L 10cM C#tPLIK AIR CollDIT10NDG SYSTEM FIRFORMANCE INFORMATION (Components and quantities are for one unit only) 1 Filter Trains A & B Type Automatic roll with fibrous glass media quantity 1 (per Ac unit) l Efficiency 75% dust arrestance per A8ERAE std. 52-68 Control Room Condensins Unit Type Borisontal, dr'aw thru consisting of a fan section, condensing coil section and damper section O Quantity 2 Safety Clase 3 (all components) l Seismic Category I (all components) I Fan Centrifugal, non-overloading with backward curved blades Quantity 1 (per unit) Air Flow Rate 33,000 (cfa) Static Pressure 1.7 (in. V. C.) Drive V" Belt Motor Borsepower 40 Class 11 Yes O O y-c -g-
as.17 '9420:51 8:17 5 EOR 00K STRff0N - 976L P.820 'd I SB1&2 FBAR O 143L$1.4-18 (Sheet 3 of 7)
- wnmOL ROON CGIFLEE AZE CONDITIONING ST5fai FERFORMANCE INFORMATION
) (Components and quantities are for one unit only) g g s. Trains A & 3 Type Direct expansion, alumin a fin, copper tube Quantity 2 (per condensing unit) Capacity (5tu/hr) 1,092.000 i Control Roon-Comorossor Type gemi-hermetic Quantity 2 Refrigeration Effact 833,000 (5tu/hr) Raat Rajacted to Condensor (atu/hr) 1,092.000 ~ Class 11 Motor Yes Accessorias Crankesse heater Refr'inerant Accessories Roceiver Type Herisontal, aeeel Quantity % (per condensing unit) Capacity 280 (ib. of refrigerant) Esfety Class 3 Saismic Category I O
'3.17 '90 20:31 SMY SELDR00K 57RTIDH i ~ '. 0 21~. - A 5763 D162 FEAR O Tm2 9.4-18 (Sheet 4 of 7) i CONTEDL ROOM ""I.II Aft CONDITIONINC SYsiasi Peng^a3 INF0gauT105 4 (Canponents and quantities are for one unit only) Accumister Trains A & B Type Morisontal, steel Quantity 1 (per conpressing unit) Capacity 72 (ib. of refrigerant) Safety Class 3 Seismic Category I Refrizarant Devices Solenoid valves, expansion valves, filter drivas and Vibration elininators safety Class 3 Salsaic Category I Computer Roon Air l Conditioninz Unit Type Borizontal, draw-thru consisting of a fan section, cooling coil section and filter section 1 Quantity 1 Seismic Category I safety Class Jane l h Centrifugal, non-overloading with backward curved blades l Quantity 1 Air riow Rate 5,700 Q (efn) + m.-
1 as.17 'ee meis2' eeft seneroom sTaview - en' _ .. W^ ~,.e22 Y* c. 831&2 Psaa O. 1 TABLE 9.4-18 hheet5of7) colrmot Rocti cmM.II AT* MEITIONINC SYSTIM FERF0EWANCE_INFORMATION (Componente and quantities are for one unit only) l Za!L (continued) Trains A & B Statie Pressure 1.9 (in. W. C.) Drive "Y" Belt Motor Borsepower 7.5 Clase it No Seu Type Direct arpansion, aluminum fin, copper tube Quantity 1 Cooling Capacity 130,193 (5tu/hr) Filter Type Disposable, high velocity l l Quantity 6 Sisa , 16" x 25" x 2" thick Afficiency 30-35% per ASHRAE std. 52-68 Computer Room Condansina Unit Type Vertical, drew-thru Quantity 1 Safety Class Mona saf==4e Category I
' ~ E *" - an.u se ab42 thfs'sas::cox sintzow - sn:- ~~ SB1&2 FEAR O ~ TABLE 9.4-18 ($ heat 6 of 7) CONTROL E0(38 CC3tFLEI ATE CostDIT"0NING SYSTEN Pun'ORNANCI INFonMAT:'ON (Campona ta and quantities are for one unit only) I F gg, Trains A & R 3 Type Four bladed almaintsu propeller Quantity 2 Air Flow Rate 4,000 (per fan) (cfa) Driva Direct Motor Horsepower 3s (each fan) Class 1E No O Coil Type
- Direct expansion, alumintas fin, c pper tube Quantity 1
~~ Capacity 130,193 (Deu/hr) Compressor Type Semi-harmetic Quantity 1 Refrigeration Effect 130,193 l (Stu/hr) Class 12 Motor No Accessories Crankcasa heater Enfriserant Devices Solenoid valves, expansion valves and filter drivers --,y
as.:r7e aesss ont str.s: con sinysok. - srs:
- p. e2 4_ -
851s2 FSAR O l TABLI 9.4-18 (Sheet 7 of 7) Conrrt0L EDON Cymr Aga mery" aging XYiaan FIRYOIMANCE IN7daMAV;0N (Camponents and quantities are for one 'mit only) Unit Easters Trains A & R Type Electric, propeller fan Quantity 6 Heating Capacity 23 l (KW/ unit) Motor Horsepower la l Safety Class No Bumidifiers Type . Centrifugal atosising with actor driven fan, removable filter and automatic float valve Quantity 2 Capacity (ib. of water /hr) 24 Safety Class No Seismic Category None i e O p
o o o e y ~ 'ABER 9.4-19 T (Sheet 1 of 4) ~ ^ CONTEDL RO(St COMPLEE MAEE-OF AIR AND CLEAN-UP FILTER SYSTm FRPORMANCE INFURMATIM = J (C _. : --ta and quantities are for one unit only) g Camponent Material Descriptfem or 5pecifiestiam = hergemey Cleam-Up Packaged, consisting of profilter, IMPA filter, 3 Filter Enclosere carbon adsorber bed and MEPA filter. 2 A . Safety Class NES .i g Seismic Category 1 Profilter Roll Type Fibreos Class 2%" thick Aetomatic advance 176 horsepower motor g UL Class II Frame Galvanised Steel ~ Rfficiency 602 based on Amm an standard 32-68 Dust Spot Test - 75% at design air flow 3.- EIFA Filters "4.. Type Molded glass without MIL-F-51079A separatore UL used to standard Utr586. Casias Chronised steel 14 gauge Frame Stainless steel y Efficiency 99.971 at 0.3 micrees at rated air flow, 20E E and 120% rated air flow. Tested la accordance with DOP-qlD7. qualificatica Meet requirements of NRC Reg. Guide 1.52, goalified tested to MIL-F-51068.
