ML20009B596

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Technical Evaluation of Licensee Responses to IE Bulletin 80-06,re Engineered Safety Feature Reset Controls for Point Beach Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20009B596
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/31/1981
From: Debby Hackett
EG&G, INC.
To: Bender P, Wilson R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20009B594 List:
References
CON-FIN-A-0250, CON-FIN-A-250 EGG-1183-4209, IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, TAC-42768, TAC-42769, NUDOCS 8107160369
Download: ML20009B596 (8)


Text

' '

EGG 1183-4209 f.9 A Y 1981 v vg~i.=L=,s G El2RGY MEASUREMENTS GROUP TECHN! CAL EVALUAT!ON OF TME L!CErdSEE'S EESPONSE TO [&E BULLETIN GO-06 CONCERNING ESF RESET CONTROLS FOR THE PC'!NT GEACH HUCLEAR FOWER STATION, UNITS 1.AND 2 -

1 t

(DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301) \ s

~

. Ls s 5 s -

e.

8107160369 810707 SAN E AMON OPERATIONS PDR ADOCK 05000266 w.~ n, o c ~o u c .. . c. ... , n G PDR sa,.. vo, cm...cu,.. ..a.....

Dl5 CLAIMER S This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United ..

Neither the United States nor the United States .'

States Government.

. Department of Energy, nor any of their empl oyees, uskes any warranty,. .

express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of any information, apparatus, .

product or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe on privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, mark, inanufacturer, or other- '

wise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommend-ation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thcreof.

The views and opinions of authors e/nressed herein do not necessarily state ' '

or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. s, 9

~

. LT e-e g, _

~ ^

g g.

g

_ 4

~

  • ' q=%_ *' ,"e *

==

e e m ,

  • l 4

~

INTERIM REPORT h:EG  :: u::==.

9 ~

flRC TAC fl0. 42768 and 42769 Report No. EG&G 1183 4209 Contract Program or Project

Title:

Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control System Support Subject of this Document: ,

I Technical Evaluation of the Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Design Aspects of the ESF Reset Controls for the Point Beach fluclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 _

Type,of Document: -

Infomal Report Author (sh .

D. B. Hackett 4 ,

Date of Document:

Itay 1981 .

Responsible tiiiC Individual and NRC Of fice or Division: '

P. Bender /R. Wilson,1CSB This document was prepared primarily for preliminary or internal use. It has not received full review and approval. Since there may be Substantive changes, this document should not be considered final. ,

EG&G Energy Measurements Group San Ramon Operations San Ramon, CA 94583 <

Prepared for the .

U.S. Nuclear Regulatpry Cornission '

Washington, D.C.

Under 00E Contract N g201904031.

NRC FIN No. .

O e

INTERIM REPORT

EGG 1183-4209

  • $4[] I b f b May 1931 Energy Measurements Group San Ramon Operations TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE LICENSEE'S RESPONSE TO I&E f:ULLETIN 80-06 CONCERNING ESF RESET CONTROLS FOR THE .

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 (DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301) by D. B. Hackett ,

c Approved for Publication

$ J. h hmM R. Radosevic ,

Department Manager I

l This document is UNCLASSIFIED -

9 Derivative -

Classifier: )/ ,]I 6Mi ,,./ f

' Nicnola:P E. BrodericK ,-

Department Manage.r e... . . .

c w

a Work Performed for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under U.S. Department of Energy Contract No. DE- ACOB-76 NVO 1183 e

l -

INTRODUCTION On Marcn 13, 1980, the USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (I&E), issued I&E Bulletin 80-06, entitled " Engineered Sefety Feature (ESF)

Reset Controls," to all PWR and BWR facilities witn operating licenses.

I&E Bulletin 80-06 requested tnat tne following actions de taken by the licensees: ,

(1) Review the drawings for a.ll systems serving safety-related functions "at the schematic / elementary diagram level to determine whetner or not upon the reset of an ESF actuation signal all associated safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode.

(2) Verify that the actual installed instrumentation and _

controls at the facility are consistent with the schematics reviewed in Item 1 above by conducting a test to demonstrate that all equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal of the actuating signal and/ar manual .esetting of tne various isolating or .

actuation signals. Provide a schedule for the per-

  • formance of the testing in your response to this bulletin. ,

(3) If any safety-related equipment does not remain in its emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal at your facility, describe proposed system modification, design change, or other corrective action planned to resolve tne problem.

(4) Report in writing within 90 days the results of, your . ,

review, include a list of all devices whicn respond as discussed in Item 3 above, actions taker, or planned to assure adequate equipment control, and a scnedule for -

implementation of corrective action.

Tnis technical evaluation addresses tne licensee's. response to I&E Bulletin 80-06 and the licensee's proposed system modification, design cnange, and/or other corrective action planned to resolve the problem. In evaluating the licensee's response to the four Action Item requirements of the bulletin, the following NRC staff guidance is also used:

Upon the reset of ESF signals, all safety ^related equipment shall remain in its emergency mode. Multiple reset ,,

sequencing shall not cause the affected equipment to deviate from its emergency mode. Justification sho,uld be. provided for any exceptions.

l .

l t

EVALVATION AND CONCLUSIONS In a letter dated June 6,1980 [Ref.1], Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WE), the licensee for Foint Beach Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, replied to I&E Bulletin 80-06. A conference call was made to tne licensee on February 5,1981 [Ref. 2] to discuss several open items. Tne licensee sent a letter dated March 10, 1981 [Ref. 3] as follow-up documen-tation.

