Text

Requests Addl Info Re Accident Resulting from Turbine Failure That Occurred on 931225
	ML20029D890
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	03/21/1994
From:	Dingell J; HOUSE OF REP.
To:	Selin I, The Chairman; NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
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ML19304C139	List: ML20029D861; ML20029D890; ML20029E437;
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Eashington, BE 20m-6116 March 21, 1994 Dr. Ivan Selin Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

Dear Chairman Selin:

As you know, an accident resulting from a turbine failure occurred at Detroit Edison Company's Fermi II Plant on December 25, 1993.

I was pleased to learn from the February 7, 1994 final Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) report on the incident (Docket Number 50-341) that the safety related/ safe shutdown equipment performed properly and that the NRC determined that the event ultimately posed no threat to public health and safety.

However, I am troubled by a number of events surrounding the incident and would appreciate your assistance in answering the following questions:

1.

According to a Preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual Occurrence Dated December 30, 1993, from the Region III NRC office on December 28, 1993 ( PNO-III-93 -6 9), Detroit Edison was to submit its investigation of the review of the incident to the NRC.

Was this submittal completed?

If so, has the NRC reviewed-it and what were the findings?

2.

The AIT report states that a inspector from the turbine manufacturer approved turbine blade #27 under the condition that it be changed at a scheduled refueling in September, 1992.

Instead, Detroit Edison decided to delay blade replacement for another cycle, until March of 1994.

Has Detroit Edison offered an explanation for that decision to the NRC?

Did the NRC concur with that determination?

Was Detroit Edison in violation of NRC rules or an agreement with the turbine manufacturer when it decided to not replace the blades in 1992?

3.

The AIT report states that when the turbine manufacturer was informed of Detroit Edison's decision to not replace the blade in question, it requested that an inspection be performed during the September 1992 outage.

Was the inspection required for (7405l>6D(D 2p %

D Dr. Ivan Selin Page 2 operation?

Did Detroit Edison perform the inspection?

If so, in your opinion was the inspection adequate?

4.

According to the chronology of events in the AIT report, Detroit Edison first identified problems with the turbine blades during a routine outage in September 1989.

Further, the AIT report states that at the time of the accident, the plant was operating at 93% power because Detroit Edison had identified t

problems with the turbine.

Detroit Edison clearly was aware that j

there was some difficulty with the turbine.

Why di.d the company not address the problem and replace the blade?

In your l

assessment, could the accident have been avoided if the blade had been replaced?

5.

The AIT report states that "the root cause of this event and the full extent of damage to the turbine-generator system has not been determined."

Since that document was prepared, has the NRC l

determined the cause of the turbine-generator damage and the l

incident?

Has Detroit Edison Company?

j 6.

I further understand that the NRC is awaiting a response from Detroit Edison Company on questions raised by the NRC in the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL-3-93-018).

I would like to receive a copy of that response when it is prepared and sould like to know what action, if any, the NRC decides to take as a result.

Based on the findings of the AIT report or other material is the NRC examining the incident for possible violations?

Additionally, please send me all relevant material on this accident, including but not limited to:

any interim reports prepared by the NRC; any correspondence between the manufacturer of the blades and Detroit Edison; and.ny correspondence between the NRC and Detroit Edison in which the accident or the initial discovery of turbine blade damage was discussed.

J I would appreciate your prompt response to the issues and questions raised in this correspondence.

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Lisa M.

Kountcupes of my staff at M**

225-2927.

Thank you for your attention to this matter ncerel l

l Johr. D. Dingell Chairman Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations l

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ENCLOSURE B ENCLOSURES 1-18 IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION 7 Enclosure

1. Director highlight reports to NRC management related to the event

2. Licensee event report 93-014 of January 24,1994

3. Licensee event report 93-015 of January 25,1994

4. Slides used in the staff's weekly events briefing of January 5,1994

5. Slides used in Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards briefing on March 11,1994

6. Records of reportable events 26536,26540,26709 and 27056

7. January 4,1994, special report from the licensee

8. February 4,1994, Hopper and Associates report to Detroit Edison on the turbine failure i

9. Licensee's recovery plan

10. Letter from the turbine manufacturer (GEC ALSTHOM) to the licensee dated February 21,1992

11. Letter from GEC ALSTHOM to the licensee dated January 10, 1994 (proprietary)

12. Letter from GEC ALSTHOM to the licensee dated January 14, 1994 (proprietary)

13. Licensee procedure 35.109.005, Revision 21

14. Related work request D739920312

15. April 14,1991, record of the LP3 eighth stage blade inspection data L

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16. March 27,1993, letter from the licensee to the turbine manufacturer

17. NRC inspection report 50-341/93028 dated February 24,1994

18. NRC inspection report 50-341/94004 dated March 18,1994 t

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DD DIRECTOR'S HIGHLIGHT PROJECT DIRECTORATE 111-1 DECEMBER 29. 1993 Fermi-2 On December 25, 1993, the unit experienced a catastrophic failure of the main turbine. A turbine trip followed by a reactor trip occurred. All safety systems were operable; however, when placing division 2 of shutdown cooling in service, the B recirculation pump loop discharge valve failed to indicate fully closed. There appeared to be possible blading or other component failure in the area of the third stage low pressure turbine.

There was extensive damage to the exciter, the main condenser tubing, the generator, the turbine casing and several coolant supply line, lube oil line and other secondary side equipment. The licensee declared an ALERT due to a small fire which began in the vicinity of the brushes of the main turbine generator.

The fire was quickly extinguished.

There were no injuries or radioactive releases associated with this event.

In addition to the extensive damage and potential fire hazards associated with the oil / water residue, high conductivity (180 micro mhos peak) in the reactor is a concern. A Commisioners' Assistant briefing was conducted at 8 PM on the 25th by Mr. Greenman of Region III.

The Project Manager and Assistant Director for Region III Projects participated.

The plant is currently in cold shutdown, and is being cooled via division 1 of shutdown cooling.

The licensee has stationed additional fire watches to augment their fire protection detection system and is proceeding to reduce the high conductivity in the reactor (currently 114 micro mhos). The drywell is being deinerted in preparation for entry to inspect the B recirculation pump discharge valve.

An Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) has been formed (Ron Gardner, Region III as team leader) and the team leader and some team members are onsite. Region III issued a confirmatory action letter (CAL) on December 28, 1993, to alert the licensee of the AIT and to ensure in-situ quarantining of the area. The AIT charter will be issued later today. The remainder of the AIT team plans to be onsite January 10, 1994. The licensee is proceeding slowly and deliberately to develop a course of action for assessment of damage and investigation of the root cause of the event.

Three headquarters personnel are on the AIT.

Contact:

T. Colburn 1

504-1341 l

1

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e PM PD AD DD DIRECTOR'S HIGHLIGHT PROJECT DIRECTORATE III-1 JANUARY 4. 1994 Fe rmi-2 i

This is an update to the December 29, 1993 Director Highlight. Messrs.

Ed Greenman and Jack Martin visited the Fermi site on January 4, 1994.

Mr. Martin also held a press conference at 2:30 PM that afternoon at the site.

The AIT leader, Mr. Ron Gardner has been onsite with selected Region III support personnel to conduct interviews and begin the AIT assessment of the licensee's root cause investigation and recovery planning prior to the arrival of the full A!T team on January 10, 1994.

Messrs. Colburn, Stang and Ornstein from HQ will be on site Wednesday and Thursday (January 5-6) to assist the team leader.

Contact:

T. Colburn 504-1341 1

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I PM PD AD l.

i DIRECTOR'S HIGHLIGHT j

PROJECT DIRECTORATE 111-1 2

JANUARY 11. 1994

[grmi-2 This is an update-to the December 29, 1993 Director Highlight. The reactor is J

being cooled via the Division I loop of shutdown cooling.

There is still a large quantity of oil and water in the Radwaste and Turbine Building basements.

The FSAR Chapter 15 analysis for a seismic event concludes.that if a seismic event were to occur, the activity at the Monroe water intake structure would be 3E-3 of the maximum permissable concentration (MPC). The 4

j licensee has recalculated the results for the volume and activity of water if the event were to occur today and the results approach 6E-2 MPC.

The licensee

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is evaluating the potential for water to seep _into the ground water system, 4

The turbine vendor, English Electric, has also performed an analysis indicating that there may be potential hydrogan pockets in the generator which could ignite.

The licensee is currently trying to restore their C02 system in order to purge the generator prior to allowing access to the immediate generator vicinity. The licensee will be entering the hotwell of the main condenser to remove debris and prepare for transfer of Radwaste Building basement water to the hotwell.

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An additional problem arose with reactor coolant conductivity cleanup efforts.

J The licensee had estimated that it would take about 2 weeks to reach the administrative limit of 2R/hr. contact dose reading on the portable l

demineralizers in use to restore conductivity.

The limit was exceeded (2.2R/hr. contact) during the first 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of operation. The licensee has temporarily suspended the cleanup operation until they can investigate j

further.

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The full AIT team arrived onsite lionday, January 10, 1993. They are continuing to monitor the licenst.e's actions for water management and 4

investigation of the event.

A aember of the Michigan Public Service Commission is onsite to observe.

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Contact:

T. Colburn 504-1341 i

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PM

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AD DD RIRECTOR'S HIGHLIGHT PROJECT DIRECTORATE III-1 dANUARY 26. 1994 Fermi-2 A public exit meeting of the Fermi AIT inspection was held onsite in the Nuclear Orerations Center at 1:00 PM on Wednesday, January 19, 1994.

Several members of the public and media were in attendance.

Preliminary team findings indicated that while the sequence of events resulted in severe damage to the i

turbine, generator and exciter, there was no serious threat to public health l

and safety. Overall, the plant operators responded properly to a challenging event which included fire in the turbine building.

There were no immediate precursors which could have signaled a pending turbine failure and the turbine failure does not appear to be the result of.a grid disturbance or an overspeed condition.

Early liquid releases were not radioactive and gaseous releases (mostly steam and smoke through the turbine building roof vents) were within i

allowable parameters. The root cause of the event has not yet been determined, and the NRC is continuing to monitor the progress and results of the licensee's investigation.

Some weaknesses in offsite notification, personnel accountability, and firefighting were observed.

Some procedural deficiencies were also noted.

The licensee committed to followup on these issues. NRC opening and closing remarks were provided by Mr. Edward Greenman of Region III.

The team leader, Mr. Ron Gardner, assisted by other team members, presented team findings and l

were available for public questions. Mr. Jack Martin, Region III Administrator, and various other NRR and Region III personnel were in attendance.

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Contact:

T. Colburn 504-1341

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PM PD AD DD l

DIRECTOR'S HIGHLIGHT l

PROJECT DIRECTORATE III-l fgbruary 2. 1994 Fermi-2 i

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Last week, Fermi 2 experienced a 57 minute loss of shutdown cooling and a 20 minute fire in an elevator shaft. Neither had adverse safety consequences.

On January 27, 1994, at 1:05 PM, a loss of offsite power to Division I l

occurred causing a loss of the Division I reactor protection system (RPS) motor-generator (MG) set resulting in a Group IV isolation signal and a loss of shutdown cooling. The inboard suction valve for shutdown cooling closes as part of the Group IV isolation. The area had been experiencing an ice storm with freezing rain at the time.

Shutdown cooling was restored after 57 minutes by restoring power to the RPS MG set, clearing isolations and filling / venting the RHR pump in service for shutdown cooling. The RCS temperature increased 15 degrees F during this time.

Fermi's Group IV l

isolation scheme is a generic BWR design.

l On January 29, 1994, at 6:54 AM, a fire occurred in the turbine building passenger elevator shaft. The fire was extinguished at 7:14 AM by the

)

licensee's onsite fire brigade.

The licensee declared an Unusual Event because the fire duration was greater than 10 minutes. One security guard (assisting the brigade) suffered smoke inhalation and was transferred offsite by ambulance.

The fire was caused by two elevator power cables in the shaft rubbing together.

The cloth fire protection wrapping on the cables was degraded due to oil / water contamination from the December 25, 1993 turbine failure.

