ML20032B109

Requests Util Compare Fire Protection Program w/10CFR50 App R.Deviations from App Should Be Identified & Justified

ML20032B109
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	10/21/1981
From:	Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Dunn C DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
References
NUDOCS 8111040460
Download: ML20032B109 (19)

Text

... _

j y

yr y

y

y e

tW W

Dist.

Docket File FRosa OCT 2 1 1981 LB#1 Rdg 0Parr DEisenhut/RPurple WJohnston RLTedesco NHughes BJYoungblood Docket No.:

50-412 JGrant bcc:

MRushbrook TERA RFerguson NRC/PDR Mr. C. H. Dunn, Vice President TWambach L/PDR Ooerations Division VBenaroya NSIC Duquesne Power Co7pany GHarrison TIC

• 35 Sixth Avenue PSears ACRS (16)

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania W 14 RAnand

Dear lie. Dunn:

T t

Sub.iect: Appendix R of 10 CFR Part 50 - FirehrNetion Rule The Co:<nission published a revised Section 10 CFR 50.48 and a new Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 on Novenber 19,1980 (45 FR 76602). This rule became effective on February 17, 1981, and it specifies certain fire protection features for operating nuclear pomr plants licensed before January 1979. T'ie technical requirements stated in Appendix R were adopted after several years experience with the fire protection guidelines of Appendix A to CTP-ASB 9.5-1 in evaluating fire protection progra'is.

A copy of the Federal Register Hotice is enclosed (Enclosure 1).

The technical requirenents of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part G0 are now being used as guidelines in our evaluation of the fire protection progran for plants under review for operating licenses.

It has been our recent practice to perform the fire protection reviews for OL plants using the provisions of Appendix R.

Accordingly, as part of your overall fire protection progra7 submittal, we request that you include a conparison of your fire protection program to Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

Specifically identify and justify any deviation from Appendix R.

Deviations fro 1 Appendix R should be identified as early in the review process as possible, so that they may be resolved and all fire protection features be inpleqented by the time the plant is ready for fuel loading.

If you have any questions on this suSject, please contact the HRC Project llanager for your facility.

h?))D 9

~ Vs

/_7iO '[

.)Y

'6

)

b OCT2 61981* d, u.s. gfy*

_1 %

"'C'>

" "'I

.....N' Reno 811021**%R F

'*m e2 mc ronu ais no so,-cu eno OFFICIAL RECOFiD COPY

r 16 G,

s a

g.:

o The reporting / record keeping requirements associated with Appendix R of 10 CFR 50 have been approved by the Of fice of Management <ind Budget under approved number 3150-0011 which expires September 30, 1983. Coments on burden and duplication mey be directed to the Office of tianagement and Budget, Reports Management Room 3208, !!cw Executive Office Building, Washington, D. C.

20503 Si ncerely,

)

_q, VCe% f G' u q/3lC au Darrell G. Eise/1 hut,lDirector Division of Licensing Office of ?!uclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

110tice of Fire Protection Rule cc w/ enclosure:

See next page nil s

/74 mO or,,c r y DL:LB#1 DL'l%

DL:g/L Dl40M'

'J "'"r T ~B R ohybl660'

'RITsW3to" '"I' JE15MhUt" '

"' " ^ " ' )

f

.g

c. i,....

A

==>

1.w. A /.81..

..impm...104a1..' 10;g./81...

N C FORM 318 t10.tlO6 NRCM O240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY e usc.m mo-m eu,

Mr. Earl 'J. Wooleveri Vice President Duquesne Light Company 435 Sixth Avenue Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania '15219 cc: Gerald Charnoff, Esq.

Mr. M, H. Judkis

-Jay E. Silberg, Esq.

' Westinghouse Electric Corporation Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Power Systems 1800 M. Street, N. W.

P. O. Box 355 Washington, D. C.

20036 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.15230-Karin Carter, Esq.

Mr. C. O. Richardson, Jr.

Special Assistant Attorney General.

Stone & Webster Engineering. Corporation Bercau of Ad:ainistrative Enforcement P. C. Box 2325 Executive House - 5th Floor Boston, Massachusetts 02107 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Mr. Joseph A. Fricker, Jr.

Uti".ity Counsel City.cf Pittsburgh 313 City-County Building-Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 Attorney General Department of Justice Capitol' Annex Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Governor's Office of State Planning & Development ATTN: Coordinator, Penna. State Clearinghouse P._0. Box 1323 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Mr. Thomas J. Czerpah, Mayor Borough of-Shippingport P. O. Box 26 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency

~*

ATTN: EIS Coordinator Region III Office Curtis-Building (Sixth Floor) 6th & Walnut Streets Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 4

4

e b

_M Wednesda

,-u+- ~_=

November 19,1980 W =- j+ s i

._.a__

N.2 M

-.a m_ _

_e

-- 4 5

-E E._.=__

o a

=

n

=a

.=

g.

+,-

. =

=

=-

=

=

~

==

=

-=

== ~ =-

_ = _ =

=

=

..=

=

=

_ =

g

=

Part 11

=

=

Nuclear Regulatory

-2 Comm.ission

=_. g s.

EL _ri Fire Protection Program for Operating

_=_s -- =

Nuclear Power Plants i=-

.=

W.-

w'ase y-MTwe mN

.::':= =0 CO

• • W T.

-=

=

I".

