ML20035B949
| ML20035B949 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1993 |
| From: | Westberg R, Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035B928 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-93-03, 50-461-93-3, NUDOCS 9304060029 | |
| Download: ML20035B949 (29) | |
See also: IR 05000461/1993003
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-461/93003(DRS)
Docket No. 50-461
License No. NPF-62
Licensee:
Illinois Power Company
Clinton Power Station
Mail Code V-275
P. O. Box 678
Clinton, IL 61727
Facility Name:
Clinton Power Station
Inspection At:
Clinton, IL
Inspection Conducted: January 18 through February 19, 1993
Inspection Team:
R. Westberg, Team Leader
D. Butler, Reactor Inspector
J. Neisler, Reactor Inspector
J. Schapker, Reactor Inspector
R. Doornbos, Licensing Examiner
NRC Consultants:
0. Mazzoni, Systems Research International (SRI)
K. McCullagh, Atomic Energy of Canada, LTD. (AECL)
J. Haller, AECL
Approved By: (
k \\U
3/ 30I7 3
Ro # A':-sestberg, Team Lea'Ser
Date
Approved By:
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_ J[s/[O
/ Geoffrdf C/ Wright, Qhief -
Date
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/ Engineering Branch
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Inspection Summary
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Inspection on January 18 throuah February 19. 1993 (Report No. 461/93003(DRS).
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Special announced electrical d'atribution system functional inspection in
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accordance with Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/107 (25107).
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Results:
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The team determined the electrical distribution system was functional and
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engineering and technical support was adequate. . The team identified one
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violation relative to inadequate design control (Section 3.6); three
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unresolved items, pending NRC review of CR No. 1-92-04-031 (Sections 2.l.3)
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and loss of voltage protection and degraded voltage licensing basis (Sections
2.1.4 and 2.1.5), and relative to EDG starting air check valve testing
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(Section 2.3.1).
Strengths and weaknesses in system design and engineering
support are provided in the Executive Summary.
9304060029 930331
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ADOCK 05000461
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.............................................
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1.0
INTRODUCTION...................
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2.0 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS........................................
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2.1 AC SYSTEMS..........................................
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2.2 DC AND 480V SYSTEMS.................................
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2.3 MECHANICAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS..........................
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3.0 ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SUPP0RT........................
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4.0 UNRESOLVED ITEMS.........................................
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5.0 OPEN ITEMS ............................................... -13
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6.0 EXIT MEETING.............................................
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Appendix A - Personnel Contacted
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Appendix B
. Requests for Information
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Executive Summary
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During the period of January 18 through February 19, 1993, a Region III
inspection team conducted an electrical distribution system functional
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inspection (EDSFI) at the Clintor. Power Station. The inspection reviewed the
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plant's electrical distribution system (EDS) design and operation, and the
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Engineering and Technical Support (E&TS) organization' adequacy. The team
reviewed EDS electrical and mechanical support systems, examined installed EDS
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equipment, reviewed EDS testing and procedures, and interviewed selected
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corporate and site personnel.
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The team' concluded that Clinton's electrical distribution system was designed,
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operated and maintained in an effective manner and that engineering and
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technical support was good. The team identified the following strengths:
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There was a good working relationship between system engineers,
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design engineers, maintenance, and operations.
System Engineers were knowledgeable and competent.
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There was good followup on Industry initiatives.
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Engineering's effort to take ownership of calculations and to
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improve the calculations.
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Plant material condition was good.
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The team identified the following weaknesses:
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Early vintage calculations did not meet the ANSI Standard for
design.
Coordination curves were extrapolated into areas undefined by
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vendor supplied data.
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There was no comprehensive, documented program / procedures for fase
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control.
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No calculations existed for tornado induced depressurization
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effects on the EDG Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
(HVAC) ducting.
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DETAILS
1.9
Introduction
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- During electrical inspections at various operating plants in the country, the
NRC staff identified several EDS deficiencies. The Office of Nuclear Reactor.
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Regulation (NRR) Special Inspection Branch initiated special EDS inspections
at other operating plants after they determined that such deficiencies could
compromise design margins. These deficiencies included unmonitored and
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uncontrolled load growth on safety buses and inadequate modifications, design
calculations, testing, and qualification of commercial grade equipment used in
safety related applications. The NRC considered inadequate.E&TS to be one
cause of these deficiencies.
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The EDS inspection objectives were to assess Clintons's EDS performance
capability and the licensee's E&TS capability and performance in this area.
For this inspection, the EDS included power sources to systems required to
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remain functional during and following design basis events.
EDS components
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reviewed included EDGs, 125Vdc batteries, offsite circuits and switchyard,
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4160Vac switchgear, 480Vac load centers (LCs), 480Vac Motor Control Centers
(MCCs), 125Vdc MCCs, battery chargers, inverters, associated buses, breakers,
relays, and other miscellaneous components.
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The team reviewed for adequacy the emergency, offsite and onsite power sources
for EDS equipment, the power regulation to essential loads, protection for
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postulated fault currents, and coordination of protective devices interrupting
capability. The team also reviewed the mechanical systems that interface with
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the EDS, including air start, lube oil, and cooling systems plus the cooling
and heating systems for EDS equipment. The team walked down originally
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installed and as-modified EDS equipment for configuration and equipment
ratings and reviewed system component qualification, testing, and calibration
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records.
The team assessed the licensee's E&TS organization capability with
respect to personnel qualification and staffing, timely and adequate root
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cause analyses for failures and recurring problems, and involvement in design
and operations. The team also reviewed training for Operations and E&TS
personnel relative to the EDS.
The team verified conformance with General Design Criteria (GDC) 17 and 18 and
the applicable 10 CFR 50, Appendix B criteria. The team also reviewed plant
Technical Specifications (TSs), the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), and
appropriate Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) to verify that TS requirements
and licensee commitments were met.
The areas reviewed and the concerns identified are described in Sections 2.1,
2.2, 2.3, and 3.0 of this report. Conclusions are provided at the end of each
of these sections.
Personnel contacted and those who attended the exit
meeting on February 19, 1993, are provided in Appendix A.
A complete listing
of the team's requests for information is attached as Appendix B.
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2.0
Electrical Systems
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2.1
AC Systems
In order to assess EDS capability, the team reviewed EDS load regulation,
engineered safety system (ESS) buses electrical interfaces, .the equipment
short circuit ratings, overcurrent protection' schemes, enviror. mental equipment -
qualification, and protective devices coordination for compliance with
regulations, design engineering standards and accepted engineering practices.
The review was based on the following licensee provided information:
system descriptions
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station USAR
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related TS sections
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system design basis documents
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voltage drop and short circuit calculations
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equipment sizing calculations
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protection coordination studies
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equipment specifications
licensee event reports (LERs)
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test and operating procedures
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electrical one line diagrams
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control logic diagrams
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elementary schematic diagrams
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The team conducted EDS equipment walkdowns and verified that the operational,.
environmental and seismic criteria had been correctly applied.
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characteristics of the power system electrical grid to which the Clinton plant'
is connected were reviewed to assess the adequacy of important parameters such.
as voltage regulation, short circuit contribution, protection. schemes, surge
protection, control circuits, stability and reliability. The preferred power
source supply transformers were reviewed in terms of their capability, their
connections to the ESS buses, field installation arrangements, protection and
voltage regulation. The EDGs were reviewed to assess power rating adequacy,
ability to start and accelerate the assigned safety loads in the requird time
sequence, voltage and frequency regulation under transient and steady. state
conditions, compliance with single failure criteria and applicable separation
requirements. The 4kV ESS buses and their connected loads were reviewed to
assess load current and short circuit current capabilities, voltage
regulation, cable connection protection and adequacy between loads and buses,
and compliance with single failure criteria and applicable separation-
requirements.
2.1.1
protective Relays Setooints
The team was concerned that there was a possibility for spurious tripping of
the HPCS bus ICI medium voltage main feeder breaker. Utilizing.a computerized
approach, the team found that'an inadequate time margin was provided.between
the tripping of the 4.16kV protective relay and the mr.ximum inrush current
duration. The relay's coordination curve had a hand-drawn .axtrapolation
beyond the manufacturer's published values into an undefined area for the
breaker. The licensee subsequently determined that the breaker would not
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trip; however, the team considered protective relay coordination curves
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extrapolation to be a weakness.
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2.1.2
Transfer of 4kV E;: Buses between Offsite Sources
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The team determined that momentary paralleling of Reserve Auxiliary
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Transformer (RAT) and the Emergency Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (ERAT) could
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result in undesired trips if the operator were to hold the control switch for
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longer than 5 seconds. The licensee indicated that if the transfer was
accomplished in 5 seconds, there would be no adverse effects. However,-
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extreme network voltage conditions were not considered (see Sections 2.1.3 b- -
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and c) and loading conditions were not in agreement with latest calculations,
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such that the estimated 5 seconds could actually be less. Further, tripping-
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time was evaluated for an undefined area of the relay characteristic.
Between
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1.0 and 1.5 per unit (PU) pickup, tripping could occur before 5 seconds.
- Relay curve evaluation ir. an undefined area, was' considered a.further example
of the weakness identified in Section 2.1.1.
The team found no objective
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evidence in the procedures or controls that would alert the operators to the
possible consequences of holding the control switch handle for longer than 5-
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seconds.
In response to the team's concerns, the licensee committed to modify
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Procedures No. 3501.01 and No. 3080.09 to alert operators of the potential for
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undesired tripping.
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2.1.3
Voltaae Studies
The team discovered the following inadequacies in the Clinton voltage study,
Calculation No.19 AK-6.
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a.
Inadeouate Voltaae Acceptance Criteria - Reference
1, Section 6.1,
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indicaten that the voltage acceptance criteria of Section 2 " generally"
assure adequate equipment terminal voltage. The assurance provided by
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the criteria should not be " generally", it should apply to all cases,
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for all equipment.
b.
Incorrect Minimum Grid Voltaaes - Reference 1, Section 6.1, stated that
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the minimum grid voltage was 348.45kV.
ais.value was not consistent
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the minimum grid voltage of 3-10kV with an error of .+-l% (minimum of
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336.6kV) provided to the team. This discrepancy introduced an eirer of
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more than 3.5%, which could invalidate the calculation's conclusion.
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c.
Incorrect Maximum Grid Voltaaes - Reference 1, Section 6.2, takes
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358.8kV as the maximum grid voltage, which is lower (non conservative)
than the maximum measured historical value. As a result, the margins
described in the calculation may not exist (1% on bus lA1).
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edition, because calcul.tions may contain high intrinsic errors,1% may
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not be adequate.
The licensee responded that Corrective Action Report (CR) 1-92-04-031 had been
issued previously and that it i. .uld address this concern. Pending CR
completion and int review, this is considered an Unresolved Item.
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(50-461/93003-01A(DRS)).
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2.1.4
Loss of Voltaae Protection
The team was concerned that there was no objective evidence demonstrating-
proper contact e and operating equipment operation given the loss of voltage-
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time delay. The team's review of the Clinton degraded grid voltage
calculation, No. 19-AN-19,. indicated a minimum Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP)
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relay time delay of 2.1 seconds for an offsite voltage of zero volts.
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addition, from the LOOP setpoint to zero volts, depending on the voltage decay
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time, the delay could be as long as 10 seconds. A 15 seconds delay couldi
occur for a slowly decaying voltage transient between the degraded voltage
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setpoint and the LOOP setpoint.
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The team was concerned that as voltage dropped, energized contactors would
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begin to " chatter" (contact bounce). Chatter has the potential to cause the
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contacts to weld together.
In addition, the contactor chatter could cause
excessive operating equipment jogging and could cause pulsating contactor in .
rash current with tte potential to blow control power fuses.
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In response to the team's concern, the licensee produced documentation that
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the NRC had reviewed and approved their LOOP and degraded voltage scheme.
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However, the team could not determine from the supplied documentation that the
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NoC had considered the above scenario.
Pending further review by the NRC,
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this is considered an Unresolved item (50-461/93003-02A(CRS)).
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2.1.5
Dearaded Voltaae Relav Licensina Basis
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The team was concerned whether sufficient operating voltage would be available.
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following the block loading of ESF loads along with reset of the degraded
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voltage (second level) relay and a continuing degraded voltage condition that
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decreased to just above the minimum degraded voltage setpoint.
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The licensee's interpretation of Safety Evaluation Report (SER), September
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1986, Supplement 7, Section 8.4.4, appeared to be consistent with the SER.
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The SER stated, in part, that for voltage just above the second level
undervoltage setpoint, the safety loads would. transfer to the EDG because of
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the relays reset band or, if the voltage was higher than the reset, the safety
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loads would satisfactorily start on the offsite system. However, there is a
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question whether the SER review considered voltages hovering between the reset
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value and the under voltage trip point with relay trip.
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The team's position was that at the minimum degraded voltage setpoint, there
should be adequate voltage for the starting and continued operation of all
safety related equipment. The licensee took the position that the reset value
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of the degraded voltage relays was the licensing basis at Clinton and not a
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voltage that hovers just above the . minimum degraded voltage setpoint.
Pending
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further review by the NRC, this is considered an Unresolved Item
(50-461/93003-02B(DRS)).
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During the licensee's preparation for the EDSFI, they identified that just
above the degraded voltage setpoint or 3762V, there may be insufficient
voltage to permit manual starting of four circuits on AB MCC No. ICI and one
circuit each on SSW MCC No. lA and SSW MCC No. 10.
These control circuits
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were the EDG room IC vent system fan and dampers, shutdown service water pump
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-10 and shutdown service water Room-1A supply fan. The licensee issued CR
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1-92-04-031 to address this concern.
In the short-term, the licensee,had
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established an administrative process computer point to detect a potential
degraded voltage condition at the 4kV ESF buses._ The computer point, set at
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3940V, would sound an audible alarm and illuminate an' alarm window.
If the
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4kV bus voltage falls below 3890V, the operator will transfer the bus to the
EDG.
Long term corrective actions were under consideration and may require
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hardware changes and a change to the TS degraded voltage setpoint.
Pending CR
completion and subsequent NRC review, this is considered an Unresolved Item. -
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(50-461/93003 01B(DRS)).
2.1.6
Documeniation of Desian Basis Calculations
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The team found that older vintage calculations. did not have proper referencing
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and/or. methodology description, and had not considered all worse case
conditions, such that an independest reviewer could not complete the review
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without recourse to the originator.
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Examples were as follows:
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a.
In Calculation No.19-AN-6, the total cable impedance (Z) calculation
failed to identify three required steps: (1) the PU impedance, to be
extracted from a table not included in the calculation,-(2) the cable-
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length, to be extracted from tables not included in the calculation, and
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(3) the multiplication of (1) and (2). The full load current (FLI)
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calculation failed to identify two required steps:-(1) the FLI at rated
voltage, to be extracted from a table not included in the calculation,
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and (2) the multiplication of (1) by 460/414.
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b.
In calculation No.19-AN-4, the 225kVA ESF transformer IC protection -
calculation, an analysis of the trade offs bet,.een protection and
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spurious tripping was not provided.
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c.
The calculation for the relay settings on 4.16kV switchgear, No.19-AN-
7, did not include all possible considerations that were relevant to the
relay settings.
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d.
Calculation No.19-AN-14 for EDG relay settings, did not include'an
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evaluation of the effect of third harmonic currents.
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e.
Calculation No.19-AN-ll used a synchronous check relay setting of 20 ,
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but provided no basis for the selection of this phase angle. The
licensee indicated that the synchronous check relay.is required as_a
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permissive for manual transfers.
But since the maximum-line to line:
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standing phase angle is 9 , the basis for the 20* setting remained
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unsupported.
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f.
Calculation No.19-AI-14- considered the maximum bus PU voltage at the
instant of a bus transfer. This was questionable, since the minimum bus -
voltage would have provided worse case results.
Further, calculation
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19-AI-14 did not provide a definition of the variables used in the short-
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circuit time constant calculation.
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Calculation No.19-Al-76, did not consider lower system capacitance than-
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that for full load. While the impact on this calculation was not
important, lower system capacitance would result in worse case results
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for the calculated stresses.
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From the calculation reviews, the team concluded that there was no immediate
concern with safety; but considered the lack of documentation to be a weakness
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relative to independent review.
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2.1.7
Electrical Separation
The team reviewed the electrical separation between redundant divisions and
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between Class IE and Class Non IE equipment. The team found that separation
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at Clinton Power Station was good with IE systems fed from the offsite sceca
at all times. This allows for an uninterrupted supply of power to the saverj
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systems in case plant generation is lost and it separates the IE systems froc
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the non IE systems when the plant is operating at power, since under this
operating mode the non IE systems are fed from the Unit Auxiliary Transformer.
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2.1.8
Conclusions
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The team's AC electrical systems review considered the EDS design good.
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However, the team considered coordination and protection curve extrapolation ,
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and documentation deficiencies in early vintage calculations to be weaknesses.
