ML20039B011
| ML20039B011 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 10/08/1981 |
| From: | Vosbury F Franklin Research Ctr, Franklin Institute |
| To: | Clemenson F NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039B006 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-03-79-118, CON-NRC-3-79-118 TAC-08079, TAC-8079, TER-C5257-114, NUDOCS 8112220174 | |
| Download: ML20039B011 (29) | |
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TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS SACRAliENTO liUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 2nn mwmeasuev-mm :.,
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' NRC DOCKET NO. 50-312 FRC PROJECT CE:57 NRC TAC NO. 08079 FRC ASS 3GNMENT 3 g NRC CCNTRACT NO. N RC-03-79-118 FAC TAS K 114 Prepared by Franklin Research Center Author: F. Vosburf The Parkway at Twentieth Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader:
I. H. Sargenc Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Comrnission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer:
F. Clemenson i
,t October 3, 1981 i
This report was prepared as an account of work soonsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal i
liacility or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third I
party would not infringe privately owned rights.
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CONTENTS Section Title Page 1
INTPCDUCTICN.
1 1.1 Purpose of Peview 1
1.2 Generic 3ackground.
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- 1. 3 Plant-Specific Background 2
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- "/ALUATICN AND RECOMMENOATICNS 4
2.1 General Guidelines.
4 2.2 Interim Protection Measures.
19 1
I 3
CONCLUDING
SUMMARY
22 3.1 General Provisions for Lead Handling 22 3.2 Interim Protection 25 3.3 Su= mary.
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FIFDENCES 27 X,%
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INRCDUCTION t
i 1.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEW This technical evaluation report documents the Franklin Research Center (FRC) review of general load handling policy and prrcedures at the Sacramento Municipal Utility District's (SMUD) Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station.
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This evaluation was performed with the following cbjectives:
to assess conformance to the general lead handling guidelines of o
l NCREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Leads at Nuclear power Plants" [1],
t Section 5.1.1 o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of NCREO-0612, Section 5.3.
a 1.2 GEhERIC BACKGRCUNC Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear pcwer plants to assure the safe handling of heavy leads and to recc= mend necessary changes in these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 (2) to all power reactor licensees, requesting information concerning the control of heavy leads near spent fuel.
The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants."
The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control tne handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of lead handling accidents and should be upgraded.
In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy leads, the staff developed a series of cuidelines designed to achieve a twc-part cbjective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first portion of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in
%' REG-0612, Article 5.1.1, is to ensure that all lead handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their probability of 4 Nd Franklin Research Center A Centen af *he Frenamn momane
l TER-C5 257-ll4 failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through cuidelines identified in NURIG-0612, Articles 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in l
addition to these required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of Icad-handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small.
Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NURIG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.
The approach used to develop the staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a lead drop was based on defense in depth and is summarized as follcws:
1.
provide sufficient cperator training, handling system design, 1 cad handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable cperation of the handling system 2.
define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy leads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdewn equipment 3.
provide mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to prevent movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or in pecximity to equipment associated with redundant shutdown paths.
Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 reconraended that a program be
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initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.
i 1.3 PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGRCUND Cn December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter (3) to the SMUD, the L,1censee for the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, requesting that the Licensee review the provisions for handling and control of heavy leads at the Rancho Seco plant, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of
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i TER-C5 25 7-114 NUREG- 0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these cuidelines.
On June 23, 1981, SMUD provided the initial response [4] to this reTaest.
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TER-C5 25 7-ll4 2.
EVAL"ATION AND RECCM.MENCATICNS FRC's evaluation of load handling at the Rancho Seco plant is divided into two categories. These categories deal separately with the general guidelines of NUREG-0512 Article 5.1.1 and the staff reccmmendatiens for interim protection, p+nding complete implementation of the guidelines of
?." JIG-0 612 (NUF2G-0 612, Article 5. 3). Applicable guidelines are referenced i:.
each category.
FPC's conclusion and recommendations are provided in the summary for each guideline.
2.1 GENERAL GUIEELINES The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy leads.
These guidelines consist of the follcwing criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:
o Guideline 1 - Safe Load paths o Guideline 2 - Load Randling Procedures o Guideline 3 - Crane Cperator's Training o Guideline 4 - Special Lif ting Devices o Guideline 5 - Lif ting Devices (not specially designed) o Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) o Guideline 7 - Crane Design.
These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhead handling l
systems and programs in order to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the r
reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas wnere a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems.
The Licensee's verification of the extent to which these seven guidelines have been satisfied and FRC's evaluation of this verification are contained in the succeeding paragraphs.
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TER-C5257-114 2.1.1 Overhead Heavv Load Handline Svstems The Licensee's review of overhead handling systems identified the following cranes and hoists which handle heavy leads in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or safe shutdcwn equipment:
o reactor building polar crane o turbine building gantry crane.
The Licensee also indicated that four cranes could be excluded frcm satisfying the requirement of NUREG-0612 as follows:
o the two monorail hoists in t.5-auxiliary building because a floor slab separates the sevements of heavy loads from safe shutdcwn equipment.
o the jib crane in the reactor building because it handles a heavy load ever the cere; however, the Licensee is installing mechanical and/or electric interlocks to prevent inadvertent mcvement ever the core.
o the stcp log hoist in the spent fuel building because the Licensee will upgrade or replace the hoist.