In response to Action Item 1 of I&E Bulletin 80-06, tne kicensee reported that they nad conducted a review of drawings to determine wnetner j or not equipment returned to its n'on-emergency mode upon removal of tne ESF j actuation signal and reset of the ESF function. The licensee concluded tnat there are two instances in wnicn equipment returns to its non-emergency mode, as discussed below:

(1) Two valves on each unit control the addition of addi-tive to the Containment Spray System (CSS). Upon initiation of CSS, tnese valves remain in tneir normal, closed position; tnus, not allowing additive into tne CSS. Two minutes after CSS initiation, the valves will open allowing additive injection into tne .

CSS. The operator may prevent tnese valves from

  • opening by switcning the valve controls to manual prior to the expiration of the 2-minute delay time. ,,

's Upon removal of tne CSS actuation signal and reset of the CSS, these valves will return to their non-emergency or closed position; tnus, cutting off addi-tive to tne CSS. The operator does have a manual control of valve position at all times.

(2) Upon initiation of Containment Isolation (CI,) in either unit, a single solenoid valve is de-energj zed. -

~

causing 100 percent recirculation of control room air.

Upon removal of the CI actuation signal and reset of CI, the solenoitt valve is energized returning control room ventilation to its non-emergency mode. Tne operator does nave manual control of valve position at '

all times. ,

We conclude that the licensee has complied with Action Item 1 of 5 I&E Bulletin 80-06 by completine tnis drawing review. C In resp:;..: to Action Item 3 of -I&E Bulletin 80-06, tne licensee '

committed to perform modifications to the solenoid ' valve co'ntrol, as de-scribed in (2) above. The modifications as described in tne conference call of February 5, 1981 [Ref. 2] and confirmed in reference 3, will ensure tnat 100 percent recirculation of control room airxwill con.tinue after

~

e reset of containment isolation. Return of tne control' room ventilation to

  • C

l i

l its non-emergency mode will require separate operator action. In reference 3, tne licensee reported the completion and satisf actory testing of tnis modification. Therefore, we conclude tnat the licensee nas complied with the requirements of Action Item -3 of I&E Bulletin 80-06 for control room ventilation.

In response to Action Item 3 of I&E Bulletin 80-06 for tne CSS additive valves, the licensee does not intend to make any modifications.

Tne licensee nas offered tne following justification:

We do not believe it is necessary to modify control of the containment spray additive valve,s as described in (1) above.

Tnis evaluation is based on the f act tnat containment spray would not be reset unless it was intended to stop tne spray system shortly thereaf ter. The present configuration would close the spray additive valves automatically as a result of

, manually stopped. Requiring that a separate operator action -

be required to close the spray additive valves before stop-ping the spray pumps would provide no change in the sequence

- of events and would introduce another manual action required by the operator. Al so, the operator nas at all times the option of manually controlling the posit on of tne spray i

additive valves. Manual control is needed to control the pH

. of the containment sump water' during tne post accident re- <

circulation pnase.

The above justification was offered by the licensee in lieu of any system modification, design change, or other corrective action. We have reviewed the justification submitted by the licensee to ensure that sufficient information is provided as a basis for tne NRC staff to prepare a Safety Evaluation Report.

In response to Action Item 2 of I&E Bulletin 80-06,' the lic.ensee reported tnat a test to verify tnat the actual valve control functions, as j identified in the review of scnematic diagrams during ESF actuation and ESF reset, was conducted on Unit 2 during its 1980 refueling outage (Ref.1]

and on Unit I during its recent refueling outage [Ref. 3]. We conclude ti.a t the licensee has complied with the requirements of Action Item 2 of I&E Bulletin 80-06 by performing tne testing. ,

We conclude that the licensee has complied with the requirements s of Action Item 4 of I&E Bulletin 80-06 ir, their response to Action Items 1, 2, and 3. ,

FINDINGS .

Based on our review of the information and documen,ts provided, we find tnat tne ESF reset controls for Point Beach NJdTea'F Power Station , ,

Units 1 and'2 meet ,tne requirements of Action Items 1, 2, and 4 of I&E Bulletin 80-06. e

In response to Action item 3 of I&E Bulletin 80-06, tne licensee performed modifications to tne control room ventilation and in offered lieu of the any justification given in tne previous section of this report spray system modifications or other corrective actions on the c.ontainment additive valves.

REFERENCES

1. WE letter (C. Fay) to NRC (J. Keppler), " Reply to ISE Bulletin' 80-06,"

dated June 6, 1980. _

. 2. Telephone conference call, NRC (P. Bender and J. Colburn) and EG&G/SRO (D. Hackett) to WE (P. Katers and C. Krause), February 5,1981.

I&E

- 3. WE letter (C. Fay) to NRC (J. Keppler), " Additional Inforamtion,

- Bulletin 80-06," dated 14 arch 10, 1981.

d 4

e e

4 e .,E e

b

,f g* . s e* ,

l m.

e e ,

.