ML20035D370
| ML20035D370 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 03/26/1993 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Maxwell G, Morgan M, Wright R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035D354 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-93-04, 50-348-93-4, 50-364-93-04, 50-364-93-4, NUDOCS 9304130134 | |
| Download: ML20035D370 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000348/1993004
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION H
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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ATLANT A, GEORGI A 30323
%...../
Report Nos.:
50-348/93-04 and 50-364/93-04
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Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P.O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295
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Docket Nos.:
50-348 and 50-364
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Facility name:
Farley 1 and 2
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Inspection Conducted:, February 10 - March 22, 1993
Inspectors:
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GeorgeFfNaxwell,SeniorResidentinspector
Date Signed
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Michael JJ Morgan, Resident inspector
Date Signed
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Robert W. Wtight, RI'l Farley Project
Date Signed
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Engineer (M;ch1-March 12)
Approved by:
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Floyd S. Tantrell, Chief
Date Signed
Reactor Projects Section IB
Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY
Scope:
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This routine, monthly resident inspection involved on-site observation of
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operations, maintenance, surveillance, previous inspectin findings, event
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followup and an ongoing observation of FNP self-assessment activities. Deep
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backshifts were performed March 7 and 8, 1993.
Results:
On February 19, the Unit I number 4 main turbine governor valve displayed
" higher than expected" vibration readings, paragraph 5.d.
On March 6, Unit 1
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was shutdown to repair the main turbine governor valve, paragraph 3.c.
On
March 1, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) reduced their number of
persons that needed to maintain a reactor operator licenses, paragraph 3.a. On
March 7, a systems operator operated a local / remote control switch on the
wrong unit, paragraph 3.b.
On March 18 and 19, an inspection of control room
,
drawings, disclosed a backlog of only 25 revisions request of more than 90
days old, paragraph 3.d.
Follow-up inspections were performed for two,
(February 2 and 5), unplanned primary water injection events, paragraphs 5.b.
and 5.c.
A violation was issued for both events. On March 8, the inspectors
attended a Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meeting, paragraph 6.
9304130134 930326
ADDCK 05000348
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No other violations and no deviations were identified.
Results of this
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inspection indicate that actions by management, operations, maintenance and
other site personnel were adequate,
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
W. Bayne, Supervisor Safety Audit and Engineering Review
- C. Buck, Technical Manager
R. Coleman, Modification Manager
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- W. Cumbee, Safety Audit and Engineering Review
L. Enfinger, Administrative Manager
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- P. Harlos, Safety Audit and Engineering Review
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- R. Hill, General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant
M. Mitchell, Superintendent, Health Physics and Radwaste
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- C. Nesbitt, Operations Manager
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J. Osterholtz, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
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- L. Stinron, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations
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J. Thomas,- Maintenance Manager
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B. Yance, Systems Performance Manager
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- Attended the exit interview
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Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations
personnel, security, maintenance, I&C and office personnel.
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During the week of February 16-18, F.S. Cantrell, Chief, Reactor
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Projects Section IB, Region II, met with the site resident inspectors
and observed site resident inspector activities.
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From March 1 to March 12, the Farley Region II Project Engineer, R.W.
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Wright, assisted the site resident inspectors.
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Acronyms and initializations used throughout this report are listed in
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the last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status
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a.
Unit 1 Status
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Unit 1 operated at approximately 100 percent power for most of the
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reporting period. However, on March 6, the unit was shutdown in
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order to replace the number 4 main turbine governor valve. The
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reactor was returned to power (critical) March 15 at 7:33 a.m. and
the unit was placed on the grid, March 16 at 2:27 a.m., paragraph
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3.c and 5.d.
b.
Unit 2 Status
Unit 2 operated at approximately 100 percent power for most of the
reporting period.
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3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The resident inspectors conducted routine plant tours to verify license
requirements are being met. The inspection tours included review of
site documentation, interviews with plant personnel and an on-going
evaluation of licensee self-assessment.
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a.
Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) License Expirations
)
Southern Nuclear Operating Company notified the Region by letter
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(NEL-93-0087) dated March 1, 1993, that the eleven listed
individuals no longer have need to maintain their licenses in
accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 55.55(a). This action by
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the licensee indicated that efforts are being made by SNC to
reduce the number of inactive operator licenses,
b.
Local Control Of Wrong Unit Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Flow
Control Valve (MDAFWFCV) FCV-3227B (FNP Incident Report 1/93/63)
On March 7, 1993, a Unit 1 board operator instructed the roving
auxiliary systems operator to take local control of the Unit 1
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MDAFWFCV "FCV-3227B" and to attempt to close the valve to assist
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in troubleshooting for I&C.
Shortly after these instructions were
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given, Unit 2 operators received an annunciator alarm JJ5, "MDAFWP
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or TDAFWP FCVs In Local". The auxiliary operator was paged and
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the alarm immediately cleared. The operator acknowledged that he
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had mistakenly placed the " local / remote" control switch for Unit 2
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control valve "FCV 3227B" in " local", but placed it back in
" remote". The unit was not placed in an LCO condition by the
incorrect placement of the switch.
This item is identified as an unresolved item UNR 50-364/93-04-02,
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Inappropriate operator action results in wrong unit auxiliary
feedwater valve control. This item will remain open until a final
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root cause report has been provided by the licensee and has been
evaluated by the inspectors.
c.
Return To Power After Shutdown For Governor Valve Repair - Unit 1
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On March 6, 1993, Unit I was shutdown in order to inspect and
repair the number 4 main turbine-generator governor valve. The
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reactor was returned to power (critical) March 15 at 7:33 a.m. and
the unit was placed on the grid, March 16 (paragraph 5.d).
The inspectors observed various stages of the startup which was
conducted in accordance with FNP-1-UOP-1.1, Startup of Unit From
Cold Shutdown To Hot Standby and FNP-1-U0P-1.2, Startup of Unit
From Hot Standby To Minimum Load.
The inspectors determined that
operator actions during these activities were conducted in
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accordance with site procedural requirements.
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d.
Control Room Drawing Information - March 17, Region 11 Request
The inspectors conducted an inspection of FNP's control room
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drawings (P&lDs) on March 18th and 19th and noted the following:
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for the most part, drawings used in the control room are
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legible.
However, certain " involved" drawings, for example
those providing information on plant elevation layouts and
those dealing with " larger" plant system details;
i.e., RCS,
SWS, CCW, etc., tend to have small, compact lettering.
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FNP's use of " description lines", (which point to various
components), can be confused with system piping lines if the
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user of the drawing is not careful. No specific plant
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problems have been identified as being attributed to the
above observation.
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Drawings used in the control room are generally very
accurate.
Of the approximately 60 drawings reviewed by the
inspectors, two small errors were found. These errors had
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already been noted by the shift supervisors and shift
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foremen and reported to the plant modifications group for
corrections.
FNP has recently established a new method of
noting drawing errors and set-up better guidelines in how
corrections are noted, reported and made.
This information
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is contained in FNP administrative procedure, AP-8, Design
Modification Control, Revision 18.
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Discussions with Mr. J. K. Osterholtz, Assistant General
Manager, Plant Support, revealed that the current " backlog"
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of design change revisions was 330 drawings. Most of these
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were for parts replacements and many of the remaining were
associated with minor "as built" conditions. Only 25 of
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these changes were greater than 90 days old.
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The drawings used in the FNP control room were of very good
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quality and they were quite accurate in regards to "as designed",
"as built" and "as found" conditions.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
Results of
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inspections in this area indicate that operations personnel generally
conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedures.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors reviewed various licensee preventative and corrective
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maintenance activities, to determine conformance with facility
procedures, work requests and NRC regulatory requirements.
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Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed:
P
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MWR-253551; "2C" D/G Fuel injection nozzles leaking jacket water
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The inspectors observed the replacement of seal ring adapters and
gaskets for the No. 12 control side and Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 11
opposite control side fuel injector collar assemblies.
