ML19360A102
| ML19360A102 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 12/05/2019 |
| From: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19360A097 | List: |
| References | |
| LR-N19-0102 | |
| Download: ML19360A102 (73) | |
Text
Section 8.1 8.1.1 8.1. 2 8.1.3 8.1. 4 8:1.4.1 8.1.4.2 8.1.4.2.1 8.1.4.2.2 8.1.4.2.3 8.1.4.2.4 8.1.4.2.5 8.1.4.2.6 8.1. 5 8.2 8.2.1 8.2.2 8.3 8.3.1 8.3.1.1 8.3.1.2 8.3.1.3 8.3.1.4 8.3.1.5 SGS-UFSAR SECTION 8 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS TABLE OF CONTENTS Title INTRODUCTION Utility Grid System and Interconnections Onsite Power Systems Safeguards Loads Design Bases General Cabling Cable Fire Protection Marking Separation In-Plant Separation in Control Areas and Components Quality Assurance Penetrations OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM Analysis ON SITE POWER SYSTEM AC Power Station Power and Auxiliary Power Transformers 4160-Volt System 460- and 230-Volt 115-Volt ac Instrumentation Power Standby Power Supplies 8-i 8.1-1 8.1-1 8.1-1 8.1-2 8.1-2 8.1-2 8.1-4 8.1-4 8.1-4 8.1-5 8.1-7 8.1-9 8.1-12 8.1-12 8.2-1 8.2-1 8.2-1 8.3-1 8.3-2 8.3-2 8.3-2 8.3-6 8.3-6 8.3-7 Revision 26 May 21, 2012
Section 8.3.1.5.1 8.3.1.5.2 8.3.1.5.3 8.3.1.5.4 8.3.1.6 8.3.2 8.3.2.1 8.3.2.2 8.3.2.3 8.3.2.4 8.3;3 SGS-UFSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)
Title Diesel Generator Capacity and Loading Diesel Generator Control and Trip Functions Diesel Generator Instrumentation Diesel Generator Support Systems Tests and Inspections DC Power 250-, 125-, and 28-Volt Systems Station Batteries Station Monitoring CW Switchgear Batteries Containment Penetration/Conductor Overcurrent Protection 8-ii Page 8.3-8 8.3-9 8.3-12 8.3-15 8.3-15 8.3-16 8.3-16
- 8. 3-17 8.3-18 8.3-20 8.3-20 Revision 14 December 29, 1995
Table 8.3-1 8.3-2 8.3-3 8.3-4A 8.3-4B 8.3-5 8.3-6 SGS-UFSAR LIST OF TABLES Title Different Feeds to the Vital Instrument Buses Diesel Generator Loading Sequence for Loss of Offsite Power with Accident Diesel Generator Loading Sequence for Loss of Offsite Power Deleted Deleted 28-VDC Battery Load Profile -
SGS Units 1 & 2 125-VDC Battery Load Profile -
SGS Units 1 & 2 8-iii Revision 22 May 5, 2006
Figure 8.2-1 8.2-2 8.3-1 8.3-2 8.3-2A 8.3-3A 8.3-3B 8.3-4 8.3-4A 8.3-4B 8.3-4C 8.3-5 8.3-6 8.3-7 8.3-8 SGS-UFSAR LIST OF FIGURES Title Deleted:
Refer to Plant Drawing 205415 500 kV Switchyard Diagram Auxiliary Power System Diagram 13 kV North Ring Bus Diagram 13 kV South Bus Sections Diagram Deleted:
Refer to Plant Drawing 203001 Deleted:
Refer to Plant Drawing 203062 Deleted:
Refer to Plant Drawing 203002 Deleted:
Refer to Plant Drawing 203003 Deleted:
Refer to Plant Drawing 203063 Deleted:
Refer to Plant Drawing 602939 Deleted:
Refer to Plant Drawing 211370 Deleted:
Refer to Plant Drawing 211357 Deleted:
Refer to Plant Drawings 203007 (U1) and 223720 (U2)
Deleted:
Refer to Plant Drawing 203008 8-iv Revision 27 November 25, 2013
SECTION 8 ELECTRIC POWER
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8.1.1 Utility Grid System and Interconnections Each unit generates electric power at 25 kV which is fed through an isolated phase bus to the main transformer bank where it is stepped up to 500 kV and delivered to the station.
The 500-kV station design a breaker-and-a-half scheme for high and is connected to three 500-kV transmission lines.
Two transmission lines go north, via right-of-way, to two major stations:
Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G)
New Freedom Switching Station and Atlantic City Electric's Orchard Switching Station.
The New Freedom Switching Station is solidly connected to the PSE&G 230-kV bulk power system via four 5001230-kV autotransformers.
Orchard Switching Station is also connected to Atlantic City Electric's 230-kV bulk power system via a
5001230-kV autotransformer.
In addition, it is connected to the Pennsylvania I New Jersey I tvJaryland 500-kV interconnected acent Hope Creek 500-kV switchyard line which is also into the I New I Maryland 500-kV interconnected system.
8.1.2 Onsite Power Systems The Onsite Power System for each unit consists of the main generator, the auxiliary power and station power transformers, the diesel generators, 40-MW gas turbine generator ( or.e for both units), the group, vi tal and circulating water bus sections and their related distribution systems.
The 4160-V vi tal
- buses, which feed are zed by station power transformers served by the 13-kV south bus sections.
Preferred power is SGS-UFSAR to the 13-kV bus south sections by two sources from the switchyard.
8.1-1 Revision 25 October 26, 2010
Safeguards loads are divided among the vi tal buses in three independent load groups.
Each of these load groups is provided with a diesel generator which serves as a standby power supply in the event that the preferred source is unavailable.
Each unit has a 125-V de power system to provide power to safeguards loads.
This system also supplies power through inverters to the 115-V ac instrument buses.
In addition, each unit is provided with a 250-V de power system and a 28-V de control system.
The above constitutes station de sources.
Two separate 125-v de batteries and associated equipment are provided in the circulating water switchgear building to provide power to the switchgear and 13.8 kV south bus section breakers.
8.1.3 Safeguards Loads Safeguards loads are identified on the following figures:
Load Group 4160 V ac 460 V ac 230 V ac 28 V de 125 V de 8.1.4 Design Bases 8.1.4.1 General Plant Drawing No.
203002 203003 and 203063 203003 and 203063 211357 203007 and 223720 The station has been designed to be capable of being safely shut down from full power in the event of the loss of all offsi te power sources.
Redundant and independent onsite power sources are provided to ensure the availability of the necessary power for shutdown systems.
power is not a design basis event.
Total loss of all onsite and offsite ac The distribution system for each unit and the network interconnections are
- designed, fabricated, and erected with sufficient independence, redundancy, capacity, and testability to 8.1-2 SGS-UFSAR Revision 27 November 25, 2013
provide rel.iable power to unit auxil.iaries during startup, operation, and shutdown.
The Class lE portion of the distribution system of each unit is designed to meet the intent of IEEE 308-1971, "Criteria for Class lE Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
onsite Electrical Systems and components vital to station safety, including the emergency diesel generators, are designed so that their integrity is not impaired by a design basis earthquake, high winds, floods, or disturbances on the Electrical system.
