ML20038A927
| ML20038A927 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 11/18/1981 |
| From: | Maine Yankee |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20038A923 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8111240460 | |
| Download: ML20038A927 (6) | |
Text
_
3.6 EMERGEtCY CORE COOLING AND CONTAIteENT SPRAY SYSTEMS Acplicability:
Applies to the operating status of the emergency core cooling and containment spray systems.
Objective:
To define the conditions under which components of the emergency core cooling and containment spray systems must be operable.
Soecifjcation:
A.
The following equipment must be operable whenever the reactor coolant system temperature and pressure exceed 2100F and 400 psig:
1.
Two safety injection tanks set for automatic initiation. Each tank shall contain 11,200 + 500 gallons of water borated to at least 1720 ppm and pressurTzed with nitrogen to 230 psig + 10 psi,
- 25 psi.
2.
One operable ECCS train consisting of the following subsystems of
- the train. Each subsystem includes the manual valves that are aligned and locked in the position required for safeguards operation, the automatically operated valves set for automatic operation or aligned and locked in the position required for safeguards operation, the controls set for automatic initiation where appropriate, and a pump powered from an engineered safeguards bus.
a.
One service water pump subsystem b.
One component cooling pump subsystem c.
One low pressure safety injection pump subsystem d.
One high pressure safety injection pump subsystem f.
One containment spray pump and RHR heat exchanger subsystem 3.
Station service power in accordance with Technical Specification 3.12 supplying the same operable ECCS train as in (2) above.
4.
The refueling water storage tank filled and available in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.
5.
The fill header motor operated root valves to two loops.
Exception: The requi_ements may be modified with regard to the position of controls and valves during periods of hydrostatic testing.
Remedial Action: Restore required limiting condition within four hours or place the plant in a Hot Shutdown condition within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in a Cold Shutdown condition within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
(5111240460 81111B' I
PDR ADOCK 05000309 3.6-1 P
B.
Whenever the reactor coolant system boron concentration is less than **
that required for hat shutdown condition, two high pressure safety Injection pu.np subsystems shall be operable.
C.
The following equipment must be operable whenever the reactor is in a power operation condition.
1.
Three safety injection tanks set for automatic initiation and subject to the conditions specified in A.1 above.
2.
Two operable and redundant ECCS trains, each train consisting of the subsystems specified in A.2 above.
3.
Station service power in accordance with Technical Specification 3.12.
4.
The refueling water storage tank and the spray chemical addition tank filled and available in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.
5.
The fill header motor operated root valves to three loops.
Exceptions:
1.
If any of the component subsystems specified in B and C.2 above becomes inoperable continued power operations is permitted for a maximum of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> provided the component subsystem performing the same function in the other train are operable.
In this situation the operable subsystem and its diesel generator shall be tested within two hours after discovery of the outage.
2.
If any of the fill header motor operated root valves becomes Inoperable continued power operation is permitted for a maximum of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> provided both of the remaining root valves are tested
- operable within two hours after discovery of the outage.
3.
One safety injection tank may be isolated for a period not to exceed one hour.
4.
If one of the safety injection tanks is found not to be within soecifications it shall be restored to specification within four hours.
Remedial Action: Restore required limiting condition within grace period specified or place the plant in a Hot Shutdown condition within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in a Cold Shutdown condition within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Basis:
Adeauate core cooling and containment spray is provided for the entire break spectrum up to and including the design basis accident.
This protection covers all modes of operation from shutdown to full power.
At full power minimum required safety injection includes three (3) operable safety injection tanks, and two complete ECCS trains consisting of the equipment specified in A.2, A.3 and A.4 above.
The accident analysis considers that only 2/3 of the capacity of the operable equipment is effective for core cooling.
3.6-2
Containment peak accident pressure is maintained below design pressure and subsecuent containment cooling requirements are adecuate if one of the two containment spray pumps is operable.
Specification A provides a pressure and temperature limit above which ECCS must be operable.
It recognizes the greatly decreased probability of a loss of coolant accident and the negligible amount of energy stored in the primary coolant.
Specification B ensures that a sufficient Quantity of boron can be injected by the ECCS to maintain the reactor subcritical following the most limiting main steam line break accident with the concurrent failures of the highest worth CEA stuck out of the core and the failure of one HPSI pump subsystem to function.
l 3.6-3
r 3.10 CEA GROUP, POWER DISTRIBUTION, MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT LIMITS AND COOLANT CONDIII0t6 Aoplicability:
Applies to insertion of CEA groups and peak linear heat rate during operation.
Objective:
To ensure (1) core subcriticality after a reactor trip, (2) limited potential reactivity insertions from a hypothetical CEA ejection, and (3) an acceptable core power distribution, moderator temperature coefficient, core inlet temperature, and reactor coolant system pressure during power operation.
Specification:
A.
CEA Insertion Limits 1.
When the reactor is critical, except for physics tests and CEA exercises, the shutdown CEA's (Groups A, 8 and C) shall be fully withdrawn and the regulating CEAS (groups 1 through 5) shall be no further inserted than the limits shown in Figure 3.10-1 for 3 loop operation.
2.
CEA's shall be considered fully withdrawn when positioned such that:
a.
the rods are inserted within 4 steps from their upper electrical limit when the RCS boron concentration is greater **
than 100 ppm or b.
the rods are at their upper electrical limit when the RCS baron concentration is less than or equal to 100 ppm.
3.
When the reactor is critical, the shutdown margin with one CEA stuck out will not be less than that shown in Figure 3.10-7.
During low power physics testing at the beginnirg of a cycle, CEA insertion is permitted such that the minimum shutdown margin is no less than 2% in reactivity.
4.
Operation of the CEA's in the automatic mode is not permitted.
B.
Power Distribution Limits 1.
The peak linear heat rate with appropriate consideration of normal flux peaking, measurement-calculational uncertainty (8%),
engineering factor (3%), increase in linear heat rate due to axial fuel densification and thermal expansion (0.3% for Types E, G, H &
I only) and power measurement uncertainty (2%) shall not exceed:
3.10-1
$Hh 2aG r :r m
?d<
POWER LEVEL (% OF RATED POWER) VS. CEA WITilDRAWAL (STEPS)
SSh FOR TilREE LOOP OPERATION m
OR (% OF 0.63 x RATED POWER) FOR TWO LOOP OPERATION O
J'%
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i las 6
! POWER STEPS CEA WITHDRAWAL
)
t LEVEL BY CROUPS Ng
(%)
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o 80
- 90 90 180 180 180 180 g
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f f
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CEA WITilDRAWAL BY GROUP (STEPS) oE bS NOTE: IN APPLYING TilIS RESTRICTION TO 'It'0 LOOP OPERATION, T11E RATED POWER FOR 'DJO LOOP OPERATION MUST BE USED WITilIN FOUR (4) IIOURS OF ATTAINING TWO LOOP CONDITIONS
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. t 6.0 RCS Boron Conc. Reactivity _ = _....
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0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 RCS Boron Concentration - YPM-MAINE YANKEE Minimum Rer;oired Shutdown Margin Figure Technical Versus 3.10-7 Specification RC5 Boron Concentration 3.10-15 1
-