=

.ll

~*

~~~.

We e eu.

I W." - -.$

)

y- _ _ % --

w

=

.=

3*.

-30

.y_

y-M-*w w r si a

K

=.

y:

- v:.:

g

..=

-.:;:;:';=A=

E 3

730C2 Fedeial Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19.1980 / Rules and Regulations NUCLEAR REGUt.ATORY that the comment period should have are already set forth in General Design COtmAISSION been extended.

Criterion 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR The Commission does not agree.The Part 50 and in the NRC guidance 10 CFR Port 50 NRC has been developmg fire protec; ion documents. These general provisions requirements since 1975. The NRC gave rise to a number of disputes over Fire Protection Program for Operatin9 published comprehensive fire protection whether specific methods adequately Nucteer Power Plants guidelmes. Dranch Technical Position accomplished the intended goal.The AossocT: Nuclear Regulatory BTP APCSB 9.5-1, and its Appendix A in proposed rule is intended to provide Commission.

1976.1.icensees have compared their fire sufficient specific guidance to ensure ACTION: Final rule.

pr]tection programs against these satisfactory resolution of these issues.

guidelines and have discussed their Thus, reverting to generalized guidance SussseAaT:Re Nuclear Regulatory deviations from these guidelines with would not accomplish the intended Commission is amending its regulations the NRC staff for the past four years purpose of the proposed rule.

to require certain provisions for fire during the NRC's fire protection reviews The second issue involved some protection in operating nuclear power of operating reactors. A Safety instances in which the specific wording i

plants. This action is being taken to Evaluation Report and. in most cases, used resulted in unnecessary and upgrade fire protection at nuclear power supplements to the Safety Evaluation unintended restrictions. For examt e.

l plants licensed to operate prior to Report, have been issued for each the proposed rule called for a " fresh January 1.1979, by requiring resolution operating reactor. These reports water" supply. For firefighting purposes, of certain conteste3 generic issues in describe fire protection alternatives that brackish water is satisfactory and a fire protection safety evaluation reports.

have been proposed by the licensee and

" fresh" water supply is unnecessary.

aprective OAfr February 19.1981.

found acceptable by the staff as well as Similarly, the proposed rule called for Note.-The Nuclear Regulatory unresolved fire protection issues an " underground" yard fire main loop.

Commission has submitted this rule to remaining between the staff and the Of ten portions of a fire main loop run the Comptroller General for review as licensee. Proposed Appendix R provided above ground in and as they enter may be appropriate under the Federd the Commission's requirements for structures. The Commission had not Reports Act, as amended (44 U.S C.

resolving those issues. Thus, it concerns intended to prohibit running portions of 3512). The date on which the reporting only a limited number of issues derived a fire main loop abovs ground. Other requirement of this rule becomes from the use of the earlier guides. The sir 1ilar changes are discussed in Section effective unless advised to the contrary. Commission believes that a 30-day til " Specific Requirements." of this reflects inclusion of the 45-day period comment period was adequate under preamble.

that titatute allows for such review (44 these circumstances.

The third issue relates to imposition of U.S.C. 3512(c)(21).

2. Many licensees questioned the need peouimments on plants with presently FOR PURTHeR BNFOnesATION CONTACT:

for backfitting all the requirements of

"'.talled or with existing commitments I mstall fire protection features David P. Notley. Office of Standards Appendix R.They commented that they pwvi usly determined by the staff to Development. !J.S. Nuclear Regulatory had previously complied with staff fire satisfy the guidance of Appendix A to Commission. Washington D.C. 20555.

protection recommendations in " good DTP APCSB 9.5-1. The Commission phone 301-443-5921 of Robert L faith" and have committed to or generally agrees that. except for three Ferguson. Office of Nuclear R: actor completed certain modifications. They Regulation. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory contend that the staff has properly

," endi no tr actively Commission. Washington. DC 20555 determmed that these modifications applied to features dat have been phone 301-492-7096, provide at least the level of fire previously approved by the NRC staff as WWITAAN#ssATION* On May protection described by the guidance satisfying the provisions of Appendix A 29.1980. the Nuclear Regulatory contained in Appendix A to Brench to BTP ApCSB 9 5-1 Commission published in the Federal Technical Position LTTP APCSB 951.

The NRC staff had intended in its Register (45 FR 36082) a notice of They also contend that these original proposal for Appendix R. that proposed rulemaking inviting wr tten modification, provide a level of the requirements be applicable only for suggestions or co.nments on the protection at e quivalent to that the resolution of unresolved disputed proposed rule by lune 30,1980. The contamed in the proposed rule. They fire protection features. Thus, the staff notice concerned propcsed amendments expresa w concern that the proposed had not intended the provisions of to to CFR Part 50. " Domestic Licensing rule was written in such specific Appendix R to require modification of of Production and Utilization Facihties."

language that fire protection issues that previously approved features.This was which would require certain minimum were thought closed would be reopened not clearly described in the proposed provisions for fire protection m nuclear and new, but not r.cr. manly better-rule as published for comment. In fact.

power plants operating prior to January modifications wodd be required. These the Supplementary Information 1.1979. Fifty-one comment letters were modifications could be accomplished published with the proposed arule received regarding the propsed only by the expenditure of considerable explicitly indicated that "[ajll licensees amendments. A number of comments engmeering, design. and construction will be expected to meet the pertained to specific requirements in the effort and at great undue expense. The requirements of this rule in its effective y

proposed Appendix E and these willbe commenters request that the form. including whatever changes result dealt with below. liowever, there were requirements in the proposed rule be from public comments."

three substantive contentions which rewritten to specify only the general in determining whether the spec;fi.

were raised by many of the commenters, requirements of what needs to be requirements of Appendix R should be These three comments are summarized accomplished.

imposed on licensees with presently as follows:

These con ments raise three related installed or existing commitments to

1. Most commenters stated that the 30 issues. The fust relates :n the need for install fire protection features previously e

day comment period war too short to specific requirements. The general determined to satisfy Appoda A to permit adequate detaile.1 response and requirements relating to fire protection Branch Technical Position DTP APCSD

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations '18803 9.5-1,it is important to recognite that arrangements were accepted in some permitted either an oil collection system Appendix R addresses only a portion of early fire protection reviews. As a result or a fire suppression system.The staff the specific items contained in the more of some separate effects tests, the staff has also accepted an sutomatic fire comprehensive document Dranch changed its position on this suppression system as an acceptable Technical Position DTP APCSD 9.5-1 configuration, and subsequent plans method t,f fire protection for this j'

and its Appendix A. Appendix A to DTP have been required to provide

. application.The Commission has ApCSD 9.5-1 has been the basic fire additional protection in the form of fire concluded that fire suppression systems protection guidance used by the staffin barriers or substantial physical do not give adequate protection for fires their fire protection reviews conducted separation for safe shutdown systemsf that may be induced by seismic events.

. for all operating plants during the past No credit for such coatings as fire The Commission therefore believes that several years. For many plants, barriers is allowed by Section III.G of previously approved suppress #on i

licensees proposed systems and features Appendix R. Appendix A to Branch systems should be replaced with oil 9

- that satisfactorily achieved the fire Technical Position IrrP ApCSD 9.51 and collection systems that can withstand protection criteria set forth in Appendix the proposed Appendix R recognized seismic events.

A to DTP ApCSD 9.5-1 and began to that there were plant-unique The technical basis on which these i

promptly implement such features and configurations that required fire three sections are based are further systems.

protection features that are not identical discussed in Section III. " Specific Satisfactory features and systems are to those listed in Section !!I.C of Requirements."of this preamble.

already in place and in operation 'n Appendix R. For these cases, fire

, 3. Afost commeriters stated that the many plants.There is a reasonable protection features were developed by implementation schedule contained in degree of uniformity among most of the licensee and described in a fire the proposed rule is impossible to meet these approved features for all facihties hazards nnalysis Some of these for any of the operating plants.The since they were reviewed agrinst the arrangements were Lccepted by the staff commenters further stated that if the same criteria of Appendix A to BTP as praiding equivalent protection to the implementatio i schedule in the effective ApCSD 9.5-1. In general, the features requirements of Section !!I.G to rule is the same as that in the proposed i

previously approved by the NRC staff in Appendix R.

rule, the Commission must be prepared its reviews of fire protection using the Requirements that account for all of to either shutdown each operating criteria of Appendix A to DTP APCSD the parameters that are important to fire nuclear power plant, or process 9.5-1 provide an equivalent level of fire protection and consistent with safety exemption requests.

protection safety to that provided onder requirements for a!! plant-unique The commenters then concluded that the specific provisions of Appendix R.

configurations have not been developed. the implementation schedule sLould be Thus, the further benefit that might be in light of the experience gamed in fire rewritten to all w an adequate time provided by requiring that previously protection evaluations over the past four priod for compliance. The proposed rule approved features be modified to years, the Co.nmission believes that the stated that all fire protectica and conform to the specific language set licensees should reexamine those m difications identified by the staff as forth in Appendix R is outweighed by previously approved configurations of necenary to sayy Meso 3 of the overail benclit of the early fire protection that do not meet the Appendix A to this part, whether l

irnplementation of such previously requirements as specified in Section c ntamed in Appendix R to this part or in ther staff fire protection guidance approved featuree, which in many cases III.G to Appendix R. Dased on this fhu d]wn ca pi are currently being installed.

reexamination the licensee must either b1 ) sha 11 ompleted Nevertheless, as a result of its meet the requirements of Section Ill.G of continuing review of fire protection Appendix R or apply for an exemption by November 1.1980 unless, for good matters, the NRC staff has mdicated to that justifies alternati$es by a fire cause shown. the Commission approves the Commission that there are hazard analysis. Ilowever, based on an extension." (proposed paragraph 50.4a 1.(c)). The Commission went on to requirements ht three sections in which present information. the Commission 4

state its intention in the Statement of the protection afforded by Appendix R does not expect to be able to approve Consideration to the rule that ",.no over and above that previously exemptions for fire-retardant coatmgs plant would be allowed to continue to accepted, may be desirable. The used as fire barriers.

operate after November 1.1980, or Commksion has decided that these The second relates to emergency beyond an extended date approved by requirements should be retroactively hghting. Section IIIJ of Appendix R calls the Comission, unless all modifications applied to all facilities. This decision is for 8. hour emergency lightmg. whereas (except for alternate or dedicated not meant to reflect adversely on in some cases less than 8-hour shetdown capability) have been previous licensee or staff evaluations; emergency lighting has been accepted as implemented?

rather its purpose is to take fully into satisfying Appendix A to DTP ApCSD The Commission has reconsidered the

=

account the increased knowledge and 9.5-1. While an adequate levet of safety implementation schedule and has expenence d*" eloped on fire protection may be provided by less than an 8-hour determined that it should be modified

+

F, matters over de last several > ears.

supply, an Prhour system would provide for the following reasons:

The first of these sections is related to added protection and would generally

. After reviewing the comments and fire protection fectures for ensuring that ievolve only a small cost. The the information developed as a result of systems and associated circuits used to Commission therefore believes that completion of fire reviews over the past

-achieve and maintain safe shutdown are licensees should upgrade the previously 6 months, the staff has infonned the free from fire damage. Appendix A 'o approved facilities to satisfy the 8-hour Commission that the date of November DTP APCSD 9.51 permits a combination lighting requirement of Appendix R.

1.1980, is not possible because the of fire-retard mt coatings and fire The third relates to protection against effective date of the rule will be after detection and supression systems fires in noninerted containments that date.

without specifying a physical saparation involving reactor roolant pump

+ The staff has informed the distance to protection redundant lubrication oil !Section !!LO of Commission tnat it would expect systems (Appendix A. D.1(2)), and such Appendix R).The proposed rule sittually alllicensees to request

-y

,r--w w

--g*-

=ww

,w, y,.

-w, n--,

o e

,n ee

.,m t-rm,,--te-e-

...,m---

q r-w,

,+w,.w,e

---ev

.wy i

y

70004 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 4

exemptions if the new implementation Section 111. we provide a summary of the automatic water suppression system dates do not provide an appropriate Technical Basis for each requirement.

throughout the plant.

period of time for complying with the followed by a summary of the public An ensured minimum volume of water requiremerts of Appendix R.%e time comments and a statement of the staff's is set aside and dedicated for fire and manpower rasources needed by the disposition of those comments.

protection uses to be available at all times regardless of other simultaneous licensees to prepare such requests and Section 1. Intmduction otid Scope water uses in the plant.This water by the staff to formulate recommendations on these requests is This section has been revised as a volume is dedicated for fire service by not warranted from the standpoint of result of comments to include a means of separate storage tanks or timely fire protection improvement.