- Power, control, and instrument cabling, motors, and other electrical equipment required for operation of the engineered safety features are suitably protected against the effects of either a nuclear system accident or of severe external environmental phenomena in order to assure a high degree of confidence in the operability of such components in the event their use is required. Considerations which reflect the above requirements and which have been incorporated in the Electrical system are evidenced by the following:
- 1.
The enclosures for motors and electrical switchgear suit the local conditions and are designed in accordance with specifications issued by the National Electrical Manufacturers Association. All electrical equipment operates within ita rated limits.
- 2.
All switchgear is of metal-clad construction.
The 4160-V and 460-V switchgear control power is taken from the station 125-V de sources.
Each breaker cubicle is separated from the adjacent cubicle by metal SGS-UFSAR barriers and each bus section is physically separated from all others.
Vital switchgear, unit substations, and motor control centers are confined to Seismic Category I areas. Separation of redundant power equipment has been maintained throughout the station.
This equipment is designed to permit safe operation under
- normal, overload, and short circuit conditions. The equipment design provides for satisfactory voltage regulation while short circuit duties remain within the equipment capability.
8.1-3 Revision 16 January 31, 1998
The station batteries and associated chargers are in separate rooms within a Seismic Category I structure.
- 3.
Adequate communications systems are provided for station operating personnel which include a page and party line communication system, a direct dial telephone system with Telephone Company central office tie
- lines, and a system of transceivers with fixed repeaters.
phones are also provided.
8.1.4.2 Further information for protection circuits is presented in Section 7.
8.1.4.2.1 Cable Ratings "Power Cable Ampacity," AIEE Pub.
No.
5-135-1/IPCEA Pub.
No.
P-46-426 was originally used as the criteria to determine allowable cable ratings as appropriate for tray, conduit, and raceway applications.
Since 1993, ICEA P-54-440, "Ampacities of Cables in Open-top Cable Trays", has also been used to derive the ampacity of power cables in open air random filled trays.
Power and control cable insulation selection was based on an optimurrc combination of insulation, fire resistance, and !1on-propagation quaLities.
cables are shielded to minimize induced voltaqe and interference.
8.'.4.2.2 Fire Protection In areas where safety-related cables are protection and/or detection is provided:
the following fire
- 1.
Lower Electrical Penetration Areas at Elev.
78',
460V Electrical Swi tchqear Rooms at Elev.
84' photoelectric (smoke) and thermal detectors, automatically operated sprinkler systems.
- 2.
4160V Electrical Switchgear Rooms at Elev. 64' -
photoelectric (smoke) and thermal detectors, automatically operated sprinkler systems.
8.1-4 SGS-UFSAR Revision 24 May 11, 2009
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
Relay Room (cable spreading rooms)
Ionization-type products of combustion detectors and independent Halon 1301 fire extinguishing system which is actuated either automatically upon receipt of a
coincident signal from both zones of the cross zone Fire Detection System, or manually by either operation of a remote pull station or by depressing the STRIKE button on the Halon system control panel.
Control Room Ionization-type products of combustion detectors and manual fire alarm pull-stations.
Diesel Generator Compartments Rate of rise and/or rate compensated thermostats and manual co 2 total flooding systems.
The manual systems for the diesel generator co2 protected areas have a first-in-with-lockout capability.
Upon manual actuation of any one diesel generator area co2 system, a permissive circuit is established to the other two systems to shunt-trip the supply breakers for either of these other two systems upon receipt of any actuation signal.
Therefore, the first-in signal effects a lockout of the other two systems.
Pilot valve actuation of a diesel generator area co2 system remains operable with the manual pushbutton response locked out (deenergized).
At all fire barrier walls, floors, and ceilings, fire stops are provided for all openings through which cables pass.
A Fire Detection System is installed in critical areas throughout the station.
Additional information regarding fire protection is presented in Section 9.5.1.
8.1.4.2.3 Marking The cable identification system provides distinctive markings in order to readily enable detection of any violation of the independence criteria, by visual inspection.
It provides that a 8.1-5 SGS-UFSAR Revision 29 January 30, 2017
cablemark channel (for such nonsafety-related cables that run with safety-related cables), be applied to each cable as it is installed.
The locations for these tags are: 1) at each end; 2) in the vicinity of each traymark of the route; 3) both sides of penetrations of walls, etc.; and 4) at the entrance and exit of all conduit or duct runs.
Installation conformance to design criteria is assured by quality control surveillance during installation and separate audits performed after installation, as indicated in Section 8.1.4.2.6.
8.1-Sa SGS-UFSAR Revision 10 July 22, 1990
*~----------
SGS-UFSAR THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK 8.1-Sb Revision 10 July 22, 1990
To facilitate installation audits by others, colored tape is employed to offer further evidence of conformance to the independence criteria.
The colored tape is applied during installation, adjacent to the cablemark tags indicated above and will serve for construction conformance purposes only.
The tape is a different solid color for each of the four safety-related channels and the same four colors striped for the associated nonsafety-related channels (when nonsafety-related cables are run with safety-related cables, as noted in Section 8.1.4.2.4).
Cable identifications consist of a series of alphanumeric digits associated with its system, origin, or function.
Safety-related cables and nonsafety-related cables safety-related cables are suffixed by which a "-"
are and run with a
letter indicating channel.
These cables must follow the rules for routing described below.
Identifying Mark No.
lA4D-A (Power Cable) 1RMS48-GT (Control Cable)
Examples Digits (s) 1 A
4 D
-A 1
RMS 48
-G T
Significance Unit No.
Bus Designation Breaker Position Voltage Level Safety-related Channel A Unit No.
Radiation Monitoring System Sequential Designation Nonsafety-Related Channel G Digital Signal Each cable tray run has its own five-digit identification number.
This number defines the unit number, building, elevation, and general area. This number will also appear on cable schematics and on cable and conduit schedules.
Safety-related trays are color coded to distinguish the safety-related from the nonsafety-related 8.1-6 SGS-UFSAR Revision 6 Februar 15 1987
cable trays.
In addition, all wireways containing safety-re1ated cables are di 1dentified as such.
8.1.4.2.4 Separation In-Plant The routing of control, instrumentation, and power cables is such as to minimize their vulnerability to damage.
Power and control cables are distributed from the switchgear and control areas by means of rigid metal conduits or ladder type cable trays.
Three separate trays are provided for 4160 V, 460 V, and 230 V power, control, and instrumentation cables.
The 4160 V power cables are limited to a single
- 460 V power cables are limited to two layers; and 230 V power, control, and instrumentation trays are not filled above the side rails.
Four independent protection channels, A, B, C, and D are provided.
In general, the criteria is a minimum vertical and horizontal spacing between redundant trays of 18 inches and 12 inches, respectively, with additional design conservatism as indicated below.
Vertical tiers and of redundant trays are generally avoided.
Dissimilar channel designated safety-related trays are color coded at crossover points.
For free air cables not installed in limited hazard areas a minimum vertical and horizontal spacing between redundant cables of lB inches and 12 inches 1 respectively, shall be used except as noted below.
