ML20028B314
| ML20028B314 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 11/15/1982 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028B304 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8211300279 | |
| Download: ML20028B314 (26) | |
Text
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'4 UNITED STATES f '.,
i( 7 NUCLEAR REGULA, TORY COfiiMISS.10N I
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..a u OPERAilliG LICEliSE h?F-15 SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GEliERATING STATION, UNIT 3 DOCKET f40. 50-362 I.
Introduction o
On February 6,1981, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Ur.its 2 and 3 (50!.35 2 and 3, or San Onofre 2 and 3), NUREG-0712.
The SER covered all non-TMI-related aspects' of our safety review of San Onofre 2 and 3.
Go February 25, 1981, the staff issued Supplement No. I to the SER which addressed the TMI-related aspects of our safety review.
Supplements No. 2 through 6 were issued in May 1931, September 1981, January 1982,
- February 1932, and June 1982, respectively.
These Supplements addressed issues that had previously been open.
Cn January 11,19E.2 the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board issued a Partial Ini::a1 Oe:ision, ar.: on ay la, 1952 tr.e B :.rd i.ssued its Initial Decision relating :: :*.e cre ation of San On:'re 2 and 3.
On February 16, 1922,
- erati.; ti erse ';;. F-10 was issue: au:horizing ice ;;wer operation cf ri. Dr.0're Unit 2, at: On September 7, 1982, NDF-10 vas acer.ded to permit ra 3:::, : f
.'-M : 2 at full p:wer.
etter ca:ec 5e::t Cer 27, IE32, the Southerr, Calif rnia EdisCn Ccmpany
( E E ) I : a t e ~ ". ' i ". E i
.' ' : f r e U ~ i : 2 n:Lld... "be rei:y :0 en:er the fLel I:atir; ar: 1 :.: ~;..er testi.g phase of *ne s*artup pic9 Fan by aD0ut
.0ve~ er if, 1932.
The.'dC staff nas reviewed the San OnOfre 2 anc 3 applicaticn and based cr. car review we nave cre:ared inis safety evaluation to support the issuance cf 0: era:ing License No. NPF-15 for San Onc're Uni: 3.
As is disscused l
in the SER, its supplerents, and herein, at this time all previously open ite : rela:in; to feal loadir.; and icw power testing of San Cnofre Unit 3 have been resolved.
A discussion of these and other items is given below.
II.
Evaluation A. Environmental Oualification In Section 3.11.2 of Supplement No, a to the SER (issued in January, 1932), se con:lucec that the San Onofre 2 and 3 envircnnental qualification and cecu entation program reets :ne requirements of NUREG-05SS and Commission Memorancum and Order CLI-20-21 and are acceptable, provided that:
1.
'er :c June
- ,19E2, the appli: ants ' licensee ) must ::nfirr
- .a:.* eir r : - :
for rair:3i-ir; e:uir ent cualification per
- '.a FC:uiri n't! :# 's-EEG-[EEE hai teer i~';Ie~ented.
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1951 submittal shall be completed on the schedules defined in the tables.
In February 1982, Operating License fiPF-10 was issued, authorizing fuel loading and low power testing of San Onofre Unit 2.
fiPF-10 was conditioned to require that by June 30, 1982, San Onofre 2 r.ust comply with the provisions of fiUREG-0588, and that complete.
and auditable records must be available and maintained at a central location documenting compliance with tiUREG-0588.
However, the June 30, 1982 deadline by which electrical equipment must be
'q alified has b ee n rem ved as a license condition for all operating u
plants by a recently issued rule (47 F.R. 28363, June 30,1982),
and a new deadline will be imposed by a forthcoming revision to that rule.
e At the staff's request, SCE provided information on the status of environmental qualification at San Onofre Unit 2 and 3 by letter dated October 22, 1982.
The hRC staff has reviewed the environmental c,ualification infer atico proviced in SCE's letter cf October 28, 1982, and has found it acceptable for Unit 3 the fcilowing reasons, i
i 1.
SCE stated *.hc; all ecuipr.ent excep the auxiliary fee: water (AFW) uns m::crs r.est: l,"JREG-05E5 cuidelines for a Cites:ry II plant r
(:EEE 223-1971 ::andard).
San Cnofre 3 is a Ca:egory II plant.
ine AFW pump :::rs are dis:ussed below.
2.
SCE stated tr.a: ctrole:e-and av:itable files d::u e,:ing :r.e califica.ico status for all ecuipment are available and maintained in a ce. tral loca:icn in the SCE general office.
3.
5:E stated tra: :r.e enviennmental qualifica 4cn surveil. lance end raintenarce progran procedures are scheduled for full impler,entation
. the firs: refueling outage, eich is censistent with the fiRC
,letter to SCE of August 30, 1982.
With regard to the AF'n' pump motors, in meetings between the licensee '
1 ar.d the tiRC staff on May 2' and June 24, 1982, and in letters dated June 10 and July 12, 1982, the licensee informed the staff that failures of the environmentally qualified cast iron bearings of the AFW pump r.otors had occurred.
To allow the startup test. prcgran to, continue, the cast iron bearincs had been replaced with Babbitt-metal bearings.
Mcwever, the Eabbitt bearings are not cualified for caeration in the environment :nat they would experience in the event of a steam line break in the IJW punp rcom.
In their letter of July 12, 1982, SCE evaluated a number of possible soluticns to the problem cnd re:0 mended that augmented ir. service 3
9.:p;;.i:n M ;erf:~id on -Se 1.;1-I:ne in e A% p rp rc; o redute f5 :L!i!:' Thi: fEllure Of P e lir.
This V:ulC, in 1.elih::
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steam line) provices a casis for interim piant operation, that ultimately a hardware modification is necessary to protect the AFW systen against the potential common-mode failure of all three pumps due to the failure of a single line.
Ey letter dated Octoberl29, 1952, SCE provided additional evaluations of the feasibility and costs associated with three potential plant modifications to resolve the problem.
SCE concluded that the cost-s of the plant modifications outweighed their benefits, and again proposed augrented inservice inspection as a long-tern solution.
The staff has reviewed the October 29, 1982 submittal and has again concluded that inservice inspection is not acceptable as a icng-term solution, and that a hardware modification is required, although not necessarily one of the three modifications proposed in the October 29, 1952 letter.
Consequently, we will condition the San Onofre 3 operating license to require that SCE propose a hardware modification to resolve this problen prior to exceeding 5 percent power.
In the interim, daily instection of the IJW Oucp roc, stean line will be recuired to. provide an early incicaticn of leaks in the steam line. 50 that it nay be isolated, thereby acce;; ably rec;cir; the likelihood of catastrophic failure.
