Text

Forwards FEMA Transmitting Rept for 890516 full-participation & 891113 Remedial Exercises.Deficiencies Noted Re Emergency Broadcast Sys Messages & Notification of Hearing Impaired
	ML20033G362
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	03/26/1990
From:	Randy Erickson; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Ronald Bellamy; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML17056A781	List: ML17056A780; ML20033G362;
References
	NUDOCS 9004090206
	Download: ML20033G362 (2)
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_ UNITED STATES g

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION rn j-W ASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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March 26,p.990 j

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l MEMORANDUM FOR:

Ronald R. Bellamy, Chief ti

-Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety and-Safeguards Region 1 FROM:

Robert A.' Erickson, Chief' Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Protection

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and Emergency Preparedness u

Office of-Nuc1 car Reactor Regulation H

SUBJECT:

FEMA EXERCISE REPORT FOR THE NINE-MILE POINT NUCLEAR-POWER = STATION

.l Enclosed is a letter from Dennis Kwiatkowski of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) dated March 15, 1990, transmitting the FEMA Region 11 report l

for the May-16, 1989 full-participation exercise and the November 13,:1989 remedial exercise at the Nine-Mile Point Nuclear Power Station.- There'were l

three deficiencies identified during the exercise. The deficiencies-involved-

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problems with the EBS messages, the notification of the. hearing-impaired,~ and monitors used f or detecting contamination.1They were corrected in the November 13, 1989 remedial exercise.

We reconnend that you transmit the enclosed FEMA letter and exercise report to the licensee.

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Ro rt A. Eric son, Chief Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Protection-and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Enclosure:

-FEMA ltr. dtd. 3/15/90 w/ enclosure Ee

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i Federal Emergency Management Agency i

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FIAR 15 W Mr. Frank J. Congel Director, Division of Radiation Protection -

and Emergency Preparedness

-Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

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Dear Mr. Congel This is to transmit a copy of the Post-Exercise Assessment (PEA) report for the May 16,1989, full-participation e_xercise and the November 13, 1989, remedial exercise for the Nine-Mile Point Nuclear Power Station, in Scriba, Oswego County, New York.

The report, dated February 19, 1990, was prepared by the staff'of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Region II and received in FEMA Headquarters on ' February 26, 1990.

Three deficiencies, several Areas Requiring Corrective - Action and several planning issues resulted from the May 16, 1989, ' exercise. - The three deficiencies were corrected in the November 13, 1980,, remedial-exercise.

The New York State Emergency Management Of fice has also. committed to a schedule of corrective action in order to address-by June 1, 1990, the planning issues identified during the exercise and others identified'as part_of-l the ongoing plan review process.

Based on the results of the remedial exercise and the commitments of the State of New York FEMA considers

.j that offsite' radiological emergency preparednens is ad. equate to provide

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reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.

Therefore, the approval of offsite plans and preparedness granted on February 1,1985, under 44 CFR 350 will remain in effect.

If. you have any questions, please. feel f ree to contact me at 646-2871.

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Sincerely,

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,; s Dennis H. Kwiatowski

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Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Enclosure As Stated

\\ Phi POST-EXERCISE ASSESSMENT May 16,1989, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of the State of New York and Oswego County for Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation's -

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION at Scriba, Oswego County, New York Including the results of the November 13,1989 Remedial Exercise February 19,1990 Federal Emergency Management Agency Region 11 25 Federal Plaza, New York, N.Y.10278 d0 0)2A g

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POST-EXERCISE ASSESSMENT

.L May 16,1989, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of the State of New York and Oswego County for Niagara. Mohawk Power Corporation's l

NINE. MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION at Scriba, Oswego County, New York February 19,1990 t

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l Federal Emergency Management Agency Region II 26 Federal Plaza, New York, N.Y.10278 L

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CONTENTS P ARTICIP ATION O F GOVERNM ENTS........................................

V A B B R E VI A TI O N S..........................................................

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SUMMARY

................................................................ vill 1 I N T R O D U C TI O N........................................................

1 1.1 Exercis e Bac kgro und................ n...............................

1 1.2 Fede ral Eval ua t ors.................................................

2 1.3 Evalua tion Crit e ria..................................................

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1.4 Ex e rc ise O bj e c t iv es............................................... -

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1.4.1 State Emergency Operations Center............................

4-1.4.2 Central District Operations Center..............................

5 1.4.3 Em ergency Operations Facility.................................

6 1.4.4 Joint Ne ws C e nt er...........................................

6 1.4.5 Oswego County Emergency Operations Center...................

7 1.4.6 Oswego County Field Activities................................

8-1.4.7 Oswego County Medical Drill..................................

9 1.5 Ex e rc is e Sc e n ar io..................................................

9 1.5.1 Sc e nario Overvie w...........................................

9 1.5.2 State and Local Ac tivities.....................................

13 1.5.3 Emergency Classification and Event Time Line...................

14 1.5.4 Protective Action Time Line...................................

15 2 E X E R C IS E E V A L U ATIO N................................................

16 2.1 N e w Yo r k S t a t e....................................................

16 2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center............................- 16 2.1.2 Central District Emergency Operations Center................... - 18 2.1.3 Emergency Operations Facility.................................

19 2.1.4 Joi nt Ne ws C ent er........................................... 22 2.2 Os w e go C o u n ty.................................................... 28 2.2.1 Oswego County Emergency Operations Center................... 28 l

2.2.2 Field Monitoring Teams....................................... 39 l

2.2.3 Field Ac tivi tie s.............................................. 41 l-2.2.4 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control................ 50 2.3 M e d i c al ' D r ill......................................................

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2.3.1 A m bulanc e Por tio n........................................... 53 2.3.2 Hosp i t al Port ion............................................. 5 4 2.4 Su m mary of Planning Issues.......................................... 54 2.5. Remedial Exercise (November 13, 19 8 9 )............................... 56 3

SUMMARY

OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING C O R R E CTIV E ACTIO N.................................................. 62 i

4 REMOVAL OF COMPLETED AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION FROM PREVIOUS POST-EXERCISE ASSESSMENT................... 87' iii

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TABLES 1.5.3 Emergency Classification and Event Time Line......................... 14 1.5.4 Protective Action Time Line.........................................,

3.1 Nine Mlle Point Site - Summary of Areas Requiring ~

Corrective Action - May 16,1989 New York State EOC.................. 63 3.2 Nine Mlle Point Site - Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action - May 16,1989 Central District EOC................ 64 3.3 Nine Mlle Point Site - Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action - May 16,1989 Emergency Operations Facility.................. 65 3.4 Nine Mlle Point Site - Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action - May 16,1989 Joint News Center............................. 67 3.5 Nine Mlle Point Site -- Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action - May 16,1989 Os w ego Co unty................................ 73.

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PARTICIPATION OF GOVERNMENTS Participating Governments The State of New York Oswego County Onondaga County r

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ABBREVIATIONS j

ANL Argonne National Laboratory ARC American Red Cross CDEOC Central District Emergency Operations Center CNFLO County Nuclear Facility Liaison Officer DOC U.S. Department of Commerce DOE U.S. Department of Energy DOI U.S. Department of the Interior-DRD direct-reading dosimeter DOT U.S. Department of Transportation EBS Emergency Broadcast System ECL emergency classification level EMO Emergency Management Office (Oswego County)

EMS emergency medical service EOC

. emergency operations center EOF emergency operations facility EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ emergency planning zone ERPA emergency response planning area FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory -

JAFNPP J.A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant JNC Joint Ne s Center w

KI potassium lodide MD medical drill NFLO nuclear facility liaison officer NMPNS Nine Mlle Point Nuclear Station NMPS Nine Mlle Point Site NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUE Notification of Unusual Event OCEOC Oswego County Emergency Operation Center OCFA Oswego County field activities PAG protective action guideline vi j

i ABBREVIATIONS (Cont'd)

PAR protective action recommendation PEA post-exercise assessment P!O public infoamation officer PMC Personnel Monitoring Center RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RECS Radiological Emergency Communications System REPP Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan RO radiation officer SEMO

. State Emergency Management Office SEOC State Emergency Operations Center (Albany)

TCP traffic control point TLD thermoluminescent dosimeter TSC Technical Support Center TTY teletypewriter USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture l

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SUMMARY

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On May 16,1989, a team of 20 Federal evaluators evaluated an exercise of the l

radiological emergency response plans and the level of State and County preparedness for the Nine Mlle Point Nuclear Station located in Oswego County, New York. The exercise' was announced and took place from approximately 0800 to 1600 hours0.0185 days 0.444 hours 0.00265 weeks 6.088e-4 months .' Following the exercise, an evaluation was made by the Federal evaluator team,~ and a preliminary l

briefing for exercise participants was held at the Best Western motel in Oswego, New York, on May 18,1989, at 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months . A media briefing was held on May 19,1989, at the McCroble Building in Oswego, New York. Subsequent to those preliminary briefings, detailed evaluations were prepared and are included in this report..

During a full-scale exercise, th'e Federal Emergency ; Management Agency requires that most components of the State and local emergency response organizations participate. Federal evaluators evaluated the following operations:

State Emergency Operations Center in Albany Off-Site Emergency Operations Facility

Joint News Center s

Central District Emergency Operations Center in Oneida Oswego County Emergency Operations Center Evacuation of the general population Evacuation of the mobility impaired Evacuation of school children Radiological field monitoring Impediments to evacuation

Traffic and access control Personnel Monitoring Center Reception Center l

Congregate Care Center-Medical drill i

e Siren activation (simulated)

Emergency Broadcast System messages A remedial exercise was held on November 13, 1989 to test the capabilities of the State and Oswego County to correct the three deficiencies evaluated at the May 16, 1989 exercise. The results of the remedial exercise appears in Section 2.5 of this report.

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I 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1. EXERCISE BACEGROUND On December 7,

1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response. FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review l

and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) developed by State and local governments.

Determining whether such plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by State and local governments.

Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

- U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)

- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-

- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)

- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) t

- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) l

- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) i

- U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

- U.S. Department of the' Interior (DOI)

Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA. The RERPs for the Nine Mlle Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS) were critiqued and evaluated after formal submission of the plans on July 15, 1981. A public meeting was held on November 4,1981, to acquaint the public with the plans' contents, answer questions, and receive suggestions for changes in the plans.

The following exercises have been conducted by FEMA Region 11 to assess the l'

capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing l

their RERPS and procedures to protect the public in a radiological emergency involving l

the nuclear power plant.

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Issuance of

-Final.

Exercise Exercise Post-Exercise Number Date-Assessment

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by FEMA Region II 1

9/15/81 12/20/81-2 9/11/82 10/29/82 3

9/28/83 12/23/83 4

11/13/85 2/18/86 5-12/15/87:

6/3/88-6 5/16/89 2/1 9/90 0

The sixth exercise, the subject of this report, was an announced exercise. An-evaluation team comprising personnel _ from FEMA Region II, RAC, and - FEMA's -

contractors evaluated the May 16, 1989, exercise. Twenty evaluators were assigned to 1 evaluate the emergency response activities of State and local-jurisdictions.

Team leaders coordinated team operations.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluators, with final determinations by the FEMA Region !! RAC Chairman. A' remedial-drill was-held on November 13, 1989, to correct the deficiencies evaluated during_ the i

exercise. Activities demonstrated during the remedial drill must be extensive enough to show that the deficiencies have been rectified. FEMA requests that State and local jurlsdictions submit a schedule of remedial actions for correcting, the areas requiring -

corrective action (ARCAs) discussed in this report.. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that all negative findings evaluated during the exercise will be corrected and that such corrections are being incorporated into State and local plans, as appropriate.

1.2 FEDERAL EVALUATORS Twenty Federal evaluators evaluated off-site emergency response functions.

These individuals, their affiliations, and their exercise. assignments are given below.-

Evaluator Entity Exercise Location (Function (s})

I. Husar FEMA FEMA 11 RAC Chairman (Evaluation)

G. Seidenfeld -

FEMA FEMA 11 NMPNS Project Officer (Evaluation)

S. Gray FEMA State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)

(Team Leader)

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S. Nelson ANL SEOC (Communications)

W. Serrano '

INEL SEOC (Dose Assessment)-

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J. Mitrant ANL Central District EOC (CDEOC)

E. Fox NRC Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

J. O'Sullivan FEMA Joint News Center (JNC) i K. Call' FEMA-JNC, Radio Station WKFM P. Weberg FEMA Oswego County Emergency Operations Center (OCEOC)

(Team Leader)-

P. Kier ANL OCEOC (Communications, Warning Point)

H. Fish DOE OCEOC (Operations)

B. Salmonson INEL OCEOC (Accident Assessment)

D. Duncan ANL Oswego County (Fleid Monitoring)

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R. Bernacki FDA Oswego County (General Population Evacuation,

' Reception Center Medical Drill, Hospital Medical Drill)

C. Heilig FEMA Oswego County (School Evacuation) i S. James FEMA Oswego County (Impediments to Evacuation, Mobility-i Impaired Evacuation, Traffic / Access Control)

A. Fellman EPA Oswego County (Personnel Monitoring Center)

M. Pensak EPA Onondaga County (Reception Center)

B. Galloway ARC Onondaga County (Congregate Care Center) 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercise evaluations presented in Sec. 2 are based on' applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, Sec. II (Nov.1980). For the purpose of exercise assessment, FEMA uses an evaluation method to -

apply the criteria of NUREG-0654.

FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies.as l

deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action (ARCAs).

Deficiencies are l

demonstrated and observed inadequacies in the performance of State and local governments that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not 1

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l adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be-taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of a radiological emergency.- Because of the potential adverse impact of ' deficiencies = on emergency preparedness, they must~ be corrected within 120 days of the exercise date through appropriate remedial actions, including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions. ARCAs are also demonstrated and observed inadequacies in the performance of State and local governments, and although their-correction is required during the next scheduled biennial exercise, they are notl considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety. An ARCA that is not corrected in future exercises may be reclassified as a deficiency. _ FEMA also u

I identifies areas recommended for improvement (ARFIs), which are probl.em areas -

l observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety. _While not required, correction of these would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness.

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L 1.4 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES l

The objectives of New York State and Oswego County in this exercise were to demonstrate the adequacy of the RERPs, the capability to mobilize needed personnel and equipment, and the adequacy of the famillarity with the procedures required to cope with an emergency at Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation's (hereafter referred to as the Utility) NMPNS. The exercise was to involve activation and participation of Utility staff and response facilities of the NMPNS, as well-as the emergency organizations and facilities of New York State and Oswego County. Federal representatives were to act as exercise evaluators. The scope of this exercise, with some exceptions, was to endeavor to demonstrate by actual performance a number of primary emergency preparedness funcilons. At no time was the exercise to Interfere with safe operation of the NMPNS.

The State of New York State Emergency Management Office and Oswego County agreed to demonstrate the following objectives for this exercise.

The numbering of these objectives corresponds to the number scheme used for the standardized FEMA objectives.

1.4.1 State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)

SEOC1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use emergency classification levels (ECLs) through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenario.. The four ECLs are Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency,- and General Emergency.

SEOC 2 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions.

SEOC 3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities.

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Demonstrate - the ability to communicate with all appropriate-l locations, organizations, and field personnel..

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SEOC 5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and l

other materials to support emergency operations.

SEOC 10 Demonstrate the ability, within the plume' exposure pathway, to

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project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and.

1 field data.*

SEOC 11 Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate' protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA protective action guidelines - (PAGs), availability 'of adequate ' shelter, evacuation time estimates, and other relevant factors.*

SEOC 12 Demonstrate the. ability to initially alert the public within_ the 10-mile emergency planning. zone (EPZ) and begin dissemination of an instructional message. within 15 minutes of a deelslon by appropriate State and/or local official (s).*

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SEOC 13 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemi-nation of accurate information and instructions to the public in a i

1 timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred.*

SEOC 16 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of potassium lodide. (KI) to emergency -workers and Institu-'

tioaalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the deelslon is made, if necessi-tated by radiolodine releases.

1.4.2 Central District Operations Center (CDEOC)

CDEOC1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and.

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activities corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenario. The 4 four ECLs are Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency.

'l CDEOC 2 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate i

personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions.

This objective would have been evaluated for the SEOC had the Governor declared a State of Emergency.

i o-o CDEOC 3 Demonstrate the. ability to direct, ' coordinate, and control :

emergency activities.

CDEOC 4 Demonstrate the 1 ability t communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel..

CDEOC5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment,' displays, and other materials to support emergency operations.

1.4.3 Emergency Operations Paellity (EOF)

EOF 1 Demonstrate _the ability to ' monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriete implementation of emergency functions and i

activities corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenario. The four ECLs are Notification of Unusual Event, Alert,. Site Area.

Emergency, and General Emergency.

i EOF 2 Demonstrate the ' ability to fully _ alert, mobilize, and. activate l

personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions.

EOF 3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities.

EOF 4 Demonstrate the ability-.to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

1 EOF 5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and 1

other materials to support emergency operations.

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EOF 34 Demonstrate the ability to. maintain s*.affing on a continuous 24-hour basis by an actual shift change.

1.4.4 Joint News Center (JNC)

JNC1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency. functions and activities corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenario. The i

four ECLs are Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area l

Emergency, and General Emergency.

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JNC 2 Demonstrate the ability _ to fully akt, mobilize, and activate personnel fcr both facility-and field-based emergency functions.

JNC5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations.

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JNC 12 -

Demonstrate the ability. to initially alert the_ public within the i-10-mile EPZ and begin' dissemination of an instructional message ~

i within 15 minutes of a deelslon by appropriate State and/or local official (s).

- JNC 13 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemi-1 l

nation of-accurate information and Instructions to _the public In~ a.

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JNC 14 Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordi-nated, and timely manner, j

JNC 15 Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion.

1.4.5 Oswego County Emergency Operations Center (OCEOC) i OCEOC1 Demonstrate the ' ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropelate implementation of emergency functions and.

activities corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenarlo. The four ECLs are Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency.

OCEOC 2 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions.

1 OCEOC 3 Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities.

OCEOC 4 Demonstrate _the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

OCEOC5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations.

i OCEOC 10 Demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure pathway,.to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data.

OCEOC 11 Demonstrate the ability to make appropelate protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAGs, avall-i ability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates, and other relevant factors.

OCEOC 12 Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 ' minutes of a deelslon by appropriate State and/or local offIclal(s).

y OCEOC 13 Demonstrate the ability. to coordinate the formulation and dissemi-

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nation of accurate information.and instructions to the public in a 1

timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred.

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OCEOC 16. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the.

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use of KI to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distrib'ute and administer it 4

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once the deelslon is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases.

- OCEOC 18 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions' for the Impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ' populations ;(including transit-dependent persons,. special-needs populations,. handicapped perdons, ' and institutionalized persons).

t OCEOC 19 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to Implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ.

OCEOC 20 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources'necessary to l

control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated-and sheltered areas.

1.4.6 Oswego County Field Activities (OCFA) l l

OCFA 4 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with appropriate field locations, organizations, and field personnel.

OCFA 6 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

OCFA 7 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures ~ for determining field radiation measurements.

OCFA 8 Demonstette the appropriate equipment and procedures for the measurement of altborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 10-7 4

microcuries per cc in the presence of noble gases.

OCFA 9 Demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses.

OCFA 18 Demonstrate the ability.and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and.

transient plume EPZ populations (including transit-dependent persons, special-needs. populations, handicapped persons,- and institutionalized persons).

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OCFA 19 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ.

OCFA 20 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas.

OCFA 21 Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, egelpment, andt

-r' personnel _ for the registration, i radiological monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees.

OCFA 22 Demonstrate the adequacy'of facilities, equipment, and personnel for congregate care of evacuees.

OCFA 25 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies,-

procedures, and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles, and for waste disposal.

1.4.7 Oswego County Medical Drill (MD)

MD 23 Demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, procedures, and personnel _ for transporting contaminated, injured, or exposed individuals.

MD 24 Demonstrate ' the adequacy of medical facility's equipment, procedures, and personnel for handling contaminated, injured, or exposed individuals.

l-1.5 - EXERCISE SCENARIO 1.5.1 Scenario Overview Initial Conditions 1

Nine Mile Point Unit No.1 is operating at full power near the middle of its cycle on the present core, having been at that power level for the past four months. All systems are operating normally with the exception of the following:

Reserve transformer 101N is out of service for an emergency

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inspection of the transformer internals and replacement of the

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transformer oil because products of combustion were detected in the oil during a routine test.