The elevator was empty at the time and no plant safety systems were affected by the fire. The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 7:53 AM and later issued a press release.

UPDATE ON THE DECEMBER 25. 1993 TURBINE FAILURE The licensee is working to clean up water in their condensate storage tank in preparation for discharge later this week.

The licensee plans to remove the hood of the No. 3 low pressure turbine over the weekend for inpection.

Reactor coolant has been restored to Technical Specification chemistry limits although still slightly higher than normal conductivity. The majority of water in the turbine and radwaste building sumps has been pumped to the hotwell.

Contact:

T. Colburn 504-1341

b PM PD AD DD DIRECTOR'S HIGHLIGHT PROJECT DIRECTORATE 111-1 February 16. 1994 Fermi-2 Turbine Failure Update The licensee has completed temporary modifications to the condensate storage 4

tank (CST) in preparation for discharge to Lake Erie later this week.. The i

licensee plans to discharge the entire CST contents (about 600,000 gal.) from the CST through a filter media, to a neutralization tank, then to the circulating water decant line and from that ' point to Lake Erie. There will be flow rate monitoring, temporary radiation monitoring, sampling, and isolation capability available on the discharge line.

The discharge will be within the licensee's offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM) limits.

The licensee will recirc the CST, sample and perform a release rate calculation.

The NRC independent measurements van will confirm the licensee's results.

Region III will approve the licensee's plans prior to discharge. The licensee also plans to issue a press release prior to discharge.

I The licensee has pulled the rotor from the damaged No. 3 low pressure (LP) turbine and may begin non destructive examination as ealy as Thursday. The preliminary assessment of damage to the turbine does not appear as extensive as originally thought based on visual observations. At least 5 blades (approximately 120 lbs. each) are completely gone from the eighth stage of No.

3 LP turbine.

All 64 of the fixed blades appear to have suffered some damage.

The No. I and 2 LP turbines do not appear to be significantly damaged. The 4

exciter and generator have suffered significant damage and will probably have to be replaced.

1

Contact:

T. Colburn 504-1341

A PM PD AD DD DIRECTOR'S HIGHLIGHT PROJECT DIRECTORATE 111-1 March 1. 1994 Fermi-2 Turbine Failure Update i

The licensee completed the first discharge of wat4r to Lake Erie from the condensate storage tank on Friday, February 25, '.994.

This water had originally been scheduled for discharge on February 17, 1994 but was delayed in order to hold a public meeting on February 23 at the request of local officials. The licensee began discharge of approximately 600,000 gallons of slightly radioactive (about 10E-7 microcuries per milliliter) water on February 24 after independent NRC Region III measurement confirmed the activity levels were well within discharge limits.

NRC monitoring of the discharge point and the Monroe water intake showed less than detectable activity. There has been considerable media and Congressional interest in the discharge to date. The next scheduled discharge is expected to take place in 1

approximately 3 weeks.

Management Changes The licensee is planning several management changes at Fermi. On March 1, 1994, Anthony F. Earley Jr. joins the licensee as President, Chief Operating Officer and Director.

Mr. Earley formerly held these same positions with Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO). John lobbia, formerly President, retains his position as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.

Mr. Robert McKeon, formerly Plant Manager, has been promoted to Assistant Vice President and Manager, Operations. Mr. McKeon will retain his present duties and organization. Wayne D. Romberg, formerly Vice President, Nuclear Operations Services at Northeast Utilities, has been hired as Assistant Vice President and Manager, Technical. Mr. P.omberg will manage the technical aspects of plant support and licensing. Mr. Paul Fessler, Technical Manager will report directly to Mr. Romberg.

Contact:

T. Colburn 504-1341 I

J PM l

PD AD DD 4

DIRECTOR'S HIGHLIGHT PROJECT DIRECTORATE III-1 i

March 15. 1994 i

1 Fermi-2 4

1

O The licensee plans to begin the second of three expected discharges from the condensate storage tank to Lake Erie this evening. A Region III inspector has taken a confirmatory split sample with the licensee from the condensate storage tank and will complete a confirmatory independent analysis of the sample at the Region III laboratory prior to actual discharge.

The inspector t

will verify agreement with the licensee's sample and that the sample is within j

the regulatory limits for unrestricted discharge.

The resident inspector will observe the discharge, however, the Region does not plan to monitor the discharge point and Monroe water intake as was done during the initial discharge on February 24-25, 1994. All initial discharge

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monitoring samples showed less than minimum detectable activity except for i

naturally occuring potassium.

The Region had offered to the Monroe city officials to monitor the city water intake for. this discharge, but their offer

)

was declined.

The State of Michigan has also declined to perform a j

confirmatory split sample with the Region and the licer.see, as was done for the initial discharge.

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Contact:

T. Colburn 504-1341 1-

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.s PM PD AD DD DIRECTOR'S HIGHLIGHT PROJECT DIRECTORATE III-1 April 6. 1994 Fermi-2 Update on Turbine Failure The turbines have been discovered to be more significantly damaged than originally thought. All three low pressure turbine rotors have exhibited indications of bowing and will need to be shipped off site for repair.

Additionally, crack indications have been found at the base of eleven 7th stage blades of low pressure turbine number 2 (LP 2). An unspecified number of blades in the 7th stage of LP 3 may also have crack indications.

The 7th stage rotors of the low pressure turbines need to be debladed in order to complete the inspection. Based on the foregoing, the licensee plans to reinspect the high pressure turbine to determine if it is damaged.

In addition to the turbine damage, the beam box that the tubine rests on within the condenser appears to be significantly damaged. The initial tube inspections have indicated that 5200 condenser tubes will require repair.

The generator rotor has been shipped to Siemans Company in Milwaukee for inspection and repair. The generator hydrogen coolers have been shipped to Toledo, Ohio for repair. The new excitor is expected to arrive on site in July.

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Contact:

T. Colburn 504-1341 L

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10CFR50 73 January 24, 1994 NRC-94-0006 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555-l

Reference:

Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43

Subject:

Licensee Event Report (LER) No.93-014 Please find enclosed LER No.93-014, dated January 24, 1994, t

for a reportable event that occurred on December 25, 1993 A copy of this LER is also being sent to the Regional Administrator, USNRC Region III.

i l

If you have any questions, please contact John A. Tibai, Principal Compliance Engineer, at (313) 586-4289 Sincerely,

Enclosure:

NRC Forms 366,366A cc:

T. G. Colburn W. J. Kropp J. B. Martin M. P. Phillips P. L. Torpey l

Wayne County Emergency Management Division

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PAGE (3 Fermi 2 05000341 1OF7 Automatic Reactor Shutdown Following Failure of the Main Turbine i

EVENT DATE (5)

LER NUMBER (6i REPORT NUMBER (7)

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) 90N%

CAv YEAA YEAA MON'M DAY YEAR g

5 00 F ACI.frv NAME 12 25 93 93 014 00 01 24 94 DOCKET NUMBE R 05000

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, ABSTRACT (um;t to 1400 spa:es i e, appecaimately 15 singte. spaced typewrmen lines) (16)

On December 25, 1993 at 1315 hours0.0152 days 0.365 hours 0.00217 weeks 5.003575e-4 months an automatic reactor shutdown occurred when the main turbine tripped off line. The turbine generator tripped when the mechanical overspeed device was activated. This was most likely due to high vibration levels and was not due to an actual overspeed condition. he turbine generator unit and associated support systems sustained significant damage. All safety systems and isolations performed as designed during the event. An Unusual Event was declared at 1352 hours0.0156 days 0.376 hours 0.00224 weeks 5.14436e-4 months . n is was upgraded to an Alert at 1357 hours0.0157 days 0.377 hours 0.00224 weeks 5.163385e-4 months . The presence of a fire at the main generator exciter was extinguished by the plant fire brigade using hand held extinguishers.

1 he probable cause of the high turbine vibration was due to a loss of aaterial from a turbine rotor in low pressure section number 3 ne exact source of the material and the root cause of the failure are under investigation.

Turbine / generator repairs will be determined based on the results of the investigation. Other corrective actions needed to return the plant to power operation are being formulated. A supplement to this LER will be submitted by April 25, 1994.

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Operational Condition:

1 - Power Operation Reactor Power:

93 5 Percent Reactor Pressure:

1020 psig Reactor Temperature:

535 degrees Fahrenheit Description of Event:

On December 25, 1993 at 1315 hours0.0152 days 0.365 hours 0.00217 weeks 5.003575e-4 months an automatic reactor shutdown [JC]

occurred in response to a main turbine [TA) trip. The specific cause of the reactor automatic shutdown was fast closure of the turbine control [JJ) valves. The main turbine generator [TB] tripped off line due to activation of the mechanical overspeed trip device. This most likely was caused by very high vibration levels and not by an actual overspeed condition.

Control room operators (Utility-Licensed] heard a loud noise from the turbine deck followed by heavy rumbling. A number of alaras were received in the control room (NA) including the seismic monitoring alarm, turbine vibration alarms (VA), turbine tripped alarm and alarms from turbine auxiliary systems. Control Room operators noted that the oil supply pressure to the main turbine indicated 0 psig.

Twenty five (25) seconds into the event the main steam isolation valves l

(MSIV)[ISV] automatically closed due to high condenser [SG) pressure (Group j

1 isolation).

A Group 13 isolation (Drywell Sumps) [WK] occurred when j

reactor water level decreased to level 3, which normally occurs during an 1

automatic shutdown from power operation. Reactor pressure was controlled by l

nanually opening safety relief valves (RV) and water level was controlld by

'l manual operation of the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)[BN] and standby feedwater (SBFW)[SK] systems.

The Nuclear Shift Supervisor [ Utility-Licensedl declared an Unusual Event at 1352 hours0.0156 days 0.376 hours 0.00224 weeks 5.14436e-4 months based on fire alarms and potential fire hazards from turbine lubricating oil. The emergency classification was upgraded to an Alert at 1357 hours0.0157 days 0.377 hours 0.00224 weeks 5.163385e-4 months based on a report of a fire on the second floor of the turbine unc vano nu o.n

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building in the area of the lubricating oil reservoir. De fire brigade was assembled and assistance, although not utilized, was requested from the

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local fire department. At 1400 hours0.0162 days 0.389 hours 0.00231 weeks 5.327e-4 months it was determined that a fire in the i

lubricating oil area had not occurred. The previous communication to the control room operators had been misunderstood.

The misunderstood communication was attributed to the difficulty of communicating with hand l

held radios while wearing self contained breathing equipment. At 1405 hours0.0163 days 0.39 hours 0.00232 weeks 5.346025e-4 months 3

1 a small fire was identified in the exciter area. This was extinguished with portable fire extinguishers.

4 i

A review of the event determined that the initial fire alaras were caused by a rapid hydrogen burn around the generator. The source of hydrogen was that used to cool the internals of the generator. The automatic fire suppression systems operated as designed.

Significant damage was sustained by the turbine / generator and the auxiliary systems.

The exciter rotor [TL) had become disconnected from the i

turbine / generator shaft.

in the northwest corner of the number 3 low pressure turbine hood.Aholemers General ~

Service Water (KG) and Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water [EB) Systems,

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which cool hydrogen [LJ) in the main generator and air within the exciter, respectively, were breached.

Approximately 550,000 gallons of water from these two systems and the fire suppression system flooded the radwaste building [NE) and turbine building [NN) basement areas disabling the j

radwaste systems, i

The turbine lubricating oil systen [TD) also suffered significant damage.

3 An estimated 17,000 gallons of turbine lubricating oil was spilled onto the turbine building floor areas and mixed with water in these areas.

j 1

The main condenser also sustained damage. An unknown number of condenser tubes were severed resulting in approximately 250,000 gallons of circulating water flowing into the condenser hotwell. His water was subsequently t

discharged through the condensate polishing demineralizers, compromising the effectiveness of the deafneralizers. The water was discharged to the condensate storage tank [KA) as the hotwell level control system functioned to compensate for increasing hotwell water level. Reactor water quality deteriorated as the RCIC and SBN systems utilized water from the condensate storage tank to maintain reactor water level.