E. ::st-Accicen: : nit:rinc Instrunentation
- :- Se :icn 7.E.1 cf the SER we concluced :ta: the San On:fre 2 and 3 ; s:-accicen:
- ':c-ing instr;rentatic was a:ce;;able because it te:s :ne rec:- ; caticns :f Re;;1a;;ry 5; ice 1.97, Revisio-1,
'Ir. :rcrentatic. fcr Light '.later-Coolec lL: lear Fcear Piants to Assess Flant anc Environs Conditi:ns During and F:liowing an Accident." Since that tire, Revision 2 to Regula :ry Guide 1.97 nas teen iss'ved, and y letter cc:e "ay 13,1952, Sr.E descriced the present and planned cc aiiance to Hegulatory Guide 1.97, Revisien 2 fer San Onofre 2 and 3.
The l'ay 13, 1952 letter indicated that SCE inten:s to conply with Revision 2 of the regulatory guide prior to startup follcwing the first refaeling of eacn unit.
(
It is the staf f's-pos'ition that full compliance to Revision 2 of Regulatory j
Guide 1.97 is not recuired pricr to the first refueling outage.
The-s;aff has reviewed the instrumentation that e'xists for Units 2 and 3 prior to their initial operation and has d.etermined that.there is sufficient instrenentation available to allow the operators to ccpe with pla,t cencitions that might result frca analyzed design basis l
events.
On this basis the staff concludes tnat San Onofre 3 can be allowad to operate curinc its first fuel cycle with ut ur.due risk to the health and safety of the public.
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k The proposed NRC position, as stated in SECY-82-1113 (September 8, 1982) requires that conformance to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2 be addressed in the broader context of the requirements.for energe.ncy response capability.
The staff's review of the overall ccmpliance of San Onofre 3 to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2 will be completed on a schedule consistent with.SCE's commitment to make the modifications required for conformance with the subject regulatory guide revision prior to startup after the first refueling.
4
~
Until our review is complete, however, we conclude that operation of San Onofre 3 is acceptable, based on compliance with Revision I to Regulatory Guide 1.97.
~
C. Fire Protection In the SER we stated that based on SCE's commitments to modify the f acility,
,<e believed that the San On:fre 2 ar.d 2 fire protection progra wil? meet the recuiremer.ts of Apsendix R to 10 CFR 50
- v. ten the cc--itted t ifi:cticos hac teer, cc pleted.
H:never, since A;pencix R dic not a; ply to San Onofre 2 anc S at the time our fire t
- rctecti n review was con:ucted, we did n:t re uire SCE to s:ecifically-evaluate all a;e::s of the fire protecticn pr;;ran for cc pliance
,;ith Ap;endix R.
Sir:e that ine, our fire ;r tection criteria have
- sen deli sa:et in 'a:EG-CEOC (:he Stancard Retiew Flar), Se:ticn
..E.1, 5..ich a'.sc ir:iu:es i;:e cix R.
' e :teref:re ccr.citioned the San Cnofre Unit 2 operating li:ense to require SCE to submit an e.aivation of tne plant agains: the criteria of Sectic'n 9.5.1 of
' REG-0EOC prier to ei.ceeding E percent power.
In the interim, piant cperation was considered acceptatie because of the staff's tudit reviei. cescrited in tne SER indicated ccr.plian:e with A;pendix R or an e:uivalent level of protectien.
Ey letter. dated July 22, 1982, SCE rrcvidcd a ccrparison of the :iant fire protection program acainst the criteria of Section 9.5-1 of NUREG-0300.
In accition, the letter identified inconsistencies in the SER and its supplements.
By letter dated July 27, 1982, SCE committed to meet the technical recuirenents of Section III.G " Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability," III.J "Emercency Lighting", and III.0 "0il Collection System for Reactor Coolant Pump" of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 and proposed plant r.edifications to ccmply with our guidelines.
Our l
evaluaticn of each of the ret;ested deviaticr.s and the proposed rodifications is as follows:
1 i
(
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2
l.
Deviations from Section 9.E.1 of NUREG-0200 E ? CMEB 9.5-1 Item C.3.b 1..
C 3.b recbamends that the fire brigace leader and at 1 ;s t a brigade members should have sufficient knowledge if pl..; safety-related systems to assess the effects of~
re suppressants on safe shutdown capability as evidenced by possession of a reactor operator's license or equivalent knowledge.
SCE currently has a full time fire brigade 4
consisting of five members on each shift, whose sole
- function is fire protection.
The brigade members have had training in plant systems in order to develop basic skills with which to assess the effects of fire on safe
~
shutdown capability; however they do not have knowledge equivalent to an operator.
To compensate, each shift.
will also have an assistant control cperatcr to serve' as tr.e sixth.erber of the fire brigate, and to assess the ef fects of the fire ar.c fire suppressar.ts on safe s..;t erar ca:Stility an: : - ricate t.e sa e to the watch engireer in the cc. trol TOor.
- e agree tr.at
,e additicr :f the assi:ta.
c:r. trol operator t:.'e fire brigade aili provide 2. 5::epta:le level of
- ll.
Syste.s k C- 'ed?e wit"i, the #i e or#;a:e.
The
- .ili#icati:- C f *. re # # Pe oric;i i
~9 Lers are eOuivalent to
.ncse reco encec oy tne guicelires of :ter. C.3.5 of EDT C"EE 9.5-1.
Trerefore, we fd r:' :ne SCE request for a deviation acce; table.
b.
ETP Ct'.EE 9.5-1 Iter C.5a(5)
Item C.5.a(5) recc-ends that areas protected by total flooding gas sappression systens have elect.rically super ised self-closing fire doors.
The Unit 3 computer room, located on the 30' elevation of the cuxil'iary building, are protected by total flooding Halon systems.
The dccrs to the computer rcom are not electrically supervised.
The computer room is located in close proximity to the main control room which is continuously manned.
If the computer room coors were left open, prompt action by the cperator is adecuate to enture their proper cicsure.
Eased en the above t.e conclude
- hat the ccor supervision provided for the computer l
recms is equivalent to that required by Iter C.5.a of BlP CMES 9.5-1.
Therefore, we find the SCE request for a deviation i
acceptable.
i
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c.
BTP CMES 9.5-1 Iten C.6.a(1)
Item C.6a(1) recommends that fire detection systems be provided for all areas that contain safety-related equipment or present a fire exposure. hazard to safety-related ecuipment.
In our SER, we stated tnat SCE had committed to provide fire detection systems in all safety-related areas.
SCE-has now proposed that 23 fire areas within the plant not have fire detection systems.
4 The basis for this deviation is that the fire area has a low fire load, the equipment in the fire area consists of tanks or piping only, and/or the area was previously reviewed by
,us and, subsequently, approved.