It is expected to be returned to service within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Diesel generator 102 is running' with l

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10; breaker R-1022 closed and-powering: power board 102 ~ until-the transformer can: be returned to service. - The following breaker alignment exists as a result of this evolutiont Breakers R-112, R-1012, and R-1011 are in pull-to-lock.

" Switch 168 TRANS 101 N" is in pull-to-lock.

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Core spray pump 112 is out of service for motor bearing repair and is expected to be returned to service within two days.

r Instrument air compressor 12 is tagged-out_ and_ dismantled for a major overhaul and is expected to be returned to service within.16 to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Quarterly - surveillance testing of containment Isolation valves is in proctress per Technical Specification 4.3.4.

Weather conditions are fair, with the wind out of the north at 6-8 miles per hour. -

Scenario The exercise will be initiated when, at 10 minutes into the exercise, a torus vacuum relief check valve (IV-68-06) will become jammed in the partially open position during testing. It _will not be possible to close the valve manually. It will have to be dismantled and repaired. -Five-minutes later a fault in reserve transformer 101S~ will result. The loss of this transformer in turn will cause loss of power board 101 and its associated equipment listed belows t

Reactor recirculation pump No.13.

Motor drive fire pump.

Condensate pump No.12.

Feedwater booster pump No.12.

Power board 103 will also be de-energized with the loss of off-site power, but diesel generator 103 will auto start and re-power the emergency bus normally. CRD pump 12 will auto start when power board 17B is re-energized.

With both reserve transformers out of service, an Unusual Event will be declared, based on the loss of all off-site power per EAP-2.

Upon investigation of the problem with-transformer 101S, it will be discovered that a short exists in the primary winding. Repairs to the transformer will commence.

and will be expected to be completed within four to six hours.

Approximately one hour into the exercise, an electrical grid disturbance will cause the main generator to trip. Because reserve transformer power is unavailable, the trip of the main turbine-generator and loss of station service transformer 10 will cause

11 loss of power boards 11 and 12. Non-safety-related equipment will be lost. With the loss of off-site power, the following systems of primary interest are lost:

Condensate /feedwater.

TBCCW.

Reactor recirculation.

Service water.

- Circulating water.

Compressed air. -

t Drywell coolers.

All ventilation fans except emergency ventilation.

With the loss of the circulating water pumps, condenser vacuum will gradually-decrease.

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CRD pumps will be the only means, other-than' the liquid poison system, of injecting water into the reactor without first de-pressurizing the reactor. Power boards 168 and.17B will also be cross-tied to.their respective "A". section' and the emergency-condensers will be initiated, thereby restoring. power to the drywell coolers! and '

instrument air compressor 11. With the low-low. level following the turbine trip, the MSIVs will trip closed, and the emergency cooling systems will be initiated to cool down

-f the reactor. Then, manually starting an emergency service water pump will ensure-l cooling of emergency plant systems, and the plant-will be in a stable condition as the reactor level increases, i

Because of the pressure transient on the reactor from the turbine-generator trip, a leak will develop at the reactor water cleanup tapoff reactor recirculation loop No.11. The leak will be greater than 50 gallon per minute as indicated by integrator -

readings and will be detected by increasing drywell pressure and floor drain levels. To maintain drywell pressure below the 3.5 psig set-point, operators will be expected -to lower the RBCCW temperature to provide better cooling _to the drywell coolers. The l,

leak rate exceeding 50 gallons per minute will require that an Alert be -declared per l

EAP-2. Following the declaration of the Alert by the SSS, appropriate notification will be made, and staffing of the TSC, OSC, EOF, JNC, and corporate EOC will be required.

The leak will gradually increase over the next two hours until the line finally severs completely. The reactor will de-pressurize, and the level will drop when high

(

drywell pressure starts the core spray and containment spray systems. All pumps will start normally except core spray pump 122, which trips an overcurrent-during start-up l

because of a failed thrust bearing.' A damage repair team will be dispatched to identify

i the cause and correct this failure. Core spray pumps 111 and 121 will provide sufficient

makeup water to recover reactor level. Tite loss of coolant accident will necessitate i

that the emergency be upgraded to a Site Area Emergency per EAP-2, and'a station l

evaauation will occur (simulated). A site evacuation (simulated) may be ordered after completion of station evacuation activities.

l Approximately two hours after the declaration of the Site Area Emergency, the 102 diesel generator will trip because of a faulty lockout relay. This will in turn cause 4

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power boards 102,16A, and 16B to fall, and thereby the following components, because of loss of powers Core spray and topping pumps 111 and 121..

j Containment spray and raw water pumps 111 and 112.

e RBCCW pump 13.

Shutdown cooling pumps 11 and 13.'

' J SBLC pump 11.

e CRD pump 11.

ESW pump 11.

Emergency ventilation fan 11.,

Instrument air compressor 11.

e Drywell coolers 14,15, and 16.

At this point a complete loss of core spray will exist, and the reactor level will drop again, uncovering the core.

Major ~ core damage will begin at. this time as the fuel overheats and melts, releasing fission products to the drywell and torus. A General Emergency will be declared per EAP-2 at this time, based on either the loss of two of three fission product barriers, with a potential loss of the third, or a loss of coolant accident,.wlth a loss of the emergency core cooling system. Emergency core cooling system and containment failure is imminent.

The operators may attempt to back feed power from power board 103 to po,wer boards 11,.12, or 102. They will be prevented from doing that by Edditional electrical problems.

I With the loss of instrument air compressor 11 because of power board 16A/B undervoltage, eventually the instrument air system pressure will bleed down to the point where all air-operated valves fall to their normal loss-of-ale position. At this time, torus isolation valve IV-68-09 opens, providing a direct pathway of the torus atmosphere to the secondary containment.

Manual closure of the valve will be precluded because of 4

excessively high radiation levels in the area. As a result of the failed fuel, lodines and.

noble gases will leak from the reactor / containment system at this point, and the emergency ventilation system will filter the release to the environment.

Eventually, diesel generator 102 will be repaired, and power _will be restored to power board 102. Core spray pumps 111 and 121 will be restarted to reflood and provide sufficient cooling to the core to prevent further core damage. -With power restored, the instrument air header will gradusily re-pressurize after the compressors are started.

With air pressure restored, the torus isolation valve closes, preventing further dumping of j

the torus atmosphere to the secondary containment. The release to the environment will continue, however, until the activity in the reactor building has dissipated (approximately two days).

Following restoration of power and reflooding of the core, time will be advanced three days. At that time, Utility staff will enter recovery / reentry in accordance with EPP-25.

.I The exercise will terminate once the decision is made to enter the recovery phase.

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1.5.2 : State and Local Activities I

New York-Oswego Activity

-State County Notify agencies Actual

. Actual 1

Call-up personnel Actual Actual' Activate organization Actual' Actual 1

Maintain security Actual.

Actual Conduct dose assessment Actual Actual Make PAR recommendations Actual' Actual' Activate JNC Actual-Actual l

NAa Simulate Activatesiregs Broadcast EBS message NA Simulate Dispatch field monitoring teams NA Actual Exchange field survey data Actual Actual Set up Reception Center:

NA Actual Activate Congregate Care Center 104 Actual' Conduct school bus run' NA!

Actual 1

Conduct general population bus run NA Actual Test traffic / access control points-NA Actual Test road-impediments NA Actual Test mobility-impaired capability NA Actual C

Activate emergency worker.PMC NA Actual Conduct medical drill NA Actual aNot applicable.

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cPersonnel Monitoring Center.

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1.5.3 Emertency Classifloation and Event Tisse Line (hours)

I 3mergency Declared Classification by Received Received Received Received Received Notification Utility by EOF by OCE0C by SEOC by CDEOC by JWC i

Notification of 0819 0830 0830

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Unusual Event Alert declared 0852 0901 0901 0901 i

Facility declared 0946 0945 0945 0931 0932 operational Site Area 0928 0928 0942 0942 0942 0942' l

i Emergency declared General Emergency 1035 1035 1050 1050 1050 1053 declared Release started 1245 1259 1259 E

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I 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION 1.1 NEW YORE STATE j

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2.1.1 New York State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)

The SEOC is located underground in Bu!! ding 22 of the State Office Campus in.

Albany, New York. The SEOC had six objectives to demonstrate during this exercise.

j All six were fully demonstrated.

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SEOC 1.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities

]

corresponding to ECLs, as required bij the scenarlo, was met at the SEOC.

The notification times were as follows: Notifleation of Unusual Event at 0830 hours0.00961 days 0.231 hours 0.00137 weeks 3.15815e-4 months , Alert at 0901 hours0.0104 days 0.25 hours 0.00149 weeks 3.428305e-4 months , Site Area Emergency at 0942 hours0.0109 days 0.262 hours 0.00156 weeks 3.58431e-4 months , and General Emergency at 1050 hours0.0122 days 0.292 hours 0.00174 weeks 3.99525e-4 months .

The ECL changes were posted immediately.

They were prominently displayed on i

monitors in both the command and operations rooms. The ECL flashed on the screen for about 10 seconds as part of a series of status displays. Staff were also Informed of each ECL change in briefings, SEOC2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions was met at the SEOC. All off-site agencies were notified at the Alert, and key agency personnel were told to report in. Other agency personnel were placed on standby and notified to report at the Site Area Emergency. Personnel from all 20 State agencies reported to the SEOC 1

in a timely manner with the exception of an ARC personnel who arrived at 1052. The call-in went smoothly, as all numbers were correct. Staff members were able to report to the SEOC in time to a sume their responsibilities.

l SEOC 3.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and J

control emergency activltles was met at the SEOC. The director of field operations of l

the New York State Department of Health served as the Governor's designee and was clearly in charge. Periodic briefings were beld to update the staff. In addition to those l

I given by State Emergency Management Oftlee (SEMO) staff, briefings were given by j

representatives of the State Police, the NRC, the New York State Department of j

Agriculture and Markets, and the New York State Department of Energy. Copies of the plan were readily available for reference. Message logs were kept of all incoming and outgoing messages. These messages were produced and promptly provided to SEOC staff. Deelslon making for protective actions is a County responsibility. The State's role is to give advice and provide support. The State coordinated recommendations with the Oswego County Emergency Management Director. The Accident and Assessment Group at the SEOC was fully prepared to make dose assessments and recommend protective actions. These were relayed to the County. SEOC staff members were actively and appropriately involved in matters of State involvement.

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SEO C 4.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all i

appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met by the SEOC.

l Communications links were used with OCEOC, contiguous states, the Utility, FEMA, the l

Province of Ontarlo, JNC, and CDEOC. The Radiological Emergency Communications l

System (RECS) line, which is a dedicated conference telephone line connecting the Utility, OCEOC, and CDEOC, worked well. Backup systems for contacting these three entitles consisted of radio linkages, Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES),

and commercial telephones. The primary means of communicating with other agencies was commercial telephones, which were backed up by radio systems. There was a speakerphone on the command room phone to tie-in with the County so that the entire command room staff was aware of conversations between the State and County. There was a slight problem with the telephone service between the State public Information officer (PIO) and the JNC.

Three short disruptions of service occurred.

Back-up r

communications were successfully utilMd to maintain communications with the JNC.

Communication was promptly restored >.ach time with no impairment of organizational function.

SEOC 5.

The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilltles, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations was met at the SEOC.

The space was adequate and sufficient furniture, telephones, and equipment were available. Access was controlled by security officers, and each person entering had to show proper identification and sign in on a roster. Maps, charts, displays, and status monitors were available and promptly updated as to ECLs and protective actions. The Accident and Assessment Group's area, while adequate, is su'uject to considerable traffic and attendant interruptions. Consideration is being given to modifying the floor plan to provide adequate space without so much coming and going.

SEOC 16. The objective to demonstrate the ability to make the deelslon to recommend the use of K! to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases, was met at the SEOC. The decision to recommend or not recommend use of K! was based on predetermined criteria. The source term in the plant before and during the release was used to make dose projections. These projections resulted in values less than the emergency worker PAGs.

Consequently, the recommendation was correctly made not to use KI.

DEFICIENCIE3 No deficiencies were observed at the SEOC during this exercise.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (ARCAs)

No areas requiring corrective action were observed at the SEOC during this exercise.

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AREAR RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROYEMENT (AR91s)

==

Description:==

Telephone service between the PIO at the SEOC and the JNC was interrupted three times. In each case, communications were promptly restored.

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Recommendatlosu The cause of the disruptions in telephone i

communications should be determined and corrected.

==

Description:==

The space in the SEOC assigned to the Accident and Assessment Group was subjected to heavy traffic, which led to frequent interruptions.

d Recommendations Consideration should be given to modifying the floor plan to provide adequate space without traffic problems.

2.1.2 CENTRAL DISTRICT EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (CDEOC) i The CDEOC is located in an underground civil defense bunker in Oneida, New

]

York. The CDEOC had five objectives to demonstrate during this exercise. All of these were met.

CDEOC 1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to 3CLs, as required by the scenarlo, was met at the CDEOC. All changes in ECLs were received at the CDEOC over the RECS line. The ECLs were posted prominently on status boards. The staff was briefed at each change in ECL.

CDEOC 2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions was met at thn CDEOC. At 0912 hours0.0106 days 0.253 hours 0.00151 weeks 3.47016e-4 months , the CDEOC began notifying outside agency staff to report, following the declaration of the Alert. Staffing was completed at 0931 hours0.0108 days 0.259 hours 0.00154 weeks 3.542455e-4 months . The written list used for the call-out contained no incorrect numbers.

A previous ARCA (CDEOC-1) from the JAFNPP-PEA (J.A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Post-Exercise Assessment) dated 6/3/88 was corrected.

CDEOC 3.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities was met at the CDEOC. The Central Division Office l

district coordinator was effectively in charge of the CDEOC. Staff briefings were held

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approximately hourly.

Staff members were involved in decision making, when appropriate. The plans for the State, the CDEOC, and Oswego and Onondaga counties were readily available.

Both incoming and outgoing messages were logged and distributed to appropriate personnel.

Information was readily available to all staff through postings on status boards and periodic briefings.

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CDEOC 4.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all

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appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met at the CDEOC. No problems were experienced with CDEOC communications systems. The telephone system i

consisted of three lines, one of which was dedicated to a telefacsimile machine. The following staff organizations also had direct radio linkages to their base offices the Department of Environmental Conservation, the Department of Transportation, Fire and T

Rescue, the State Police, and ARC. These systems were supplemented by the DPC van

2, which can handle eight radio channels and one satellite telephone. The ARC had a problem at its base station with its radio system. Communications were unaffected because other systems were able to cover the lack of a direct linkage. No delays in communications were observed.

A prevlot; A RCF. (CDEOC-2) from the JAFNPP-PEA dated 6/3/88 was corrected.

CDEOC 5. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations was met at the CDEOC.

The CDEOC was located in an underground bunker and was well equipped. It had a large operations room, private office areas, dormitories for men and women, an infirmary, kitchen facilities,'a radio room, and space for routing and decontaminating contaminated Individuals. Access to the CDEOC was controlled. All raaps designated in the plan were available. The status boards were used and updated with each change in ECL, weather condition, or protective action recommendation (PAR).

e DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed at the CDEOC during this exercise.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION (ARCAs)

No areas requiring corrective action were observed at the CDEOC during this exercise.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT (ARFis)

No areas recommended for improvement were observed at the CDEOC during this exercise.

2.1.3 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The EOF was located in the Utility's Nuclear Training Center located on the Nine Mlle Point Site (NMPS). Emergency operations at the EOF are the joint responsibility of personnel from the Utility, the State, and Oswego County. The EOF had six objectives to demonstrate during this exercise; five were met, and one was partially met.

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EOF 1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use l

ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities cor-responding to ECLs, as required by the scenarlo, was met at the EOF. As the exercise j

escalated through the emergency response activities as speelfled in the plan and procedures, ECLs were prominently displayed in contrasting colors on a large sign in an easily visible location.

A previous ARCA (EOF-5) from the JAFNPP PEA dated 6/3/88 was corrected.

EOF 2.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions was met at the l'

EOF. Commercial telephones were used by the SEMO and Oswego County to contact the emergency response personnel required to report to the EOF. The representative from Oswego County arrived at the EOF at 0915 hours0.0106 days 0.254 hours 0.00151 weeks 3.481575e-4 months ; the SEMO representative arrived at 1004 hours0.0116 days 0.279 hours 0.00166 weeks 3.82022e-4 months , and the New York State Department of Health representative arrived at 1024 hours0.0119 days 0.284 hours 0.00169 weeks 3.89632e-4 months .

EOF 3.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and l

control emergency activities was partially met at the EOF. The off.,lte dose assessment manager frequently briefed both the State representatives and the Oswego County repressntatives on plant conditions, dose projsations, and actual readings, as well as on-the PARS. The recovery manager from the Utility briefed personnel from SEMO, Oswego County, and the New York State Department of Health, either personally or over the public-address system. However, there were several Instances when the Oswego County representative was not included in these briefings and did not receive updated information until it was provided in hard copy. Oswego County assumes the primary role in off-site response until the State of New York declares a State of Emergency; therefore, personnel from the County should be included in all briefings conducted by the RACES operator at the EOF. This is a continuing problem that was first evaluated during the December 15,1987, exercise.

A previous ARCA (EOF-1) from the JAFNPP PEA dated 6/3/88 was not corrected and remains outstanding.

EOF 4.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicete with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met at the EOF. RECS was used to communicate changes in plant status; commercial telephones were' used as the primary communication system; and backup systems were demonstrated. A new high-frequency radio system is being provided for use by the RECS operator at the EOF. This system will replace the commercial citizen-band radio already available in the State / County room. RACES operators were available to provide radio backup.

EOF 5.

The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations was met at the EOF. The

21 i

space provided for the State and County was sufficient to support emergency operations; however, the area was somewhat cramped. The State representatives consisted of one l

nuclear facility liaison officer (NFLO) and one New York State Department of Health representative. Oswego County was represented at the EOF by one County nuclear facility llatson officer (CNFLO). A RECS communications offleer was also present in the State / County operations room.

This operations room was separated from the EOF i

operations area by a window, which facilitated viewing the status boards and maps displayed in the EOF. All required displays were present and appropriately updated.

l Two previous ARCAs (EOF-3 and EOF-4) from the JAFNPP PEA dated 6/3/88 were corrected.

EOF 34. The objective to demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour basis by an actual shift change was met. A complete shift change of State and Cour.ty personnel was demonstrated at the EOF; all emergency workers responding to the initial notification were relleved by knowledgeable and well-trained second-shift personnel.

The shift changes were accomplished smoothly; incoming '

personnel were properly briefed by first-shift staff on current conditions and status. The transfer of responsibility from the first shif t to the incoming second shif t took place over a period of time long enough to allow the second shift to get a feel for operations and activities. Introductions were made to famillarize second-shift personnel with Utility staff.

Two previous ARCAs (EOF-2 and EOF-6) from JAFNPP PEA dated 6/3/88 were corrected.

DEFICIENCIES s

No deficiencies were observed in the EOF during this exercise.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECT!YE ACTION (ARCAs) 1.

==

Description:==

Although PARS were issued to the County's director of emergency management, the CNFLO was not included in some of the discussions between the emergency director M the EOF and the State and was therefore not always provided ':<lth pertinent InformatM regarding PARS. (NUREG-0654, !!, C.2.a).

Recommendation: The CNFLO should be included in all discussions with the emergency directer at the EOF regarding PARS. The State and County should meet with the Utility to resolve this issue.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROYEMENT (ARFis)

No areas recommended for improvement were observed at the EOF during this exercise.

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S.1.4 Joint News Center (JNC) j 1

The JNC is located in the McCroble Building in Oswego, New York. This building I

is normally used as a Senior Citizen Centers however, through excellent planning and

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extensive effort, it serves well as a news-handling and processing center.

The JNC had seven objectives to demonstrate during this exercises four were met, two were partially met, and one was not met and was evaluated as a deficiency.

]

JNC 1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activltles corresponding to ECLs, as required by the scenarlo, was partislly met at the JNC. The assistant P!O was in constant contact with the PIO at the OCEOC and was promptly r

advised of all actions and decisions. All ECLs were quickly given to the assistant PIO and recorded on a message log. Although all ECLs were recorded and verlfled, JNC staff l

members were not always aware of the change in classification. In one instance, the Oswego County PIO did not know that the ECL had been upgraded from an Alert to a Site Area Emergency until so informed by the Utility representative, some 15 minutes following receipt of the Site Area Emergency declaration at 0942.