For installations in containment where cables are routed in free air from a conduit to a cable tray that requires separation from adjacent trays 1 the following minimum horizontal and vertical spacing shall be used:
Control and Instrumentation Cables l inch horizontal 3 inches vertical Low Power Cables Less Than or Equal to 2/0 AWG 6 inches horizontal 12 inches vertical There are three instances in the Salem Units where 460 V power cable trays run beneath control cable trays in a vertical tier.
These instances do not involve cables from different safety-related channels.
The Salem tray criteria is such that cable trays are arranged in order of ascending voltage except where it is not possible to do so.
In these cases, a fire resistant barrier has been provided in the upper tray.
8.1-7 SGS-UFSAR Revision 18 April 26, 2000
Extensive flame tests performed on the cables proved that the combination of cable construction and minimum spacings used is adequate to prevent propagation of fire.
Even though the tests have proved the 18-inch vertical spacing as acceptable when redundant cables are involved, an additional fire resistant blanket is provided for each tier (except bottom tier} in the Control Room, Relay Room, and all other congested areas where the vertical spacing is 18 inches or less.
The blanket is a fire resistant type and will prevent propagation of fire.
In general, the ordinal arrangement of trays is higher voltage trays on top with control cable trays at the bottom.
The safety-related cables are physically separated in accordance with channel designations, A,
B, C, and D;
nonsafety-related cables are routed, if necessary, in trays containing safety-related cables as follows:
E with B F with c G with D H with A Where E, F, G, and H are the nonsafety-related cables Non-s~fety related cables that can be connected to a non-affiliated channel of the on-site power system must be evaluated to ensure that no loss of a safety function can occur due to the lack of physical separation of cables.
The grouping of penetrations in the electrical penetration area and the selection of conductors for each penetration follows the criteria established for the separation of redundant cables and provides for the implementation of these criteria for the cables approaching and leaving the area.
Written design and installation procedures are established to assure that nonsafety-related cables only run with one safety-related channel.
8.1-8 SGS-UFSAR Revision 16 January 31, 1998
8.1.4.2.5 Separation in Control Areas and Components Limited Hazard Areas Limited hazard areas at Salem are considered to be the Relay Rooms, Elevation 100 r and Control Equipment Rooms, Elevation 122 I.
The required physical separation of cables in free air is designated as 1" horizontal and 3" vertical for instrumentation and control cables and 6" horizontal and 12" vertical for low voltage power cables less than 2/0 AWG.
Control Boards, Panels and Racks The control boards, panels, and relay racks have been designed to provide independence and separation necessary to fulfill the single failure requirement of IEEE Standard 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
Control Console The control console is a free standing unit that is totally enclosed including a dropped floor with a steel bottom plate.
All cables entering the console pass through sealing bushings installed in the steel bottom plate on 6-inch centers.
Up to eight cables may pass through a numbered sealing bushing; however, only cables of the same separation designation are permitted in a single bushing.
Safety-related and nonsafety-related cables may be assigned to the same bushing in accordance with the criteria stated above.
Once in the console, cables are assigned to a four-section cable lattice arrangement with supports which have a minimum center to center distance of 1 7/8 inches and are 2 inches high.
Cables go through the lattice to the plug-in instruments.
The lattice is assigned separation designations and is also divided horizontally into a numbered grid system. Each cable is assigned a separation designation, a bushing, and a lattice position number. Therefore, the location and path of each cable in the console is individually defined.
Installed cables are fastened to the lattice supports.
The plug-in cables terminate at the rear of the console-mounted equipment. All pushbutton stations and vertical indicators plug into identical steel housings which have a rear-mounted receptacle for the plug-in cable.
The steel housings provide physical separation for adjacent pushbutton stations or indicators.
There are no exposed terminations associated with the control stations and indicators.
8.1-9 SGS-UFSAR Revision 16 January 31, 1998
Each pushbutton station has functions associated with one separation designation.
The minimum center-to-center distance between the double barriered control station housings is 1 1/2 inches and is based on the use of low voltage controls and special teflon insulated plug-in cables.
This minimum distance occurs at the entrance to plug-in modules containing terminations which are enclosed in a steel housing.
From the modules, the cables are separated in the lattice system described above which provides for specific routing of the cables to the floor bushings.
Redundant cables are "fanned out" from the modules to achieve a greater separation as soon as practical; however, the separation is never less than 1 1/2 inches, center to center.
Safety-related wiring other than the plug-in cables is run in conduit.
The reactor trip switches' wiring is not of plug-in cable construction.
Reactor trip wiring is run in conduit (using two separate paths for the two trains) from the entrance to the console up to the switches.
Wiring for redundant functions is separated by using the front and rear decks of the multi-deck switch.
J Each circuit in Current overload the 2 8-V de Logic System is protected by circuit breakers.
tests cable based upon the protection failed to have been performed on the multi-conductor plug-in calculated current which would occur if the circuit interrupt a
short circuit due to failures in the pushbutton control stations.
These tests showed that a fault occurring in a pushbutton control station could not cause a fire in the console space.
Within the console, color coding is used to identify the cables and connectors associated with each of the four safety-related and nonsafety-related channels.
8.1-10 SGS-UFSAR Revision 18 April 26, 2000
Redundant safety-related components/wiring are generally located in physically separated panels or racks.
For those exceptions where redundant components/wiring are located in the same
- panel, and are required for completion of a protection action, then the components' design, the materials and the wiring arrangement are such that the possibility of propagation of an electrical failure/fire from one separation group to the redundant one is minimized.
It must be shown by evaluation that no loss of a function can occur due to the loss of or wiring in a enclosure which does not for cables of different Internal cables which carry redundant functions must be by a minimum of 6 inches, conduit, or other suitable fire-retardant barrier.
Color coding is used to identify panels and racks containing sensors and logic for reactor protection and safeguards actuation.
Two sets of non-safety related power feeders are provided for the Pressurizer Electric Heaters mounted in the bottom of Pressurizer.
The heater feeder cables route their banks from separate cable trays below the Pressurizer in free air to heater terminations.
Due to the configuration of the heater in the bottom of the the cables in free air are intertwined and may touch.
When the Pressurizer busses are connected to their related sources, the free air intertwining and touching is acceptable based on non-safety cables routing together.
Each of the non-safety related Pressurizer Busses is backed up by an emergency feeder from the Emergency Diesel Gener~tors (EDG) to support natural circulation of RCS in the event of an accident or transient condition.
The 1(2)A 460V Vital Bus provides emergency power to the 1(2)EP Pressurizer Bus and the 1(2)C 460V Vital Bus emergency power to the 1(2)GP Pressurizer Bus.
When the 1(2)EP Bus is connected to the 1(2)A EDG, the 1(2)EP heater cables are considered A Channel and when the 1 (2) GP Bus is connected to the 1(2)C EDG, the 1(2)GP heater cables are considered C Channel.
Prior to the implementation of DCPs 80095831 and 80096074, the 1 (2) EP pressurizer heater cables were related cable trays.