We accept a deviation from this requirement for the following areas because tnere are essentially no combustibles in the area:
Nabe Fire Zone 8
Maste Gas Decay Tanks la Ecric A ic Ma<,e-up Tank Rocms 15 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tant 2:
Ccncensate Storage Tank Rcom 21 Nuclear Service Kater Storage Tank 23 Spen-Fuei ?::i Heat Ex: banger Room 27 Le:down Ee:- Exchanger Roc s 3E
'Letcc.n Centrol valve Rc:ms 42 CCW Heat Exchanger Rocns 51 Eoric Acid Make-up Pums Robas-54 Shutdown Heat Exchanger Rcoms 55 Com; nents cooling Water Surge ' lank Rooms 69 Salt Water Cooling Piping R oms 70 Duct Shaft 75 Refueling Water Storage Tank 20 Duct Shaft 81 Duct Shaft 82 Auxiliary Feedwater Pipe Tunnel We co not accept a deviation from the fire detection requirement for the following fire areas because~of -the fire loadino in nese areas:
~
_ ire Zone Name 11 Main Steam Relief Valve Rooms i
62 Volume Control Tank Rocms 72 Ce?-ider 201, Centrol Em idir; Eleva:icn 70' t
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r Ey letter cated August 31, 1952, SCE committed to provide fire detection in fire zones 11, 62, 72, 28, and 45 prior to startup folicwing the first refueling outage.
We find this prcposed installation date unacceptable and will condition the 1.icense to require completion of installation prior to exceeding 5% of full power and to require SCE to propese appropriate modifications to the. plant Technical Specifications.
Because of the low level of hazard' associated with plant operation below 5% of full power, we concluded that the above actions are acceptable during this period.
d.
STP CMEB 9.5-I Item C.7.f _
Item C.7.f recommends that redundant safety-related panels remote from the control room be separated from each other by a minumum of three-hour fire rated barriers.
Additionally, panels providing remote shutdown capability should be separated from the concrol rcom complex by a minmum of three-hour fire rated barriers.
SCE has pr:vided alternate safe shutd:<m cabability independent of the control room and cable spreacing room.
Fire zone 66 contains the train E e
te shutdovm panels.
The train A and E remote shutdowr canels are not separated from e::F ::her b.,
a three-htur fire rate tarrier.
The remote shut-d:,c- :Enels a e electrically isolated frcm the c:ntrol rcom and are separa:e: by a w:-5:ur rated fire barrier, previcusly fcund a:ce::::le te: ;se of the 1:e fuel icac.
- r the even: cf a fire in either the control rcor er the remete shu cown panel, the two i
areas are electrically anc physically separated..Therefore a fire in cr.e area will nct affect ne other areas, and the plant
}
can be :a fely shutdo.a frca the una'f acted area.
Eased cn the above evaluation', we conclude that the separation of the remote-shut c,,n panel is ecuivalent to the guideline of Item C.7.f.
l Therefore, we find the SCE re:uest for t'1is deviation acceptable.
l e.
BTP g.5 1 Ite,m C.7.i Iten C.7.i reccarends that automatic fire suppression systems installed to ccmbat diesel generator fires be designed to cperate when the diesel generator is running without i
affecting the diesel.
The San Onofre 2 and 3 diesel generators are not designed and have not been tested to cperate while being sprayed by the sprinkler system.
The arrangement of the ciesel generators is such that if spray deflectors are installed, they would render the extinguishing system ineffective.
In addition, redundant trains of diesel generattes Orctected by separate strinkler systers are provided.
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In the event one train is rendered inoperative due to fire or inadvertent operation of the sprinkler system, the redundant train would be unaffected.
Based on the above evaluation we find that one train of diesel generators needed for safe shutdown will be maintained free of fire damage.
Therefore, ecuivalent protection is provided to that recommended by Item C.7.i of BTP CMEB 9.51.
Therefor ~e, we find the SCE request for this deviation acceptable.
f.
BTP CMEB 9.51 I em C.7.k
' Item C.7.k recommends that redundant trains, of safety-related pumps be separated by three-hour fire rated barriers.
Originally there was one mechanical driven and one steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump in the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump room.
The room is provided with a sprinkler systen.
The two pumps were not separated by three-hour rated fire barrier as our guidelines recommended.
Instead, we accepted a) anclosure of the cable to the motor driven punp in a cne-hour rated wrao; c) :ne i,stallati n of a drain to rencse any possi;ie oil leakage, fr: :ne steam driven : mos; and-c) the existing missile shield as a :-artial barrier between the two pu ps, as an ecuivalent level ;f ;rotecticn.
Since our SER w:s iss_ed, a third AF'n'
- n: hat ;een installed in the pump ro:m, a.
no a ditior.al fire ;rcte::icn sasures have been provided.
Ey le::er ca:ed Ja', 17, '.!!2, S~E stated that at:itional fi e ; ::e::icn measures were u-e:essary anc ceuid be detrir. ental to puma naintenance.
Koeever, following additional discussions with 'the. staff, SCE prc;:se: to install a metal shrced en the turoine lube oil syster ar.a install an accitional sp.-inkler systen ebove the lute oil systen pricr to startup followine the first refueling
- outage, n's fir.c the prcposed modifica icos acceptable.
- However, we fin: the pr: Dosed in;iementation date una:ceptable.
Therefore, l
ue will condition the San Onofre 3 license to recuire cocpletion of the above nodifications prior to exceeding 5% of full power l
and to recuire SCE to propose appropriate m ifications to the l
plant Technical Specifications.
Because of the-low level of hazard asscciated with plant operations below 5% of full power, we ccnclude that plant operation is acceptable during this period prior to the ccmpletion of the above codifications, g.
BTP CMES 9.5-1 Item C.6.b(6)
Item C.6.b(6) recommends that each fire pump and its driver i
and controls be separated from the remainir; fire pumps by Free $
r fire ated bz. riers.
Tr.e San On:fre 2 ' ire pumps are arited :y r.ree-!. ur fire rated :;rr'a s. In :ne
.3 9
by a fire, fire fignting water wculd still be available by using the plant fire truck and/or the interconnection between the Unit I and Units 2 and 3 fire mains.
Based on the above evaluation, we accept this deviation as providing an eqpivalent level of safety to that recommended by the guidelines in Item C.6.b.
Therefore, the SCE request for a deviation in this area is acceptable.,
h.
ETP CMEB 9.5-1 Item C.7.a(1)(e)
Item C.7.a(1)(e) reccamends that the reactor coolant pumps be equipped with an oil collection system which is designed, engineered and installed such that its failure will not lead to fire during normal or design basis accident conditions and 3'
that there is reasonable assurance that it will withstand a safe shutdown earthquake.
SCE's interpretation of this guideline is correct.
An acceptable oil collection system has been provided.
Therefore, a request for a. deviation is not needed.
2.
!E: ! E e ents !: rich are Ir:cnsistent Llith Inferr.atic-Provided oy 5;i:
Ey letter :a ed J.ly 22, 1952, SCE brcu;h: to cur a::entien
- the fcli: in; c:- en s we rade in the SER.
e.
- a;e E-ZC c' :ne 5EF., we state: that "All valves in the fire :rc:ection..a:er sucply syste. are electrically s;;ervisec exces: for the post incica;or valves, which are in the underground yarc main syster.."
SCE has' stated l
- na: tFe header isola:icn valves for seismic stancpires and leckee ccen ranual isolation velvec to deluge systens are n:: ele: rically supervised.
We 'inc : hat this ce: hod of contrciling valve pcsition is in accordance with fiFPA Standard 26, " Supervision of Valves."
It" provides a level of protection equivalent to Item C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, and is, therefore, acceptable.