5 JNCS. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and 4

i activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions was met at the JNC. The JNC was fully staffed and operational by 0932 hours0.0108 days 0.259 hours 0.00154 weeks 3.54626e-4 months ; security for access to the facility was established by 0920 hours0.0106 days 0.256 hours 0.00152 weeks 3.5006e-4 months . Notification of personnel was initiated by the director of the Oswego County director of emergency management. The County PIO used comprehensive calllists and commercial telephones to alert emergency staff.

JNC 5.

The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, e

displays, and other materials to support emergency operations was partially met at the JNC. The area provided at the McCroble Building for use as the JNC was spacious ard 1

had adequate furnishings.

The press briefing room on the first floor and the State / County room on the second floor (room 5) contained a large map of the designated ERPAs, with lights indicating various protective actions (i.e., red a shelter, green =

evacuation, and yellow = no action). The various colored lights were appropriately lit.

The sign-in board in the JNC briefing room did not have enough room on it for all staff members.

i The McCroble Building is within the 10-mile EPZ. Should the JNC have to be evacuated, the backup (second-shift) staff would be contacted and sent directly to the alternate facility at the Niagara Mohawk Building in Syracuse to begin to set up that facility. JNC staff members were not issued dosimeters, nor was a central dosimeter serving all building occupants. All emergency workers within the 10-mile EPZ should be Issued dosimetry equipment. Because the McCroble Building is withllt the 10-mile EPZ, requires dosimetry, and may necessitate relocating the JNC in a real emergency consideration should be given to changing the primary JNC designated in the plan to one

23 outside the 16-alle EPZ. This planning lasue must be addressed in the next revision of the Oswego County REPP to be reviewed by the RAC.

In general, all required displays and maps were posted and maintained; however, at the beginning of the exercise, after the JNC had been activated, the status board for displaying ECLs had not been set up. The ECL was eventually posted (by 1030 hours0.0119 days 0.286 hours 0.0017 weeks 3.91915e-4 months ), and the status board was for the most part maintained. However, the time at which the General Emergency was declared was never posted on the status board on the second floor (State / County room).

JNC 12. The objective to demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an Instructional message within 15 mimites of a dectslon by appropriate State and/or local official (s) was met at the JNC.

The staff demonstrated an efficient system for disseminating Instructional messages within 15 minutes of the decision to do so by the County. The assistant PIO at the JNC was in constant contact with the P!O at the OCEOC. When a protective action decision was made, the JNC was notifled of the time of the decision by telephone and immediately started preparing the EBS message. Eight me.asages were formulated for transmission to the public. Six of these were prepared using prescripted messages, two were developed by JNC staff. AllInstructional messages were sent to the EBS stations and broadcast (simulated, except for the first EBS mesage) within the 15-minute requirement.

A Federal evaluator was positioned at the EBS radio station WKFM in Syracuse, New York, to evaluate the station's response to the emergency. At 1009 hours0.0117 days 0.28 hours 0.00167 weeks 3.839245e-4 months , through &

telephone call from the JNC, the station was placed on standby in preparation for receiving a simulated EBS message. Station personnel followed written procedures and implemented all necessary emergency actions, including notifying (simulated) three other EBS radio stations and placing them on standby. At 1014 hours0.0117 days 0.282 hours 0.00168 weeks 3.85827e-4 months , the station simulated broadcast of the first EBS message. The station's procedures speelfy that the station continue to periodically transmit messages. This first EBS message was the only message transmitted to the EBS station during the exercise subsequent EBS messages were not relayed from the JNC. However, the JNC simulated notification to the EBS station for all EBS messages. Per instructions from the OCEOC, the JNC staff advised WKFM to simulate broadcast of EBS messages.

Three previous ARCAs (OC-1, JNC-3, and JNC-4) from the JAFNPP PEA dated 6/3/88 were corrected.

JNC 13. The objective to demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred was not met at the JNC. The JNC staff operated efficiently, and all EBS messages were simulated as being transmitted to the EBS station within the 15-minute requirement. The assistant PIO was in constant communication with the OCEOC and maintained a log of all issues (e.g.,

decisions times, EBS message content, and clarification of questions).

24 l

However, EBS messages were not always clear, consistent, and accurate. The first EBS message referred to the closing of Oswego and Mexleo school districts and listed 26 schools as closed, advising that the children are sent home. The thle:i EBS message stated that school buses were being rerouted to the reception center, but listed i

23 schools as being evacuated.

The fitth and sixth EB8 messages, which were the i

messages developed by the JNC, not prescripted messages, stated that residents in ERPA 7 should be evacuated (which was erroneous), but failed to mention that ERPA 3 was affected. The second pages of the fifth and sixth EB8 messages told residents of these ERPAs to report to the reception center or to the home of a friend or relative.

This information should have been clarlfled to specify that the home should be outside the 10-mile EPZ. Of the eight EBS messages, only two gave boundary descriptions of the ERPAs, and only one told parents to pick up evacuated school children at the reception center at the fairgrounds. Consideration should be given to having the PIO function reside at the OCEOC, where communications with the EBS station could originate after the EBS message is composed and verlfled.

1 l

l Also, the eighth EBS message, in attempting to clarify any misunderstanding or I

confusion in previous messages (i.e., the fifth and sixth EBS messages), stated that residents in ERPA 7 need not take any action. However, the fourth EBS message advised farmers to shelter all farm animals in ERPAs 7,18,19, and 20. While this Instruction was repeated at the end of the elghth EBS message, it was inaccurate to say that residents need not take any action.

Additionally, five of the eight EBS messages referred to the public Information brochure entitled " Emergency Planning and You," but none of them mentioned the new 1989 edition or noted that a reception center no longer exists in Jefferson County, which is pointed out in the 1989 brochure.

i A previous ARCA (JNC-1) from the JAFNPP PEA dated 6/3/88 was corrected. A

~

previous ARCA (JNC-3) from the JAFNPP PEA dated 6/3/88 was not corrected because no EBS message was actually broadcast. Therefore, this ARCA remains incomplete.

JNC 14. The objective to demonstrate the ability to brief the media In an accurate, coordinated, and timely manner was partially met at the JNC. Press briefings were conducted during the exercise. Seven joint media briefings were held. Input was received from representatives from Oswego County, New York State, the Utility, and, occasionally, the NRC. At each briefing, the Utility representative spoke about plant status and conditions, and the County P!O outlined the County's responses and how it was marshaling resources in support of the protective action deelslons. Each briefing ended with an open question-and-answer session for media personnel. If answers could not be given immediate~ly, the questions were researched and then answered at the next briefing. In addition, press releases were issued by PIOS at the JNC: Oswego County issued 1, New York State issued 3, and the Utility issued 13. However, materlats given in the press belefings contained the same inaccurate Information as was present in the EBS messages. The representative did not check the Information before briefing the media, therefore incorrect Information was presented.

v

+

+---

.-4-,-

l...

I 25 l

j JNC 15. The objective to demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor l

controlin a coordinated and timely fashion was met at the JNC. The emergency workers l

at the JNC followed the procedures in the 1987 edition of the "Nine M11e Point JNC j

Procedures and Public Education Workplan." Per rumor-control procedures, the rumor-l control telephone numbers were distributed to the State County, and Utility telephone r

operators and to emergency response personnel.

They were instructed to call the numbers to confirm information or clarify circulating rumors. Rumor-control numbers are not published for the general public.

The emergency information brochure contains a toll-free telephone number to t

the OCEOC for use by the public. There were six rumor-control workers answering incoming telephone calls from the pubile. All workers were periodically updated on -

emergency information and maintal11: message logs for all~ calls. If a rumor-control worker was unable to answer a question from the public, the incoming call was referred j

to the rumor-control telephone number at the JNC.

DEYtCIENCIES l

1.

==

Description:==

Some of the EBS messages generated at the JNC I

contained incomplete, inaccurate, and unclear information regarding protective action responses. (NUREG-0654, !!, E.6, E.7, 0.4).

The first EBS message listed 26 schools as having been evacuated: the third EBS message listed 23 schools.

The fifth and sixth EBS messages erroneously included ERPA 7 as being evacuated and omitted ERPA 3 as being evacuated.

Physical descriptions of ERPAs were included in only two of the messages.

Residents were instructed to evacuate to the homes of friends or relatives, but were not told that the homes should be outside the 10-mile EPZ.

Parents were notified to pick up their evuuated school children at the reception center in only one EBS message.

Recommendation: Before being broadcast, the content of all EBS l

messages should be verified by OCEOC personnel. A computer or a telefacsimile machine could be used for this verification process. If not feasible, consideration should be given tc having the PIO function reside at the OCEOC, where communications with the EBS l

station could originate after the EBS message is composed and verified. The message could then be transmitted to the alternate County P!O at the JNC by telefacsimile for the purpose of

26 j

o.

i informing the media. Additionally, physical descriptions of ERPAs l

l should be included in all EBS messages.

I AREAS REQUIRENG CORRECT!YE ACTION (ARCAs) l l

1.

Desertption:

JNC staff members were not always aware of

}

changes in ECL. In one instance, the Oswego County PIO did not l

know that the ECL had been upgraded from an Alert to a Site Area l

Emergency until so informed by the Utility representative.

[

(NUREG-0654, !!, D.3).

Recommendation: Procedures should be established to ensure that i

all personnel are promptly Informed of changes in ECL.

l Consideration should be given to announcing this information over the public-address system.

j 2.

Deseription: At the beginning of the exercise, after the JNC had l

been activated, the status board for showing ECLs was not Immediately set up and the ECL was not immediately displayed.

Also, the time the General Emergency ECL was declared was 1

never posted on the status board in the State / County room on the second floor. (NUREG-0654, !!, D.3).

l Recommendation:

Procedures should be followed that call for promptly setting up status boards and using them to post the ECL.

3.

==

Description:==

EBS messages did not mention the 1989 emergency f

information brochure entitled "Nine Mlle Point Emergency l

Planning and You," which contains information different from that in previous editions.

For example, Jefferson County no longer

. osts a reception center. (NUREG-0654, !!, G.4).

liecommendation:

EBS messages should mention the updated emergency information brochure and should point out that the i

reception center is no longer located in Jefferson County.'

i Consideration should also be given to changing the cover of the brochure from year to year to help distinguish among the various i

editions.

i 4.

==

Description:==

The McCroble Building is within the 10-mile EPZ.

Should the JNC have W be evacuated, the backup staff would be l

contacted and sent dMetly to the alternate facility at the Niagara Mohawk Building in Syracuse to begin to set up that facility. JNC staff members were not lasued dosimeters, nor was there a central dosimeter serving all building occupants. All emergency workers I

within the 10-mile EPZ should be issued dostmetry equipment

[

(NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a).

l l

Recommendation:

Considerations should be given to using the i

Niagara Mohawk Building in Syracuse for the primary JNC since it

['

is outside of the 10-mile EPZ. If the present JNC is retained, dosimetry must be issued to the JNC staff.

i

~

w,

< ~..

4 s.

27 5.

==

Description:==

Press briefings were conducted during the exercise.

~

Seven joint media briefings were held.

At each briefing, the Utility representative spoke about plant status and conditions, and the County PIO outilned the County's responses and how it was marshaling resources in support of the protective action I

deelslons. In addition, press releases were issued by PIOS at the JNC. However, materials given in press briefings contained the same inaccurate Information as was present in the EBS messages.

The representative did not check the information before briefing the media, therefore, incorrect Information was presented (NUREG-0654, !!, 0.4).

Recommendation: All representatives responsible for briefing the media should check the information before presenting it to the public, to avoid reproducing the same errors found in EBS messages.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT (ARFis)

Deseriptions The JNC staff sign-in board placed in the press briefing room did not have enough room for all staff members.

Raeommendation: A larger sign-in board should be used, it should contain a spot for each worker, with enough room for the worker to write legibly.

e

28

' i i

i 2.2 O6WEGO COUNTY 2.2.1 Oswego County Emertency Operations Center (OCEOC)

The OCEOC la located in the basement of the Oswego County branch building in Fulton, New York.

The OCEOC had 13 objectives to demonstrate during this exercises seven were i

met, five wen partially mot, and one was not met and was evaluated as a deficiency.

OCEOC 1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs, at required by the scenarlo, was met at the OCEOC.

The chairman of the County legislature and the Oswego County director of emergency management understood the use of ECLs. Upon notification over the RECS line of a change in ECL, the director directed that the current ECL be displayed in the operations and dose assessment rooms, so that the entire OCEOC staff could be aware of the current ECL. Furthermore, the director announced each ECL over the public-address syste m as soon as it was declared.

i OCEOC 2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency func?.lons was met at the l

OCEOC. The Notice of Unusual Event was received via the RECS line at the County Warning Point in the dispatch room of the County Fire Control Center in Oswego, New York, at 0830 hours0.00961 days 0.231 hours 0.00137 weeks 3.15815e-4 months . A dispatcher at the County Warning Point promptly notified the County director of emergency management. Following procedures, pagers were activated to alert and mobilize key emergency management personnel. Because the Notice of Unusual Event was received during working hours, staff at the OCEOC assisted with mobilization procedures. Full activation of the OCEOC occurred at approximately 0945 hours0.0109 days 0.263 hours 0.00156 weeks 3.595725e-4 months .

A notification list dated May 1989 was used to mobilize key personnel, including the chairman of the County legislature, the County director of emergency management and his deputy, the radiological officer (RO), the PIO, the County commissioner of health, the director of transportation and planning, the school representative, the fire control coordinator, the superintendent of public works, the County sheriff, and the assistant County administrator.

l A previous ARCA (OC-1) from the JAFNPP PEA dated 6/3/88 was corrected, f

OCEOC 3.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities was partially met at the OCEOC. Command and control of the emergency response were thoroughly demonstrated by the County director of emergency management. Regular briefings and consultations were held at each decision point. Individuals responsible for direction and control demonstrated knowledge of the i

.m o,,-

m.

.c 29 Oswego County RERP, a copy of which was available for reference. Deelslons regarding PARS were carefully evaluated and discussed with dose assessment personnel.

All decisions were coordinated with the SEOC. Message logs were kept for allincoming and outgoing messages for each County agency represented at the OCEOC.

However, PAR #2, which called for evacuation of ERPAs 1, 2, 3, 5, 9,10, and 11, was issued at 1022 hours0.0118 days 0.284 hours 0.00169 weeks 3.88871e-4 months , before ascertaining that sufficient buses were available to pick up transit-dependent Individuals.

The County director of emergency management learned nearly one hour later from the County planning board representative that a poll of bus suppliers indicated that too few buses were available to plek up transit-dependent individuals in ERPAs 5, 9, and 10. School children were then being evacuated to the r

reception center. Since there was no release at this time, a helicopter and a sheriff's car were dispatched to tell those waiting for buses in these ERPAs to return home and listen to EBS for further Instructions.

At 1128, the decision was made to inform transit i

dependent residents of ERPAs 5,9,10 to take shelter. At 1212 hours0.014 days 0.337 hours 0.002 weeks 4.61166e-4 months , PAR #6 was issued to inform transit-dependent individuals in ERPAs 5,9, and 10 to return to the bus pick-up points. The availability of transportation resources should influence the content of l

protective actions issued by the OCEOC (See also OCEOC 18).

i Furthermore, the decision to utilize buses for evacuating the general population in ERPAs 1, 2, 3, and 11 was improperly made by the County planning board representative.

When an Insufficient amount of buses was available for the general population evacuation, the County Director of emergency management should have been notified immediately. Instead the County planning board representative himself made j

the decision as to which ERPAs would be evacuated. This resulted in the evacuation of

)

citizens in ERPA 11, rather than the evacuation of citizens residing closer to the NMPNS i

in ERPA 5.

During the exercise, it appeared that the OCEOC did not direct a request to the Central District Emergency Operations Center that the Onondaga EOC be contacted regarding opening the reception center at the fairgrounds in Onondaga, as required by the plan.

Although the reception center and congregate care centers were opened by l

Onondaga County through their own initiative and were operational during the exercise, the procedure in the plan was not followed. Coordination efforts should comply with the plan.

OCEOC 4.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met at the OCEOC. Most of the systems available for radiological emergency communications were demonstrated during the exercise. ECL notifications and plant data were received from the NMPNS control room or EOF via the RECS line. The executive hot line in the command and control room was used for coordination with the SEOC. Commercial telephones and various radio networks were used for communleating with field locations, which included the County field monitoring team, the PMC, the traffic control point (TCP), the site of a traffic impediment, bus depots, and the reception center.

Some time after 1040 hours0.012 days 0.289 hours 0.00172 weeks 3.9572e-4 months , the County fire radio system was not operating at the OCEOC. This system was repaired by 1240 hours0.0144 days 0.344 hours 0.00205 weeks 4.7182e-4 months .

In the Interim, the County

30 l

Emergency Management Office radio network was used as a backup and functioned i

adequately.

The County Warning Point had been recently moved to the dispatch room of the l

County Fire Control Center in Oswego.

The dispatchers were unfamiliar with the facsimile machine there.

When they first attempted to transmit a copy of a RECS message to the OCEOC, they could not operate the machine.

After consulting instructions for several minutes, they were able to transmit the message. Dispatchers at i

the County Warning Point should receive training in using the facsimile machine, or instructions should be posted.

J A previous ARCA (OC-7) from the JAFNPP PEA dated 6/3/88 was corrected.

OCEOC 5. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, i

displays, and other materlats to support emergency operations was met at the OCEOC.

The OCEOC was comprised of several roomss' the operations room, the command and control room, the communications room, and the dose assessment room. These rooms l

were quite adequate, with sufficient space, furnishings, lighting, and equipment (e.g.,-

j photocoplers and telefacsimile machines). The amenitles (e.g., toilets and a kitchen) i were also sufficient. Access was controlled by the Fulton Pollee Department; sign-in 4

procedures were followed, and proper Identification was mandatory.

I The dose assessment room had the most specialized equipment. Two computers were used for dose projcetions. One of them allowed the OCEOC Dose Assessment Group to view Utility calculations made with its Class A projection model. The other was used by the Dose Assessment Group to make its own dose projections using the

)

!RDAM model. Serving as backup for the IRDAM computer were another computer hnd 3

two Hewlett Packard 41CV programmable calculators.

1 The OCEOC was equipped with a variety of maps, charts, and status boards that were well positioned for viewing by staff members concerned with their informational 3

displays. All requisite maps were displayed, except a map showing the reception center I

l at the fairgrounds in Syracuse, Onondaga County New York.

A map showing the reception center should be displayed.

j l

1 OCEOC 10. The objective to demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure

)

pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, was partially met at the OCEOC. The primary dose projection system -- the J

computer system using the IRDAM model - was used throughout the exercise. Thus, the i

backup Hewlett Packard 41CV programmable calculators were not used. The Utility dose projections were available for viewing on line and via hard-copy printout through a computer link. Thus, a means was provided for continuously comparing the Utility and the County dose projections. However, the OCEOC's Dose Assessment Group cannot j

input directly into the Utility's Class A model.

The projected plume location was plotted on a map of the 10-mile EPZ. Precut I

map overleys developed for each stability class and range of wind speeds were used.

i

{

e

I

. 4 31 o

l Each map overlay represented a three-stgma plume spread for given meteorological conditions. New dose projections were made when plant conditions changed. When field data became available, dose projections were compared with the field data, and tt.e field data were used to back-calculate the release rate source term. The Dose Assessment Group clearly demonstrated the ability to use plant and field data to project dosage to the public via plume exposure.

]

1 4

The fleid team coordinator directed the field monitoring team to speelfic monitorit.g Joculons; however, the field measurements do not appear to have adequately defined the plume. For example, the fleid team was stationed at a pre-selected monitor j

location. An air sample was collected at the pre-selected monitoring point after the plume arrived and the team left the plume to count the air samples.

The field monitoring team was directed back into the plume for another air sample and was told to monitor en route to the sample locations. However, the team was not told to traverse the plume to define the edges of the plume, nor was it told to locate the centerline of the i

plume. Also, the team was not provided with Information regarding protective actions or other information related to the areas they were in. Direction and control of the field monitoring teams should be improved. Additional training and drills are needed to famillarize the field team coordinator with methods for efficiently gathering the J

necessary field information and to sensitize team members to the need to accomplish their tasks in the plume and then get out.

