ML20031C527
| ML20031C527 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1981 |
| From: | Dalesandro D, Hossain Q, Kaul P QUADREX CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031C518 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR QUAD-1-81-868, QUAD-1-81-868-PT-02, QUAD-1-81-868-PT-2, TAC-08079, TAC-8079, NUDOCS 8110070241 | |
| Download: ML20031C527 (20) | |
Text
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QUAD-1-81-868
SUMMARY
REPORT REVIEW 0F CRANE DESIGN AND THEIR LOAD PATHS FOR RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR STATION - PART 2 UNIT 1 Prepared for:
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT Sacramento, California Prepared by:
QUADREX CORPORATION 1700 Dell Avenue Campbell, California 95008 T
September 1981 s
Prepared by
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Reviewed by M -
P. Kaul '
O. C. Dalesandro 5 G.id a
,4 S. Chidambaranathan Approved by
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Q. NL., Ho s sai n'
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o Revision No.
Date
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SMD-0109 w
8110070241 810930 PDR ADOCK 05000312 P
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QUAD-1-81-868
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SUMMARY
REPORT REVIEW 0F CRANE DESIGN AND THEIR LOAD PATHS FOR RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR ST.TTION rART 2 UNIT 1 Prepared for:
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT Sacramento, California Prepared by:
QUADREX CORPORATION 1700 Dell Avenue Campbell, California 95008
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September 1981
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QUAD-1-81-868 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1-1 2.0 REVIEW
SUMMARY
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2.2 Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Vicinity of the Fuel Storage Pools 2-1 2.2.1 List of Overhaad Load Handling Systems 2-1 2.2.2 Exclusior Overhead Handling Systems 2-1 2.2.3 Crane Design Feature Evaluation 2-2
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2.3 Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Containment 2-2 2.3.1 List c' Overhead Load-Handling Systems 2-2
3. 2 Exclusion of Overhead Handling Systems 2-2
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2.3-4a Jib Crane Exclusion 2-3 2.3-4c Polar Crane Exclusion 2-3 2.4 Overhead Handling Systems Operating Outside Containment and Spent Fuel Lt? rage Pool Areas 2-4 2.4.2 List of Overhead load Handling Systems 2-4 2.4.2.1 Haza -o Fvaluation 2-4 2.4.2.2 Evaluation Results (Hoist A1) 2-7 2.4.2.3 Evaluation Results (Hoist AS) 2-9 2.4.3 Auxiliary Building Hoists Exclusion 2-9
3.0 REFERENCES
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QUAD-1-81-868
- 1. 0 INTRODUCTION
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This report, prepared by Quadrex Corporation for Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD), summarizes the results of the review of the overhead load handling systems at SMUD's Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station.
This review was performed to assist SMUD in geparing their
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nine-month report in response to USNRC's 'etter of December 22, 1981 (reference 1).
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1-1
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l 2.0 REVIEW
SUMMARY
j Review results for the overhead handling system are p n sented in the l
following subsections.
The order *a which these have been arranged is identical to that shown in sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 of enclosure 3 to reference 1.
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2.2 Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Vicinity of the Fuel Stcrage Pools 2.2.1 List of Overhead Load Handling Systems
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The overhead load handling systems from which a heavy ioad cculd, if dropped, land or fall into the spent fuel pool are listed below:
Stop log hoist in the spent fuel building (1.5 ton capacity);
o and Gantry crane in the turbine building (185 ton capacity).
o 2.2.2 Exclusion of Overhead Handling System
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The following cranes are excluded from the above list because they handle only fuel assembly or etter loads which, by definition, are not heavy loads (.eference 2):
o New fuel handling bridge in fuel storage building (four ton i
capacity); and o
Spent fuel handling bridge in fuel storage building (three ton capacity).
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No overhead handling system listed in section 2.1.1 above has been excluded from evaluation on the justification that sufficient physical separation exists from any potential load-impact point and the spent fuel pool.
1 The Gantry Crane will be used in the future to move spent fuel casks which constitutes a heavy load.
The consequences of potential drops of spent fuel casks were analyzed earlier by the Bechtel 2-1
J QUAD-1-81-868 l
l Corporation and submitted to the NRC. However, before the Gantry Crane is actually used te move the spent fuel cask, this analysis will be reviewed.
2.2.3 Crane Design Feature Evaluation p
The stop log hoist in the spent fuel building can be excluded frnm the list of cranes in section 2.2.1 since SMUD is planning to replace this hoist.