_rPC does not concur with these exclusions.
The intent of the application of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.1 to nuclear pcwer plant cranes was to ensure that all cranes, the failure of which could conceivably damage either spent fuel or safe shutdown equipment, are designed and operated in accordance with accepted industrial standards.
The only cranes intended to i
be exempt from these requirements were those that obvicusly could not result in such damage (e.g., cranes located in areas remote to spent fuel or safe shutdcwn equipment). While analysis of intervening barriers or the use of i
i nterlocks to prevent crane travel in the vicinity of spent fuel or safe l'
shutdewn equipment is expected to provide an acceptable basis for not requiring additional design features (i.e.,
folicwing the guidance of NUREG-0612 A rticles 5.1. 2 and 5.1. 3), such actions do not exempt a crane from the general guidelines.
The jib crane, step log hoist, and the two menorail hoists should be included with the polar and gantry cranes in the Licensee's respense to SUREG-0612.
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TER-C5257-114 2.1.2 Safe Lead Paths !Cuideline 1, NL*RY -0612, Article 5.1. l f 1) [
"Saf e lead paths should be defined for the mcvement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy leads, if d:cpped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural ficer members, beams, etc., such that if the load is d:cpped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in precedures, shcwn en equipment laycut drawings, and
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clearly marked en the floor in the area where the lead is to be hi.ndled.
Leviatiens fren defined 1 cad paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."
a.
Summarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusiens The Licensee stated that load paths for heavy leads handled by the polar crane, gantry crane, and auxiliary building monorail heists are identified in gereral arrangement drawings. Ecwever, the lead paths are not explicitly stated in the cperating procedures.
b.
FFC Evaluation Althcugh lead paths are addressed in the Licensee's response, the Licensee does not state whether the basic intent of this guideline, establish-ment of safe lead paths, has been accomplished for heavy loads at the Rancho seco plant.
No information has been provided in the Licensee's response to verify tha t the folicwing criteria have been satisfied:
1.
Icad paths have been selected to folicw, to the extent practical, j
structural ficor members and beams 2.
lead paths are clearly marked on the floor 3.
deviations frem established 1 cad paths require written alternatives approved by the plant safety review committee.
The Licensee states that the load paths for movement of heavy loads have i
not been explicitly stated in the operating procedures.
The Licensee complies with the requirement to have safe load paths shown en equipment layout drawings.
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FRC Conclusion and Recemrendations The Rancho Seco plant does not comply with Guideline 1.
The Licensee should develop safe lead paths that meet the criteria of this guideline (i.e.,
1 cad paths are defined in procedures, folicw structural floor members, and are clearly marked; deviations are properly centrolled) for heavy leads handled by the overhead handling systems identified by FRC.
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The Licensee meets the criterien of having the lead paths for the polar and gantry cranes defined in the general arrangement drawings.
2.1.3 Load Randlinc Procedures [ Guideline 2, SUREG-0612, A rticle 5.1. l( 21 )
" Procedures should be develcped to cover lead handling.cperations for heavy loads that are or could be handled evet er in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures should cover handling of those leads listed in Table 3-1 of SUREG-0612.
These procedures should include:
identification cf required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before =cvement of Icad; the steps and proper sequence to be folicwed in handling the lead; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."
a.
Summarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated:
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- Movements of heavy icads handled by the everhead handling systems are governed by approved operating procedures. These procedures provide cuidance for moving loads frem one location to another.
Even though 1 cad paths for the movements of heavy loads have not been explicitly defined in these operating procedures, the load paths identified in the general arrangement drawings are the safest and in general the shortest routes.
4 "These procedures, in general, include sections such as Purpose, References, Limitations and Precautions, Special Tools and Equipment, Testing and Acceptance Criteria, Procedures, Checklists, and meet the requirements of Section 5.1.l(2) of NUREG-0612.
"All movements of heavy leads are performed by qualified operators who are supervised by experienced foremen.
- Adherence of these experienced personnel to the operating procedures ensures that the movements of heavy loads follow the safest path possible."
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PRC Evaluation Lead handling precedures used by the Rancho Seco plant pcrtially satisfy the criteria of Guideline 2 based on the Licensee's verification that its peccedures comply with NUREG-0612 Secticn 5.1. l(2), with the exception that saf e lead ;aths are not defined in the procedures. The use of operators and supervisors to determine the correct safe lead paths does not =eet the intent of Guideline 2.
c.
FRC Conclusion and Recommendation The Rancho Seco plant partially complies with the criteria of Guideline 2 with the exceptien that safe load paths are not defined in the procedures.
In order to fully comply with this guideline, the Licensee shculd either define the safe load paths in its procedures for handling heavy leads or previde an appropriate alternative.
2.1.4 Crane Crerator Trainina f Gu ideline 3, 'sT320-0612, Article 5.1.1(311
" Crane cperatcrs shculd be trained, cualified and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANS: 330.2-1976 ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [51."
a.
Sum.marv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee states, "A training program has been developed in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI 330.2-1976.
Additionally, an administrative guideline delineating the control of operator training has been developed for inplementation. This action is considered adequate and meets the intent of i
Section 5.1. l( 3) of NUREG-0612, of the training, qualification, and conduct of crane operators.*
b.