~
~
b.
On pages 9-20 and 9-21 of the SER, we stated that; "Tne areas that have been equipped with water suppression systems include the following:
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E er; crc;. A.C. Uni: Ec:r 21, Cta :cEl ril crs -
.:ne 9
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- In.
Emergency A.C. Un'it Room 301, Charcoal Filters -
Zone 9 Piping Penetration Area (El 30') Charcoal Filter -
Zone 28 Control Room Complex - Zone 31*
1
- Turbine Lab
- Instrument Repair Area
- Storace, Rooms 249,_251, 252
- Fan Roons 219 and 221, Charcoal Filter - Zone 32A Corridor 442, Elevation 70', Axuiliary Building -
Zone 72*"
SCE has stated that:
l') manual water suppressi:n systems are 4
i provided for the charcoal filters only.
Ik area sprinklers are creviced in these zones; 2) Corridor 401 was incorrectly i:e-tified as ::rric':r 4:2; and 2) the use Of :hsse areas has cranged with the acciticn of the technical supp;rt center (TSC).
We find that:
- 1) the r.ar.ual sprinkler system for the
- nar:cEl filters pr vices a level of safety equivalent to the guicelines in Ite: C.E.c of BTP C"EE 5.5-1 and is, therefore 1
2-acce;;ab'e; 2) :he trange in identification of :crridor 4:2 as
- cr-id:r 101 is a :y; graphical err:r and ie will corre:: it; an: 2) by le::er cate: Jul;. 27,15E2, SCE c:rmitted to provide fire cetec:icn and portable water-type extinguishers in the technical su::or center cor. plex in lieu of aut:matic sprinklers.
Ease; on :ne icw combustible loadir.; in this area, we find the
- r
- pesed fire protection acceptable.
Mcwever,+e find the proposed inclerentaticn date unacceptable.
We will condition the San l
Onofre 3 license te recuire installaticn cf fire detection and i
p:r:atle extincuishers in the TSC prior to exceeding 5% of full power, and to recuire SCE to propose appropriate modifications to the technical specifications.
c.
On Page 9-21 of the SER we stated:
"Atourrequest,theapplicantsha$einstalledstandpipehose stations in five [ sic] :0nes 4,10, 28 and 45."
SCE has not ins:alled standpipe hose stations in fire :cnes 28 and 45.
Ey le::er dated Auccst 31, 1982, SCE committed to install fire detection in these two fire zones prior to startup following the first refueling outage.
We find the proposed modification acceptable.
However, we find the pro?csed irole entation date
- -'
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- e v. f:nciti:n the Sa-Cr:fre 2 license to
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..._: c..c re:uire CE :c pr ::ae a;;r: riate cccifications to tne plan Technical ~ Specifications.
Because of the low level of hazard associated with plant operations below 5% of full power, we conclude the above actions are acceptable during this period.
Moreover, based on the low fire load in these fire zones and.the availability of extra lengths of fire hose on the plant fire truck, we conclude that a level of safety ecuivalent to that recommended in the guidelines of Item C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 will be provided, and'is, th'erefore, acceptable.
d.
On page 9-24 of the SEP. we stated:
"However, the ventilation ducts which penetrate the heavy concrete walls enclosing the charging pump room (Zone 50) were not provided with dampers.
At our recuest, the afplicants have committed to provide 1 1/2 hour dampers for these duct penetrations."
SCE stated that this ccr :itrent was in error.
Sy letter cated July 27,19E2, SCE ccmnittec to orovide a 1 1/2 F:u-fire car:er for c e cf -he :r.ree charging rump rooms.
Tne charging p.:rps are separa:ec from each cther by three-hour ratec barriers.
Coly or.e charging purc is reeded for safe shutd;e.
Each re:- has ar i r.de:er den: E.%C cc:t to the corridor.
SCE nas r;; providec darpers in these F'.'AC cucts.
There is cc cc-u icaticn betwee t e three chargir; r; rects.
h ere':re, : e c:- :- fire :r.a: colc affec; the perferna ce of ali crarging pu ps woult e a fire in tre corridor.
The ros; likely concustitle in :ne corricor would be the labe oil
~
needed fcr :nese cur.as.
A fire camper in the H7AC' duct will effectively isolate t e charging pur,p rcor.
Since cnly one charging cump is needed for safe shutdown, the isolation of cnly one charging punp recn is necessary.
SCE has proposed to provide this fire canper prior to startu: following the first refueling cc: age.
'le fine the prcposed modification i
acceptable.
However, we find the proposed implementation date unacceptable.
!le will condition the San Onofre 3 license to recuire conpletion of the installation of the fire datper prior to exceeding 5% of full power.' Eecause of the low level of hazard associated with plant operations below 5f. of full power, we conclude that the above actions are acceptable curing this period.
3.
Sur:arv of Deviations As discussed above, have reviewed the following re:;uests for deviations, frc: the rece mendations of ETP CMES 9.5-1, which include those ::revicusly c--
- ved i, C.e EE',, anc have fcun: iner :: 55 accepta:le.
~' e f # TO brigade leaCer's C'alifi;atic".s n.ill Ec! be as a.
r reCC--CCc by
.I e-C.3.t: '
- o..Or a si C h
~e~ Er Will be ar.ded 10 the fire Viga:e W nill be ar assi!:ar T; c r;'. ~.
2 y,
f.
.,s b.
The doors to the computer rocms on the 30' elevation will not be electrically supervised as recommended by Item C.5.a.
Instead, this area is continuously manned by the control room ope-rators.
c.
Fire detectors will not be installed in 18 areas identified in the SCE's July 27, 1922 letter containing safety-related
~
equipment, as reccamended by Item C.6.a.
These areas do not contain significant amounts of combustible materials.
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d.
The remote shutdown panels will not be separated by a three-hour rated fire barrier as recommended by Item C.7.f.
- Instead, they will be electrically isolated from the ~ control room and separated by a two-hour barrier.
, e.
The fire extinguishing system for the diesel generators is not desicr.ed for operation without affecting the diesel, as is recornerded by Item C.7.i.
Redundant diesel generators are provided, protected by separate extincuishino systems.
f.
The auxiiiery feedsater punas are. not separated by three-hour rated barriers.
However, a metal shroud will be provided between
- he stear driver rumo anc the newly installe: ms:cr driven curr. and a one-hour tarrier and a sprinkler system is provided te: wean tre stea-driven suno and existing r:ter driven purp.
g.
Tr.e fire c. ;s are r.ct separated by three-hcar rated fire barriers as reconm. ended by Item C.6.b.
Instead a cross tie is prsviced batneen units.
h.
The oil collection system for the reactor coclant pumps is in acccrean:e with cur guidelines.
Approval of a deviation is not needed.
i.
Hose standpipes will not be installed in fire zones 28 and 45 as recommended by Item C.6.c.
Instead, fire detectors will be pr ovided, j.
Only cne of the three charging pump rooms will be provided with a fire dapper instead of all three as recommended by the cuidelir,es in Item C.5.a.