discussion of the importance of safe separate pump suctions from a large

• The revised implementation shutdown capabihty and the distinction body of water. When common tankage schedule providea a careful balance of between requirements for " safety-is employed for fire service rieeds and these considerations, calling for the related* equipment and equipment other water services the fire pump remaining fire protection modifications needed for " safe shutdown."

mctions must be at the bottom cf the tank and other water supply suctions to be implemented and installed on a g,cfjgy ff, gyn,mf g,qujf,,,,f, must be located at a higher level to phased schedule that is as prompt as This section has been substantially ensure that the minimum dedicated can be reasonably achieved.

%e revised schedules distinguish rewritten as i result of comments to water volume is set aside for fire between requirements imposed for the provide a concise summary of general protection needs. Administrative first time on the licensee by Appendix R requirements. The specific requirements controls by themselves, such as locked and those requirements already imposed were consolidated with the appropriate valves to ensure adequate water supply in license conditions or Technical parts of Section !!!. " Specific for fire fighting needs, are deemed Specifications issued prior to the Requirements." except that the credit unacceptable at nuclear power plants.

effective date of the rule. For given for 50-foot separation has been Comment Ilesolution requirements imposed by Appendix R.

dropped.

Many commenters stated that we including the items "backfit" to all Section //1. Specific Requirements were being too restrictive by stipulating plants. the schedule provides a The requirements in this rule are an underground yard fire main loop and reasonable time after publication of the based upon principles long accepted fresh water supplies. Our intent was rule for completion of required within that portion of American industrF on;y that a yard fire main loop be modifications. For requirements already that has been classified by their furnished. We have deleted the imposed by license conditions providing insurance carriers as " Improved Risk,*

speciUcation for an underground loop for implemention after November 1.

or "llighly prutected Risk". In each of since special conditions may dictate that 1980, the Commission has reviewed these cases. the Commission has part of ths loop be above ground or these schedules and has found that in decided that the overall interest of inside safety-related buildings. Such some instances the allotted time for completion of the required modifications public safety is best served by arrangements are acceptable.

establishing some conservative level of With regard to the specification for a may be excessive.Thus, for fire fire protection and ensuring that level of fresh water supply, the staff was protection features other than those covered by Appendix R. although the compliance exists at all plants. %e attempting to avoid potential plant Commission has extended the following is a list of the specific problems that are not associated with tachnical bases and resolution of public fire protection From a fire protection compliance dates beyond the November comments for each of the specific standpoint, salt or brackish water is 1.1980, date in the proposed rule, the Commission has added a requirement requirements in Appendix R.

acceptable for fire suppression provided that limits the compliance schedule in A. Water Supplies for Fire the fire protection system is designed existing licenses if such schedules Suppression Systems Technica.' Basis.

and maintained for salt or brackish extend beyond what wa now believe One of the basic fire protection water.The requirement for fresh wa:er should have been a reasonable schedule requirements for a modern industrial supphes is therefore dropped. Other initiali. Relief from such limitation may site in the United States is a separate operational problems unrelated to fire f

be granted by the Director of Nuclear water distribution system for fire protection that may result from the use Reactor Regulation upon a showing that protection with dual water supplies.

of salt or brackish water for fire there is good cause for extending such DJplicate water supplies are required to suppression activities are outside the I

date and that public health and safety is ensure uninterrupted fire suppression scope of this regulation.

not adversely affected by such capability allowing for single failures Several commenters took issue with and periodic maintenance and repair of the requirement for two separate extension.

It should also be noted that for vital portions of the systems. Duplicate redund tnt suctions, stating that some licensees whose license conditions wate? supplies may consist of separate plants use a single large intake structure imposed a schedule with a compliance suctions for fire pumps from a large on a tal a or a river for all water l

deste of November 1.1980, or other date body of water such as lake, river. or requirements. The requirement for l

prior to the effective drA of I 50.48, the pond or from two water storsge tanks.

separate intake structures was not Commission has suspended such For auclear power plants, the mtended and the rule has been clarified.

compliance dates by promulgating on distabution system is required to consist Several comments called for deleting October 29.1980. a temporary rule of a loop around the plant with suitable the requirements for dedicated tanks or i 50.48 (45 FR 71569), whhh will be valves forisolating portions of the use of vertical standpipe for other water superseded by this rule, system for maintenance or repair services when storage tanks are osed for To better understand the nature of the without interrupting the water supply to combined service-water / fire-water uses, public comments received and the staff's the various fire suppression systems in on the basis that this is overly restrictive resolution of these comments. the the plant.Thus, with dual supplies and a and other ways are available to ensure followmg section will consider each loop concept, an adequate water supply a dedicated supply such is weirs.

section of Appendix R to this part. In can be ensured to each manual or suction location, etc. Two separate but l

l

Federal Register / Vol. 45 No. 225 / Wednesday, November 19,1i,a0 / Rules and Regulations 76605 i

related issues are involved here. The hour water supply is considered by a visually indicating or key. operated first is the requirement for dedicated adequate. it should also be noted that (curb) valve." and there was an water storage tanks for fire fighting this minimum dedicated water volume is opportunity to comment on this purposes.The suggestion that the based or. maximum flow rates.Since document.

requirement for dedicated tanks be most fires are controlled and D.Manua/FimSuppmssion Technical deleted was rejected for the reasons extinguished with much smaller flow Bos/s. Considerable reliance is placed stated in the preced.ng Technical Basis.

rates. this requirement realistically on automatic fire suppression systems The other point deals with ensuring represents a dedicated water volume far throughout a nuclear power plant.

minimum water storage capacity for fire in excess of two hours, llowever, manual fire fighting activities D.Sectionof fsolation Valves-often can control and extinguish slowly suppression activities when storage tanks are used for combined service.

C. llydront Isolation Valres developing fires before an automatic fire Technico/ Bosis. These two suppression system is actuated. In water / fire-water uses. The term

" vertical standpipe for other water requirements are similar and can be addition, fires that are controlled or service" simply means that the suction treated together. Proper valving is extinguished by automatia systems g

for other water uses in common storage required to tsolate portions of the water require a certain amount of manual tanks will be loc *ed sufficiently high to distribution system for maintenance or response. Also, some areas of the plant ensure the minimum water solume repair without interrupting the water do not warrant the installation of aceds for fire suppression activities. lf supply to manual or automatic fire automatic fire suppression systems.

the commenters were assuming that suppr-ssion systems inside the plant.

Manual response is the only fire

" vertical standpipe" referred only to Valses are similarly required to permit suppression available for these areas:

isolation of outside yard hydrants from thus, it is important that manual fire pipes inside the tank, this is not the the water distribution system for fighting capability be present in all case. In fact a standpipe exterior to the maintenance or repair without areas of the plant, and that standpipe storage tank is more desirable since ar.y Interrupting water supply to fim and hose stations be located throughout leakage would be immediately evident.

suppression systems maide the plant.

the plant.The standpipe and hose On an internal standpipe a leak in the Visually indicating valves such as post stations are to be located so that at least pipe could actually allow depletion of indicator valves are preferred so that one effecthe hose stream can be the water otherwise to be reserved for fire uses.The rule has been clarified to the position of the valve can be readily brought to bear at any location in the determmed flowever, key-operated plant containing or presenting a hazard allow physical alternatives for water valves Wmmonly known as curb to structures, systems, or components supply dedication but to preclude valves) are acceptable for these important to safety.They are to be exclusive use of administrative controla purpcses where plant specific supplied from the fire water supply for this purpose.

Some commenters objected to the cfon 878 tem except for those inside nt / / es mment c ntainment, which may be connected requirement that other water ystems Resolution. Many commenters stated to other reliable water supplies if a used as a backup water supply for fire that the requirement for " approved separate penetration into contaimr.ent proteuion should be permanently indicating" sectional control cannot be made for fire water service vid'was overly restrictive, connected to the fire main system and y,3y,,

needs.

suggested that it would be sufficient t unnecessary, and not specific with provide a water supply capable of being respect to who should give the approval Comment Resolution connected to the fire main system within The Commission has arcepted this Sweral commenters suggested adding ten minutes of the loss of normal water suggestion; the rule now requires that a sentence reading,' Standpipe and hose a

supply or pumps.The rule do. not sectional control valves shall be stations are not required if sufficient address backup water supplies. The provided to isolate portions of the fire justification can be provided that requirement means that,if another mair' for naintenance or repair without adequate fire protection features have water system is used as one of the shutting off the entire system. Post been provided to account for a given fire redundant water supplies it must satisfy indicator or key-operated valves are area." This suggestion was rejected. The all of the requirements of the fire mentioned as two examples of staff has taken the position that the protection wat?r supplies. Additional acceptable valves.

backup supplies need not meet these C. Hydrant BlocA Vo/res-Comment minimum requirements are that at least one effective hose stream that will be requirements.

Resolution. A number of commenters One commenter asked why only a made suggestions for rewording this able to reach any location that contains two-hour water supply is required when section. This section has been clarified or could present an exposure fire hazard the Erwns Ferry Fire lasted well over to state the requirement for capability to to the safety-related equipment. The two hnart Allof theinvestigations of sciate hydrants from the fire main Commission concluded that no analyses e

the Umwns Ferry Fire clearly show nat without disrupting the water supply to can identify hazards so carefully that if wsta 1 ad been used in'meJiately, the autometic or manual fire suppression this minimum requirement can be further reduced.

fire would have been extinguished much systems in any area containing or earlier indeed once the manual fire presenting a fire hazard to safety-related F. Hydrostatic Hose Test Technicol fightina activities were started with the or safe shutdown equipment.

Bosis. Fire hoses should be use of anly one fire hose stream, the fire One commenter suggested that this hyd:ostatically tested periodically to was extinguished within one-half hour.

requirement be dropped in its entirety ensure that they will not rupture during The etaff would find unacceptable any since it "is a new requirement which han use. The requirement for a minimum test condition in which a postulated fire that not been subjected to the peer review pressure of 300 psi comes from NFPA could threaten safe shutdown capability process." This suggestion was tejected No.196 (National Fire Protection could not be controlled and extinguished on the basis that Appendix A to BTP Association Standard No.196-within two hours with any combination APCSB 95-1 contains the following Standard for Fire IIose). a nationally of manual and automatic fire sentence:"The lateral to each hydrant recognized consensus t.tandard. This suppression activities. Therefore, a two-from the yard main should be controlled standard contains other guidance for the l

78606 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations use and care of fire hose that most system in all such areas should be I. Mre Brigade Training Technical industries find useful.

retained. The fire hazards analysis may Basis. M ost modern industrial plants call for a separate suppression system.

with replacement cost values Comment Resolution but this would be m, addition to the fire approaching those of a modern nuclear Many commenters pointed out the detection system, powered electric generating stetion have erroneous usage of the term " service G. Protection ofSafe Shutdown a full-time fully equipped fire pressure" rather than " operating Capabihty TechnicalBasis. The department. including motorized fire pressure" in this requirement.The objective for the protection of safe apparatus. Because of the reduced intended meaning for this requirement is shutdown capability is to ensure that at severity of fire hazards in a nuclear that all hoses would be tested at a least one means of achieving and generating statio:: as campsred to a pressure greater than the maximum maintaining safe shutdown conditions manufacturing plant. the Commission pressure found m the fire protection will remain available during and after believes that it is not necessary to water distnbution systems. The correct any postulated fire in the plant. Because mandate a fully staffed fire department.

terminology is " operating pressure." The it is not possible to predict the specific flowever, manual fire response rule has been so changed. In addition.

conditions under which fires may occur capabihty is required at a nuclear plant the staff added a specific minimum test and propagate the design basis and a properly equipped and fully pressure requirement of 300 psi to meet protective features are specified rather trained fire brigade will satisfy this need. The Commission has determined the NrPA standard.