FFC Evaluation Administrative procedures have been developed to ensure that crane operators are trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with 9
Guideline 3.
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FRC Ccnclusion and Recc==endations 1
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The Rancho Seco plant ccmplies.with the criteria of Guideline 3 for those 4
handling systems identified. The Licensee should ensure that, upon the implementation of this administrative guideline, readily auditable records of crane cperator qualification, training, and ccnduct are available for inspecticn by the NRC.
2.1.5 Scecial Liftino Cevices (Guideline 4, NCREG-0612, Article 5.1.l(4)1 "Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lifting Oevices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 ?ounds (4500 kg) or More fcr Nuclear Materials' (6).
This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry i
heavy loads in areas as defined abcve.
For cperating. plants certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material
- equirements in the standard.
In additien, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 shculd be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used.
This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the 4
stress design factor en cnly the weight (static load) of the load and of the intervening ce=penents of the special handling device."
a.
Summarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Rancho Seco plant's lifting devices were designed to industry 1
i standards which were applicable at the time the devices were procured and which used iced engineering practice.
The Licensee made the folicwing statements concerning lifting devices:
"Within the time f rame allcwed, all of these lifting devices.could not be reviewed for compliance with the applicable requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 or ANSI 330.9-17971.
Further evaluation is under way.
Ecwever, these devices are proof tested before actually being used and are periodically lead-tested and inspected in accordance with approved written procedures.
J' "The lifting devices used with the Polar Crane were evaluated to determine their adequacy in accordance with the applicable sections of ANSI N14.6-1978 or ANSI 330.9-1971.
In this evaluation, a dynamic loading factor of 1.25 was used which is consistent with the previous evaluation reported in amendment 15, appendix 9A of the FSAR.
Evaluation l
results showed that the lif ting devices satisfy the ANSI stress criteria except that the evaluation of the Internals Handling Extension is under way.
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TER-CS 2S 7-ll 4 The Licensee stated that the requirement for doubling of the stress design factors per Section 6 of ANSI N14.6 was not considered justified for the follcwing reasons:
"a.
Fer conventional structural and stress analysis of tension members, a safety-margin of 1.5 is typically used, which is equivalent to using a stress design factor of 1.5.
Unless the uncertainties of the load, the material, and the analyses ce thod are extreme, the use of a very high stress design factor does not increase the real margin of safety.
- b.
Lif ting devices used in Rancho Seco Plant undergo periedic inspec-tien and lead test.
This reduces the uncertainties significantly and should enable the use of lower stress design factors."
b.
FRC Evaluation The ?.ancho Seco plant satisfies the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978 Section 5 (Acceptance Testing and Assurance of Continued Compliance) based upon verifi-cation by the Licensee that the requirements are met.
The plant satisfies the criteria of ANSI N14.6, Section 3.2 (Design Criteria), for the lif ting devices associated with the polar crane.
The Licensee did not provide sufficient information to determine if the Rancho Seco plant's special lif ting devices meet the criteria of Section 3.1 (Designer 's Responsibilities) and Section 3.3 (Design Considerations) of ANSI N14. 6-19 7 8.
,FRC concurs with the Licensee's response to ANSI N14.6 Section 6 (Special Lifting Devices for Critical Loads). Section 6 need not be addressed pending completion of analysis and determination of specific " critical loads" at the Rancho Seco plant.
c.
FRC Conclusiens and Recommendations The Rancho Seco plant does not comply with the criteria of Guideline 4.
To comply fully wiLh Guideline 4, the Licensee should verify that all of the Rancho Seco plant's special lif ting devices comply with the criteria of Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 of ANSI N14.6 prior to their next use. ['h-Franklin Research Center w.as vm u.
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t TER-CS257-ll4 2.1.6 Lifting Devices (not specially designed) fGuideline 5, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.l(5)]
" Lifting devices that are not specially designed shculd be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI 330.9-1971, ' Slings' [7].
Ecwever, in selecting the proper sling, the lead used should be the sum ofthe static and maximum dynamic icad.
The rating identified cn the sling should be in terms of the ' static lead' -hich prcduces the maximc=
static and dynamic icad.
Where this restricts slings to use en enly certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with wnich they may be used."
a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions
" Lifting devices were designed according to industry standards -hich were applicable at the time these were procured and using goed engineering practice. Within the tire frame allowed, all of these lifting devices could not be reviewed for ccepliance with the applicable requirements of ANS I N14. 6-19 78 or ANSI 330.9-1971.
Further evaluation is under way.
However, these devices are proof-tested before actually used and are periodically lead-tested and inspected in accordance with approved written procedures.
Thus, even though evaluations of these devices per ANSI N14.6-1976 or ANSI 330.9-1971 are not cceplete, SMUD considers these to be safe.
"These lif ting devices used with the Polar Crane were evaluated to determine their adequacy in accordance with the applicable sections of ANSI N14.6-1978 and ANSI 330.9-1971.
In this evaluation, a dynamic load-ing f actor of 1.25 was used which is consistent with the previous evalua-tien reported in amendment 15, appendix 9A of the FSAR.