However, only cne pump is needed for safe shutdown.
i k.
An adequate number of sectionalizing valves have not been provided for the fire main reconmended by Item C.6.b.
Instead, a backup systen,is provided.
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1.
Three-hour fire rated barriers are not provided in all areas of the plant as recommended by Item C.5.a.
Fire barriers of lesser fire resistance are accepted in the various plant areas listed in paragraph 9.5.1.3 of the SER based on the fuel load in the area.
m.
Approved fire door assemblies are not provided in fire zones 44, 83 and 50 as recommended by Item C.5.~a.
Alternative decrs are provided which provide adequate fire resistance.
n.
Not all redundant trains are separated by three-hour
. rated fire barriers as reccamended by Item C.5.b.
One-hour rated fire barriers in conjuction with automatic suppression systems have been accepted for those plant areas listed in paragraph 9.5.1.6 of the SER, based on the fuel load in the area.
D.
00erator Licensinc/ Shift Manninc
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Oral c;erator licensing exanir.ations for San ~0nofre 3 were g:ven to
- .: Senier r ea::cr 0;erator (IRO) and 17 Reacter 0; era cr (RS) candidates -
during the ti a period be: Ween November 1 and NCvem;er 11, 1982.
Sufficient
- arciates passed :c rest :te minimur shif: staf'ing criteria of NUREG-0737,
E.
E e C e * '. Eretarec9ess With recard to cur evaluation cf emercency preparedness' at San Onofre, the s;aff review is ccmplete, and there are no open
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11 ceasing itens Other than the ASLE conditions discussed Delow.
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Eased en the inclusion of these conditicns in the. San Onofre Unit 3 c;eratinc license, the staff confirmation cf certain ASLB recairerents (see below), and the staff findir.cs that bcth offsite and onsite enercency preparedness are adequate, issuance of NPF-15 authorizing ope (ation of San Onofre Unit 3 is warranted.
- 1. ASLE Conditions l
The NRC staff conclusion regarding onsife and offsite ' capabilities to respond to an energency at San Onofre 2 and 3 was provided in..
Su;ple en: Nc. 6 to the Safety Evaluation Report, issued in June 1982 (SSER 5).
That supplement also addressed the Mty 14, 1982, Initial Decision of the San Onofre 2 and 3 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (the ASLB or Board), as modified by its clarifying Order of l
May 25,1932.
The staff committed to confirm that each Board condition his eit'er been sttisfied cricr to issuance of a full peser license fer Sar : :fre Unit 2 c :ne the li:e.se vill it ccrciti:ned to re:; ire tra: :te'Ecirc :cr;;; ion te satisf: 0: cn :ne scr.5: ale defined by t'e ~:1 d.
The staff, based en its re'1er: cf tre ":y :a, 1932 r
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<. Initial Decision concluceS that the items the Board required " prior-to full power operation" should be completed prior to Unit 2 exceeding 5% power, and that the items the Board required "during the first six nonths of full power operation" should be completed no later than five months after Unit 2 initially exceeded 5% power in order to permit f?RC evaluation within the 6-nonth period.
The q
following discussion addresses the items required to be completed prior to Unit 2 exceeding 5% power.
The remaining items, viz., those required within five months after Unit 2 exceeded 5% power, were imposed as license conditions by Amendment fio. 7 to the San Onofre Unit 2 Operating License No. ???F-10, and will also be conditions of the San Onofre Unit 3 Operating License, NPF-15.
Since Unit 2 ini.tially exceeded 5% power on September 17, 1982, the Unit 3 license will require completion of these items by February 17, 1983.
The conditions imposed by the Board that were satisfied prior to Unit 2 exceeding 5% power are those identified as items A.1 and A.2 (a-h) in Section 13.3.4 of SSEP 6 and are.epeated below:
A.1 Ine :JC staff snall certify to the ASLS tnat the siren system has been shewn to perform in accorcance with its tech.ical specifications.
A.2 ine GC staff shall ccnfirm that:
e-5.
The FE% ccncerns expressed in the fievember Upcated Eva hatic abc.ut lesson plans and senecules nave beer satisfied.
b.
Initial training of adequate numbers of cnsite and cf fsite personnel in each category listed in Secticn
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11.0.4 of fiUF,EG-0554 has been completed, except for i
radiolcgical monitoring teams and radiolbgical analysis l
persennei (paragraph 4.C of Section 11.0.a).
I c.
The sane (or an improved) communications system that was installed at the original interin Emergency Operations i
Facility (EOF) has been adopted for the relocated interim EOF.
d.
The same (or an improved) set'of operating p'rocedures that were adopted for the original interim Emergency,
0;eraticns Facility have been acepted for tne relocated interim EGF.
e.
Emergency equipment, suitable for its emergency purpose, has been purchased and delivered to the offsite response crga-izatic 5.
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A crill has been conducted to verify the adequacy of the physical design, communications equipment, and operating procedures of the relocated interim EOF.
g.
FEMA has reviewed and confirmed that the EOF, Offsite Dose Assesiment Center (ODAC), and-Liaison S0Ps are adequate.
h.
Consistency has been achieved in the~prewritten instructions for the public in the licensees' and the local jurisdictions' emerger.cy plans.
Condition A.1.
The NRC staff certifies that the siren system installed within the 10 mile plume exposure EPZ has been shown to perform in accordance with its technical specifications.
This certification is based upon a similar certification received from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in a memorandum ;o Brian Grimes, NRC, f rom Dichard k'. Krir.n, FEMA, dated July 1,1982 (Suoject:
Initial Decision (ASLB) on San.Onofre 2 and 3 dated May 14, 1952).
Tne staff has aisc revieweed the following ccrres;c cerce anc rescrts proviced by the licensees to NRC and FE.Mi ;er:li.ing to the installation and testinc of the siren syster-
- e..
(1)
Le :er tc F.en Naa an, FE"*, from F. K. "assey, SCE, cate: a r :" 25, 1912.
(2)
Letters to Frank "iraglia, NRC, from K. P. Easkin, SCE
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datec May 25, 1952, and June 4, 1982.
Tne above certification does not adcress the performance of the sirens piar.ned for installation in Dana Point and the remainder of San Juan Capistrano in accordance with the Scard's condition regardinc extension of the plume expcsure EPZ boundary.
The staff will confirm siren performance in these areas on a schedule-consistent with that established by the Board in its clarifying Order of May 25, 1982.
Conditions A.2 (a-h)
The NRC staff nas deternined that each of the above items a-h ir. posed by the Eoard and required by the Scard to be satisfied prior to l'ait 2 exceeding 5% power have been cor.pleted.
The staff ccncurs with the FEMA evaluation of these license conditions given in their above mentioned July 1,1982 letter and has evaluated NRC Inspection Reports Nos. 50-261/81-31, 50-351/82-07, c.d 5'-?f;/E2-IE a'd the d: cur 2n 5ticr provided cy "e licensees in a ".ay 20,19E2 letter to the Direc cr, NRC Of# ice of :te huclear Re;;;cr Regulation.