than the design basis fire.Three One commenter also pointed out that diffe rent neans for protecting the safe th4t a brigada of five persons constitutes hoses should be inspected for mildew, shutdown capability outside of the minimum size sufficient to perform the actions that may be required by the rot cuts.or other damcge. Although this containment are acceptab!L The first is a valid comment.,th any licensee so it means is separation of rtduridant safe brigade during the fire and to provide it is not an anresolved issue wi shutdown trains and associated circuit, some margin fo. unarticipated events.8 Similarly, the training requirements need not be covered by this rule. In by means of 3-hour fire rated barriers.

listed are considered the minimum addition, such inspections are already The second means is a combination of needed to ensure that the fire brigade beirg performed in accordance with the separation of redundant safe shutdown will be able to function effectively plant s Technical Specificaitons.

trains and associated circuits by a 1 F. Automatic Fire Detection Technical hour fire rated barrier and automatic fire during a fire emergency.

The proposed rule required emergercy Basis. The requirement that automatic euppression and detection capabihty for breathing apparatus without specifyin?

fee detection systems bc installed in all isoth redundant trains. The third means.

the number of such pieces of apparatus.

areas that Contain safe shutdown or which may be used only when The rule has been modified to specify safety.related systems or components redundant trains and associated circuits the personnel for whom such apparatus fobows generally accepted fire are separated g>y :M yeet or more o7 clear is to be provided and to specify reserve protection practice. Installation of such space, requires automatic fire g

fire detection capebility is independent suppression and detection systems in II. Fire Brigade-Comment of any requirements for automatic or the area. An ulternative or dedicated Resolution. Many commenters suggested manual fire suppression capability in an safe shutdown capability mdependent of changing this requirement to a simple area. The purpose of these detection the fire area is required if fire protection statement tl.at a trained and equipped, systems is to give early warnmg of fire f r safe shutdown capability cannot be nominal size, site fire brigade of five conditions in an area so that the fire provided as outimed abcre. For cables persons be provided on each shift unless brigade can initiate prompt actions to minimite fire damage within the plant.

and equipment needed for safe a lesser number is justified. This shuqwn located mWe of noninerted recommended change was rejected by Comment Resolution contamments, a lesser degree of fire the Commission for the reasons stated Many commenters suggested that the protection is permitted because in the Technical Basis.

words " automatic fire detection transient exposure fires are less likely Some commenters objected to the capability" be substituted for mside containment during plant exclusion of the shift supervisor from

" automatic fire detection systems" on oper stion. Section Ill.M. " Fire Barriers.'

the fire brigade. The commenters felt the basis that, as worded, the discusses the techmcal basis for the 3-that the shilt supervisor should go to the requirements are too limiting. TI.ey hour barrier, and Section III.L-firt and provide the benefit of his stated that an automatic sprinkler

" Alternative and Dedicued Shutdown expertise and authority.The rule would system with appropriate alarm check Capability.' discusses the technical not prevent this. llowever, the shift valves and central alarm features basis for safe shutdown capability, supervisor may have in go elsewhere provides acceptable detection / alarming Comment Resolution during the course of a fire that adversely capability. Several commenters claimed affects plant operation.The fire brigade that a separate detection system is not Many commenters suggested that the leader must stay with the fire brigade needed in are" ' covered by sprinkler ~

first paragraph be changed sli@tly and and be assigned no other systems equipped with fusible link the rest of this section deleted. The responsibihties durmg a fire emergency, sprinkler heads. A fusible link has a basis for their contention is that the rule therefore, the shift supervisor must be time delay before it actuates llowever, shorld state simply the requirement to excluded from membership on the fire more importantly, a smcidering protect cables or equipment of systems brigade.

localized fire that could do damage may necessary for safe shutdown of the plant

1. Fire Brigade Troming-Comment l

i not generate enough heat to melt the and leave specific implementr.aon Resolution. Many commenters have fusible link While we do not disagree details in some other type of document.

that the alarm from an automatic fire Wa have modified this section by i rhi. i. di.co..ed ai length in the NRC stds suppression system serves as removing the listing of considerations,

~ Evaluation of Mmimum fire Brigade Shifi $ ire",

d8d lune s. :rro. copies are., otable from nad notification that a fire exists, we delet:ng Table 1. and revising the C,I,7,1*

c"",d7,dN,Q',"[D\\

6 wordm8 o provide clarification.

t concluded that the minimum requirement for a separate fire detection

11. Fire Brigode.

msss.

4 6

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday. Newember 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 78807 stated that NRC used unnecessary detail fire emergency and operators involved modifications to provide alternative in spelling out specific requirements for in safe plant shutdown should not also shutdown systems are extensive, a classroom instruction, fire fighting have to be concerned with lighting in the dedicated system that is esrentially a practice, and fire dri!!s. Some area. The small cost differential minimum capability safe sLatdown train commenters felt that these requirements between 2. hour supply and the and is independent of those already were more detailed than anything the substantial additional protection existing may be provided.This minimum Commission has published with regard afforded by the 8-hour supply does not capability is required to maintain the to opera.or traimng. The Commission warrant reducing this requirement.ne process variablea within those values here points out that most of the Commission has decided to require an 8-predicted for a loss of offsite power. The investigations of the TMI accident hour battery power supply in all areas case ofloss of offsite power is assumed t

identified inadequately trained needed for operation of safe shutdown because fires in certain circumstances operators as an important factor and equipment and in access and egress (e.g., electrical distribution system 4 that work is now being done in this routes.

could cause or be related to such a loss.

f area.The fact is not that the training K. Administrative Controls Technical Fire damage to cold shutdown capabihty requirements spelled out here for the fire Basis. The fire protection program uses is limited to damage that can be brigade members are excessine when admmistrative controls for fire repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to prov!de a compared to training requirements for prevention and prefire planning. The margin in achieving cold shutdown reactor operefors, but that fire brigade items listed in this section are generally conditions. Consideration is given to training is further along in development, accepted within the fire protection associated circuits because most plants and training para:neters that r.re community as minimum requirements were not designed with this concept in i

essential to a comprehensive program for an effective administration of the fire mind. Should either the alternative or have been identified.

protection program. Controls are placed dedicated capability be required to J.EmergencyLighting Technical on the storage and use of combustible function because of a fire,it must not be Basis. Emergency lighting is required in materials to reduce the fire loading in disabled by fire damage to associated all nuclear power plants. Battery-safety-related areas and on ignition circuits. Also, this capability does not powered lights with capacities of 1 % to sources to avoid careless operations.

have to meet the single failure criterion 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> is usually sufficient for piocedures are used to control actions because it is only one of several levels emergency egress. llowever, th. postfire to be taken by individuals who discover of defense. Seismic Category I criteria is emergency lightmg requirements in a a fi e and by the fire brigade for the not imposed because fires that would nuclear power plant are of a different development of preplanned fire fighting require the installation of alternative or i

kind.The need is for lighting that aids strategies and actual fire fighting dedicated shutdown capability are not the a cess to equipment and techniques.

seismically induced.

2 Yp ra e C mmentResoludon Comment Resoludon by a t perso lto ifect safeplant shutdown during plant Many commenters stated that this Many of the commenters stated that emergencies. Decause such actisities requirement was much too detailed for a this requirement exceeded the scope of may extend over a considerable reriod regulation. Some stated that the Appendix R by defining alternative of time both during and after the fire,it requirements should apply only to those shutdown requirements. They stated

~

is prudent to provide 8-hour battery areas having safe shutdown equipment.

that the time requirements are excessive emergency lighting capability to allow Other commenters stated that a simple and shoulit be dropped. They also sufficiant time for normallighting to be statement that administrative' contend that this regulation does not restored with a margin for unanticipated proc. lures should be established to take into.iccount the many plant eventa.

camtrol the various fire hazards reviews b ring conducted under the throughout the plant was sufficient, and Systemati : Evaluation Program (SEP).

Comment Resolution that the details could be spelled out in a It is generally understood that cold Many commenters stated that Ae regulatory gui fe or some other similar shutdown is the ultimate safe shutdown requirement for emergency lightmg is document.

condition and that, for each fire area.

Overly restrictive in three specifics: first.

Minor changes have been made in the different means may be used and may that emergency lighting is unnecessary wording of this requirement for be necessary to achieve cold shutdown.

in many of the designated areas: second. clarification.

Because a fire in certain areas at some that the regnirement for realed beam or L Alternat;ve and Dedicated plants would have the capability of fluorescent units is overly restrictive; Shutdown Capability.

disabling systems required to achieve third. that the requirement for individual TechnicalBasis. In some locations both hot and cold shutdown. it is 8-hour bam ry power supply is (such as the cable spreading room) necessary to specify the minimum excessive. Three commenters within operating nuclear power plants. it capability and time requirement for each recommended a 2-hour battery power is not always possible or practicable to condition necessary to achieve safe supp'y; fi :.ammenters recommended a protect redundaC safe shutdown shutdown. We agree that evaluations plant. specific power supply; and one systems against adverse effects of fire or being made under the Systematic commenter recommended that there be fire suppression activities only through Evaluation Program (SEP) may also call s

no permanent installation.

the use of fire protection features for alternative or dedicated shutdown These sucgestions have been accepted because the redundant safe shutdown capability for reasons other than fire in part. !)ghting units with 8-hour systems in a given fire area are too close pnrntion. For example, seismic, battery wpplies are to be provided in all to each other. Alternative shutdown fladmg. or emergency core cooling areas needed for operation of safe capability has usually been requi.ed to requirements resulting from the SEP may shutdown equipment and in access and be independent of the control room, rquire additional modifications. Each egress routes thereto. The reasoning cable spreading room, switchgear rooms licensee should be aware of the status of behind the requirement for an 8. hour and cable riser areas because redundant the SEP so that the requirements battery power supply is that there can systems in these areas are not resulting from SEP can be effectively be a great deal of other activity during a adequately separated. When plant integrated with those relating to fire

_,, ~ - - _ _ - - _ _

4 7 eses Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19.19H0 / Rules and Regulations protection to the extent possible.

required to ensure safe shutdown the national consensus standard used llowever, the Commission has decided capability.The use nf a 1. hour barrier in for testing and rating these cable that the modifications required to conjunction with automatic fire

- penetration seals. Since the cables complete the fira protection program seppressicn and detection capability for conduct the heat ihtough the barrier, should not be defened until the SEP each redundant train of safe shutdown and since the cable insulation is review is completed.

equipment is based on the fpilowing combustible, tha acceptance criteria of M. Fim Barriers.

considerations. Automatic suppression the ASTM Standard E-119 relating to Technica/ Bosis. The best fire is required to ensure prompt, effective temperature on the unexposed side must protection for redundant trains of safe application of suppressant to a fire that be appropriately modified.

shutdown systems is separation by could endanger safe shutdown C#**#"#N'88I"N##

unpierced fire barriers-walls and capabihty.The activation of an ceiling &or assemblies. Pecause these automatic fire detection or suppression Some commenters suggested that this barriers are passive fire protection system does not occur until sufficient entire section be deleted and replaced features, they are inherently reliable smoke or heat has been developed by with the following two sentences:

i~

provided they are properly installed and the fire. Therefore. the Commission is

" Penetration seals shall provide the 1

maintained. Fire barriers have been requiring a 1-hour barrier to ensure that equivalent protection which is required used successfully for many years to fire damage will be limited to one train of the fire barrier. Evaluation of the subdivide large potential fire losses into until the fire is extinguished penetration seals based upon a design smaller, more acceptable risks. Even fire These requirements have now been review and relevant test data or barriers with openings have successfully incorporated in Section !!! G. " Fire qualification teats may be made." The interrupted the progress of many fires Protection of Safety Functions."

commenters felt that sufficient test data are available to permit evaluation of provided the openings were properly Comment Resoluh.on protected by fire doors or other design requirements without full-scale acceptable means.

Seseral commenters made a number mockup testing and that many of the Fire barriers are " rated" for fire ei suggestions of an editorial nature.

items spelled out in the regulation, such a

resistance by being e) posed to a One suggestion was tc add "or unless as the water hose stream test. were too

" standard test fire".This standard test other fire protection features have been detailed and did not belong in the fire is defined by the American Society provided to ensure equivalent te ulation.The Commission has '