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2.2
DC and 480Vac Systems
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The team reviewed the station Class IE DC systems, inverters and cable
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penetrations for design compliance to applicable standards and codes. The
inspection included review of the 125Vdc battery design with respect to
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sizing, duty cycle loading, cell temperature, battery aging and capacity.
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associated battery charger design was reviewed for total loading capabilities
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and the applicable calculations were reviewed. The inverter sizing and design
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calculations were reviewed to verify their adequacy. Short circuit
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calculations and voltage drop calculations for the 125Vdc systems and 120Vac
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systems from the inverters were reviewed for c;rrectness and accepted
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engineering practices.
Penetrations electrical parameters were reviewed-for
adequacy.
Cables in the 125Vdc and 120Vac systems were checked and the cable
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sizing criteria were reviewed for acceptance in-accordance with standard
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engineering practices.
The circuit breakers and fuses were checked for sizing
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and coordination.
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The 480Vac ESS buses and MCCs along with their connected loads were reviewed
to assess load current and short circuit current capabilities, voltage
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regulation, protection and cable connections adequacy between loads and
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sources, and compliance with single failure criteria and applicable separation
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requirements.
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2.2.1
Division Il 125V DC Battery Reolacement
The team was concerned that the Division 11 battery capacity had only a 1.3%
margin.
Further, a design margin factor of 1.0 was used in calculating the
battery size, whereas IEEE Standard 485-1983, " Recommended Practice for Sizing
large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations" suggests
a 1.10 to 1.15 design margin factor be considered.
In response to the team's concern, the licensee advised that the Division 11
battery was scheduled for replacement in the spring of 1995 using a like-for-
like replacement. This implied the continued use of a 1.0 design margin
factor. The team was aware that the licensee had. committed to analyze the
impact of any future load additions to existing battery systems in lieu of
applying a specific design margin factor and the com.aitments acceptance by the
NRC in a letter, dated 2/5/93. However, it was the team's opinion that when
replacing a Class IE system battery it would be prudent desig, practice to
consider IEEE Standard 485 recommendations.
2.2.2
Battery Room Temperature Measurements
The team noted that Operations was monitoring the ambient temperature in the
four safety related battery rooms during C-Area rounds.
Battery room
temperature monitoring was not required by TSs and was being performed to
alert Operation's of potential low battery temperatures. The team did note
that temperature indicator Nos. ITIT-VX056, 57, 58.and 59 were not in a-
calibration program.
The licensee committed to verify the accuracy of the four temperature
indicators on a periodic basis.
The team had no further questions on this
item.
2.2.3
Conclusions
The team determined that, in general, the design of the Class IE safety
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related 480V and 125Vdc systems were acceptable; however, additional _ attention
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should be given to IEEE 485 recommendations for future battery replacements.
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2.3
Mechanical Systems
The team reviewed the EDGs and their mechanical support systems to determine
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their adequacy following design basis accidents.
Included in the review were
EDG fuel oil, air start, lube oil, air intake and exhaust, room ventilation,
and control panel ventilation.
In determining each system functional
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adequacy, the team examined sample documentation and conducted system
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walkdowns. The team's concerns are identified in the following sections.
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2.3.1
Diesel Generator Startino Air Receiver Check Valve Testina
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The team noted that the safety related check valves, internal to the air start.
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accumulators, were not being adequately tested.
Because of the design of the
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air receiver system and the safety related check valves, the licensee had
submitted a Relief Request (to NRC) to perform testing of these valves via a
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system leak test during the monthly EDG operability surveillance. The NRC
approved the relief request; however, the system line-up during the
performance of the surveillance procedure did not isolate the safety related -
check valves from the nonsafety system. Therefore, the check valves, for
which the relief request was granted were not routinely tested because system -
pressure was not relieved in the_ functional direction of the check valves.
The licensee agreed with the team and committed to revise the surveillance
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procedure.
Pending subject check valve testing and subsequent NRC review,
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this is considered an_ Unresolved Item (50-461/93003-03(DRS)).
2.3.2
Tornado Induced Depressurization
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There were no calculations to show that the EDG HVAC systems were qualified
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for the design basis tornado (DBT). The team was concerned that loss of
cooling air to remove. engine heat from the EDG rooms during operation could
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result in breakdown and loss of emergency power. ~ The DBT is a common mode -
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event and could affect any or all Division I, II or III EDG HVAC systems.
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The licensee carried out extensive calculations during the inspection to
demonstrate that the HVAC systems would function as specified following a DBT,
providing normal damper positions were maintained. The CPS USAR safety design
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basis and the NRC SER for both EDG ventilation systems, 9.4.5, and EDG
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combustion air intake and exhaust systems, 9.5.8,. discussed the design for
seismic requirements in detail but did not mention application of the DBT.
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The DBT loading imposes a maximum negative pressure of 3 psi over a period of-
3 seconds on building exterior surfaces.
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The team's review of the licensee's response indicated that the combustion and
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exhaust air system design was acceptable; however, the HVAC system was not .
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addressed. During a Division I walkdown, the team observed the following
problem areas
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When the EDGs are not running the HVAC system inlet and outlet
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vane type dampers are normally closed. The dampers are
approximately 8 feet square with fail-closed actuators and
appeared to be a commercial design for differential pressures from
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5 to approximately 10 inches of water column (INWC).
The DBT would impose 83 INWC which could distort and jam the
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damper vanes in the closed position'or the damper assembly could
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disintegrate with sections blocking the missile barrier and the
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exterior grill and shut off or severely restrict the fan air flow.
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2)
If the EDGs were running with the inlet and outlet dampers in the
j
open position, the supply or exhaust ducts could depressurize to a
j
greater extent than the EDG rooms causing collapse of the largest
duct sections, shutting off or restricting the fan air flow.
j
The fan air flow rate was sized to remove approximately 6.5% of
l
the total engine heat rate at full load with a 30 degree
-l
airtemperature rise. These are normal design parameters for this
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
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type of diesel engine.
Loss of this cooling air flow could cause
the ambient air temperature in the EDG room to rise to the' engine
exhaust temperature of approximately 790 F.
This could result in
the rapid breakdown of organic compounds including electrical
insulation and. elastomers. Day tank fuel could also approach the
ignition point. The team calculated that this . temperature would
be reached approximately three hours after the DBT event if
cooling air flow was zero and the EDG was operated at full load.
The licensee carried out structural calculations to assess the maximum-
allowable differential pressures which could occur across the inlet and outlet
dampers prior to gross deformation of the carbon steel damper vanes.
Calculation, NO. IP-M-0144, gave a maximum pressure of 3.07 psi with a
limiting buckling stress of 34000 psi for the weakest damper vane.
The team
concluded that the dampers would survive the DBT and still function.
The licensee also carried out' flow calculations to show that Division I EDG
room depressurization would not result in unacceptable room to duct
differential pressures if internal dampers were in their normal operating
positions. The analysis was carried out for a tornado depressurization of 2
psi per second for a period of 1.5 seconds per Regulatory Guide 1.76.
Calculation, No. IP-M-0188, gave a maximum differential in the' exhaust duct as
0.442 psi and in the supply duct as 0.207 psi after 1.5 seconds. Structural
)
Calculation No. IP-M-0130 established the maximum allowable differential air
pressure across the weakest duct panel as 0.849 psi for a limiting stress of
30000 psi. The team concluded that the ducts would also survive the DBT.
The licensee was asked what operational controls were in place to control
internal damper positions. Balance damper Nos. IVD0llY and IVD016) halfway
along the supply distribution ducts were of particular concern. Closed or
partially closed, they would increase the flow resistance (k) and the duct
differential pressure downstream from the fan.
The licensee stated that the damper shaft position was fixed by a circular
anchor plate with indexed holes to which the manual operating lever was
bolted.
The team considered this adequate since changing damper position
would require the use of the plant's work order procedures which, in turn,
would involve maintenance planning and operations.
2.3.3
Conclusions
The team reviewed mechanical calculations and modification packages completed
since 1988. The review indicated that, in general the quality was good.
Input parameters and references were traceable, assumptions were reasonable,
methodologies were in accordance with standard engineering practice, and
results were reasonable compared to the inputs.
For modification packages,
appropriate QA and QC control points were evident.
The lack of documentation
to support that the EDG HVAC system would survive the DBT was considered a
weakness.
9
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3.0
Enaineerino and Technical Support
During the inspection, the team evaluated Clinton's E&TS capability. The team
reviewed.the 1icensee's programs for temporary modifications, permanent
-
modifications, engineering interfaces, drawing control, discrepancy manage-
[
ment,10 CFR 50.59 evaluations, test development and control, manual operator
actions, maintenance and QA/QC.
In addition, the team reviewed the electrical
training programs for engineers and the root cause analysis for LERs..
i
3.1
Enoineerina Staff
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!
The team evaluated the training requirements for system and design engineers.
,
,
The licensee had a qualification card system for the system engineers. .A
_
qualification card system for design engineers will be implemented by December
i
31, 1993. The team considered the competence and' knowledge of the' engineering
l
staff to be a strength.
!
System and design engineers were located onsite. .The team observed that
information flowed freely between the engineering' groups, maintenance, and
7
operations. The interface between these groups contributed to effective
i
modification coordination and plant problem resolution.
In addition,
t
Engineering had taken. control of calculations and continued to review and
.;
improve the calculation quality. The team considered the interface between
engineering and the station, and engineering taking ownership of calculations-
to be strengths.
l
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3.2
Independent Safety Enaineerina Group (ISEG)
i
.
!
The ISEG consisted of qualified and experienced personnel.- ISEG reviews often
l
went further than the plant reviews. Similar events from other utilities were
-
considered during the review process and additional ISEG recommendations were
!
incorporated into proposed corrective actions. The team considered the ISEG's
!
initiatives to be proactive in the identification of deficient plant
activities.
!
!
3.3
l
?
The team considered the licensee's temporary modification control to' be good.
,
Temporary modifications were well documented, minor in scope, and were
!
assigned definite time limits.
Each temporary modification was screened to
i
reduce the potential of creating. an unreviewed safety question. Three of the
thirty-three installed temporary modifications were reviewed by the team and
!
were found to be acceptable,
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3.4
Ouality Assurance Proarams
"
The team concluded that the quality assurance audit -and surveillance program
!
was well managed with an appropriate mix of programmatic and performance based
j
audits. The reports were thorough, well documented, and the quality
j
organization followed up on proposed corrective actions.
For example,'the
i
licensee's self-initiated EDSFI identified issues similar-to those the team
)
identified. The quality organization audit and surveillance effort was
!
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considered a strength.
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.
3.5
Licensee Initiatives
i
1
The team concluded that the licensee's efforts to address Industry identified
problems, such as NRC Information Notices and General Electric Service
Information Letters (SILs) to be a strength. .The reviews were. thorough-and
adequately addressed the safety significance of any identified concerns.
If-
1
required, timely corrective actions were initiated.
3.6
Modifications
{
!
The team identified that Modification No. DGF024, " Emergency Diesel Generator
l
(EDG) 1A and IB Run/ Idle Switch," would prevent the EDG from performing its
i
automatic safety function, with the switch in " idle," and reset of_the EDG
!
automatic start signal.
The key operated run/ idle switch modification .
incorporated into'the design the capability to fast-start the EDG when_the
'
--
switch was in the idle (400 rpm) position. The circuit was designed to
i
override the EDG test mode for a LOCA, degraded voltage or a LOOP automatic-
(
start signal and realign the EDG into its automatic mode.
!
However, the design did not include a seal-in of the idle bypass circuitry.
l
As a result, on automatic start signal reset the EDG would revert to the
nonsafety idle speed operation and trip the EDG and its output breaker.
,
Operator action would be required to restore the EDG to its emergency
I
'
alignment. The licensee's failure to verify the run/ idle switch design
adequacy of the is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria III, Design'
i
Control (50-461/93003-04(DRS)).
_
i
The 1scensee protection tagged (red tag) the two switches to keep them in the
l
"Run" position until further reviews were completed.
In addition, CR No. I-
1
93-02-015 was initiated to evaluate this deficiency.
!
During the performance of Surveillance Test No. 9080.01, " Diesel Generator IA
(IB) Operability - Manual," only one EDG at a time is placed in this
j
configuration. The switch is in the idle position for approximately 10
l
minutes during initial EDG startup and approximately 10 minutes prior to
i
shutdown.
EDG 1A was tested in this mode eight times between November 2,
!
1992, and February 1, 1993, and EDG 1B was in this mode four times between
November 17, 1992, and February 14, 1993.
During testing,_an operator was in
i
the EDG room during diesel operation and in direct communication with the main
j
control room.
Procedure 9080.01 also had steps which instructed the operator
i
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to restore the EDG to the condition necessary to support current plant
l
conditions.
In addition, Division III diesel, which was_ not affected by the
J
"
' modification, was available along with the diesel that was not in test. The-
,
availability of two electrical divisions meets the requirements of the current-
j
licensing basis.
j
J
Based on a review of the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 analysis, the team concluded
.j
the run/ idle switch modification had minimal impact on safety and did not
.I
increase the probability of the EDG to malfunction beyond what was previously
analyzed.
I
11
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,_.
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.
o
The team reviewed 12 additional modifications and concluded the licensee
adequately implemented those modifications.
3.7
Fuse Control Procram
l
,
l
The team noted that CPS did not have a formal fuse control program. Any fuse
l
could be replaced once without delineating requirements for evaluating the
i
cause of a blown fuse. Verification that installed and replacement fuses met
design requirements was weak, since engineering only reviewed the fuse
.
replacement log twice each year and only repeat failures of replaced fuses
-;
documented on MWRs receive an engineering review.
Plant Manager's Standing-
i
Order (PMS0) 52, " Fuse Replacement Program," was the only controlling document
specifically for fuse control and was limited to like-for-like replacement.
It did not cover fuse dedication, inspection criteria, selection of fuse types
or characteristics or quality requirements. The team did not identify any
<
fuse misapplications in the limited number of panels examined, however,
i
considering the importance of fuses to the EDS and plant reliability and
I
safety, the team concluded that the lack of a comprehensive, documented fuse
i
control program was a weakness.
i
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3.8
Conclusion <-
-!
The team considered the engineering staff competence and knowledge to be a
!
strength. The team considered the interface between engineering and the
,
station, and engineering taking ownership of calculations to be strengths.
The quality organization audit and surveillance effort was considered a
j
strength. The team considered the ISEG's initiatives to be proactive in the
identification of deficient plant activities. The team concluded that the
i
licensee's efforts to address industry identified problems, such as NRC
j
Information Notices and General Electric Service Information Letters ;SILs),
i
and the licensee's self-initiated EDSFI to be a strength.
The lack t/ a
[
comprehensive, documented fuse control program was considered a weakness.
4.0
Unresolved Items
i
!
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order
j
to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations.
l
Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Sections
!
2.1.3, 2.1.4, 2.1.5, and 2.3.1.
!
5.0
Exit Interview
i
The team conducted an exit meeting on February 19, 1993, at the Clinton Power
l
Station to discuss the major areas reviewed during the inspection, the
i
strengths and weaknesses observed and the inspection 'results.
Licensee
l
representatives and NRC personnel in attendance.at this exit meeting are.
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documented in Appendix A of this report. The team also discussed the
j
inspection report likely informational content with regard to documents
i
reviewed by the team during the inspection._ The licensee identified the
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proprietary documents and the team agreed to handle this information
,
accordingly.
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APPENDIX A
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CPS EDSFI Exit Meetino February 19. 1993
,
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Illinois Power Company
l
J. A. Miller, Manager - NSED
F. A. Spangenberg, Manager - Licensing & Safety
,
P. D. Yocum, Director - Plant Operations
R. E. Wyatt, Manager - QA
. , .
D. R. Morris, Director - 0A
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J. Palchak, Manager - NP&S
R. Houston, Project Engineer - Engineering Assurance
!
M. A. Reaudean, L&S Licensing- Specialist
J. V. Sipek, Supervisor - Regional Regulatory Interface
T. W. Parrent, Project Engineer - Engineering Assurance
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K. A. Baker, Supervisor - Engineering Assurance
R. F. Phares, Director - Licensing
T. Weldzius, Technical Advisor
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J. M. Lewis, Supv. Spec. - Nuclear Program Anal .
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K. S. Moore, Director - Plant Technical
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J. W. Pruitt, Nuclear Program Assessor - QA
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B. Glenn, Program Specialist
R. S. Frantz, Sr. Licensing Engineer
S. S. Guron, Project Engineer - Tech Assistant
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M. W. Lyon, Director - Emergency Response
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R. T. Kerestes, Director - Nuclear Safety & Analysis
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D. G. Lukach, Engineer - Systems B0P/ Electrical
T. K. Ramanuja, Supervisor - Engineering (50)
D. T. Lindeman, Project Engineer - EQ
,
T. Wiggins, Supervising Engineer
J. M. Emment, Supervisor - ED&A
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M. G. McHenamin, Supervising Enginear
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J. L. Richardson, Project Engineer - ED&A
!