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- 014 00 rm,. -. -.. - _., -,c - n All safety systems [JE] and isolations performed as designed.

All safet systems were available throughout the event. Standby gas treatment [WP]ywas manually started in response to the loss of the reactor building HVAC [VA]

system.

At 1722 hours0.0199 days 0.478 hours 0.00285 weeks 6.55221e-4 months the Emergency Director downgraded the emergency status to an Unust.al Event based on stable plant conditions. The Unusual Event was terminated at 2052 hours0.0238 days 0.57 hours 0.00339 weeks 7.80786e-4 months based on the plant being in a stable condition.

On December 26, 1993, while preparing to place the reactor into cold shutdown, reactor recirculation discharge [AD] valve B3105-F0318 failed to i

close.

Had the reactor coolant level dropped to level 2 durin event, the low pressure coolant injection [(LPCI)(BO)g the December 25, 1993 J path through division 2 of the residual heat removal systen sight not have been available. LER 93-015 will be submitted concerning this valve failure.

D e plant was placed in cold shutdown at 2251 hours0.0261 days 0.625 hours 0.00372 weeks 8.565055e-4 months on December 26, 1993 Cause of Event The reactor scram was caused by the closure of the turbine control valves when the main turbine generator (MTG) tripped off line. The turbine trip was caused by the activation of the mechanical overspeed trip device.

Activation of the wechanical overspeed trip device was most likely due to severe vibration and not from an actual overspeed condition. The high vibration of the main turbine was most probably the result of mass loss from a turbine rotor from Low Pressure Turbine Section Number 3 The cause of the mass loss is still under investigation. Results of this investigation will be provided in a supplement to this LER.

Analysis of Event:

An automatic reactor abutdown was initiated by the closure of the main turbine control valves. A turbine trip was initiated by the activation of the mechanical overspeed trip sechanism. Analysis of the turbine vibration s.

NIN M N

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m a.. ~.,.a -.o a w i on data determined that this trip most likely initiated due to high vibration on the main turbine unit and was not due to an actual overspeed condition.

A loss of mass on the low pressure turbine number 3, 8th stage blading, north side was discovered. The impact on turbine vibration of that mass loss plus other damage to the turbine is under active investigation. he investigation will determine the root cause for the event.

Plant response following the automatic shutdown, including the low level 3 actuation was normal. The turbine failure did not result in any abnormal releases of radioactive material.

A comparison of the event against the UFSAR turbine missile analysis was made by Engineering and it was determined that the event was bounded by the UFSAR analysis.

The dynamic response of the reactor / auxiliary building to the MTG failure induced excitation was measured by earthquake recording devices located in the reactor / auxiliary building. The data from these devices show that the reactor / auxiliary building was not significantly excited or displaced by the HTG failure event. Detailed data evaluation and documentation activities are in progress and a formal assessment report is being prepared.

There are three triaxial passive peak shock recorders installed in the following reactor / auxiliary building locations; High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room floor (El. 540'-0"), relay room floor (El. 613'-6"),

refueling floor (El. 684'-6"). Rose devices are capable of recording accelerations in the frequency range of 2-25 Hz and fully characterize the structural dynamic environment in the reactor / auxiliary building. Data from the relay room and refueling room recorders show no significant response resulted from the turbine event. Data from the HPCI room is now being evaluated.

There are also two triaxial accelerometers located on the HPCI room floor and at the top of the reactor pedestal. The accelographs indicated three short duration acceleration excursions. The first and second were separated by approximately 2 seconds and the second and third were separated by approximately one minute. Preliminary review indicates these to be at l

frequencies greater than 25 Hz and are not anticipated to be structurally significant. Further, there is no evidence that the four inch seismic l

1 solation gap between the turbine and auxiliary building was infringed on during the turbine event.

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l The fire protection systen performance during the event was reviewed by Plant Engineering. Although there was some damage to the fire suppression system, the system responded as designed.

Corrective Actions:

Detroit Edison will complete those actions agreed to by the NRC and Detroit Edison management and specified in the Confirmatory Action Letter dated December 28, 1993 These actions will be completed prior to returning the unit to power operations.

An investigation of the event was initiated by the Plant Manager. A turbine-generator assessment team (TGAT) was given the responsibility to determine the root cause of the main turbine generator trip and develop a plan for damage assessment, repair options, reassembly, startup, and monitoring turbine performance following implementation of the corrective action. Specifically the TGAT will:

Develop a sequence of events leading to the failure.

Determine the root cause of the turbine / generator failure.

Develop lessons learned Publish a final report.

In addition, before the plant returns to power operation the following actions are planned.

A valkdown of the turbine building structure to assess any damage, and identify needed repairs.

A walkdown of systems located in the turbine building to assess any damage, and identify needed repairs.

A review of the effects of the poor reactor water quality on the fuel assemblies and other incore components.

A review of the effects of the poor reactor water quality on the reactor pressure vessel internals.

An assessment of the structural integrity of the main turbine generator pedestal, and specification of repairs as necessary.

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.: _ m.wc - m,on data determined that this trip most likely initiated due to high vibration on the main turbine unit and was not due to an actual overspeed condition.

A loss of mass on the low pressure turbine number 3, 8th stage blading, north side was discovered. The impact on turbine vibration of that mass loss plus other damage to the turbine is under active investigation. The investigation will determine the root cause for the event.

Plant response following the automatic shutdown, including the low level 3 actuation was normal. The turbine failure did not result in any abnormal i

releases of radioactive material.

t A comparison of the event against the UFSAR turbine missile analysis was made by Engineering and it was determined that the event was bounded by the UFSAR analysis.

I The dynamic response of the reactor / auxiliary building to the MTG failure induced excitation was seasured by earthquake recording devices located in the reactor / auxiliary building. The data from these devices show that the reactor / auxiliary building was not significantly excited or displaced by the NTG failure event.

Detailed data evaluation and documentation activities are in progress and a formal assessment report is being prepared.

There are three triarial passive peak shock recorders installed in the following reactor / auxiliary building locations; High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room floor (El. 540'-0"), relay room floor (El. 613'-6"),

refueling floor (El. 684'-6"). These devices are capable of recording accelerations in the frequency range of 2-25 Hz and fully characterize the structural dynamic environment in the reactor / auxiliary building. Data from the relay room and refueling room recorders show no significant response resulted from the turbine event. Data from the HPCI room is now being evaluated.

There are also two triarial accelerometers located on the HPCI room floor and at the top of the reactor pedestal. The accelographs indicated three short duration acceleration excursions. The first and second were separated by approximately 2 seconds and the second and third were separated by approximately one minute. Preliminary review indicates these to be at frequencies greater than 25 Hz and are not anticipated to be structurally significant.

Further, there is no evidence that the four inch seismic isolation gap between the turbine and auxiliary building was infringed on during the turbine event.

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January 25, 1994 NRC-94-0005 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference:

Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43

Subject:

Licensee Event Report (LER) No.93-015 Please find enclosed LER No.93-015, dated January 25, 1994, for a reportable event that occurred on December 26, 1993 A copy of this LER is also being sent to the Regional Administrator, USNRC Region III.

If you have any questions, please contact Joseph M. Pendergast, Compliance Engineer, at (313) 586-1682.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:

NRC Forms 366, 366A cc:

T. G. Colburn W. J. Kropp J. B. Martin M. P. Phillips P. L. Torpey Wayne County Energency Management Division Wogo3M'Spr

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'O(6 l"* Failure of Reactor Recirculation Pump B Discharge Valve B3105-F031B to Close EVENT DATE (5)

LER NUMBER (6 REPORT NUMBER (7)

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! MODE (9) 3 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 0 (Che0k One or mofe 20 402ici 20 405(e) 50 73(a)(2i( v) 73 7iioi POWE R 20 405ta11 HH 50 36(cH1) 50 73(a)(2)(v) 73 71 tei j

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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

? LE *-oNE N.vm et ae A<n :,o:,

Joseph M. Pendergast, Compliance Engineer (313) 586-1682 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURF DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

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On December 26, 1993 at 0520 hours0.00602 days 0.144 hours 8.597884e-4 weeks 1.9786e-4 months while preparing to place division 2 of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system into service for the Shutdown Cooling

[SDC) mode of operation, valve B3105-F031B, the "B" loop recirculation pump l

l discharge valve, failed to indicate fully closed.

Technical Spe.71rication l

Action Statement 3 5.1.b.4 was entered. The plant was brought to Cold Shutdown within the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months as required by the Technical Specification i

Action Statement and SDC was established using division 1 SDC. On December 28, maintenance personnel inspected the valve's limit switch compartment and l

found three wires from the torque switch to the limit switch broken at the l

crisp of their respective lugs, located at the limit switch upper i

fingerboard. The three wires were relugged and reconnected. On December 29, at 0235 hours0.00272 days 0.0653 hours 3.885582e-4 weeks 8.94175e-5 months the valve was successfully stroked and declared operable.

The cause of the event was three wires at the limit switch upper fingerboard terminations broken from their lugs. Test results to date indicate the failure mechanism to be vibration induced fatigue. An investigation into the root cause of this event is still proceeding.

A supplement to this Licensee Event Report will be submitted when the investigation is complete.

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.-: m n Initial Plant Conditions:

Operational Condition: 3 (Hot Shutdown)

Reactor Power:

O percent Reactor Pressure:

110 psi Reactor Temperature:

330 degrees Fahrenheit Description of the Event:

i On December 25, 1993 at 1315 hours0.0152 days 0.365 hours 0.00217 weeks 5.003575e-4 months an automatic Reactor shutdown occurred following a failure of the Main Turbine [JJ]/ Generator [EL) system.

On December 26, at 0520 hours0.00602 days 0.144 hours 8.597884e-4 weeks 1.9786e-4 months while preparing to place division 2 of the Residual Heat Removal [(RHR)(BO)] system into service for the Shutdown Cooling [SDC] mode of operation, valve [V) B3105-F0318, the "B" loop recirculation [ AD) pump [P] discharge valve, failed to indicate fully closed after attempting to close the valve. Operations personnel [ Utility Licensed) were unable to verify that the discharge valve was open or closed from the control panel indication. he valve's control panel indication was in the mid-position.

I 1

Initial troubleshooting at the actor control center indicated that the.

i problem was in the Drywell [NG) where the valve is located. Low Pressure L

Coolant Injection [(LPCI)(BO)] loop selection depends on valve B3105-F031B being able to close and therefore both LPCI subsystems were considered inoperable. Technical Specification Action Statement 3 5.1.b.4 was entered. Operations personnel forced the LPCI loop select logic to select I

the "A" loop in order to establish an operable injection flow path. The "B" loop is the normal flow path, he "A" loop of RHR was then placed in SDC and the plant was brought to Cold Shutdown within the twenty-four hours required by Technical Specifications.

On December 28, following de-inerting of the Drywell, valve B3105-F031B was visually verified not fully closed. he valve was approximately two-thirds open. Subsequently, maintenance personnel [ Utility Non-Licensed) inspected the valve's limit switch compartment and found three out of four wires from the torque switch to the limit switch broken at the crisp of their respective lugs, located at the limit switch upper fingerboard. The wires ac romu aun ne

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.,m,,a.w n were relugged and reconnected. On December 29, at 0235 hours0.00272 days 0.0653 hours 3.885582e-4 weeks 8.94175e-5 months the valve was-successfully stroked and declared operable.

I Cause of the Event:

4 This event occurred because three of the four wires between the torque switch anet the limit switch fingerboard were broken. Open circuit wires 4

numbered, 45, 43 and close circuit wire numbered 55, at the limit switch l

upper fingerboard terminations numbered, 5, 50 and 10 (i.e., located on the upper limit switch outer edge terminals) were broken at the crisp of their lugs. This condition disabled the opening and closing circuits of this valve.