Evaluaticn results shcwed that the lif ting devices satisfy the ANSI stress criteria s
except that the evaluation of the I.iternals Handling Extension is ur. der way."
b.
FRC Evaluation The Licensee does not address the methcd for selecting a pecper sling for use, sling rating, or marking of slings restricted to certain cranes.
i c.
FRC Conclusions and Peccerendatiens The Rancho Seco plant does not comply with the criteria of Guideline 5.
In order to meet full ccmpliance, the Licensee should verify that slings used to handle heavy leads in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment conform to the criteria of ANSI 330.9-1971.
In addition, the Licensee should ensure that:
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sling selection is based upon the sum of the static and maximum dynamic leads 2.
slings are marked with the " static lead" which produces the nAximum static and maximum dynamic load 3.
slings restricted in use to only certain cranes are clearly marked to so indicate.
2.1.7 Cranes (Inscection, Testina, and Maintenance) rGuideline 6, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.l(61)
"The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI 330.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the f requencies of ANSI 330. 2 for periedic inspection and test, or where f requency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test f requency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 13 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI 330.2, hewever, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly.
For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance should be performed prior to their
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use). "
a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Crane inspeccion, testing, maintenance, and surveillance procsdures have been developed on the basis of the requirements of ANSI 330.2-1976, Chapter 2-2.
b.
FRC Evaluation The Licensee has stated that the inspection, testing, and maintenance t
programs were developed on the basis of ANSI 330.2-1976; hewever, the Licensee did not verify that all the criteria of ANSI 330.2 chapter 2-2 have been incorporated into the Rancho Seco plant's crane inspection, testing, and maintenance program.
c.
FRC Conclusions and Recommendations The Rancho Seco plant partially satisfies the criteria of Guideline 6.
In Order to fully comply, the Licensee should conduct a point-by-point review of l
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6 TLR-C5 25 7-114 ANSI 33 0. 2-1976 and the Rancho Seco plant's crane inspection, testing, and maintenance program.
If the Rancho Seco program dces not meet the above criteria, the Licensee should implement the requirements of ANSI 330.2 and eport satisfactory compliance with this guideline to the TRC.
If t..a Licensee can eerify that the current crane inspection, testing, and maintenance program meets the above criteria, the Licensee shculd make the applicable documentation readily available to the NRC for review.
2.1.8 Crane Cesien { Guideline 7, NUREG-0 612, Article 5.1. l (711 "The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI 330.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' [ 3]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI 330.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific ccmpliance if the intent of the specificatien is satisfied."
a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions "The cranes listed in Table 3-1 were designed in accordance with industry standards which were applicable at the time these were procured. The polar Crane and the Gantry Crane were designed according to ECCI and AISC specifications and USAS 330.2 standard. The design specificatien of
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these cranes were reviewed for compliance with the applicable guidelines of CMAA specification 70.
The review result showed that the cranes l
satisfy the general guidelines of CMAA specification 70 which are l
applicable for evaluating the potential for heavy lead drop."
t i i b.
FRC Evaluation l
The cranes at the Rancho Seco plant substantially satisfy the criteria of i
Guideline 7, since the cranes were precured in accordance sith industry l
standards at the time.
Rowever, SMUD did not specifically address any of the l
l more restrictive design requirements imposed by CMAA-70, which could affect l
the crane's ability to handle a heavy load safely.
FRC has compared those requirements against the recommendations of CMAA-70 and identified several areas where revisions incorporated into CMAA-70 l
may affect crane safety. The Licensee should evaluate these areas to 1
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TER-C5 25 7-114 determine whether the intent of NUEEC-0612 is satisfied. The following issues shculd be addressed in the Licensee's review.
1.
Imcact allowance.
CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.1.3 requires that crane design calculations include an impact allcwance of 0.5% of the lead per foot per minute of heisting speed but not less than 15%.
ICC:-61 s ecifies cnly a minimum allcwance of 151.
Consequently, for cranes with hoist speeds in excess of 30 feet per minute, it is possible that the impact allewance applied under ECCI-61 will be less than that required by CMAA-70.
This variation is not expected to be of consequence for the overhead cranes subject to this review since these cranes, in general, operate with hoist speeds belcw 30 feet per minute, mest ccmmonly in the range of 3 to 10 feet per minute.
2.
Tors io~nal ferees.
CMAA-70, Article 3. 3. 2.1.3 :equ ir es that twisting mcments due to overhanging leads and lateral forces acting eccentric to the hori: ental neutral axis of a girder be calculated on the basis of the distance between the center of gravity of the lead, or force center line, and the girder shear center measured normal to the fetce rector. ECCI-61 states that such rements are to be calculated with reference to girder center of gravity.
For girder sections symnetrical about each principal central axis (e.g., box section or :-beam girders ccmmonly used in cranes subject to this review), the shear center coincices with the centroid of the girder section and there is no difference betweer the two requirements.
Such is not the case for nonsymme-trical girder sections (e.g., channels).
3.
Lenaitudinal s' _i, 'feners.
CMAA-70, Article 3. 3.3.1 specifies (1) the maximum allcwable web depth / thickness (h/t) ratio for box girders using longitudinal stiffeners and (2) requirements concerning the location and minimun moment of inertia for such stif feners. ICCI-61 allows the use of longitudinal stiffeners but provides no similar guidance. Requirements of CMAA-70 represent a codification of girder design practice and they are expected to be equivalent to design standardo empicyed in cranes built to EOC:-61 specifications.