M. Goel, Project Engineer
J. A. Nolting, Project Specialist
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T. Mohammed, Project Engineer
D. Teckstein, Project Engineer
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T. M. Phillips, Staff Engineer
A. B. Haumann,-Project Engineer
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B. J. Puckett, Project Specialist - ISI
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K. M. Forrest, Staff Engineer
!
J. D. Peregoy, Senior QA Procurement
!
J. E. Loyd, Project Specialist
'
M. S. Dodds, Supervisor - Rad OPS
J. R. Langley, Director - Design & Analysis
K. R. Graf, Director
Engineering Projects
!
R. D. Weber, Supervisor - Quality Engineering QA
D. W. Waddell, Director - Program & Administration
D. E. Korneman,. Director - Systems & Reliability
_;
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A. M. Norris, NSED Work Coordinator
E. D. Halverson, Supervising Engineer
P. W. Kirchhofer, Staff Engineer - Mechanical Design
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G. D. Matthews, . Reliability Engineer
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~R. Fields, Supervising Engineer B0P/HVAC
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J. D. Hawk, Senior Engineer
D. V. Thomas, Staff Electrical Engineer-
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'G. K.'Bhayana, Project Manager.
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T. A. Butera, Project Specialist
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P Thompson, NSED
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H. J. Ehalt, NSED
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J. M. Scott, Supervising Engineer
J. C. Golding, Staff Engineer
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E. R. Turner, Nuclear Program Controller
'
J. Blanke,-Supervisor - Programs & Support
W. Bousquet, Director - Plant Support Service
W. Clark, Director - Plant Maintenanca
,
D. Antonelli, Director'- OPS Training
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T. R. Zycinski,IP1, S&L
_
P. J. Schaffer, Senior Electrical Project Engineer, S&L
A. L. Porento, Electrical Project Engineer, S&L
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C. R. Smail, Senior Generating Station Clerk-
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K. H. Reinert, Supervisor - OCA Facility Maintenace
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J. R. Taylor, Director - Administration
1
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U. S Nuclear Reaulatory Commission
R. Gardner, Chief, Plant Systems.Section
G. Wright, Chief, Engineering Branch
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D. Pickett, Licensing Project Manager
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R. Hague, Chief Reactor _ Projects Section IC
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e
APPENDIX B
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1.
PROVIDE PRDCEDURES DE1' .ING INTERFACES BETWEEN ENGINEERING AND DiHER DEPARTMENTS,
f
ARCHITECT / ENGINEERS, P.>CUREMENT, ETC?
2.
PLEASE PROVIDE LIST OF OUTSTANDING TEMPORARY MODIFICATIDNS / ALTERRATIONS.
,
'
3.
PROVIDE A COPY OF CLINTON HODIFICATIDW PROCEDURES.
.4.
PROVIDE A LIST OF MODITICAT!DNS (OPEN AND CLOSED)1NVOLVING ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND COMPOWENTS $!NCE
,
JANUARY 1988.
>
5.
PROVIDE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR DESICW AkD SYSTEMS ENGINEERS.
l
6.
PROVIDE A COPY OF PRDCEDURES FDR CONTROLLING ACTIVITIES OF CONTRACTORS.
l
7.
PROVIDE A COPY OF THE EDG LOAD STUDY / TRANSIENT ANALYSIS.
B.
PROVIDE PROGRAMS / PROCEDURES FOR CONFIGURATION CONTROL 7
9.
PROVIDE ELECTRICAL DEVIATION REPORTS FDR THE PAST THREE YEARS.
,
10. PROVIDE A LIST OF OPEN ELECTRICAL WORK REQUESTS.
.j
11. PROVIDE A LIST OF ELECTRICAL LERS ISSUED SINCE JANUARY 1987.
12. PROVIDE A LTST OF DERS GENERATED SINCE JANUARY 1988.
?
13. PROVIDE A LIST OF AUDITS AND SURVEILLANCES INVOLVING ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS / COMPONENTS PERFORMED BY DA
' f
SINCE JANUARY 1968.
,
14 PROVIDE OR MAKE AVAILABLE ISEG REPORTS ISSUED $1NCE JANUARY 1990.
i
15. DO ENGINEERS RECEIVE PLANT SYSTEMS INTERFACE TRAINING 7
.
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16. PROVIDE EXISTING PROCEDURES FOR TRACKING IMPLEMENTATION OF INDUSTRY INITIATIVES (INCLUDE A LIST OF
SILS, TILS, ETC.).
'
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17. WHAT !$ THE BACKLOG OF WORK ITEMS IN THE TECHNICAL ENGINEERING CROUP SY CATEGORY, MANHOURS, AND
,
MANYEARS? WHAT IS THE TREND FDR THE PAST SIX MONTHS?
l
18. PROVIDE THE PROCEDURES FOR THE AC LOAD GROWTH PROGRAM.
.
,
19 HOW MANY MAINTENEWCE WORK REQUESTS ARE ON HOLD AWAITING RECEIPT OF PARTS OR MATERIALS 7 WHAT IS AVERAGE-
AGE OF WRS AWAITING PARTS 7
20. ARE ALL THE SAFETY RELATED SWITCHGEAR ROOM COOLERS FED FROM A CLASS 1E POWER SUPPLY? PROVIDE
APPLICABLE DRAWINGS.
j
21. PROVIDE PROCEDURES FDR NRC INFO NOTICE RESPONSE AND TRACKING.
,
22. PROVIDE A LISTING OF ELECTRICAL AND ILC INFO NOTICES SINCE 1988.
!
23. PROVIDE PROCEDURES FOR OPERATOR ACT!DNS TAKEN IF ESF S!GNAL ACTUATION OCCURS DURING ESDG TESTING
(MONTHLY SURVEILLANCE TEST).
l
24. FROVIDE DRAWING LIST /INDEX FOR EDG SYSTEMS INCLUDING THE FOLLDWING AS APPLICABLE: DNE-LINES,
l
SCHEMATICS, RELAY AND METERING KEY DIAGRAMS.
-
25. PROVIDE A LIST CF SAFETY RELATED CALCULATIONS.
-l
26. PROVIDE LIST OF SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENTS IN RECAllBRATIDN PRDGRAM.
t
27. ARE THERE ANY PRDCEDURAL OR PHYSICAL CDNSTRAINTS WHICH WOULD PREVENT ODERATDRS FRDM
,
TRANFERRING TO THE OFFSITE SOURCE WHEN LESS THAN ADEQUATE VOLTAGE IS AVAILABLE7
l
28. PROVIDE SHDRT CIRCUlf CALCULATIONS FDR SIZING OF 4160 AND 480V BREAKERS.
t
29. PROVIDE SHORT CIRCUIT CALCULATION FOR AC SYSTEMS, MEDIUM AND LOW VOLTAGE.
{
3D. PROVIDE SHORT-CIRCUIT CALCULATIONS FDR THE DC DISTRIBUTION SYSTLM.
l
31 PROV10E THE OPERATING IkSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DC GROUND DETECTORS. PROVIDE GROUND DETECTDR WIRikG
1
DI AGRAMS AND CONNECTlDN DI AGRAMS FOR THE BATTRY SYSTEM.
l
32. ARE DC GROUND DETECTORS CHECKED AND AT WHAT ACCURACY?
l
33. WHEN IS A GROUND PRESENT, THAT IS, AT WHAT RESISTANCE VALUE WOULD A GROUND BE 1NVESTIGATED7
'
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34. PROVIDE THE PRDCEDURE FOR LOCAflWG DC GROUNDS.
35. ARE SURGE ARRESTORS PROVIDED DN THE SECDNDARY SIDE OF THE START-UP AND STAkDBY TRANSFORMER $7
{
36. PROVIDE A COPY OF THE FAST BUS TRANSFER STUDT.
37. PROVIDE "STARTUP" TRANSFORMER SIZING CALCULAT10NS
'
3B. PROVIDE ST ATION "NDRMAL" POWER TRANSIDRMER $1 ZING CALCULATION.
]
39. PROVIDE A COPY OF THE $1ZlNG CRITERIA FOR POWER CABLES.
40. WHAT ARE THE CRITERI A FOR CABLE TRAY FILL /CONDUlT LDADING7
,
-
41. WHAT IS THE BASIS DOCUMENT FDR CABLE SEPARATIDN7
I
42. WHAT CABLE CONDUCTOR TEMPERATURE WAS USED To DETERMINE CONDUCTOR RESISTANCE USED IN VOLTAGE DRDP
.J
CALCULATIONS? WHAT l$ THE MAX DESIGN TEMPERATURE ALLOWED IN THE PLANT?
i
43. PROVIDE DC CABLE $1 ZING CRITERI A.
)
e
44. WHAT CONDUCTOR TEMPERATURE WAS USED TO DETERMINE THE CONDUCTOR RESISTANCE USED IN THE SHORT CIRCUIT
j
CALCULATION.
'j
45. PROVIDE AC CABLE SIZING CRITERIA.
i
46. PROVIDE BACC-UP CALCULATIONS FOR $1 ZING AND SELECTING CABLES TO CLASS 1E MOTORS, SWITCHGEARS AND
TRANSFORMERS.
i
47. PROVIDE THE INSULATION CO-DRDINATION STUDY TO BACKUP THE SELECTION OF SURGE ARRESTORS IN THE PLANT.
'
48. PROVIDE A RECORD OF GRID VOLTAGE FLUCTUATIONS FOR THE PAST YEAR.
49. PROVIDE DETAILS OF TRANSFER SCHEME FOR SUPPLY OF DIV I AND DIV ll,1NCLUD1kG LOGIC' STATEMENTS AND
SCHEMATICS.
50. WHAT IS THE PNASE ANGLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN POWER SUFPLIES PRIOR THE BUS TRANFER7
51. PROVIDE THE HISTORICAL RECORDS OF 345KV SWITCHYARD VOLTAGES.
52. SHOULD A LOSS OF 345Kv BUS OCCUR DURING TESTING OF EDGS, HOW IS BUS TRANSFER INITIATED TO TRANSFER
THE LDADS.
,
S
9
53. IS THE FAST TRANSFER SCHEME TESTED PERIODICA MY? PLEASE PROVIDE FROCEDURES AND TEST RESULTS FOR
LAST $ TESTS.
54. IF OFFSITE POWER IS RESTORED FOLLOWING A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER, Do OPERATING PROCEDURES ALLOW /
REQUIRE RETRANSTER 10 THE OFFSITE SOURCE 7 PROVIDE PROCEDURES THAT GOVERN THIS CONDITION.
55. WHAT ARE THE MINIMUM STARTING AND RUNNING VOLTAGES FOR THE ESSENTIAL MOTORS?
56. WHAT ARE THE MINIMUM PICKUP VOLTAGES FOR THE 480V SAFETY RELATED MOTORS?
$ 7.
WHAT ARE THE MINIMUM PICKUP VOLTAGES AT THE SAFETY RELATED MOTOR CONTACTORS?
58. PROVIDE MOTOR START!kG CALCULATIONS WHICH REPRESENT WORST CASE TRANSIENT AC STEADY STATE
VOLTAGES.
59. PROVIDE PROTECTIVE RELAY AND CB COORD!kATION CURVES FOR AC STSTEMS, MEDIUM AND LOW VOLTAGE.
60. PROVIDE CURRENT COMNITMENT REGUARDING BREAKER / FUSE C00RDikAT10N FOR THE DC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
61. PROVIDE THE PROGRAMS / PROCEDURES FOR FUSE CONTROL.
62. PROVIDE EXISTINC PROCEDURES FOR BREAKER SETTING / VERIFICATION.
63. PROVIDE EXISITlWG PROCEDURES FOR SETTlWG MOTOR THERMAL OVERLOAD HEATERS.
64. PROVIDE THE PROCEDURES FOR SETTING THE EMERGENCY BUS LOSS OF VOLTAGE AND DEGRADED VOLT AGE
r
RELAYS.
65. PROVIDE THE PROCEDURES FOR TESTING THE OVERCURRENT DEVICES.
66. PROVIDE CALCULATION l@EX AND DESIGN INSTRUCTIONS INDEX FOR APPENDIX "R".
67. PROVIDE THE PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE OVERCURRENT RELAYS.
68.
PROVIDE SCHEMAilC FOR ALL EDG TRIP CIRCUITS AND RELA) SETPOINTS.
69. PROVIDE COPY OF PROTECTIVE RELAY CAllBRATION PROGRAM.
70.
PROVIDE DC BREAKER / FUSE CHARACTERISTIC CURVES.
- j
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71. PROVIDE THE DEGRADED VOLTAGE SETPolWT CALCULATION AND SUPPORTING LOADFLOW DOCUMENTS.
t
!
72. PROVIDE A COPY OR COPIES OF THE VENDOR MANUAL FOR THE TYPE OF PROTECTIVE OVERCURRENT RELAYS
JNSTALLED IN SAFETY RELATED SWITCHGEAR.
73. PROVIDE THE PROCEDURE FOR THE DAY TANK LEVEL SWITCH CALIBRATION.
[
74 PROVIDE 1HE PROCEDURE FOR THE DAY TANK LEVEL SWITCH CAi!BRATION.
}
75. PROVIDE A SCHEMATIC OF THE EDG FUEL TRANSFER PUMP CONTROL LOGIC.
-
76. PROVIDE RESULTS OF THE LAST 6 OIL SAMPLE TESTS.
77. PROVIDE TEST DATA DEMONSTRATING FUEL 0]L CONSUMPTION AT DESIGN CONDITIONS.
j
78. PROVIDE DRAWINGS OF STORAGE AND DAY TANK INTERNAL DIMENTIONS.
t'
79. PROVIDE CALCULATIONS FOR FUEL DIL STORAGE CAPACITY.
BD. PROVIDE SETPOINTS FOR STORAGE TANK AND DAY TANK LEVEL ALARMS AND SWITCHES.
f
81. PROVIDE EDG FUEL SYSTEM CONTROL SCHEME.
82. PROVIDE DOCUMENTATION OF SEISMIC OUALIFICATION OF EDG LUBE OIL TANK, FUEL CIL DAY TANKS, AND MAIN
}
STORAGE TANKS.
!
83. PROVIDE THE CALIBRATION PROCEDURES FOR THE EDG LUBE OIL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER.
_ !
84.
PROVIDE METHOD FOR VERIFYING CHECK VALVES WORK FOR THE AIR RECEIVER CHECK VALVES.
[
85. HAS VENTILATION, SUPPLY AIR, AND EXHAUST P! PING BEEN EVALUATED FOR TORNADO INDUCED
l
DEPRESSURIZATION?
j
86. PROVIDE EDG PRE-OPERATIONAL TEST RESULTS.
1
87. PROVIDE TEST DATA DEMONSTRATING TECH SPEC REQUIRED STARTS WITHOUT RECHARGING RECEIVER TAWKS.
'
E3. PROVIDE SETPOINTS FOR PRESSURE SWITCHES AND ALARMS.
I
89. PROVIDE HVAC LOAD CALCULATION FOR LOP /LOCA OPERATION FOR THE SWITHGEAR ROOMS.
{
90.
PROVIDE HVAC LOAD CALCULATION FOR LOP /LOCA OPERATION FOR THE BATTERY R00MS.
91. PROVIDE HVAC LOAD CALCULATION FOR LOP /LOCA OPERTION FOR THE EDG ROOMS.
t
92.
PROVIDE MAINTENENCE AND OPERATING MANUALS FOR THE EDGS.
i
93. PROVIDE THE SCHEMATICS FOR EACH OF THE EDG START CIRCUITS.
}
94.
HOW ARE BATTERY ROOM TEMPERATURES MONITORED? WHAT ARE THE ALARMS FOR HIGH/ LOW TEMPERTURE?
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95. IS THERE A LOAD GROWTH PROGRAM FOR THE BATTERIES? PROVIDE MOST UP-TO-DATE LOAD LIST AND PROFILE.
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96. PROVIDE VENDOR INSTRUCTIONS / MAINTENANCE MANUAL FOR THE BATTERY CHARGERS.
97. PROVIDE THE MOST RECENT DC BATTERY CHARGER SIZING CALCULATIONS / STUDIES.
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98. PROVIDE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION DOCUMENTATION FOR BATTERIES. IN PARTICULAR DISCUSS HOW BATTERIES ARE
!
RESTRAINED IN THE VERTICAL PLANE.
!
99. WHAT IS THE GUIDANCE TO LOAD BATTERY CHARGERS ON THE EDG AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN LOAD ShED? WHEN
i
RUNNING ON BATTERIES AFTER LOAD SHED, HOW OS BATTERY CONDITION / CAPACITY MONITORED?
!
100. PROVIDE MANUFACTURERS DATA SHEEis FOR BATTERIES, AND CHARGERS.
J
101. ARE THE BATTERIES SIZED FOR THE FULL CAPACITY OUTPUT OF INVERTERS OR ARE THEY SIZED ON EXISTING
!NVERTER LOADS?