When access t/c the Drywell (NG) was made available, the liait switch a

compartment was inspected. There was no indication of arcing or heat

]

residue. The limit switches were inspected and no damage was found. One j

limit switch rotor had some loose movement but was within nominal j

tolerance. The torque switch was inspected and no discrepancies in i

functionality or setting were found. All wiring and terminaticns in the limit switch compartment were inspected and no other discrepancies were observed.

e i

Subsequent to the initial inspection, all four wires between the torque and l

limit switches (i.e., the three broken wires and one that was not broken) l l

were removed. The limit switch upper fingerboard wires together with one of 1

the lugs from which the wire was detached were sent to the test lab of the j

Technical and Engineering Services department of Detroit Edison for physical j

and chemical testing. De wire failures occurred inside the lugs, just at j

the edge of the crimp.

There was no evidence of cracking at any other j

location on the strands. The fingerboard end lug was removed from the j

unbroken fourth wire; the wire was examined and found to have one strand which had fractured.

he other six strands ox the unbroken wire had no visible signs of j

distress. The lugs were the proper size and the crisp was the proper size and properly compressed.

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Examination of the failure ends in the scanning electron microscope revealed that the mode of failure was reverse bending fatigue. All strands in the wires had similar failure characteristics; the predominant fracture area was j

fatigue with a narrow band, on the ridge of the final fracture, characterized as ductile. Examination of the fractures through a wide field

{

alcroscope revealed that the fracture propagated over a period of time, i

This was evident mainly by discoloration on portions of the fracture, progressively less toward the final fracture zone. This examination also revealed other fracture characteristics that strongly suggested that the 7

fatigue was high cycle, low stress.

There was no sign of environmentally induced (e.g., corrosion assisted) l fatigue. There. was no nicking or cutting of the wire that would indicate a j

crimping problem. Hardness and bend tests were performed. The hardness was-similar to that of new wire. Chemical tests were also performed and the chemical composition was similar in the old and new wire tested. Overall, results to date indicate vibration induced fatigue to be ths failure i

mechanism.

j As described in the corrective actions section, the current plan is to relug

(

and replace similar switch compartment internal wires of the suction and discharge valves of both recirculation loops. Further tests and analyses of 1

these wires will be performed to identify the root cause of the vibration i

fatigue failure mechanism. A supplement to this LER will be provided following completion of this investigation.

i i

Analysis of the Event:

i i

i The failure of valve B3105-F031B to close is bounded by the Updated Final

)

Safety Analysis Report section 6 3 3 for a large break Loss of Coolant l

Accident coincident with a LPCI injection valve failure. This single failure leaves two Core Spray [BM) divisions, the High Pressure Coolant 4

l Injection [BJ) and the Automatic Depressurization [RV) systems operable.

The peak cladding temperature result for the design basis accident is 20811 degrees Fahrenheit.

An analysis was performed and was described by Licensee Event Report 88-032,

" Recirculation Pump B Discharge Valve Failure to Close". The analysis did not take credit for the B3105-F031B valve closure. 'the analysis concluded j

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OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 94-01 i

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LOCATION:

10 Bil, WHITE FLINT-l WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 5, 1994 11:00 A.M.

FERMI, UNIT 2 CATASTROPHIC TURBINE FAILURE j

(AIT) i MCGUIRE, UNIT 2 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER WITH i

COMPLICATIONS (AIT) i 1

i PRESENTED BY:

EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH j

DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR q

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l 94-01 FERMI, UNIT 2 CATASTROPHIC TURBINE FAILURE DECEMBER 25, 1993 P.R01LEM WHILE OPERATING AT 93% POWER, A SUDDEN CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF THE TURBINE OCCURRED.

IT APPEARS THAT A TURBINE BLADE OR BLADES BROKE LOOSE FROM THE TURBINE ROTOR.

PIECES OF MATERIAL WERE EJECTED THROUGH THE CASING OF THE NUMBER 3 LOW PRESSURE TURBINE.

A SMALL FIRE ENSUED NEAR THE GENERATOR EXCITER.

CAUSE THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF THE TURBINE IS BEING INVESTIGATED BY THE LICENSEE.

REPRESENTATIVES FROM ENGLISH ELECTRIC, GENERAL ELECTRIC, SALEM AND SAN ONOFRE ARE ONSITE.

THE FIRE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF A RAPID BURN OF THE HYDROGEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE GENERATOR.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE BROKEN ROTOR AND LOOSE TURBINE BLADES CAN BECOME MISSILES AND CAUSE SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE.

THE FIRE PUT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AT RISK.

CONTACT:

T. GREENE, NRR/0EAB AIT:

YES

REFERENCES:

10 CFR 50.72 #26536, #26538, SIGEVENT:

IRQ

26540, PN 3-93-0354, MORNING REPORTS DATED 12/27/93, 12/28/93, p 12/30/93 f //3/'75-

l FERMI, UNIT 2 94-01

\\'

DISCUSSION l

e ON DECEMBER 25, 1993, THE PLANT RECEIVED MULTIPLE l

TURBINE VIBRATION ALARMS AND A SEISMIC ALARM.

j VIBRATIONS WERE FELT IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND THROUGHOUT THE PLANT.

THERE WERE LOUD SOUNDS ASSOCIATED WITH THE j

VIBRATIONS.

e GENERATOR HYDROGEN GAS PRESSURE DROPPED TO ZERO.

1 l

o THE TURBINE TRIPPED AND THE REACTOR SCRAMMED.

ALL l

SAFETY SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED AS EXPECTED.

o MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES CLOSED ON CONDENSER HIGH j

PRESSURE.

i o

REACTOR PRESSURE WAS CONTROLLED VIA SRVs AND REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL VIA RCIC AND STANDBY FEEDWATER SYSTEM.

e SM0KE AND STEAM WERE NOTICED IN THE TURBINE ROOM.

l LICENSEE DECLARED AN ALERT AND SUSPENDED SECURITY i

REQUIREMENTS FOR SOME PERSONNEL RESPONDING TO THE EVENT i

(PERSONNEL NOT SEARCHED).

J THE LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT WAS SUMMONED TO THE SITE, BUT e

IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM TO ENTER THE ' PLANT.

L i

A SMALL FIRE AT THE BRUSHES OF THE GENERATOR EXCITER e

WAS PUT OUT USING FIRE EXTINGUISHERS.

t, i

FERMI, UNIT 2 94-01 e

A 2 INCH TURBINE BUILDING EQUIPMENT COOLING LINE WAS

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SEVERED DURING EVENT.

THIS AND THE ACTIVATION OF THE SPRINKLER SYSTEM RELEASED A LARGE AMOUNT OF WATER MIXED WITH OIL ON THE MAIN AND LOWER TURBINE DECK.

ABOUT I

17,000 GAL OF TURBINE LUBRICATION OIL AND HYDROGEN SEAL j

OIL WAS RELEASED.

1 j

CONDUCTIVITY IN THE REACTOR INCREASED, DUE TO SEVERED e

i CONDENSER TUBES.

THE MAXIMUM VALUE WAS 180 MICROMHOS l

(T.S. LIMIT IS 10 MICROMHOS).

1 e

PLANT COMMENCED A C00LDOWN RATE OF 15 DEGREES j

FAHRENHEIT PER HOUR.

j e

ALERT CLASSIFICATION WAS DOWNGRADED TO AN UNUSUAL EVENT i

CLASSIFICATION, APPROXIMATELY 7 1/2 HOURS AFTER THE l

START OF THE EVENT.

j o

WHEN ATTEMPTING TO PLACE DIVISION II SHUTDOWN COOLING l

IN SERVICE, THE "B" RECIRCULATION PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE l

WOULD NOT FULLY CLOSE.

SHUTDOWN COOLING USING THE "A" i

LOOP WAS INITIATED.

i i

o ON 12/26/93 PLANT ENTERED COLD SHUTDOWN.

FOLLOWUP o

LICENSEE FOUND A PIECES OF MATERIAL THAT BROKE THROUGH l

THE TURBINE CASING OF THE NUMBER 3 LOW PRESSURE TURBINE.

THE MATERIAL IS ASSUMED TO BE PART OF A TURBINE BLADE.

i 1

- - =

!g FERMI, ilNIT 2 94-01 e

THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT THE HYDROGEN USED FOR COOLING l

i THE MAIN GENERATOR HAD BURNED AND DAMAGED GENERATOR j

COMPONENTS.

o THERE IS LARGE AMOUNT OF OIL THROUGHOUT THE TURBINE BUILDING.

THE LICENSEE HAS POSTED FIRE WATCHES.

j l

o A BROKEN WIRE WAS FOUND IN THE LIMITORQUE HOUSING 0F j

THE "B" RECIRCULATION PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE.

o LEAD STAFF FOR AN AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM WERE j

DISPATCHED TO THE SITE.

TEAM LEADER IS RON GARDNER.

HAJORITY OF THE TEAM WILL BE ONSITE 01/10/94 WHEN TURBINE INVESTIGATION BEGINS.

i.

J l

i l

}

NRC STAFF PRESENTATION TO THE ACRS thn REgy b,

s i=P $

il o

,L gk 4 4***

SUBJECT:

FERMI 2 CATASTROPHIC TURBINE-GENERATOR FAILURE DATE:

MARCH 11, 1994 PRESENTER:

RONALD H. GARDNER, CHIEF PLANT SYSTEMS SECTION ENGINEERING BRANCH DIVISION OF REACTOR SAFETY REGION III u

TELEPHONE NO.:

(708) 829-9751

l PROBLEM 1.

CATASTROPHIC TURBINE FAILURE 2.

HYDR 0 GEN / LUBE OIL FIRE 3.

RADWASTE BASEMENT FLOODING 4.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) CHEMISTRY l

I 2

1..

l.

4 CAUSE 1.

TURBINE A.

LICENSEE INVESTIGATING j

s.

POTENTIAL HIGH CYCLE FATIGUE i

2.

FIRE i

A.

HYDROGEN LEAKAGE i

s.

SIGNIFICANT GENERATOR SHAFT / INTERNALS 1

DISPLACEMENT i

3.

FLOODING f

A.

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION / DAMAGE i

s.

GENERAL SERVICE WATER PIPE TO HYDROGEN COOLERS

)

c.

TURBINE BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER LINE

{

o.

LUBE OIL LINE 4.

CHEMISTRY A.

CONDENSER TUBES RUPTURED s.

HOTWELL REJECT TO CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK c.

STANDBY FEEDWATER SUCTION FROM CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK 3

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE 1.

SAFETY RELATED/ SAFE SHUTDOWN PERFORMANCE NOT AFFECTED 2.

GASEOUS RELEASES WITHIN NORMAL RANGE i

i 3.

LIQUID RELEASES CONTAINED NO DETECTABLE CONTAMINATION I

I i

-1 l

4 i

i NRC ACTION 1.

SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY l

2.

AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM (AIT) l L

l 3.

EXPANDED AIT TO PROVIDE WATER MANAGEMENT l

OVERSIGHT l

1 t

l i

5 l

i 4

~

9ISCUSSION i

DECEMBER 25, 1993 - TURBINE FAILURE i

l REACTOR SCRAMMED - ALL SAFETY SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED AS EXPECTED l

MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES CLOSED

{

4 I

REACTOR PRESSURE CONTROLLED VIA SAFETY RELIEF VALVES AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLANT (RCIC)

)

OPERATOR ERROR CAUSED DELAY IN PLACING RCIC-IN j

SERVICE i

l

)

ALERT DECLARED l

LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT SUMMONED TO SITE i

I APPR0XIMATELY 500,000 GALLONS OF WATER AND l

17,000 0F OIL RELEASED TO TURBINE BUILDING FLOORS 7

WATER AND OIL OVERFLOWED TO RADWASTE BASEMENT RCS CONDUCTIVITY INCREASED DUE TO SEVERED CONDENSER TUBES 6

i

! ~

DISCUSSION (cont'D) i OPERATORS SLOW TO RECOGNIZE SIGNIFICANCE OF HIGH HOTWELL LEVEL WHEN ATTEMPTING TO PLACE DIVISION II SHUTDOWN COOLING IN SERVICE, THE "B" RECIRCULATION PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE WOULD NOT CLOSE.

