05000265/LER-1980-030-03, /03L-0:on 801031,primary Containment Valve AO-2-1601-63 Required 30-s to Close.Caused by Malfunction of Pilot Solenoid SO-2-1601-71.Solenoid Replaced & Tested

/03L-0:on 801031,primary Containment Valve AO-2-1601-63 Required 30-s to Close.Caused by Malfunction of Pilot Solenoid SO-2-1601-71.Solenoid Replaced & Tested

ML20002B083
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	11/20/1980
From:	Robert Murray COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20002B074	List: 05000265/LER-1980-030-03, /03L-0:on 801031,primary Containment Valve AO-2-1601-63 Required 30-s to Close.Caused by Malfunction of Pilot Solenoid SO-2-1601-71.Solenoid Replaced & Tested
References
LER-80-030-03L-03, LER-80-30-3L-3, NUDOCS 8012090416
Download: ML20002B083 (2)

LER-1980-030, /03L-0:on 801031,primary Containment Valve AO-2-1601-63 Required 30-s to Close.Caused by Malfunction of Pilot Solenoid SO-2-1601-71.Solenoid Replaced & Tested

Event date:
Report date:
2651980030R03 - NRC Website

text

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U. E SaVCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIMtUN NCC FORM 366 I

(7 771 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT j

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60 6I COCKET NUVSE R 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 S

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROB ABLE CC,NSEQUENCES h After venting primary containment valve A0-2-1601-63, Standby Gas suction vent.

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required 30 seconds to respond to a closed sional.

Once the valve o m a ri to close I it closed in less than 10 seconds. The consequences were minimal because the slow l

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closure of A0-2-1601-63 would not have prevented the isolation of primary con-l

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In addition, upstream isolation valves A0-2-1601-61, 62, and 23 were fully l l:);j l operable for primary containment isolation.

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VALVE SYSTEM

CAUSE

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42 4J 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECT;VE ACTIONS h 6: t311 The cause of this occurrence is attributed to the malfunctionino of oilot solenoid l

J tt1l S0-2-1601-71 which had worn 0 rings. A0-2-1601-63 valve was left in the closed I

3.,.jj position. Solenoid 50-2-1601-71 was replaced and valve A0-2-1601-63 was stroked 1

) t.; j l three times satisfactorily on November 2, 1980.

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DESCRIP fiON 1

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PHONE:

NAME OF PREP.ARER

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LER NUMBER: LER/R0 80-30/03L-0 i

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LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company a

quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station lll.

FACILITY NAME: Uni t Two IV.

D0,".KET NUMBER: 050-265 i

i V.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

1 On October 31, 1980, at 2:45 p.m., Unit Two was operating at 2464 MWt with a load of 812 MWe.

Primary Containment pressure reduction by vent.*ng to

• he Standby Gas Treatment System had Just been completed. The Standby Gas Treatment vent / suction valve A0-2-1601-63 required approximately 30 seconds i

to initially respond to.the signal to close from the Control Room. Once started, full closure of the valve was completed in less than 10 additional 4

seconds.

Technical Specification 3.7.D.I. requires that the A0-2-1601-63 valve operate within a maximum of 10 seconds. Work Request Q0878) was initiated to investigate and repair the valve malfunc :lon.

VI.

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The probable consequences o this occurrence were minimal. The slow 2

closure of the A0-2-1601-f3 valve would not have prevented the capability of the Primary Containme : System to isolate as designed. Valves A0 1601-60, A0-2-1601-61, oc "-1601-62 and A0-2-1601-23 which are located in-board toward the Primary ontainment, with respect to A0-2-1601-63, were fully operable. These valves could have properly isolated Primary Con-

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tainment if a Group 11 PCI signal had occurred. This occurrence did not affect normal venting operations of the Primary Containment.

Radio-logical activity inside the drywell was low enough at the time to allow venting of Primary Containment through the Reactor Building ventilation exhaust system.

Vll.

CAUSE

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The cause of this occurrence was attributed to the malfunctioning of pilot i

solenoid valve 50-2-1601-71. The two-way solenoid-valve was discovered i'

to have worn 0-rings, which restricted free movement of the valve stem.

This 'resulted in 'the delayed response of A0-2-1601-63 The pilot tolenoid valve was manufactured by Versa Products, Model No. VSG-4322.

Vill. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

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The corrective action tsken was to leave the A0-2-1601-63 valve in the closed position, thereby ensuring the capability of attaining Primary l

Containment until the precise cause of the malfunction could be identified and repaired. The pilot solenoid valve 50-2-1601-71 was replaced on November 2, 1980, and the valve was test' stroked three times satisfactorily.

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