3 2.3 Sverhead Handling systems Operating in the Containment 2.3.1 List of Overhead Load-Handling Systems The overhead load-handling systems which are capable of carrying J
heavy loads over the reactor vessel are listed below:
Folar crane in the reactor building (180 ton capacity);
o Jib crane in the reactor building (five ton capacity); and o
Auxiliary bridge crane in the ceactor building (three ton o
3 capacity).
2.3.2 Exclusion of Overhead Handling Systems The following cranes are excluded from the above list because they
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handle only fuel assembly or other loads which, by definition, are not heavy loads (reference 2):
Main fuel handling cridge in reactor building (three ton o
capacity);
Auxiliary fuel handling bridge in reactor building (three ton o
capacity); and o
Boom crane in the reactcr building (one ton capacity).
D The auxiliary bridge crane in the reactor building is also~ excluded since it does not carry any heavy load over the reactor vessel er any safety-related cernponent.
D 2-2 D
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QUAD-1-81-868 Although the capacity of this crane exceeds the limit for heavy loads in this plant, a review of plant operations has identified no
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heavy loads which would be handled by this crane.
The lifting of heavy loads by this crane without further review is precluded by operating procedures.
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If, $n the future, a heavy load lift becomes identified, the crane will bt analyzed and evaluated for the lift.
l 2.3.4a Jib Crane Exclusion
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The jib crue is used to move the in-core instrumentation transfer cask.
There are no safety-ralated components in tt9 vicinity of its load path, but the crane is currently capable of moving the load over the reactor vessel.
However, SMUD is undertaking modifi-cation of this crane.
This modification will include installation of acchanical and electrical devices which would prevent inadvertent movement of the in-core instrumentation transfer cask or other loads over the reactor vessel.
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Both electrical devices and mechanical stops will be provided to precluda crane movemant over the reactor vessel, thereby providing safety in-depth.
The mechanical stops will be welded to the crane
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and provide a positive backup to the electrical limit devices.
These protective devices can not be removed from the crane without a de iberate construction program, which would require a review and approval by SMUD.
The requirement for the limit devices will be
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incorporatea into the lifting procedures for this crane.
The jib crane in the reactor building can, therefore, be excluded from the list of cranes in sec+. ion 3.1.
BD 2.3.4c Polar Crane Exclusion The polar crane is currently being evaluated for potential drops by the reactor supplier, the Babcock & Wilcox Company, on a generic D
basis.
The reactor pressure vessel closure head and the plenum 2-3 D
QUAD-1-81-868 assembly are the loads considered in the evaluation.
The potential
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load drops will be evaluated following the criteria and procedures outlined in sections 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.1.5, and 5.1.6 of NUREG-0612.
The objective of this study is to satisfy the guidelines recommended ir section 5.1 (criteria I through IV) in order to exclude the ij polar crane from the list of cranes in section 2.3.1.
2.4 Overhead Handling Systems Operating Outside Containment and Spent Fuel Storage Pool Areas D
2.4.2 List of Overhead Load Handling Systems The overhead load handling systems from which a heavy load may, if dropped, result in damage to any system or component required for
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reactor shutdown, core d cay heat removal, or spent fuel pool cooling are listed below:
o Monorail hoist A1 (10 ton capacity); and o
Monorail hoist A5 (10 ton capacity).
O These monorail hoists are located in the auxiliary building.
2.4.2.1 Hazard Evaluation 9
Since tne auxiliary building monorail hoists are not single-failure proof, the consequences of dropping heavy loads have been evaluated.
The load / impact area matrix for the postulated drop of heavy loads e
from the two auxiliary building monorail hoists is provided in table 2.4-1.
Heavy loads identified in this matrix are the same as those identified in response to section 2.1 of enclosure 3 to reference 1, except as follows:
e o
The heat exchanger (no. E-467) has been excluded from the list of heavy loads to be handled by these two monorail hoists.
SMUD's review of their maintenance procedures inoicates very little or no probability of lifting the heat exchanger during g
the lifetime of the plant.
Should lifting of the heat exchanger become a necessity in the future, SMUD will evaluate the 2-4 9
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O QUAD-1-81-868 consequences of its drop.
Consequently, the monorail hoist Al will be used to lift the following heavy loads:
- 1) floor plugs, and 2) pump motors (make-up pump, high pressure injection pumps, and d cay heat removal pumps).
No heavy loads beside the hatch covers (in the area serviced) were O
identified for monorail hoist AS.
Further, this hoist does not operate in the vicinity of any safety-relat:!d equipment.
Floor plugs are lifted only six inches above the floor and are laid down on the floor in an area adjacent to the hatch.