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) WARMUP VALVE FAILED TO CLOSE WHEN PLANT WAS BEING PLACED IN RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE "l

ON DECEMBER 26, 1993, THE PLANT ENTERED COLD SHUTDOWN i

J I

)-

4 i

7

j i

INSPECTION RESULTS i

TURBINE FAILURE i

NO INDICATION OF PENDING TURBINE-GENERATOR l

FAILURE I

l ROOT CAUSE BEING INVESTIGATED BY LICENSEE l

i NO INDICATION FAILURE WAS DUE TO TURBINE

)

OVERSPEED OR ELECTRICAL GRID DISTURBANCES i

~

FERMI PRECURSOR EVENTS:

]

SEPTEMBER 1989 - REFUELING OUTAGE (RFO) 1 i

FAILED BLADES FOUND IN STH STAGE OF LOW l

PRESSURE (LP) 2 i

l ALL LP TURBINE EIGHTH STAGE BLADES SUSTAINED EXCESSIVE WEAR OF LACING RODS AND LACING i

HOLES DUE TO TIP ROCK 4

]4 DECEMBER 1990 FIVE STAGE 4 BLADES OF LP3 EXPERIENCED i

FATIGUE FAILURE

}

8

s APRIL 1991 - RF02 i

ALL LP TURBINE STAGE 4 BLADES REPLACED ALL LP STH STAGE BLADES REINSTALLED i

i i

l REFURBISHED EIGHTH STAGE LP1 BLADES INSTALLED IN LP2 SEPTEMBER 1992 - RF03 i

BASED ON VISUAL INSPECTION, LICENSEE DID NOT i

l REPLACE EIGHTH STAGE BLADES IN LP3 l

1 i

\\

i 1

i I

i i

9 Tr m

W

^

twNw-w

t INSPECTION RESULTS RCS CHEMISTRY HIGH CONDUCTIVITY PRIOR 0.08 uMHOS AFTER 185.0 uMHOS HIGH CHLORIDES PRIOR < 2 PPB AFTER 10 PPM CONCERNS t

1.

CONTROL R0D DRIVE (CRD) SEALS 2.

REACTOR INTERNALS TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS 1.

CONDENSATE RETURN TANK (CRT) TO CRD FOR CRD SEALS BACK TO CRT VIA REACTOR WATER CLEANUP (RWCU) AND PORTABLE DEMINERALIZERS 2.

RWCU TO PORTABLE DEMINERALIZERS (HIGHER FLOWS) 10

i-

~

INSPECTION RESULTS l

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION AND FIRE ALARM SYSTEMS l

OPERATED AS DESIGNED I

FULL FIRE BRIGADE RESPONDED AS A TEAM APPR0XIMATELY 37 MINUTES AFTER THE EVENT COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS CAUSED DELAYS IN ASSESSING FIRE'S EXTENT NO ABNORMAL PROCEDURE FOR TURBINE BUILDING FLOODING l

DIFFICULTY IN SECURING SYSTEMS CAUSING FLOODING 1

5 4

i 11

INSPECTION RESULTS 4

l WATER MANAGEMENT i

1.

RADWASTE BUILDING 500,000 GALLONS OF WATER AND 17,000 GALLONS OF OIL FLOODED RADWASTE BUILDING BASEMENT WATER BECAME CONTAMINATED AFTER MIXING WITH CONTENTS OF TANKS AND SUMPS i

NORMAL RADWASTE PROCESSING EQUIPMENT INOPERABLE PRESENT DESIGN INADEQUATL TO PREVENT FUTURE FLOODING TEMPORARY MODIFICATION TRANSFERRED WATER TO HOTWELL 12

D i<

2.

REACTOR BUILDING CORNER ROOMS 40 FT. BELOW RADWASTE BUILDING BASEMENT I

NO TESTING OR PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE ON CHECK VALVES DESIGNED TO PREVENT CORNER ROOM FLOODING 3.

CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK 4

DAMAGE TO MAIN CONDENSER RESULTED IN LAKE WATER ENTERING CONDENSER HOTWELL AND BEING PUMPED TO CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK TEMPORARY MODIFICATION INSTALLED TEMPORARY j

DEMINERALIZER SYSTEM TO RECIRCULATE AND TREAT WATER PRIOR TO DISCHARGE E

e 13

l,

+. ____________. _______________..+

+.__________________..__+

l l POWER REACTOR j

l EVENT NUMBER: 26536 l

+.___________________. ___________.+

+______________.._______+

j

+_____________________..____________________....+_..__________________________+

FACILITY: FERMI REGION: 3 NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/25/93 UNIT:

[2] [ ] [ ]

STATE: MI NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:25 [ET)

- RX TYPE: [2] GE-4 EVENT DATE:

12/25/93 i

+------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TIME:

13:57[EST)-

LNRC NOTIFIED BY: POUPARD/KIEL

[LAST UPDATE DATE:

12/25/93 1

HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON

+-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+

NOTIFICATIONS l

)

EMERGENCY CLASS: ALERT

+-----------------------------+

n

}

10 CFR SECTION:

JOHN JACOBSON RDO AAEC 50.72(a)(1)(1)

EMERGENCY DECLARED BRAIN GRIMES E0 CARR FEMA KEN BROCKMAN.

AEOD i

i i

ED JORDAN AEOD-

+_____+__________+-______+.______+ _____________+__+ _____..+...______________+

l UNIT l SCRAM CODE lRX CRIT lINIT PWRl INIT RX MODE lCURR PWRj CURR RX MODE l

l

+_____+ _________+ ______+________+_________________+._______+_________________+

l l

2 i

A/R Y

93 POWER OPERATION O

H0T SHUTDM N i

I

+_____+____. ________.____ _____________.___ _____ _+.______..........________..+

EVENT TEXT 4..

__________._______________________________________________ ________________+

LOSS OF OIL SUPPLY PRESSURE TO MAIN TURBINE BEARINGS CAUSED REACTOR SCRAM l

AND DAMAGE TO MAIN GENERATOR.

i l

l LICENSEE HAD HIGH VIBRATION OF THEIR MAIN TURBINE (RECEIVED SEISMIC ALARM) l AND THEY FOUND OUT THAT THEY HAD LOST CIL SUPPLY PRESSURE TO THE MAIN j TURBINE BEARINGS. LICENSEE THINKS THAT THE'HIGH VIBRATION OF THE MAIN l TURBINE CAUSED THE HIGH PRESSURE TURBINE STOP VALVES TO COME OFF -THEIR OPEN l

i SEAT AND CLOSE ENOUGH TO CAUSE A TURBINE TRIP SIGNAL. THIS CAUSED A TURBINE l TRIP AND A REACTOR SCRAM. ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED. LICENSEE IMMEDIATELY

! BROKE VACUUM TO STOP THE TURBINE (DONE WITHIN A FEW SECONDS OF THE REACTOR l SCRAM). MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VA VES CLOSED ON CONDENSER HIGH PRESSURE.

l (LICENSEE SAID THAT THEY 'SOMEHOW LOST SOME MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM PRIOR TO l STOPPING THE MAIN TURBINE, POSSIBLY A SEAL PROBLEM ON THE MAIN TURBINE).

! CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS ARE CONTROLLING REACTOR PRESSURE WITH SRVs AND j CONTROLLING REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL VIA RCIC AND STANDBY FEEDWATER 1 SYSTEM. ALL ECCS AND EDGs ARE FULLY OPERABLE. LICENSEE DECLARED AN ALERT WHEN THEY SAW STEAM /SM0KE IN THE GENERAL LOCATION OF THE OIL PURIFICATION ROOM (ASSOCIATED WITH MAIN TURBINE) WHICH IS LOCATED IN THE TURBINE BUILDING. LICENSEE FOUND A SMALL FIRE AT THE BRUSHES OF THE MAIN TURBINE 4

GENERATOR AND IT WAS IMMEDIATELY EXTINGUISHED. NOBODY HAS BEEN INJURED.

LICENSE CALLED FRENCH TOWN FIRE DEPARTMENT AND THREE FIRE TRUCKS SHOWED UP j AT THEIR MAIN GATE BUT THEY WERE NOT USED. OPERATIONS ENTERED EMERGENCY d

j OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL WHEN SUPPRESSION. POOL j TEMPERATURE EXCEEDED 95 DEGREES F. LICENSEE SAID THAT ARE IN SUPPRESSION j POOL COOLING MODE AND SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE IS NOW 95 DEGREES.

p 7r--

,-g

p 1 GENiL TOR HYDROGEN GAS PRESSURE WENT TO ZER0 AT THE START OF THIS EVENT.

LICENSEE SAID THAT IT APPEARS THAT THEY HAD A RAPID HYDROGEN BURN OR A HYDROGEN EXPLOSION BECAUSE THE SEAL ON THE MAIN GENERATOR IS NO LONGER ATTACHED TO ITS CASING, EXCITER CASING IS NOT ATTACHED TO THE EXCITER, AND 1

EXCITER BRUSH HOUSING IS DESTROYED (THERE IS NO INDICATION OF HYDROGEN GAS IN THE TURBINE BUILDING AT THE TIME OF THIS CALL). LICENSEE SAID THAT 100 TO 2GO GALLONS OF TURBINE LUBRICATING OIL IS MIXED WITH WATER (FROM RUPTURED TURBINE COOLING WATER PIPES) ON THE MAIN TURBINE DECK AND ON THE

' LOWER TURBINE DECK. LICENSEE HAS FIRE WATCHES STATIONED AND DOES NOT CONSIDER THE OIL AND WATER MIXTURE A FIRE HAZARD. LICENSEE NOTIFIED STATE i

AND LOCAL OFFICIALS OF THIS EVENT.

RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS CALLED BY LICENSEE.

)

- - UPDATE 9 1752EST BY REITH TAKEN BY MACKINNON***

ALERT CLASSIFICATICN WAS DOWNGRADED TO AN UNUSUAL EVENT CLASSIFICATION AT i

l 1722EST BASED ON STABLE PLANT CONDITIONS (FIRE IS EXTINGUISHED, REACTOR IS l SHUTDOWN AND IS BEING C00LDOWN, AND FRENCH TOWN FIRE DEPARTMENT FIRE TRUCKS l WENT BACK TO THEIR FIRE. STATION). R3D0 (JOHN JACOBSON), EO (BRIAN GRIMES),

j FEMA (M0STELLER) NOTIFIED.

i l

l Mr IVAN VAJC0VEC 0F THE CANADIAN ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL BOARD WAS NOTIFIED

[ OF THIS EVENT AT 1945EST.

i

- - COMMISSIONERS ASSISTANCE BRIEFING B 2000EST BY ED GREENMAN***

BRIEFING PARTICIPANTS WERE KEN BROCKMAN (AE00), SUE GAGNER (PUBLIC AFFAIRS), DICK BANGART (STATE PROGRAMS), BILL UPSHAW (INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS), BILL HILL (SECY), TOM MADDEN (CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS), JACK l SCARBOROUGH (COMM. ROGERS ASSIST.), JOSE IBARRA (CHAIRMAN SELIN ASSIST.

l JACK GUTTMANN (COMM. REMICK'S ASSIST.), J0EL LUBENAV (COMM. de Planqu l ASSIST.), TIM COLBURN (PM), & SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR (KROPP) NOTIFIED.

- - UPDATE 02107EST BY OPLAND TAKEN BY MACKINNON***

I l UNUSUAL EVENT TERMINATED AT 2052EST BASED 0N PLANT BEING IN A STABLE l CONDITION. LICENSEE IS G0ING TO A COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION, THEY HAVE

' EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO THEIR MAIN GENERATOR. LICENSEE NOTIFIED STATE & LOCAL 0FFICIALS OF THIS EVENT. R3D0 (JOHN JACOBSON), E0 (BRIAN GRIi1ES), & FEMA (SHULL) NOTIFIED.

- - - FEDERAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED OF ABOVE EVENT ****

, FEMA (CARR/M0STELLER/SHULL), DOT (PETTY OFFICER DEEGAN), DOE (THOMAS TANNER), HHS (KENT GRAY), EPA (CRAIG CONKLIN), & USDA (GEORGE BICKERTON).

l RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED OF THIS EVENT BY LICENSEE.

4 _______________... __________________________________________________________+

(

-.,...m

t l

+...........__.__._...__...__.....+

+_-__.....____.______...+.

jPOWER REACTOR l

l EVENT NUMBER:

26540 l

+____...___.___...______...._______+

+______.....__....___..+

+_........___..____._____________________________+....._______.....__..__..... +

3 FACILITY: FERMI REGION:

3 NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/26/93 UNIT:

[2))GE-4[][]

STATE: HI NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:09 (ET)

[2 RX TYPE:

EVENT DATE:

12/26/93

+------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TIME:

05:20(EST) i-

'NRC NOTIFIED BY: KIEL lLAST UPDATE DATE:

12/26/93 HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON

+-----------------------------+

i

+------------------------------------------------+

NOTIFICATIONS l

1

' EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE

+-----------------------------+

10 CFR SECTION:

JOHN JACOBSON RDO 4

AIND.50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION

NLC0 TECH SPEC LCO A/S 9

i I

+-_________+_______+........+.____..._____.4. + _______+___......______.+

! UNIT l SCRAM CODEjRX CRIT lINIT PWRl INIT RX MODE lCURR PWRj CURR RX MODE l

+_.__+_.........+.____._+.______ +.... ____________+._______+.__..__ _______.+

2 i

N N

0 HOT SHUTDOWN 0

HOT SHUTDOWN

!j l

t q

+.____+.___............._______________________....+.. ____............_______+

J EVENT TEXT 4

+__________________..____........______.....___ ______________________....___...+

l WHILE PLACING DIVISION 2 0F RHR INTO SERVICE FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING (SDC) l MODE OF OPERATION THE "B" RECIRCULATION PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE (B31-F031) 1 l FAILED TO CLOSE.

!WHILEPLACINGRHRDIVISION2INTOSDCMODEOFOPERATION,"B" RECIRCULATION i

l PUMP LOOP DISCHARGE VALVE (B31-F031) FAILED TO INDICATE FULLY CLOSED.

l LICENSEE IS UNABLE TO OPEN OR CLOSE THIS LIMITORQUE VALVE (THINK THAT THEY j

l MAY HAVE A LIMIT SWITCH PROBLEM ASSOCIATED WITH THIS VALVE). THIS PLACED

' LICENSEE IN TECH SPEC ACTION STATEMENTS 3.5.1 (ECCS OPERATION), 3.5.2 (ECCS SHUTDOWN), & 3.4.9.1 (RHR SDC OPERATION). LICENSEE IS STILL IN TECH SPEC 4

3.5.1 ACTION STATEMENT (HAVE 24 HOURS TO BE IN A COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION LICENSEE SHUT RHR CROSS CONNECT VALVE (Ell-F010, CROSS TIE VALVE BETWEEN 3

DIVISION 1 & 2 0F RHR ) AND FAILED THE "A" SIDE OF LPCI LOOP SELECTION LOGIC (PREVENTS LPCI TRANSFERRING ITS INJECTION PATH TO THE "B" i

RECIRCULATION PUMP LOOP IN CASE "A" RECIRCULATION LOOP DEVELOPED A LARGE LEAK)

LICENSEE SECURED PLACING DIVISION 2 0F RHR INTO SERVICE AND ARE PLACING DIVISION 1 0F RHR INTO SDC MODE OF OPERATION. LICENSEE CONSIDERS DIVISION 2 0F RHR FUNCTIONAL BUT INOPERABLE (INOPERABLE PER TECH SPECS).

LICENSEE WILL BE IN A COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION WITHIN TECH SPEC ACTION STATEMENT TIME LIMIT OF 24 HOURS. REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE IS CURRENTLY 130 psi AND REACTOR VESSEL WATER TEMPERATURE IS 310 DEGREES F.

ALL OTHER ECCS SYSTEMS ARE FULLY OPERABLE IF NEEDED (SINCE STEAM DOME PRESSURE IS i

BELOW 150 psi RCIC AND HPCI ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE).

4 4

,,m.

_ ~.,

a.al.

43-_..e J

w.4.,1lAd s

a 1

l LICENSEE DETERMINED THIS TO BE A REPORTABLE EVENT AT 1030 EST 12/26/93.

l l

l THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED AND THE LICENSEE WILL ISSUE A PRESS l

RELEASE ABOUT THIS EVENT.

l l

V l

+_____________________________

__..______4 b

n-,.

c - -.,,

e c e

,,.w.

,-,w-

t i c>,

+_-_-____.__________.__......__--_+

l POWER REACTOR

+_-___.__._-__ ______._.+

+_________ _____________.._________+l l EVENT NUMBER: 26709 l

+____-__-_______________.._ ________-____________++_-___

______._______-__--__-______ +

FACILITY: FERMI-REGION:

3 NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/29/94 UNIT:

[2] [ ] [ ]

STATE: MI NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:56 [ET]

i iRX TYPE: [2] GE-4

+------------------------------------------------+ EVENT DATE:

01/29/94 EVENT TIME:

07:04[EST]l

'NRC NOTIFIED BY: SNYDER lLAST UPDATE DATE: 01/29/94 l

HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON

+ - -- -- - - --- ---- _ ------ - _ - ---- -- ---------- ------ +-- - --- N OT I F I C AT I O

+

! EMERGENCY CLASS: UNUSUAL EVENT

+-----------------------------+l

'IO CFR SECTION:

JIM CREED RDO l

i LAAEC 50.72(a)(1)(1)

EMERGENCY DECLARED STEVE VARGA E0 l

,SHULL FEMA l

i

.ED JORDAN AE00 i

3 l

LBILL BEECHER PA0 l

l

+...._+........._+____. _+_-__..._+ __..--___.__-+ LED GREENMAN REG 3

._+_.--_...+.___....___...._+

l UNIT l SCRAM CODE lRX CRIT lINIT FWR INIT RX fl0

+_-_-_+...._-_..+_......+..._.__+l-_.____.__-_DElCURR PWR!

CURR RX MODE l

--. +-.__.__.+______.._..... __+

4 l

2 l

N N

O COLD SHUTDOWN l

0 COLD SHUTDOWN l

l l

l

+.._. +_......_____.__.-_.....___._-____.....___ __+l__......______________

___+l EVENT TE

+.__ _______________...__-____________ _____XT

______ --___-_______-_____ ________+

j FIRE LASTED 20 MINUTES IN TURBINE BUILDING PASSENGER ELEVATOR SHAFT BEFORE 3

l jITWASEXTINGUISHED.

~

l FIRE IN TURBINE BUILDING PASSENGER ELEVATOR SHAFT LASTED FROM l IT WAS EXTINGUISHED AT 0714EST. LICENSEE'S ONSITE FIRE BRIGADE E l THE FIRE USING FIRE EXTINGUISHERS AND USING FIRE RETARDANT CHEMIC J

i l (LICENSEE DID NOT HAVE TO CALL LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT FOR HELP) l LICENSEE'S FIRE FIGHTERS WAS OVERCOME BY SM0KE INHALATION WHILE F l

1' 1

l THE FIRE. THE FIRE FIGHTER RECOVERED AND WAS LATER TRANSFERRED AN AMBULANCE FOR OBSERVATION (LICENSEE HAD CALLED FOR THE A j

l LICENSEE THINKS THE FIRE IN THE ELEVATOR SHAFT WAS CAUSED BY THE TOGETHER OF TWO I.25" DIAMETER ELEVATOR POWER CABLES LOCATED IN T i

c l

ELEVATOR SHAFT BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND FLOOR OF THE TUR l

FLAMES COULD BE SEEN SHOOTING UP THE ELEVATOR SHAFT THROUGH TH

DOORS ON THE SECOND AND THIRD FLOOR OF THE TURBINE BUILDING. LICENSEE SAID l THE THE FIRE WAS NOT CAUSED BY RESIDUAL MAIN TURBINE LUBRICATING O l MAIN TURBINE EHC OIL FROM 12/25/93 EVENT. SM0KE FROM THE FIRE ACCUMULATED j IN THE THIRD FLOOR OF THE TURBINE BUILDING. ALL THE SM0KE FROM THE FIRE HAS

[

l BEEN VENTILATED FROM THE TURBINE BUILDING. LICENSEE TERMINATED TH l

l EVENT AT 0753EST AFTER THEY MADE SURE THE FIRE WAS OUT. ELEVATOR n

! IN IT WHEN THE FIRE STARTED. NO SAFETY SYSTEMS IN THE PLANT WERE AF l BY THIS FIRE. LICENSEE NOTIFIED STATE AND LOCAL 0FFICIALS OF THIS EVE l PRESS RELEASE WILL BE MADE BY LICENSEE LATER TODAY ABOUT THIS FIRE.

i l LICENSEE WILL NOTIFY THEIR RESIDENT INSPECTOR OF THIS EVENT.

l 1

w.

l

+__________________________________+

+___________________--__+

l POWER REACTOR l

jEVENT NUMBER:

27056 l

+__________________________-_______+

+-______________________+

+__.._____________________________________________+_____________________________+

l FACILITY: FERMI REGION:

3' NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/07/94 l

juNIT:

[2] [ ] [ ]

STATE: MI NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:57 [ET]l lRX TYPE: [2] GE-4 LEVENT DATE:

04/07/94 l

+------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TIME:

17:30[EDT]l lNRC NOTIFIED BY: HOSKINS lLAST UPDATE DATE: 04/07/94 l

lHQ OPS OFFICER:

CHAUNCEY G0ULD

+-----------------------------+

+-_______________________------------------------+

NOTIFICATIONS l

l EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE

+-----------------------------+

l10 CFR SECTION:

' BRUCE BURGESS RDO l

lAPRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) 0FFSITE NOTIFICATION l

l I

l l

+_____+__________+_______+________+______________+ _+________+________________

l UNIT l SCRAM CODE lRX CRIT lINIT PWR!

INIT RX MODE lCURR PWRl CURR RX MODE

+_____+-_________+_______+________+_________________+________+

i 2

l N

N 0

COLD SHUTDOWN l

0 COLD SHUTDOWN l

l l

+-____+_____________________________________________+__________

EVENT TEXT

+______________________________________________________________________________+

)

l THE LICENSEE ISSUED A PRESS RELEASE CONCERNING CURRENT STATUS ON THREE l

1 l ITEMS.

I l THE FIRST WAS THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE 12/25/93 MAIN i

l TURBINE FAILURE. DURING AN INVESTIGATION FOCUSING ON THE 8TH STAGE OF THE l

l #3 LOW PRESSURE TURBINE, THEY DISCOVERED ADDITIONAL CRACKS IN THE ROOT OF j

l 12 SEVENTH STAGE BLADES OF LOW PRESSURE TURBINES 2 & 3. PRELIMINARY TESTS l INDICATE THAT THESE CRACKS MAY HAVE EXISTED BEFORE THE 12/25/93 EVENT. THEl l FINDING 0F THESE ADDITIONAL BLADE CRACKS HAS PROMPTED THE LICENSEE TO l CONSIDER WHETHER TO REPLACE PART OR ALL 0F THE TURBINE. MINOR DIST0RTIONS l HAVE ALSO BEEN FOUND IN ALL 3 LOW PRESSURE TURBINE ROTORS.

l l

l THE SECOND ITEM WAS THAT THE LICENSEE PLANS TO RELEASE THE REMAINING i

l 500,000 GALS OF EXCESS WATER WHICH ACCUMULATED AFTER THE ACCIDENT. THE l

l QUALITY OF THE WATER MEETS ALL STATE AND FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS l

l FOR DISCHARGE.

l l

l THE THIRD ITEM IS THAT THE LICENSEE IS MOVING AHEAD WITH ARRANGEMENTS TO l

REFUEL THE REACTOR. THE RI WILL BE INFORMED.