4.
Allowable comoressive stress.
CMAA-70, Article 3. 3. 3.1. 3 identifies allowable compressive stresses of approximately 50% of yield strength of the
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i' TER-C5 25 7-114 recommerded structural material (A-36) for girders where the ratio of the distance between web plates to the thickness of the tcp cover plate (b/c ratio) is less than or equal to 38.
Allowable compressive stresses decrease t
linearly for b/c ratics in excess of 38.
ECCI-61 provides a similar method for calculating allewable ccepressive stresses except that the allcwable stress decreases f:cm app cximately 50% of yield only af ter the b/c ratio exceeds 41.
Consequently, structural members with b/c ratics in the general
- ange of 38 to 52 designed under EOCI-61 will allev a slightly higher i
ccmpressive stress than these designed under CMAA-70.
This variation is not i
expected to be of consequence for cranes subject to this review since b/c ratics of structural members are expected to be less than 38.
5.
Faticue censiderations.
CMAA-70, Ar ticle 3. 3. 3.1. 3 prevides s;cbstantial guidance with respect to fatigue failure by indicating allewable stress ranges for varicus structural members in joints under repeated leads.
IOCI-616ces not address fatigue failure. The requirements of CMAA-70 are not expected to be of censequence for cra cr subject to this. review since the cranes are not generally subjected to frequent leads at ce near design conditions (CMAA-70 provides allcwable stress ranges for leading cycles in excess of 20,000) and are not generally subjected to stress reversal (C!AA-70 allewable stress range is reduced to belcw the basic allewable stress for enly a limited number of joint configurations).
6.
Heist rece recuirements.
CMAA-70, Article 4.2.1 requires that the capacity load plus the bettem block divided by the number of parts of ecpe not exceed 20% of the published :cpe breaking strength.
IOC -61 requires that the rated capacity lead divided by the number of parts of :cpe not exceed 20% of l
the published :cpe breaking strength. The effect of this variation en crane i
Iety margins depends en the ratio of the weights of the lead block and the est ed load.
i 7.
Drum desien.
CMAA-70, Article 4.4.1 requires that the drum be designed to withstand combined crushing and bending leads. EOCI-61 requires only that the d:cm be designed to withstand maximu= icad bending and crushing leads with no stipulation that these leads be combined. This variation is not expected to be of consequence since the requirements of CMAA-70 represent the A MU Franklin Research Center so m urm m
TIR-C5257-114 codification of good engineering practice which should have been incorporated in cranes built to ICCL-61 specifications although a specific requirement was not contained in ICCI-61.
B.
Drum design.
CHAA-70, Article 4.4.3 provides recemnended drum grcove depth and pitch.
EOC!-61 provides no similar guidance. The recemnendatic.is in CHAA-70 constitute a ccdificatien of good engineering practice with regard to reeving stability and reducticn of rope wear and are not expected to differ substantially frem practices empicyed in the design of cranes subject to this review and built to ICCI-61 specifications.
9.
Gear design.
CMAA-70, Article 4.5 requires that gearing hctsepewer rating be based on certain American Gear Manuf acturers Association Standards and provides a method for determining allowable horsepewer.
EOCI-61 provides no similar guidance. The reccmmendations in CMAA-70 constitute a ecdification of good engineering practice for gear design and are not expected to differ substantially f cm the practices employed in the design of cranes subject te this review and built to ICCI-61 specificaticns.
10.
3ridce brake design.
CMAA-70, Article 4. 7.2. 2 requires that bridge brakes, for cranes with cab control and the cab cn the trolley, be rated at least 75% of bridge mctor torque.
ICCI-61 requires a brake rating of 50% of bridge motor torque'for similar configuratacns.
A cab-en-trolley centrol arrangement is not expected for cranes subject to this review.
11.
Hoist brake desion.
CMAA-70, Article 4.7.4.2 requires that hoist holding brakes, when used with a method of control braking other than mechanical, have torque ratings no '-te han 125% of the hoist motor torque.
ECCI-61 requires a hoist holding brake torque rating of no less than 100% of the hoist motor torque withcut regard to the type of control brake employed.
This variation is not expected to be of consequence for cranes subject to this review since mechanical 1 cad brakes were typically specified for cranes procured during the pericd when EOCI-61 was the standard. The addition of a holding brake safety margin in conjunction with electric control braking is a codification of good engineering practice. Scme manufacturers provide holding brakes rated at up to 150% of hoist motor torque when used with electrical control braking systems. !N,branklin Research Center 4 ow n. r m.%
m
i 4
TER-C5257-ll4 12.
Surcers and stcos.
CMAA-70, Article 4.12 provides substantial guidance ice the design and installation of bridge and trolley bumpers.and.
steps for cranes which cperate near the ends of bridge and trolley travel. No simila: guidance is provided in EOCI-61.
This variation is not expected to be significant for cranes subject to this review since -hese cranes are not expected to be cperated under icad at substantial bridge or trolley speed near the end of the same travel.