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Based on this determination'and the above finding regarding condition' A.1, the staff concluded that.all the ASLB conditions required to be completed prior to Unit 2 exceeding 5% power have been ccmpleted.
This requirement also applies prior to Unit 3 exceeding 5% power, and has been completed well in advance of that time.
2.
Evaluation of Aoril 15, 1982 Exercise
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On April 15, 1982, an emergency preparedness exercise was conducted at San Onofre to demonstrate the adequacy of the emergency plan and the implenentation capabilities of the State and local agencies i nvol,ved.
The exercise also provided opportunities to demonstrate the adequacy of corrective actions that were called,for in the May 13, 1981 exercise critique.
The FEMA evaluation of the exercise was documented and transmitted to
. the NRC staff by letter dated July 7,1982, frca Richard W. Krimm, FEMA, to Brian Grimes, NRC,
Subject:
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Exercise.
Eased on their evaluation cf the April 15, 1922 exercise, FEMA concluced that with respect to the status of offsite emergency preparecness, all participating jurisc'ictions exhibited and acecuate er better capability to respcnd to an offsite emergency.
The NRC staff has evaluated the FEMA findings ar.d concurs.
3.
InctStiOn PathWaV Tna ASLE, in its May 14,';9S2 Initial Decisicn, :eterninec that t.he ade:uacy of emergency preparedness in the ir.gestion pathway energency planning zone (ingestion EPZ) was no longer a. contested ratter and accorcingly left satisfaction of this planning star. card to tne 2C staff fo resolution.
This section addresses resolution of this item.
As part of the FEMA evaluation of the April'15, 1982 exercise, FEMA provided their findings regarding the results of a March 25, 1982 i
drill during which Orange County exercised its capabilities with regard to the ingestion EP2.
By letters dated July 28, 1982, and l
August 5, 1982, frca Richard W. Krimm, FEMA, to Brian Grines, NRC, i
FEMA presented additional information regarding ingestion pathway planning and capabilities and stated that the current overall offsite response cabability is adequate.
The NRC staff has evaluatec the FE"A findings and conclusions and concurs.
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.. c.
Co aletion of Emercancy Precarecness Recuirements The formal FEMA approval process for State emergency response plans as outlined in the proposed FEMA rule, 44 CFR 350, has not been conpleted.
Consistent with an agreement reached between General Giuffrida, Director, FEMA, and Chairman Palladino, NRC, at an August 19, 1981 meeting, the San Onofre Unit 3 license will be conditioned to identify to the licensees that deficiencies identified during the 44 CFR 350 approval process may be viewed as potentially significant deficiencies for which NRC enforcement action in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii) may be considered.
5.
Conclusions In summary, as stated above, the staff has found that:
a.
The ASLB conditions that must be satisfied prior to Unit 2 or 3 exceeding five percent power Eave been satisfied.:
b.
Tre April 15, 1952 exercise cemonstratec that the offsite enercency plans and implerentation capability at San Onofre is adequate.
Tre ingestien ;athnay EPZ assess er.t ar.d monitoring capability is ace;uate.
c-Curther, i 5.::lerer: 'O.
5 to the SE;
..'e
- ate: tha the ASLB ccnci:icns thi ras: :e satisfie witr.in 5 ncntr.s of full power cperation wosic be included in the San Oncfre Uni: 2 license as conditiens.
These conditions will also be included'in~'the Unit 3 iit.ense.
Eased cn the foregoing we ccn lude that offsite
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energency preparedness at San Onofre meets the requirements oi 10 CFR 50.c7(b), Appendix E :o 10 CFR 50, Regulatory Guide 1.101, Revision 2, NUREG-0554/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, and the 2.5LE nitial Decision of "ay 14, 1982, and is a:ceptable.
F.
Fhysical Security SCE nas previously submitted security plans entitled " San Onofre Nuclear Generatine Station Physical Security Plan" and " San Onofre Nuclear Generatinc Station Guard Training and Qualification Plan",
for the protection of Units 1, 2, and 3 acainst radiological sabotage.
ine contingency plan is incorporated as Chapter 5 in the San Onofre 1
Nuclear Generating Station Dhysical Security Plan.
1 As' a result of our evaluation, certain portions of these plans sere f
identified as requiring additional information and upcrading to
- ':fy the recuire erts cf Se: i:n 72.55 ar.d I;:erdices E and C of 10 CFR Far: 73.
Tre literreas filed revisicns :: these olans I
.nich s :isfied these rez; ire ents, t'e conci.ced :.a: :ne revised
-l a s comply wi.P :,e C:.'ssi:n's regula:iors cc :ained in 10 CFR 7 1'ts EC aro 73.
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An ongoing review of the procress of the implementation of these plans will be performed by the staff to assure conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73.
The identification of vital areas and measures.used to control access to these areas, as described in the physical security plan, may be subject to amendments in the future.
The San Onofre security plans are being protected from unauthorized disclosure in accordance with Section 73.21 of 10 CFR Part 73.
G.
TMI-Related Issues There a're several TMI-related items for which the, licensees have requested relief from the schedular requirements of NUREG-0737,
" Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements." These items are discussed below, along with our evaluation of the requests for relief.
1.
I.C.1 - Guicar=ce for the Evaluation and Cevelocment of Procedures for Trarsients anc Accicents Ey letter dated August 12, 1932, SCE requested relief from the schedular requirerents of N'.' REG-0737 regarding this item.
SCE prc:: sed to implement, at the first refueling cutage, procedures basec cn " fir.al" guidelines currently being reviewed by the NRC staff.
This schedule,is acceptable to t.e staff for resting the F
Icn;- :rr requirerer.ts Of '..' REG-0737, Item I.C.1, because in the interit, the existing precedures are adequate, as, discuss,ed in 50pple.
t No. t to the SER.
2.
I.G.1 - Soecial Low Power Testing and Training Special icw pcwer tests are not requiret for' San Orofre Unit 3, which is ider.tical to Unit 2, because the soecial testing and training being conducted on Unit 2 satisfies the requirements for Item I.G.1 of NUREG-0737 for Unit 3.
3.
II.E.3 - Post-Accident Samaling Capability By letter dated October 4, 1982, the TTcensees indicated that the Unit 3 post-accident sacpling system would be operable prior to exceeding Et power, but would not be operable at fuel loading.' A similar request for relief was evaluated for Unit 2 and was found i
i acceptable by the staff.
As is discussed in Supplement No. 4 to the SER, the SCE request is acceptable because (1) sufficient fission prcduct inventory to warrant the use of the system in the eve-: of an ac:ident will. ci exist before coeraticn ateve 5% power inc (2) tne sc :: ling rid cr.alysis sy: tem for r.:rrai creration will be a ','3 i l s :Ae.
.e will cc"";iti, the San Oncfre 3 cperatir; license to l
'e5 i re t ' '
the post-iccic2nt sarDling a"c c'.alysis System be installs" :r'cr 10 cicrat' ^ ; cove Ei pc..er.
D 1
. 4.