8.1-11 SGS-UFSAR routed in B Channel Revision 26 May 21, 2012.
A special acceptance of criteria has been established by evaluation S-C-RC-ESE-0870 to provide the technical basis to allow connection of the EP and GP pressurizer busses to the pressurizer heaters when either or both pressurizer busses are connected to their alternate EDG feeders.
S-C-RC-ESE-0870 analyzed the impact on the 1(2)A 460V Vital Bus, 1(2)C 460V Vital Bus and the 1(2)B 460V Vital Bus.
After S-C-RC-ESE-0870 was issued, DCPs 80095831 and 80096074 removed the 1(2)EP pressurizer heater cables from the B channel safety related tray.
Therefore, the analysis in S-C-RC-ESE-0870 only to the intertwined cable at the bottom of the in Units 1 and 2.
The 1(2)EP and 1(2)GP heater cables and penetration conductors are protected by two Penetration protection fuses in series at the 1 (2) EP and 1(2)GP Buses respectively.
When the 1(2)EP and/or 1(2)GP Buses are connected to the alternate emergency feeder, additional protection is provided by the upstream Class lE isolation circuit breaker at the 1(2)A and/or 1(2)C 460V Vital Buses Any changes to the 1(2)EP or l(2)GP Pressurizer Bus and its associated cables must be reviewed in accordance with the safety evaluation S-C-RC-ESE-0870.
Any changes to the 1(2)A emergency feeder to the Pressurizer or the 1(2)C emergency feeder to the Pressurizer must be reviewed in accordance with S-C-RC-ESE-0870.
8.1-lla SGS-UFSAR Revision 26 May 21, 2012
THIS PAGE LEAVE BLANK 8.1-11b SGS-UFSAR Revision 16 January 31, 1998
8.1.4.2.6 Quality Assurance In addition to the specifications and drawings, documents are prepared to identify the requirements for implementation of the design and construction criteria. These documents are prepared or approved by the responsible engineer and are further reviewed and approved by the responsible supervisory engineering personnel prior to their release.
The following procedures are established to verify that the cable installation is in accordance with the applicable criteria:
- 1.
Each cable has a "pulling card" or data sheet which shows the cable number, segregation code, and cable routing. The foreman or supervisor of each crew installing the cable signs each card certifying that the cable has been installed as specified.
- 2.
Outage Services performs quality verification inspections (as defined in Chapter 10 of the QATR) during safety-related cable installations, and Nuclear Oversight performs independent assessments (as defined in Chapter 18 of the QATR) of randomly selected safety-related cable installations, to ensure proper installation.
8.1.5 Penetrations Electrical penetrations comply with IEEE Standard 317-1972. A fuse is placed in series with the primary interrupting device for select electrical penetration circuits. This provides a second level of overcurrent protection for the respective penetration assembly where deemed necessary.
8.1-12 SGS-UFSAR Revision 29 January 30, 2017
8.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM 8.2.1 Description Each unit generates electric power at 25 kV which is fed through an isolated phase bus to the main transformer bank where it is stepped up to 500 kV and delivered to the switching station.
The 500-kV switching station design incorporates a breaker-and-a-half scheme for high reliability and is connected to three 500-kV transmission lines.
Two transmission lines go north via separate rights-of-way to two major switching stations:
Public Service Electric &
Gas (PSE&G)
New Freedom Switching Station and Atlantic City Electric's Orchard Switching Station.
The New Freedom Switching Station is solidly connected to the PSE&G 230-kV bulk power system via four 500/230-kV autotransformers.
Orchard Switching Station is also connected to Atlantic City Electric's 230-kV bulk power system via a autotransformer.
In addition, it is connected to the Pennsylvania/New Jersey/Maryland 500-kV interconnected system.
The third transmission line serves as a tie line to the adjacent Hope Creek 500-kV switchyard which is also integrated into the Pennsylvania/New Jersey/Maryland 500-kV interconnected system.
All three 500-kV power lines are available for either or both units.
Site transmission lines are routed as shown on Plant Drawing 205415.
A one-line diagram of the 500-kV switching station Electrical System is shown on Figure 8.2-2.
There are no present plans to incorporate automatic load dispatching for the Salem units.
8.2.2 Analysis Reliability considerations to minimize the possibility of power failure due to faults in the network interconnections and the associated switching are as follows:
SGS-UFSAR 8.2-1 Revision 27 November 25, 2013
- 1.
Each of the three transmission lines takes a separate route to its destination
- 2.
The breaker-and-a-half switching scheme in the 500-kV switching station
- 3.
Primary and backup relaying systems have been provided for each circuit along with circuit breaker failure protection
- 4.
Two independent de circuits are provided for each 500-kV breaker from the two independent and separate sources of de control power which are supplied to the 500-kV switchyard from the station batteries.
Loss of either de source will not prevent connection of the station auxiliary power system to a 500-kV source.
System network performance has been analyzed and evaluated on a computer model for critical three-phase faults cleared by primary relay protection. The Salem nuclear units are stable for the following postulated conditions:
- 1.
Loss of One Salem Nuclear Unit For the loss of one of the two Salem nuclear units (i.e., a fault in the generator or in its step-up transformer),
the remaining Salem nuclear unit is stable.
From the stability standpoint, the loss of a Salem unit is less severe than the loss of the most critical line as described below.
- 2.
Loss of Largest Generating Unit on the Grid SGS-UFSAR The largest generators on the system are the Salem units.
Therefore, the results of 111" above apply.
8.2-2 Revision 6 February 15, 1987
- 3.
Loss of the Most Critical Transmission Line There are three 500-kV transmission outlets from Salem Generat one to New Freedom Switching and one to the adjacent one to Orchard Creek 500-kV switchyard.
For stability analysis purposes, a three-phase fault at Salem v.1as simulated on each of the three 500- kV circuits.
A fault on the Salem-Hope Creek 500-kV line is the most critical line fault in evaluat:ing Salem stabi.l.ity.
units will remain stable.
Studies conditions such as Hope Creek For a fault on this line the Salem for Red Lion 500-kV or East Windsor New Freedom 500-kV line having an extensive outage, have indicated that the most critical condition is ~he disconnection of the East Windsor -
New Freedom or the Hope Creek -
Red Lion 500-kV line respectively.
In such a situation to maintain System Stability, the tripping of one of the Salem Units is required.
The relay was modified to this The above considerations mir.imize the of loss of more than one offsite power source.
In the event of a loss of all offsite power sources, the Engineered Safeguards will be supplied from the standby ac power supply
{see Section 8.3.1.5).
8.2-3 SGS-UFSAR Revision 25 October 26, 2010
Emergency lighting is provided throughout various areas of the plant where operator action may be required.
In addition, 8-hour battery pack lights have been provided in selected areas of the plant as part of the fire protection program.
Sufficient lighting exists for postulated loss of ac power events.
No action is required for these lights to be operational.
8.2-4 SGS-UFSAR Revision 15 June 12, 1996
SGS-UFSAR Figure F8.2-1 intentionally deleted.