e for Testing and Materials in ASTN E-protection" in the first paragraph. whehe reconsidered this issue and revised the 119. " Standard for Fire Resistance of three-hour rated fire barriers were rule to (a) seguire the use of IFiding Materials." Fire barriers are stipulated unless a lower rating was noncombustible materials only in the commonly rated as having a fire justified by the fire hazards analysis.

construction of fire barrier penetration resistance of from 1 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Most The Commission feels that this adds seals. (b) require fire barrie' netration

" Improved Risk" or " Highly Protected nothing in the way of clarification and seals to be qualified by test; ~d (c)

Risk"(as classified by insurance the suggestion was not adopted. The require such tests to satisfy certain carriers) industrial properties in the second paragraph requires that acceptance criteria.

United States require fire barriers to structural steel forming a part of or O. Fire Dcors.

have a resistance rating of 2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

supporting any fire barrier have a fire TechnicalBasis. Door openings in fire While a nuclear power plant has a resistance equivalent to that required of walls constitute another breach that low fire load, the potential the barrier. An example was given of must be protected. Fire doors that have consequences of fire are serious.

metal lath anti plaster covering as being been tested and rated for certain fire Therefore, the Commission has selected one means of providing equivalent exposures are installed to protect these 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> ha~s been as an acceptable protection. Several commenters stated openings. Fire doors frequently fail to minirr.um fire resistance rating for fire that they thought this was too narrow protect the openings in which they are barriers separating redundant trains for and would bs interpreted by some installed because they are not fully safe shutdown systems. This will give people as the only acceptable method closed. Various reethods are available to ample time for automatic and manual permitted. Since the example seemed to licensees to ensure that fire doors are in 1

fire suppression activities to control any be confusing. > decision has been made proper operating condition and that they potential fire and for safe shutdown to eliminate it. Other comments to the will be closed during a fire. These acUvities to properly control the reactor. effect that the requirement was options are listed in Appendix R.

Many operating plants, or plants that excessively restrictive with regard to C8**'"'N'88/868" are already built but that are not yet fire barrier penetrations, including fire operating, have both trains of safe doors and their associated frames and Many commenters stated that this shutdown equipment located in close hardware and ventilation systems have requirement is too detailed and should proximity and a single fire could been acted upon by the staff and the be deleted. Minor editorial changes have damage or destroy the functional requirement. as it had affected these been made in order to more clearly state l

capability of both redundant trains. If items. was deleted.

the requirements.

epecific plant conditions preclude the N. Fire Barrier Cable Penetration Seal P. & actor Goolant Pump Lubrication installation of a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier to Qualification.

System.

separate the redundant trains a 1-hour TechnicalBasit Unpierced fire TechnicalBasis. Each reactor coolant 9

fire barrier and automatic fire barriers offer the best protection for pump motor assembly typically contains suppression system for each redundant separating redundant trains of safety-140 to 220 gallons of tube oil. Oilleakirg train will be considered the equivalent related or safe shutdown equipment.

from some portions of the lube oil of 3-hour barrier.

Ilowever, these barriers must be pierced sys'em may come in contact with If the 1-hour fire barrier and automatic for both control and power cables.

surfaces that are hot enough to ignite the fire suppression for each redundant These penetrations must be sealed to oil. The resulting fire could be large, and train cannot be provided because of achieve a degree of fire resistance access to the fire would be delayed plant. specific conditions. alternative or equivalent to that required of the bar;ier because of the time r%. red to enter the dedicated shutdowns capability will be that is pierced. ASTM Standard E-119 is containment. Containent Mr temperature

\\

-.._,_ _ --, - -_ _ _ ~. _

m -

_-. ~__ _,-

Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 7ssee would increase, severe localized pump oil collection system is covered by Capability ") In the fire hazards analysis environments would develop in the area paragraph C.2 because its function is for a plant, the equinment relied upon to of the fire. and a large amount of smoke required to protect safety.related perform both functions must be would be generated _ nese conditions systems rather than to perform a safety identified for each fire area. it follows could affect operability of safety-related function. Because the failure of the oil that any associated non-safety circuits t

equipment inside containment.

collection system for a seismically in the fire area that could adversely nerefore, an oil collection system is induced oil fire should not prevent a affect the identified shutdown necessary to confine any oil discharged safety-related system from performing equipment by feeding back potentially due to leadkage or failure of the its safety function (Regulatory Guide disabling conditions (e.g., hot shorts or lubrication system and to prevent it 1.29. " Seismic Design, Classification."

shorts to ground) to the power supplies from becoming a fire hazard by draining paragraph C.2), the od cullection system or control circuits of that equipment it to a safe location. These occurrences should be designed. engineered, and must also be evaluated. Of course such could be random or could be seismically installed so that its failure will not lead disabling conditions must be prevented j

induced because the existing lobe oil to a fire affecting safety related to provide assurance that the identified

~

system piping and oil collection systems equipment as a result of an earthquake.

may not be designed to withstand a The proposed rule permitted tw safe shutdown equipment will function design basis scimie event.

alternatives-an oil collection system or as designed.These requirements have Appendix A to BTP APCSD 9.5-1 an automatic fire suppression system.

now been incorporated in Section 111.1.

We have deleted the alternative of the

" Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown states that for operating plants, post

• dated fires or fire protection suppression system because Capability."

system failures need not be e,onsidered unacceptable damage may result to the Comment Resolution concurrent with other plant accidents or safety-related systems froct ;he burning f oil before the suppression system is Many commenters stated that this the most severe natural phenomena."

actuated and because the fire water requirement should be deleted because The basis for that statement is two fol

'".pply system is not designed to many older plant designs did not First. nuclear power plants are massive withstand seismic events. In addition.

consider associated circuits and this is, structures. and essential services are these pumps are located within the t.serefore, a new design requireinent.

designed to withstand earthquakes and biological shield inside containment.

De con'menters felt that the analysis other natural phenomena. Second, the therefore, timely fire brigade action that will'oe required to satisfy this history of many fires associated with would be difficult if the suppression requirement will be both long and recent earthquakes have been system malfunctions.Further,if the complicated and the requirement should evaluated.nese evaluations showed suppression system becomes inoperable therefore be deleted.

that such fires usually are due to failure during operation. a fire watch or patrol The Commission rejected these of piping or tanks o'!!ammable gasses cann enter the area during opnation.

suggestions for the following reasons.

or liquids such as municipal natural gas distribution systems or gasoline storage Comment Resolution

1. Virtually all of the fire protection modifications made to date have been and/or dispensing stations. Where such A number of commenters suggested potential fire hazards exist in nuclear that this section is too detailed and required to correct deficiencies that power plants (e.g., hydrogen for should be substantially modified.This resulted from lack of consideration of generator cooling, or oil fuel for the requirement was changed to delete the certain specific items during initial eme.gency diesel generator or station option of protecting the reactor coolant design and construction.

space heating boilers) they are designed pump lubrication system with an

2. The Drowns Ferry fire showed the and installed tJ withstand the damaging automatic fire suppression system. We necessity of divisional separatica of the effects of various natural phenomena, have modified the rule to indicate that associated circuit of the control cables and other special fire protection features the tequirement that the oil collection to prevent the disabling of safety are provided as necessary. Ilowever, system be designed to provide systems by a single fire, nis has been General Design Criterion 2 Design Bases reasonable assurance that it will discussed with licensees during for Pmtection Against Natumf withstand the Safe Shutdown evaluations of alternative and dedicated Phenomeno requires that structures.

Earthquake can be met by satisfyina shutdown capability and is necessary to systems, and components important to paragraph C.2. uf Regulatory Culde 1.29, ensure that safe shutdown systems will safety be designed to withstand the

" Seismic Design Classification." as be able to function properly in the event effects of earthquakes without loss of described above.

of fire capability to perform their safety Q. Associoned Circuits.

3. The staff considers incomplete any function. Regulatory Guide 1.29.

TechmcolBasis. When considering fire hazard analysis that does not

" Seismic Design Classification."

the consequences of a fire in a given fire c nsider the effects of fire damage to describ-s an acceptable method for area during the evaluation of safe circuits that are associated with safe identifying and classifying those shutdown capabilities of a plant, the features of light. water-cooled nuclear staff must be able te conclude that one shutdown systams.

power plants that should be designed to train of equipr..-nt that can be used As indicated above, as a result of the withstand the effects of the Safe immediately to bring the reactor to a hot comments received on this issue, it is Shutdown Earthquake. In this guide, shutdown condition remains uraffected unclear that associated circuits have in paragraph C.1 applica to systems that by that fire.ne staff must also be able fact been adequately considered by are required to remain functional to to conclude that damage to one train of licensees in their reviews using the ensure heat removal capability; equipment used for achieving cold guidance of Appendix A to BTP APCSB paragraph C.2 applies to systems that do shutdown will be limited so that the 9.5-1.To ensure that the associated not have to remain frunctional for that equipment can be returned to an circuits are considered, all operating purpose, but whose failure could reduce operable condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. (See nuclear power plants will be required to the functioning of those systems covered Technical Basis for Section Ill.G.

meet the requirements of Section Ill.G of by paragraph C.1.ne reactor coolant

" Protection of Safe Shutdown Appendix R.

r

79610 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rul:a and Regulations 4

Ceneral Comments Resolut shutdown capabdity.The Commission comments received on the proposed does not agree. We believe that the regulations, other commenters Several commenters contended that Commission's overall fire protection demonstrated a thorough understanding Commission regulations mandate that program involving extensive plant-of the proposed requirements.

an adjudicatory hearing be conducted specific fin p stecuon modifications Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of rior to a final decision. One commenter fabeled the regulation an "crder" within that are based on guidance set forth in 1954, as amended, the Energy Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB Reorganization Act of1974 as amended.

the meaning of the Administrative 9.5-1 and its Appendix A and the and Sections 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551(61) ( ApA) specific requirements of Appendix R to United States Code, notice is hereby and asserted that 10 CFR 2.204 of the nsolve disputed issues provide given that the following amendments to Commission's regulations. " Order for adequate fire protection.

Title 10. Chapter I. Code of Federal Modification of 1,1 cense," applies to.his One commenter stated that the Regulations. Part ;io, are published as a rulemaking proceeding.

ambigmty of the proposed regulation document subject to codifHation.

The Commission disagrees with these with regard to critical items requires

1. A new i 50.48 is added to read as comments. A" rule"is defined in the that it be renoticed. The commenter follows:

APA to mesn "the whole or a part of an I 50.48 Fire Protection.

agency statement of general or e

e i aea ples of partic alar applicabdity and future effect such ambiguity. They were Section Ill.G.

(a) Each operating nuclear power Section Ill.N. and Section 111.Q. We have plant shall have a fire protection plan designed to implement,,

or that satisfies Criterion 3 of Appendix A prescribe law or policy 15 U.S.C.

les.

rer'et ed these exambrat example, theto this part. This fire protection plan 551(41).The agency action questioned in reference to the here.a clearly one that treats similarly commenter stated that the first shall describe the overall fire protection situsted licensees equally and that paragraph of Section Ill.G identifies program for the facility. Identify the alternative shutdown capability as an various positions within the licensee's ents. For those licensees whr, optional protective feature and that organization that are respnosibile for the 9u r paragraph Ill.G.2.c then identifies program, state the authorities that are evel fi protect on. certa n sp ci alternative shutdown capabihty as a delegated to each of these positions to fire protection features are required.

minimum fire protection feature. We do impleme it those responsibilities, and Various of these requirements would not agree with this statement.The first outline the,lans for fire protection, fire apply to approximately 40 faci!!tles. The paragraph of Section til.G identifies detection and suppression capability, commenter e characterization of the rule alternative shutdown capability as one and limitation of fire damage.The plan es an order, along with the assertion option in a combination of fire shall also describe specific features that 10 CFR 2.204 mandates a hearing pr.tection features for a specific fire necessary to implement the program before the rule becomes finalis area. Pcragraph lit.G.3 indicates when described above, such as administrative inenrrect. On its face, that regulation this option should be used.