The pump motors are lifted from the floors below grade (elevations -47.0 and
-20.0 feet) to six inches above the floor at grade (elevation 0.00 feet) through the appropriate hatch opening.
The motors are O
subsequently moved outside the building through a door on the east wall.
The safety-related equipment which may be affected if the f.oor O
plugs or the pump motors are accidentally dropped are listed below:
o High pressure injection pumps P238A and 2388 (elevation
-20.00 feet);
o Makeup pump P-236 (elevation -20.00 feet); and 9
o Decay heat removal coolers E260A and E260B (elevation
-20.00 feet).
In addition, the probability of damaging the decay heat removal 9
pumps P261A and P261B was also considered.
These are located on the floor at elevation -47.00 feet.
If the pump motors are accidentally droped while being lifted S
through the hatch openings, they would not fall on the above-listed safety-related equipment directly since the hatch openings are not directly above the equipment.
Although the pump motor for the high pressure injection pump P238A does project into the hatch, it 3
is itself the only heavy load to be lifted through this hatch and 2-5 0
O QUAD-1-81-868 l
therefore it can not impinge on other safety-related equipment.
If l
dropped, the motors would fall en the floor slab at elevation n"
-20.0 feet (injection pumps and the makeup pump) or on the slab at
-47.0 feet (decay heat removal pumps).
These two floor slabs were evaluated for adequacy against local failure resulting from the drop of pump motors through the hatch openings. When local failure O
of the floor slab was postulated, consequences of such failure were investigated.
After the pump motors are lifted through the hatch openings at O
elevation 0.0 feet, they are translated laterally with a six inch height limitation above the floor.
During such movement, the motors, if accidentally dropped, would impact on the floor at elevation 0.0 feet.
Similarly, the floor plugs at elevations 0
0.0 feet and -20.0 feet would be lifteu to six inches above the floor and moved horizontally to the adjacent lay-down areas.
If accidentally dropped, these floor plugs would impact on the floor slabs.
Consequences of these drops were also evaluated.
O Since the safety related equipment is not impacted directly, the hazard evaluation consi'ted of determinir.g the structural integrity s
of the impacted floor slabs and the consequences of their failures, O
if any. This analysis was performed using an energy-balance method as briefly outlined in the following steps:
The impact energy was computed as the product of the weight of o
the load and the drop height.
All of this energy was assumed O
to be absorbed by the target st<ucture, i.e., energy absorption in the dropped object was conservatively ignored.
Using yield-line theory (which assumed elasto plastic flexural o
behavior) and available ductility ratios (based on available
- g reinforcement ratio), the energy-absorption capacity of the impacted slab was determined.
o If the energy absorption capacity of the floor slab is more than the impact energy (i.e., the available ductility ratio is
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O QUAD-1-81-868 more than necessary to abscrb the impact, no structural failure was postulated.
Otherwise, structural failure was g
postulated and its consequences investigated.
2.4.2.2 Evaluation Results (Hoist A1)
O Results of the hazard evaluation described above are presented in the following paragraphs for monorai
..oist A1:
a.
Drop of a pump motor on t.he floor at elevation -20.0 feet in g
the vicinity of the make-un pump and the high oressure injection pump P2308.
The floor slab at elevation -20 feet is supported by soil o...
is 3 feet thick. This slab is structurally adequate to absorb g
the energy imparted by the motor er a result of a 20.5 foot fall from 6 inches above the floor et grade level (elevation O'-0").
O b.
Drop of a pump motor on the floor at elevation -20.0 feet in the vicinity of the high pressure injection pump P238A.
Should a pump motor fall 20.5 feet through the hatch opening O
at elevation 0.0 feet, it would impact the hatch cover number 8 below at elevation -20.0 feet.
The energy absorption of this hatch cover ic less than the surrounding, supporting slab and it would fail, allowing the motor and failed hatch cover to e
fall to the slab at elevation -47.0 feet, which has adequate capacity to absorb the energy of both the motor and the hatch cover (see paragraph 2.4. '.2c).
Since the Ntch cover will fail, the impact energy cannot be fully transferred to the U
surrounding slab and its structural adequacy will not be endangered.
c.
Drop of a pump motor on the floor at e;evacion -47.0 feec in 4
the vicinity of tha decay heat removal pump 261A and B.
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QUAD-1-81-868 The floor at elevation -47.0 feet, which is supported by soil y
and is 4 feet tnick, has adequate capacity to absorb the energy imparted by the motor falling from a height of 47.5 feet.
d.
Drop of pump motors and floor plugs on the floor at elevation 0.0 feet (above decay heat removal coclers E-260A and E-2608).