Two previous ARCAs (OC-2 and NYS-2) from the JAFNPP PEA dated 6/3/88

]

were corrected.

i OCEOC 11.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to make appropriate i

i protective action deelslons, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAGs, availability l

of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates, and other relevant factors was partially met at the OCEOC. The Oswego County RO demonstrated the ability to make appro-priste PARS to the County director of emergency management. The PARS were based on plant conditions and projected off-site doses that could have resulted from these plant conditions. The RO followed the plan and procedures for determining protective actions based on ECLs and Utility recommendations. The Dose Assessment Group used plume projections and meteorological conditions to determine which ERPAs were potentially affected. The RO compared projected doses to the EPA PAGs for plume protective actions.

l Use of preplanned PARS for special populations was demonstrated in PAR #1, which involved deciding whether to close beaches and parks. This PAR was considered at the Alert ECL.

The RO discussed it with the County director of emergency management. A discussion at 0950 hours0.011 days 0.264 hours 0.00157 weeks 3.61475e-4 months was held to close beaches and parks, and also to t

close schools and to evacuatt lake and river ERPAs 23-29. The decision to implement this PAR was made by the County. director of emergency management at 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months .

The plan calls for the closing of beaches and State par:ts within the EPZ no later than at the Site Area Emergency. Waiting to combine this preplanned PAR with other PAR information caused a delay in notifying the citizens at beaches and State parks, since the Site Area Emergency was declared at 0928 hours0.0107 days 0.258 hours 0.00153 weeks 3.53104e-4 months . The initial precautionary actions l

w.

y

-,m.

O, should have been implemented no later than the receipt of the Site Area Emergency

)

ECL.

New protective action decisions were made as plant status changed.

Eight I

protective action decisions were made during the exercises all were timely with the I

exception of PAR #1.

OCEOC 12. The objective to demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within

.)

15 minutes of a deelslon by appropriate State and/or local official (s) was not met at the OCEOC. At 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months , a precautionary protective action deelslon was made to close l

certain schools, clear parks, and evacuate lake and river ERPAs. Sirens were to be i

sounded (simulated) at 1011 hours0.0117 days 0.281 hours 0.00167 weeks 3.846855e-4 months , with an EBS broadcast (simulated) at 1014 hours0.0117 days 0.282 hours 0.00168 weeks 3.85827e-4 months ..

I Although the County director of emergency management Instructed staff to ensure that hearing-tmpaired individuals were alerted, all such Individuals were not alerted. The County public Information brochure contains a section entitled " Project Special Care,"

which requests that hearing-lmpaired residents requ! ring special notification in addition to the stren warning should notify the County by completing and malling a card. On file at the OCEOC is a computer listing of hearing-tmpaired individuals who require special notification.

The County Fire Control Center has a list of those hearing-tmpaired l

Individuals having a teletypewriter (TTY), which is a teletypelike devlee that can be used for notification. The County Fire Control Center did activate the TTYst however, not all-hearing-tmpaired Individuals have TTYs. Although the Emergency Medical Service (EMS) and the County Fire Control Center coordinated their efforts, at least ihree individuals on the hearing-tmpaired list who had requested special notification and who did not have i

TTYs, did not receive special notification.

For the purpose of demonstrating this objective, it had been agreed that the initial instructional message would be the first nonprecautionary protective action. This was to be coordinated with the JNC for the actual notification of EBS station WKFM..

Though the JNC notified WKFM for a precautionary PAR, eva'uations were made at the OCEOC as originally agreed upon.

At approximately 1007 hours0.0117 days 0.28 hours 0.00167 weeks 3.831635e-4 months , the County RO conferred with the Utility concerning a keyhole evacuation (i.e., evacuation of ERPAs 1, 2, 3, 5, 9,10, and 11, and sheltering in ERPAs 18,19, and 20). At 1010 hours0.0117 days 0.281 hours 0.00167 weeks 3.84305e-4 months , the RO made such a recommendation to the County director of emergency management. At 1022 hours0.0118 days 0.284 hours 0.00169 weeks 3.88871e-4 months , the decision was made to accept this recommendation. The sounding of the strens was simulated at 1033 hours0.012 days 0.287 hours 0.00171 weeks 3.930565e-4 months by the sheriff's dispatcher in the communications room. Activation (simulated) of the EBS at 1036 hours0.012 days 0.288 hours 0.00171 weeks 3.94198e-4 months was performed by the JNC staff (confirmed by JNC evaluators) thus meeting the 15-minute objective.

OCEOC 13.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and Instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notifleation has occurred was partially met at the OCEOC. EBS messages were prepared in a timely manner and within the 15-minute broadcast requirement.

Protective actions were carefully evaluated, discussed, and coordinated with the SEOC.

The substance of EBS messages was transcribed on prescripted forms at the OCEOC. These forms were then read by a PIO via telephone to the Assistant PIO. The JNC then formulated the EBS messages. Whether a prescripted i

l I

33 i

form or a special message was draf ted depended on the content of the PAR. The first four EBS messages used prescripted forms and were accurate. However, the fifth, s!xth and eighth messages were incorrect (see JNC deficiency).

The fifth EBS message at 1128 hours0.0131 days 0.313 hours 0.00187 weeks 4.29204e-4 months and the sixth at 1212 hours0.014 days 0.337 hours 0.002 weeks 4.61166e-4 months were specially drafted and contained errors in their recapitulation sections. These errors were (1) that ERPA 7, which was totally out of the plume, was to be evacuated, and (2) that persons in ERPA 3, which was substantially evacuated by 1050 hours0.0122 days 0.292 hours 0.00174 weeks 3.99525e-4 months , should evacuate. The OCEOC did not receive telefacsimile transmissions of EBS messages formulated at the JNC in time for errors to be corrected before broadcast. The public Information staff at the OCEOC did not review EBS message copies to correct the fifth and sixth messages in a timely manner. Finally, at 1440 hours0.0167 days 0.4 hours 0.00238 weeks 5.4792e-4 months , the eighth EBS message corrected these errors, but made an additional error. Procedures should be developed to ensure verification of i

EBS messages before broadcast.

P A previous ARCA (OC-3) from the JAFNPP PEA dated 6/3/88 was corrected.

t OCEOC 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of K! to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases was met at the OCEOC. The County RO the County commissioner of health to authorize use of Kl. The projected thyroid doses l

evaluated the projected thyrold exposure to determine whether a PAR should be made to l

and measured lodine concentrations indicated that K! use would not be warranted.

Therefore, the County RO did not recommend that the County commissioner of health authorize use of KI. The County decision was in agreement with the State decision and recommendation concerning authorization of use of KI.

K! was available in the emergency worker exposure control kits that had been t

distributed to emergency workers when they were activated and deployed to field locations within the 10-mile EPZ.

Two state police troopers and a deputy sheriff s

reported to the OCEOC to pick up radiological exposure control kits at 0916 and 0929 hours0.0108 days 0.258 hours 0.00154 weeks 3.534845e-4 months , respectively. These emergency workers were given proper instruction on the use i

of Kl. that 1s, that it was to be taken only when authorized by the County commissioner of health.

i OCEOC 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent persons, special-needs populat!one, handicapped persons, and institutionalized persons) was not met at the OCEOC. Detailed discussions were held about the availability of resources to effect orderly evacuation of the general population. At 1022 hours0.0118 days 0.284 hours 0.00169 weeks 3.88871e-4 months , PAR #2 was made to evacuate ERPAs 1,2,3,5,9, 10, and 11. At that time, limited transportation resources were available because school buses were evacuating children to the reception center. Af ter contacting bus companies, the representative from the County Planning Board identified only 10 locally available buses and 20 buses from Centro of Syracuse Bus Co.,10 of which had already been

34 l

dispatched to Oswego County. These resources were inadequate to evacuate transit-i dependent Individuals in the affected ERPAs. Consequently, PAR #5 and PAR #6 had to j

be lasued. A helicopter and a sheriff's car were dispatched to inform waiting evacuees to return home for further instructions. Contracts and memoranda of understanding with bus suppliers should be reviewed to ensure that sufficient buses are available for concurrent evacuation of school children and transit-dependent Individuals. (See OCEOC

]

3)

{

Mobility-and hearing-tmpaired Individuals were identitled by current lists, which

)

included the type of disability and telephone numbers. Appropriate contacts were made i

for the type of vehicle required to transport mobility-impaired Individuals, and a*rangements were made at the reception center for their arrival. Hearing-tmpaired i

individuals were contacted via TTY.

Those without a TTY were not contacted (see i

objective OCEOC 12).

)

After the exercise, the emergency worker training logs were reviewed at the

)

Oswego County EOC.

These training logs Indicated that an insufficient number of emergency workers have been trained for the operation of buses and ambulances. As a result, FEMA disagrees with the New York State Emergency Management Office certification dated March 9,1989, that all emergency workers in Oswego County have l

received training.

The Oswego County plan lists the following transportation resources (pages D23-D25, E51-E53):

City School District of Oswego 67 buses Centro of Oswego 9 buses Gibson Bus Service 10 buses Centro of Syracuse 175 buses Oswego County BOCES 29 buses Oswego County Opportunities 19 buses Mexico Academy and Central Schools 44 buses i

Total transportation resources 353 buses The Oswego County plan lists the following number of vehicles required for evacuation of school children

for the following school districts (D14-D15b):

City School District of Oswego 112 buses and 2 vans City School District of Mexico 52 buses and 1 van i

Total buses required for school evacuation 164 buses and 3 vans

EPZ only I

J

s, 35 j

ISSUE:

During the exercise only 131 buses were available for evaeus':on of

)

school children from Oswego and Mexico school districts.

The Oswego County plan lists the following number of vehicles required for evacuation of special facilities 12 buses and 2 vans j

The Oswego County plan lists the following number of buses required for evacuation of the general population (E12-E34a):

190 buses I

Blnee the total number of buses available to simultaneously evacuate the schools and general population is 353 and the totel transportation requirements for the one-wave evacuation are 366 buses and 5 vans, a total of 13 buses and 5 vans should be available to make up the difference. Letters of agreement should be reviewed relative to the number of vehicles actually available. This is a planning lasue and must be addressed in the next revision of the Oswego REPP to be evaluated by the RAC.

The training logs maintained at the Oswego County EOC Indicate the following l

emergency workers (bus drivers) have been trained since January 1988:

Total Trained Oswego County BOCES NONE Oswego County Opportunities NONE Mexico Academy and Central Schools 48 40 on 4/7/89 i

8 on 9/21/88 City School District of Oswego 39 20 on 10/25/88 14 on 10/13/88 5 on 3/8/88 Gibson Bus Service 5

5 on 9/20/88 Centro of Oswego 15 10 on 5/9/88 5 on 5/7/88 J

Centro of Syracuse 24 16 on 2/29/88 8 on 1/27/88 A total of 131 eme:Tency workers have been trained for the operation of buses, 1

and 366 buses are required for a one-wave evacuation.

Therefore, 235 additional emergency workers need to be trained for the operation of buses. This is a planning lasue and must be addressed in the next revision of the Oswego County REPP to be reviewed by the RAC.

The following are the ambulance corps transportation services resources listed within the Oswego County plan (Q-21):

j SOVAC Ambulance Corp.

Phoenix Ambulance Corp.

l

j 36

\\

Oswego Fire Dept. Ambulance Menter Ambulance Services NOCA Ambulance Corp.

A&E Medical Transport Oswego County Opportunities The plan does not list the number of vehicles being provided by each of these i

transportation services. However, the training logs maintained at the Oswego County EOC Indicate the following emergency workers have been trained since January 1988:

Eastern Paramedic 10 (12/02/88)

A&E Medical Transport 10 (09/07/88)

Menter Ambulance Services 9 (05/23/88)

NOCA Ambulance Corp.

10 (03/30/88)

McFee 11 (03/17/88) 1 NOTE:

Eastern Paramedic and McFee are not listed as Oswego County resources. However, Eastern Paramedic is a resource for the reception center according to the Onondaga submission. The number of vehicles being provided by the ambulance 2

companies should be stated in the plan. Letters of Agreement with these companies should also be provided. This is a planning lasue and must be addressed in the next a

revision of the Oswego County REPP to be reviewed by the RAC.

l No training logs were submitted for emergency workers from the following q

companies:

i SOVAC Ambulance Corp.

Phoenix Ambulance Corp.

Oswego Fire Dept. Ambulance Oswego County Opportunities These planning lasues must be addressed in the next revision of the Oswego County REPP to be reviewed by the RAC. Also, the inconsistency between training logs l

and Annual Letters of Certification must be resolved and any necessary training completed.

OCEOC 19. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to Implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ was met at the OCEOC. At 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months , which was shortly after the Site Area Emergency notification was received at the OCEOC, the first protective action decision was made.

Oswego and Mexico schools, BOCES, State University of New York, private schools, and nursery schools were to be closed. The initial deelslon was to send the children home.

However, because of changing plant conditions, it was changed to evacuating the children to the reception center. At 1006 hours0.0116 days 0.279 hours 0.00166 weeks 3.82783e-4 months , OCEOC staff began to notify schools to close.

Adequate numbers of buses and drivers were available to meet the transportation needs of schools in the plume EPZ.

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OCEOC20.

The objective to demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas we.s met at the OCEOC.

Timely establishment of a TCP was adequately demonstrated. Free-play message #1 was inserted at 0945 hours0.0109 days 0.263 hours 0.00156 weeks 3.595725e-4 months . Given to the law enforcement function at 0947 hours0.011 days 0.263 hours 0.00157 weeks 3.603335e-4 months , it was communicated to the field by a police dispatcher at 0950 hours0.011 days 0.264 hours 0.00157 weeks 3.61475e-4 months . The responding police vehicle arrived at the site at 1012 hours0.0117 days 0.281 hours 0.00167 weeks 3.85066e-4 months .

A previous ARCA (OC-8) from the JAFNPP PEA dated 6/3/88 was corrected.

DEFICIENCIES Descriptions Three hearing-l'npaired Individuals who had requested special notification in addition to stren activation, who were on a computer list of hearing-tmpaired Individuals on file at the OCEOC, i

were not notified.

They did not have TTYs and requested special notification. (NUREG-0654, !!, J.10.c).

Recommendation: Procedures for alerting hearing-tmpaired individuals should be revised or TTY's should be provided to the Individuals.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECT!YE ACTION (ARCAs) 1.

==

Description:==

PAR #2, which called for evacuation of ERPAs 1, 2, 3, 5, 9,10, and 11, was issued at 1022 hours0.0118 days 0.284 hours 0.00169 weeks 3.88871e-4 months without ascertaining whether sufficient buses were available to pick up transit-dependent individuals. The representative of the County Planning Board was able to locate only 10 locally available buses and 20 buses from Centro of Syracuse Bus Co.,10 of which had been dispatched to Oswego County.

When.the County director of emergency management learned nearly an hour later that there were too few buses available to pick up transit-dependent Individuals in ERPAs 5, 9, and 10 (because school children were being evacuated to the reception center), a helicopter and a sheriff's car were dispatched to inform those waiting for buses in these ERPAs to return home to listen to EBS for further instructions. (NUREG-0654,11 J.10.g).-

Recommendation:

The availability of transportation resources should shape the content of protective actions issued by the OCEOC.

Contracts and memoranda of understanding with bus companies should be reviewed to ensure resources are sufficient for concurrent evacuation of school children and transit-dependent individuals.

2.

==

Description:==

The deelslon to utilize buses for evacuating the general population in ERPAs 1,2, 3, and 11 was improperly made by the County planning board representative. When an insufficient a

amount of buses was available for the general population l

l-

38 evacuation, the County Director of emergency management should have been notified immediately. Instead the County planning board representative himself made the deelslon as to which ERPAs would be evacuated. This resulted in the evacuation of citizens in ERPA 11, rather than the evacuation of citizens residing closer to the i

NMPNS in ERPA 5 (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.a).

Roeommendation: Additional training is required to ensure that Agency representatives coordinate activities with the County Director of emergency management when they are unable implement his PARS.

3.

==

Description:==

The OCEOC apparently did not request the Central i

District Office to contact the Onondaga EOC regarding opening i

I the reception center at the Fairgrounds, as provided for in the Plan.

The reception center and congregate care centers were opened by Onondaga County and were operational during the exerelse, but the procedure in the plan was not followed.

(NUREG-0654, !!, J.12).

Recommendation:

Coordination should be accordance with the plan.

4.

==

Description:==

The plan calls for the closing of beaches and State parks within the EPZ no later than at the Site Area Emergency.

Waiting to combine this preplanned PAR with other PAR Informa-tion caused a delay in notifying the citizens at beaches and State l

parks, since the Site Area Emergency was declared at 0942 hours0.0109 days 0.262 hours 0.00156 weeks 3.58431e-4 months .

The initial precautionary actions should have been implemented no.

later than the receipt of the Site Area Emergency ECL (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.1,m).

]

Recommendation: The initial precautionary operations should be followed as indicated within the plan.

I 5.

==

Description:==

Field team measurements did not adequately define the plume. Although the team was directed to monitor en route to some sample locations, it was not directed to traverse the plume to define the edges of the plume or to locate the centerline of the

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plume. (NUREG-0654, II, I.8).

Recommendation: Direction and control of the field monitoring team should be improved. Additional training and drills are needed l

to familiarize the field teare %ordinator with methods for I

efficiently gathering the necesury field data necessary to define the plume.

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6.

==

Description:==

The public information staff at the OCEOC did not review hard copies of any EBS meaages before they were read to j

EBS station WKFM, and were therefore unable to prevent erroneous information (EBS messages #5 and #6) from being j

broadcast (simulated). As an example, the second EBS message at

_, ~., _..,, _

. ~ - -..

o' 39 1022 hours0.0118 days 0.284 hours 0.00169 weeks 3.88871e-4 months called for evacuation of ERPA 3. However, the recapitulation section of the fifth EBS message at 1142 hours0.0132 days 0.317 hours 0.00189 weeks 4.34531e-4 months and the sixth at 1226 hours0.0142 days 0.341 hours 0.00203 weeks 4.66493e-4 months did not mention evacuation' of ERPA 3, which had been substantially evacuated by 1050 hours0.0122 days 0.292 hours 0.00174 weeks 3.99525e-4 months .

It did include ERPA 7 as being evacuated even though this ERPA was completely outside the plume. (NUREG-0654, II, E.7).

Recommendation:

Procedures should be developed to ensure verification of EBS messages by the County director of emergency management or his designee at the OCEOC prior to broadcast.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT (ARFfs) t 1.

==

Description:==

Dispatchers at the County Warning Point in the County Fire Control Center were unfamiliar with the telefacsimile machine located there. When they attempted to transmit a copy of a RECS message to the OCEOC, they could not operate the machine. They were able to transmit the message several minutes after finding the operating instructions.

Recommendation: Dispatchers at.the County Warning Point should be taught how to use the facsimile machine there, or instructions should be posted.

2.

==

Description:==

No map posted at the OCEOC showed the reception-center at the fairgrounds in Syracuse.

Recommendation: A map showing the reception center should be displayed.

2.2.2 Field Monitoring Teams One radlological field monitoring team was activated by Oswego County during this exercise. The three radiological field monitoring objectives were met.

OCFA 7.

The objective to demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurements was met. The field monitoring team demonstrated its ability to use the instruments provided in the field monitoring kits and to follow procedures in making the required measurements. The instruments were i

calibrated and properly checked and used. The beta / gamma instrument, which was the instrument used most, was properly protected; however, the RO2A lonization chamber was not covered by a plastic bag to limit contamination.

The field monitoring team followed instructions given by the field team coordinator in the OCEOC. MeasuremenN were reported back to the OCEOC in correct, instrument-speelfic units, even though the scenarlo data received by the field monitoring team was not in units appropriate for the instruments.

l L

The field monitoring team is composed of sheriff's deputies who, being famillar with the area, found the sampling locations with ease. However, maps that might be necessary for other fleid teams (e.g., federal fleid teams) to find monitoring points were not observed in the vehicle. This planning lasue must be addressed in the next revision of the Oswego County Radiologleal Emergency Prepa.M.s Plan (REPP) to be reviewed by the RAC.

OCFAS.

The objective to dettonstrate the appropriate equipment an procedures for the measurement of altborne radiolodine concentrations as low a microcuries per cc in the presence of noble gases una partially met.

The field monitoring team properly set up and tested the air sampler. The equipment used had a current calibration date and was of the type specified in the plan. The field monitoring team did an excellent job of properly reporting the air sample data. However, the field monitoring team did not exit the plume immediately following the collection of the air sample. The team remained at the sampling location for about three times as long as necessary to collect the air sampling thus Incurring unnecessary additional exposure and Incorrectly gathering field data.

The engine of the vehicle used by the field monitoring team was not running while the air-sampling equipment.was operating. A large load was put on the vehicle's battery while operating the 110-volt (with 12-volt converter) air sampler for seven minutes. The procedure should be modified to require that the vehicle's engine run during air sampling to preclude excessive battery drain.