Refer to plant drawing 205415 in DCRMS Revision 27 November 25, 2013
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PSEG Nuclear, LLC SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING ST A liON Rev1s1on 25, Octobel"' 26, 2010 Solem Nuclear Generotin_g Station 500 k V SWIT CHY ARD DIAGRAM Updated FSAR Figure 8.2*2 2000 PS£G Nocle<r, llC. All Riljlts Reserved **
8.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEM The description in this section is on a unit basis.
identical in configuration and differ only in nomenclature.
Units 1 and 2 are The Onsite Power System for each unit consists of the various Electrical modes of to reliable electrical power during all and shutdown conditions.
The have been with sufficient power sources, redundant provide reliable electrical 9ower.
and required switching to A one-line diagram of the station's Onsite Power System is shown on Figure 8.3-1, which indicates that power to supply the station electrical requirements is available via the station power transformers and the auxiliary power transformer.
The Offsite Power in combination with the Onsite Power has been shown by analysis and test to possess sufficient capacity and capability to automatically start and subsequently operate all safety loads within their voltage ratings for anticipated transients and accidents. The worst sustained undervoltage condition in the Onsite Power System vital buses, while connected to the Offsite Power System with two 500/13 kV transformers supplying the vital
- buses, was found to occur with the 500-kV offsi te system at the minimum with a concurrent loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) on Unit 2 while in Mode 1 and Unit 1 in Mode 3 (or vice versa).
This undervoltage condition results from the automatic transfer of the group buses from the auxiliary power transformers to the station power transformer and the automatic start of the required vital bus loads.
The 4160-V Undervoltage Protection System is described in Section 8.3.1.2.
8.3-1 SGS-UFSAR Revision 26 May 21, 2012
8.3.1 AC Power 8.3.1.1 Station Power and Auxiliary Power Transformers The 500-13 kV station power transformers are connected to different bus sections of the 500-kV switching station as indicated on Figure 8.2-2.
has the capacity to start both units at the same time.
Each The 13-kV north ring bus arrangement is shown on Figure 8.3-2.
Sectionalizing breakers in this ring bus are normally open and each 500-13 kV transformer Tl and T2 feeds two (one for each unit) 13-4 kV station power transformers Tll, T21 and Tl2, T22 associated with group buses.
The 13kV south bus arrangement is shown on Figure 8. 3-2a.
Each isolated section (A and D) of the bus is powered from 500-13kV transformer T3 and T4 respectively and feeds two, one for each unit, 13-4kV station power transformers Tl3, T24 and Tl4, T23 associated with vital buses and circulating water switchgear.
The 13-4kV station power transformers Tl3 and Tl4 (Unit 1) share the loads of three vital buses and two CW bus sections while T23 and T24 (Unit 2) share the loads of three vital buses and two CW bus sections.
The 13-kV bus arrangements assure a continuous preferred power supply to each unit in the event one 500-13 kV transformer should become inoperable.
The 25-4-4 kV auxiliary power transformer primary side is connected to the generator isolated phase bus.
Each of the two 4-kV secondary windings is connected to two 4160-V group buses.
8.3.1.2 4160-Volt System The 4160-V system is divided into four group bus sections, three vital bus sections and two circulating water bus sections as shown on Plant Drawings 203001, 203062, 203002 and 602939.
The group buses feed plant auxiliaries other than engineered safeguards equipment.
The group buses are energized by the 13-4 kV station power transformers during startup.
After the generator is synchronized to the 500-kV system, the group buses 8.3-2 SGS-UFSAR Revision 27 November 25, 2013
are manually transferred to the 25-4-4 kV auxiliary power transformer.
Should a unit trip, each 4160-V group bus automatically transfers from the auxiliary power transformer source to the station power transformer source.
The vital buses are fed directly from 13-4kV station power transformer T13, T14 (Unit 1) and T23, T24 (Unit 2). During normal operation, two of the vital buses are supplied from one station power transformer and the third from the other station power transformer. station power transformers Tl3, Tl4 (Unit 1) and T23, T24 (Unit 2) are also power source for two sections of cw switchgear.
The tie breaker between these sections is normally open.
The in-feed breakers on each vital bus from the two station power transformers are electrically interlocked to prevent paralleling both sources through a vital bus. These in-feed breakers provide means for transferring between sources in the event of an interruption of power from one source. Control power for each of the three 4160-V vital buses is provided by a normal feed from one battery and an emergency feed from another battery through two manually-operated, mechanically-interlocked molded case circuit breakers. Each 4-kV vital bus provides power to a 460-V and 230-V bus.
There are no interconnections between the redundant 460 or 230-V vital buses.
In the following discussion, component numbers for Unit 1 are used.
The functional description applies to Unit 2 as well.
The 4-kV vital buses are normally energized from either No. 13 or No. 14 station power transformer through in-feed breakers 13ASD, 13BSD, 13CSD or 14ASD, 14BSD, l4CSD.
In the event the normal source to a 4-kV bus becomes unavailable, that bus can be automatically transferred to its alternate source, provided the following conditions are met (assume No. 14 transformer is the normal source for vital bus lA) :
- 1.
lA bus differential or overload relays have not operated. Voltage on the bus is below a predetermined value.
Breaker 14ASD is open.
8.3-3 SGS-UFSAR Revision 15 June 12, 1996
- 2.
l.AJ)Jl breaker (diesel generator) is open.
No.
13 station power transformer is energized.
SBC bus undervoltage relay has not operated.
In the event all offsite power is lost, the standby diesel generators are automatically started and the normal in-feed breakers to each 4-kv vital bus are opened.
When the diesel generator is up to speed and voltage, its generator breaker is closed to energize that 4-kV bus.
An interlock from the diesel generator breaker prevents closure of either in-feed breaker to that bus, thereby preventing any interconnection between redundant 4-kv buses.
The above controls and interlocks are in conformance with the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.6.
undervoltage protection on the 416o-V vital buses is provided in two levels as described below.
The first level uses undervoltage relays to sense the loss of offsite power.
These relays monitor the 416Q-V vital buses.
When the voltage on these buses drops below 70 percent of its rated voltage, the undervoltage relays drop out.
The drop-out action of the relays isolates the buses from the offsite sources, and initiates the SBC to accomplish safeguards loading.
The Second Level Undervoltage Protection System (SLUPS) is comprised of three under voltage and time delay relays per vital bus which react after the voltage at the vital bus drops below the setpoint of 95.1 percent (94.61 by technical specifications, the difference is relay calibration range) of rated voltage and does not recover to the relay reset setpoint for a period of 13 seconds.
Each SLUPS relay operates an auxiliary relay which provides an input to the undervoltage relays associated with the vital bus Safeguards Equipment controller (SBC).
The SBC utilizes this input to provide 8.3-4 SGS-t1PSAR Revision 16 January 31, 1998
/
a two-out-of-three relay intelligence to separate the vital bus from the offsite power source and load it onto its associated emergency diesel generator.
One of these SLUPS relays will also operate the vital bus 70-percent auxiliary relays (one for each SEC) to provide a two-out-of-three bus undervoltage intelligence similar to the 70-percent protection scheme.
A failure for each component in the That demonstrates that no failure will result in the creation of an unanalyzed condition.