+_____________________________________________________________

1

,7 i

Dougiss R. Gipson i

Senior v ee piesicent j

Nscwar Generai.cn i

Fermi 2 6400 Nov Dae Ngh*ay Edison -(3t3)5865249 t

January 4, 1994 NRC-94-0001 1

i i

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nashington, D.C.

20555 Attn: Document Control Desk

References:

1) Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43

2) Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4 3 7.2.2

Subject:

Technical Specification Special Report of the Actuation of Active Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation on December 25, 1993 the Fermi 2 Plant experienced a failure of the turbine generator. A reactor scram occurred as a result of the turbine trip and was reported as required by 10 CFR 50.72. 1he Licensee Event Report for this event is being prepared and will be submitted as LER No.93-014.

Because this event also involved the actuation of plant seismic monitoring instrumentation, this S,necia'. Report is being submitted as discussed la Reference 2 for seismic events.

Information collected from the ceismic monitoring instrumentation is still being evaluated. A discussion of the magnitude and frequency spectrum at the event will be included in LER 93-014.

4yeyfh/95 2g

USHRC January 4, 1994 g

NRC-94-0001 Page 2 1

i l

i i

The effects of the December 25, 1993 event are being thoroughly evaluated l

and will also be addressed in LER 93-014.

Preliminary walkdowns of the Reactor Building and the Auxiliary Building were performed on December 29, 4

1993 and did not identify any adverse effect on structures, systems, or components important to safety.

Plans are currently being developed to i

conduct more detailed walkdowns of plant structures and systems.

The results of these walkdowns till be discussed with the NRC's Augmented Inspection Team when they are completed.

Should you have any questions concerning this report, please contact Joseph j

H. Pendergast, Compliance Engineer at (313) 586-1682.

i j

Sincerely, 1

J cc:

T. C. Colburn W. J. Kropp i

J. B. Martin M. P. Phillips b

j.

4

FORD 1 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9403280061 DOC.DATE: 94/02/04 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #

FACIL:50-341 Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2, Detroit Edis 05000341 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION Hopper & Associates, Engineers RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

" Fermi 2 Turbine Failure, Post-Event Earthquake I

Instrumentation Data Evaluation."

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/ Notice of Vidlation Response

[

5 1

NOTES:

5 4

i RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES f

'D CODE /NAME LTTR ENCL M AME LTTR ENCL PD3-1 PD 1

OLBURN,T) l 1

0 INTERNAL: ACRS 2

AEOD/DEIB 1

AEOD/DSP/ROAB 1

AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1

R AEOD/TTC 1

DEDRO L

1 NRR/ DORS /OEAB 1

NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRIL/RPEB 1

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D 1

NRR/PMAS/ILPB1 1

NRR/PMAS/ILPB2 1

NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1

OE DIR 1

OGC/HDS2 1

REG FILE 02 1

RES/HFB 1

RGN3 FILE 01 1

EXTERNAL: EG&G/BRYCE,J.H.

1 NRC PDR 1

0 NSIC 1

O C

U M

E N

T NOTE TO ALL

RIDS

RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK.

ROOM Pl 37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON"T NEED' TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR ENCL 24

70 341 1

HOPPER AND Ass @CIATES sNCINE5t$

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1 FERMI 2 TURBINE FAILURE POST EVENT EARTHOUAKE INSTRUMENTATION DATA EVALUATION l

Prepared for:

Detroit Edison Company Enrico Fermi 2 Job Site l

6400 North Dixie Highway Newport,MI 48166 Prepared by:

Hopper and Associates n.- r 1

300 Vista Del Mar v"

~~

Redondo Beach. CA 90277 n56061 Eebruary 4,4,,,

NE*iSSI&o!888$2 5t gg S

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HOPPER AND ASSOCIATES anclNEERS i

i l

TABLE OF CONTENTS PACE I

l 1.0 introduction 1

l 1.1 Fermi 2 History 1

1.2 Turbine Failure 1

1.3 Shock incident i

1 1.4 Seismic Event Procedure Requirements 2

1.5 Results 2

i 2.0 History 3

2.1 Seismic Events i

3 1

2.1.1 Previous Seismic Events 3

l 2.1.2 December 25,1993 3

1 2.2 Sequence of Events 3

l 2.2.1 Turbine Fallure and Damage 3

l 2.2.2 Shutdown 6

2.2.3 Observations 6

2.2.4 Human Sensitivity to Vibration 7

1 2.2.5 Fermi 2 Selsmic Event Procedure ReQulrements 7

{

1 3.0 Data 10 3.1 instrumentation and Location

~

l l

10 l

3.1.1 Passive Sensors 10 3.1.2 Active Sensors 10 I

l 3.2 Data Reduction 14 3.2.1 Passive Sensors 14 3.2.2 Active Sensors 14 3.2.3 Active and Passive Data Correlation Comparison 45 3.3 Results 45 4.0 Conclusion 47 i

5.0 References i

50 t

' I l

H3PPER AND Ass 3CIATES ENC 3dEWt$

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Fermi 2 History The Enrico Fermi Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant is a 1,203 MV gross Boll-ing Water Reactor located outside. Detroit, Michigan on Lake Erle.

Ferml 2 has been in commercial operation since 1988, using a turbine manufactured by English Electric of Rugby, England,'now part of G.E.C. Alsthom. The facility site is located on stable land, ard few large intensity earthquakes have occurred in the facility vicinity throughout documented history.

1.2 Turbine Failure At approximately 13:15 on December 25,1993, the turbine at the En-rico Fermi Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant failed. The turbine failure in-ciuded thrown blades, severed cooling system piping, turbine lubricating system failures, and a hydrogen explosion. Vibration im-balance In the main turbine generator activated a turbine alarm. Al-i most simultaneously, numerous alarms were received, including sels-mic event, additional turbine alarms, and reactor scram.

Upon receiving the reactor scram alarm, the operator immediately began shutdown procedures of the turbine and reactor.

1.3 Shock incident Personal observations attest to a loud noise followed by a rumbling sound which lasted two to three minutes. The selsmic event alarm and the reactor scram alarm were noticed concurrent with the loud noise and rumbling. Although the root failure cause is unclear at this time, the rumbling sound was attributed to vibration.

The passive peak shock record plates on the second and fifth floors of the Reactor / Auxiliary building recorded insignificant accelerations, or accelerations below the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE).

The active strong motion time history accelerometers in the HPCI room and at the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) pedestal base recorded measurable accelerations. The accelerometers were preset to ac-tivate at a 0.01 g level. Subsequent to this activation, two impulsive acceleration excitation spikes were recorded after approximately two and sixty three seconds. The passive peak shock record plates in the sub-basement of ths Reactor / Auxiliary building (HPCI room) also recorded measurable accelerations.

1 i

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4 HOPPER AND AS$$CIATES 1

moments I

i l

Instrumentation data from both active and passive sensors were evaluated and compared to those excitation levels in the Fermi 2 Up-f dated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to verify the continuing structural integrity of the Reactor / Auxiliary building and the eQulp-

}

ment inside the buNding.

l

(

i J

1.4 Seismic Event Procedure Reauirements Section 3.7.4.4 of the UFSAR states an earthquake has occurred if the 4

seismic trigger is activated. If the selsmic event exceeds the OBE, the i

reactor must be shut down as Quickly as possible. Before normal l

operation.can commence, the UFSAR requires data reduction, analysis, and interpretation of time histories and response spectra 3

j from instrumentation; and structure, system, and component inspec-

}

tion.

1 l

j 1.5 Results Globally, the building did not experience an OBE event,-and con-seQuently, the Reactor / Auxillary building vias never exercised near OBE excitation levet as evidenced by the insignificant accelerations i

measured on the second and fifth floors of the building.1.lkewise,

{

the eQulpment on the second and higher floors was never exercised near OBE excitationlevels.

Below the second floor, at the RPV pedestal, the active instrumenta-tion show OBE exceedences at high frequencies and both active and passive instrumentation exhibit OBE exceedences in the HPCI room.

However, no anornalles were observed during the event, and a cur-a f

sory inspection of both building and equipment after the event Indi-cates there to be no apparent problems.

1 j

The two distinct tremors recorded by the active instrumentation 4

mounted to the structural foundation exhibit those characteristics f

that would be anticipated from a surface wave system emanating from an impact at an adjacent surface location. These waves locally pass through the structural foundation with the path of the particle motion theoretically describing a single retrograde ellipse. They pos-4 sess none of the energy characteristics of tectonic earthquake waves and do not result in the global structural excitation experienced i

during a traditionalseismic event.

i j

2-4 1

f i

HOPPER AND ASSCclATES 3fCINEWt5 2.0 HISTORY 2.1 Seismic Events 2.1.1 Previous Seismic Events Fermi 2 is located in a relatively seismic stable area.

AD-proximately fifteen intensity VI (Modified Mercalli Scale) or.

greater earthquakes have occurred within a two hundred mile radius in the last two hundred years (Figure 2.1.1.1). Addition-ally, nine earthquakes of intensity V or less have occurred within a fifty mile radius of the facility (Figure 2.1.1.2).

Al -

though the Fermi 2 OBE is associated with an intensity VI sels-l mic event, it is un!!kely the facility will expert 3nce such an earthquake within its lifetime.

2.1.2 December 25,1993 The National Geophysics Data Center and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration show no seismic activity for

{

December 25,1993, within a five hundred km (310 mile) radius of Detroit. The center has immediate knowledge of all seismic activity in the Detroit vicinity of intensity 111 or greater.

The most recent selsmic event within two hundred miles of the facility site had an intensity of approximately I and oc-curred in April of 1993. The passive peak shock recorder plates were callbrated and installed in July of 1993 (second and fifth floors) and September of 1993 (HPCI room). This evidence indi-Cates the passive plate records contained only.the turbine failure Incident.

2.2 Secuence of Events 2.2.1 Turbine Fallure and Damage it is beyond the scope of this document to chronically arrange i

the events of the turbine failure on December 25,1993.

At approximately 13:15 on December 25,1993, the number 3 low pressure turbine at Fermi 2 failed catastrophically. The turbine threa several blades. One blade ripped through the steel turbine casing. The other blades are believed to be In-3

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H2PPER AND AS$gCIATEs ancmasts l

side the condenser. Vibration caused measurements in excess l

of 37.5 mils peak to peak at the turbine bearings, recorded by the Diagnostic Vibration Analysis (DVA) System.

1 A small hydrogen explosion occurred near the number 9 bear-ing, and the resulting fire charred the shield wall. The fire or the steam from the turbine casing activated the fire protec-l tion system. Approximately six hundred thousand gallons of water poured into the turbine building. Additionally, a 2*

I cooling system pipe was severed, adding more water. The tur-

]

bine lubricating system also failed, and approximately seven-

~

teen thousand gallons of oil poured onto the floor. The ensu-ing mixture drained into the turbine building basement.

i Turbine vlbration tore couplings, sheared bolts, and loosened i

the excitor from the main turbine generator, t

, ~

2.2.2 Shutdown a

E The turbine failure activated the turbine, seismic event, and reactor scram alarrns, and both the turbine and the reactor proceeded to shutdown.

All safety systems responded to achieve a satisfactory shutdown of the turbine and the reac-1 j

tor. The event was declared an alert at approximately 13:52 due to fire potential, and later downgraded to an unusual i

event i

i 2.2.3 Observations 1

No personnel were in the Vicinity of the turbine failure. Al-most all personnel nearby heard a loud noise, followed by a i

rumbling, which lasted two to three minutes. Some personnel l

felt vibrations through the building. Almost simultaneously, personnel in the buildings heard the reactor scram alarm.

Those near the turbine building reported heavy smoke.

Several personnel were directed to inspect the turbine build-ing for fire. They noted damaged parts on the third floor, and a small fire at the generator brushes, which they extinguished with a CO2 fire extinguisher.