The sample collection envelopes for the lodine cartridge and the particulate air filter had neither a " block" for specifying the time of collection nor a block for designating the field monitoring team. Such blocks would permit better use of the data.

Laboratory field data needs should be reviewed, and the labels or envelopes should be redesigned.

While the air was being sampled, a team member held the air sampler in front of him for seven minutes. This practice introduces the risk that the air sampler could be dropped. The field monitoring team should be equipped with a small table upon which to l

set the air sampler during sample collection.

OCFA 9.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses was met. The field monitoring team, following the plan, used good technique in collecting I

the particulate sample. The sample was read in the field, and the readings were recorded and reported. The sample was then given to a runner. Exercise play did not call for delivering the sample to an actual laboratory for analysis; rather, the OCEOC was a simulated laboratory. The elapsed time between sample collection at approximately 1321 hours0.0153 days 0.367 hours 0.00218 weeks 5.026405e-4 months and delivery at the " laboratory" at 1446 hours0.0167 days 0.402 hours 0.00239 weeks 5.50203e-4 months satisfied the requirement for prompt analysis.

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41 1

DEMCIENClDis No deficiencies were observed in the activities of the Oswego County radiological field monitoring team during the exercise.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION (ARCAs)

No areas requiring corrective action were observed in the activities of the Oswego County radiologleal field monitoring team during the exercise.

i AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT (ARMS) 1.

==

Description:==

The RO2A lonization chamber used by the field monitoring team was not properly covered by a plastic bag to limit contamination.

Recommendation: Proper contamination control methods should be used by members of the field monitoring team.

2.

==

Description:==

The engine of the vehicle used by the field monitoring team was not running during air sampling. A large load was put on the vehicle's battery to operate the 110-volt (with l

12-volt converter) air sampler for seven minutes.

Recommendation: The procedures should be modifled to require that the vehicle's engine run during air sampling.

3.

==

Description:==

Sample collection envelopes for the lodine cartridge and the particulate alt filter had neither a " block" for specifying 1

the time of collection nor a block for designating the field monitoring team. These blocks would allow for better use of the data.

Recommendation Laboratory field needs should be reviewed, and the labels or envelopes should be redesigned.

4.

==

Description:==

While the air was being sampled, a team member held the air aampler in front of him for seven minutes. This practice introduces the risk that the air sampler could be dropped.

Recommendation: The field monitoring team should be equipped with a small table upon which to set the air sampler during collection of air samples.

2.2.3 Field Activities There were seven objectives associated with Oswego County field activities (OCFA): five were met, one was partially met, and one was not met and was evaluated as a deficiency.

k

_, ~.

42 OCFA 4.-

The objective to demonstrate the - ability to communicate with appropriate field locations, organizations, and field' personnel was met. Efficient communication was observed at a number of field locations, including the PMC, the field monitoring team, the TCP, the traffic impediment, a school bus, a general populntion bus, the reception center, the congregate care-center, and tl.e ARC ; disaster headquarters.

At the PMC, one team member was in charge of communications. This individual received periodle telephone calls-from: the County commissioner of health at the OCEOC.

PMC staff members were equipped with-walkle-talkies. for in-house communications.

The field monitoring team installed a portable radio in its van._

Communications with the Dosa Assessment Group at the OCEOC were clear and uninterrupted. The police officer who set up the TCP and those who were dispatched to the site of the traffic impediment communicated clearly via radio with their control locations. The school transportation dispatcher communicated with the transportation =

supervis: M Che school bus garage and the OCEOC via telephone, and effective radio commuMcatkas were demonstrated between the school bus while in transit and the dispatchm There was telephone communication between Centro of Oswego Bus Co. and

'I the OCEOC regarding general population buses.

l Various communications systems were demonstrated at the reception center.

Communications systems were set up early by RACES and' ARC. A computer link was also set up. Commercial telephones were used for communications with the OCEOC and with the Onondaga County Department of Social Services. Cellular telephones were used by ARC staff to inform the congregate care center about how many individuals to expect.

Walkie-talkies were used for in-house communications. Six _ communications systems (i.e., two telephone systems, three radio systems, and a computer linkup) were used during the exercise between ARC disaster headquarters and ;the congregate care center. All functioned well.

A previous ARCA (OC-7) from the JAFNPP PEA dated 6/3/88 was corrected.

t l

OCFA 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to Implement appropriate protective actions for-the impacted permanent and transient i

plume EPZ populations (including transit-dependent persons, special-needs population, handicapped persons, and institutionalized persons) was met. At 1103 hours0.0128 days 0.306 hours 0.00182 weeks 4.196915e-4 months , Centro of Oswego Bus Co. received a telephone call from the representative of the County Planning Board at the OCEOC (free-play message #3). The Company was instructed to activate general population bus route #15. The bus left the garage at,1120 hours0.013 days 0.311 hours 0.00185 weeks 4.2616e-4 months and ~

reached the start of the route at 1125 hours0.013 days 0.313 hours 0.00186 weeks 4.280625e-4 months . The driver had a map of the route and knew all 10 stops.

He completed the route at 1135 hours0.0131 days 0.315 hours 0.00188 weeks 4.318675e-4 months and then continued on to the reception center at the State fairgrounds in Syracuse. The bus arrived at the reception center at 1235 hours0.0143 days 0.343 hours 0.00204 weeks 4.699175e-4 months .

At 1417 hours0.0164 days 0.394 hours 0.00234 weeks 5.391685e-4 months , A & E Medical Transport received a telephone call from the OCEOC (free-play message #5).

An ambulance was to proceed to the home of a wheelchair-bound person and simulate evacuating him. The OCEOC, which had a list _of the addresses of mobility-impaired persons, provided the address.

The ambulance 1

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company should have had the address, but did not. The ambulance departed at M25 hours

-j l

and scrived at the home at 1450 hours0.0168 days 0.403 hours 0.0024 weeks 5.51725e-4 months . The ambulance driver described hw a m..*!!!ty-J tmpaired evacueo could be transported to the ambulance, which was eouir;ed m:h a j

lift. The ambulance driver indicated that, upon receiving instructions, N wodd hve i

evacuated the person to the reception center at the fairgrounds.

l OCFA 19. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ was l

met. At approximately 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months , free-play message #4 was inserted at the OCEOC to J

demonstrate evacuation of the Wine Creek Day Care Center. The school bus dispatcher at the bus garage at Oswego Middle School received this message from the school.

transportation supervisor at the OCEOC via telephone at 1017 hours0.0118 days 0.283 hours 0.00168 weeks 3.869685e-4 months .. The dispatcher displayed knowledge of the correct sequence of actions to take. Copies of the City of Oswego's School District REPP Evacuation Bus Routes document were available for distribution to drivers. The bus departed at 1055 hours0.0122 days 0.293 hours 0.00174 weeks 4.014275e-4 months and drove to the Wine Creek Day Care Center. It followed the speelfled route to the reception center, arriving there at 1213 hours0.014 days 0.337 hours 0.00201 weeks 4.615465e-4 months .

The principals of Oswego Middle School and Mexico Middle School were interviewed (EV-2). Both schools had tone-alert radios and written procedures.for early dismissal and relocation of school children to reception centers. The principals were knowledgeable about the early dismissal polley. They knew how it 's implemented and how many buses are required for evacuation. They also knew that school children are -

evacuated to a reception center at the fairgrounds.

OCFA 20. The objective to demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas was partially met. A TCP was set up at the Intersection of Middle and Creamery roads in Scriba (ERPA 5) in response to free-play message #1, which was inserted at the OCEOC at 0945 hours0.0109 days 0.263 hours 0.00156 weeks 3.595725e-4 months . A sheriff's deputy arrived at the intersection at 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months , after being notified via radio. He was knowledgeable about the plan and the provisions relating to his assignment (e.g., evacuation routes, the location of the reception center, the role of TCPs, and radiological exposure control).

j At 1045 hours0.0121 days 0.29 hours 0.00173 weeks 3.976225e-4 months , free-play message #2A, which identified a traffic impediment at the intersection of Hay Fly Road and County Route 4 (Hall Road) in Scriba (ERPA 10),

was inserted at the OCEOC. At 1105 hours0.0128 days 0.307 hours 0.00183 weeks 4.204525e-4 months , the responding police officers arrived at that location. However, State police arrived rather than the County Sheriff's department as negotiated. The field evaluator then inserted free-play message #2B, which called for I

dispatch of a tow truck to remove a tractor trailer that had broken down. The vehicle was totally disabled and causing traffic to back up. The officer called in the information to the dispatcher, but was told that contacting the tow truck driver would be simulated because the driver would have to be paid for his time if he appeared at the intersection.

I The negotiated extent of play called for a tow truck driver to actually appear for the purpose of evaluating emergency worker functions.

Therefore, this aspect of the objective was not met. The county plan calls for the police officer to contact tow truck operators, through the dispatcher, to remove disabled vehicles from evacuation routes.

l 44

.o t

u The county plan also calls for the County Highway Superintendent to direct road crews to clear county evacuation routes of Impediments. This is inconsistent with the procedures for the County Sheriffs department for the removal of impediments..This planning lasue must be addressed in the next revision of the Oswego County REPP to be i

reviewed by the RAC.

l.

OCFA 21. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment,.and.- personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring, and

'i decontamination of evacuees was not met. The reception center was located at the Arts r

and Home Center at the State fairgrounds in Syracuse. The two individuals responsible

'for monitoring vehicles did not know at what levels the vehicles would be considered:

" contaminated" (i.e., 360 epm or 0.1 mR/h above background)._ They were unaware that paperwork had to be completed to' record vehicle contamination levels, and they used instruments (CDV-700) that had last been calibrated in February 1984. The advice given

[

to evacuees on a bus that was being. monitored contradicted plan procedures.' The evacuees were told to stay on the bus until it was monitored, whereas the plan states

~

that only the bus driver remain on the bus. -Decontamination of. vehicles was not -

demonstrated because the Solvay Fire Department personnel responsible for performing.

it had lef t the facility.

The posting of signs in the vehicle monitoring area was inappropriate. The only sign read " Decontamination Area STOP." t There should have been signs showing-the -

drivers where to park clean vehicles (the vehicle monitors did not know this themselves) and where the vehicle decontamination area was.

Vehicle ~ monitors should receive additional radiological training, should be more famillar with the plan, and should be.

provided with properly calibrated instruments. Also, the posting of signs in the vehicle monitoring area should be modified.

Inside the Arts and Home Center were two initial monitors to detect evacuee contamination. - Assisting the monitors.were two persons who recorded readings.c The monitors evaluated during the exercise were thorough but required 90-180 seconds:to-monitor each person.

At the lower end of that range-(1.e., 90 seconds per person),

Oswego County would need 21 monitors to meet the FEMA standard, i.e.,. 20% of the I

plume EPZ population (8236 people) in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .. However, at the high end of that range (i.e.,180 seconds per person), the number of monitors will have to be doubled to monitor 20% of the EPZ population in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . In addition, the Oswego County plan (Procedure f

C, page C-53) provides that the monitors are to scan the evacuees at a rate of 1 i

inch /second. If one assumes that the average evacuee is 5 feet-tall, one pass for the front, back and both sides would take 240 seconds per evacuee. This does not-include arms and hands, to which monitors are directed to pay particular attention.- If monitors follow this procedure, Oswego County will need even more monitors available.

It is of course, acceptable to adopt a monitoring procedure which takes the slower approach seen in the Oswego County plan as long as the number of monitors is increased to reach the goal of monitoring 20% of the plume EPZ population in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

At the current time, however, the Oswego County plan contains no mention of the

[

l number of monitors available. This is a planning lasue and must be addressed in the next revision of the Oswego County Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan (REPP) to be

_. _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -. _ _,

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_,w,_,-

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j reviewed by the RAC. It was also reported that the personal belongings _of evacuees were not monitored. A sufficient number of individuals should be properly trained in radiological monitoring and decontamination to' provide monitoring of the public in a timely manner. A log should be provided Indicating the number of trained radiological monitors available in Oswego County. This is a planning lasue and must be addressed in the next revision of the Oswego County Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan (REPP) to be reviewed by the RAC.

i The decontamination area had inadequate facilities and monitoring equipment.

Only one CDV-700 instrument was available for four decontamination monitors. There should be at least two monitoring instruments available in the decontamination area,'one for each of the shower areas. The decontamination room was too small for contaminated evacuees to.be handled effielently. Another area, with ample space should be designated as the decontamination room.

Shower areas were awkwardly positioned such that evacuees decontaminated in a shower would step onto a contaminated path. Facilities should be rearranged so that evacuees emerging from showers do not step upon a-contaminated path. There was only one shower for each sex. There should be more than one shower available for each sex to insure that decontamination action is as timely as 7

possible. The showers should have been separated by more than a thin material screen.

The monitors did not know that they were to keep individual forms; therefore, the paperwork was inadequately completed. They did not'know that they were to collect contaminated waste and store it in a corner away from the monitoring room, instead, they thought that the material was to be disposed of in dcsignated dumpsters.

Radiological training logs for the monitors were not available, although they have been provided to FEMA since the exercise. Decontamination monitors should receive further training and be more familiar with the plan.

Registration and mass care activities at the reception center were handled by the social service departments of Oswego and Onondaga counties.

Two separate reception desks were set up; one for clean evacuees and.the other for contaminated-evacuees. Several Onondaga social service staff members indicated that, in' the event of-an actual emergency, another building or even several buildings at the fairgrounds would be used as the reception center. If the Arts and Home Center will not be used in an actual emergency, the reception center designated in the plan must be changed. The primary reception center mue be designated and exercised. This planning issue must be addressed in the next revision of the Oswego County REPP to be reviewed by the RAC.

The Onondaga Department of Social Services set up and ran the reception center efficiently.

Evacuees were processed according to the plan. Individuals knew their responsibilities and acted accordingly. Maps for 7 of the 29 congregate care centers were available, in an actual en.ergency, the American Society for the prevention of Cruelty to Animals would be responsible for animal care. The waiting rooms for school children were separate from those for the general population and for Oswego County staff family members. School children were not individually signed into the reception center; rather, teachers were responsibla for their students and for having lists of their names. This is inaccordance with Procedures D, Attachment 1, page D-10 of the Oswego County Plan.

,y 46 e

Onondaga Department of Social Services staff arrived at the reception center at 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months . Some Oswego Department of Social Services staff were officially dispatched 1

at 1017 hours0.0118 days 0.283 hours 0.00168 weeks 3.869685e-4 months and arrived at 1020 hours0.0118 days 0.283 hours 0.00169 weeks 3.8811e-4 months . Additional staff arrived at 1120 hours0.013 days 0.311 hours 0.00185 weeks 4.2616e-4 months . There was therefore some prepositioning and advance knowledge of scenarlo times, which was-

)

also the case for RACES and ARC. The monitoring area was set up after the Site Area j

Emergency announcement, instead of after the General Emergency announcement, as specified in the plan. Apparently, participants were anticipating that the evaluators would arrive early.

Emergency workers being' evaluated should not-have advance -

knowledge of the exercise scenario, and the monitoring areas should be set up as specified in the plan. Although the social service staffs of the two counties worked well 1

together, each thought its county was in charge, and the plan did not provida guidance.

The plan should be modified to clarify which is the lead agency and which is the support -

agency at the_ reception center. This planning lasue must be addressed in the next

)

revision of the Oswego County REPP to be reviewed by the RAC.

j OCFA 22. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, and personnel for congregate care of evacuees was met. A congregate care _ center was set up at C.W. Baker High School in Baldwinville, New York. At 1330 hours0.0154 days 0.369 hours 0.0022 weeks 5.06065e-4 months , the shelter manager was informed that 500 evacuees, which was the capacity stated in the plan, would be arriving shortly. The Syracuse Chapter of: the ARC had 23 staff members supporting the erercise and the congregate care function.

Arriving evacuees were checked for registration cards before being allowed to enter the building. Those entering'-

the congregate care center had their identitles recorded, were assigned-sleeping quarters, were given rules, and were taken to the cafeteria for juice and a snack (simulated). The school cafeteria has a seating capacity of 750 and sufficient food in stock for more than 1500 meals. The Syracuse Chapter of the ARC has access to USDA food supplies and has standing agreements with several fast food-chains and food markets. This congregate care center was both adequate and very well managed.

OCFA 25. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment,-

supplies, procedures, and personnel for decontamination - of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles, and for waste disposal, was met. The PMC was located at the Volney Volunteer Fire Department station in Volney, New York. At 1005 hours0.0116 days 0.279 hours 0.00166 weeks 3.824025e-4 months , the first i

members of the PMC team arrived and began to set up the facility. The facility was-fully staffed by 1025 hours0.0119 days 0.285 hours 0.00169 weeks 3.900125e-4 months , and the staff thoroughly and efficiently completed setting up the fac31ty by approximately 1100 hours0.0127 days 0.306 hours 0.00182 weeks 4.1855e-4 months .

Six E5erline E-140N survey meters with Geiger Mueller pancake probes were 1

available for scanning.

All instruments had been calibrated within the past three j

months. Probes were covered with clear plastic bags to prevent contamination. Four monitors were prepared to scan incoming personnel and vehicles. Two-were stationed inside ' for personnel (one for the initial scan of workers and one for the post-decontamination scan), and two were stationed outside for vehicle scanning and for initial and post-decontamination checks. At a table inside, three emergency workers were responsible for communications and recording the dosimetry readings of emergency workers and PMC staff. All monitors were familiar with scanning and decontamination l

- 1

~*

procedures.-

When asked to by the evaluator, they demonstrated proper scanning I

technique. (No persons or vehicles were sent to the facility during the exercise.) Four of' the PMC team members are registered nurses.' If requested, the National Guard would have provided apparatus for vehicle decontamination, and the Oswego County Highway '

Department would have provided a basin to collect the water' contaminated during vehicle decontamination.

As the facility was being set vp, protective wall coverings were attached with masking tape. The making tape was not strong enough, and the protective wall coverings fell and had to be reattached several times. A stronger adhesive tape than masking tape (e.g., duct tape) should be used.

DEFICIENCIES

1. -

Description:

' Inside the reception center located at the Arts and Home Center were two monitors for initially detecting evacuee contamination. The monitors evaluated during the exercise were thorough, but slow, requiring 90-180 seconds / evac'uee. However, Oswego' County plan instructs monitors to go even slower.

Satisfying the FEMA guideline to monitor 20% of the population within the plume EPZ-within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months at the reception center, would have required 21 monitors if each monitor takes 90 seconds / evacuee.

If monitors take 180 seconds / - evacuee, the number of monitors would have to be doubled to monitor 20% of the EPZ population. There is no number of monitors indicated in the Oswego County Plan to perform the duty of monitoring 20% of the population within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months at the reception center at the rate -

(90-180 sec/ evacuee) observed during the exercise or the rate recommended by the Oswego County Plan.

The personal belongings of evacuees were not monitored. Monitors did not know that they were to collect contaminated waste and' store it in a corner away from the. monitoring room, not in dumpsters.

Monitoring training, equipment and facilities 4 1n the shower area were grossly inadequate. (NUREG-0654, II, J.12).

Only one CDV-700. instrument was available for decontamination monitors.

Evacuees decontaminated in shower would step onto contaminated path.

Male and female showers were separated by only a thin material i

' screen.

Monitors did not know that they were to keep individual forms.

. - - +

w

48 1

Individuals responsible for monitoring vehicles 'at the reception

=

center did not know at what levell vehicles would be~ considered 1

contaminated, did.not know that they'had to complete paperwork

~

that recorded vehicle contamination levels, and 'used instruments (CDV-700) that were last calibrated in.1984.

The advice given to evacuees on a bus that was being monitored was e-contradicted by plan procedures.

Vehicle decontamination was not demonstrated because the Solvay.

l Fire Department personnel responsible for performing it had already.

lef t. (NUREG-0654, II, H.10, J.12) q Recommendation:

A sufficient' number of individuals should. be properly trained in. radiological monitoring and - decontamination _In order to provide monitoring of 20% 'of the plume EPZ population within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .. ' There should be at least - two monitoring instruments available in the decontamination area one-for each shower ' area.'

Facilities should be rearranged such that evacuees.. emerging from-l

. showers do not step on a contaminated path. -

Decontamination personnel should receive further training and be.more familiar with the-plan. ' Vehicle monitors should receive further radiological: training, should be. more familiar with the plan, and should be provided with~

properly calibrated instruments. -

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION (ARCAs).

1.