This configuration:
- 1.
Eliminates the possibility of vital bus flip-flopping.
- 2.
Provides for separation of the vital buses from the preferred source on an individual basis only.
- 3.
Satisfies GDC-17 relative to the connection between the offsite source and the onsite distribution system, as clarified in the following paragraphs.
Two situations exist whereby a single vital bus could be separated from its offsite source (SPT) when the offsite source is operath1g within expected limits.
The first case occurs as a result of failure of the relay providing the No.
1 input to the affected SEC, coincident with a LOCA This is j
to be on the following bases:
- 1.
The affected vital bus is automatically loaded onto its emergency source and is available for accident mitigation.
- 2.
The separation occurs only as a result of a failure of the relay providing the No. 1 input to the SEC.
The second case occurs as a result of a such that its output is less than the 8.3-5 SGS-UFSAR Revision 22 May 5, 2006
- SPT,
of the second level undervoltage system but greater than the of the primary undervoltage system.
This unlikely condition would have to occur to the SPT supplying power to two of the three vi tal buses.
For this scenario, the second level undervoltage system would operate as designed, such that after 13 seconds the affected buses would be separated from the offsite source and loaded onto the emergency source.
However, sufficient time exists
(~13 seconds) between the from the preferred source and the sequencing of the bus onto the emergency source to allow operation of the primary undervoltage system.
The primary undervoltage system would sense a loss of power to the affected buses and, upon completion of its two-out-of-three bus logic, cause the remaining vital bus (supplied from the alternate SPT) to be separated from the preferred source.
This condition reasons:
- 1.
Expected failure mechanisms for this type of transformer result in complete loss of secondary voltage.
- 2.
The scenario described above only occurs when the degraded transformer is providing power to two of the three vital buses.
Since only one of the two SPTs per unit can be loaded in such a
- fashion, the of an invalid occurring is further reduced.
- 3.
In the unlikely event that this condition should occur, the bus which is separated from the functioning SPT is loaded onto its emergency source, thereby ensuring its availability in the event of an accident.
It should also be noted that the same scenario would occur if the PSE&G bulk power was below expected limits.
source is desirable for this condition.
\\
8.3-5a SGS-UFSAR from the offsite Revision 26 May 21, 2012
Except as previously discussed, the loss of offsite power to vital buses, due to spurious operation of the voltage protection relays, will not occur when the offsite grid voltage is within its expected limits and both 500/13 kV transformers are supplying both Units 1 and 2.
There is a possibility of spurious tripping occurring during minimum grid conditions if one transformer is supplying both units' vital buses.
The NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated October 21, 1981, which documents the NRC's review of Salem Station Units 1
and 2
adequacy of station electrical distribution system voltages, states that the incidence of spurious relay tripping in this case is dependent upon several events occurring simultaneously:
(1) the loss of a station power transformer, (2)
Loss of coolant accident on one unit, (3) shutdown of the other unit, (4) grid voltages at minimum expected value, and (5) rate of change of grid voltage exceeding the response time of the self regulating transformer.
The NRC staff states that the probability of all of these events occurring simultaneously is very low and the consequences of such an occurrence would be a
safe unit shutdown.
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the incidence of spurious tripping is insignificant and Position 3 of the August 8, 1979 letter is met.
The second level undervoltage trip setpoint of 95.1 percent is based upon the results of detailed analyses of the Salem Generating Station electrical distribution system transient response characteristics.
Those analyses indicate that, at the PSE&G bulk power system voltage minimum expected value and for a LOCA on one Salem unit, concurrent with the other unit in Mode 3, vi tal bus voltage will recover to a worst-case value of r::::97 percent.
The minimum allowable trip value and trip setpoint are derived using the 90-percent minimum motor terminal voltage requirement as a
starting point and then applying appropriate allowances required by Regulatory Guide 1. 105.
Specific motor loads not meeting the 90-percent criteria are analyzed to demonstrate the ability of those motor loads to fully meet their design function without tripping their protective devices or exceeding their thermal capabilities.
Group bus undervol tage protection ( 68 percent of nominal) will automatically trip the reactor coolant and condensate pump 4-kV breakers upon sensing an undervoltage (i.e., loss of voltage) condition on its respective 4-kV group bus (1E, 1F, 1G, and 1H) using 1/1 logic taken once.
8.3-5b SGS-UFSAR Revision 27 November 25, 2013
8.3.1.3 460- and 230-Volt Systems The 460-V Auxiliary System feeds most motors from 20 to 300 hp.
The 230-V System feeds smaller loads and, for convenience of operation, a
few motors larger than 15 hp.
The 4160-V System feeds the 460-V and 230-V systems via 4160-460-V and 4160-240-V transformers.
The 460-V and 230-V Vital Bus Systems are divided into three bus sections which correlate to their respective 4160-V vital buses.
8.3.1.4 115-V ac Instrumentation Power Four 12-kVA 115-V ac vital instrument buses (1/2 A,B,C & D) receive power from individual Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) to form redundant channels for reactor control and protection instrumentation and safety-related equipment.
Each vital instrument bus UPS's Rectifier receives normal source, vital 230-V ac power, converts (rectifies ac/dc) it to de power, and then converts (inverts dc/ac) it to ac power.
In the event of a 230-V ac power loss or an UPS's Rectifier malfunction, 125-V de vital station battery power will automatically supply power to the UPS's Inverter, via the UPS's auctioneering circuit, to maintain uninterruptible ac output power.
Each UPS also contains a
12-kVA ac Line Regulator and Static Switch that receives alternate source, vital 230-V ac power from the same normal source vital 230-V ac bus.
In the event of an UPS's Inverter malfunction, the Static Switch senses a
loss of Inverter output voltage and automatically fast transfers the associated vital instrument bus loads to the ac Line Regulator 115-V ac output.
When the UPS's Inverter voltage returns to normal, the Static Switch will automatically return the associated vital instrument bus loads to the Inverter output.
Table 8. 3-1 depicts channel designations for each vi tal instrument bus power feed.
The 115-V ac Control Power System for Units 1 and 2 is illustrated on Plant Drawing 211370.
SGS-UFSAR 8.3-6 Revision 27 November 25, 2013
8.3.1.5 Standby Power Supplies The standby ac power source consists of three automatically starting diesel generators. Each diesel generator set supplies power to one 4160-V vital bus in the event of a loss of offsite power. The system is shown on Figure 8.3-1.
The nameplate continuous rating of the diesel generator units is 2600 kW, 900 rpm, 4160-V, 3 phase, 60 cycles. The units are sized to handle the loads necessary for a design basis LOCA coincident with the loss of all offsite power. The diesel generators are designed to be ready to accept load within 13 seconds after receipt of a signal to start.
The diesel generator units are located in the Auxiliary Building at Elevation 100 feet. Within the building the diesel-generators are isolated from each other and from other equipment in the area by fire walls and fire doors. A Manual Fire Protection System is installed for the protection of the CO2 diesel generator equipment. Separate detectors are located in each compartment so that only the area containing the fire is blanketed.