F'.t r the r, the guidance of CSLA-70 ccnstitutes the codification of good engineering practice that would have been used in cranes built to ECCI-61 specifications.
13.
S_tatic control systems.
CRAA-70, Article 5.4.6 provides substantial guidance for the use of static control systems.
ECCI-61 p:cvides guidance for magnetic centrol systems only. This variation is not expected to te of censequence because magnetic control systems were generally ecplcyed in cranes designed when ICCI-61 was in ef fect and the static centrol requirements identified in CMAA-70 constitute a codification of the sama gecd engineering practice that wculd have been used in the design of static control systems in cranes built to ECC!-61 specifications.
14.
Restart crotection.
CHAA-70, Article 5. 6. 2 rec.uires that cranes not
~
equippod with spring-return centrollers or cementary-contact push buttons be provided with a device that will disconnect all =ctors c.ocn.ecuer failure and.
xs will not permit any motor to be restarted until the centroller handle is
[~'
brcught to the CFF position. No similar guidance is provided in EOCI-61.
This variation is not expected tc be of consequence for cranes subject to this-review since they are generally designed with spring-return centrollers or
^
=cmenta ry-centact push buttens.
s c.
FRC Conclusiens and Recem=erdaticns s
s SMUD partially complies with the criteria of Guideline 7.
To en6cre -the ' - -.
=-
~
requirements of NUREG-0612 are met, the Licensee shculd verify that the fol10 wing conditions are satisfied for cranes subject to this review or
~!
provide alternate justification for concluding that the requirements of CHAA-70 are satisfied.
~
4 9.
b_Frankiin Research Center 4 Ca*=en as N rrer a inseam,
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e.
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i TER-CS257-ll4 1.
Hoist speeds do not exceed 30 feet per minute 2.
Nonsym:netrical girder sections were not used i
3.
Any longitudinal stif feners in use conform to the recuirements of C4AA-70, and allcwable h/t ratics in box girders using thesa stiffeners do not exceed ratics specified in CMAA-70 4.
Cirders with b/c ratics in excess of 38 were not used 5.
Fatigue f ailute was considered in crane design and the number of design loading cycles at or near rated load was less than 20,000 cycles 6.
Maximum crane-load weight- (plus the weight of the bottem block) divided 'by-number of parts of rope does not exceed 20% of :he-anufa?tur2r's published breaking strencth OrumdesigncalculabicNs.werebasedontheecmbinationofcrushing 7.
4 and bending 1 cads l
3.
Crum greeve -depth and pitch substantially conformed to the reccmmen-dations of CMAA-70 4
9.'
- nar horsepewer ratings
-sed o'n design allcwables and
-- Salculation methodology
.ient to that incorporated in CvAA-70 n
3
' l0. 'A cab-control, cab-on-trolley, configuration was not used 11.
, f, echanical lead brakes or hoist, holding brakes with torcue ratings
~
~
'3 of approximately R5% of the hoist motor torque were used l
12.
Crane operation under lead near the end 'of bridge of trolley travel
~
e is no vallowed or is compensated for by bumpers and stops which
< satisfy the intent of CeAA-70 s
~
- 13. oAny stat:c control systems in ese conform to the recuirements of
~
C4AA-70 N..
x y
- 14. _ Controllers used were of the spring-return or momentary-contact
~
I a'
"gyshbutten type, f
- + ^ JAsmprevicusly identified in Section 2.1.1 (Cverneed Heavy Icad Handling y
s
- x.,
3[stans), 90 PIG-0612 evaluations of the jib crane, stop leg hoist, and the s o
, ~
s.
=cn6clil hoiusishould be performed by the Licensee. The following general
-/
cuidyllnec,are applicaole and snould be implemented by the Licensee for each y chhese ' andling systems:
5 x-I
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TIR-C5257-114 o Gaideline 1 - Safe Load Paths o Guideline 2 - Lead Handling Frecedures s
o Guideline 3 - Crane Cperator Training o Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) o Guideline 7 - Crane Design.
~
2.2 INTERIM FROTECTICN MIASURES The NRC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented at operating r.uclear power plants to provide reascnsble assurance that no heavy icads will be handled ever the spent fuel pcol and that measures exist to reduce the potential for accidental lead drops to impact en fuel in the core or sp ent fuel pool. Four of the six interim measures of the report censist of general Guideline 1, Safe Lead Paths; Guideline 2, Load Handling precedures; Guideline 3, Crane Cperator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Mainter.ance).
The two remaining interim measures cover the follcwing criteria:
1.
Heavy lead technical specifications 2.
Special review for heavy leads handlad over the core.
Licensee implementation and evaluatien of these last two interim protection measures is contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.
2.2.1 Technical Scecifications [ Interim Protectio, Messure 1, WJREG-0612, Article 5.3(1)]
" Licenses for all cperating reactors not having a single-f ailure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification ecmparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,
' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage ? col Building,' for FWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2,
' Crane Travel,' for SWR's, to prohibit handling of heavy leads over fuel in the storage pool until implementation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1."
a.
Summarv of Licensee Statemerts and Conclusions s
None provided by the Licensee.
4 19 Jhu Franklin Research Center
%.o no rm mu,
TER-C5257-114 b.