- - - o o
O 5 E T ~ 4 l TABUL 9.4-19 (Sheet 2 of 4) e p =! I Caeyeneet Material Descrip:fon or Speelficatica I Carbon Adsorber O Filter media Impregnated activated EtC Reg cuide 1.52 R E 'q cocemet =h=11 carbon ) Attenuation factor for _3 l aleasatal ioding per O 2' bed depth at 70% j a u Att===meien factor for methyl lodido per 2" bed depth at 70% ER ggg Impregnetlag Material KI3 m= Iar.ition Temperature. *C 340 go De e. f Emik. Density. Ibs/cw. ft. 32 w E Eerdasse, percent 95%. = 49 - ( Mesh Sise (Tyler) 8 x 16 C Weight of Carbon, Ibe. 440 Carbon Bed Envelope Stainless steel. Type 304 Bossing carbon steel, epony coated I Fans Type Carbon steel housing, aluminem Vaue Aslal s blades and hab. j quantity 2-100% redundant fame ( t
C ~~O O O ? 4. ~ TABLE 9.4-19 (sheet 3 of 4) t ) Compement Meterial Deeeription or Speciffemtion in Safety Class 5 EMS = ~ Salamic Category E 1 3g Air ylew Este (cfm) 2,000 (per fan) 5 1" a' Total Pressure E i 8.1 (1a. W. C.) Motor Eerseposer 7.5 Drive Direct Dampers 3 Type Bechdraft pf e-Staatity 2 (one each fan) Safety Cimme NES }1 seismic Category t, I [ Eousig 10 ga. steel ASTN-A569 Blades 3/16" eteel ASTN-A36 Maka-Up Air yees Type Carbon eteel housing. Vane Asial ? altmalnum blades and hop E 9 Quantity 2 Safety Clase Yes J l
8 - ~o O O TABLE 9.4-19 3 (Sheet 4 ot 4) G Camponent Material Description or Synetfication e 5 Make-Up Air Fans (continned) "5 Seismic Category I = Air Flow Rate 550 (cfa) i ~ 2 Static Pressure 4.5 I i (ia. W. C. ) ~ Motor L._1;_-- 1h j Drive Mrect i
- l m
y,gg,g,,,,,, g i w. e Type nound, single black automatic e. .u y Qaantity 2 (one per fan) Safety ClasE 3 Seimmie Category I j Frame Steel ASTM A181 & A36 Blade 10 ga. - ASTM A36 i 1 4 b 3 e ) I
SB 1 & 2 FSAR i RAI 410.36 (9.4.2) Clarify the apparent discrepancies between Table 3.2-1, Section 9.4.2.1 and Figure 9.4-3 regarding the safety design of the fuel storage building venti-lation system. It is our position that those portions of the fuel building ventilation system utilized during the emergency filtration modes be seismic Category I, and that the system be designed so that failure of the non-safety portion of the system will not compromise the operability of the safety related portion. The FSAR text and Figure 9.4-3 should demonstrate this capability.
RESPONSE
Table 3.2-1 lists seismic Category I structures, mechanical equipment and electrical systems and components. Table 3.2-2 lists those fluid systems and components which are seismic Category I and/or safety classified. Sheet 7 of Table 3.2-2 lists the ANS safety class and seismic category of the fuel storage building emergency cleanup system and components including fans, filters, dampers and ductwork. The ductwork listed in the table was not classified as to an ANS safety class. This table has been revised by note (number 12) to indicate that the ductwork from the downstream side of the air cleaning units to the fan intakes and the discharge of the fans to the building boundaries is Safety Class 3. A discussion of this system is O contained in Section 6.5.1. @e e { l l l O p
TABLE 3.2-2 (Sheet 7 of 31) AES Principal FSAR Safety Design /Const. Code Seismic Sectiot Systems and. components Claes Codes /Stds. Class Category Building (ll) Supplier Notes Fans 2 WRS. STDS. I CE AE Filters (HEPA & Charcoal) 2 NES. STDS. I CE AE Ductwork and Despers 2 MFRS. STDS. I CE AE Fuel Storage Building Emergency Cleanup System Fans 3 W RS. STDS. 1 FS AE Filters (Charcoal & HEPA) 3 WES. STDS. 1 FS AE E Dampers 3 WES. STDS. 1 FS AE @~ N e-Ductwork WES. STDS. I FS AE 12 g 6.8 Emergency Feedwater System Emergency Feedwater Fump 3 ASME III 3 I EF AE Air Receiver 3 ASME III 3 I EP AE Piping and Valves 3 ASME III 3 I EF AE Auxiliary Systew 9.1.3 Spent Fuel Fool Cooling and Cleanup System Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump 3 ASME III 3 I FS AE Spent Fuel Pool Skimmer Pump NNS W RS. STDS. FS AE Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger 3 ASME III 3 I FS AE O O O
JAH.09 '60 22:59 GMT SEABROOK STATION - 9763 P.008 SB 1 & 2 FSAR O NOTES TO TABLE 3.2-2 (Cont'd) reactor coolant pressure boundary meet the requirements of the 1971 Versiod, with application of all Addenda through to and including the Susumer 1972 Addenda. Pumps, valves and piping which are part of the reactor. coolant pressure boundary meet the requirements of the 1971 Versiod, with application of all Addenda through to and including the Winter 1972 Addenda. Later code versions may be used optionally. 8. Augmentjed to provide additior.a1 quality assurance. Provisions include compierely welded systems except where maintenance or testing requires flanged connections, material certifications consistent with ASME Section III, ND-2121, and mandatory hydrostatic testing of all systems. 9. Fan / cooling units are designed and seismically analyzed to assure that they wi ll not overturn or fail structurally during an SSE. 10. Ductwork supports are designed and meismically analysed to withstand an SSE where support failure could damage safeguards equipment. 11. Building coder AB = Administration Building O CE = Containment Enclosure ~ CR = Control Building CS = Containment Structure CT = Cooling Tower CW = Circulating Water Pump House DG = Diesel Generator Building EF = Emergency Feedwater Pump Building FS = Fuel Storage Building PA = Primary Auxiliary Building PC = Main Steam and Feedwater Pipe Chase SW = Service Water Pump House l TB = Turbine Building WP = Waste Processing Building l YD = Yard 12. Ductwork from the downstream side of the air cleaning units to the fan intaken and discharge of the fans to the building boundaries is safety class :l, seienic category 1. l O
SB 1 & 2 FSAR RAI 410.37 (9.4.3) It is our position that those portions of the PAB ventilation system j providing acceptable environmental conditions for operation of ESF pumps (e.g., charging, safety injection, RHR and containment spray pumps) be seismic Category I, possess the same degree of redundancy as the ESF pumps including redundant power supplies, and be designed so that failure of the non-seismic portion of the PAB ventilation system will not compromise the operability of the safety related portion. Clarify your FSAR text and figures to demonstrate this capability.