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102. WAS WORST CASE TEMPERATURE RATING USED TO DETERMlWE THE MAXIMUM AVAILABLE SHORT CIRCUlf
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CAFACITY OF THE BATTERY? VHAT IS THE ROOM MAXIMUM TEMP 7 WHAT IS THE ELECTROLYTE TEMP USED TO
!
CALCULATE MAX SHORT CIRCUIT TEMPERATURE.
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103. PROVIDE BATTERY CAPACITY AND DISCHARGE CURVES.
'
104. PROVIDE BATTERY TEST PROCEDURES.
.!
105. PROVIDE A COPY OF THE SAFETY RELATED BATTERY CHARGER VENDOR MANUAL.
[
106. PROVIDE THE TEST PROCEDURE THAT VER]FYS THAT EACH OF THE BATTRY CHARGERS ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPLYING
THE NORMAL DC LOADS ON THE BUUS AND SIMULTANEOUSLY RECHARGING THE BATTERY IN A REASONABLE TIME.
i
107.15 THE SWITCH YARD BATTERY TEMPERATURE MONITORED? AT WHAT TEMPERATURE WILL THE BATTERY
f
MAINTAIN THE DESIGN RATING?
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2
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108. VHAT IS THE LOW VOLTAGE SHUTDOWN PolNT FDR THE INVERTER $7
109. PROVIDE VENDOR INSTRUCTIONS /KAlWTENANCE MANUAL FDR THE INVERTERS AND RELATED REGULATING
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TRANSFDRMERS.
,
110. PROVIDE DESIGN AND PURCHASE SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE 120V INVERTERS.
111. PROVIDE THE PROCEDURE AND DATA SHEETS WHICH CHECK THE REGULATION OF THE SAFETY RELATED
INVERTERS.
.
112. HAS THE DUTPUT REGULATIDN OF THE INVERTERS BEFN TESTED BY VARYING THE INPUT VOLTAGE FROM THE LOWEST
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TO THE HIGHEST EXPECTED INPUT VDLTAGES7
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113. PROVIDE LDAD GRDWTH CONTROLS FDR EDG LOADING.
!
114. PROVIDE COPlES OF EDG LOADIWG SEQUENCER LOGIC DIAGRAMS AND ELECTRICAL SCHEMATICS.
,
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115. PROVIDE MANUFACTURERES LITERATURE FDR EDG LDADING SEQUENCER.
116. PROVIDE OPERATOR'S EDP PROCEDURES TO CONTRDL MANUAL LDADING ON EDG.
117. EDG LDADS: PROVIDE PUMP CURVES SHDW!kG SYSTEM OPERATING POINTS, ACTUAL MOTOR SPECS VS AROVE PUMP
CURVES, AND MOV SPECIFICATIONS.
.
.
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118. PRDVIDE AN UPDATED LIST OF PLANT EQUIPMENT THAT WOULD BE LDAD-SHED DURING AN *ESF WITH A LOSS OF DFF
SITE POWER" WITH THE PLANT AT 100% PDWER.
119. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING FOR CABLE PENETRATIONS: SIZING CALCULATIONS, PROTECTION CALCULATIONS, AND
i
MANUFACTURER'S INFDRMATIDN FDR MEDIUM VOLTAGE, LOJ VOLTAGE AND CONTROL PENETRATIONS.
i
120. PROVIDE SEVEN CDPIES OF SECTIDW 8 0F THE FSAR.
,
121. PROVIDE TWO CDPIES OF SECTION 7 0F THE FSAR.
122. PROVIDE A LIST OF ELECTRICAL /l&C SURVEILLANCE PRDCEDURES,
123. PROVIDE A CDP) DF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.
124. PROVIDE MANUFACTURER'S DATA DN CABLES USED IN THE DC SYSTEMS (CABLE INSULATION TYPE, TEMPERATURE
RATING, AMPACITY, ETC).
s
125. PROVIDE VOLTAGE DRDP CALCULATIONS FOR DC DPERATED EDUIPMENT AND DEVICES IN THE ESS SYSTEMS
(
(MOTDRS, CIRCUlf BREAKER COMPohENTS, SOLENDID VALVES, MOVS, ETC).
126. PROVIDE BATTERY SIZING CALCULAT!DNS FDR CLASS 1E BATTERIES 1A,1B,1C, AND 1D.
'
127. PROVIDE SHDRT CIRCUIT CALCULATIDN FDR BATTERY SYSTEM 1C. THIS WAS NOT INCLUDED IN CALC 19-D-14
(VERBAL REGUEST GIVEN TO JERRY RICHARDSON ON 1/18/93).
128. PROVIDE A CDPY OF THE MODIFICATlDN DESIGN SUMMARY, 50.59 REVIEW, DRAWIWG LIST, POST MOD TESTING
PROCEDURE (IF APPLICABLE) FDR THE FOLLOWING N005: 1PFDC3, 1PF005, DGF039, C-F059, DGF026, APF013,
APF014, APF011, DCF002, DG-013, DG-038, DG-066, DGF024, AWODOF004. (WILL DICUSS WITH MOD C00RDINATDR
i
THE EASIEST WAY TO DBTAIN THIS INFDRMATION).
129. PROVIDE A COPY OF MODIFICATDW PACKAGE E-F006.
130. AT CLINTON POWER STATIDN, WHAT IS THE NEGATIVE PRESSURE VALUE USED TOR TDRNADO CONDIDERATIONS?
l
131. WhAT IS THE DES!GN BASIS EARTHOUAKE (DBE) VALUE USED AT CLINTON POWER STATION 7
'
132. AT WIhE MILE 2, THE ELGAR INVERTERS USE A BATTERY TO TRANTER FROM THE DC TO THE AC SDURCE. THE MFGR
STATED ThAT THE BATTERY WOULD LAST 5 YEARS. THE STATUS OF THE BATTERY WAS NOT ANNUNCIATED, AFTER
j
1 YEAR, THERE WAS A LOSS OF DC POWER AND TEM LDAD DIDNOT TRANSFER BECAUSE THE BATTERY WAS DEAD. DO
YOU HAVE THE SAME INVERTERS AT CPS 7
133. PROVIDE CDPIES OF THE FDLLOWING: AUDITS 0-88 56 AND Q38 89 18; SURVE!LLANCES o-15052, 15123, 15138,
15139,15146,15161,15176,15190, AND 16087.
134.1. PROVIDE A CDPY OF FIELD ALT APF011,
2. HDW ARE FIELD ALTS CONTROLLED 7
3. WHO REVIEWS AND APPROVES
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FIELD ALTS7
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135. PROVIDE A COPY OF EDG LOAD SEQUENCER TEST PROCEDURE AND CDPIES/RESULTS OF LAST 3 COMPLETED TESTS.
,
136. PROVIDE COPIES OF THE FOLLOWING CONDITION REPORTS, INCLUDI AG PROPDSED AND COMPLETED CDRRECT!DNS:
>
92-04-016, 92-DB-028, 92-10-019, 92-03-019, 92-07-014, 92-05-051, 92-05-039, AND 92-04-052.
'!
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137. PROVIDE A COPY OF LER 920001 AND CDRRECTIVE ACTION RESULTS ASSOCIA1ED WITH THE LER.
138. PROVIDE A LIST OF STANDING ORDERS FOR ELECIRICAL MAINTENANCE, DPERATIONS, TECHNICAL STAFF, AND
ELECTRICAL DESIGN ENGINEERING WHICH ARE ASSDCIATED WI! THE ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
139. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT BATTERY RDOM LOW TEMP IS NOT ALARMED (SEE RESPCWSE TO ITEM 94), HOW IS A
2
MINIMUM BATTERY RDOM TEMPERATURE OF 65 DEGREES F (PER CALC 19-D-27, ETC.) ASSURED 7
140. PROVIDE CDPIES OF THE FOLLOWING ISEG REVIEWS: CE 5601, 5551, AND 5032. ALSO PRDtIDE 92-037 AND
CLOSING DOC Y-215021; 92020 AND CLoslNG DOC Y-214603; AND 92-017 AND CLOSING DOC Y-214458.
,
141. PROVIDE A COPY OF MOD PACKAGE DCF034.
142. PROVIDE COP!ES OF REG. GUIDES 1.128 AND 1.129.
143. WHY IS THE JUMPER FDR DIV !! BATTERY RDOM IN CDWDulf C61063 P2E LARGER THAN THE FEED CONTAlWED IN
i
CONDUIT C61D65 P2E7
.
144. ARE THE LDADS OF THE DG 2 CONDUCTORS PER PHASE (DNLY 2 CDNDUlTS EXITING THE DG MAIN TRANSFORMER
- l
CABINET C91222 AND C91223)?
!
145. PROVIDE THE VENTILATIDW PRDCEDURE / SEQUENCE FOR DG SURVEILLANCE RUNS, ESPECIALLY DURING WINTER
DPERAT !DNS.
j
146. PROVIDE THE SUPPLIER FDR THE DIV I BATTERY SPACERS (FDAM SPACERS).
l
147. PROVIDE INTDRMATIDW ABOUT THE FDLLUWING MWRs: C14805 (9/19/89 DN BRKR 1AP07E (1E21-C001 LPCS PUMP)),
l
D16725 (9/17/90 ON 1FCO2PA), D30248 AND (1DC01E). WHY HAVE THE MWRs BEEN DPEN FDR THELONG TIME PERIDD7 -
,
148. Flu!D WAS FOUND DN THE BATTERY RACK BEHIND CELL 29 AND ON THE FLODR UNDER CELLS 28 AND 29 IN THE DIV
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1 BATTERY RDOM. IS THIS SPILLAGE OR A LEAKY BASTTERY7
)
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149. DURING THE TOUR, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE VENTILATIOG INLET IN THE Div i BATTERY ROOM WAS NOT FULL'
OPEN. 'IS THERE ENOUGH AIR FLOW TO PREVENT H2 BUILDUP UCER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS THAT REQUIRE
SUSTAINED BATTERY USE?
150. RE: EDG STARTING AIR CHECK VALVES OPERABILITY. REQUEST REVIEW OF SURVEILLANCE DOCUMENTATION
,
RELATED 70 EDG AIR START ACCUMULATOR CHECK VALVES AND OCOUSTIC MONITORING / CHECKS 1F PERFORMED.
!
151. RE: DG HEAT EXCHANGERS Div 1 AND !!. REGUEST REVIEW of MODIFICATION PACKAGES FOR DGF041 AND REVIEW
.;
0F DOCUMENTATION RELATIVETO THE CONTROLOF Mit WITHIN T6E HX, INCLUDlWG EDDY CURRENT [KAMINATION DATA.
152. PROVIDE A COPY OF LAST COMPLETED CPSPROCEDURE 9333.01, Plv I 4.16kV UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY CAL 1 BRAT 10N.
153. REQUEST INFORMATION COPY OF OPERAT10hAL SCHEMATIC OS-1103 SHEETS 1 AND 2 0F 2.
THis INFORMATION l$
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REQUESTED TO CLEARIFY AIR FLOW THROUGH THE OUTSIDE AIR lh?AKE LOUVERS FOR BOTH DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM
l
MAKE-UP AIR FLOW PATH AND DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM VEhTAIR FL*N PATH.
154.1. HOW OFTEN ARE THE DC GROUND RECORDERS CHECKED BY OPERATIONS?
2. PROVIDE A COPY OF DC GROUND
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RESPONSE PROCEDURE.
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155. PROVIDE OPERATOR ROUND SHEETS (BOTH SURVEllLANCE AND MM SURtE!LLANCE REQUIRED) THAT CHECK EDS
!
EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AC, DC, FUEL OIL LEVEL, VENTILATION SYS'EN, EDGS, EDG AIR COMPRESSORS, AND
BATTERIES.
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156. PROVIDE RELAYlWG SETTING CALCULATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE S0t'.CES (RAT AND ERAT) DUE
70 FALLING OF 345 kV LINE ON TOP OF 138 kV LINE (REFERENCE USAR P.8.2-1) 15h PROVIDE RELAY SETTINGS,
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RELAY TYPES, FUSE TYPES, COORDINATION CURVES, FOR ALL LOADS ON THE 138 kV ERAT LINE.
158. ARE THE BATTERY CHARGER ICICATORS (VOLT E CURRENT) AND GROUC RECORDERS IN A CALIBRATION
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PROGRAM 7
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159. ARE BATTERY ROOM TRMPERATURE ELEMENTS 1TE-Vx057 AND 056 IN A CALIBRA110N PROGRAM 7
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160. BATTERY ROOM VENT AND EXHAUST FANS DURING A LOOP, ARE THE FANS REPOWERED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE SAFETY
DIVISION EDG?
16*,. DIV 11 BATTERY ROOM; WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF PIPE TFA6STDWPB0018 AND is IT SE!SMICALLY INSTALLED IN
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19E BATTERY ROOM?
?
162. WORK REQUEST MR D16257, EIN1DCO2E, " REPLACE BATTERY TERMINAL PLATE", TAG DATE 1/5/91: WHEN IS THl$
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MR GOING TO BE WORKED AC WHY WASN'T IT COMPLETED ALREADY?
163. PROVIDE COPIES AND RESPONSES TO THE FOLLOWikG $1Ls: 484 AND 484S1, 448, 04454 AND 04454R1, 418R1, 514,
343, 496 AND 496R1, 332 AND 33251, 491, AC 253.
,
164. RE: EDG FUEL Olt SAMPLING. REQUEST REVIEW OF DG FUEL OIL SAMPLING PROGRAM / RECEIPT AN" PERIO01C
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TESTING.
.(
165. PROVIDE 1E NOTICE AND YOUR RESPONSE TO THE FOLLOWING NRC INFORMAfl0W NOTICES: 91-051,91-078, 91 085,
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92-003,92-009, 92-045,92-048, 92-044.
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166. !S TPERE ANALARM FOR HIGH TEMPERATURE IN THE INVERTER ROOMS?
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167. ThERE IS FOREIGH MATERIAL FLOATING IN THE DIV !! AND DIV IV BATTERIES. WHAT IS THE SOURCE AND WHAT
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AFFECT DOES THis HAVE ON ThE BATTERIES?
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168. CELL 48 0F THE DIV IV BATTERY APPEARS TO BE WEEPING FROM THE SEAM AROUND THE TOP OF THE BATTERY. WHAT
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AFFECT DOES TH15 HAVE ON THE BATTERY?
169. A HAZZARD0US MATERI AL SP!LL SOCK WAS FOUND COILED OVFR THE DRAIN IN THE Div IV BATTERY ROOM. WHY
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WAS IT THERE7
6
170. PROVI>E DETAILS ON CONSTRUCTION OF CONTAINMENT ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS (POWER, CONTROL &
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INSTCMENTATION). PROVIDE DETAILS ON THE AMPACITY OF EACH TYPE OF PENETRATION FROM PURCHASE SPECS,
VEN% R DRAWINGS, OR VENDOR DATA.
171. CPS NO. 4200.01, * LOSS OF AC POWER", SECTION 2.1.C, STATES THAT LOADS VILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CONNECTED
TO THE ECCS BUS AS REQUIRED BY ECCS INITIATION LOGIC,1F POWER 15 AVAILABLE. IS THERE A MANUAL LOADING
>
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SEQUENCE AVAILABLE TO THE CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR $HOULD POWER BE AVAILABLE7 IF SO, OR NOT So, WHAT
l
ARE 1HE LOADS AND THE!R RATINGS? USAR ONLY PROVIDES TIME OF LOAD AND AMOUNT.
!
172. PROVIDE A COPY OF THE F,TATION BLACKOUT EVALUATION REPORT DATED 7/3/85. (REF #7.9 0F CPS NO. 4200.01).
.i
173. PROVIDE A COPY OF THE FOLLOWING STANDING ORDERS: PLANT MANAGERS 052 - FUSE REPLACEMENT, OPS DEPT -
l
050-003, OPS / NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INTERFACE, OPS DEPT - 050-013, LARGE MOTOR STARTS, TECH DEPT
!
T50-051, TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION RECDED.
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174. PROVIDE THE LOADING CALCULATIONS FOR THE FOUR SAFETY RELATED INVERTERF.
!
175. RE RESPONSE TO QUESTION 15: PROVIDE A LIST OF THE PLANT SYSTEM ENGlWEERS AND ALTERNATES AND THE
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SYSTEMS TO WHICH THEY ARE ASSIGNED.
.
176. VENDOR MANUAL K2999-D001 FOR THE REGULATING TRANSFORMERS (IN SECTION 1, SPECIFICATIONS), SHOWS
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VOLTAGE PEGULATION AS +/- 1% FROM k0 LOAD TO FULL LOAD. LATER IN THE MANUAL, IT SHOWS OUTPUT
VOLTAGE PROTECTION AS +/- 2% FROM NO LOAD TO RATED LOAD. WHY THEDIFFERENCE7 SEE ATTACHED.-
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177. PROVIDE A COPY OR MAKE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW SPECIFICATION K29BB.