FFC Ivaluation Rancho Seco Technical Specificatien 3.8.12 specifies that no leads are to be handled in the fuel storage area in tne spent fuel pool <.xcept the fuel assemblies themselves. This technical specificaticn satisfies the require-enes of 2nteri= Frctectics.weasure 1.
c.
FFC C:nclusiens and Recc =endatiens The Rancho Seco plant cc pl!es with the requirements of 2nterim Protection Measure 1.
2.2.2 Administrative Centrols {2nteria Frctection Mansures 2, 3,
4, and 5.
NCRIr-0612, Articles 5.3121-5.3(5)]
"Precedural or administrative-measures (including safe load paths, Icad handling precedures,. crane-cperator training, and crane inspection]...
can be accc.?plished in a shott time pericd and need not be delayed for cc=pletion cf evaluations and.medif.ications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 cf [NCEIO-C 612]."'
a.
Summa rv cf Licensee Statements and Conclusiens Sum = aries of Licensee ststements and conclusions are centained in discussicns of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1. 3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.,7.
b.
FRC Ivaluation, Cenclusions, and Feecerendations FRC's evaluations, conclusions, and reccmmendations are centsined in discussicns of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7.
2.2.3 S=ecial Reviews for Heavy Leads Cver the Core !!nterim Frctection Measure 6, NUFSO-0612, Article 5.3(6Q
- Special attentien should be given to procedures, equipment, and persennel for the. handling of heavy leads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspectien tools.
This special review should include the following for these leads:
(1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load to assure that
, IM Franklin Research Center A re.una of The Frannan m
'"E3-C 5 2 5 7-114 suf ficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise; (2) visual inspectic is of lead bearing cogonents of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the ec=ponent; (3) apprcpriate repair and replacement of defective cer penents; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been pre;erly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g.,
hand signals, conduct of cperations, and content of precedures."
3.
Sur. ary of Licensae Staterents and Ccnclusiens Ncne previded by the Licensee.
b.
F4C Ivaluation, Conclusions, and Rece =endations_
The.:ancho Seco plant dces not et-ply with Interim Protection Measure 6.
e A NOU nkJin Research Center A h ad The Fw w
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4 TER-C525 7-114 1
j 3.
CONCLUDING
SUMMARY
r This.u= mary is provided to censolidate the conclusions and recommenda-tions of Section 2 and to document FRC's overall evaluation of the handling of heavy loads at the Rancho Seco plant.
It is divided into two sections dealing with general provisions for lead htndling at nuclear power plants (NUREG-0 612, Article 5.1.1) and the staff recommendations for interim protecticn, pending ecmplete implementation of the guidelines of NUREG-0612 (NUREG-C612, Article 5.3).
In each case, recommendations for additional Licensee acticn, and additienal NRC staff acticn where appropriate, are provided.
3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FCR LCAD HANDLING J
The NAC staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for handling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, aear stored spent fuel, or in other areas where an accidental 1 cad drop could damage safe shutdewn systems. Compliance with these guidelines is necessary to ensure that load-handling system design, administrative controls, and cperator training and qualification are such that the possibility of a load drop is very small for the critical functions performed by cranes at nuclear power plants. These guidelines are partially satisfied at the Rancho Seco plant.
This cenclusion is presented in tabular form as Table 3.1.
Specific recommen-dations for achieving full compliance with these guidelines are provided as follows,:
Guideline Reecenendatien l
1 Develep safe load paths that meet the criteria of Guideline 1 (i.e., safe load paths defined, follcw structural floor members, defined in procedures, are clearly marked, and deviations are t
prope ly controlled) for heavy loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.
l 2
Revise procedures for handling heavy leads to include the safe load paths.
f, 3
[The Rancho Seco plant complies with this guideline.}
. Oh _ Franklin Research Center A ca
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a1 Table 1.3.
Heral.o Seco,%ernLG-Ghl2 n epliance Matste 3
E he lejht EU Ir.tesle teeteria os Guideline I Guideline 2 Guidelleie 3 Culdeline 4 GulJellne S Gistdeline 6 GeslJeline 2 Me e eis s e !
Me e eus e 6 h
Capecity Safe lea:t Csone bresatos specist Elftley Caane - Test s ec t.nic a l special an y Heavy toede jhL re t in e Pr oc eJu s e s Teetning _
tw v ls e s slinge en1 anapection Cs ene twelyn Egegiflgtlone Attention, tm 8
4.
New ruel 4
C NC pe; 7
HenJilog 19 n m e Cs.no inE fuel Aeoembly 0.0 NC NC tac C
4 2.
Stop le3 1.5 3
tac 3
jtg{ st 6 top two 3.5 NC ted e.C C
3.
Centay Halst 195 C
0+C nC Q a ne Aua.
)$
C tac tec Neu 3.6 faC NC g
eg Fuel Cask esc (J
0
$ rent 68 tac NC HC teC twel Cask 4.
Poler Csene ISO C
NC NC I'l e ews DC NC NC NC Assembly Closuse el teC NC teC aC MeeJ Miselle 89 NC BdC NC get bieteIJe Cloeuse ase eJ Il ra' pac HC 3.c 5es wice Sasuctuse atentet Ceek 6
tac NC ed*
peC l'
e N
Cose &opport
!!2.5 to t<C NC p.C g>
4 A s s ent,1 y Ut FJ Un
~J C = Licensee ectic,n compilee with NuHLG-otl2 sa.lJeline.
l NC = Lice.see action does not comply uitte NimLG-0642 Guidelina.