The effect of the 6-inch drop of the motor, both on the hatch covers and the floor slab at elevation 0.0 feet, has been evaluated. Analysis shows that both the structural elements have sufficient capacity to absorb the impact energy imparted by the motor.
As sucn, the safety-related function of decay heat removal coolers (E260A and E260B) located at elevation -
20.0 feet would not be jeopardized.
Analysis shows that the floor elements in this area are struc-turally ad2quate to absorb the energy imparted by the heavier segment of flocr plug number 5 as a ruolt of a 6-inch drop.
D Further calculations, however, show that the bottom segment of the concrete floor plug for hatch number 5 would fail in flexure if the upper segaent is dropped directly on it from a D
height of 6 inches above the floor elevation.
The failed plug would fall to the soil-supported floor below at elevation -20.0 feet which is adequate to absorb the energy.
Damage to the decay heat removal cooler E-260A is precluded as it is remote D
from the hatch opening and is further protected by a wall enclosure.
The E-2608 cooler is sufficiently remote from the hatch to preclude any effect from the plug impact on the floor.
e.
Drop of floor plug for hatch number 6 on the floor at elevation
-20.0 feet in the vicinity of high pressure injection pump P238A.
nnalysis has been done both for one segment of the three piece D
2-8 D
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O QUAD-1-81-868 hatch cover falling on the other segments and also the segment g
falling directly onto the supporting ledges.
Both the impacted segment and the ledge are structurally adequate to absorb the impact energy generated by the falling segment (weight = 5.4 kps).
Should the segment being lifted slide through the opening, it will fall on the hatch cover (hatch number 8) below at elevation nv
-20 feet as discussed in paragraph 2.4.2.2.b.
This hatch cover would fail allowing the falling segment to drop onto the floor at elevation -47 feet, which has the capacity to absoro the energy as explained therein.
f.
Drop of floor plugs on the floor at elevation 0.0 feet (above make-up pump P-236 and high pressure injection pump P-138S).
O Analysis of the floor at elevation 0.0 feet in this area shows that the floor is adequate to absorb the energy of a dropped floor plug.
Consequently the safety-related equipment located below this floor will not be affected.
O 2.4.2.3 Evaluation Results (Hoist A5)
Although no heavy loads were identified for the monorail hoist AS, the floor slab at elevation 0.0 feet was analyzed for a potential O
drop of a hatch cover and found to be adequate to absorb the energy.
There are no safety-related equipment on the floor below at elevation
-20.0 feet or immediately below the hoist.
O 2.4.3 Auxiliary Building Hoists Exclusion The auxiliary building hoists identified in section 2.4.2 can be excluded by virtue of the hazard evaluation presented in sec-O ti ns 2.4.2.2 and 2.4.2.3 which demonstrated that the identified safety-related equipment would not be affected by a postulated drop of a heavy load by these hoists.
O 2-9 O
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3 Page 1 TABLE 2.4-1
_J Load / Impact Area Matrix or Evaluating Consequences of Postulated Drop c
of Heavy Loads O
Crane: Auxiliary Building Monorail A-1 Location: Auxiliary Building
- D I act Between Column Lines L-V and 9 10.3 Remarks Impact Drop Safety-Related Hazard Elimination Loads El a ion Equipment (2)
Category (1)
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Pump Motors
-20.0 20.5 High Pressure Max. Wt. = 4.9 Kips Injection Pump b,e Refer to P238A Paragraph and 2.4.2.2.b. and P238B b,e 2.4.2.2.a.
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-20.0 20.5 Make-up Pump P-236 b,e D
0.0 0.5 Decay Heat Removal Coolers b,e l
E260A &
E260B at El.-20.0 D
l NOTES:
(1) Hazard Elimination Categories l
a.
Crane travel for this area / load combination prohibited by electrical I
interlocks or mechanical stops.
b.
System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of system to perform its safety-related function following this load drop in this area.
c.
Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider load /
equipment combination.
3 d.
Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely j
small (i.e. section 5.1.6 NUREG 0612 satisfied).
l e.
Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not l
damange safety-related equipment.
[3 (2) Bechtel Corporation Drawing No. M-303, sheet 7 (Reference 3)
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O Page 2 TABLE 2.4-1 O
Lcad/ Impact Area Matrix For Evaluating Consequences of Postulated Drop of Heavy Loads
'O Crane: Auxiliary Building Monorail A-1 Location: Auxiliary Building O
Impact Between Column Lines L-V, and 8.7 - 10.3 Area Remarks Impact Drop Safety-Related Hazard Elimination Loads Elevation Ht.