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178. PLEASE PROVIDE HEAD-FLOW PUMP CURVES FOR THE FOLLOW!hG :1.SSW PUMP 1 A-1Sx01FA 2.LPCS PUMP
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1 1E21-C001 3.RHR PUMP 1A 1E12-C002A
4.FPC PUMP 1A-1FCO2PA 5. DRYWELL CHILLER 1A 1VPO4CA 6.HPCS PUMP
'
1-1E22-C0017.DWCW PUMP 1A 1VP03PA 8. DG VENT FAN 1A-1VD01CA AND ALSO KW RATING OF 9. SWGR 1A HT RMVL
CONDENSING UNIT TVXD6A AND CONTROLROOM LOADS 10.MCC E1 & E2 AND 11.MCC G.PLEASE ALSO CONFIRM
,
CONTROL ROOM STATED LOADS FOR 12. CHILLER A-0VC13CA 211rW 13. F AN A-CVCO3CA 201KW 14. FAN A-0VC04CA
16BKW,
179. PLEASE PROVIDE' SPECIFICATIONS AND DESCRIPTION OF AIR PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES 1DG005-ABCD AND EF. PLEASE
,
PROVIDE DETAILS OF SEISMIC OUALIFICATION
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I.
180. FOR 1PS-DG003A PROVIDE SETPOINT + SETTING ACCURACY AND M&TE RANGE * ACCURACY; FOR AIR RECEIVER 1A
PROVIDE THE SAME AS ABOVE FOR THE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE; FOR HPCS PROVIDE THE SAME AS ABOVE FOR ONE
v
AIR RECEIVER.
181. PROVIDE KEY DI AGRAMS FOR TI E FOLLOONG MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS AND FANELBOARDS: AUX BLDG MCC 1A1, 1A2,
[
1A3, AND 1A4; CONT BLDG MCC E1, E2, W C; DG MCC 1A; DAMPER MCC A; 125Vdc MCC 1A; 125Vdc PANELBOARD
L
1 A; AND 120Vac FANELBOARD A.
182. IN VIEW OF RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTION 7 WAS THAT CPS DOES NOT hAVE A TRANSIENT LOADlWG ANALYSIS,
i
PROVIDE THE SPECIFIC DETAILS OF OTHER BASES FOR ASSURING THE THE EDG 15 CAPABLE OF STARTING AND
ACCELERATING THE EMERGENCY LOADS, UNDER WORST POSSIBLE LOADINGCONDITIONS.
,
183. PROVIDE ERAT LOW VOLTAGE CABLE SIZING CALCULATIONS, ADDRESSING AMPACITY, VOLTAGE REGULATION, AND
l
SHORT CIRCUIT CAPABILITY (INCLUDING GROUND SHIELD). I C ICATE THE TYPE OF SHIELD GROUNDING UTILIZED.
't
184. PROVIDE NAMES OF DESIGN ENGINEERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FOLLOWING SYSTEMS:
185. PROVIDE THE MANUFACTURER'S DATA WHICM GIVE THE OVERCURRENT AND INTERRUPTING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
[
CLASS 1E 480Vac AND 125Vdc MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS AND THEIR INTERRUPTING DEVICES.
'
186. PLEASE MAKE AVAILABLE SOMEONE THAT I CAN TALK WITH THAT WOULD BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THE TRAINING THAT'
HAS BEEN PROVIDED DURlWG THE QUALIFICATION OF THE FOLLOWING SYSTEM ENGINEERS: D. NELSON, J. SCOTT, J. *
GOLDING, K. THOMAS, J. SUTHAR, AND B. MAMER. THE INDIVIDUAL PROVIDED SHOULD HAVE ACESS TO THE TRAINING-
RECORDS OF THE LISTED PERSONS.
187. PROVIDE COPIES OF SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS AND DESIGN Basis DOCUMENTS FOR THE FOLLOUING: -AZ - 480Vac
'
DISTRIBUTION, DC - BATTERY AND DC DISTRIBUTION, EE - ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS, IP - 1NSTRUMENT AND
CONTROL POWER, AND GD - CATHODIC PROTECTION.
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188. PROVIDE THE MOST CUdRENT SYSTEM STATUS REP 0ki, AS DESCRIBED IN NSED PROCEDURE A.18, REVIS10N 1, FOR
-f
THE FOLLOWING SYSTEMS:
189. HAVE THE ELGAR INVERTERS BEEN TESTED AT EXTREME INPUT AC OUTPUT LCADS CINCE THE FACTORY
r
ACCEPTANCE TEST IN 19807
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190. REQUEST ADDITIONAL DRAWINGS - SWITCHGEAR HEAT REMOVAL DRAWING No. OS-1115 SHEETS 1, 2, AC 3.
.l
191. PROVIDE ELEMENTARY DI AGRAMS (SCHEMATIC) DI AGRAMS FOR THE FOLLOWING: TYPICAL SAFETY RELATED MOV
t
SERVED FROM A DIV 1 MCC, TYPICAL SAFETY RELATED MOTOR SERVED FROM A DIV 1 MCC, TYPICAL SAFETY
RELATED DC MOV SERVED FROM DC MCC 1A, RCIC GLAND SEAL AIR COMPRESSOR MOTOR STARTER WilCH IS ON DC
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MCC 1A.
192. RE: MOD DG-066
1) WHAT DEVICE TRIPS THE MOTOR DRIVEN AIR COMPRESS 0T ON ALOCA SIGNALT 2) DURING A
i
LOCA, APPROX 1MATELY WHAT TIME INTO THE EVENT WOULD OPERATORS RESET THE LOCA SIGNALT
l
193. RE: DRAWING E02-1HP99, SHEET 109, LOC E4. WHICH DRAWING HAS THE C0!L FOR RELAY K11 CONTACTS 7/8
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SHOWWT
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194. SYSTEM VOLTAGE VARI AT10ks WERE PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTIONS 48 AND 51. THE REVIEW OF THESE
i
RESPONSES INDICTE DIFFERENT VOLTAGES FOR THE NORTH A C SOUTH 345 KV BUSES. THIS WOULD IMPLY THAT
THE RING 15 OPERATED OPEN. ALSD, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO ACTUAL RECORDING OF MIN AND MAX VOLTAGES
PER PERIOD. THE CHARTS PROVIDED PORTRAY ONLY THE CONTINUQUS VOLTAGE VARI Afl0N ON A 120V
!
SECONDARY BASIS. THE TEAM REQUIRES THE ACTUAL MAX./ MIN. VOLTAGES AT 345KV AND AT 138 KV EXPERIENCED
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IN THE LAST THREE YEAARS AT THE CLINTON SWITCHYARD. PROVIDE THE SETTINGS AND BASES FOR VOLIAGE
ALARMS.
j
195. SYSTEM STABILITY: PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR NOT EVALUATING STABILITY FOR 3 PHASE FAULTS COINCIDENTAL
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WITH BREAKER FAILURE
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196 SYSTEM STABILITY: PROVIDE AN UPDATED EVALUATION OF THE 1987 EVALUATION, CONSIDERING PRESENT
NETWORK CONFIGURATIONS
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197. PROVIDE A INDEX FOR ALL THE SAFETY RELATED ELECTRICAL CALCULATIONS
j
198. PROVIDE SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS (AC/OR DSD) FOR: 4160 VAC (AX)6.9 KVAC (AY)EDG (DG)GROUNDlWG AND CP
1
(GD) MAIN POWER (MP) AUTO DISPATCH (MR) SWITCHYARD (SY)
199 RE: MOD DGF024. PROVIDE COPY OF COMPLETED POST MOD TEST.
I
200. PROVIDE AP CARD PRINT, REFERENCE DRAWING FOR THE Folt0 WING: 1E02-1DG99 SH 1-17 AND E03-1PL12JA SHEETS
8 S 10.
( 1 MAVE COPIE$ OF PENDING ECNS)
231. COMPLIAkCE WITH THE SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION. PROVIDE AN ANALYSIS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE
FOLLOWING TWO EVENTS THAT COULD LEAD TO A LOSS OF ALL AC POWER: EVENT 1: $1MULTANEOUS LOSS OF ONE
EDG+ RAT + ERAT DUE TO A FAILURE IN NON IE EQUIPMENT,-EVENT 2: THE SUBSEQUENT FAILURE TO START (SINGLE
FAILURE) 0F THE REDUCANT EDG. EVENT 1 COULD OCCUR WHEN THE EDG Ir DN TEST IN FARALLEL WITH THE RAT,
AND SWITCH ET14 FAILED CLOSED. THE ACCIDENTAL PARALLELING OF UNSYNCHRONIZED SOURCES COULD INDUCE
TRANSIENT SUUURGES THAT MAY MAKE INOPERABLE'THE EDG, THE RAT, AND 1HE ERAT.
202. FOLLOW UP TO REPLY ON NRC QUESTION 52: (1) PROVIDE AN ANALYSIS OF EVENTS IF EDG IS TESTED IN PARALLEL
WITH ERAT AND 138 KV SUPPLY FAILS, (2) PROVIDE AN EVALUATION OF TRIP 71ME FOR THE EVENTS CONSIDERED
UCER A LOSS OF RAT 345 KV VOLTAGE, ANALY2ING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE TRIPPING TIME VERSUS THE
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. INCLUDE THE CONSIDERATION THAT UNTIL THE SEPARATION OF THE EDG UNDER TEST FROM
THE RAT, THE REDUNDANT EDG DOES NOT RECEIVE A $1GNAL TO START.
203. PROVIDE DOCUMENT ATION OF FUNCTIONAL TESTING PERFORMED FOR FIELD ALTERATION APF011.
204. K2801 0144 IS MIS $1NG PAGE 1-1 WHICH COVERS EQ.
205. PROVIDE COPIES OF THE CLASS 1E KEY DI AGRAMS OF THE IV SYSTEM.
2D6. RE: MOD DOF004 PROCEDURE 6423.04 SPECIFIC GRAVITY ACCEPTANCE CRITER10N IS TO 0.8762. THIS EXCEEDS
THE INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION SP GR OF 0.86. A SPECIFIC GRAVITY OF .8762 WILL CAUSE THE LEVEL INSTRUMENTS
TO READ HIGH (NONCONSERVATIVE). IS THIS ACCEPTABLE FROM A SAFETY POINT OF VIEW vs THE MOD OVERFLOW
Po!NT OF VIEWT
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2D7. PROVIDE A COPY OR MAKE AVIALABLE FOR REVIEW CPS 9080.01, CURRENT REVISIDN.
I
208. PROVIDE MANUFACTURER'S LITERATURE FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE CLASS 1E BATTERIES.
~209. RE: QUESTION 149 WOULD SUFFICIENT AIR FLOW BE AVAILABLE IF THE AIRF0ll LOLVERS ON GRD #2000 WERE To
f
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BE FULLY CLOSED? HOW Do YOU CONTROL THE POSITION OF THE LOUVERS? WHAT IS THE CURRENT POSITION OF
THE LOUVERS?
,
210. PROVIDE RAT!DNAL FOR NOT CONTlWUOUSLY PRESSURIZING ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS.
211. PROVIDE A COPY OR MAKE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW VENDOR MANUAL FOR DIVI AND 11 BATTERY CHARGERS TO INCLUDE
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DESIGN, OPERATION, AND MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS.
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212. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING CALCS RELATING TO THE INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM: SHORT CIRCUIT,
!
PROTECTION COODINATION, AND VOLTAGE CONDIT!DNS AT LDADS.
'
213. PROVIDE A COPY OF DRAWING NO. E02-1DG99, SHEET 067.
214. PROVIDE THE SWITCHYARD BATTERY S121NG CALCULATION.
215. WHAT ASSURANCE IS THERE THAT WEEKLY MDNITORING OF THE SWITCHYARD BATTERY AMBIENT TEMPERATURE (PER
,
RESPONSE TO QUESTION 107) WILL ALLOW THE BATTERY ELECTROLYTE TEMPERATURE TO BE MAINTAINED AT OR ABOVE
h
THE MINIMJM VALUE USED IN THE CALCULATION. (NOTE: THE RESPONE TO 107 IMPLIES A MINIMUM OF 60 DEGREES
F.)
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216. RE: QUESilDN 180. PROVIDE ACTUAL CALIBRATION RECORD FOR 1PS-DG178,1PS-DG003A RELIEF VALVES 1DG006A
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AND 1DG6D06E. INCLUDE MTE GAUGE RANGE AND ACCURACY USED FDR THE CALIBRATION.
217. PROVIDE LATEST CALIBRATION RECORDS FOR TEMPERATURE SWITCHES LISTED IN PROCEDURES CPS 5011.08 AND
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5011.07,
218. PROVIDE TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS WHICH DESCRIBE THE PROBLEM AND THE RESOLUT!DN OF THE DCTOBER 1992 DIV
11 BATTERY PILOT CELL SITUATION WHICH WAS DISCUSSED DURING THE ENTRANCE MEETING.
219. PROVIDE TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS WHICH DESCRIBE THE PRDBLEM AND RESOLUTIONS TO THE IP/RP SYSTEM
INVERTER PROBLEMS WHICH WERE DISCUSSED DURING THE ENTRANCE MEETING.
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220. To: PAUL KIRCHHOFER FURTHER To QUEST!DN ITEM NO. 77 TO PROVIDE TEST DATA TO DEMONSTRATE SEVENDAY
OPERATING CAPABILITY. EDC LOADINGS SHOWN 04 A DATA SHEETS, DO NOT RELATE SUFFICIENTLY 10 EDG
FUEL CONSUMPTION SHOWN ON C/D DATA SHEETS. THIS APPLIES TO DIVIS10N 1,2 and 3. PLEASE REVIEW.
,
221. To: M. GANDHI FURTHER TO QUESTIDN ITEM NO. 25 , TDRMADO INDUCED DEPRESSURIZATION LOADS ON SUPPLY
& EXHAUST VENTILAT10N TO THE EDG's. CERTAIN DESIGNATED STRUCTURES AT CPS ARE DESIGNED To WITHSTAND
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TORNADO LOADING CONDIT]DNS. THE CONCERN HERE IS THAT THELARGE DIMENSION DUCTS AND DAMPERS OF THE EDG
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VENTILATION SYSTEM AND THE ENGINE EXP'nSTS WILL NOT COLLAPSE UNDER 3 PSI NEGATIVE PRESSURE, SO AS 70
CAUSE INADEQUATE PERFDRMANCE. PLEASE 4 dOVIDE SPECIFICATIONS / DRAWINGS / CALCULATIONS 10 SUPDRT THIS.
222. PROVIDE ALL MANUFACTURER DATA FOR UV. RELAYS UTILIZED IN MONITORING THE OFFSITE SOURCES
223. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING CALCS RELATING TO THE SYSTEM LY (2D8/120V) CLASS 1E CIRCulTS AND EQUIPMENT:
SYSTEM FAULT LEVELS, SYSTEM LOADING, WORST CASE LDAD EQUIPMENT TERMINAL VOLTAGES UNDER DEGRADED GRID
CONDITIONS. NOTE: REQUIRED EARLY IN THE W/0 2/1/93.
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224. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING CALCS RELATINGTO THE SYSTEM AZ (480V) CLASS 1E CIRCUITS AND EQUIPMENT: MCC
FAULT DUTY, WORST CASE MCC SERVED MOTOR AND MOV TERMlWAL VOLTAGES UNDER DEGRADED CRID CONDITIONS, WORST
,
CASE MCC STARTER CONTROL CIRCUIT VOLTAGES UNDER DEGRADED GRID CONDIT!DNS. NOTE: REQUIRED EARLY IN THE
W/0 2/1/93).
225. PROVIDE DESCRIPT!DNS OF WIRE AND CABLES USED IN CLASS 1E CIRCUITS SERVED BY THE 480Vac MCCs ($YSTEM
,
1
AZ) AND BY THE 208/120V POWERE PANELS OR PANELBOARDS LSYSTEM LV). NoiE: REQUIRED EARLY IN THE W/0
2/1/93).
226. THE RESPONSE TO ITEM N-169 ADVISES THAT ELECTROLYTE HAD BEEN ADDED TO SOME OF THE CELLS OF DIV IV
"
BATTERY. IN VIEW OF THE : CAUTION" STATEMENT DN PAGE 23 OF THE MANUFACTURER'S MANUAL No. K2988-0001,
PLEASE ADVISE REGARDING MAINTENENACE PRACTICES AND THENEED FOR THE ADDITION OF ELECTROLTTE. ALSO,
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PROVIDE A COPY OF THE COMPLETED MR D26801,
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227. FDDR LH1-1250 CHANGED THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIO!N OF THE INVERTERS 70 MINIMUM +4 DECREES F AND
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MAXIMUM 178 DEGREES F 1N PURCHASE SPECIFICATION 21 A3794. SINCE PAGE 1 10F THE VENDDR'S MANUAL IS
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MISSING, WHAT IS THE ACTUAL MAXIMUM OPERATING TEMPERATURES 0F THE INVERTERT
228. WHAT DO YOU Do TO ASSURE EDG LOAD SEQUENCERS STAY WITHIN ACCEPTABCE CRITERIA (PMS / CALIBRATION
f
CRITERIA / FREQUENCY) ?