The two 30,000-gallon fuel-oil storage tanks are located below the diesels at Elevation 84 feet. Each diesel generator has its own fuel oil day tank with a 550-gallon capacity. The tank is mounted above the unit for gravity feed of fuel at startup. Each diesel generator unit has its own lube-oil jacket cooling, ventilation, and dual air starting system. Cooling water is supplied by the Service Water System.
Any two of the diesel generators and their associated vital buses can supply sufficient power for operation of the required safeguards equipment for a design basis LOCA coincident with a loss of offsite power. Sufficient redundancy is provided in the safety features and their assignment to the vital buses so that failure to energize any one vital bus does not prevent operation of the required minimum safety equipment.
8.3-7 SGS-UFSAR Revision 30 May 11, 2018
In addition to the emergency diesel generators, there is a gas turbine generator installed at the site. This unit is rated at approximatel~O MW and is normally used for peaking purposes.
The gas turbine unit is connected to the auxiliary electrical system such that it can be paralleled with the normal source of plant startup or standby power.
Figure 8.3-2 shows the gas turbine connection to the 13-kV ring bus system.
8.3.1.5.1 Diesel Generator Capacity and Loading Each diesel generator unit is rated as follows:
TIME KW PF KVA.R KVA.
1/'2 HR
- £3100 0.8 2325 3875 2 HRS
- £2860 0.8 2145 3575 2000 HRS
,5.2750 0.8 2063 3438 CONT
- E-2600 0.8 1950 3250 A detailed loading study (Calculation ES-9.002[Q)) has been performed for the diesel generator units based on the following:
- 1)
Design basis Loss of Offsite Power Accident (LOPA).
start successfully.
All three D/G's
- 2)
Design basis Loss of Coolant Accident {LOCA) coincident with Design Basis LOPA.
All three D/G's start successfully and experience worst case active single failure.
- 3)
Design basis LOCA coincident with Design Basis LOPA.
failure analyzed is one (1) D/G failing to start.
Active single Conclusions of this study indicate tha~ for the above mentioned scenarios, all expected loads are within the Diesel generator ratings as given
~bove. ~
Furthermore, the study also confirms that the auto connected loads do not exceed the short time rating (2 Hour) as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.9 Rev. 2 and IEEE STD 387 1977.
Tables 8.3-2 and 8.3-3 indicate the timing and sequence in which the loads are a~~omat~cal~y connec~ed to the D/G's
- o~ the LOP~ only and LOCA
+LOPA cases.
In the event that the D/G loading requires revision, the changes will be evaluated to verify that they are enveloped by the worst case transient load (Service water pump start) and therefore do not result in unacceptable voltage and frequency responses, consistent with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1. 9 Rev. 2.
8.3-8 SGS-UFSAR y...
Revision 14 December 29, 1995
In addition to prototype tests conducted in the manufacturer's plant, testing has been performed at the station to simulate the various modes of These tests verified that the fied diesel load criteria have been met.
The diesel generators have the capability to attain rated within 13 seconds after receipt of the start signal, 8.3-Ba SGS-:JFSAR and Revision 25 October 26, 2010
SGS-UFSAR THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 8.3-Sb Revision 12 July 22, 1992
in Tables 8. 3-2 and 8. 3-3.
The and to accept load Loading Control in the sequence shown will automatically eneralze the required loads within 35 seconds.
that credit the assume start and load well as any value fied by Technical of the diesel generators that bound these values as The Safeguards Equipment Control (SEC) the diesel generators, is described controller in each train (A, B, and C) bus in that train.
System, which controls the loading of in Section 7.
Control power for the is supplied from the 115-V ac instrument 8.3.1.5.2 Diesel Generator Control and Functions The diesel are started automatically by the ection signal or indication of a loss of all offsi te power to the 4160-V vi tal buses.
The latter signal, determined using 2/3 logic, initiates the loading sequence for each vital bus.
The loading sequence trips the vital bus in-feed breakers and all motor feeder breakers, closes the diesel generator breaker after the unit comes up to its speed and voltage permissive set points, and connects the sa loads in a predetermined sequence.
The sequence for each vital bus is separate and of that for the other buses.
The diesel generator sequences under emergency conditions are discussed in Section 7.
Following an am::omatic start (by loss of normal auxiliary power or by an accident signal), the follm-;ing automatic protective devices are in service during emergency startup and operation of the diesel generator:
- 1.
SGS-UFSAR Shut down the diesel generator and breaker due to:
- a.
Mechanical l)
Engine overspeed
- 2)
Lube oil pressure low 8.3-9 the diesel generator Revision 25 October 26, 2010
- b.
Electrical
- 1)
Generator differential current relays
- 2.
Trip the diesel generator breaker only due to:
- a.
Electrical
- 1) 4 kV bus differential Manual diesel generator control is provided as follows:
- 1.
on the local diesel generator control panels; Diesel generator "START-STOP" pushbutton, "LOCK-OUT" switch selector switch.
selector switch, "EMERGENCY STOP" (key operated)
"AUTO-MANUAL" mode Diesel generator breaker "TRIP -
CLOSE" selector switch Generator voltage "RAISE -
LOWER" control switch Speed.. RAISE -
LOWER" control switch Regulator "MANUAL -
AUTO" switch Diesel unit trip relay "RESET" Fuel transfer pump "OFF -
AUTO -
RUN" selector switch, "REGULAR -
BACKUP" selector switch Starting air compressor "OFF -
AUTO -
RUN" selector switch Turbo air compressor "OFF -
AUTO -
RUN" selector switch
- 2.
In the Control Room:
8.3-10 SGS-UFSAR Revision 6 February 15, 1987
Diesel generator *sTART-STOP* pushbutton&, *CLOSE -
TRIP*
puahbuttone.
Following a manual start, the following automatic protective devices are in service during startup and operation of the diesel generator:
- 1.
Shut down the diesel generator and trip its 4-kV circuit breaker due to:
- a.
Mechanical l)
Engine overapeed
- 2)
Lube oil pressure low
- 3)
Jacket water temperature high
- 4)
Lube oil temperature high
- 5)
Engine overcrank
- b.
Electrical
- 1)
Generator differential current relays
- 2)
Loss of generator excitation
- 3)
Diesel generator breaker failure protection
- 2.
Trip the diesel generator breaker only due to:
- a.
Electrical
- 1) overcurrent relay
- 2)
Reverse power relay 8.3-11 SGS-UFSAR Revision 6 February 15, 1987
- 3.
Prevent the Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker from closing only
., due to:
- a.
Electrical
- 1.
Syncrocloser check relay; the syncrocloser check relay provides a permissive to allow the operator to synchronize the Diesel Generator with ita vital bus.
The permissive will be enabled during a specific closing phase angle range, slip limit (AF limit), voltage range, and blocked when out of these ranges and when the breaker control switch at the Diesel Generator Control Panel is intentionally held closed prior to achieving syncpronization.
Elimination of trips could cause damage to the diesel generators if a trip condition were to occur.
8.3.1.5.3 Diesel Generator Instrumentation To facilitate control and adjustment of the diesel generators, the following instrumentation and alarms are provided.
- 1.
controls on the local diesel generator control panels:
SGS-UFSAR.