Fairbanks
Morse Operation and Maintenance Manual, Colt 50 35-205917, IC/2C,
Volume 1, Drawing 16200743, Revision 0, was referenced and used
for this work.
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MWR-258871
Perform eddy current testing on lube oil, air coolant
MWR-258872
and jacket water heat exchangers for the "2C" D/G
MWR-258873
The inspectors reviewed NDE Procedure No. ML-NDE-2.1, Revision 0,
Set-Up, Calibration, and Operation of ZETEX MlZ-18/MlZ-18A and
conducted inquires of the Master-Lee Energy Services (the
contractor) while observing the performance of the above mentioned
eddy current inspections of the subject heat exchanger tubing.
The testing was found to be conducted in accordance with
procedures.
No leakers were identified.
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MWR-260910; "2C" Component cooling water heat exchanger repairs
The inspectors observed the installation of plugging devices for
tubes which were leaking in the subject heat exchanger. Work
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activities were conducted in accordance with the MWR requirements.
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MWR-384216; Perform shutdown inspection per procedures MP 13.1, MP
13.9, MP 12.2 and MP 13.10 for the "2C" D/G
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The inspectors observed required maintenance performed on the "2C"
D/G externals and internals in accordance with the above mentioned
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procedures. A Fairbanks Morse contractor representative was
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present during the entire operation. No major defects were
identified during the inspection.
The wrist pin inserts and
bushings for upper cylinder Nos.10 and 12 were replaced in
addition to new gaskets, 0-rings, seals, and oil / fuel filters.
The inspectors witnessed post-maintenance testing which verified
that the diesel operated in a loaded condition with all operating
parameters in a normal range.
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WA00384213; Inspect D/G "l-2A" per plant maintenance procedures
inspectors observed portions of this work including fuel injectors
being removed, inspected, cleaned and replaced.
The number 6
piston fuel injector could not be removed without removal of the
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number 6 cylinder head. Signs of carbon deposits on the cylinder
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head indicated leakage around the injector seals. Work performed
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was satisfactory and in accordance with directions contained in
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the work authorization, plant procedures and the D/G technical
manual.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area. The results of
inspections in the maintenance area indicate that both operations and
maintenance personnel generally conducted assigned activities in
accordance with applicable procedures.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
Inspectors witnessed surveillance test activities performed on safety-
related systems and components, in order to verify that such activities
were performed in accordance with facility procedures and regulatory and.
licensee technical specification requirements.
a.
The following surveillance activities were observed:
a
1-STP-1.0
Operations Daily / Shift Surveillance Requirements
2-STP-1.0
Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4
Inspectors routinely observed operator activities while
parameters were monitored, documented and evaluated.
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2-STP-33.0B;
Solid State Protection System Operability
Test
The inspectors observed the satisfactory completion of this
test which assures that the solid state protection system
will function as required. This STP had been revised as
part of the licensees corrective action associated with the
Unit 2 safety injection event that occurred on February 5,
1993, while using the previous revision of the STP (see
Inspection Report No. 93-02).
The revised STP is more
detailed and " user friendly" for the operators.
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0-STP-52.1; Number 1 Diesel Fire Pump Operability Test
Inspectors observed satisfactory testing of automatic pump
starts with the fuel oil storage tank supply at prescribed
levels,
b.
Follow-up inspection for Unresolved Item (UNR) 50-364/93-02-01,
Inappropriate operator action which resulted in an injection of
primary water into the reactor coolant system (RCS) - Unit 2
A further evaluation of the circumstances which resulted in this
unresolved item indicated that the " operator-at-the-controls"
(0ATC) violated procedures FNP-STP-45.4, ECCS Valve ISI Test
During Cold Shutdown, Revision 7, and FNP-0-AP-5, Surveillance
Program Administrative Control, Revision 16.
Step 3.4.4 of AP-5
required the operator to perform tests as written in the STP.