229. PLEASE ADVISE REGARDING THE CURRENT STATUS OF ACTIONS RESULTING FROM THE SELF INITIATED EDSFl.
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INCLUDE TARGET DATES AND COMPLETION STATUS OF DPEN ITEMS.
230. PROVIDE INFDRMATION ON BUS FAST TRANSFER TO ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING DUESTIONS: 1) EVALUATION OF
i
TRAkSFER INDUCED TRANSIENT TORQUES ON THE CONNECTED MJTORS; 2) PERIODIC TESTING ( ATTACH
PROCEDURE); 3) EVALUATIDW OF IMFACT OF TRANSFER FAILURE M3 DES ON THE SAFETY FUNCT10N, TRANSFER
FAILURE MODES SHOULD INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF THE POS$1BILITY OF ACCID:NTAL PARALLELING OF SOURCES;
4) DESCRIPT]DN AND EVALUATION OF PROTECTIVE FEATURES (If ANY) THAT WOULD PREVENT UNDESIRED
TRAkSFERS FROM TAKING PLACE.
231. PROVIDE A COPY OF NSED STANDARD C1-01.00, "!NSTRUMENT SETPOINT CALCULATION METHODOLOGY". NOTE: NOT
REQUIRED UNTIL W/0 2/1/93.
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232. PRE QUEST 10N 158, THE BATTERY CHARGERS ARE NOT IN A CALIBRATION PROGRAM. OPERATIONS DETERMINES
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-DURING THE C- AREA ROUND SHEET THAT THE BATTERY VOLTAGE IS >= 129 VOLTS. SHOULDN'T THE VOLTMETER BE
CAllBRATED C@ VERIFIED WITHIN TOLERANCE BY COMPARISDN To THE WEEKLY TECH SPEC (4.8.2.1.a.2) CHECK
0F THE BATTERY? NOTE: INFORMATION NOT REQUIRED UNTIL W/0 2/1/93.
233. REFERENCE ANSWER TO ITEM 195, PROVIDE BACK UP INFDRMATION FDR THE STATEMENT Thai A 3 PHASE FAULT IS
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LESS LIKELY TO OCCUR THAN A DOUBLE LINE To GROUND FAULT. NOTE: IkFDRMATIDN REQUIRED THE V/O
2/1/93.
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234. PROVIDE ELECTRICAL AND C&l PROCEDURES RELATIVE TO SURVEILLANCE, MAINTENANCE, AND TEST OF DIV I
SHUTDOWN SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SX). INCLUDE LATEST COMPLETED COPY. NOTE: REQUIRED THE W/0 2/1/93.
235. WHERE Do YOU ENSURE THAT THE BATTERY ROOM TEMPERTURE DESIGN BASIS OF 77+ 3 DEGREES F. (USAR
9.4.5.2.1.1.F) IS MET WHEN THE ROOM TEMPERATURE DEVICES ARE NOT IN A CLAIBRATION PROGRAM. NOTE:
REQUIRED THE W/0 2/1/93).
236. PROVIDE A COPY OF VOLTAGE DROP CALCULATIONS FOR POWER AND CONTROL CABLESFOR DIVISION I SK PUMP. NOTE:
REQUIRED W/0 2/1/93.
237. PROVIDE FOR THE WEEK OF 2/1/93 FOR SYTEMS WALKDOWNS: P&lDs FOR DIV I SYSTEMS VX, DO, DG.
238. PROVIDE OR MAKE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW WYLE TEST REPORT 17769-1 AND 2.
239. THE DIV !! BATTERY HAD ONLY 1.3% MARGIN BASED ON VOLTAGE 10 THE INVERTER. CR 1-92-10 045 TALKS ABOUT
CELL - 47 ROOT CAUSE FOR THE FAILURE WAS AGE-RELATED DEGRADATION. DIV 11 BATTERY WAS SUPPOSED TO BE
REPLACED IN 1991. ARE THERE PLANS TO REPLACE THE BATTERY? PROVIDE PLANS AND DATES.
240. PROVIDE A COPY OF CR 1-92-03-067
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241. Provide procedure to support cate.19- AK 6, sect. 6.3, requirement to limit toad to 13.6 MVA. Provide
evidence that this procedure was followed during EDG testing.
242. Electrical Distribution System Description,Section IV, p. 66, rev.3, indicates that short time
paratteting of sources at 480V is attowed. Is there any alarm annunciation for this operating
condition? How long is the "short time paralleling" attowed to persist? Is there any analysis of the
length of time in parattet operation vs. the probability of a short circult?
243. Provide an explanation for the approach to rubering and controtting of Safety Related Calculations,-
addressing the following as a mininsa: Why is it that dif ferent calculations bear the same ruber? How
can one be sure that the calculations are not mixed up? Why is it that many calculations are
listed without a date? Why is it that calculations do not have sign offs on individual sheets? What
prevents getting the unsigned sheets mixed up with unapproved sheets?
244. (See item 49 response) What prevents accidental and undesired paralleling of sources under a slow
transfer event? What prevents the EDG to become paralleled to an of fsite source if the source becomes
available at the same time the EDG bkr. closes?
245. Provide an explanation for the deletion of timitation 6.2 in EDG CPS No. 3506.01 (See inspection item
54)
246. Provide rational for preventing EDG 1A f rom starting under a LOCA signal when remote shutdown panel
switch is on " EMERGENCY" (see CPS No. 3506.01 section 6.3)
247. What prevents the overloading of an EDG if a LOCA occurs some time af ter the occurrance of a LOOP?
248. When running as an isolated power source, the EDG voltage can be 10% higher than 4160, or 4580V, in
accordance with CPS NO. 3506.01. Nas this 10% overvoltage been taken into account to evaluate the
possibility of spurious trips of overcurrent protective devices under motor inrush? Was this higher
voltage evaluated in terms of the overvoltage tolerance of connected equipment?
249. Explain the feasibility of the operating approach described by Note c in CPS No. 3506.01, section
,
8.1.2.1, page 17, which requires the operator to react in a time span of 15 seconds.
250. Provide a rational for setting the EDG 1C governor speed droop at 50% prior to start for parallel
operation.
251. Provide an explanation and elaborate on the consequences of statement in 8.1.3.6 of 3506.01 that
,
" personnel could become trapped in EVAC (f an EDG ventilation f an starts"
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252. Provide rational for cautien note to station a switchman at both 1372 bkrs to reenergize the 138 kV
>
tine in case of a fault (see CPS 3506.01, 8.1.4.1.1)
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253. Why is reactive toad allowed to reach higher values than load limits? (See 3506.01, 8.1.4.4 and
8.1.4.6)
254. What is the full sequence of operating approach when a ground f ault is present as described in 3506.01,
8.2.3.
What is the maximum period of time the operation can continue with a ground fault present? How
was this maximan time determined?
255. Re. gaestion 182. Provide detait of any design corrective measures ipplemented on Drywell Chillers to
prevent spurious tripping such as ocurred in Test 4.
Also, provide an analysis of ths adequacy of the
i
preoperational testing vs. the actual LOCA loads and sequencing. Indicate whether or not the EDG was
'
demonstrated capable to restart spuriously tripped largest accident load on a futty loaded in.rs.
Elaborate on governor and voltage regulator setting requirements.
256. I'he review of calculation for analysis of tansferred surges from of fsite power systems, calculation
19- Al-76, dated 3/5/92, indicates that the calculation is not adequately perf ormed to at tow for
independent review without recourse to the originator. Examples of questloable areas are: 1) Ref
i
XII.I lacks adequate readability, 2) Use of the capacitive current for the whole 4kV system appears to
be nonconservative, 3) Cable capacitance requirements can not be verified, it is not known if the
requiremeents apply only to Westinghouse transformers or to other types as well. 4) What are the values
of transformer capacitance between high voltage and low voltage windings and between 1.v.
winding and ground? 5) Why was the EDG capability not verified?
257. RAT relay setting calculation 19AN-10, shows that over:urrent relay ~ faits to provide adequate
protection against overloads, since relay trippin will occur af ter the transformer damage curve limit
is exceeded. Please explain.
258. ASSUMPTION 4.6 0F CALC 19-D-47 IMPLIES THAT ELEVATED ELECTROLYTE TEMPERATURC HAS INSIGNIF1 CANT
!
EFFECT ON BATTERY SHORT CIRCUIT CURRENT CAPABILITY. A TEST REPORT, AE1 TEST NO. 0591-1, MAY 15 1 16,
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1991 IS REFERENCE 3 IN SUPP0kT OF THE ASSUMPTION. IS THERE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE to INDICTAE THE f,ATTERY
'
MANUFACTURER, CD, CONCURS WITH THE METHODS, PROCEDURES, AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE TEST REPORT?
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259. SECTION 8 0F ATTACHMENT 17 TO CALC 19-D-28, REV 10, RECCOMMENDS AN EQUALIZING RANGE OF 135.4 VOLTS
To 137.25 VOLTS. WHILE THE RANGE IS WITHIN THE MANUFACTURER'S RECOMMENDATION (135.14 TO 138.04 VOLTS)
IT DOES NOT APPEAR COMPATABLE WITH THE VALUE OF 135.2 +
~0.7 VOLTS AS STATED IN USAR SECTION
8.3.2.1.2.4 (LAST PARAGRAPH ON PAGE 8.3-59). PLEASE CLARIFY.
260. PROVIDE A COPY OF REFERENCE 3.21 of CALC 19-D-28. THAT IS LIMITOROUE CORP., MAY 9.1985 TELECDPY
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CONFIRMING REDUCED VOLTAGE STARTING RCIC VALVES 1E-51-F013 AND 1E51 F045.
4
261. PROVIDE ikFORMATION REGARDINGSOURCE AND VAllDITY OF THE STARTER PICK-UP AND DROPOUT VOLTAGE DATA
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GIVEN ON PAGE 3 0F CALC 19-AJ-17. REV 0.
NOTE THAT TABLE 16 0F IEEE STD 399-190 IMPLIES TYPICAL
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VALUES FOR DC CONTACTORS AS 80% OF RATED FOR PICK-UP AND 60T0 70% OF RATED FOR DROPOUT.
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262. USAR SECT 10N 8.3.2.1.1, PAGE 8.3-55 ATATES THAT NORMAL BATTERY OPERATING TEMPERATURES ARE BETWEEN
60 DEGREES F. Ac 90 DEGREES F.
HOWEVER, BATTERY SIZING CALCS 19-D-28, ET AL USE A MINIMUM VALUE OF
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65 DEGREES F.
PLEASE CLARIFY WHY THE CALCS DID WOT USE 60 DEGREES F. FOR BATTERY SIZING.
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263. PROVIDE THE CALCULATION USED TO ESTABLISH THE STATION GROUND CRID DESIGN. ALSO PROVIDE DIAGRAMS
,
SHOWING THE GRID. WHAT IS THE MEASURED GROUND REslSTANCE AND HOW OFTEN IS IT CHECKED?
264. WHY DOES CLAC 19-D-14, WHICH DETERMINES FAULT DUTY FOR 125Vdc MCCs 1A,18, AND 1D CONSIDER CABLE
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RESISTANCE AT 25 DEGREES C (77F) AS THE WORST CASE, WHEREAS MINIMUM BATTERY ROOM TEMPERTURE IS
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REPORTED TO BE 65 DEGREES F (18.3C) PER CALC 19-D-277 FURTHER, CALC 19-D-47, FOR DIV Ill FAULT DUTY,
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CONSIDERES CABLE TEMPERATURE RESISTANCE AT 65 DEGREES F.
265. PROVIDE A COPY OF THE VENDOR'S DATA ThAT SUPPORTS THE STATEMENT ON PAGE 90F CALC 19-D*14 THAT A
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FULLY CHARGED BATTERY HAS A VOLTAGE OF 119.5 VOLTS OR 2.06 VOLTS PER CELL.
266. PROVIDE A COPY OF PENETRATION THERMAL CAPABILITY CURVES - SEE REFERENCE A IN CALC 19-M-3.
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267. WITH REFERENCE TO CALC IP-M-03, PROVIDE STATUS OF THE FOLLOWING: VERit 4AT10N OF ASSUMPT10N C ON
,
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PAGE 15 AND ACTIONS IMPLIED BY TWO PARAGRAPHS IN THE CONCLUSION ON PAGE 56.
268. WITH REGARD TO CALC 19-M-13, PROVIDE STATUS OF THE SECONDARY PROTECTION FOR CABLES 1RT45C AND
1RT46C OER THE RECOMMENDATION ON PAGE 4
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269. CALC 19 *N-10, PAGE 21, STATES THAT THE RX RECIC PUMP MOTOR FULL LOAD CURRENT (IFL) IS 484 AMPS. IT IS
ASSUMED THAT THIS IS AT RATED VOLTAGE. PLEASE CONFIRM. WHAT IS THE RK RECIC PUMP FULL LOAD CURRENT
AT A VOLTAGE JUST ABOVE THE DEGRADED GRID VOLTAGE PROTECTION SYSTEM PICKUP SETTING? NOTE THAT CONEX
DRAWING 7550-09000, SHEET 1, STATES THAT AMPACITY FOR THE BkV PENETRATION IS 484 AMPS. PLEASE
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270. R
03-067, " LOCKING STRAP MISSING ON ACASTAT RELAY (62SS). 1) WAS A RELAY LOCKikG STRAP
VERIFICAT10N prRFORMED ON DIV I & 11 RELAYS 7 IF NOT, WHY NOT7 2) ENG1kEERING EVALUATION FOR CR DID NOT
CONSIDER DEGRADED VOLTAGE + LOCA, WHY? (DG WDULD START,BUT NOT LOAD.) 3) WHY WAS THIS NOT
REPORTABLE (LER)?
271. ARE SPARE (FJ) BREAKERS ON 1A AND 1B RATED FOR MORE THAN 10,000A7 IS THERE ANYTHING TO PREVENT A
FAULT AT BREAKERTERMINALS AC BREAKER DAMAGING THE REST OF THE BUS IN AN EXPLOSION?
272. PAGE 23 0F 19 D-14 SHOWS HE100 BREAKER IN A DISTRIBUTION PANEL. ARE ALL BREAKERS IN PANEL HE1007 WHAT
LOADS DOES THE PANEL FEED? WHAT INDICATES THE BREAKER WILL INTERRUPT THE DETERMikED FAULT
i
CURRENT? IS THERE Co0RDINATION BETWEEN BREAKERS AT DC MCCAND INTERRUPTING DEVICES ON AC
,
SbTITCHGEAR (CONTROL POWER CIRCUITS)?
273. CR # 1-9b 05-009
The corrective action used fixed the issnediate problem. However, what activites were
,
implemented that would prevent the recurrance of the same type of event?
274. Response to NOV dated September 28, 1992. Provide a copy of the CPS Root Cause Manual per CCT
- 0590306.
Include rumber of individuals to be trained, number trained to date and the schedule that
6
is being implenented to meet the March 15, 1993 conptetion date established for CCT #059309.
275. Provide someone to condact a Control room walldown. Request the walkdown be condacted at 1 p.m.
,
Tuesday 2-2-93.
276. Provide an individual to condact a switch yard walk down at approximately 2:30 on Tuesday 2-2-93.
277. Please provide an individual that can demonstrate the use of the Electrical Loading Monitoring System
,
(ELMS) in the control of 120 volt loads to vital buses.
278. Surveillance Report # 015176 (dated 2-24-92) states that a follow up surveillance should be condacted
in approximately six months. Please provide a copy of the follow up surveillance. Additionally, in
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the same report, Licensing and Safety crernitted to review current outage management and associated
,
plant programs against the guidelines of NUMARC 91-06 to document the guidelines implemented, identif y
the open items and establish a plan to resolve the open issues. Please provide, or make available,
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this review.
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279. Please provide someone that can gain access to the following panels on the af ternoon of 2-3-93-
iPL43JB,1PL61JC, "PL91J, and OPL47JB.
280. RE: lEIN 92-003, " REMOTE TRIP FUNCTION FAILURES IN GE F-FRAME MCCBs".
1) ARE THE fouR RPS INVERTER
.
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OUTPUT BRRs G0lWG TO BE REPLACED DURING RF-47 2) DOES ATWS TRIP THESE BKRS? 3) ARE THE BREAKERS
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VERIFIED TO TRIP DURlWG EPA TESTING? 4) HAS THE WOM1hAL CURRENT FLOW BEEN MEASURED, RAiHER THAN
.
RELYING ON A CALCULATION 7 5) IS THERE AN ABNORMAL OPERATING CONDITION THAT CfA"LD CAUSE THE
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CURRENT FLOW TO APPROACH 50% OF THE BREAKER RATING 7 6) HAS ENGINEERING CONSIDERED INTERNAL PAWEL
TEMPERATURES AND SECONDDDARY HEAT SOURCES IN DETERMINING BREAKER OPERABILITY?
