ML20009B593
| ML20009B593 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1981 |
| From: | Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Jordan E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009B594 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, TAC-42768, TAC-42769, NUDOCS 8107160364 | |
| Download: ML20009B593 (3) | |
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iG MEMORANDUM FOR:
E.L. Jordan, Deputy Director, Division of Res and Regional Reactor Inspection, IE FROM:
Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for Operating Reactors, DL
SUBJECT:
POINT _ BEACH _1_AND1-ESF RESET CONTROL - I&E BULLETIN 80-06 l
Task Interface agreement ROI-80-15 assigned the responsibility to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for reviewing the licensee's re-sponses to Items 1 and 3 of IAE Bulletin 80 'J6.
Our review of Wisconsin Electric Power Company responses to the bunutin for the Poir.t Beach Nuclear Plant Unit Nos. I and 2 ziae complete. The Technical Evaluation Report (TER) prepared by our contractor E38G and our Safety Evaluation Report (SER) are attached.
Please note that except for two valves which control the addition of additive to the Containment Spray System (CSS) and a single control room ventilation selenoid valve we found that for all systems and components serving safety related functions that the associated safety related equipment remained in the emergency mode upon ESFAS reset.
The licensee committed by letter dated June 6,1980 and supplemented by letter dated March 10, 1981, to implement corrective modifications to the single solenoid valve control, in each unit, found to change position upon ESFAS reset. Thelicensee has also performed verification tests on all associated equipment during recent refueling outages of each unit.
Tne Itcensee offered justification for not modifying the two containment spray system (CSS) additive valves on each unit found to change position upon reset of the CSS. Our evaluation of the licensee's justification is contained in the attached SER.
As part of our effort, the containment purge technical evaluation report was also reviewed and no conflicts with the enclosure were found. Based on our review, we find the licensee's response to items 1 and 3 of I&E Belletin 80-06 acceptable.
Original signed by:
Tlinis"$.' U$IEE, Assistant Director for LGU.ATORY DOC ~(t! Ri100?Y Operating Reactors Division of Licensing
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SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT POINT BEACH NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 LICENSEE RESPONSE TO I&E BULLETIN 80-06, ENGINEERED SAFETY-FEATURES (ESF) RESET CONTROLS INTRODUCTION Instances have been reported at operating nuclear power plants where it had been found that following the reset of an ESF actuated signal, certain equipment (e.g., ventilation dampers, motors, and valves) would return to its normal mode which could compromise the protective actions of the affected systems.
As a result, on fiarch 13, 1980 the NRC issued I&E Bulletin 80-06 requesting certain actions to be taken by licensees for all PWR and BWR facilities with operating licenses.
EVALUATION The enclosed report (EGG 1183-4209.) was prepared for us by E G & G, Inc.,
San Ramon, California as part of our technical assistance contractor program.
It provides their technical evaluation of the licensee's response to I&E Bulletin 80-06 in accordance with NRC-provided guidance.
For all safety systems, E G & G concluded that safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode upon reset of the ESF actuated signals, except for two valves which control the addition of additive to the Containment Spray System (CSS) and a single control room ventilation selenoid valve found to change position in each unit upon ESFAS reset. The licensee committed to modify and provided a detailed modification scheme for the selenoid valve control which E G & G concluded will assure that 100 percent recirculation of control room air will continue after r.eset of containment isolation.
The licensee offered justification in lieu of modifying the two CSS additive valves, which E G & G EG&G concluded contained sufficient information for us to decide the issue.
did not evaluate this item.
Further, the licensee has performed verification
-2 tests on all associated eqDioment during recent refueling outagesof 0; unit to demonstrate compliance.
Therefore, E G & G found the plant to satisfy the requirements of I&E Bulletin 80-06, with the exception of the CSS additive valves.
We have reviewed the licensee's justification for not moditying the two CSS additive valves in each unit and find it acceptable based on the premise that containment spray would only be reset if the operator intended to stop the spray system and also because the operator can always manually control the position of the spray additive valves.
CONCLUSION Based on the information and documents provided by the licensee, and on our review of the contractor's report, we conclude that the licensee has satisfied the concerns of I&E Bulletin 80-06, subject to verification by I&E of successful test completion.
Therefore, we find the ESF reset controls for the Point Beach Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, in compliance with NRC criteria.
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