Remaining T sonnel proceeded in duties as directed to facilitate the.eactor shutdown..--

I HOPPER AND ASSOCIATES anctusses l

2.2.4 Human Sensitivity to Vibration i

Work conducted by numerous researchers have established physiologicallimits of human perceptibility to vibration. The studies demonstrate humans can detect vibrations well below l

the current instrument sensitivity at Fermi 2 (Figure 2.2.4.1),

a i

2.2.5 Fermi 2 Selsmic Event Procedure Requirements I

The turbine failure activated the seismic alarm and neces-sitated the reactor shutdown. The Fermi 2 UFSAR includes a j

required response when the seismic event alarm is activated (Figure 2.2.5.11. If the seismic event exceeds the OBE, the reac-1 tor must be shutdown as Quickly as possible. The decision to shutdown involves examining the active traces from the HPCI room, utilizing the playback mode of recording instrumenta-tion, and removing the HPCI room record plates and examin-1 Ing the data compared to the OBE.

If the seismic event 3

produced a horizontal acceleration greater than 0.05 g, or the relevant OBE is exceeded, the facility is shutdown, and further operation is not resumed until analysis and/or refurbishing of necessary structures, systems, or components is completed.

The Wrbine failure necessitated the reactor shutdown im-mediately, precluding the shutdown operating oecision described above.

Additionally, the UFSAR requires data reduction, analysis, and 4

interpretation of accelerometer time histories and response spectra from active instruments; response spectra from pas-i sive instruments; and physical facility structures, systems, and components inspection. If the event does not exceed Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) Validation levels, the item is con-sidered safe for f:Jrther operation, if the eve.nt exceeds valldation levels, fur 1v.tr investigation is reQuif6d.

Investigation may include establishing realistic equipment fragility levels, detailed dynamic response analysis, or inspec-tion. The investigation results in the item proclaimed accept-able, or the item refurbished, for normal facility operation to

commence, a

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3.0 DATA

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3.1 Instrumentation and Location j

3.1.1 Passive Sensors Engdahl PSR1200 peak shock recorders are the passive record-Ing instrumentation located in the Reactor / Auxillary building.

The sensors record Various ground motion and 'in structure j

response shock spectra in three orthogonal directions. The i

sensors contain twelve reeds, each with a diamond tipped i

. stylus, which etches a scribe mark on a metal record plate.

j j

Each reed b tuned to a predominant structural frequency, j

ranging from approximately two-to twentyfive Hz.

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tion of the dynamic excitation at a particular frequency. Reed i

deflection B calibrated as a linear function of acceleration.

j After a seismic event, the plates are removed and the reduced data estabibhes the response spectra.

(*

J Three Engdahl recorders are located in the Reactor / Auxillary i

building, in the HPCI room, the second floor, and the fifth

{

floor (Figures 3.1.1.1 through 3.1.1.3). The recorders are posi-tioned to measure accelerations in the vertical, north / south, j

and east / west directions at each sensor.

4 1

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seismic event or approximately every 18 months. The plates j

for the Reactor / Auxillary building were last calibrated and re-i placed in July of 1993 on the second and fifth floors, and Sep-l tember of 1993 in the HPCI room.

1 3.1.2 Active Sensors Teledyne/Geotech Model 37800 strong motion triaxial time his-tory accelerometers are the active recording instrumentation 4

located in the Reactor / Auxillary building. The active system includes the accelerometer sensors, seismic triggers, MTS 1008 monitor and recorder, PMO101/201 playback system, and an r

alarm panel. The accelerometers have a preset event trigger

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at 0.01 g, which energizes and activates the recording system.

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The system records over a frequency range of 0 to 40 H2 for a specified time length after motion has stopped. The output I

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HOPPER AND AssoclATEs sucmasts produces a time history strip chart and a magnetic data tape '

of the event. The active instrumentation provides time his-i tories from which response spectra may be generated.

'l Two Teledyne/Geotech accelerometers are located in the Reactor / Auxiliary building, in the HPCI room sub-basement and at the RPV pedestal (Figure 3.1.1.1).

The accelerometers measure longitudinal, transverse, and vertical acceleration, which correspond to the vertical, north / south, and east / west directions of the passive recorders.

3.2 Data Reduction 3.2.1 Passive Sensors The record plates from the three passive sensors in the Reactor / Auxillary building were removed for data reduction.

The plates were inspected for scribe marks, and the calculated accelerations were plotted against the relevant OBE and SSE response spectra (Tables 3.2.1.1 through 3.2.1.9 and Figures 1

3.2.1.1 through 3.2.1.9).

Additionally, - the instrument sen-sitivity was plotted. The passive sensor is capable of measur-Ing accelerations greater than 0.01 g. The Engdahl peak shock recorders have 2% damping, and have i 3% accuracy at 19 The sensors were last calibrated and the plates replaced in July of 1993 (second and fifth floors) and in September of 1993 (HPCI room).

3.2.2 Active Sensors Subsequent to the activation of the instrumentation, two dis-i tinct tremors were recorded. The first event occurred at ap-proximately two seconds, with a duration of approximately 0.1 second, and the second event occurred at approximately one minute, also with a duration of approximately 0.1 second.

Time history acceleration data recorded by the two active sen-sors in the Reactor / Auxiliary building were digitized by Detroit Edison Company (Figures 3.2.2.1 through 3.2.2.6).

A simple Fortran routine was used to produce the response spectra.

The generated response spectra were plotted against the relevant OBE and SSE response spectra (Figure 3.2.2.7 through 3.2.2.12). -

I HOPPER AND ASSSCIATES s a nauts

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2.11 2.5 0.098 0.349 0.034 2

2.54 4.25 0.167 0.528 0.088 3

3.45 4.5 0.177 0.865 0.153 4

4.07 6.25 0.25 1.24 0.31 5

5.1 2.5 0.10 1.98 0.19 6

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D50-N005 Passive Instrumentation, Vertical Direction Records HPCI Room Table 5.2.1.1 HOPPER AND ASSOCIATES anceasts Reed tio.

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1 2

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HGPPER AND AsssetATES secasms l

Reed No.

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1 1.96 2.75 0.108 0.376 0.041 2

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l i

D30 N005 Passive instrumentation, East / West Direction Records - HPCI Room Table 3.2.1.5 HSPPER AND ASSCCIATES 54CINEWt$

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1 2.05 0.322 2

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6.35 3.101 7

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12.59 11.7 10 15.98 19.23 11 20.49 29.85 12 25.18 45.72 D30-N601 Passive instrumentadon, Vertical Direction Records - Second Moor Table 3.2.1.4 18-

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D30 N601 Passive Instrumentation, East / West Direction Records Second Moor l

Table 3.2.1.6 i

HEPPER AND Ass ctATes ancu e sts Reed No.

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D30-N006 Passive instrumentation, Vertical Direction Records - Fifth Floor Table 3.2.1.7 21-l

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//// N A A NA \\TNN'/// N A /N y X/// lX /T X \\ MN2X/// X/N X i W/} /\\ /s % )M$W/ /N /\\ 3 A N =. u is o u u no no enco \\ FREQUENCY (H2) i D50-N002 Accelerometer, East / West Response Spectra -ItPV Pedestal Mgure 5.2.2.12 l 44- l HOPPER AND Associates sucmasts 3.2.3 Active and Passive Data Correlation Comparison I The HPCI room passive instrumentation data for the vertical-and east / west directions exhibited similar data trends and ac-celeration magnitudes compared to the active instrumenta-tion. However, precise amplitude correlation at all frequencies was not possible. Reasons for the anomalies likely are associated with the short duration of the events, and the intrinsic differences between the recording methods of the two instrumentation systems. To fully understand the discrepancies, a further comprehen-sive study would need to be undertaken. However, the phenomenological similarity of the data is sufficient quantita-tively to establish essential structuraland equipment response characteristics at this time. 3.3 Results The turbine failure on December 25, 1993, did not result in a sig-nificant Reactor / Auxillary building dynamic excitation or a building global exceedence of the OBE. This was demonstrated by the insig-nificant accelerations recorded by the passive sensors on the second and fifth floors of the Reactor / Auxillary building. Below the second floor in the foundation, the building and eaulo-ment experienced local OBE and SSE exceedences recorded by the active and passive sensors located at the RPV pedestal and the HPCI room sub basement. The active instnJmentation at the RF/ pedestal exhibit OBE and SSE exceedences at higher frequencies in all directions. The RPV pedestal sensor in the vertical direction is less severe than the HPCI room verti-cal direction, while the other directions are similar. Instrumentation in the HPCI room also experienced local OBE and SSE exceedences. The active instrumentation exhibit OBE and SSE ex-ceedences in the vertical direction, and OBE exceedences in the high frequencies in the north / south and east / west directions. The passive exhibit OBE exceedences in the low and high frequencies. The HPCI room vertical and east / West passive plates show very similar data trends and acceleration magnitudes compared to the HPCI room ac-tive vertical and east / West data records. 45- ~ ^ l t i HCPPER AND ASSOCIATES anceNEWts l j Generally, the event at time two seconds was more severe than the l event at time one minute, i All eQulpment in the building functioned as expected during the tur- { blne failure and reactor shutdown. An inspection after the event produced no Indications of structural damage. Furthermore, the ex-i tant safe shutdown equipment adequacy was proven by tne satisfac-l tory safe shutdown experience. I i ( e d 2 4 HOPPER AND ASSOCIATES j 4.0 CONCI.USION l The turbine failure at Fermi 2 on December 25,1993, should not be com-pared with a tectonic earthquake, and globally, the Reactor / Auxillary bulld-Ing did not experience OBE excitation levels. The turbine failure was a shock l Incident, resulting in dynamic response phenomena or two single cycle Waves propagating through the building foundation without exciting the l structure above (Figure 4.0.1). An earthquake imparts long duration, broad range frequencies, and high j energy into a structure, while a shock impulse Imparts short duration, high amplitude, and low energy into a structure. Industry standards recognize shock Impulses do not cause significant structural stresses (Figure 4.0.2). l The shock wave length resulting from the turbine event at Fermi 2 was small compared to the building, and therefore produced local high accelerations, but the short duration, low energy, and small deformations associated with these high frequency accelerations did not compromise the structural in-l tegrity of the Reactor / Auxillary building or the equipment therein. I i 9 l 47 _ - _.., _. - ~ _. HOPPER AND ASSOCIATES B004NEBt5 e Il ca react 0R

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62' 204' 4 SECTION LOOKING SOUTH i l HORIZONTAL f 15S' 13S' t=0 .d \\ 1 I i VERTICAL 475' 20$' t=0 schematic mepresentation of shock impulse wave Length Compared to Building Dimension Figure 4.0.1 48-4 HOPPER AND ASSOCIATES swcasens I ~ l IMPULSE TREMOR I l [1 '~~ f / / N N EARTHQUAKE Schematic Representation of impulse Tremor Versus Earthquake Wave - Vertical Direction Mgure 4.0.2 49- H3PPER AND Ass ciATEs ovammes

5.0 REFERENCES

Detrdit Edison Company, Enrico Fermi 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis 1)

Report.

2)

Hasrounl/ Hopper; Detroit Edison, Enrico Fermi 2 Site Visit Fermi 2 Turbine Failure - Post Event Earthquake Evaluation; January 11,1994.

3)

Detroit Edison Company; Technical and Engineering Services Report 94H711; Digitizing Seismic Monitor Magnetic Tape Data for December 25,1993 Actuation; January 17,1994.

4)

Detroit Edison Company; Technical and Engineering Services Report 94R711;- Analysis of DVA Vibration Alarm /Coastdown Magnetic Tape for Fermi 2 MTG; January 11,1994.

5)

The Ralph M. Parsons Company; Enrico Fermi 2 Atomic Power Plant; Recommended Earthquake Recording System; Job No. 4577 3; January 1972.

6)

Engdahl Enterprises; Selsmic Instruments for Nuclear Power Plants; November 1977.

7)

Detroit Edison Company; Written Observations from Fermi 2 Person-nel; December 25,1993.

B)

The Cleveland Electric illuminating Company; Seismic Event Evalua-tion Report; Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50440, 50441; February 1986.

9)

Detroit Edison Company; Vendor Manuals VMCl143.1 and VMCl143.3; December 18,1989.

4 -..

ML20029D890

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