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281. CALCULATION IM-P-0083 SHOWS DIVISION 1 & 2 FAN FLOWS 3CA/3CB ABOVE 26300 CFM AND BATTERY ROOM SUPPLY
AS ABOVE 580 CFM VERSUS 05 1115 P&lD VALUES OF 24000 CFM AND 560 CFM. WHICH VALUES ARE APPLICABLE?
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282. CALCULATION IM-P-0083 INDICATES A Div 1 & 2 SWITCHGCAR ROOM CONTROL SETPOINT TEMPERATURE OF 75
DEGREES. THIS RESULTS IN SUPPLY AIR TEMPERTURES TO THE BASTERY ROOMS RANGING FROM 52.47 DEGREES TO
66.38 DEGREES. THE AVERAGE IS WELL BELOW THE ALLOWABLE OF 65 DEGREES ALLOWED FOR THE BATTERIES.
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PLEASE SHOW THAT ADEQUATE DIFFUSION TAKES PLACE AT THE DUCT INLET TO THE ROOM THAT SUPPLY.A!R DOES
WOT IMPINGE DIRECTLY ON THE BATTERIES.
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283. FURTHER TO QUESTION 221. 24 INCH AND 36 INCH, .375 WALL PIPE IS ADEQUATE FOR THE 3 PSI EXTERNAL
PRESSURE LOADING FOR THE EDG COMBUSTION AND EKHAUSTAIR. ASME SECTION Vl!!, UG-28 GIVES A RATING OF 37.5
AND 25 PSI ESPECTIVELY. INTERNAL PRESSURE RATING IS NOT APPLICABLE.EDG VENTILATION MUST BE REVIEWED
J
$1MILARLY. ALL THREE DIVISIONS COULD BE AFFECTED AT THE SAME TIME. TYPICALLY AN UNST1FFENED 60 INCH
I
SQUARE PANEL SHOULD BE .375 THICK. PLEASE REVIEW FURTHER.
.
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2S4. RE: SPECI AL REPORT Wo. U-602057, " VALID TEST FAILURE OF DIV 1 EDG." PROVIDE A COPY OF THE INDEPENDENT
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ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS PERFORMED BY f AILURE PREVENTION, INC., IF IT HAS BEEN RECEIVED.
285. RE: JOB NO. PEMAPM989 TO TEST MOLDED CASE circuli BREAKERS IN SK SYSTEM. BREAKER IN MCC 1A, CUB 3D,
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CKT 1, WAS NOT TESTED THIS PM SINCE THE PM SPECIFIED TYPE "E" AND THE BREAKER WAS TYPE "EH1".
PROVIDE
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TEST DATA FOR THE TYPE EH1 BREAKER.
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286. RE: NORMALT0 ALTERNATE CIRCUIT TRANSFER. PROVIDE THE LAST AVAILABLE FAST BUS TRANSFER TIMES FROM .
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THE PLANT COMPUTER FOR THE YHREE 4kV SAFETY BUSES.
287. PROVIDE A COPY OF ECN NO. 9209.
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288. PROVIDE DISCUS $10N ON METHOD FOR IDENTIFYING CALCULATION REVISION NUMBERS.
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289. RE: M00 ko. IPF003-UPS, " FILTER CAPACITOR INSTALLATION." WHAT IS THE QUALIFIED L]FE OF THE CAPACITOR 7
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WILL THE CAPACITOR BE CHANGED OUT AT SOME PERIODICITY?
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290. HOW IS VERIFICATION OF DISENCAGEMENT OF THE AIR START MOTORS ACCOMPLISHED FOR THE DIV 1 D/G7
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291. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE UNGARDED DG SHAFTS AS DISCUSSED IN AUDif FINDING C 38-88-56 037 (ATTACHMENT-
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6, PAGE 75)
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292. THE INFORMATION AT THE BOTTOM OF PAGE 30 IN CA AUDIT 038-88-56 JUST ENDS. THERE DOES NOT APPEAR 10
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BE A CONCLUSION TO THE INFORMATION PRESENTED. PLEASE PROVIDE THE MIS $1NG INFORMATION.
293. PLEASE MAKE THE DIV 1 DG LOGS AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW.
!
294. AUDIT REPORT Q 38-88-56: HOW IS DIL ADDED TO THE DIV 1 DG WHILE IT IS RUNNING 7 IS THE LOCATION FOR
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ADDlWG OIL UNDER THESE CONDIT!DNS CLEARLY IDENTIFIED ON THE DG7
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295. AUDIT REPORT C 38-88-56 IDENTIFIED SEVERAL INSTRUMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DIV 1 DG THAT DID NOT HAVE
{
PNs ASSOCIATED WITH THEM. tPG 11 0F 57) IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT THE PRACTICE OF NOT PERFORMING PMs
ON THESE INSTRUMENTS BE REEVALUATED. FOR THOSE INSTRUMENTS THAT PERFORM AUTOMATIC PROTECTIVE -
ACTIONS F0d THE DG, WHAT ASSURANCE DO YOU HAVE THAT THEY CAN PERFORM THEIR PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS?
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296. WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATUS OF DG PMs? HOW MANY ARE OVER DUE AND HOW ARE THEY JUSTIFIED?
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297. WHAT FORMAL METH00 IS IN PLACE FOR THE EVALUATION OF FAILED PMs TO DETERMINE IF THE PM FREQUENCY .
.[
HEEDS TO BE CHANGED?
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298. PLEASE MAKE THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEWS AT THE IDENTIFIED DATE AND TIME.
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D. WELSON 2-4-93 8 AM J. GOLDING 2 4-93 8:30 AM P. K!RCHOFER 2-4-93 G:15 AM E. HALVERSON 2-4-93 9:45
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AMP.
THOMPSON 2-4-93 10:30 AM
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299. PROVIDE INFORMATION PU_ATIVE TO THE SHORT CIRCUlf CAPABILITY OF ALL CABLES. PROTECTION OF CABLES WAS
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NOT SHOWN IN THE CORRESPOWDING PROTECTIVE RELAY COORDINAfl0N CURVES.
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300. PROVIDE A COPY OF REFERENCE 3 10 CALCULAT10N 19 Al 14, AND ANY OTHER DOCUMENTATION FOR SUPPORF OF
METHODOLOGY UTIL1 ZED !E 19-Al-14
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301. FROM INSPECTION OF THE NETWORK VOLTAGE LEVELS, A REVISION OF ASSUMED VOLTAGE EXTREMES MAY HAVE 10
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SE IMPLEMENTED. IN CASF THE VOLTAGE LEVELS ARE CHANGED, PROVIDE A LISTING OF CALCULATIONS THAT WILL
NEED REVISION (CONSIDER ALL CALCULATIONS, SUCH AS 19-Al-14, ETC).
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302. 1) PROVIDE RATIONAL FOR ASSUMING THAT 1.33 PU VOLTACE EQUALS 1.33 V/HZ PU, SEE PAGE 1F AND 1G., SIMILAR
QUESTION ON P.23.
2) IF 1.33 V/HZ WERE ACCEPTABLE, CONSIDERING CALC ERRORS AND APPROXIMATIONS, IS THE
LACK OF ANY MARGIN ACCEPTABLE?. 3) PROVIDE A REVIEW COPY OF ANSI C50.41. 4)WHAT IS THE IMPACT of
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DIFFERENT LOADING CONDITIONS (SUCH AS LOW LOADING) ON THE MAXIMUM TRANSFER ANGLE 7
303. REF. ITEM N-233, PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ACTUAL ILLIN01$ POWER OF STATISTICAL DATA BASED ON
l
EXPERIENCED 3 PHASE FAULTS VS. DOUBLE PHASE TO GROUND F AULTS.
304. REF. ITEM 202: 1) HOW IS 4 SEC TRANSFER TIME OBTAINED? 2) PROVIDE OC. RELAYS TRIP TIME AND ANALY2E
POS$1BILITY AND EFFECTS OF OPERATION AT LIGHT OVERLOADS. 3) CONSIDER THE OCT.92 EVENTS AT OKONEE NUC.
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PLT. IN LICHT OF YOUR STATEMENT OF "NOT CREDIBLE EVENTS" 4) CONSIDER SINGLE F. ANALYSIS OF STUCK EDG
f
OUTPUT BREAKER, UNDER LOCA + LOSS OF OFF SITE SOURCE + EDG PARALLELED TO GRID
.
305. REF ITEM 23D: 1) IS TRANSFER TIME DELAY MEASURED?, If NOT, HOW ls THE CALIBRATION OF EARLY *b" CONTACTS
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PERFORMED? 2) IF TRANSFER 15 700 SLOW, IS THERE A BLOCKING OF TRANSFER? 3) WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES
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OF STUCK BREAKER CONDITIONS, AS THEY MAY AFFECT 1E EQ.? 4) HOW ARE THE STWCHRONISM CHECK RELAY
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SETTINGS DETERMINED?
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306. IN RESPONSE 10 QUESTION 94, THE BATTERY ROOMS ARE TO BE MONITORED DURING C_ AREA ROUNDS (768 DEGREES
-
a
F.).
ARE 1TITVx056, 57, 58, 59, 60, AND 61 IN A CALIBRATION PROGRAM 7
307. WITH REFERENCE TO THE RESPONSE 10 ITEM N-239, PROVIDE COPIES OF THE WEEKLY, QUATERLY AND/OR 18
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MONTH SURVEILLANCE TESTS AND RESULTS THAT INDICATE THAT NOT REPLACING THE Div 11 BATTERY UNTIL THE
SPRING IS ACCEPTABLE.
308. RE: QUESTION 239 PROVIDE RATIONAL FOR THE "LIKE FDP !!KE" REPLACEMENT OF THE Div 11 BATTERY
CONSIDERING THAT THE SIZING CALC 19-D-29 USES A DES 1GN FACTOR OF 1.0 WHEREAS IEEE STD. 4C5-1983
SUGGISTS 1.1D To 1.15 BE USED.
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309. WITH REGARD TO CLASS 1E 480Vac VOLTAGE CONDITIONS, THE RESPONSE TO N 224 IDENTIFIED CR 1-92-04-031.
PLEASE PROVIDE A COPY OF THE LATTER.
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310. CALCULATION 19AN 6: 1) WHERE WOULD A CHECKER FIND THE VALUES OF Z? 2) HOW IS FLI CALCULATED AT 90%.
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VOLT AGE (SEE PAGE 9)? 3) HOW IS FLI CALCULATED FOR HPCS PP DISCH VV., SH0JLD THIS RATHER BE LOCKED
ROTOR INRUSH, TO CORRESPOND WITH THE STATEMENT OF 80% VOLTAGE (SEE PAGE 12)?
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311. CALCllATION 19AN 7, PAGE 16, PROVIDE COPIES OF SPEED TORQUE CURVES.
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312. RE: DIV 111 LOOP + LOCA RESPONSE. 1)WHEN THE LOCA SIGNAL IS RESET BY OPERATIONS, COULD THE HPCS AIR
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COMNtESSOR BECOME A MOMENTARY LOAD ON THE EDG7 2) SHOULD THIS LOAD BE ADDRESSED IN CALC 19-AK-05.
3) SHOULD S3 CONT ACT AT LOCATION J12 BEDRAWN AS NORMALLY CLOSED? (DWG.1HP99, SH. 202).
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313. RE: CR 1-92-08 028. 1) WAS RELAY KG (DWG.1DG99, SH.8) IN A CALIBRATION PROGRAM?. 2) WHY WASN'T THE
INCORRECT RELAY MODEL DISCOVERED SOONER? 3) DOES THE 7012 PK MODEL RELAY HAVE THE SAME CALIBRATION
ACCURACY AND DRIFT PERCENTAGE AS THE 7012 PC? WHAT ARE THET? 4) DID RELAY K6 EVER CAUSE EDG 1 A 10
NOT MEET ITS FAST START TIME DUE TO DELAYED FIELD FLASHlWG7. 5) WAS THE CORRECT MODEL RELAY
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INSTALLED IN EDG 18 CONTROL CIRCUITY?
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314. PROVIDE AS-FOUND / AS-LEFT DATA ON OPENING AND CLOSING TIMES FOR BREAKERS 1ET4- A1 AND 1RT4- A1 FROM
LAST MAINTENANCE.
315. CALC 19-AN-6, REV 2, CONSIDERED THE PICKUP VOLTAGE FOR AC STARTER CONTACTORS AS 70% OF RATED COIL
VOLTAGE (SEE PAGE 13). THE TEST RESULTS OBTAINED BY S&L INCLUDED AS ATTACHMENT 1 TO THE CALC IMPLIED
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REQUIRED PICKUP VOLTAGES OF 72.5% (87v). FURTHER, DATA REPORTED TO BE INCLUDED IN THE VENDOR'S
QUALIFICATION FOR THE MCC'SINDICATED THAT PICKUP VOLTAGE WAS 78%. PLEASE CLAREIFY THESE SEEMINGLY
CodLICTING DOCUMENTS AND ADVISE REGARDING .lMPACT ON CALC 19- AN-6.
316. CALCULATION IM-P-0083 CIVES THE TEMPERATURE CONTROL SETPOINT FOR THE SWITCHGEAR ROOMS AS 75
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DEGREES.- A HIGHER SETPOINT TEMPERATURE WOULD RESULT IN WARMER AIR SUPPLIED TO THE BATTERY ROOMS. IS
75 DEGREES THE CONTROL SETTING? WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR SELECTlWG THIS TEMPERATURE.
317. THE HEAD / FLOW CURVE FOR THE FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP 1FCO2PA/B INDICATESTH1$ PUMP HAS AN INCREASING
HORSEPOWER RUNOUT CHARACTERISTIC. THE MAXIMUMHORSEPOWER POSSIBLE IS APPROXIMATELY 390 VERSUS 340
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QUOTED FOR EDG LOADING.THIS LOADING IS ACCEPTABLE DUE TO CONSERVATIVE LOADING FOR OTHER PUMPS. THIS
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SITUATION WILL OCCUR IF CIRCUIT RESISTANCE DECREASES SUFFICIENTLY. DOES 390 HORSEPOWER EXCEED THE
RATING OF TNE PUNP MOTOR? WILL THE BREAKER FOR THIS M310R OPEN?
318. FUTHER TO QUEST!DN 179. PLEASE PROVIDE SPECIFICATIONS, BILL OF MATERIAL, AND DESCRIPTION OF PRE $SURE
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RELIEF VALVES 1DG006 ABCD AND EF. PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS OF SEISMIC QUALIFICATION.
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319. ECN 9209 INDICATES THAT FC PUMPS ARE RATED 400HP. USAR TABLE 3.8-13 INDICATES THE PUMPS ARE RATED AT
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340HP. WHICH IS CORRECT?
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320. REF. EDG GROUND FAULT PROTECTI9N, CALC 19-AN-14, P. 9, PROVIDE BACKUP INFORMATION FOR THE FOLLOWING:
1) RELAY CURVE TO CHECK TRIP TIME, 2) EDG DAMAGE THRESHOLD TO PROVE EDG WILL NOT BE DAMAGED FOR RELAY-
TRIP TIME, 3) THIRD HARMONIC CURRENT l LOW AND ZER0 SEQUENCE CURRENT FLOW UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS, TO
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CHECK SFURICUS TRIP POS$1BILITY. REVIEW WHETHER PROPER CHECKING COULD HAVE BEEN PERFORMED IN VIEW OF
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THE APFARENT LACK OF PROPER REFERENCING AND BACK UP IN THE ABOVE AREAS.
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321. EDG RELAY SETTINGS, CALC 19-AN-14: REFERENCES /BACK UP DATA ARE MISSING /1NCORRECT, FOR EXAMPLE: 1)
MISSING RELAY OPERATING CURVES TO BACK UP THE SETTING FOR THE ANTIMOTORING RELAY, 2) MISSING REF. FOR
P.U. CURRENT ON PAGE 12, 3) WRONG REF PAGES FOR RELAYCURVES ON P.11, 4) MISSING REF. FOR OPERATING
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FUNCTION OF UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY, WE NEED CLARIFICATION ON HOW THIS RELAY OPERATES COULD PROPER
CHECKING BE PERFORMED WITHOUT THE PROPER REFERENCES?
322. CALC 19- AN-14, ITEM D), "0VERLOAD" PROT.: THE RELAY DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY OVERLOAD PROTECTION, AS IT
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SET TO PICK UP ABOVE THE SUSTAINED SHORT CIRCUIT CURRENTI THEREFORE, THE FUNCTION OF THIS RELAY 15
MISREPRESENTED, WHICH DIRECTLY AFFECTS THE RESPONSE GIVEN TO FREVIOUS INSPECTION QUESTIONS ON
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PROTECTION WHILE IN PARALLEL WITH THE NETWORK.