STP-45.4, step 5.8, required the SI hot leg isolation valve to be
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" cycled" from the valve's normally closed position prior to
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performing steps 5.9.1 and 5.9.2 of the procedure. The 0ATC did
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not complete step 5.8 prior to performing steps.5.9.1 and 5.9.2
in that the SI hot leg isolation valve was not closed. This
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personnel error resulted in the injection of_1,384 gallons of
water into the RCS.
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c.
Follow-up inspection for Unit 2 Licensee Event Report (LER) 93-01
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And Inspector Follow-up Item 50-364/93-02-02, Safety injection
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(SI) when exiting surveillance testing
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An evaluation of the causes of the Unit 2 safety injection which
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occurred on February 5 and was documented in LER-93-01, was
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completed by the inspectors.
At the_ time of the injection, the
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operator was completing the final steps in FNP-2-STP-33.0A, Solid
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State Protection System Train "A" Operability Test, Revision 12.
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Step 5.7.5 requires the " block-reset" switches for the pressurizer
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pressure safety injection circuitry and the steamline pressure
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safety injection circuitry to be placed in the " block" position.
A caution statement proceeding step 5.7.6 states that step 5.7.5
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must be accomplished before' returning the " input error inhibit"
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switch to " normal". Apparently the operator did not respond to
the " lack of proper illuminated light" feedback indication while
he was placing " block-reset" switches into the " block" position.
Without regard to this improper feedback indication, he proceeded
to step 5.7.6 without discussion with the other crew members or
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the shift supervisor. This action resulted in actuation of the "A"
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train safety injection.
Administrative procedure, FNP-0-AP-5,
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Surveillance Program Administrative' Control, Revision 16, step
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3.4.4, requires " operator to shift supervisor" notification
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whenever unusual conditions are detected or when compliance with
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surveillance test criteria is not or cannot be accomplished.
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The inspectors evaluated the procedure which was being used by the
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operator, FNP-2-STP-33.0A, Revision 12, and found that the
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procedure did not contain specific guidance in reference to
whether or not a light should have illuminated when the operator
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placed the " block-reset" switches in the block position.
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Based on the above observations the inspectors determined that the
operator violated AP-16 when he failed to notify the crew or the
shift supervisor prior to proceeding to exit steps for FNP-2-STP-
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33.0A. This error was compounded by STP-33.0A, Revision 12 not
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containing specific guidance about which lights are to be
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illuminated when this STP is being conducted while the plant is in
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Mode 5.
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The inspectors evaluated the events described in paragraphs 5.b.
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and 5.c. for " common causes" and noted that both events occurred
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within a three-day time period and they both involved, 1) similar
plant outage conditions, 2) experienced licensed operators, 3)
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examples of failure of personnel to follow approved plant
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procedures and 4) a lack of proper "self-verification", " STAR"
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program techniques.
Based on this assessment, UNR 50-364/93-02-01, IFI 50-364/93-02-02
and'LER 93-01 (Unit 2) are closed.
These items are identified as
violation 50-364/93-04-01, Procedure violations due to personnel
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error.
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d)
Main Turbine Valves Operability Test, FNP-1-STP-62.0 - Unit 1
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On February 19, the inspectors observed testing activities which
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required stroking Unit 1 main turbine generator governor valves.
When the number four governor valve was being stroked a " louder
than normal" noise appeared to be coming from the valve. After
the STP was completed FNP maintenance personnel and
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representatives from Westinghouse placed special vibration
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monitoring equipment at selected locations on the valve and at
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other locations on the main turbine. The number four governor
valve was stroked again, the vibration monitoring data recorded,
and Westinghouse personnel collected the data for analysis to
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determine what action, if any, should be taken, (paragraph 3c).
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No other violations and no deviations were identified in this area. The
results of inspections in this area indicate that personnel conducted
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assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedures.
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6.
Evaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability (40500)
Inspectors attended a meeting of the Plant Operations' Review Committee
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(PORC), on March 8.
The meeting was chaired by the General Manager -
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Nuclear Plant and a quorum was present as required by Technical
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Specification 6.5.1.