==

Description:==

Free-play message #2B called for dispatch of a tow truck to remove a tractor-trailer that had broken down-at the l

Intersection of Hay Fly Road and. County Route 4 (Hall: Road) In

{

Scriba. An officer at the intersection called in this information to the dispatcher, but was told that contacting the tow truck driver

.would be simulated because the driver would have to be paid for his time if he appeared at the intersection.- The negotiated extent of play called for a tow truck driver to -actually appear.

~

Therefore, this aspect of the-objective - was not. met.

(NUREG-0654, II, J.10.k).

Recommendation: The police officer should have contacted the-County Highway Department for assistance. Additional training:

should be received on resources available-for removing traffic.

impediments.

2.

==

Description:==

Onondaga Department of Social Services staff arrived at the reception center at 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months .

Some Oswego Department of Social Services staff arrived at 1020 hours0.0118 days 0.283 hours 0.00169 weeks 3.8811e-4 months .

~

although those staff were officially dispatched at 1017-hours.

Additional staff arrived at 1120 hours0.013 days 0.311 hours 0.00185 weeks 4.2616e-4 months . There was therefore some l

.e=

's..

y prepositioning and advance knowledge of scenario times, which was also the case for RACES and ARC.. The monitoring: area was set I

up after the Site Area Emergency announcement instead of after I

the General Emergency.' announcement, as specified in the plan.

The early arrival of evaluators was apparently being anticipated.

(NUREG-0654, II, H.4) 7 Recommendation: Emergency workers being evaluated should not have ~ advance knowledge of the scenario.and should set up' monitoring areas as specified in the plan.

3.-

Description:

~ The' decontamination' room was too small for

-contaminated eva'cuees. to be handled efficiently by monitors.

(NU REG-0654, !!,' J.12).

Recommendation:- Another area, with ample space should be designated as the decontamination room.

4.

==

Description:==

There was only one shower for each sex. (NUREG-0654, II, J.12).

Recommendation: There should be more than one shower available for each sex to insure that decontamination is as timely as possible.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT (ARFis) 1.

==

Description:==

The ambulance company that. responded to the free-play message to evacuate a mobility-impaired person did not have a list-of the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of such persons.

Recommendation: Ambulance companies should be provided with-the names, addresses, and telephone numbers 'of mobility-impaired I'

persons.

2.

Descriptions The posting of signs in the vehicle decontamination' area of the reception center was inappropriate. ThereJwas only -

4 one sign that read " Decontamination Area STOP.

Recommendations - Signs should be posted that show the drivers of 1-clean vehicles where to park and -where the. vehicle decontamination area is.

3.

==

Description:==

As the PMC was being set up, masking tape was used to attach protective wall coverings. The masking tape-was not strong enough, and the protective wall coverings fell and had to be reattached several times.

Recommendation: A strong adhesive tape (e.g., duct tape) should be used to attach protective wall coverings.

-t

i 50

't.2.4 Emergency. Worker Radiological Exposure Control There was one emergency worker radiological exposure control objective; it was partially met.

OCFA 6. The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was_ partially met.

The exercise called for demonstration, of this objective by a variety of emergency workers at a: number of-locations. Included were members of the field monitor..ig team, emergency workers at the PMC, monitors at the reception center, a driver of a school bus, a driver of a general-population evacuation bus, an ambulance driver for evacuation _of.the mobility impaired, Fulton police officers responding to a traffic impediment, and a sheriff's deputy at a TCP.

4 The sheriff's deputies who ~ constituted the 'fleid monitoribg team each had_'

appropriate protective clothing 'and a kit that contained the personal dosimetry Indicated j

in the plan, including two-direct-reading dosimeters (DRDs) with ranges of _0-5R and j

0-200R, a tnermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD), and record sheets. DRDs were read at the proper intervals, and integrated dose was reported to the =OCEOC via radio in the-I proper units (mR). When the plume arrived at the first monitoring location at-.1315.

J hours, the team collected an air sample'in seven minutes. However, the team was not directed to leave the area as soon as they had collected the sample. Thus,. the team remained at the sampling location until they left at 1345 hours0.0156 days 0.374 hours 0.00222 weeks 5.117725e-4 months .. The team was given a dosimeter reading of 85 mR. However, during the 30 minutes, the scenario exposure was 590 mR per hour. Each team member therefore received 250-275 mR, which is at least three times the necessary exposure required to collect an air sample.

The field _

j monitoring team members were knowledgeable about exposure limits.1However, the field monitoring team did not exit the plume immediately following the collection of _the air sample. The team remained at the sampling location for about three times as long as necessary to collect the air sample, thus incurring. unnecessary additional exposure and incorrectly gathering field data.

The dosimeter charger was disassembled and batteries removed after zeroing ths j

DRDs, although Procedure C, Attachment 8 (page C-35) calls for rezeroing the higher-range DRD If predesignated exposures (1 R or 3 R) are recorded.

There is an j

inconsistency in the plan in that Sec. 2.3 of Procedure P Indicates that both DRDs should be zeroed if the lower-range DRD goes off scale. This planning lasue must be addressed-in the next revision of the Oswego County REPP to be reviewed by the RAC. Dosimeter

.i chargers should not be disassembled until the day's mission is completed. In accordance with procedures, the DRD record sheets were left in the monitoring kits.' Consideration should be given to changing the procedure to require that these sheets be turned over to the shift supervisor in the Sheriff's Department and transmitted to the exposure control-coordinator at the OCEOC. This planning lasue must be addressed in the next revision of i

the Oswego County REPP to be reviewed by the RAC.

At the reception center, one person was responsible for zeroing and distributing-1 dosimetry and for recording the dosimeter numbers given to the emergency workers.

Emergency workers were given one DRD; its range was either 0-500 mR or 0-200 R. The

1 4

$1 plan specifies that two DRDs are required, a low range of 0-500 mR and a high range of either 0-5 R or 0-200 R.

The range of DRDs distributed to emergency workers as speelfled in the plan does not comply with FEMA Guidance which offers two options.

Option 1 is two DRDs, one with a range between 0-5 R and 0-20 R and the other with a range of up to at least 100 R. Option 2, one DRD of 0-20 R, is the minimum acceptable system. This planning lasue must be addressed in the next revision of the Oswego County-l REPP to be reviewed by the RAC.

4 The Solvay Fire Department personnel responsible for vehicle decontamination did not have personal dosimetry.

The plan specifies that they should obtain their dosimetry from the Onondaga County Hea'th Department. Coordination should be q

improved between the Onondaga County Health Department and local fire personnel. A majority of Individuals did. not know that the DRDs should be read every 15 minutes; some were aven unfamiliar with the term " dosimetry." Exposure record cards were not provided because "the information is stored on a computer at the office." The individual in charge did not know the level of exposure that had been authorized for the mission.

Emergency workers at the reception center should receive additional training on radiological exposure control.

The emergency workers at the PMC were equipped with proper dosimetry. They read their dosimeters within the specified intervals and recorded the readings. However, they did not know whom to contact or what to do.lf an indicated exposure exceeded 500 mR. Emergency workers assigned to the PMC should receive additional training in radiological exposure control.

Both bus drivers were equipped with proper dosimetry (TLD,0-500-mR and 0-5-R DRDs, a packet of K1 tablets, and an emergency worker exposure record). The DRDs were zeroed before beginning the bus runc and were read at 15-minute intervals. The L

readings were recorded-and called -into the dispatch offices. The bus drivers were knowledgeable about whom to callif readings reached specified lim!ts.

The ambulance driver responsible for evacuating a mobility-impaired person was equipped with proper dosimetry and initially zeroed the two DRDs. He knew to report-to the PMC after completing his emergency duties and whom to notify if his dosimetry indicated excess exposure. However, he did not know at which exposure levels he should make such notifications.

Also, he took and reported dosimetry readings every hour rather than every 15-30 minutes, as required in the plan. Ambulance drivers should receive additional training in radiological exposure control.

H The police officers who arrived at the TCP and the location of the traffic impediment were equipped with proper dosimetry and were generally knowledgeable about radiological exposure control. The sheriff's deputy at the TCP, however, stated that the authorized exposure for the mission was 3 R, or 300 mR, indicating that he did not know the correct conversion between rads 'and millirads.

Radiological exposure control training should emphasize radiological terms.

Previous ARCAs (OC-4 and OC-5) from the JAFNPP PEA dated 6/3/88 were corrected.

m 52

- DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed in-the Oswego' County activities relating to.

emergency worker radiological exposure control.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION (ARCAs) 1.

==

Description:==

At the reception center, emergency workers were given one DRD; its range was either 0-500 mR or 0-200 R.

The

. plan speelfles that emergency workers are to have a 0-500mR and either a 0-5R or a 0-200R. (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a)

Recommendation:

The range of.the DRDs distributed to emergency workers should comply with FEMA guidance.

2. - Descriptiom The Solvay Fire Department personnel responsible for

' vehicle decontamination at the reception center did not have '

personal dosimetry.

The plan specifies - that they should obtain their dosimetry from the Onondaga County Health Department.

(NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a).

Recommendation:

Coordination between the Onondaga County

- Health Department and local fire department personnel should be improved.

3.

==

Description:==

A majority of staff members at the reception center did not know that DRDs should be read every:15-30 minutes, and -

some were even unfamiliar with the term " dosimetry. Exposure record cards were not provided because "the information is stored on a computer at the office." The individual in charge did not know the exposure authorized for the mission. :(NUREG-0654, !!,

K.3.b,K.4)..

Recommendation:

Emergency workers at the reception center should receive additional training on radiological exposure ' control.

4.

==

Description:==

Emergency workers at the PMC did not.know whom to contact or what to do if an indicated exposure exceeded 500 mR. (NUREG-0654, II, K 4).

Recommendatiom Emergency workers at the PMC should receive additional training in radiological exposure control.

I 5.

==

Description:==

The ambulance driver responsible for evacuating a mobility-impaired person.took and reported dosimetry-readings every hour, instead of at 15-30-minute intervals. He also did not know what apparent exposure level required notification.

(NUREG-0654, II, K.3.b, K.4).

Recommendation:

Ambulance drivers should receive additional training in radiological exposure control.

- l

3 a

53

- 6.

==

Description:==

The : sheriff's deputy at the' TCP stated that the authorized exposure for the mission was 3 R, or 300 mR, Indicating that he did not know the correct conversion between rads and millirads.

Recorrmendation:

Radiological exposure control training should emphasize radiological terms.

7.

==

Description:==

The field team did not exit the plume promptly after taking the air sample.

The team remained in plume for 30 minutes. As a consequence,' given the scenario conditions, each team member would have received 250-275 mR, which is about three times the exposure that should.have. been encurred for collecting an air sample at that location.

Recommendation: Additional training is needed to sensitize team -

i members to the need-to leave the plume as soon as possible after accomplishing their tasks.

4 AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT (ARFI) 1.

==

Description:==

The field monitoring team. disassembled the-dosimeter charger and removed its batteries after zeroing the DRDs. The procedure calls for rezeroing the lower-range DRD if.

predesignated exposures (l' R or 3 R) are recorded.

Recommendation: Dosimeter chargers should not be disassembled until the day's mission is completed.

k 2.3 MEDICAL DRILL (MD)

There were two objectives for the medical drill; both were met.

i 2.3.1 Ambulance Portion i

MD 23.

The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, procedures, and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured, or exposed individuals was met. This portion of the medical drill took place on May 16 at the reception center at the State fairgrounds in Syracuse.

An Oswego County resident, who had been-contaminated by the plume before evacuation, arrived at the parking lot and slipped on loose gravel. A worker at the reception center witnessed the accident and notified the Eastern Ambulance crew stationed there. Onondaga County personnel provided monitoring support. The ambulance crew gave the victim prompt medical attention and were very careful to prevent spread of contamination. Gloves were changed frequently, and the patient was covered to avoid spreading the contamination on him. He was thoroughly monitored, and a recorder kept a record of radiation readings and. the patient's vital signs. This information was given to the ambulance crew to take to the

'I

c ;, w :,

54 State University of New York Health Science Center in Syracuse. The drill terminated -

at this point, as the medical facilities were evaluated on May 11.

L A previous ARCA (OC-6) from the JAFNPP PEA dated 6/3/88 was corrected.

L 2.3.2 Hospital Portion MD 24.

The objective to demonstrate the - adequacy of medical ~ facility's -

equipment, procedures, and personnel for handling contaminated, injured, or exposed individuals was met. At 0637 hours0.00737 days 0.177 hours 0.00105 weeks 2.423785e-4 months on May 11, Oswego Hospital received a. call that an employee at the nuclear facility was injured and contaminated and that an Oswego. Fire -

Department ambulance would be transporting the. victim to the hospital.. The message was verified at 0639 hours0.0074 days 0.178 hours 0.00106 weeks 2.431395e-4 months . The victim had received first-and second-degree burns to the lef t shoulder, upper arm, neck, and face. These areas, as well as, the victims's clothing, were contaminated.

Two radiological physics technicians from the plant -

arrived with the ambulance to serve as radiation monitors. One surveyed the ambulance-and crew after the patient had been brought into the ' emergency room. The hospital.was set. up by the time the patient arrived.

Vital signs and contamination levels were commun!cated to the hospital staff. Appropriate medical treatment was initiated, and the patient was decontaminated. ' Samples were taken, properly labeled, and sent to the laboratory.

The hospital had excellent procedures for preventing - the spread of ~

contamination. The patient exit survey and-transfer were very well done, as were the staff exit surveys.

DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed in the medical drills.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION (ARCAs) l No areas requiring corrective action were observed in the medical drills.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT (ARFis)

No areas recommended for improvement were observed in the medical drills.

' 2.4

SUMMARY

OF PLANNING ISSUES These planning issues must be addressed in the next revision of the Oswego County Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan (REPP) to be reviewed by the RAC..

-l

k 55 i

JNC-5.

Because the McCroble Building is within the 10-mile EPZ, requires l

l-dosimetry, and may necessitate' relocating the JNC in a real emergency, consideration should be given to changing the primary JNC designated in' the plan to one outside the 10-mile EPZ.

OCEOC-18. Training logs indicated that an insufficient number of emergency-workers have been trained for the operation of buses and ambulances. New York State Emergency Management Office certification dated March 9,1989, stated ~ that all emergency workers in Oswego County have received training.

]

OCEOC-18 Since the total number of buses available.to simultaneously evacuate the schools and general population is 353 and the total transportation requirements for the one-wave evacuation are 366 buses and 5' vans, a total of 13 buses and 5 vans should be available to make up the difference. The number of vehicles. actually available through each applicable letter of agreement should also be reviewed.

OCEOC-18 A total of 131 emergency workers have been trained for the operation of buses, and 366 buses are required for a one-wave evacuation. Therefore,-

235 additional emergency workers need to be trained for the operation of buses, j

OCEOC-18 The number of vehicles being provided by the ambulance companies -

should be stated in the plan. Letters of Agreement with these companies should also be jl provided.

'l OCFA-6. There is an inconsistency in the plan in that Section 2.3 of Procedure P Indicates that both DRDs should be zeroed if the -lower-range.DRD goes off scale.

However, Procedure C, Attachment 8 (page C-35) calls for rezeroing the higher range-DRD if predesignated exposure (1 R or 3 R) are recorded. Also, in accordance with procedures, the DRD record sheets were left in the monitoring': kits. Consideration should be given to changing the procedure to require that these sheets be turned over to the shift supervisor in the Sheriff's Department and transmitted to the exposure control coordinator at the OCEOC.

OCFA-6. The dosimetry as specified in the plan does not comply with FEMA guidance which offers two options. Option 1 is two DRDs,~one with a range between 0-

5. R and 0-20 R and the other with a range of up to at least 100 R. Option 2, one DRD of 0-20 R, is the minimum acceptable system.

OCFA-7. The field monitoring team is composed of sheriff's deputies who, being familiar with the area, found the sampling locations with ease. However, maps. that i

m ght be necessary for other field teams (e.g., federal field teams) to find monitoring points were not observed in the vehicle.

,.. j 56-OCFA-20. The county plan calls for the' County Highway Superintendent. to

]

direct road crews to clear county evacuation routes of Impediments. This is inconsistent with the procedures for the County Sheriff's department for the removal of Impediments..

.OCFA-21. If the Arts and Home Center will not be used in an actual emergency, the reception center designated in the plan must be changed to reflect this.

OCFA-21. The Oswego County Plan contains no mention of the number of.

monitors available.

~

OCF A-21. Although the social service staffs of Oswego and Onondaga Counties l-worked well together, each thought its county was in charge, and the plan did not provide.

guidance. The plan should be modified to clarify which is the lead agency and which is-l-

the support agency at the reception center.

l OCFA-21. The Oswego County plan (Procedure C, page C-53) provides that the monitors are to scan the evacuees at a rate of 1 inch /second. _ f one assumes that the I

average evacuee is 5 ft. tall, one pass for the front, back and~ both sides would take-240 seconds per evacuee. This does not include the srms and hands, to which monitors are to pay particular attention. Oswego County must state in its plan the number of monitors available and the number must be adequate to monitor 20% of the population in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months at the speed recommended in the plan.

OCFA It was reported that the personal belongings of evaucuees were not monitored. A sufficient number of individuals should be properly trained in radiological.

monitoring and decontamination to provide monitoring of the public in a timely manner.

A log should be provided Indicating the number of trained radiological monitors available in Oswego County.

2.5 REMEDIAL EXERCISE NOVEMBER 13, 1989 A remedial exercise was held November'13,-1989 to test the capabilities of the State and Oswego County to correct the three deficiencies evaluated at the exercise held' on May'16,1989. This remedial exercise called for evaluation of: (1) the content of EBS messages (objective 13); (2) notification of the hearing-tmpaired (objective 12); and (3) monitoring and decontamination activities at the reception center (objective 21).

Five Federal evaluators evaluated this remedial exercise.

These individuals, their affiliations, and their exercise assignments are given below.

L

L..'

j$

$7 Evaluator Entity Exercise Location P. Weberg FEMA FEMA 11 RAC Chaleman, Joint News Center (JNC)

K. Call FEMA JNC S. James FEMA Oswego County Emergency Operations Center (OCEOC)

V. Beverly FEMA OCEOC P. Kier.

ANL' Reception Center The initial scenario condition is that NMPNS ' Unit 1 is operating at 100% reactor power on November 13, 1989. At 0915 hours0.0106 days 0.254 hours 0.00151 weeks 3.481575e-4 months , a notification of unusual ' event ECL is declared because of unidentified leakage in the reactor coolant system greater than 6 gallons per. minute. The prognosis is that plant con'ditions are degrading. ' All public, private, and nursery schools are in session.

At 0950 hours0.011 days 0.264 hours 0.00157 weeks 3.61475e-4 months , the utility declares an alert ECL because the unidentified leakage.

rate from the reactor coolant system had exceeded 50 gallons per minute and was then 65 gallons per minute.

At 1040 hours0.012 days 0.289 hours 0.00172 weeks 3.9572e-4 months , the utility declared a site area emergency ECL because there was a loss of coolant accident when the leakage rate exceeded the capacity of the makeup pump. However, the emergency core cooling system was activated and,was maintaining the water level in the reactor vessel.

At 1115 hours0.0129 days 0.31 hours 0.00184 weeks 4.242575e-4 months , a general emergency ECL was declared because the emergency core cooling system failed with the loss of coolant accident in progress.

Loss of containment was considered to be imminent.

Objective 12. The objective to demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate State and/or local officials was met. Oswego County distinguishes between those with a hearing impairment (e.g., an. individual who cannot hear a-stren.when sounded but can hear a telephone ring and can listen to the radio) and an individual who is deaf. To the best knowledge of the County office of i

emergency management, all deaf persons have TTYs. The emergency medical services (EMS) representative at the OCEOC had separate lists of deaf individuals and hearing-impaired individuals.

The list of hearing-tmpaired individuals had the name and telephone number of the contact person and some relevant information about each individual.

At 1015' hours, when the decision to issue the first EBS message was made, the l-EMS representative at the OCEOC contacted County fire control to have the deaf

residents contacted via TTY (simulated) and to alert hearing-impaired individuals via,

o 58 V.

1 telephone (simulated). At 1030 hours0.0119 days 0.286 hours 0.0017 weeks 3.91915e-4 months , the EMS' representative was notified by County fire control that the deaf Individuals and the hearing-tmpaired individuals had.been alerted. Telephone calls to hearing-tmpaired individuals were made by special facilities j

staff.

Within a minute or two of the decisions to broadcast the second and third EBS messages, the EMS representative at the OCEOC contacted those with responsibility for i

notifying the deaf and the hearing-tmpaired and correctly identified the ERPAs to be sheltered-in-place or evacuated.