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323. CALC 19-AJ-68, REV 0, INDICATES ON PAGE 21 THAT THERE ARE 2-TYPE TJ 225A FRAME BKRS MOUNTED ON AUX BLDG
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MCC 1A1 AND IMPLIES THAT THESE BRKS HAVE AN INTURRUPTING RATING OF 25LA AT 480V. CONTRARY TO THIS
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KEY DI AGRAM, E02-1 AP47, REV S, FOR THIS MCC SHOWS ONLY 1-TYPE FJ 225A BKR AND ATTACHMENT B1 TO CALC
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19 AN-6, REV O IMPLIES, ON PAGE 7, AN INTURRUPTING RATlWG OF 22kA. FURTHER, VENDOR DATA DN PAGE 35 00
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CALC 19-AJ-68 INDICATES AN IWiURRUPTING RATING OF 1BkA AT 480V FOR TYPE FJ 225A BRKS. PLEASE CLARElY
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/ EXPLAIN. SIMILAR ANOMOLIES NOTED FOR TYPE FJ, 225A BRKS ON AUX BLDG MCC 1B1, AUX BLDG MCC 1C1, AND
324. IDENTIFY ALL TIME DELAY RELAYS IN DG 1A STARTING CIRCUITS THAT ARE NOT IN A CALIBRATION PROGRAM.
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FOR EACH OF THE RELAYS, PROVIDE A Basis FOR NOT VERIFYING THE CORRECT DESIGN SETTING, AND lF THE
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RELAYS WERE OUT OF CALIBRATION, COULD THEY AT SOME PolNT IN TIME (DUE TO DRIFT) PREVENT THE DG FROM
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STARTING.
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325. 1) 15 THE OVERVOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKER IN THE DIV 1&2 DIESEL GENERATORS IN circuli BREAKER PM/ TEST
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PROGRAM 7 2) IF YES, WHEN WAS LAST TEST? 3) WHAT ARE SET PolNTS? 4) 15 THis 1 RIP FEATURE BYPASSED ON
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ECS$/LOCA INITIATION?
326. RE: DG WALKDOWN ON 02/03/93, DIV I DG VALVES 1SXO63A TAG MR NO. I,17160, " LEAK BY SEAT", DATED 2/7/91,
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AND 1SXO64A TAG MR WO.10848, " BADLY PITTED VALVE SEAf", DATED 11/14/90. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE MRs
AND THE EFFECT ON OPERABILITY OF THE DG HX? HAVE THESE VALVES BEEN INSPECTED SUBSEQUENTLY TO THE DATED
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TAGS FOR FURTHER !*CRADATION?
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327. RE: MOD DGF024, "EDG IDLE SPEED". WHO MAINTAINS KEY CONTROL FOR 1HS-DG291 (RUN/ IDLE SW)?
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328. RE: MOD DGF024 IF THE DG WAS IN TEST OR PREPARING FOR 1EST WITH 1HE RUN/ IDLE SW IN IDLE AND AN
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AUTOMATIC START SIGNAL OCCURRED, THE DESIGN SHOULD START OR ACCELERATE THE DG TO OPERATING SPEED AND
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LOAD THE SAFETY BUS AS REQUIRED. 1) FOR A LOOP OR 2ND LEVEL SIGNAL, UPON RESET OF THE 2ND LEVEL
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RELAY (227X1-21 A12) FOLLOWING DG 00TPUTBREAKER CLOSURE, COULD THE ASR-DG1 A RELAY DE-ENERGlZE AND
FORCE THE DG TO IDLE SPEED? 2) FORA LOCA, COULD THE UNLOADED DG BE FORCED 101DLE UPON RESETilWG
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THE LOCA SIGkAL73) FOR A LOOP /LOCA OR LOCA + 2ND LEVEL,COULD THE LOADED DG BE FORCE TO IDLE UPON
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RESETTING THE LOCA $1GNAL7
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329. RE: CALC 19-Al 14. REV 2, PAGE 22. IN CALCULATING Vr(6), WHY WAS AN AVERAGE MOTOR VALUEUSED INSTEAD
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OF WORST CASE? WOTE: THIS QUESTION WAS DISCUSSED BETWEEN 0. MAZZONI AND D. TOCKSTEIN.02/04/93.
330. PROVIDE COPIES OF TEMP MODS: 90-027,91-016, AND 92-070. NEEDED BY 2/15/93.
331. RE: SIL 418 - TOPAZ INVERTER LOW VOLTAGE SHUTOFF. PROVIDE CAllBRATION PROCEDURES (PM) FOR TOPAZ
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INVERTERS HIGH AND LOW VOLTAGE CUTOFF SETPolNTS. REQUIRED BY 02/15/93.
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332. RE t NSED PROCEDURE R.O.
PROVIDE A COPY OF LAST THREE QUARTERLY MCMP TREND REPORTS.
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333. FURTHER TO QUESTION 98, WYLE REPORT DOCUMENT # 43450-1 SHOWS THAT VERTICAL ACCELERATION EXCEEDS 1.0
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G FOR BATTERIES AND RACKS DURING SEISMIC LOADING. POSITIVE RESTRAINT IS REQUIRED TO KEEP THE
BATTERY CELLS FROM JUMP!NG IN THE RACKS. BATTERY CELLS MUST BE INDIVIDUALLY RESTRAINED VERTICALLY
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TO AVOID MECHANCALLY LOADING POSTS AND POST CONNECTIONS. THE EXISTING SIDE RAll, HORIZONTAL TIE
A00, EXPANDED POLYSTYRENE SPACER CONFIGURAll0N DOES NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE VERTICAL RESTRAINT. PLEASE
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REVIEW.
334. PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THE 430V AT THE SWITCHGEAR & 3 VOLT DROP TO THE MOTOR CONTROL CENTER IN
CALCULAT]DN 19-AJ-10, PAGE 7 TO ARRIVE AT THE 427V ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA IN 1-92004-031, PAGE 3.
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335. CALCULATION 19- Al-62 WAS PERFORMED TO SHOW THAT A FAULT ON A NON-SAFETY LOAD WILL NOT AFFECT A SAFETY
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LOAD ON THE SAME BUS. THERE IS AN APPARENT LACK OF COORDINATION ON PAGE 11 ON A 3 PHASE FAULT AND ON
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FAGE 13 FOR A LINE TO LINE FAULT. WHY IS THIS CONDITION ACCEPTABLE 7
336. DO THE VOLTAGE DROP CALCS 19-AJ-42, 19-AJ-54, & 19-AJ-58 PROVIDED IN RESPONSE To N-212 ADDRESS THE
WORST CASE FOR THE INSTRUMENT POWER SYSTEM 7 IF NOT, PROVIDE THE WORST CASE CALF
337. VITH REFERENCE TO QUESTION No. 269 AND RESPONSE, THis OUESTION DID NOT REQUEST km F"7P MOTOR
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START]NG CURRENT BUT RATHER CURRENT THE MOTOR WOULD DRAW WHEN THE REACTOR IS COLD AND COOLANT IS AORE
CENSE.
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338. QUESTION 212 REQUESTED C00RDINAT]ON CALCS FOR THE IP SYSTEM. THE INDEX OF CALC 19-AJ 68, PAGE 5 & 6
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DOES NOT IDENTIFY THE IP SYSTEM. WHERE IS THE IP SYSTEM DISCUSSED IN THl$ CALC 7
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339. PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TASKS PEksYMD52 PEMSYMD53, PEMSYM054, AND PEMSYM055 REQUIRE THE ERECTION OF
A CONTAINMENT ARDUND THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT IN THE SWlTCHYARD TO ACT AS ENVIRONMENTAL ENCLOSURES DURING
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THE PERFORMANCE OF WORK. FOLLOWING COMPLETION OFTHE CONTAINMENT, THE FLAT BED TRAILER WITH SPARE
ENCLOSURE MATERIAL SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE SWITCHYARD TO M]NIMlZE " MISSILE" HAZARDS TO SWITHYARD
EQUIPMENT IN HIGH WIND SITUATIONS. THE FLAT BED TRAILER CAN BE BROUGHT BACK INTO THE SWITHYARD WHEN IT
IS TIME 10 DISASSEMBLE THE ENCLOSURE. PLEASE ADDRESS.
340. PROVIDE DOCUMENT THAT ESTABLISHES AND INDICATES ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR CLASS 1E MOTORS SERVED FROM
MCCR.
341. & v!PE A COPY OF THE SYSTEM ENGINEER QUAllFICAT]DN CARD AND A DESCRIPTION (AND ANY PROCEDURE) OF
Th METHOD TO BE USED TO IMPLEMENT THE USE OF THE CARD FOR CURRENT & NEWLY ASSIGNED ENGINEERS.
342. RE: CR-1-92-03-067, "MISslWG LOCKING STRAP DN RELAY 6255. PROVIDE A COPY OF DWG.169C94BB.
343. RE: SIL 418 TOPAZ ]NVERTER LOW VOLTAGE SHUTOFF. $1NCE THE SHU10FF SETPOINT 18 WOT FUNCTIONALLY
CHECKED DURING PMs (OUESTION 331), 15 THERE SUFFICIENT MANUiACTURER'S DATA AVA]LABLE TO DEMONSTRATE
THE LOW LEVEL SHUT OFF WILL NOT DRIFT ABOVE 105Vdc DURINGTHE INVERTERS QUALIFIED LIFE CYCLE 7
344. RE: CR-1-92-03-06, "MISSikG LOCKING $1 RAP DN 62S5 RELAT". 1) HOW MANY TIMES HAS THE 6255 RELAY BEEN
REMOVED FOR CALIBRATION SINCE THE HPCS DEGRADED VOLTAGE SYSTEM WAS DECLARED OPERABLE 7 2) DID THE
TECHNICIANS HAVE PRIOR TRAINING THAT AGASTAT RELAYS MAY REQUIRE A LOCKlWG STRAP OR WAS THIS
CONSIDERED " SKILL OF THE CRAFT"?
345. ASK GE IF THEY HAVE COORDINATION ANALYSIS FOR THE FUSES FED BY WSPS DISTRIBUTION PANE't BREAKERS,1.E.
FUSES WILL BLOW BEFORE BREAKERS WILL OPEN.
346. CALC 19-M-3, REGARDING PENETRATION PROTECTION, ON PAGE 20, SUGGESTS THAT A FAULT ON ONE OF THE 2 350
MCM CABLES PER PHASE COULD OCCUR. IN SUCH A CASE, THE COORDINATION CURVES SHOWN ON PAGE 21
INDICATES A POTENTIAL COORD] NATION PROBLEM. PLEASE REVIEW ANDADVISE.
347. IS PMS0-052TO BE REPLACED WITH A FORMAL PROCEDURE 7 HOW DOES QA ASSURE THAT APPROPROATE LEVELS OF
OUALITY ARE MAINTA]NED VITH STANDING ORDERS? FROVIDE A COPY OF CLIN 10N FUSE LIST. PMSO-052
APPEARS TO APPLY TO CONTROLRDOM (OPERATOR) AND ELECTRICAL SHOPACTIVITIES, DOES SAME CONTROL APPLY
TO !&C $ HOP?
348. DG FUEL TRANSFER PUMPS, ASME SECTION XI, IST. HAS REL1EF REQUEST 3002 REVISION 3, BEEN APPROVED?
PROVIDE APPROPRI ATE DOCUMENTATION.
349. TEMPORARY MOD 90-027. ]F VALVE 1E12-F0148 OR F068B WERE INADVERTENTLY CLOSED AND SX PUMP B WAS
STARTED OR AUTO STARTED (NON-EME2GENCY SIGNAL), WOULD ENOUGH OTHER FLOW PATHS EXIST TO KEEP FROM
DAMAGlNG THE PUMP? HAS EITHER OF THESE VALVES BEEN CLOSED FOR SOME REASON WHEN THE SX PUMP B WAS
REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE 7
350. THE SAFETY GRADE CHECK VALVES FOR THE AIR RECEIVER TAWKS WERE NOT VIS]BLE DURING WALKDOWNS. ARE THESE
CHECKVALVES INTERNAL? DOES THE MONTHLY SURVEILLANCE 90BO 01D001 (REF QUESTION 150) TESE THESE
VALVES? WHAT IS THE SURVE!LLANCE/ TESTING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PRESSURE PELIEF VALVE FOR THE AIR
RECEIVER TANKS? PROVIDE APPLICABLE DATA FOR REVIEW. PROVIDE TEST DATA / ANALYSIS FOR TIVE START
CAPABILITY.
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351. PLEASE PROVIDE THE CALCULATIDNS THAT DEMONSTkATi C00RDINAT10N BETWEEN THE Div 1 MDTOR CONTROL CENTER
MOLDED CASE BREAKERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE FEEDER BREAKERS ON THE 480 VOLT SWITCHGE AR.
352.1) PROVIDE RATIONAL FOR SIZING OF THE GROUNDING TRANSFORMER AT 10 KVA, WHEN THE CONTINU0US ENERGY
REDUIREMErt FOR A MAXIMUM GROUND FAULT IS 12 KW. 2) WHAT IS THE REASDN FOR THE 10 A FUSE IN
PROTECTIVE OIRCUIT OF EDG DIV 3 (REF DWG E02-1AP01)?, SHOULDN'T THIS FUSE BE CONTINUQUSLY MONITDRED
TO PREVENT UNWOTICED DEACTIVATION OF THE PROTECTION?
353. PROVIDE THE FOLLDWING DATA: 1) TURNS RATION ON MCC CONTROL POWER TR ANSFORMER. 2) BREAKER
C00RD1kATION FOR 480V FEED BREAKER TO SWITCHGEAd DOWN STREAM TO MOLDED CASE BREAKERS.
354. CONCERN N-1020 DC1 A INSTRUMENTS NOT IN CAllBRATION PROGRAM. CALC Cl-CPS-2D4 STATED THE " DRIFT PER
UNIT TIME" (td) WAS INCLUDED ]N THE REPEAT ACCURACY (AC). IS THE AC VALUE SPECIFIED BY THE
MANUFACTURER GARRANTEED FOR THE QUALIFIED LIFE OF THE RELAYS IN QUESTION? IT THE SPEED SWITCH IN
A CALIBRATION PROGRAM?
355. 1) PROVIDE A COPY OF LAST 1 COMPLETED PEM.APM536. 2) WHAT IS THE FRDUENCY FOR PEM.APM5367
356. CALC 19-AN-4 IND]CATED THAT THE LARGEST MOLDED CASE CIRCUIT BREAKERS ON AB MCC 1A1 AND AP MCC 1B1
ARE TYPE FJ 150A FRAME. ALSO, THIS CALC 1NDICA1ED THAT THE LARGEST ON AB MCC 1C1 AND SSU MCC 1C ARE
TYPE HE 100A FRAME. CONTRARY TO THIS CALC,19-AJ-6B INDICATES THAT THE LARGEST BREAKERS ON THESE MCCs
ARE TYPE FJ 225A FRAME. PLEASE CLARIFY AND ADVISE REGARDING IMPACT ON COORDINATION SHOWN ON PAGES
14 AND 16 0F CALC 19-AN-4
357. PROVIDE COP!ES OF THE LAST 2 COMPLETED CAL 1 BRAT!DN PRDCEDURES / DATA SHEETS FOR DIESEL GENERATDR
FIELD CONDIT10NIhG RELAY.
358. NSED8s RESPONSE TO THE SELF-INITI ATED EDSFI REPORT (LETTER Y-214990 EDSF1 #637) STATED THAT A CCP AND
WOT A PROCEDURE DEVI AT!DN FOR REVIS10N (PDR) WOULD BE USED TO HANDLE THE PROCEDURE CHANGE TO CPS
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52B4.05, REV 5.
WHAT ACT10N HAS BEEN TAKEN TO INFORM THE CDNTROL ROOM OPERATDR OF HIS OR HER
REQUIRED ACTIONS SHOULD THIS ALARM COME IN PRIOR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROCEDURE REVISION?
IS THERE ANY INTENT BY CPS TO ALSO PLACE THE OPERATOR ACTIDW STATEMENT IN THE CONTROL R00M
ANNUNCI ATOR PROCEDURE FDR "DG TROUBLE ALARM", ANNUNCI ATOR # $060, E8 AND 5061, E87
359. IN THE DIV III BATTERY RDOM THE AIR SUPPLY DUCT PROTRUDES OVER THE BATTERY. 15 THis PORTION
SE!SMICALLY QUALIFIED? ALSO THE FLOURESCENT LIGHTS AND BATTERY PACK EMERGENCY LIGHTS? PROVIDE
DOCUMENTATION.
360. RE: MOD APF011 FUNCTIONAL TESTING AND N-1007 RESPONSE. FOLLOWING COMPLETIDN OF MWRs 26727, 26730,
2315*, 26728, 26726, AND 26729, WAS THE APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL TEST SECTION OF 9333.01 DR 9333.02-
PERFORMED PRIOR TO DECLARING EACH RELAY DPERAT10hAL?
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