RESPONSE
Section 9.4.3 describes the heating and ventilating systems for the locations listed in that section. Section 9.4.6 describes the cooling system for the ESF pumps as listed in 9.4.6.1. The containment enclosure cooling units, located in secondary containment, provide a redundant air conditioned air supply to the ESP pump areas. Redundant return fans and accessories return air from the ESF pump areas to the secondary containment area. Table 9.4-10 gives performance and equipment details for the containment enclosure cooling units. Figures 9.4-2 and 9.4-3 illustrate the operation of the system. These Figures,show that air is discharged into ductwork from the operating containment enclosure cooling unit; and is forced into the ESF pump areas located in the PAB. Air is returned through ductwork from the pump areas by the return air fans. The cooling units, return fans and dampers are Safety Class 3, seismic Category I. O
i l l SB 1 & 2 FSAR O l RAI 410.38 (9.4) Provide an FSAR section on the turbine building' area ventilation system in conformance with Section 9.4.4 of Regulatory Guide 1.70, " Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants."
RESPONSE
A new Section 9.4.15 has been added to the FSAk. O l l l l O
() SB 1 & 2 (To be incor-FSAR porated in Amendment 45) 9.4.15 Turbine Building Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning Systems Heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) systems are designed to circulate air through the turbine building in the summer for removal of the heat loss from all equipment and piping within the area during normal plant operation, and to maintain the temperature within specified design limits during shutdown periods. The turbine erector's office, electronic work room, start-up room and relay reom are air conditioned. The turbine building is heated with steam unit heaters, when necessary, to maintain the minimum inside design temperature during plant shutdown. 9.4.15.1 Design Bases a. The turbine building HVAC systems are designed to maintain the design conditions listed below: TEMPERATURE HUMIDITY Dry Bulk (oF) (%) Max. Min. Max. Min. l Turbine Hall 145 55 95 10 " l Heater Bay 115 55 95 10 Battery Room 95 65 95 10 Relay Room 75 60 95 10 Turbine Erector's Office, Electronic Work Room and Start-Up Room 75 70 95 10 Feed Pump Enclosures 110 55 95 10 Turbine Lube Oil Tank Room 104 55 Elevator Machinery Roca 104 55 b. The ventilation systems for both the battery room located in the relay room and the main battery room are designed to prevent hydrogen gas buildup. 1 c. The electronics work room, turbine erector's office, start-up room and relay room are slightly pressurized over ambient to prevent dust from entering those areas. d. Codes and standards applicable to the turbine building ventilation system equipment are listed in Table 9.4-1. 1 O 9.4-50
SB 1 & * (To be incor-FSAR potated in Amendment 45) 9.4.15.2 Systen Description The turbine building ventilation system is shown on Figure 9.4-15. There is no safety-rela *.ed equipment associated with this system. Design data is presented in ?.able 9.4-17. p.rbine Hall and Heated Bay a. The turbine hall and heater bay have a' total of twenty power roof ventilators, ten for each area. Each area is further sub-divided into ten ventilation zones with an operable louver and associated power roof ventilator. The operating louvers are located along the east and south walls of the turbine hall, divided between elevations 21'-0" and 46'-0"; eighteen louvers at the lower level and ten at the higher elevation. Air enters the building through the louvers and is circulated up through the upper floor elevations via floor gratings and openings. The air is then exhausted through the power roof ventilators. Equipment details are found in Table 9.4-17. The louvers are operated by pneumatic actuators controlled by solenoid valves. The solenoid valves, in turn, are controlled through manual / automatic /close switches located at local control panels. When the louvers are in the full open position, the power roof ventilators y.ill operate. b. Turbine Erector's Office, Electronics Workroom and Start-Up Room l The turbine erector's office, electronics work room and start-up room are air conditioned utilizing a split system direct expansion multizone air conditioning, ventilating and heating unit with a remote condensing unit. Table 9.4-17 contains design data relating to this system. Figure 9.4-16 shows the air conditioning system. The multizone unit is located in the roof of the area it serves, while the condensing unit is installed on the roof of the turbine building heater bay. The multizone unit consists of a mixing box with dampers, filter section, centrifugal fan, electric heating and refrigerant coils and a zone damper section. The air-cooled condenser consists of a condensing coil and fans. This system is manually operated through a local control panel by l placing the multizone unit switch in the "RUN" position, which I causes the fan to run continuously. Individual space thermostats control the zone dampers to provide room temperature control. An enthalpy controller selects the operating mede of the condensing unit, as well as positions the mixing section dampers to allow l natural cooling when possible. A minimum outside air position for 9.4-51
OU SB 1 & 2 (To be incor-FSAR porated in Amendment 45) the dampers permits ventilation air to be drawn in at all times. Whenever one or more of the space thermostats calls for heat, the cooling zone damper (s) will close as the heating zone damper (s) open. If the space thermostat is not satisfied, then the elsetric heating coil is actuated. An exhaust fan located in the toilet room exhauste the minimum ventilation air outside the building. A pressure relief damper, located in the electronic work room, prevents excessive pressure in the area. c. Relay Room The Unit I relay room differs from the Unit 2 relay room in
- hat it has battery rooms associated with it; Unit 2 does not. laile 9.4-17 lists the design data which relates to this system; Figure 9.4-16 diagrams the air conditioning system.