controls and personnel requirements for (which does grant a hearing right)

In reference to the secot.d example.

fire prevention and manual fire applies only to Commission orders that the commenter stated that Section !!!.N suppression activities, automatic and modify a license.8 tt does not apply 1 requires a pressure differential acrose manually operated fire detection and requirements promulgated through a the test specimen during the testing of suppression systems, and the means to rulemakinc action conducted m fire barrier penetration seals but fails to limit fire damage to structures, systems, accordas.ce with the requirements of define the pressure differential. This or components important to safety so applicable law.

comment is incorrect. 'the pressure that the capability to safely shut down Several commenters contended that differential called for by the proposed the plant is ensured.'

the environmental impact had not been provision was the maximum pressure (b) Appendix R to this part establishes adequately addressed. One commenter, differential that the barrier would fire protectiort features required to citing the requirements in Section !!!.A experience in the specific plant satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this of Appendix R for two water supplies nstallation. In any event. the part with respect to certain generic and two separate redundant sections as requirement for pressure differential issues for nuclear power plants licensed examples of requirements involving during such testing has been deleted to operate prior to January 1.1979.

environmentalissues contended that since only noncombustible material is Except for the requirements of Sections the Commission relied upon its staff's now being used for such seals.

111.G. Ill.J. and 111.0, the provisions of

" unsupported determination that.

In reference to the third example, the Appendix R to this part shall not be pursuant to to CFR l $1.5(d), an commenter stated that Section lit.Q is applicable to nuclear power plants environmentalimpact statement, totally lacking in definition. We do not licensed to operate prior to january 1.

appraisal or negative declaration is not agree. Footnote 6 references Regulatory 1979. to the extent that fire protection required." The Commission has G aide 1.75 and IEEE Std 384-1974.The features proposed or implemented by considered Section Ill A and has furt,ner ittier document is o commonly used considered the rer al,ing requirements ir dustry standard that defines isesic fire protection suidance for nuclear power of Appendix R and remains conymced a isociated circuits and provides plants is contamen m two NRC documents:

that the regulations are not substantive saidance for ensuring that such circuits

• Prach Techmcal Position Anihary Power Y

comme system oruch m APGs m and are insisnificant from the standpoint d > not compromise the independence of of environmentalimpact-the shutdown circuits they are

[",'ilh,"",*'y,NU,'d f$eNy'tItN d

One commenter suggested that all associated with.

daied u.e le7it plants be required to install dedicated Based on tl e at>ove exampNs and our

• Appendia A to sw APCsn s St.-CrW hnes review of the other provisions of the for Dre Protection for Nur. lear Power Pluts Docketed Prior to [uly 1.19's?' for pfenes *bst were

'It should slao t e noted that i 2.204 is codened m proposed rule. w" do not believe that

• E'"""8 "# " '"""'*W"'8'

subvert a of 10 CFm Past 2.The scope of Subpert B the rule as osed was ambi uous so construction betere jdy 1.19'tL d. i August 11 E

le specthcally limited to " cases imtleted h the of aft as to require renoticmg. Moreover. It som

e. w,ou req.4r.m.nts by ororron e has ser its om amatell. (smphnia supphed) should be noted that, based on other Also see Nots 4.

s Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19, 1980 / Rules 'and Regulations 78611 1

the licensee have been accepted by the after the effective date of this section determin=s upon a showing by the NRC staff as satisfying the provisions of and Appendix R to this part; licensee, that there is good cause for Appendix A to Branch Technical (i) the first refueling outage; extending such date and that the public Positwn DTP APCSB 9 5-l' reflected in lii) another planned outage that lasts health and safety is not adversely staff fire protection safety evaluation for at least 60 days; or affected by such extension. Extensions reports issued prior to the r frective date (iii) an unplanned outage that lasts for of such date shall not exceed the dates of this rule, or to the extent that fire at least 120 day s.

determined by paragraphs (c)(1) through protection features were as cepted by (4)Those fire protection features that (c)(4) of this section.

the staffin comprehensive fire require prior NRC approval by (1) Those fire protection features that protection safety evaluation reports paragraph (c){5) of this section. shall be involve revisions of administrative issued before Appendix A to Branch implemented within the following controls, manpower changes, and Tet.hnical Position BTP APCSD 9.5-1 schedule: Dedicated shutdown training shall be impl< mented within 4 systems-30 months after NRC months after the date of the NRC staff was published in August 1976. With approval; modifications requiring plant Fire Protection Evaluation Report I

respect to all other fire protection shutdown-before startup after the accepting cr requiring such features.

features covered by Appendix R. all nuclear power plants licensed to operate earliest of the events given in paragraph (2) Those fire protection features prior to January 1.1979 shall satisfy the (c)(3) commencing 180 days after NRC involving installation of modifications applicable requirements of Appendix R approvat modifications not requiring not requiring prior approval or r tant io this part, including specifically the plant shutdown-e months after NRC shutdown shall be implemented within requirements of Sections ELG,IILJ and

approval, 12 months after the date of the NRC (5) Licensees shall make any staff Fire Protection Safety Evaluation gjgg m difications necessary to comply w!!h Report accepting or requiring such (c) All fire protection modifications these requirements in accord %nce with features.

require to satisfy the provisions of the above schedule without prior rev:ew (3) Those fire protection features, Appendix R to this part or directly and approval by NRC except for including alternative shutdown affected by such requirements shall be m difications required by Section III.G.3 capability, involving installation of completed on the following schedule:

of Appendix R to this part. Licensees modifications requiring plant shutdown mvolve revisions of admm,n features that shall submit plans and schedules for shall be implemented before the stsrtup (1) These fire protectio istrative meeting the provisions of paragraphs after the earliest of the following events controls, manpower changes, and (c)(2) (c)(3) and (c)(4) within 30 days commencing 9 months or more after the training, shall be implemented within 30 atter the effective date of this section date of the NRC staff Fire Protection days after the effective date of this and Appendix R to this part. Licensees Safety Evaluation Report accepting or section and Appendix R to this part.

shall submit design descriptions of requiring such features:

(2) nose fire protection features that modifications needed to satisfy Section (i)The first refueling outage; involve installation of modifications that III.G.3 of Appendix R to this part within

[ii) Another planned outage that lasts do not require prior NRC approval or 30 days after the the effective date of for at least 60 days; or plant shutdown shall be impicmented this section and Appendix R to this part.

(iii) An unplanned outage that lasts within 9 months after the effective date (6) In the event that a request for for at least 120 days, of this section and Appendix R to this exemption from a requirement to comply (4) Those fire protection features part.

with one or more of the provisions of involving dedicated shutdown capability (3) nose fire protection features.

Appendix R filed within 30 days of the requiring new buildings and systems except for those requiring prior NRC effective date of this rule is based on an shall be implemented within 30 months approval by paragraph (c)(5) of this assertion by the licensee that such of NRC approval. Other modifications section, that involve installation of required modifications would not requiring NRC approval prior to modifications that do require plant enhance fire protection safety in the installation shall be implemented within r

e shutdown, the need for which is justified facility or that such modifications may a months after NR'lapproval, in the plans and schedules required ')y be detrimental to overall facility safety.

(e) Nuclear power plants licased to the provisions of paragraph (c)(5) of this the schedule requirements of paragraph operate after january 1.1979. shall section, shall be implemented before (c) shall be tolled until final Commission complete all fire protection startug after the earliest of the following action on the exemption request upon a modificetions needed to satisfy events commencing 180 da)s or m9re determination by the Director of Nuclear Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part in Reactor Regulation that the licensee has accordance with the provisions of their provided a sound technical basis for licenses.

• ciarmcation and s dance win respect te per...ible atternatives io.aiiiry Appendim A to such assertion that warrants further

2. A new Appendix R is added to tr!P AICin nt has been provided in four other staff review of the requcst.

10 CFR Part 50 to read as follows:

(d) F re protection features accepted Appendix R-Fire Protection Program for ntary Guidance on Information

• su e

b the NRC staffin Fire Protectum. to in Nudear Power Facilities operatins Prior to 3

Necded far ' ire Protection Evalualmn? dated Safety Evaluation Reports referreo January 1.1979 October 21, ws.

4 esample Technkat specificatim." dated htay pavvaph (b) of this section and I. Intmductwo and scope su; Aments to s"ch reports. other then It w7.

• "Nudeer Plant Fire Protection Functionat features covered by paragraph (c). shall This Appendix apphes tolicensed nuclear Responsihihtwo. Admimsirative Control and be completed as soon as precticable but Power electric generating stations that were Quahty Assurance. dated June 14,1977.

no later tW the comp euon date operating prior to lanuary 1.1979, except to l

the extent set forth in paragraph 50 48(b) of e *Minpower Requirements for operatins Currently specified in license conditions this part. With respect to certam generic Reactorsi' dated May H. Ms.

A Fire Protection Safety Evah.atmn Report that or technica! specifications for such issues for such facdities it sets forth fire has been weaed for each operatins plant states how facihty, or the date determined by protection features required to satisfy D,

},",,',']pp e paragraphs (d)(1) through (d)(4) of this Criterion 3 of Appenda A to this part.'

, on seues section, whichever is sooner, unless the resolved i. hen the facihty satisfies the appropriate reqmrements of Append.: R to this part.

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

'see footnote 4

\\

mi.

e

19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76612 Federal Register / Vol 45. Na. 225 / Wedne sday. Nowmber Crmrinn 3 of Appenda A to this part prouram shall estabbsh the fue protection D Alterr'orn e or Dedicuted SAurdown specifies that "$irue.tures. sy stems and pohry for the protectm of strudures.

Capobel:ty components important to safety sh W t e u stems and componer>s m>portant tu safety in areas where the fire protection features desianed and iocated to rn mm;re. ons w ent n' each phat and the pnveduret equ+ ment unnut ensure safe shutdown rapabdity in the esent of a fire m that area. alternatne or with other safety requirements. the and perwonel reqmred to unplement the dedica.ted safe shutdown capabihty shall be probabihty and effect of fires and program at the pl4nt ute T he f ue protett.on pregram sha!! bc. nder prouded esplosioe s "

the direct.cn of an mdividual wh'a has t.cen E DN MF#'#'""'8 When tonoderms the effects of ere. ihose de!cs.ited authori y comrnensura'e with the t

systems assoristed with ar.hieung md maintainmg safe shutdown ronditu no responsihdines of frie p% tion and who has A. Water Supphes for Are Surpression assame mapor importance to ssfety bet auw asadable suff personnel knowledgeable m S > stems Two separate water supplies shall be demore to them c an lead to core dsmage bnih f.re protectmn and mulear safety provided to furnish necessary water ve!ume resultine from loss nf coolant ihrou 4h boil"If Ihe fire protethon prwam shall ecend The phrases "important to safety " or the roncept of defense in-debth to fire and pressure to the fire main loop.

Each supply shall consist of a storage tank.

" safety-related." will be used throu t out tha protection m fare areas important to eafety.

pump. pipmg. and appropnate isolation and h

with the (dow.nz obnin es.

Appendia R as appymg to all safet -

control s alves. Two separate redundant i

functions The phrase " safe shutdoon" wdl

= to prevent fires trom startmg be used thruushout this Apperdia F as

• to detect rapidly. control, and eatinguish suctions m one or more intake strxtares from a large body of water (river. lake. etc.)

applying to both hot and rold shuid >wn promptly those hree that do ot. cur:

wd! satisfy t'ie reqmrement for two separates 8

e to provide protection for structures, Secease fire mrp effect safe shutiown sy stems. and components irrportant to saMy water storsae tanks.These supphes shall be fum.tions so that a hre that is not promptly separated so that a fadure of one supply wdl systems and because the loss of functmn of extinguished by the fare suppresnan actxties not result in a failure of the other supply.

systems used to rmtigste the consequem es of wi!! not prevent tha safe shutdown of th-Each supply of the fire water distnbution design basis accidents under postfire system shall be capable of providmg for a conditions does not per se impact public plant period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> the manimum espected B. Fue Horon/s Analysis safety, the need to hmit hre damage to A fire haurds analysis shall be performed water demands as determmed by the fire syntstne required to achieve and mamtam by quahfied firs protectior and reactor hazards analysis for safety related areas or esfe shutdown conditions is greater than the sprems cr$gmeers to II) consider potential in other areas that present a fire exposure rieed to limit hre damage to those systems situ and transient hre hazards.121 determine hazard to safety.related areas.

required to mitisete the consequences of the consequences of bre in any locatmn in When storage tanks are used for combined des.gn basis accidents Threc levels of fire the plant on the abihty to safely shut down service water / fire-water uses the mmimum damage limits are estabbshed accordmg to the reador or on the abibty to mmimare and volume for fire uses shall be ensured by the safety functions of the structure. system.

control the release of radioattmty to th=

means of dedicated tanks or by some et component:

enuronment. and (3) specify rneasures for phy sical means such as a vertical standpipe fire prevention. fire detettion, fire for other water service. Admmistrative

-~

- ~ - - -

suppresn'on. and fire coniainment and controls includmglocks for tank outlet s,w r...

suernatne shutdown rapabibty as requw ed salves, are unacceptable as the only means i.e me i

.. o,.. v e.c

, to to ensure mimmum water volume.

• • =******=a 'e e*

for each fire ana contaimng structures.

Other water systems used as anc of the