Objective 13.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a-t timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has' occurred was met. Promptly af ter receipt of the alert, site area emergency, and general emergency ECL declarations by the utility on the RECS line, the Oswego County director of emergency management I

and the representative of the New York State Disaster Preparedness Commission conferred by means of the executive hotline. They formulated coordinated information and protective action recommendations to be disseminated to the public-over EBS after sounding of the strens. The times of the decisions, of the siren activations '(simulated) and of the EBS message broadcasts (simulated), and the-PARS contained in the EBS messages are I!sted below.

Decision Stren EBS PAR or EBS Message Content 1015 1026 1030 As a precautionary measure, students' q

in the Oswego school districts are

)

being sent to the State fairgrounds;

~

students to the Mexico school districts are being sent home; and the water ERPAs (23, 24, 25, 26, 27,' 28, and 29) are being cleared.

1055 1106 1109 Shelter-in-place in ERP As 1, 2, 3, 5, 6,11,12, and 13.

I 1129 1142 1144 Evacuate in ERPAs 1,2,3,5,6,11, 12, and 13; shelter-in-place in ERPAs 4, 7, 8, 9,10,18,19, 20, 21, and 22.

The EBS messages were formulated at the OCEOC with use of a microcomputer _

and transmitted to the JNC via telefacsimile machine. For each of the three messages, telefacsimile transmission began at least nine minutes before broadcast time.

The i

following procedure was used to formulate the EBS messages so promptly. During the transmission of a RECS message, which was heard in the command and control room of

(

the OCEOC over a speaker, a P!O at the computer console constructed a draft EBS

59 message based on the utility recommendation and using prescripted segments stored on a diskette.

When a decision was made, the PIO at the console modified the draf t, if necessary to conform to the decision, and printed the EBS message on a laser printer.

The EBS message was reviewed by the County director of emergency management and another P!O and then transmitted to the JNC.

Also an open telephone line was maintained between the JNC and the OCEOC.

At the JNC, broadcast of EBS message #1 was simulated. The EBS messages formulated using the above procedure accurately represented the decisions of the State and County, and avoided the murkiness and errors of some of the EBS messages in the May 16,1989 exercise. There was possible source of confusion, however, regarding day care centers. One bullet referred to " Children's Center - Mitchell St. and Swetman Hall." There are actually two children's centers, one on Mitchell Street and the other in Swetman Hall at SUNY Oswego. As written, the one bullet creates confusion by allowing the interpretation that there is one children's center.

Objective 21.

The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for-the registration, radiological monitoring and -

decontamination of evacuees was met.

Demonstration of personnel monitoring and decontamination, and of vehicle monitoring and decontamination took place in and in-the vicinity of the Arts and Home Center at the State fairgrounds in Syracuse, the same facility that was used in the May 16,1989 exercise.

Signs at the entrance to the State fairgrounds directed vehicles to the Arts cnd Home Center. At the entrance to the Arts and Home Center, a sign advises all" cars" to stop, for passengers to discharge and enter the Center, and for the driver to drive ahead to the vehicle monitoring area.

This sign corrects the element of the deficiency resulting from evacuees being advised to stay on a bus untilit was monitored. However, the sign by referring only to " cars" could cause confusion as vehicles other than cars, e.g., school buses, are directed to the reception center.

Three monitors carefully monitored vehicles and their drivers for contamination using CDV-700 survey meters. The survey instruments had been calibrated between February 1989 and April 1989, as were all survey instruments used during.the remedial exercise. The vehicle monitors knew that a vehicle is-to be considered contaminated if readings of 0.1 mR/hr or more above background are observed. Forms were completed for each vehicle with information about the driver and the location and intensity of contamination, if any. These vehicle monitoring demonstrations correct another element of the deficiency.

One vehicle was simulated as being contaminated in the wheel wells.

That i

vehicle followed signs to the decontamination area where firefighters from the Solvay.

Fire Department demonstrated vehicle decontamination. One decontamination worker demonstrated adequate wiping techniques while a second checked for residual contamination. It was simulated that one wheel well was still contaminated after wiping, so soaping and hosing of the contaminated areas were performed.

'These vehicle decontamination demonstrations correct another element of the deficiency.

x.

-l 60 There were four personnel monitors and each had an assistant who completed the i

monitoring form during the monitoring process. The personnel monitors demonstrated.

adequate technique. They required between 90 and 120 seconds to monitor each person 1.

they monitored personal belongings, such as handbags; and they maintained the Integrity -

of the clean areas and paths. These personnel monitoring demenstrations correct another '

element of the deficiency. However, the number of monitors is still not specified in the plan.

The four personnel monitors were placed in a line perpendicular to the path from-entrance of the Arts and Home Center.

With this configuration, the logistics of i

separating clean and contaminated evacuees and sending them along separate paths to q

the reception center and decontamination area, respectively, was simple. There was i

space for approximately two more monitors in this line. However 21 monitors, as a.

minimum, would be required to monitor 20% of the plume EPZ population in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , it is doubtful whether the room in which personnel monitoring was demonstrated could accommodate 21 monitors, their assistants, and separate pathways for clean end contaminated evacuees. It was noted in the May.16,1989 exercise that the Arts and Home Center is an inadequate facility for use as the reception center for a radiological i

emergency. This is another example of its inadequacy.

4 One evs. :uee was simulated as being contaminated on the hands and feet, and' that her handbag was also contaminated.

She was directed to the decontamination ^

area. As was the case during the May 16,1989 exercise, there was only'one shower available for each sex and the decontamination room was small. However, each shower was contained in a plywood enclosure thet adequately protected an evacuee's privacy while disrobing and showering, which corrects an element of the deficiency.

There were two decontamination monitors; each had 'a survey meter and an assistant.

The decontamination workers exhibited adequate knowledge when they described four successively harsher personnel decontamination techniques.

They demonstrated removing contamination from the handbar by wiping and, if that failed, they demonstrated bagging and tagging the contaminated handbag, giving the evacuee a receipt. As at the May 16, 1989 exercise, there was only one pathway for both ingress and egress for each shower. Therefore, a decontaminated evacuee could possibly pick up contamination on the pathways from the showers to the exit of the decontamination room that leads to the reception center. The decontamination workers explained how they would attempt to circumvent this problem. First, after an evacuee enters a shower i

enclosure, the pathway to the enclosure would be monitored and if contaminated, the paper on the pathway would be changed. Second, before leaving the decontamination room for the reception center, an evacuee would be remonitored. A sufficient amount of protective clothing (sults, bootles, gloves, and outer gloves) were observed.

To summarize, the monitoring and decontamination staff at the reception center corrected all the elements of the deficiency that were related to staff performance.

However, except for better visual isolation of the shower r.reas, the problems of the Arts and Home Center being too small to serve as the reception center that were observed in l

the May 16,1989, exercise were observed in the remedial. In addition, there is still no number of monitors available according to the plan. This aspect of the plan's resources should be reexamined immediately so that additional trained monitors can be obtained.

o-61 This planning lasue must be addressed in the next revision of the Oswego County REPP to

. be reviewed by the RAC.

DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were. observed in the remedial exercise held on November 13,1989.

j' AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION (ARCAs)

No areas requiring corrective action were observed in the remedial exercise held on November 13,1989.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT (ARFIs)

==

Description:==

There was one possible source of confusion in the EBS messages concerning day care centers.

One bullet referred to

" Children's Center - Mitchell St. and Swetman." There are actually

~

two children's. centers, one on Mitchell Street and the other in Swetman Hall at SUNY Oswego. As written, the one bullet creates confusion by allowing the. interpretation that there is one "Calldren's Center."

Recommendation - The prescripted text should be modified to clearly indicate that there are two " Children's Center" day care centers.

==

Description:==

Slgn at the reception center in the State fairgrounds l

directs " cars" to stop at the entrance of the Arts and Home Center to discharge passengers, and for " cars" to proceed to the vehicle monitoring area decontamination area.

As vehicles other than automobiles (e.g., buses) will also be directed by this signage, the use of the term " cars" could cause confusion.

Recommendation:

Signage at the reception center should be changed so that the term " cars"is replaced by the term " vehicles."

t

-l 3

SUMMARY

OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Section 3 of this report provides a schedule for the correction of deficiencies or -

areas requiring corrective action noted during the May 16,1989 exercise.

Tables 3.1 through 3.5 summarize recommendations to correct those 'defielencies or areas requiring corrective action identified during the exercise. These tables also -

e include ARCAs identifled in previous exercises which remain unresolved or nave been -

rectified during exercise, i

f b

b i

b

'l l

TAII.E 3.1 1

CINE HILE POINT SITE 8 NEW YORK STATE F.OC 4.

Page 1 of 1 MtfMEC-0654 FEHA-REP-1 Emercise Date Rev..1, FEHA Ns.

Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference Objective Hay 16,1989 Prev 7.ous Esercises Present Status

b 1.

Confusion existed at the JNC E.5, 12 X

C resulting from coordination C.4.b efforts between the director of field operations (SEOC) and the State PIO (JNC). The role of the State regarding the activation of the alert and notification system should be focused on coordination with the Oswego County Emergency Hanagement Director.. State PIO should receive additional. train-ing as to the State's function at the JNC.

2.

The State Doll t iaison located in I'.10 10 X

C the Oswego County' EOC was un-familiar with basic dose projec-tion methodology and the conse-quences of an etevated release or plume dose rates. The State Dolt liaison. should~'be sufficiently trained'to participate in a mean-Ingful way to the overall-dose

[

assessment operation.

-l 5

.i l

i l

9 9

7,%tE'3.2 CINE HIRE POINT SITE * '

CENTRAI. SISTRICT EDC rage 1 of 1 NtJREC-0654 FEMA-REP-1 Esercise flate Rev..t.

FEMA

.b No.

Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference Objective g,7 16,1989 Previous Esercises - Present Status' Representatives from-two' State A.2.a, 2

X C

agencies did not report to ' the E.1 CDEOC in -accordance with the 4

plan.

The responsibilities of the' three agencies not.repre-sented (State Doff, and Department of Environmental ConservatiGn) should be reviewed to ensure future participation as required by the plan.

2.

Since there are not a sufficient F.1.d 4

X C

~

number of telephones ' to permit timely communications between state agency representatives at the CDEOC and.their counterparts at the SEOC, state ' agency repre-sentatives relied on backup radio communications and telecopiers to transmit their messages. - A det sy of 1-2 hours was emperienced in transmitting and receiving infor-mation.

The available-communi-cations systems, both the primary telephones ' and the backup radios and. telecopiers, are' not suffi-cient-to permit-agency repre-sentatives - at the CDEOC to3 com-saunications " with their ' counter-

-parts in the SEOC. in a timely Additional primary tele-manner.

phones and/or'. backup radios should be procured so that state agency- 'representa0ives in the-operations iroom can communicate with the SEOC in a timely manner.-

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TAitE 3.3 t'I::E MIt.E POINT SITE 8 EMEECENCY Ot*EOATIONS FACit.ITY Page 1 of 2 NtfREC-0654 FEMA-NEP-1 Esercise Date Rev. 1 FEMA No.

Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference Objective May 16,1969 Previous Exercises Present Status

b 1.

Although PARS were issued.co the C.2.a 3

X,

X I

County's ' Director of. Emergency Management, -the CNFLO was not ir>cluded in seme of' the dis-cussions between the Emergency Director at the EOF and the

State, and therefore 'was not always provided with. pertinent information4 regarding PARS.

The CNFLO should be included ' in att discussions regarding PARS with.

the Emergency Director at the JAFNPP EOF.

The State and County should meet with ' the utility to resolve this issue.

2.

The ability to maintain staffing A.4 34

.X C'

of the state functions -at the NHPNS EOF on a 24-hour' basis was not' demonstrated. The ability-to e

maintain. staffing of' the state

&^

functions at the EOF on s'24-hour basis needs to be demonstrated at a future esercise.

. 3.

A lack of paper interrupted the F.1.d

'4 X

receipt-of hard copies.by the C'

state and county representatives for over two hours.

A supply of telecopier paper for use by state-and county representatives shouldJ be maintained at the NHPNS EOF.

4.

One status board at the NMPNS Eor it -

5

.X

~ C was not' updated for about an hour-at :one point during the emer-cise. Staff should be trained to-update all status boards - prompt :

ly.

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TA81.E 3.3 i

CINE l'It.E POINT SITE 8 -

l.

EMERCENCY OPFitATIONS FACII.ITY

(

Page 2 of 2' l

t l

NUREC-0654 FEMA-REP-1 Exercise I) ate Rev. 1, FEMA b

N3.

Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference

' Objective Hay 16,1989 Previous Esercises Present Status

l r

5.

The emergency action tevel was D.3

'l X

C not displayed in the'NMPNS EOF.

The current emergency action levet should. be displayed - within clear - view of all personnel in 1

the EOF.

6.

Incoming state and county per-A.2.a.

3 X

C sonnel were not formally briefed A.4 at the NMPNS EOF.

Upon - arrival at the EOF, incoming state and county personnel -should be for-mally briefed with current status

'information.

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TnM 3.4

' [INE E I12 FORNT EITE

'l' l'

8 l

JOINT WEUS CENTER

~

i

- Pass I ef 6 l

s NUREC-0654 FEMA-REP-1 Esercise Date l-Rev. 1 FEMA b

[

Mo.

Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference Objective May 16.1989 Previous Esercises Present Status

l' 3.d

. Some of t he' EBS messages gener-E.6..

33 x

C ated at the Juc contained incom-E.7, plate, inaccurate, and unclear C.4 information regarding protective action responses.

The first E85 message listed 26 schools as having been evacuateds the third ESS mes-sage listed 23 shcools.

The fifth and sixth EBS mess-ages erroneously included ERFA F as being evacuated and omitted ERFA 3 as being evac-usted.

Physical descriptions of' ERPAs were included in only two of the messages.

Sesidents were instructed to evacuate to the homes of fri-ends or relatives, but were not told that the' homes should be outside the 10-mile EPZ.

Parents were notified to' pick up their evacuated school children at the ' reception center in only one E85 message.

Before being broadcast, the con-tent of att EBS messages should -

be verified 'by OCEOC personnel.

A computer or, a telefacsimile machine could be used for this verification process.

"ff not-feasible.-consideration should be given to having ' the P!0 ' function a

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TABLE 3.5 -

t'INE CILE pc. ort 9tTE*

JOINT WEWS (184B.

Pag) 2 Ef 6 NUREC-0654 FEMA-REP-1 Esercise Date Rev. 1, FEMA b

be.

Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference- ~ Objective May 16,1989 Previous Esercises Present States *-

s.

reside at the OCEOC, where com-munications with the ESS station coeld originate after the E85 message is composed and veri-fied.

The message could then be transmitted to the alternate County P!O at the JMC by tete-facsimile for the purpose of informing the media.

Additica-

atty, physical descriptions of ERpAs should be included in all EBS messages.)

2.

JNC staf f stambers were not always 0.3 1

I.

I aware of-changes in ECL.

In one instance, the Oswego County FIO did not know that the ECL had been upgraded from an Alert to a Site Area Emergency watit so informed by th Utility repre-sentative.

Prctedures should be established to ensure that att personnel are promptly informed of changes in ECL. Consideration should be given to announcing this information over the public-address system.

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1'INE stLE rotNT SITE

JOINT NENS CENTER e

Pese 3 of 6

- e NUREC-0654 FEMA

REP-1 Esercise Date Rev. 1 FEMA No.

Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference Objective May 16,1989 Previous Emercises Present Status

U 3.

At the beginning of the esercise, 0.3 3

I

.I after the JNC had been activated, the status board for showing ECLs was not immediately set up and the ECL was not immediately dis-played.

Also, the time the Cen-eral Emergency ECL was declared was never posted on the status board in the State / County room on the second' floor.

Procedures should be followed that catt for promptly setting up status boards and using them to post the ECL.

4.

EBS messages did not mention the C.4 13 X

X I

1989 emergency information bro-chure entitled "Nine Nile Point Emergency Planning and Yoe,"

which contains information dif-ferent from that in previous edi-tions.

Far example, Jefferson County :no longer' hosts a re-ception center.

- E8S messages should mention the updated emer-gency information brochure and should point out that. the re-ception center is no longer located in Jefferson County.

Consideration should also be given to changing the cover of g.

the brochure from year to year to

help distinguish among. the var-ious editions.

3.

The McCroble - guilding is. within K.3.a 6

-I 1

the 10-mile EPZ.

Should the JNC have to be evacuated, the backup staff would be contacted and sent directly to the-alternate facility. JNC staff members were not issued-dosimetry, 'nor was there a central dosimeter serving.

all building occupants.

Att emergency workers within the 10- "

mile EPZ should2..be issued-

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TAGLE 3.4

fGE #ft2 pelgrf SITE

JOtWT HElfS CENTER Fece 4 ef 6 Wuetc-ob%

FDtA-SEP.I E,e,cise Dete Gew. I, FEMA Do.

Aces Requielag Cecrective Action Beference Objective

May 16.1969 Free % Esecciees Pecocet Statee' 3.

deoimeter equipeeet.

Ceesider-stione ehe.2id be given to esing the Wiegere Mohawk seilding in Syescose fee the primeep JWC elece it is seteide of the 10-eite EFZ.

If the preseet JWC is ret ained, desieeter most be isoeed.

6.

Seeceiptieet frees beiefiege were conducted decing the esercise.

Sewee jelet media briefings were held.

At each briefings, the Utility representative epoke ebeet pleet states end conditione, and the Count y Pf6 settined -the Commt y* e reopenses and bee it one eersheling reseeeces in seppeet ei the protective acties decisiees.

le

addities, pees reteesse were isowed by Flos et the Juc.

Newever, esteelete given la press briefinge cont ained the some leeccurete ' im6 eemet ion se wee present la EDS wesoeres.

The representetive did not check the infocoeties befers beiefing the media.

J sece w ettoet Att eepeesent e*

O tives reopensible fee beidfing the media shoofd check the information before presenting it to the

public, to sweid repeedweing the same eegere found in ESS messeges.

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TMLE 3.4 WINE #ft2 FOINT SITE" JOfWT WEWS CENTER e

rege S el 6 e

e NURECMp654 e

FEMA-9EF-8 feercise Date see. R.

FEMA Wo.

Area Sequirieg Corrective Acties Reference

%jective' May 16.1999 Freviene Esercisee Present States" F.

Although simulated woe of the E.6 12 E

C elert and notification erotem wee timely threeghout the eserci se, coefweise between the Cemety med State le coordinating the initiet activetion of the stert and moti-fication systene genereted each confesien et the JWC.

The JWC was smoore of what immediate actions to tehe end whetber the siten system emeld be activated sprior to the leseence of pre-coet ienery school steeinse le-formation wie the ESS station.

Procedores should be developed to emeure that JWC octione to oct-iwate the E9S Systee are dose in con jonc t ion with Cemet y deci-siene.

8.

News reteese f2 Geoved et the E.5 83 I

I Juc contained infermetion that wee inaccerat e and inconsistent with the decialen recelved free the State and County EOCs.

In-edrections to ehetter rathee thee to evecwete E9FA's 1-4 'were giwee.

Precederes ebeeld be de-e4 weloped to essere that accerete p

sed erw epeiste information la iactoded in att news reteeses.

9.

Activation of the ESS, in con-E.)

12 I

C joncties with the sleeteted activation of eirene. was not denometrated.

The ESS message that wee acteetly breedcast mee set in conjeection with wisoteted activation of eirene end did met occer within 15 einstes of deci-alse end therefore could met be ceneidered demonstrated.

This test message wee not en the air as the JNC read the message iete c.

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J Tast.E 3.4 WINE WILE FOINT CITE

JetWT WEWS CENTES Fage 6 of O WUREC-M34 FEMA-SEP-l foercise Sete tee. 1 FEMA b

So.

Area Sequirieg Corrective Actice Seference Objectiee May 16,1969 Freviese Eeeeciees Fresent States

9.

the teIephone. A embetestiet de-ley occurred betweee telephemieg of the test, eevoege end its breedcset.

Additieas ti r, the State espreseed its peeference et the post-enercise briefies to etitime the CSIS beare deciesen

- time to satisfy the elect end estification SS einste esercise reeeleeseets.

The sequence of esente ese incomeistemt with the JWC peacedores.

ESS eeeds to be impleweeted es detailed im JWC precederee.

10.

S ol e of the Cemety FIO la to C.S.b 13 I

C implement decision of the Oswego Co snt r Emersency Maeotement office.

