05000265/LER-1980-028-03, /03L-0:on 801024,ECCS Surveillance Performed on Incorrect Diesel Generator Bus After Cooling Water Pump Failure.Caused by Personnel Error & Procedure Inadequacy. Personnel Cautioned & Outage Checklist Will Be Revised

/03L-0:on 801024,ECCS Surveillance Performed on Incorrect Diesel Generator Bus After Cooling Water Pump Failure.Caused by Personnel Error & Procedure Inadequacy. Personnel Cautioned & Outage Checklist Will Be Revised

ML20004D562
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	11/17/1980
From:	Dunesia Clark COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20004D551	List: 05000265/LER-1980-028, Forwards LER 80-028/03L-0 05000265/LER-1980-028-03, /03L-0:on 801024,ECCS Surveillance Performed on Incorrect Diesel Generator Bus After Cooling Water Pump Failure.Caused by Personnel Error & Procedure Inadequacy. Personnel Cautioned & Outage Checklist Will Be Revised
References
LER-80-028-03L-05, LER-80-28-3L-5, NUDOCS 8106090533
Download: ML20004D562 (2)

LER-1980-028, /03L-0:on 801024,ECCS Surveillance Performed on Incorrect Diesel Generator Bus After Cooling Water Pump Failure.Caused by Personnel Error & Procedure Inadequacy. Personnel Cautioned & Outage Checklist Will Be Revised

Event date:
Report date:
2651980028R03 - NRC Website

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8 80 81 DOCKET NUMSER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROSA8LE CONSEQUENCES h [TTT] l After discovering the 1/2 Diesel Generator was inoperable due to failure of the 1/2 l

Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump,' the surveillance for ECCS wa s performed on the g

r. usa l gl Incorrect bus. The probable consequences were minimal. All outside transmission l

ryyg g lines were available and the Unit 1 Diesel Generator was always available and could l

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have supp11ed emergency power to Unit 2 via the 14-1:24-1 bus tie.

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N 33 36 16 37 40 ' 48 42 43 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27 i O l The cause of this occurrence is designated as personnel er.ror.

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i i i personnel were reminded of the importance of proper testing. The Diesel Generator l

, 2 l outage checklist is to be revised to clarity which systems should be tested for any l

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LER NUMBER: LER/R0 80-28/03L-0 ll.

LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station 111. FACILIT" NAME: Unit Two IV.

DOCKET NUMBER: 050-265 V.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On October 23, 1980, af ter discovering that the 1/2 Diesel Generator was inoperable due to the 1/2 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump failure, the surveillance testing required for an inoperable Diesel Generator was performed. Unit One was shutdown for refueling at the time; thus, surveillance was only required for Unit Two. The required surveillance wac performed immediately on the low pressure coolant injection systems and the containment cooling mode of RHR which is supplied from 4KV Bus 23-1, whose emergency power supply is the 1/2 Diesel Generator. The following day, while preparing to perform the surveillance for the second day of the diesel outage, it was discovered that the previous surveillance had been performed on the incorrect bus. The surveillance should have been performed on the pumps supplied by 4KV Bus 24-1, which is supplied by the Unit Two Diesel Generator. This was contrary to the surveillance requirements for an inoperable Diesel Generator as specified in Technical Specification 4.9.E.

The Unit Two Diesel Generator had been tested satisfactorily on the first day. The testing for the second day was performed immediately on the correct pumps and 4KV Bus.

VI.

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The probable consequences of this occurrence were minimal. All outside transmission lines were available through the duration of the occurrence.

Thus the normal power supply to the emergency buses and systems was always available. Although Unit One was shutdown for refueling, the Unit One Diesel Generator was operable and could have supplied emergency power to Unit Two via the 14-1:24-1 Bus tie.

Vll. CAUSE:

The cause of this occurrence is designated as personnel error. Procedure inadequacy has been designated to be a contributing cause. The Diesel Generator outage surveillance checksheet did not clearly specify which emergency bus was to be tested when a Diesel Generator was inoperable.

Vill. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

All operating personnel were reminded of the importance of proper testing and operation of the proper equipment as specified in Te:hnical Specifi-cations. To prevent a recurrence, the Diesel Generator outage surveil-lance fcrm is to be revised to clarify which system should be tested for any c1e Liesel Generator being inoperable.