A conventional split system air conditioning arrangement provides heating, cooling and ventilation for the area, including the C) battery rooms for Unit 1. The air handling unit consists of a mixing damper section, filter section, electric heating coil, refrigerant coils and a fan section. The air handling unit is located on the roof of the relay room. A remote mounted condensing unit, consisting of a condensing coil and fan, is located on the administration and service building roof for Unit 1 and outside at elevation 21'-0" for Unit 2. The system is manually operated from a local control panel. Placing the control switch in the run position starts the air handling unit fan. The mixing dampers, relief dampers and condensing unit are controlled by a thermostat located within the relay room. Outside air is introduced to the air handling unit to provide make-up air and natural cooling when the outside air temperature permits, in the same manner as the turbine erector office system. Independent exhaust fans are provided for each of the two battery rooms for Unit I relay room. The fans are manually controlled from local panels and run continuously. This sub-system does not exist for Unit 2 relay room since it has no battery rooms, d. Battery Rooms The battery room at elevation 21'-0" in the turbine building is O heated and ventilated using a duct-mounted steam coil and duct-mounted mixing dampers. The mixing dampers, controlled by a 9.4-52
O SB 1 & 2 (To be incor-FSAR Porated in Amendment 45) i temperature controller with the space, modulates to maintain a fixed quantit, outside air while providing heat and cooling to o the room. A steam coil located within the same air intake duct provides heat when required. The steam coil is controlled by a space mounted thermostat. An exhaust fan draws air through the battery room and discharges it outside the building. This fan is controlled manually from a local panel and operation is continuous. The equipment details are included in Table 9.4-17. The ventilation system is shown in Figure 9.4-16. e. Feed Pump Turbine Rooms, Turbine Lube Oil Tank Room, Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir Room & Elevator Machinery Room Each of the feed pump turbine rooms, turbine lube oil tank room and turbine lube oil reservoir room, as well as the elevator machinery room, are ventilated by exhaust fans. Air is drawn into each of the rooms, then discharged outside the building. Since the supply air is drawn from the turbine building, the rooms listed Q above do not have an auxiliary heating system. The fans are con-(,) trolled manually from local control panels. The performance and equipment data is listed in Table 9.4-17. The ventilation system is diagrammed on Figure 9.4-16. 9.4.15.3 Safety Evaluation The turbine building, as well as those sub-systems included in the. building, have no safety design bases, therefore no safety evaluation is provided. 9.4.15.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements I The turbine building systems and equipment is not safety-related and, since all equipment and systems will normally be functioning, no special operational testing or special inservice inspections are required. Manufacturer's certified performance data vill be obtained for the air conditioning equipment, fans l and heating coils. Equipment operation and system balancing will be accom-plished during plant start-up. l I lO I 9.4-53 l
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P.002 43.24 'ee 81845 GMT SERB 200K CTATION - 97&3 QUESTION 410.39 O (9.4.5) The emergency feedwater pumphouse sad the service water pumphouse heating and ventilation systema discussed in FSAR Sections 9.4.11 and 9.4.12, respectively, are designed utilizing Seismic Category I aquipment, Class 1E motors, redu dancy and separate ESF power sources for their ventilation function. This ventilation function is correctly treated as safety-related, yet the safety classification shown in FSAR Table 3.2.2 and in TSAR Section 9.4.11.3 i$ non-nuclear safety (NNS). Clarify this apparent inconsistency. l AN5k'ER TSAR table 3.3.2 and Section 9.4.11.3 1.; changed to indicate that the fans and dampers associated with the ventilation systems for the emergency feedwater pump building and the service water pumphouse are Safety Sless 3. O O9 0 0 e e O 8 O
P.ss3 a*.24 'es sis 45 GMT SE1. BROOK STATION - 9763 351&2 ~ O l Codes and standards for the system components are presented in Table 9.4-1. 9.4.11.2 system Descriptio_n The emergency feedwater pump house heating and ventilation systems are shown es Figure 9.4-11. Heating and ventilating equipment and performance information cre given in Table 9.4-14. The pump house is ventilated and cooled with outside air supplied through cne of the two redundant supply fans and its intake damper with pneumatic cperator, and exhausted through its exhaust damper with pneumatic operator. Each fan, its intake desper and its exhaust damper is controlled by a separate One fan thermostat is set u 950F and the redundant fan room thermostat. thermostat is set at 1040F. Fan trip and pump house high temperature (1100F) cre both alarmed. The heating system consists of a shared steam / hot water converter, two 100% The capacity pumps, a piping system and two 100% capacity unit heaters. heating medium is a mixture of water and glycol in a closed loop circulating The glycol acts to provent freesing should the steam supply, electrical system. Each unit heater is controlled by power source or a pump or driver fail. Pump house low temperature (450F) is alarmed. its own room thermostat. 