II.D.1 - Safety Valve Test Recuirements As recuired by NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements", Item II.D.1, all PWR plant licensees and applicants are required to demonstrate that their pressurizer safety valves (SV)', power operated relief valves (PORVs),
PORY block valves, and all associated discharge piping will
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function adequately under conditions predicted for design basis transients and accidents.
In response to this require-ment, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), on behalf of the PWR 0,eners Group, has completed a full scale valve
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testing program and the Owners Group has submitted these test results to the NRC.
Additionally, each PWR plant owner was required to submit a report by July 1, 1982 wtich,eould demonstrate the operability of these valves and the associated piping.
On June 29, 1982, Southern California Edison (SCE) respo'nded to this recuirenents with a submittal that centair,s informatica fron E:RI valve test program results which apply to San Onofre 2 ard 2.
SCE has also submitted a descripticr. ar.d results of pipe stress analyses to demonstrate tne integrity of the safety valve cischarge piping.
San Onofre Units 2 and 3 do not utilize FCP.Vs or PCRV bicck valve:.
n..
Tr.e staff has not :c pietec a detailed review :f the SCE submittal; k.ca.er, base: c, a preli.inary revias we fin: t.at the general ap;; roach of using tne EPRI test results to cer:nstrate cperability of the valves and using analyses to de,5cnstrate the irtegrity of the piping is acceptable.
The SCE submittal notes that San Onofre Units 2 anc 3 utilize i
safety valves of the sane size, model, and ring settings that perforced satisfactorily for test sequences considered represen-tative or that bound conditions that the San Onofre 2 and 3 valves i
could be expose,d to and that the valve inlet piping has been shown by test and analysis to enhance valve operation as compared to EPRI test valve inlet conficuration.
The submittal also stated that determination of valve thermo-hydr'aulic forces acting on the discharge piping was performed utilizing a computer code that was l
bench marked against discharge piping force data obtained during the EPRI testing.
1 In sumary, based on a preliminary review, we conclude that the general approach used by SCE in responding to this TMI. item l
is acceptable and provides adequate assurance that the San Onofre 1
2 and 3 reactor coolant system overpressure protection system can a:ccuately perfcra its intended fun:!icn for tie ;erio: during l
w.i f r:e cc rlete car cetailed review.
If the cc ;1eti:n of our j
cetti be caview reveals tnat rocifications or adjustments to l
sifEty val'.es 0* a s: Cia *.ed pir#ng are Seeded to assure that t' er l
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, overpressure protection s'ystem can perform its intended function we will require that SCE make appropriate modifications.
5.
II.F.2 - Instrumentation for Detection of Inadeouate Core Cooling (ICC)
By letter dated October 28, 1982, SCE provided the schedule;for implementation of ICC instrumentation at San Onofre 2 and 3.
As discussed in the SCE letter, all the ICC instrumentation will be installed and operational in Unit 3 by the first refueling.
We find this acccptable for the reasons given in Supplement fio.
4 to the SER.
We will condition the Unit 3 license to require triat the schedules given in the October 28, 1982 letter are met.
6.
II.K.3.31 - Revised Small-Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA)
Analysis
!;UREG-0737 requires plant'-specific analysis of smell-break LOCA using a revised model acceptable to the flRC staff.
By letter dated April 28, 1932, SCE referenced the report CE'!-203, Revision 1, which addresses the justification of CE srall-break LOCA methods.
This report is currently being reviewed by the staff.
The staff's evaluatien of CEf;-203, Pevision 1 will be transmitted to the Ccntutti n Engineering (CE) Gener's 3rcup after completion of the review.
Currently the San Or.cfre 2 and 2 small-break LOCA analysis is in full conformance with 10 CFR EC.a5 and Ap;endix
< to 10 C = ED.
FelicWin; ccmcletion of tne staff review cf CEN-202, Revisien 1, SCE may be recuired to provide plant specific calculations.
Ey letter dated Octcber 4,1982, SCE committed to~. provide such analyses within cne yaar of the a?croval of a revised model by the inC ttaff.
We find this acceptable because, as stated ir. Supple-rent !!o. 4 to the SER, no piant modifications are expected to result frcm the study.
Also, as stated above, the plant meets the currently applicable regulations.
7.
III.A.1.2 - Vograde Emergency Support Facilities By letter dated August 12, 1982, SCE stated that the upgraded emergency support facilities for San Onofre 2 and 3 would be complete by January 1, 1983.
As is discussed i-n Supplement No. 5 to the SER, we conclude that this date is acceptable because interim facilities are available to fulfill the functicns of the improved facilities prior to January 1, 1983.
i H.
- uxiliary Building Ventilation System In ear y 19E2, SCE identified creas of the San Oncfre 2 and 3 auxiliary aicing e.e e.he airficw ratterns did rot fully set the criteria
- ec;fied in the FEF.; i.e. airfics frc creas of ler:er potential l
- vtari atien tc areas cf nigner potential ccntaniuticn.
Tc correct this, i:E ty letter ettet N:'.e :ar E, ;922, has c --itu.: :: impienent several
"~;"o.e crt" i* *ne deIign and :* era *ien cf *ne a;;;liary building i
- ~, -,, - -, - -.
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sentilation systen.
Inese macifications will inc'ude installation of a temporary design modifications in the truck bay area to control this potential release path, as well as temporary ventilation ducting in the waste gas compressor rooms and radwaste sump room.
These temporary fixes will be incorporated by January 3,1983, prior to plant criticality.
These temporary fixes, which will include appropriate administrative controls, will assure that airborne contamination and gaseous releases are controllea as described in the FSAR.
SCE will complete all long-term permanent corrective actions by the end of the first refueling outage.
These will include permanent modifications to the truck bay area and other rooms in the radwiste building, as well as corrections to the fan logic for the au,xiliary building supply and exhaust fans.
These modifications, along with their planned implementation dates ae. outlined in the November 5, 1982 letter from H. Ray, SCE, to R. Engelken, NRC.
SCE's implementation of these commitments will ensure that the air flow patterns at San Onofre 3 will be from areas of lower potential contamination to areas of higher potential contamination.
We will condition the San Onofre 3 operating license to requi're installation cf these redifications on the planned schedule.
~?I:.
Envirc-ental Consiceration We have determined :nat the issuance of Operatinc License No. NPF-15 will no: retui in any envircncental irpacts other inan those evaluated
'Gi ;he Final Envincn ental Statement (FES) and its Errata, since
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- e atics O' San Orcfre Uni 3,is entcmcassed by 09e cvsrall action e.al.ated in
- ne FES a-d its Errata.
IV.
Ccnclusion P.ior public notice of toe.cverali action involving issuance oi NPF-15 authorizing cperation of San Onofre Unit 3 was published ir, the FEDERAL REGISTER cn April 7, 1977 (*2 F.R. 18450).
Staff evaluaticn of the safi:y of the overall action is given the SER and its supplements (NOREG-0712).