M P
8 = Inaufficient Infossation psuvided ley ttie Licensee.
-- = Not alplicable.
8 l
6 c:
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c 8 "fl O
b 3
E 6
6.5 l
9:n 4
44to 1
e6 to b
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g i st,l a 3.8 (ca t.1 n
N Neight Intes's Inteste us Guideline 1 b lJeline 2 hideline 3 GulIvatne 4 Gundeline S utdeline 6 Guldeline i Hesoure 1 Meesuse 6 Cepec i t y Este noeJ Csone eaiesatos spec i a l 1.ll t leeg Caene sent le c t.nic al special s
gevyyde
_{tys L Pathe Fruceduces Tsetning _
tw v is.e s E l lmj e end Inspection Cs ane f>e e lp Epecificatione Attention S.
J M gene 8
DC I
g n.cos e 5.3 HC DC HC Instsween-totton m
y A
Tsensfes Cask l
6.
10-Ton 10 1
HC I
n~n e!LPelst flous Fluge 0.)
HC NC HC
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heat Estlienge r 3.9 BC IC HC tamp Hotose 2.S eC HC HC 7.
}0-Ton Holst to 1
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HC 1
Floos Flugs 6.)$
HC HC 4C
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TER-C5257-ll4 Guideline Recc=mendation Verify that the remainder of the plant's lif ting devices (i.e.,
4 a.
those not associated with the polar crane) comply with Section 3.2 of ANSI 14.6-1978, b.
Verify the criteria of Sections 3.1 and 3.3 of ANSI 14.6-1978 have been satisfied.
5 a.
Verify that slings used to handle heavy leads in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment meet the criteria of ANSI 330.9-1971.
b.
Sling selection should be based upon the sum of static and maximum dynamic 1 cads, c.
Slings cheuld be marked with the " static lead" which produces the maximum static and maximum dynamic loads.
d.
Slings restricted in use to only certain cranes should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used.
6 verify that Rancho seco's crane inspectron, testing, and maintenance program complies with the criteria of ANSI 330.2-1976.
7Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI 330.2-1976.</br></br>7" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process. The Licensee should perform the review of crane design with the current standards as outlined in Section 2.1.7.
3.2 INTERIM ?RCTECTICN The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Article 5.3) that certain measures should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy leads will be performed in a safe manner until final implementation of
~
the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1 is complete.
Specified measures include the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit the handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool; compliance with Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of lead handling procedures and cperator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lif ting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to compenent s
A d0 Franklin Research Center 4 oww r,
.~.
I i
i l
TER-C5257-ll4 failure.
FRC's evaluation of information provided by the Licensee indicates j
4 that the follcwing actions are necessary to ensure that the staff's measures
]
for interim protection at the Rancho Seco plant are met:
Interim Measure Rec 0=endation 1
(The Rancho Seco plant complies with this interim protection measure.)
J l
2, 3 Implement the recomendations of Guidelines 1 i
and 2.
(The Rancho Seco plant complies with this interim protection measure.)
f 5
Implement the recc =endations of Guideline 6.
l 6
Perform the recuired review of this interim j
protection measure.
f 3.3 SUMMidtY i
NFC's general guidelines and interim protection measures of NUF20-0612 have not been fully complied with at the Rancho Seco plant.
Several of the overhead handling systems at the Rancho Seco plant were ixpreperly excluded f rom the Licensee's response to NUFIG-0612.
- he Licensee should develop l
procedures and programs to ensure these systems meet' the guidelines of l
1 l
Several programs have been implemented which comoly with staff guide-i lines: in part.cular, crane design, testing, inspection, and maintenance, and I
implementation of a technical specification to prohibit movement of handling heavy loads over the spent fuel pool. Licensee action is recuired on the remaining general guidelines and interim actions to demonstrat'e comoliance I
I with NUPEG-0612.
i j
Upon completing the implementation of the guidelines of NUPIG-0612, the l
Licensee should make available applicable documentation concerning reviews conducted or pertinent procedures for review by the NRC staff.
i l
A
- 2 6-
' Odhu FranMin Research Center
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^
TER-C5 25 7-ll4 4.
REFEPINCES 1.
NCPIO-0612, " Control of Heavy Leads at Nuclear Pcwer Plants" NRC, July 1980 2.
V.
Stello, J:. (NRC)
- etter to all Licensees
Subject:
Request for Additional Information on Control of deavJ Loads -
Near Spent Fuel NRC, 17 May 1973 3.
NRC Generic letter 81-07 to SMUD
Subject:
Request for Review of Heavy Load Handling rt Pancho Seco 22 December 1980 4.
J. J. Mattince (SMUD)
Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)
Subject Centrol of Heavy Loads Review 22 June 1981 5.
ANSI 33 0. 2-1976 "Cverhead and Gantry Cranes" 6.
ANSI N14. 5-197 8
" Standard for Special Lif ting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" 7.
ANSI 330. 9-1971
" Slings" 8.
CMAA-70
" Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes"
,e UUU Franklin Research Center 4%wwre