[*, Q'Q*,*7CZ sys' ems, and components important to safety two hre water supphes shall be permanently in are ordance with NHC guidehnes and w

a

, o,.., u.

connected to the hre main system and shall wunae e.eaa w '

regulations be capable of au:ometic abgnment to the hre

~ 'Q"* "g g******"sy C Dre Presentwn Features C*'8 ***""

bre protet. tion features shall meet the mam system Pumps. controls, and power a.qm %,.

igi he wm.

followmg general requeremenis for all hre supphes in these systems shall satisfy the n* "'**a.o mei e imi c'*

• areas that contain or present a fire hazard to requirements for the mam hre pumps. The ei _ _ -

m. tu a.m a. *%

• ",((

,"j*

structures. sy stems. or components important use of other water systems for hre protection shall not be incompatible with ther fun <.tions to saf-ty I in sit:s fire hazarda shall be identihed required for safe plant shutdown. Failure of e,

Deep su.

som.

v enwie no m ww the other system shall not degrade the fire

• "***y* *,

"g and suitable protection provided.

• • "**"s

2. Transient fire t wards associated with mam system.

B.Seetwnol/solarmn Volves a w.,,,,.

normal operation. mamtenance. repair. ni modibcatmn artmties shall be idenhhed amt Sectional isolation valves such as post we elimmated where possible. Those transient indicator valves or key operated vahes sha g ? gaa g*ggsg*,9]q fire harards that can not be ehminated shall be matalled m the fire main loop to permit w

wa ** be controlled and suitable p o:ection inclabon of portions of the fire main loop for

.n

, i,,,

, c

,,na

w. a

m. s..ai.o.m 4 a.e.s

~ ww th.e,ywoasc.a.*

,.a.aem.

mamtenance or repair without interrupt:ng ea prouded.

s ws

. n

• ev.,,.c.on.s w

,,,on, m w,,wm. w

3. Fire detectmn eystems portabla the entire water supply m***..,

e,. w e.u eown,e,4 estmguishers. and standpipe and hose C //ydermt Iso /ormn ro/res w w. wi s ae.sen.v.a.en.,.

sa m, c Valves shall be metalled to permit isniation ceiee e

.n.o.

o,

,c.on%.=c3,

statmns shall be installed.

a aa.

e. m.w. a a., ceanaui. a e**.

f outede hydrants from the fire mam for 4 hre barriers or automatic suppressmn The most stringent fire damage bmit shall systen.s or both sb411 be installed as maintenance or repair without interrupting necessary to protect redundant systems or the water supply to automatic or mariisal fire apply for those eystems that fallinto more components necessary for safe shutdown.

suppression systems in any area contammg than one category. F.edundant systems used 5 A site hre brigade shall be established.

or presenting a hre hazard to safety.related to mittgets the consequences of ot er desig, tramed. and equipped and shall be on site ai or safe shutdown equipment.

g basis accidents but not necessary or safe O ManualMreSuppremon all hmes shutdown may be lost to a single e sposure

6. Dre detection and suppression systems Stendpipe and hme systems shall be fire Howes er. protection sha!! be i.nsided so shall be deswned. Installed, mamtamed. and installed so that at least n 'e effecine how that a fire wt'hin only one such syr em w dl tested by personnel properly quahfied by stream will be able to rear h any im 4tio, that not damage the redundant system eRpertence and tramirig m bre pro'ertion contains or presents an egnsurp bre I agard to structures systems, or < omrnents

{ //. Genern/ /tequirements systems.

7. Sua eillance procedures shall be important to safety.

A. Are Ntecten Pergram A fire protection program shall b -

estabbshed to ensure that hre barriers are in Access to pe; mat effective functionmg of estabhahsd at each nuclear power lant. The place and that hre suppression systems and the hre brigade shall be g wided to all areas components are operable.

that contam or present an exposure '.re Jh 1 L,, '.

,u o

=

Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulatfor s 79813 hasard to structures, systems. or components hour rating. In addition, fire detectors and an Institute for Qccupec::al safety and important to safety, automatic fire soppre.aion system shall be Ilealth-epproval forn.erfy given by the U.S.

!>tandpipe and hose stations shall be inside installed in the sre 3 Burr.su c' Mines) shall be provkled for fire MR contelnments and BWR containnaents Inside noninerted stainments one of the brigade, damage control, and control room it are not inerted. Standpipe and hose fire protection meana specified above or one personnel. Al least 13 maiks shall be ations inside containment may be of the following fire protection means shall available for fire brigaJe personnel Control connected to a high quahty water supply of be provided; room personnel may b= furnished breathing sufficient quantity and pressure other than

d. Separation of cables and equipment and air by a nanifold system piped from a tM fire main loop if plant-specific features aanciated non-safety circuits of redundant storage reserveir if pesetical. Service or isted prevent extuding the fire main supply inside trains by a horizontal distance of more than operating hfe shall be a mielmum of one-half containment. For BWR drywells, standpipe 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or hour for the self-contained units.

and hose stations shall be placed outside the fire hazards; At least two extra air inttles shall be dry well with adequate lengths of hose to

e. Installation of fire detectors and an located on site for each nelf contained b

reach any location inside the dry well with automatic fire suppressk,n system in the fre breathing unit in additian, an onsite e-hour an effective hose stream.

area; or supply of reserve air shall be provided and E. Hydrostatic Hose Tests I Separation of cables and equipment and arranged in permit quick and comple's Fire hose shal be hydrostatical!y tested at associated non. safety circuits of redund.nl replenishment of exhaur ted supply a4 bottles a pressure of 300 pl or 50 psi above trains by a noncombustible radiant energy as they 3re returned. If co&renors are used maximum fire main operatmg pressure.

shield.

as a source of breathing afr. on5r units whichever is greater. Ilose stcred in outside

3. Alternative or dedicated shatdown approved for breathing air shall be used;,

'g hose houses shall te tested annually. Interior capah.lity and its associated circuits.'

ccepressors shall be operab?e neeanung a.

~~

standpipe hose shall be tested every three independent of cables. systems or

, loss of offsite power. Srectal bre must be yeart components in the area, room or tone under taken to locate the compeuor las areas free -

F. A utomatic Flie Detection considerat5n. shall be provided; of dust and contaminan%

Automatic fire detection systems shall be

a. Where the protection of systema whose I. Fire Brigade Training installed in all areas of the plant that contain function la required for hot shutdown does

%e fire brigade train.ng progem shall or present en exoos.re fire hazard to safe not satisfy the requirement of paragraph G.2 ensure that the capability to fhrht potential shutdown or safety-related systems or of this sectiorc or

- fires is established and maintained.ne components. These fue detection systems

b. Where redundant trains cf systems program shall consist of an initial classroom shall be capable of operating with or without required for hot shutdown located in the instruction program followed by periodic ogg,,,, po,,,

same fire eres may be subject to damage classroc m instruction. Fue fighting practice G. Fire Protection of So[e Shutdown from fire suppression activities or from the and fim drills:

Capabihty rupture or inadvertent operation of fire L restruction

1. Fire protection features shall be provided Srppression systems.

a. W mitial classroom lastruction shall for structures systems, and components in addition fire detection and a fixed fire incluiten in*portant to safe shutdown. These features suppression system shall be installed in the

[1] Indoctrination of the plant fire fighting shall be capable of nmiting fire damage so area room or zone under cor.sideratice.

plan u tth riccific identification of each that:

11. AreBrigade individual a responsibilities.

a. One train of systems necessary to A site fire brigade trained and equipped for (2) Identification cf the type and location of achieve and matotain hnt shutdown fire fighting shall be established to ensure fire hazards and associated types of fires that conditions from either the control room or adequate manual fire fighting capability for could occur in the plant.

emergency control station (s) is free of fire all areas of the olant containing structures.

(3)he toxic and corrosive characteristica damage; and systems, c4 caponents impodant to safe 4 of exputed products of cornbustion.

b. Systems necessary to achieve and he fire brigade shall be at lea,st five (4)Ideniification of the location of fire mamtain cold shutdown from either the members on each shift ne bnf;ade leader fighting equipment for each fire area and control room c,e emergency control station (s) and at least two brigade members sha!! have famdiarization with the layout of the plant, su cient training in or knowledge of Sat including access and egress routes to each can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

2. Except og proviJed for paragraph G.3 of saferydated systems to undentand the ama.

this section, where cables or equipment, effests of fire and fire suppressants on saft (5) ne proper use of available fire fighting including associated non-safety circuits that shutdown capability. De qualification of fire eouipment and the correct method of fighting could prevent operation or cause brigade members shallinclude an annual each type of fire. ne types of fires covered maloperatior due o hot shorts open circuits, physical examination to determine their should include fires in energized electrical ability to perform stenuous fire fighting equipment. fires in cables and cable trays, ry'to a hie e and m activities. The shift supervisor shall not be a hydrogen fees, fires involving flananable and stems nece ta hot shutdown conditions are yocated withm.n member of the fire brigade. De brigade combusable liquids or hazardous process leader shall be competent to assess the '

chemicata fires resulting from construction or -

Pounhal safety consequenm d a hM moddications (welding), and record file fires.

one of,th foi advise control room personnel Such g) ne proper use of communication, i

ntai en means of i

g",'[,g"h'f'[,,"'8' competence by the brigade leader may be lighting. ventila'ron, and emergency breathing s is g P nde -

a. Separation of cables and equipment and evidenced by possession of en operator e equipment.

associated non-safety circuits of redundant license or equivalent knowledge of plant

- (7) ne proper m thod for fighting fires safety-related systems.

inside buildings and confined spaces.

trains by a fire barner having a 3. hour rating-l Structural steel forming a part of or De minimu.n equipment provided for the (8) ne direction and coordination of the

~

l p supporting such fira barners shall be bngade shall consist of personal protective fire fighting activities (fire brigade leaders

+

equipment such as turnout coats, boots, onlyl.

protected to provide fire resistance gloves hard hats, emergency com:nunications (9) Detailed review of fire fighting equivalent to that required of the barn.er;

b. Separation of cables and equipment and equipment, portable lights. portable atrategies and procedures.

ventdation equipuent, and portable (10) Rev'ew of the latest plant associated nomsafety circuits of redundant extiriguishers. Self-contained breathing modificetions and corresponding changes in trains by a horizontal distance of more than apparatus using full-face positive-pressu e fire fighting plans.

20 feet utth no mtervening combustible or masks approved by NIOSil(National i

fire hasards. In addition, fire detectors and an Note.-Itess (r) and (to) may be deleted l

automatic fire suppreesion syatem shall be from the trainics of no more than two of the installed in the fire grea; or e Ahemat u shutdown capabddy is peded bY

c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and rerouting. relocating or modificating of existing r.on-operations personnel who may be systems; dedicated shutdown capabdity is pnwided angned k the fim bngade.

associated non safety circuits of one by instalhng new structures and systems for the

b. ne instruction shall be provided by redundant train in a fire barrier havmg a 1 function of post fire shutdown.

qualified individuals who are knowledgeable.

I 1

I

5 i

M614 Federal Reger / Vo!. e. NA 2n / Wednesday. November 19.1980 / Rules and Reguktions

~ '

operienced and su.t d!y tram?d in fmhtirig

' brigade. and seint ron. plu ernent and us* of regen t additional fire protection m the

• se t) pes of hres that co id occur in % pknt eq. ipment, and fu e f.ghtma strateg'es.

work actnity procedure ind m usmg the t) pes of equipment asariaofe ?, It' Anscwnent of ec6 br gade trernker's

5. Govern th7 une of igmtion sources by use m the :ar! ear power plant a.a wieduc n# his or ter role m the firer -

of a flame permit system to control weldmg.

r ?.steochon shall be presided to asi. U '

(idstra tratein for the area assum d to f'ame cuttmg. brazmg or solderms P a f ain h het Assessment of the bicade opershons. A separate permit shall be issued inede rnembers ar.d fire bngade le e.rse i

Megular planned meetmo shel bs odd, bcmben 4 nnt rm.mce with estabbsf 7d for each area where work 's to be done. If I

ai le est escry 3 months for all brede pl.*iu re forhttrit procedures and use of fire work contmues over rnore than one shift. the hMr.g equipment. mcludmg self con;amed perme shall be vahd for not more than 24

'~

n, chers tu resrew a hant;es m ihr o

g r, itectmn program aTi other sub erse ao swrgency benihmg i pparatus.

hours when the plant is operatmg or for the t

com.sunmation qua meni. and s entilatiori duretion of a articular job dunng plant ne essary

t. hrunhc refresher trainit i; sessions shall wegn ant, *, the enter t pratlicable shut. lown.

6 held to repot the c4 oaroom im 'ruchon

[illhe s mu!&d use tf hre fightmg

6. Contrut the removal from the area of all ems ment #4. red tc cepe wnh the situation w iste, dehns, scrap. oil spills. or other mgrim for all brysadre met bers over a two- '

tear penod 'T hese sessa mav h und spe of f ar, c! coed for the a dl 'Ihe

. umbustd,les resu.ima from the work actmty concurrent v.th the egular planned arel malige ut fire hoen f ar the dn!!

' tmmediately followie.g completion of the meetings shoak def r frorr th%: ust d m the previous,

actnity. or at the er d of each work shift.

3*

2 Pruare

<* nit m has bngas e mo.e #ers are trurm.i us w hnheser comas first.

practa.e sessions sha:1 he hels. far cath 3 bhtmp hres m u w dn. areas. 'I he 7 Mamtain he penodic housekeepmg sh,ft fire bnpde on the proper metht d of eet un seleM shr old umulare the siv-

. mapectiona to ensure contmued corapharice hghtmg the serious types of hres that could

,s rA armement of a fire that t ue N eh these admimstratne controls.

occur in a nucle.ir power p' 4nt These

(. A ch ci rur a the area selecteuf a Control the use of specific combustibles sessmns aball provide bngade members mth eM.V.y 'ita Metopment due to ske t ma' in safety related areas M1 wood used in empenem e m actual f:re estmirmhmerit and ! n ug W

• pond to obtam eglpmec( md. safe'y-relawd arvas duni g mamtenance.

the we of emergas.ty breath ng apparalus 1.(y e pa i cJ' e fire, assump'ig to; e cd '

modificatiort.ar refochng aperatwns (such as

. nder strenuous condinons enc ocerd m i av.W e ; Lntemon i 6.pabihty lay-down blocke or scaffondmg) shall be Wated with e Lue retardant. Equipment or fire fightmg These pratt;ce se:sions shall be j W inesment of bngade leader's prouded at least once per year lor eQ f re