9.4.11.3 Safety Evaluation 3 The redundant, seismic Category I, Safety Classg,1 pump room supply fans, supply and exhaust dampers and the Class 1E fan actors, each with electrical power from a separate ESF power source, assure continued ventilation should Loss of air or an SSE, loss of of f-site power or a single failure occur. electrical power to the pnetmatically operated supply and exhaust dampers will cause them to fail open. Heating system operation is not required to assure proper operation of the pumping equipment or the electrical equipment in the emergency feedwater If an unlikely loss of the heating system occurs, the low temperature pump house. alarm will alert the operator of a potential freening situation, and corrective action will be taken to prevent freesing. 9.4.11.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements During the preoperational test program, the emergency feedwater pump house heating and ventilation system is balanced and adjusted to design air flow, and system operability, control and alarm functions are verified. Periodic operability tests of the supply fans and dampers will be performed during periods when the emergency feedwater system is required to be operable. O 9.4-40
l l t TABLE 3.2 % (Sheet 24 of 31) ANS Principal 3 'g PSAE Safaty Design /Coost. Code seimmic I {. Section Systems and Components Class Codes /Stds. Class Category Buildies(II) Supplier Estes 5 9.4.13 Service Mater Pumpheuse 3 ventilation System 3 Fans 3 IWSS. STDS. I Sif AE h nampers [ traS. Stas. 1 Sir M i 9.t.14 Service Unter Cooling Tamer i Fump anon and Switchseer Base Teatilaties Systems E l Pump Boom Feuer Reef CT AE E ISRS. S1BS. ventilator Mr 4 5 Switchgeer Room Supply Fan 3 seBS. STSS. I CT AE w Doctueek and es p es 3 INSS. STBS. I CT AE i 9.5.1 Fire Protection System j Mater Supply Tsak EFFA STDS. B AE 2 Fire Pump B AE O WFA STBS. Jockey Fuey ErPA STBS. TB AE E E Piping and Talves WFA STDS. TD AS 9.5.4 95se=1GeneratorFuelOil g Storage and Transfer System N Fuel Oil Boy Tank 3 ASM III 3 1 DG AE ~ M 3 { Fuel Oil Storage Tank 3 ASIE III 3 I BC AE 4 (
O lO O ~ .= l 2 TABLE 3.2-2 5 (Sheet 23 of 31) 2 I* ANS Principal FSAR Sa fety Design /Const. Code Seismic I section Systems and Companents Class Codes /Stds. Class Catenary Building (II) Supplier Notes
- g 9.4.8 Diesel Cenerator Building Ventilation System I
DC AE 5 Fana 3 WRS. STM. O Z I DC AE MFRS. STDS. Doctwork a I DC AE g Dempers 3 W ES. STDS. 9.4.9 Cable Spreading Boon ventilation System em CR AE se " WES. STDS. Fans sa w CR AE WRS. STDS. i Ductwork 9.4.10 4kV Switchgear Area and Battery a-Ventilation System 1 CR AE Fans 3 WRS. STDS. 1 CR AE Dampers 3 WES. STDS. MFRS. STDS. I CR AE Doctwork 1 9.4.11 Esergency Feedveter Pamphouse Ventilation System hh WES. STDS. 1 EF AE Fans Despers 1 EF AE WES. STDS. ?w
P.982 JT.M.08 ' 98 02: 32 SMT SEr.eR00K STATIoM - 9763 O EAT 410.40 Yerify the operability of the power operated atmospheric relief valves on 1hes of offsite power and af ter the SSE. It La our position that on loss of offsite power the valves be operable from the control room. For the $$E, one of the following alternatives must be utilised: (1) Frovide remote manual operation of the atmospheric relief valves from the control room using only safety related mechanical and electrical systems, or (2) Demonstrate by operational testing that controlled safe, plant cooldown can be accomplished by manual operation of the valves. The criteria that should be met in accepting manual operation of the valves in lieu of aseting (1) above should bot (a). Demonstrate that the plant can be maintained in a safe hot standby condition, assuming loss of offsite power, without reliance on atmospheric relief valve manual operation for at least one half hour following reactor shutdown. (n). Demonstrate that an operator has good access to the atmospheric relief valves, can safely operate them manually, and communi-I cate with the control room af ter the SSE. (c). Include in the plant test program a test that verifies the ability to achieve safe plant cocidown using atmospheric relief l valve operation.
Response
a). The atmospheric relief valves tre located adjacent to the main I 'pteam safety valves described in FSAR Section 10.3.2.6. These r Valves will operate without plant operator action for an indefinite period, and will maintain the esin staan pressure between 1185 peig and 1255 peig during the hot standby condition. When available, the atmospheric relief valves can be-used to reduce main steam pressure for both hot and cold shutdown condition. b). Operability of the atmospheric relief VJ/*s' is achieved by manual operation of the valves, The pperator has ready access to these relief valves, w4/c/t dre located in an unobstructed location within the pipe chasa area. x Ac*uation of the valves is accomplished by maans of a hand- ' wheel. Co:xnunication with the control room during the SSR is accomp-lished by means of walkie-talkies. l c). A plant test program will be performed during initial pra-operational testing to verify the ability to achieve plant cooldown using the manual-operated atmospheric relief O lb valves.
SB 1 & 2 FS/R O ~ RAI 410.41 (10.3.1) The FSAR states that the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) are closed by pneumatic pressure when the hydraulic fluid that opena the valves is relieved. There is no indication that accumulators are provided for these valves. Describe how the MSIVs would be closed on loss of air pressure and provide drawings showing the hydraulic and pneumatic MSIV operation systems.