Equipment (2)
Category (I)
(ft)
(ft)
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Pump Motors
-47.0 47.5 Decay Heat b,e Refer to Max. Wt = 4.9 Kips Remnval Pumps Section P261A 2.4.2.2.c and P2618 O
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10 NOTES:
(1) Hazard Elimination Categories a.
Crane travel for this area / load combination prohibited by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops.
b.
System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of
- O system to perform its safety-relate
- ' function following this load drop in this area.
c.
Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider load /
equipment combination.
d.
Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely l
small (i.e. section 5.1.6 NUREG-0612 satisfied).
o e.
Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not damage safety-related equipment.
(2) Bechtel Corporation Drawing No.'M-303, Sheet 7 (Reference 3)
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O Pag 2 3 I
TABLE 2.4-1 O
Load / Impact Area Matrix For Evaluating Consequences of Postulated Drop of Heavy Loads O
Crane: Auxiliary Building Monorail A-1 Location: Auxiliary Building O
Impact Between Column Lines N-S and 9.7 - 10.3 Area Remarks Impact Drop Safety-Related Hazard Elimination Loads El a ion l
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Component
' Category Floor Plug No. 5 0' - 0" 0.5 Decay Heat b.e Refer to Section Lower segment Removal Coolers 2.4.2.2d wt. = 12.62 kips E260A Upper segment and O
wt. = 7.26 kips E260B 4
O O
NOTES:
() Hazard Elimination Categories a.
Crane travel for this area / load combination prohibited by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops.
b.
System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of O
system to perform its safety-related function following this load drop in this area, c.
Site-specific c;.. iderations eliminate the need to consider load /
equipment combination, d.
Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely
.g small (i.e. section 5.1.6 Nt! REG-0612 satisfied).
e.
Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not damage safety-related equipment.
(2) Bechtel Corporation Drawing No. M-303, Sheet 7 (Reference 3)
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D Page 4 l
l TABLE 2.4-1 D
j Load / Impact Area Matrix For Evaluating Consequences of Postulated Drop of Heavy Loads Crane: Auxiliary Building Monorail A-1 Location: Auxiliary Building D
Impact Between Column Lines L-N and 8.7 - 10.3 Area Remarks Impact Drop Safety-Related Hazard Elimination Loads Elevation Ht.
Component Category (ft)
(ft) i D
Floor Plug No. 6 0' - 0" 0.5 High Pressure t,,e Refer to Section l
Injection Pump 2.4.2.2.e P-238A l
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D NOTES:
(1) Hazard Elimination Categories a.
Crane travel for this area / load combination prohibited by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops, b.
System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of D
system to perform its safety-related function following this load l
drop in this area.
I c.
Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider load /
equipment combination.
d.
Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely 3
small (i.e. section 5.1.6 NUREG-0612 satisfied).
e.
Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not Jamage safety-related equipment.
(2) Bechtel Corporation Drawing No. M-303, Sheet 7 (Reference 3) 3 1
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Pags 5 TABLE 2.4-1 O
Load / Impact rea Matrix For Evaluating Consequences of Postulated Drop of Heavy Loads Crane: Auxiliary Building Monorail A-1 Location: Auxiliary Building 9
Impact Between Column Lines T-V and 9.7 - 10.3 Area Remarks Impact Drop Sa fety-Rela ted Hazard Elimination Loads Elevation Ht.
Component Category (ft)
(ft)
O Floor Plugs O'.0" 0.5 High-Pressure b,e Refer to Section No. 3/4 Injection Pump 2.4.2.2f wt. = 13.37 kips P238B and Make-up Pump O
P-236 O
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O NOTES:
(1) Hazard Elimination Categories a.
Crane travel for this 3rea/ load cc:nbination prohibited by electrical interlocks or trechano il stops, b.
System redunhcy a,'. separation precludes loss of capability of O
system to perform tes safety-related function following this load drop in this area.
c.
Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider load /
equipment combination.
d.
Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely g
small (i.e. section 5.1.6 NUREG-0612 satisfied).
e.
Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not damage safety-related equipment.
(2) Bechtel Corporation Drawing No. M-303, Sheet 7 (Reference 3)
O J
O QUAD-1-81-868 3.0 REFERENCE 5 l
D 1.
Letter dated 12/22/80 fro $NuclearRegulatoryCommissiontoall licensees of Operating Plants.
2.
NUREG-0612, Controi of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, USNRC, O
July 1980.
3.
Bechtel Corporation Drawing No. M-303, sheet 7.
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