,med..on of the fue !.ghtmg el' art us to t.upphes (such as new fuell shipped m br.gade member.

por%ghnear au uracy. and e@raveness.

utreated combust.ble packing contamers

( H~n!5 me; he unpacked :n safety-related areas if 1 Dn/!s In('v4 d prds cWamir rovided to a bre brarad dri.is sy ill bs grf nrd m f equired for wahd op:raung reasons.

the plant so tht Y ftrs bagide can prat tire e $ fu e bngs le member. it e' Jr.ig doll

' llowcut, all creabustdle matenals shall be i

as a team O per. d.g p mamta.nk for at least 3 removed ' rem the e.rea immediately followmg f' 9 h, to eriuns ' nat ed rrember receives the unpuimg Suen transient combustible b Dn!!s ea$ be prrformed at regular intervals not io rwr.ced 3 % *ths Gr each tremng y ay pris of the traim pregram.

materbil. unless stored in approved shift fire bngade. Each t;r4 tAs je tv-mber TW w res 1r64 Wmng shaff he asunable coa ainers, shrJ1 not be left unattended

/

should part.cipate in each d dl. ut must for WC review; & amng or brbiaened dunna luncn breaks shift changes. or other participate m at least two drdis pet year tram na f( te rightmg withm huildmgs shall simdar periods Mose combustitde pac kmg A sufhch nt number of tha e do!!s. but not be st hewled for all those bi;.tade men.bers matenal y en a4 wood or paper escelsior, or less than.me for each sh/t >. 'e bngade po

- W.+pcipmance ree rds snu puf>ethylent si reung shall be placed in year. shall be unannouriceG to determme the Af.cl.ncieh

. neta' iantainers with tight httmg self-closing fire fig tmg readmess o' the p' ant fire

' ( Fmertenc ) Lidhng melal cos a.

h 6

/ mae cy bghtme umts with a least an 8-4 Control actwn= to be taken by an hngade, bngade leader. and I:re protection g ey stews and eqiupment. persans pleanmg

-, hme hatter) power supply shall be pnuded itividual discovenrg a fire. for example.

and authunzma an unancer,i dnll shau m aM treas needed for operation of safe notihcation of control room. attempt to

• nut i wn equqme2r and m access and estir caish fee. and actuation oflocal fire ensure that the resymdma shift hre brtade c

members are n)q siware that a dnilis bug egr s2 mutes thereta supprrasion systems.

pW.med untd it b begun UnannowdM K. 4dm ristrutac Carls

10. Control actions to be taken by the Adm.nistratne enntrob shall b.*

contr d room operator to determme the need shaff not be scheduled rioser then fCA g

w eek s.

est4thshed to.,immaze fire hazards m areas for 'f ngade assistance upon report of a fire or At least one Jnll per yem md be containmg structures sWems, and rec 6pt of alarm on conirol room annunciator perbrmeu uti a"back shift 7 for each eli.' e corrpon-nts important so safety. These pacet h r esample. announcing location of f re ovei pA system. sounding fire alarms, run'rols shall estabbsh proc edures to.

i brhtah

c. ihe dnhsalt be prepianned to i

1 Gowrn the handimg ai d hmitatmn of the and noteymg the shift supervisor and the fire esiabhnh ere trammg objet tnes of the deb use of orJ. nary cc,bustdde matenals.

bngade ieader of the type. size, and location arm sha?: b entiqued to determme hw weil combusoble and fiamrnable nases and of the fire.

e = %g y b ectnes beve becw wet hquids, high efhciency parte alde air and U. Control actions to be taken by the fire i

charcoal filters. a y iun escharge resins. or bngade after notihcation by the control room

_ t'nannot, ed onlls shaff be plcned M r

criNued iv members of the mat:agemene other combustible pupphes m syft'y related operat"r of a fire. for example, assembhng in

.s desig iated location. receivinc {tections sfa.f responsrde for plant caft.y and tire areas protection. performance dehciencies of a fire

2. prohibit the storage of comtost bles m from tt fire bngade leader. and dischargma bngade or n! mdmdual bre brspde members safeterelated are.es or estabbh designated soecifu hre fightmg responsibihties includmg shall be remedied by schedabru.ddeional storage areas with approvnate b-selectu i and transportation of bre fightmg equiprn nt tc f:re location. selection of tamirmg for the bngade or members protection Unsatisfactory dnll performance st.all be 3 Gonrn the haaahog <f arat hmi!

protect.e equipment, operatmg mstructions followed by a repeat dedl with Jo days.

trans ent fire loah such as comNstible and for use.f bre supprenaion systems, and us=

d. At 3-year tntersals. a renomly selected flammable hquids. wood and plastic of preplanned strategies for fsht ng fires in unannounced drill shall be ent%aed by products, or other combustib'e materials in specifu areas quahfied indniduals mdepesnt of the bmhtne aontaming s&ty-related systems

12. Defme the strategies for fighting fa cs in brensee's staff A cnpy of G w tten repor' or equ:pfr ent dunng all phases of operatmg.

all safety-related areas and areas presentmg from such indmduals shall be av.uteble fcr and espedady durma mamtenance.

a hazard to safety-related equipment These NRC reuew.

mMfication. ar refuehng operations.

sirategies shall designate:

e Dn!!s shall as a mammum mriode le 4 Designate the onsite staff member

a. Fire hazards m each area cost red by the follow mg resp,nsib!c for the mplant hr, potection spenfic prefire plans.

D) Assessment of bre alarm effe. nveness.

reuew of proposed work actmties to identify

b. Fire extinguishants best suited for t me required to notify and asserrOle fire potential transient fire hazards and specify controlhng the hres o uaed w.th the inc i

l l

\\

i

4 s.*

Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rulea and Regulations 78815 a

hazards in that area and the nearest location coolent level above the top of the core for separation and barriers between trays and of these extinguishants.

BWRs and be within the levelindication in conduite containing associsted circuits of one

c. Most favorable direction dom which to the pressurizer foe PWRs.

safe shutdown division and trays and attack a fire in each area in view of the

c. The resctor heat removal function shall conduits containing associated circuits or 6

ventda%n d. ection, eccess hallways, stairs.

be cupable of arEeving and maintaining safe shutdown cables from the redundant and int rs that are n ost likely to be free of decay heat removal division, or the isolation of these associated fire, and the best station or elevation for

d. The process monitorind function shall be circuits from the safe shutdown equipment, fightmg the fire. All access and egress routes capable of proWiing direct readings nf the shallbe such that a postiJated fire involving that invilve locked doors should be process variables necessary to perforn and associated circuite will not prevent safe o

specifically identified in the p ocedure with control the above functions.

shutdown >

the appropnate precaut'ons and methous for e.The supporting functions shall be M. Fim Barrier Cable IYnetration Seal access specified.

capable of providing the process cooling.

Qualification

d. Plant systems that should I.e managed to lubrication, etc necessary to permit the Penetration seal designs shall utilize only

{

reduce the damage potential during a local operation of the equipment used for safe noncombustible materials and shall be fire anu the location of local and remote shutdown functions.

qualified by tests that are comparable to tests controis for s :h management (e g., any 3.ne shutdown capability for specific fire used to rate Cre barriers.ne acceptance hydreibc or e ectnca! systems in the zone areas may be unique for each such area, or it criteria for the test shallinclude:

coveied by the specific fire fighting procedure may be one unique combination of systems 1.nc cable fire barrier penetration seal that could ;ncrease the hazards in the area for all such areas. In either case, the has withstood the fire endurance test without because of overpressurization or electncal alternative shutdown capability shall be passage of flame or ignition of cables on the hazards).

Independent of the specific f:re areaN and unenosed sida far a period of time

e. Vital heat-sen6ive system components shall accommodan postfire conditions where equivalent to the fire resistance rating that nee,i to be kept cool while fighting a offsite power is avestable and where offsite requimd of the barrier.

local fire. Particularty hazardous power is not available for 72 haurs.

2.The temperature levels recorded for the combustibles that need cooling should be Procedures shall be in effect to implement unexposed side are analyzed and designated.

this capabihty.

demonstrate that the maximum temperature

f. Organization of fire fighting bngadas and

4. If the r.apability to achieve and maintain is sufficiently below the cable insulation the assignment of special duties accrnding so cold shutdown will not be available because ignition temperature; and job title so that all fire fighting functions are of fire damage the equipment and systems

3. ne fire barrier penetration seal remains covered by any complete shift personnel.

comprising the means to achieve and intact and does not allow projection of water comple.nent. These duties include command maintain the hot standby or hot shutdown beyond the unenposed surface during the contr01 of the brigade, transporting fire condition shall be capable of maintaining hose stream test.

supp.esmon and support equipment to the fire such conditions entil cold shutdown can be N. Fin Doors scer es, applying the extinguish nt to the fire, achieved. In sucn equipment and systems will Fire doors shall be self-closing or provided communication with the control room, and not be capable of being powered by both with closing mechanisms and shall be coordination with outside fire departments.

onsite and offsite electric power systems inspected semiannually to verify that

g. potential radiological and toxic hazards because of fire damage. an independent automatic hold + pen, release, and closing in fire rones.

onsite power system shall be provided.The mechanisms and latches are operable.

h. Ventilation system operation that number of operating shift personnel.

One of the following measures shall be ensures desired plant air distribution when exclusive of fire brigade members, required provided to ensure they will protect the the ventilation flow is modified for fire to operate such equipment and systems shall opening as required in case of fire:

containment or smoke clearing operations.

be on site at all tiv.Ja.

1. Fire doors shall be kept closed and

1. Operations requiring control room and

5. Equipment and systems comprising the electrically supervised at a continuously shift engineer coordinatiori or authorization.

means to achieve and maintain cold manned location;

i. Instructions for plant operators and shutdown conditions shall not be damaged

2. Fire doors shall be locked clood and general plant personnel during fire.

by fire; or the fire damage to such equipment inspecte I weekly to verify that the doors are L Alternatire and Dedicored Shutdown and systems shall be limited so that the in the cle med position:

Copobdity systems can be made operable and cold

3. Fire doors shall be provided with

1. Alternative or dedicated shutdown shutdown achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

autmatic hold-open and release mechanisms capability provided for a specific fire area Materials for such repairs shall be readdy and inspected daily to verify that doorways are free of obstructions; or shall be able to achieve and maintain available on site and pro edures shall be in subentical reactivit> conditions in the effect to implement such repairs. If such

4. Fire doors shall be kept closed and reactor, maintain reactor coolant mventory equipment and systems used prior to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> mspected daily to verify that they are in the achieve and maintain hot standb> '

after the fire will not be capable of being closed position.

conditions for a pWR (hot shutdown ' for a powered by both onsite and offsite electric The fee brigade leader shall have ready access t a keys for any locked fre doors.

BWR) and achieve cold shutdown power systems bwuse of fire dan.w. an 3

conditions within 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> = and maintam cold independnet onsite power system shall be Areas protected by automatic total flooding gas suppression systems shall have shutdown conditions thereafter. During the provided. Equipment and systems used after electrically supervised self< losing fire doors postfire outdown, toe reactor coolant system 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> may be powered by offsite power or shall satisfy option 1 above.

! O process variables shall be maintained within only.

a No odystem Mece those predicted for a loss of normal a.c.

8. Shutdown systems installed to ensure power and the fission product Nundary postfire shutdown capability need not be

"[

Qg gg integrity shall nct be affected:1.e there shall designed to meet seismic Category I criteris, equippe I w th an oil collection system if the be no fuel clad damage, rupture or eny single failure cnteria. or other design basis contaim ient is not merted during normal pnma poolant boundary, et rupture of the accident criteria except where e equired for operatit n.The oil collection system shall be contairurant boundary.

other reasons, e.g. because of interface with so designed. engineered, and installed that

2. nc Prformance goals for the shutdown or impact on existing safety systems, or failure voll nw lead to fire dunna normal or functions shall be:

beause of adverse valve actions due to fire desigra 1-sis acredent conditions and that

a. Dr reactivity control function el.all be damage.

capable of achieving and maintaining cold 7.The sa'e shutdown equipiaent and systerm ar each fire area shall be known to

• Ar. a. eptable method of comply ag with this r

shutd,wn reactivity condii. me.

alternauw would be to met RegulatorWaide m b.The reactor coolant makeup function be inclated from associated non. safety ahall be capable of maintaining the reactor circuits in the fire art a so that hot shorts.

[ [ g7

',,, ' ' 'h$*"["j

,,g cpen circuits, or shorts to ground in the redundant safety divissor.s are sa prctected that

? As defined in the Standard Techmcal associated circuits wdl not prevent op2 ration postulated firas affect trays from only one sa'ety Specificahons.

of the scle shutdown equipment. He dmsion U

- 7este Fedeiral f.egister / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. Novstrber 19. 1980 / Rul:s and Regulationa

. e there'is reasonable assurance that the system will w6thstand the Safe S'autdown' Earthquake

• Such collection systems shall be carble of collecting tube oil from all potential pressurtsed and unpressurized leakage sites in the teactor coolant pump lube oil systems.

LeeLage shall be collected and drained to a vented closed container that can hold the entire tube oil system inventory. A flame

+

arrester is rrTitred in the vent if the flash point characteristics of the oil present the e

hazard of fire flashback. Leakage points to be t-protected shall include Itit pump and piping.

overflow lines, lube oil cooler. oil fili and 1

drem lines and pluss. flanged connections on j

' oillines, and tube oil reservoirs where such foeturce exlet on the reactor coolant pumps.

1he drain line shall be large enough to accommodate the largest potential oil lerk.

(Sec.161b. Pub. I,83-703. 68 Stat. 948. sec. 201. Pub. L 93438. ea Stat.1242 (42 U.S.C.

4

- 2201(b). 5641 Deted at Washington. D.C.. this Uth day of November 1980. For the Nudear Regulatory Commission. Samuel J. Chilk. Secretary of the Commission. p1t Det am-3s17s Fded 11-1HR s 45 am) DILuist COM Psee et-es a W + j 4 4

• i

\\ J

• See Regulato'y Guide 1 W" Seismic Dosega case 6fication" Paragraph C2 :

i i ~---a--n ,a., , - m.r a. m r a, e, m-e .c ,}}