RESPONSE
The actuator is a stored nitrogen unit with a hydraulic cylinder coupled directly to a precharged nitrogen accumulator which stores the closing energy. The precharged high pressure nitrogen is stored in an integral, essentially spherical accumulator which is designed as a pressure vessel meeting the requirements of ASME VIII, Div. 1. Schematic control drawings 506565 thru -568 which are listed in FSAR Section 1.7, were provided to the NRC under a separate submittal. O O O
410.42 In order to meet Position 3 of B'N 10-2 regarding steam generator 1 (10.4.7) water hammer, we require that you commit to performance of tests acceptable to NRC to verify that unacceptable feedwater hammer will not occur using plant operating procedures for normal and emergency restoration of steam generator water level following loss of normal feedwater flow. This commitment must be reflected in the FSAR.
RESPONSE
Feedwater flow stability tests will be demonstrated during preoperational testing. The FSAR will be revised to include such testing. a I O l V e --.---,.,-,,----v.-aw--- --n,..,.-r -~~- --
SB 1 & 2 FSAR O RAI 410.43 (10.4.9) Describe the routing of the EFW pumps' supply piping from the condensate storage tank to the EFW pumphouse. Verify that these supply pipes are housed in seismic Category I pipe tunnels or other protective structures that are seismic Category I and tornado missile protected. In describing the routing, indicate where these pipes and pipe tunnels interface with the EFW 6 pumphouse and CST structures (FSAR Figures 1.2-5 and 3.8-30).
RESPONSE
The EFW pumps supply piping runs from nozzles on the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) to the EFW pumphouse. The CST nozzles and adjacent piping are protected by a seismic Category I structure which is part of the CST enclosure and tornado missile shield. The piping is routed underground and runs below grade into the EFW pumphouse, also a seismic Category I structure. I O l () 1
SB 1 & 2 FSAR O RAI 410.44 (10.4.9)* isourposjlitionthattheEFWsystemmustmeetGDC2withregardtobeing It designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena including the SSR. We therefore require the following: ) (1) The eeergency feedwater pump turbine as well as a portion of its steam supply line is indicated as non-seismic Category I (FSAR Figure 10.3-1, Sheet 1). We require that this turbine and its control features and steam supply line meet seismic Category 1, Safety Class 3 requirements. Therefore make the necessary design changes and revise your F8AR accordingly. (2) The EFW pump recirculation lines are indicated as non-seismic-Category I (F8AR Figure 6.8-1). Therefore a seismic event combined with an operator error (e.g., failure to close either V67 or V73 after performance of the monthly EFW pump flow tests) can result in failure to deliver the proper flow to the steam generators, loss of condensate storage inventory, and flooding of the EFW pump rooms. We therefore require that the recirculation piping be designed to seismic Category I*. Therefore, make the necessary design changes and revise the FSAR accordingly. (3) Line 4626-02-D2-1", which appears to be the EFW turbine bearing oil cooler discharge line, has a normally open isolation valve and is partially non-seismic Category I (F$AR Figure 6.8-1). We require that the entire line be seismic Category I unless you can demonstrate that a failure of this line will;not result in unacceptable loss of steam generator feedwater and in unacceptable flooding of the EFW pump rooms. l
RESPONSE
(1) The EFW pump turbine and its integral trip valve are commercially unarallab?e as ASME Section III, Class 3, design. However, these componence are designed to seismic Category I requirements and fabricated in accordance with an approved QC program. The steam supply line is designed to seismic Category I requirements. (2) The EFW pump recirculation lines are designed to seismic Cat egory I requirements. Yalves V67 and V73 are administratively opesed only for EFW pump flow tests. Fosition switches on these valves provide an alarm to the operators if these valves are not closed. (3) The water lines to and from the oil cooler are designed to seismic Cat esory I requirements. The breakdown orifice in the line to the oil cooler limits the flow to 2-3 gym. This flow was considered in sizing the pump capacity. In the unlikely event of pipe fai O lure, this flow will easily be handled by the pump room floor draLus.
- In FSAR section 6.8
410.45 Provide a response to our March 10, 1980 letter to near-term [~'\\ operating license applicants concerning your EFW system design \\s-(TMI-2 Task Action Plan, NUREG-0737, Item II.E.1.1). This response should include the following: (1) A detailed point-by-point review of your EFV system design against Standard Review Plan Section 10.4.9, and Branch Technical Position ASB 10-1. (2) A reliability evaluation similar to that performed for operating plants (refer to Enclosure 1 of Fkrch 10, 1980 letter) and discussed in NUREG-0611. (3) A point-by point review of your EFW system design, Technical Specifications and operating procecares against the generic short-term and long-term requirements discussed in the March 10, 1980 letter. (4) The design basis for the EFW flow requirements and verification that your.EFW system will meet these requirements (refer to Enclosure 2 of the March 10, 1980 letter).