Based on our revie/, we conclude that there is reasonable assurance that the health anc safety Of the public will not be endangered by operation of San Onofre Unit 3 in the manner authorized by this license, and the activities authorized by this~ license will be conducted l
in ccmpliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this license will no: be inimical to the comm.on defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
l Dated:
ll0V I E ;;33 i
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' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM'*lSSION s
UNITED STATES
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%..h 9 *g' Docket Nos. 50-206 50-361 50-362 A32ND32NT TO INDE"NITY AGREELENT NO. B-31 AFENDMENT NO. 17 r
Effective
'HOV 15 M Indemnity Agreement No. B-31, between.
Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas and Electric l.
Company, City of Riverside, California, and the City of Anaheim,'
California, and the Atomic Enercy Cc= mission, date'd June 3, 1966, as amended, is hereby further amended as follows:
Item 3 of the Attachment to the indemnity agreement is deleted in its entirety and the following substituted t' erefor:
I Item 3 - License number or nu-bers SNM-962 (Frca 12:01 a.n.,
June 3, 1966, to 12 midnight, March 26, 1967 inclusive)
OPE-13 (From 12:01 a.m.,
March 27, 1967)
SNM-1579 (From 12 : 01 a.n., S'ay 21, 1981, to 12 midnight, February 15, 1982 inclusive)
NPF-10 (Frem 12:01 a.m.,
February 16, 1982) 55M-1852 (From 12:01 a.m., May 21c 1982,
)
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FOR THE UNITED STATES liUCLEAR REGULATORY CO!OiISSION
[(.h~Q.
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Jerome Salt =an, A.,sistant irector State and Licensee Relations Office of State Programs By SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON
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col @ANY Acceoted
~ 1982
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SAN DIEGO GAF ' "D ELECTRIC u,. n.ay, :....
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Accepted 1982
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CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIF 0 F.!;IA 1
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Accepted 1982
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4 Ev CITY OF ANAHEII*., CALIFORNIA a
i il Accepted
. 15;82 i
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A::EG X C f
c ANTIT:.UST CONDITIONS LICENSE NO. NPF-15 The "Scuchern ' California Edisen Cc=pany shall ec ply with the following antitrus: conditions:
1.
As used herein:
e l'.1 "Eulk Pever" teans the electric pc:. er, and any attendant energy, supplied er nade available at trans issien or sub-::ansmissien vcltage by one en:ity :c ancther.
1.2 "Enti:y" neans a persen, a priva:e or publi: corpora-tien, a nenicipali:y, t.
cocperative, an ar secia:Len, o,.
a je6: s tock asse:ia:1c. er business trus: ov. in g,
cperating er prep: sing in gecd fai:h te evn er cperate equi;nen: or f acilities fer :he genera:icn, :rans-nissic er dis:ributica of elec:ricity to er fer the
- ublic as a utili
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2.
Sou:her.l. California Edison,.(hereaf ter SCE) recc.gnizes it is generally in the public interest fer electric utilities-c in:ercennect, coordinate reserves, and/or engage in bulk '
pcVer supply transactiens in crder to provide :::ual, though not necessarily ecual benef t:s, to.each of the ~
parties in such arrang2,:ents. F.cvever, SCE should not be obliga:ed to enter into such an arrangerent if (1) to do so veuld violate, or incapacitate it free perforcing any.
lawfully existing cen:racts it has with another party, or (2) there is contenperaneously available to it a n'urvally cxclusive conpe ing or alternative arrange:ent vi:h another party which affords 1: grea:er benefi:s.
In inglenenting the cer=ir.:ents in the succeeding paragraphs, SCE vill act in accordance with these principles.
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2-3.
SCE shall, pursuant to such principles, per=it participation en mutually agreeable ter s in new nuclear generating units initiated by SCE, upon ti=ely applica:icn*j by any entity (ies) withh or contiguous to SCE's service area which at that tice does not have access to an alterna:ive ec:parably-priced source of bulk pcVer supply.
With respec: to these units not initiated by SCE in which SCE is a joint' participan: with other utilities, SCE shall cooperate in facilitating the participatien of any such entity (ies) which seeks such par:1-cipatien upen ti._ely applica: ion.
4 SCE shall per=it interconnecticn and coordination of reserves by =cens of agree ents for the sale and purchase of e:ergen.cy bulk power with any entity (ies) within or centiguous to l
SCI's service a;ea and thereby allow such other entity (ies),
as well as SCE, full access on a propertienste basis,to the benefits of reserve coordbatien.
(" proper:ichate basis" ref ers to the equaliced percentage of reserves concept rather 0'-
than the larges s ingle-unit concept, unless the participants have c:herwise agreed.)
Interce.nections vill not be limited
- o icv voltages when higher voltages are available fro i
i SCE's installed f acilities in the t.rea where 6:ercennection 4
is desired, when the preposed arranjeren: is fcund to be e c.,
' -~ d-- d ' y, technically and ecencrically f easible.
Eter-gency service :o be provided under such agreements vill be furnished :: the fulles: c: en: available and desired where such supply decs not jeopardice or 1: pair service :o the sup;11er's custenars.
5.
SCE shall sell. bulk pcuer :c or purchase bulk pc e: fro: any other entity (ies) within or contiguous to SCE's service area.
This ref ers to the =utually beneficial cpportunity to coordinate in the planning cf new generation, related trans-
=ission and associated faci.lities.
- this provision shall not.
be cens, trued to require SCE to purchase er sell bulk power if such purchase er sale cannot be found to be functionally, technically and eccac=ically f easible.
or future resale cus:c ers "tinely a_/With respect to SCE's presen:
la:er than COdaysafterpublica; application" shall be in no even:
the receipt o.
- 1cn b'v the A:c=ic Energy Co==ission of the notice c:
With respect to all other applica:icn for a ccc.struerien per it.
~
entity (ies) ref erred to above "ticely applica:icn" shall be within af ter the first public a reasenable period frc= a planning s:andpoin:the specific unit, but announce ent cf SCE's inten:icn :o construct la:er :han the said tire specified f : SCE'8 76 Sale b no even:
CusEcOers.
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6.
SCE shall, pursuant to such principles, trans=it bulk power over its trans=ission facilities within its service area, both between or, a=eng two or = ore entities'vith which it is interconnected to the extent that such trans=ission can be found to be functienally, technically and econe ically feasible and can be ef fected without an adverse effect on',
service to its' own custo=ers.
SCE is obligated under this condition to trans=it bulk power on the ter=s stated above, and in connection with SCE's plan to construct new trans-
=1ssion facilities for its own use within its service area,
'to include in its planning and construction progra: sufficient trar.m=ission capacity as required for such. transmission, provided that such entity (ies) are obligated to co=pensate SCE fully for the use of its syste=.
SCE shall use its best ef forts to facilitate the trans=ission of bulk power over then existing trens=1ssion facilities outs,ide its service area for such entities.
7.
The f oregoing cenditions shall be i=ple=e:. ed in a =anner censistent with the provisiens of the Federal Fever Act and all rates, charges, or practices in connection therewith are to be subject.to the approval of regulatory agencies having jurisdiction over the=.
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