The purpose of the meeting was to review draft LER 93-02, Missed
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Technical Specification Surveillance of The Turbine-Driven Auxiliary
Feedwater Pump for accuracy and completeness. Revisions, typos, and
further clarifications were agreed upon for several areas in the report
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by the members.
Prior to its release the involved designers (Bechtel,
Westinghouse, NEL) were scheduled to be consulted for their comments on
this matter.
Members were prepared for the discussions, had knowledge of the issues,
and discussion among the PORC members was uninhibited and encouraged by
the chairman of the committee.
The licensee's self-assessment program,
specifically PORC activities, are adequate and no violations or
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deviations were identified.
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7.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
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(Closed) UNR 50-364/93-02-01, Inappropriate operator action results in
an injection of primary water to the RCS.
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(Closed) IFI 50-364/93-02-02, Safety Injection when exiting surveillance
testing.
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(Closed) Unit 2 LER-93-01, Inadvertent safety injection due to personnel
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error.
Each of the above items are closed for tracking purposes, and are
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identified as violation, 50-364/93-04-01, Procedure violations due to
personnel error.
See Paragraphs 5.b. and 5.c. of this report (50-
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348,364/93-04) for details.
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8.
Exit Interview
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Inspection scope and findings were summarized during management
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interviews throughout the report period and on March 23, 1993, with the
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plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings
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were discussed in detail.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection
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findings and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by
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the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee was informed that
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the items discussed in paragraph 7 were closed.
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ITEM NUMBER
DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE
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50-364/93-04-01 (NOV)
Procedure violations due to personnel
error
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50-364/93-04-02 (UNR)
Inappropriate operator action results in
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manipulation of the wrong unit auxiliary
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feedwater valve control switch.
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Acronyms and Abbreviations
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"As low As Reasonably Achievable"
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Abnormal Operating Procedure
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Administrative Procedure
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Chemical and Volume Control System
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Component Cooling Water
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Containment Spray System
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Diesel Driven Fire Pump
D/G
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Division of Reactor Projects
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Emergency Contingency Procedure
EIP
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Emergency Plant Implementing Procedure
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Engineered Safety Features
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F
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Fahrenheit
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Flow Control Valve
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
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Farley Nuclear Plant
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GPM
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Gallons Per Minute
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High Head Safety Injection
HSB
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Hot Standby
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Instrumentation and Controls
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IN
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Information Notice
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Inservice Inspection
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Inservice Test
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Limiting Condition for Operation
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LHSI
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Low Head Safety Injection
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LER
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Licensee Event Report
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MDAFWFCV
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Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Control Valve
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Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
MDFP
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Motor Driven Fire Pump
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Motor-Operated Valve
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MOVATS
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Motor-Operated Valve Actuation Testing
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MWR
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Maintenance Work Request
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NI
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Nuclear Instrumentation
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NRC
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Nuclear Steam Supply System
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OATC
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Operator at the Controls
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Occupational Safety and Health Administration
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Plant Drawings
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Plant Change Notice
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Plant Change Request
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Plant Modifications Department
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Power Operated Relief Valve
PPB
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Parts Per Billion
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Parts Per Million
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PR
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Power Range
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Pressurizer Relief Tank
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PSID
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Pressure per Square Inch Differential
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PZR
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Pressurizer
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Reactor Coolant Pump
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Resistance Temperature Detector
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Refueling Water Storage Tank
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S/G
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Safety Injection
SAER
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Safety Audit and Engineering Review
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SCS
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Southern Company Services
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SFI
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Shift Foreman - Inspecting
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SFO
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Shift Foreman - Operating
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Steam Generator Feedwater Pump
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Systems Operator
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Spent Fuel Pool
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company
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S0P
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Standard Operation Procedure
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Systems Performance Group
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Safety Parameter Display System
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Shift Supervisor
SSPS
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Sclid State Protection System
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"Stop, Think, Act, Review"
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Surveillance Test Procedure
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Service Water System
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TDAFWP
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Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
TS
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Technical Specification
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Unit Operating Procedure
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Volume Control Tank
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WA
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Work Authorization
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