RESPONSE
(1) In comparing the Seabrook Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system design against the Standard Review Plan Section 10.4.9, the following applies: I 1. Missile protection for the EFW system components and piping \\ 'T is described in FSAR Section 3.5. 2. Pipe whip and jet impingement effects on the EFW system may be found in FSAR Section 3.6(B) and Appendix 3A. 3. The EFW system is designed such that failure of non-essential equipment or components does not reduce the performance capabilities of the system. See FSAR Section 6.8. 4. EFW system active component failure is addressed in FSAR Table 6.8-2. 5. Refer to FSAR Section 6.8.2 for motive power source diversity. 6. Feedwater system water hammer is addressed in FSAR Section 10.4.7.3. 7. Water Level (Flood) Design is addressed in FSAR Section 3.4. 8. System leakage is detected and collected through the floor drainage system. Leakage would be directed to the electrical cable tray area sump where it would be removed by redundant sump pumps. Pump controls and status indicating lights are on the main control board and sump high level is annunciated in the control room. Normal rounds by auxiliary operators -~) G
also provide leak detection capability. Numerous isolation () valves have been provided in the system design permitting isolation of all components which would be subject to excessive leakage or component malfunctions. 9. The EFW system design permits periodic testing of all active components, including the actuation circuitry, as required by the Technical Specifications. 10. A description of EFW system instrumentation is presented in FSAR Section 6.8.5. 11. A description of system operation and actuation details can be found in FSAR Sections 6.8.2 and 7.3, respectively. 12. Manual actuation of the EFW system is available at all times. 13. Protection against excess EFW flow to a depressurized steam generator is provided as detailed in FSAR Section 6.8.5. 14. A design basis analysis of the EFW flow requirements will be available by 6/1/82. 15. Section 3/4.7.1.2 of the Technical Specifications provide the LCO's and surveillance requirements for the EFW system. 16. Relative to the generic short-and long-term recommendations g of NUREG-0611, the following responds to those recommendations: Short-Term Recommendations GS-1: The requirements for an inoperable EFW pump are defined in Technical Specification 3.7.1.2. CS-2: Manual valves in the EFW system which, if not in the open position, could interrupt EFW flow, will be locked in the open position. GS-3: The design of the Seabrook EFW system is such that throttling flow for water hammer considerations is not required. GS-4: Procedures for the operation of the EFW system, including means for transferring to alternate sources of EFW supply, will be developed three months prior to fuel load. t i O I l t
G3-5: For a complete loss of ac condition (station () blackout), the EFW system is designed to automatically initiate EFW flow. The steam driven EFW pump requires no ac power for its operation. Bearing lubrication cooling is provided by condensate trem the pump's own discharge and is independent of an ac supplied cooling source. GS-6: Three months prior to fuel load, procedures will be developed to verify the position of all EFW system valves required to assure EFW flow from the condensate storage tank to the steam generators. These procedures will be performed periodically including prior to plant startup following an extended cold shutdown and following maintenance activities which have altered the required valve alignment. Additionally, a performance test of the EFW pumps will be performed prior to plant startup following an extended cold shutdown, following maintenance of an EFW pump which could have an effect upon pump performance, and also to meet the surveillance requirements specified in the Technical Specifications. GS-7: The automatic start circuitry for the EFW system is designated as safety grade, Class lE. See FSAR Section 7.3 for additional information. - s/ GS-8: See response to GS-7. Additional Short-Term Recommendations Primary AFW Water Source Low Level Alarm a. Redundant level indication for the condensate storage tank is provided on the main control board. o Additionally, low level in the CST is annunciated in the control room. The setpoint for the low level alarm will ensure suf ficient time is available to permit an operator to shif t to an alternate water supply. b. AFW Pump Endurance Test The pre-operational test program will include a 72-hour endurance test of the EFW pumps as outlined in NUREG-0611, Appendix III, Section 5.3.2. Indication of AFW Flow to the Steam Generators c. EFU flow to each steam generator is provided by safety grade instrumentation powered from emergency buses. See FSAR Sections 6.8 and 7.5. O, d. AFW System Availability During Periodic Surveillance s, Testing
During periodic surveillance testing of the EFW pumps, O manual valve alignments will be required. Only one EFW pump will be tested at a time. Because each EFW pump is capable of providing 100% of required flow, full system flow requirements will be available at all times. Additionally, when these valves are changed from their norral position, an alarm is annunciated in the control room to alert the operators. Long-Term Recommendations GL-1: See response to GS-7. CL-2: See FSAR Section 6.8. GL-3: See response to CS-5. CL-4: Ete FCAR Section 9.2.6. ~ CL-5: See response to CS-7. 17. A reliability analysis of the EFW system will be available by 6/1/82. 18. Extended decay heat removal capability is assured by the minimum condensate storage tank reserve of 200,000 gallons of (% primary grade water. This reserve of 200,000 gallons permits \\_) worst case decay heat removal capability for a minimum of 14 hours including a cooldown to 3500F for RRR operation. ( Approximately 27,000 gallons of the 200,000 gallons is required to cooldown from 5670F to 3500F.) In comparing the-Seabrook Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system design against Branch Technical Position ASB 10-1, the following applies: 1. See FSAR Section 6.8. 2. See FS AR Section 6.8. l 3. See FSAR Section 6.8. ~ 4. See FS AR Section 6.8. 5. See FSAR Sections 6.8 and 3.6. (2) A reliability evaluation of the EFW system is presently being performed and will be available for review by June 1,1982. (3) See the response to RAI #410.45.(1).16. l (4) A design basis analysis of the EFW system is presently being l l performed and will be available for review by June 1,1982. m )
SB 1 & 2 FSAR RAI 430.46 (10.4.9)* (1) Describe the function of the recirculation lines (e.g., 4606-15-1506-4") from the main feedwater lines to their associated emergency feedwater lines. Describe the provisions used to verify and maintain the block valves associated with' these lines closed during normal operation '.n order to ensure that the flow restricting venturi located in each EFW steam generator supply line is not bypassed. Also, describe the plant condition when these block valves are open. Conside: the effect of these lines in the EFW system reliability evaluation. (2) Describe the provisions used to verify and maintain the block valve in the branch line from the EFW turbine driven pump suction line to the " alternate fuel post makeup" connection closed during normal operation. Consider the effect of this connection in the EFW system reliability evaluation.