Ceest y Pio should re-ceive additicoat training in the Ceest y decision enties process and in the -implementation of these decisione et the JWC.

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.e WUREC-06 %

FTMA-REF-I Esercise Dete Rev. 3 FEMrc No.

Area Segeieles Corrective Actise Seference Objective #

May 16.1999 Frevisee F=eecieee Present States' t.

Three beeeleg-impeived le-J.19.e 18 1

C dividmete edne bed. eeguested specist motifiestion is addities to elsee activties. =be were se e computee list of hearing-impeived individmete en file et the OCEDC, were net eetified. They did not have TTYe med regeested epecial setificaties.

Precederee for electing heering-impeired indivi-

..deste eheeld be e**ised er TTY *e shoeld be provided to the indivi-duelo.

2.

FAR #2 which cetted for e=ec-J.19.s 3

I I

eation ef ERFAs 1 2 3

5. 9 18 19 and it, wee seemed et 1922 howee witheet eeceetsieles whether eefficient beoes weee e,silable to ylch op treesit-dependent ledivideale.

The repeesentat ive of the Ceest y Planning Board wee able to locate eely It lecetty available buses end 20 beses f ree the Centre of Syrecuee tus Co.

10 of which had been diepesched to Oswege Coe=ty.

Ifhee the Cemety director of emersemer management leereed 4

weerly en heer later that there W

were too few buses available to pick op t receit-dependent iedividmete le EDFAs 3. 9. and le (beceese ochool children were beleg ewecosted to the recepelos center),

a belleepter and e eheriff*e cor were dispetched to infece those waiting for beses in these ERFAs to vetere twee to tietes to ESS for further instenctions.

The eweitebility

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i facLE 3.5 eger 0112 rotwT 581t*

ossets couvrr l

Foge 2 of 14 sustC-6454 FEMA-SEF-1 Esercise Date Bew. I, FEMA b

Wo.

Area Segwiring Corrective Action Reference Objective May 16,3999 Previese Esercises Present States

2.

et treespectation reseeeces ebeeld shape the centent of protective actions iossed by the OCEOC.

Centracts and meeerende of enderstanding eith bee componies eheeld be reviewed to essere reeeweces are esificient i

for concorrent e.acenties of school children med treesit-dependent ledieldeele.

3.

The decision to stilise besea fee J.lg.e 3

I E

eweteeting the geneest pepeleties in EEFAs 8, 2, 3, and II wee ie-property mode by the County plem-ning board cepresentative.

When j

en ineefficient emeent of twees wee eveitable for the generet pepelation ewecuation, the Cemety Director of emergency eenagement should have been motified ie-mediatety.

Eastead the Comat y _.

plenning beard representative himself eede the deciesen as to

- sic h ERFAs would be ewecuated.

This resetted in the eescention of citisees la taPA II, rather thee the ' eveceetion of citizen, 4

eesiding elesee to the estres in tare 3 Addielenet traielse le regelred to ensure that Agency representatives coordinat e activities with the Ceest y Director of emergency management when they are enable implement his FASO.

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TAetE 3.5

+

WINE Mite pofWT SITE' osutto cousTY Fece 3 et 15

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NUREC-0656 FEMA-REF-1 Esercise Dete See. 1 FEMA b

No.

Area Segeivies Coerecties Action Reference objectiee Mey 16,1989 Freeiene Esercisee Fresent States

6.

The OCEOC apparently did met J.12 3

1 I

regeest the Centret District Office to coatect the Oncedese EOC regarding opening the re-cepties center et the fair-gravede, se proeided for is the ples.

The recepties center and congregate care centere were opened by Cooedese Ceest y end were operatiesel during the esercise, het the procedere le the pies wee not followed.

Co-erdiestion should be acceedence with the ples.

S.

The plea cette for the closing of J.30.I.m 3

I I

beaches and State parks within the EPZ eo teter then et the Site Area Emergency.

Waiting to com-bise this prept emped FAR with other PAR infermation ceased a deley is motifying the citisees et beeches med State parke, eisce the Site Aree Emergency wee de-etered et 0942 heers.

The is-itlet precautionary actione sheeld heee been Implement ed me later thee the receipt of the Site Area Emergency ECL.

The e,J initiet precautionary operations fy -

should be followed as ledicated withis the ples.

4 6.

Field team messeremente did not 1.3 7

I I

edegestely define plume.

Al-theegh the tese wee directed to moeiter le route to some semple locations, it wee set directed to traverse the piese to define the edges of the piese er to locate the centertime of the plume.

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osueco couuTT Foge 4 ef 13 musEC-0614 FErbt-REF-1 Eserci,e bere Bew. 1 FEMA b

pe.

Area Segoiries Corrective Acties Reference objectiee 8ter 16,1999 erevisie Esercises Fresent States

6.

Directies and centret of the

' field moeitering teen seneeld be

leproved.

Additiesel tesiming rmed drille are needed to feeitierine the field toes coordieeter with methode fee

, efficiently getherleg the

eecessary field date necessary to define the plume.

F.

The p.6 tic. iefermetion etaff et E.7 13 E

I

+ t he OCEOC did not review hard

'cepies of any Eng meseges before they were read to EDS staties M F?f, and mere therefore membte to prewest erreneens infocention (EeS messagee #5 med #6) f ree ke-leg breedcast (elest at ed).

As se esseple, the neceed EBS message et 1022 hoore cetted for e,ec-motion of ESPA 3.

Newever, the recepitaleties section of the fifth EBS message 1842 fneere med the eisch at 1226 heere did set eestion eweceetion of EDFA 3,

ehich had been sebot est i elly evecosted by 1050 heers.

It did lectode EDFA 7 as being erecosted eves theogh this ERFA wee com-Q pletely eetende the pteme.

Pre-m cedores eheeld be - developed to emeur e verification of EES mese-eges by the Ceest y direct or of emergenc y eseegement er his de-eigeee et the OCEOC prior to broadcast.

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NUREC4654 FEMA-REF-1 Exercise Date I

Rev. 1 FEMA Wo.

. Area pequiring Corrective Action Reference Objective May 16,1989 Frevious Esercises Present Status

b 8.

Onondaga Department of Social N.4 2,21 I

I Services staff arrived at the reception center at 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months .

Some Oswego Department of Social Services staff arrived at 1020 hours0.0118 days 0.283 hours 0.00169 weeks 3.8811e-4 months . There was therefore some prepositioning and advance

. knowledge of scenario times, which was also the case for 1EACES and ARC.

The monitoring

. area was set up after the Site iArea Emergency announcement

instead of after the General

! Emergency announcement, as

.specified in the plan.

The 4early arrival of evaluators was

apparently being anticipated.

Emergency workers being evate-

.ated should not have advance

J 1bnowledge of the scenario and ishould set up monitoring areas

- N es specified in the plan.

9.

The field team did not emit the I.8 6

X I

plume promptly af ter taking the air sample.

The team remained in plume for 30 minutes.

As a consequence, given the scenario conditions,-- each team member would have received 250-275 mR '

which is about three times the esposure that should have been incurred ~ for collecting an air sample at that location.

Addi-tional training is needed to sensitize team' members to the need to leave the plume as soon as possible after accomplishing their tasks.

10.*

The decontamination room was too J.12 21 X

small for contaminated evacuees to be handled efficiently by monitors.

Another area, with

' ample space should be designated as the decontamination room.

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OSWECO CDUNTY Fage 6 of 13 If0 REC-0654 FEMA-REF-1 Esercise Date Rev. 1 FEMA b

No.

Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference Objective M8F 16,1989 Frevious Esercises Present Status" 11.*

There was only one shower for J.12 21 X

each sea.

There should be more than one shower available for each ses to insure that decon-tamination is as timely as possible.

12.

Inside the reception center l'.10, 21 I

C located at the Arts and Home J.12 Center were two monitors for initially detecting evacuee contamination.

The monitors evaluated during the exercise were

thorough, but

slow, requiring 90-180 seconds /-

evacuee.

However Oswego County plan instructs monitors to'go even slower.

Satisfying the FEMA guideline to monitor 20% of the population within the plume EPZ within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months at the

+4 reception-center, would have required 21 monitors if each monitor takes 90 seconds /

evacuee.

If monitors tabe 180 seconds / evacuee, the number of monitors would.have to be

. doubted to monitor 20% of the EPZ population. There is an in-sufficient nustber of monitors indicated in. the Oswego County Plan to perform the duty of monitoring 20% of the population within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months at the reception center at the rate (90-180 sec/

evacuee) observed during the exercise or the rate recomumended by the Oswego County. Plan.

The personal belongings of evacuees were not monitored.

Monitors did not know that they were to collect contaminated waste and store it in a corner'away from the monitoring

room, not in dumpsters.' Monitoring training, equipment and facilities in the shower area-were

. grossly inadequate.

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Fase 7 of la s

O sount.C-0634 FEMA-SEF-8 Esercise Date Rev. 1, FEMA esea Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference Ob ject ive Hay 14,1989 Previous Esercises Present Status

b 12.

Only one CDV-700 irstrument was available for decontaoi-nation monitors.

Evacuees decontaminated in shower would step onto contseinsted path.

Male and female shower separated by only a thin material screen.

Monitors did not know that they were to keep individual forms.

Radiological training logs for the monitors were weawailstbe.

Individuals responsible far anonitoring vehicles at the reception center did not know at what levels vehicles would be considered contaminated,

4 did not know that they had to

'O complete paperwork that recorded vehicle contamination levete, and weed instrumente (CDV-700) that were test calibrated in 1984.

The advice given to evacuees on a bus that was being monitored - was contradicted by plan procedures.

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TAatE 3.5 mINE Mite potwT LITE

osueco coeurrY Page 8 of 14 sRNtEC454 FEMA-REF-1 Esercise Date new. 1 FEMA No.

Area Requiring Corrective Action Beference Objective May 16,1989 Frevious Esercises Present States

b 12.

Vehicle decontamination was not demonstrated becewse the Solway Fire Depa rtment per-sonnel responsible for per-forming it had already left.

Sufficient n seer of indivi-deals should be property trained in radiological non-itoring and decontamination in order to provide monitoring of 20% of the plwee EFZ popula-

' tion within 12 howes.

There should be at least two moni-toring instruments available in the decontamination area -

one for each shower area.

Facilities should be rearrang-ed such that evacuees emerging free showers de not step on a contaminate path.

Decentamin-ation monitors should receive further training and be more familiar with the plan. There should be more adequate shower W

facilities for each ses.

O Vehicle monitors should re-ceive further radiological training, showld be more fee-iliar with the

plan, and should be, provided with pro-perly calibrated insteweents.

13.

Free play message f28 called for

~ J.10.k 20 X

t dispatch of a tow trucit to remove a tractor trailer that had broken down ' at the intersection of Itay Fly Road and County Route 4 (Rail Road) in Scriba.

An officer at the intersection called in this-information, Imt was told that contacting the tow t ruc k driver S

e h.

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.,.. O WUREC-OtS4 FEMA-9EP-1 Emeecise Date Rev. 1 FEMA po.

Area Beteiring Corrective Action Reference Objective May 16,1989 Previous Esercises Present States

b 13.

would

,e simulated because the drie,r would have to be paid for b's time if he appeared at the im ersection.

The negotiated estent of play called for a tow t rack driver to actually ap-pear.

Therefore, this aspect of the objective was not met. The polic officer shoold have con-tacted the Coenty Ifighway De-partment for assistance.

Add-itional training should be re-ceived on resources available for renewing traffic impediments.

Onondaga Department of Social Services staff arrived at the reception cent er at 1000 howes.

Some Oswego Departocet of Social Services staff arrived at 1020 howes. There was therefore. some arepositioning and edvance knowledge of scenario

times, which was also the case for RACES and AAC..The monitoring area was g.

set up after the Site Ares e.s Emergency aneowncement instead of after the General Energency announcement, as specified in the plan.

The early arrival 'of evalustors was apparently being anticipated.

Emergency workers being evaluated should set up monitoring areas as specified in the plan.

1 13.

At the recept ico center. emer-K.3.a 6

X gency werkers were given ene DRD; its range was either 4-500 ma or 0-200 R.

The plan specifies that emergency workers are to have a 0-500 ma and either a 0-$a or a 0-200R.

The range of th DRDs distributed to emergency workers should comply with FEMA Ceidence.

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esweos menrrT Fege 10 of 16 NUSECH454 FEMA-REF-l Esercise Date Re*. l.

FEMA so.

Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference Objective M8y 16,1999 Frevices Esercises - Fresent States

b 16.

The Solway Fire Department per-K.3.a 6

Z sonnet responsible for vehicle decontamination at the reception center did not have perstnat dosimetry.

The plan specifies that they should obt ain their desimetry from the Onondaga County Health Depart ment.

Co-ordination between the Onondaga County Health Department and local fire departeent personnel should be improved.

17.

A sta jority of staff members at K.3.b.

6 I

I the reception center did not know K.4 that DeDs should be read every 15-30 minutes, and some were even wafamiliar with the tere "desi-eetry."

Esposwee record cards were not provided becaese *the information is stored on a com-poter at the office."

The in-dividual in charge did not know the esposure authorised for the g

mission.

. Emergency workers at g

the reception cent er should re-ceive additional training on radiologicat esposure control.

18.

. Emergency werbers at the FWC did E.4 6

I I

not know whom to contact or what to do if an indicated esposere esceeded 500 en.

Emergency worters at the FMC shoold recebe additional training.in radio-logical esposwee control.

- 19.

The ambulance driver responsible K.3.b.

6 I-I for evacwating a mobilit y-le-K.4 paired person took and reported dosimetry readings every hour, instead of at 15-30 minute in-tervals.

He also dad not know what apparent esposure level required notification. Ambulance drivers should receive additional training in ' radiological esposure control.-

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Esercise Date TEMt,4 EP-1 Rev. 1, FEMA lie.

Area Reqwiring Corrective Action Refetence Objective May 16,1989 Previous Emercises Present States

b I

20.

The sheriff's deput y at the TCP K. ~ -.e 6

I stated that the authorised es-posure for the mission was 3 R, oc 300 mR. Indicating that he did not know the correct coevereion between rado end - eittireds.

Radiological exposere contret training should emphasise radiological teres.

I C

23.

Initist notification of the Ateet E.2 2

ECL was not relayed f ree - the County warning Point at the Sheriff's Coesnanications Center in Oswego to the OCEOC in Fett in after it had been ' opened.

Fes' activation of the OCEOC ese thereby delayed because twe County Director of EMerseur Manesenent was not aware that the emergency had been wpgreded to an Alert ECL watil approeimetely 'io einates after this information was initially available to - tse

. 09

-County.

Procedures.should.ae (4

developed to encore, especial!y dering the critical time requird to open the OCEOC, that changes in ECL ' status are relayed fres -

the Coenty Werning Point to tid "t

OCEOC as soon as possible after the EOC is opened.

I C

22.

When the MMRAS system was beooght I.10 le on-line, and af ter the appropri-ate scenario data were used in this systee, the projections did agree with the otility's dose not projectson, which was provided in.

a hard copy of Part II: of the Radiological' Assessment.

Data form.

Either the MMRAS code is a

mw.-

8 wiu nets retur SeTE eswco couemr Page 12 of 1*a wueEC-0654 FDIA-REP-1 Esercise Date Rev. 1, Ff.MA slo.

Area Sequiring Corrective Action Peference Objective May 16,1989 Frevious Esercises Present States

b 22.

feetty or the etitity operatee was ces property trained in ese of the MMRAS system.

On several occasicas, the County dose assessment staff att empt ed to clarify the apparent differences with utility representatives at the E00, but these attempts were en=ccessful.

The utility either failed to respond to the requests or, on one occasion when a util-ity spokesperson attempted to emplain the differences via the open telephone time to the EOF, the explanation mede no sense.

The County mest resolve with the utility the reeson for the apper-eat differences between MMRAS projections and the Fort 11 pro-jections developed by the stil-ity.

In addition, the reason for the f ailure of the EOF to respond to County requests for clarifica-tion of etility dose pro ject ions OD most be identified and corrected.

b 23.

The County 4ie not pta to ect(-

E.5 13 I

C wote the alert system (eimulation of strens) when a decision was made to close schools as's pre-cautionary action since that is neither the practice for school closings nor the plan for pre-cautionary actices.

However, there are no procedores in place other thaa notification by sir-

ens, to'~ infers the public to listen to ESS.

The County's alerting procwderes for a radio-togical emergency should be re-viewed and revised as appro-priate.

The County should deve-top procedores to ensere that the public is alerted (EBS systee, b

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FEMA-REF-t Emeetise Dete Rev. 1 FtJoA No.

area Rerwiring Corrective Action Reference Objective May 16,1989 Previous Esercises' Present Status' b

2 3.'

media broadcasts, etc.) to obtain precewtionary protective action instructions sech as schoot-closing information. ' S.ch plan revisions are needed becaese the public would not k.new to listem to Et3 or. ether media information when radiological.

emergenty c nditions would warrant the closing of schools.

26.

The communications between the K.3.a 6

K C

CCEOC and County emergency workers regarding individual radiation received did not in-ctwde the appropriate units of esposure.

The use el waits she=Id be reviewed in ' OCEOC and field emeraency worker - i-cations training.

1 C

23.

The ' field monitorirg teams were K.3.a 6

fetty aware of the personnet not esposure limits and requirements for reporting at specified levels

'and keeping individual esposure hist ory on the small caeds pro-vided.

rield' monitoring. per-soncel ' should be trained: regard-ing -individeal esposure limits, individual-record keeping,.and

' predetermined reperting levels.

X C

. 26.

The procedores demonstrated' by.

L.6, 6

the' ambulance crew for controit---

'K.5.b ing and containing the radiolog-ical contamination at the acci-dent site were inadequate. Addi-tional-. training.in the _ proper

' handling of contaminated indivi-duals should be provided' to ambu-lance crews assigned - to respond to radiological accidents.

F

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USWECU COUNTY Page 14 6f 1*s NUREC-0654 FEMA-REP-1 Esercise Date Rev. 1 FEMA No.

Area Requiring Corrective Action Reference Objec t ive May 16,1989 Frevious Esercises Present Status

b 27.

The Reception Center was never F.I.e 4

1 C

informed of the progress of the general population evacuation bus toward the Reception Center or its estimated art at time at that location. The Ian and pro-cedures should be reviewed and tevised as appropriate to ensure that measures are taken to mon-iter progress of the general pop-ulation bus evacuation at the 00EOC and to inform the Reception Center of the estimated arrival time of evacuees.

Also, bus dis-patchers who are la consnunication with the buses should be+ trained to relay route completion and Re-ception Center arrival times to the Transportation Coordinator at the OCEOC.

Op injected J.10.k.

20 X

C e

28.

A f ree play message was at the OCEOC at 0330 hours0.00382 days 0.0917 hours 5.456349e-4 weeks 1.25565e-4 months , de-N.I.b signating an impediment. et the intersection of County Route 43 and State Route 104.

This mes-sage specified that an ambulance was needed to transport one in-dividual and that two tow trucks were needed to remove the disable automobiles.

An agreement stade with State planners before the esercise that resources would actually be dispatched to the scene..This deployment was not demonstrated.

Mobilization of resources adequate to verify the capability to respond to an acci-dent scenario requiring response needs to be demonstrated at future exercises.

8oth the Nine Mile Nuclear Station and the James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant are located on'the Nine Mile Point Site.

bObjective number is from CM Ex-3 (dated February 26,1958) as it relates to ARCAs.

cC = Completel I

tocomplete i

d Deficiency o

These ARCAs remain uncorrected f rom the November 13th 1989 Remedial Drill.

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,*e-4 REMOVAL OF COMPLETED ARCAS FROM PREVIOUS PEA The following list summarlzes those ARCAs identified in the NMPNS PEA dated June 3,1988 which have been corrected and verified in previous exercises and are being removed from the chart provided in Section 3:

A New York EOC numbers 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.

[

Joint News Center number 5.

Oswego County numbers 9,10,11,12,13,14 and 15.

f Onondaga County numbers 1,2, and 3.

The only ARCAs which appear in Section 3 are those previous ARCAs which remain Ine'omplete, have been completed as a result of the May 16,1989 exercise, or the new ARCAs identified during the May 16,1989 exercise, h

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ML20033G362

Contents

Text

SUBJECT:

Enclosure:

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

i the cause and correct this failure. Core spray pumps 111 and 121 will provide sufficient

Description:

Description:

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

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ML20033G362

Text

SUBJECT:

Enclosure:

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

i the cause and correct this failure. Core spray pumps 111 and 121 will provide sufficient

Description:

Description:

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

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