RESPONSE
(1) The 4606-15-1506" line is to be used for SG recirculation and wet layup to bypass the low flow around the 18" check valve utilizing the EFW discharge line. The valves would be locked closed during normal operation and opened administrative 1y. (2) The valve is normally closed and is physically located close to the suction line. A short length of pipe downstream of the valve is fitted with a blind flange. The valve would be administrative 1y, opened, and l does not af fect EFW system reliability. O I f s
- FSAR Section 6.8 5
g 6 \\
..,..u... a...- SB 1 & 2 FSAIL O RAI 410.47 (10.4.9)* ClarifythealpparentdiscrepancybetweenFSARFigures6.8-1and10.4.5with regard to the' routing of the startup pump discharge flow via the EW header. Figure 6.8-1 indicates that a portion of the startup feed pump discharge line located within the E W pump room is non-seismic. Discuss the possibility qf flooding the IW pump room and depletion of the condensate supply in the event of the $$E combined with failure of valve V156 in the open position due to valve actuator malfunction er operator error.
RESPONSE
the EW pump room is seismically supported, including the All piping in portion of startup feed pump (and BG recirculation pump) discharge line. All connections from this line to other plant piping include normally closed valves. The line is used during plant shutdown for 50 recirculation. In both cases, valve and pump operation is adelnistratively controlled. During normal plant operation, this line is not pressurised. Valve V156 is normally closed, and is furnished with a manual gear operator. Therefore, the possibility of flooding the E N pump roam and depletion of condensate supply is negligible. O er e B e D
- F5AE 8ection 6.8
() 410.48 Your response to our acceptance review Question 410.2(1) states \\s,/ that the EFW pump discharge header is "not considered high or moderate energy piping" since header pressurization is normally prevented by stop-check valves (not shown in Figure 6.8-1) in the EFW branch lines to the individual steam generators. It is our position that the AFV piping upstream of the above referenced stop-check valves as well as the EFW steam supply line inside the EFW pump room is classified as a moderate energy system, for which through-wall leakage cracks may be pestulated. (
Reference:
BTP MEB 3-1 Section B.2.e, with regard to fluid eystems that qualify as high-energy fluid systems for only short operational periods, but qualify as moderate-energy fluid systems for the major operational period, including auxiliary feedwater systems that are not utilized during normal startup and shutdown.) The jet impingement and environmental effects of through-wall leakage cracks for the above piping must be included in the FSAR moderate energy piping analysis.
RESPONSE
Because the EFW pump discharge header could be subject to possible back leakage through the stop-check valves or at least subjected to the height head pressure of the Condensate Storage Tank, the lines upstream of the stop-check valves will be considered " moderate-energy" lines. A Moderate-Energy Line Break study is presently being performed. These lines will be considered in that study. It is presently anticipated that the MELB study will be completed and available for review by April 1982. g (_) In regards to the steam supply line to the steam driven EFW pump - Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1, Section B.2.e states that: "Through-wall leakage cracks instead of breaks may be postulated in the piping of those fluid systems that qualif as high-energy fluid systems for only short operational periods BUT QUALIFY AS MODERATE-ENERGY FLUID SYSTEMS' (emphasis added) 'for the major operational period.' Gs. Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 3-1 defines (in part) moderate-energy fluid systems as: " Fluid systems that, during normal plant conditions, are either IN OPERATION OR MAINTAINED PRESSURIZE.D ( ABOVE ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE)' (emphasis added) 'under conditions..." Footnote 6 of Section B.2.e in MEB 3-1 'efines "short operational d periods" for which the steam supply line to the steam driven EFW pump, downstream of valves MS-V127 and V128 (see FSAR Figure 10.3-1, Sheet 1), applies. However, this piping does not " qualify as moderate-energy" piping as defined in Appendix A to ASB 3-1. The piping downstream of MS-V127 and 128 contains normally open valves and connects directly to the turbine driver. The turbine exhausts directly to atmosphere. Therefore, this steam supply line is constantly vuited to atmosphere and is at atmospheric pressure. Even if MS-V127 or 128 should incur minor seat leakage, the steam, in all probability, would condense in the line and be removed by drain traps and, under worst case conditions, pass / through the turbine and vent to atmosphere. Therefore, this piping is normally vented to atmosphere, is maintained at atmospheric pressure, and does not qualify as " moderate-energy piping".
l, SB 1 & 2 FSAR RAI 410.49 (10.4.9)* Your response to our acceptance review Question 410.2(3) does not provide the requested information regarding power diversity for the five motor operated valves in the E W pump discharge header. Therefore provide the missing information.
RESPONSE
The five valves in the E W pump discharge header are furnished with gear operators, not motor operators. Therefore, the question of power diversity is not applicable. O I i l l is
- FSAR Section 6.8
i SB 1 & 2 FSAR O RAI 410.50 (10.4.9)* In a letter dated December 4, 1981, you stated that you were considering the use of the non-safety grade Startup Feedwater Pump as a backup source of emergency feedwater "for the unlikely occurrence of multiple failures which would render the existing EFW System inoperable." You went on to describe provisions for supplying emergency power to this pump. In order to demonstrate that the Startup Feedwater pump has sufficient capacity to serve as a backup source of feedwater, please provide the pump head and capacity curve for this pump.
RESPONSE
The design capacity for the emergency feedwater pumps is 710 gpm at 3050 ft TDH. The design capacity for the startup feedwater pump'is 1500 spa at 2700 ft TDH. H2ad and capacity curves for these pumps on the ssee plot show that the startup pump has sufficient capacity to serve as backup for the emergency feedwater pumps (see Figure 410.50-1). l !O I
- FSAR Section 6.8
l2 -o Tmus z>m N$k 982 m x Q u)o O -< -1 E $dA 4000 %gz< -<O.o START UP PUMP CT 3 us zz Ahk C o-I E 3000 M$b 3 i e 5 Y EMERGENCY FEEDWATER $ 2000 PUMP DESIGN POINTS m >0 z2 I Omg ggg 1000 >x MM> %8o$ $g! A~ l o >:EN 400 800 1200 1600 2000 3 O' 8 ,x" GALLONS PER MINUTE = E20 me' @}}