Generator ammeter (with phase selector switch), wattmeter, voltmeter (with phase selector switch),
frequency meter, varmeter, field ammeter, field voltmeter, synchroscope, synchronizing lights, eynchroscope switch, 4 kV bus voltmeter (with phase selector switch), diesel generator running time meter, RPM meter Jacket water pressure gage Raw water pressure gage Fuel oil header pressure gage Fuel oil transfer pump pressure gage 8.3-12 Revision 14 December 29, 1995
SGS-UFSAR Air manifold pressure gage Starting air pressure at engine {duplex gage)
Starting air tank pressure (duplex gage)
Turbo air tank pressure (two duplex gages)
Jacket water heat exchanger differential pressure (duplex gage)
Lube oil filter differential pressure (duplex gage)
Lube oil strainer differential pressure (duplex gage)
Fuel oil primary filter differential pressure (duplex gage)
Fuel oil secondary filter differential pressure (duplex gage)
Lube oil header pressure Lube oil pump discharge pressure Lube oil heat exchanger differential pressure Revision 13 June 12, 1994
THIS PAGE INTENTIONAllY LEFT BlANK 8.3-12b SGS-UFSAR Revision 13 June 12, 1994
- 2.
Controls in the Control Room:
Diesel generator voltage, frequency, watts, amps.
- 3.
Alarms local to the diesel generator:
following:
SGS-UFSAR Cooling water temperature low Cooling water temperature high Jacket water temperature high Jacket water heater failure Lube oil temperature high Lube oil heater failure Fuel oil day tank level low Expansion tank level high crankcase level high/low Engine lube oil header pressure low Fail to start (overcrank}
Diesel generator tripped Generator negative phase sequence Fuel oil day tank level high Pre-lube pump failure Crankcase blower failure Exciter regulator on manual control Diesel generator locked out (for maintenance)
DC control voltage failure-a single alarm to include the Loss of de power to the engine control Loss of de power to the generator field Loss of de power to the unit trip circuit Loss of de power to the local alarm system Air receiver No. 1 pressure low Air receiver No. 2 pressure low Generator breaker trip Generator field ground 8.3-13 Revision 16 January 31, 1998
I Expansion tank level low Generator overspeed Generator overvoltage Generator loss of PT secondary voltage Generator ground fault Turbo air receivers low pressure
- 4.
Alarms in the Control Room:
SGS-UFSAR Diesel generator trouble (a common alarm which will be actuated by the operation of any of the above local alarms).
Diesel generator urgent trouble-a single alarm to include the following:
Jacket water temperature high Lube oil temperature high Engine lube oil header pressure low Air receiver pressure low Pre-lube pump failure Generator ground fault Turbo air receivers low pressure Fuel oil day tank level trouble (a common alarm for all three unit day tanks).
Loss of de power to the engine control, generator field, trip circuits.
Diesel generator in Local-Manual control mode, failure to start, emergency trip, locked out.
Generator breaker spring charger failure, breaker trip.
- 8. 3-14 Revision 18 April 26, 2000
8.3.1.5.4 Diesel Generator Support Systems Diesel Generator Support Systems are desclibed in the following sections:
Fuel Storage and Transfer System Jacket Water Cooling System Starting Air System Lube Oil System 8.3.1.6 Tests and Inspections Section 9.5.4 Section 9.5.5 Section 9.5.6 Section 9.5.7 Periodic tests will be conducted to ensure proper operation of electrical features necessary for plant safety.
Tests will be conducted to identify and correct electrical or mechanical deficienci~s before they result in a system failure.
Tests will be conducted periodically to verify the starting of the diesel generators on loss of voltage to the 4160-V vital buses and their ability to carry load.
The standby ac power sources (diesel generators) are automatically started and connected to the vital buses 1n the event the normal offsite sources become unavailable.
The standby diesel generators are automatica!ly started by eLther a safety injection signal or a 2-out-of-under~o:tage signal derived from under~oltage relays located on the three 4-kV vlta buses.
Testability of each of these signals LS provided.
The Solid State Protection System (SSPS) test cabinet is used to check the continuity of the SSPS output relay contact, the field wiring, and the Safeguards Equipment Controls (SEC) input relay without actually operating the SEC unit.
The undervoltage relays can be tested by operating test switches to simulate a single bus undervoltage condition.
During the test mode an alarm is actuated in the Control Room signifying that diesel generator automatic start is defeated.
8.3-15 SGS-UFSAR Revision 6 February 15, 1987
Since the SEC units are completely independent of each other, the SSPS test cabinets are used to provide independent output signals from both SSPS trains to the three SEC units.
Buffer relays are used on each vital bus undervoltage sensor to supply independent signals to each SEC unit. Thus, complete channel independence is maintained.
The SEC units are completely redundant.
Both SSPS trains feed each SEC; a
failure of an SSPS train will not negate safeguards operation.
Failure of a bus undervoltage relay to operate will not negate safeguards operation since a 2-out-of-3 undervoltage logic is used to sense loss of offsite power conditions.
If only one bus experiences undervoltage, and the sensor on that bus fails to recognize the condition, only that bus will not be loaded; the remaining buses will supply power to the required amount of safeguards equipment.
The diesel generators can be started and loaded during power operation. As discussed above, the 4-kV bus undervoltage relays can also be tested during power operation.
The complete operation of detecting the loss of normal power sources, starting of the standby power sources, and connecting these sources to the vital buses can be accomplished during plant shutdown.
These design provisions satisfy General Design Criterion 18.
8.3.2 DC Power 8.3.2.1 250-, 125-, and 28-Volt Systems Separate 125-V and 250-V de sources supply power for operation of switchgear, annunciators, vital instrument
- buses, inverters, emergency
- lighting, communications, and turbine generator emergency auxiliaries. Three independent 125-V de sources provide power to the engineered safety features.
Plant Drawings 211357, 203007, 223720 and 203008 illustrate the 28-V, 125-V, and 250-V station de systems, SGS-UFSAR 8.3-16 Revision 27 November 25, 2013
respectively.
Safety-related loads are identified by the use of the symbols A, B, C, D on the feeders.
Battery load profiles are shown in Tables 8.3-5 and 8.3-6.
As shown on Plant Drawings 203007 and 223720, three 125-V batteries are provided for each unit to supply an independent source of control power for each of the three 4160-V and 460-V vital buses and for the 125-V distribution cabinets.
A backup source of control power for each of these buses is provided via manually operated breakers under administrative control.
The station de systems provide a continuous source of power for operation of circuit breakers, valve controls, inverters, etc.
No initiation or control is required to connect the batteries to the de buses.
Two separate non-safety related 125-V de batteries have been provided to serve the 4160 V CW switchgear, 13 kV south bus section breakers, SCADA systems and portions of switchgear relaying systems.
8.3.2.2 Station Batteries The Station Battery System includes one non-vital 250-V, three vital 125-V, and two vital 28-V batteries, static battery chargers for each battery, and a ground detection system and undervoltage alarm relay for each bus.
The batteries are mounted on corrosion-resistant, seismically designed steel racks in separately ventilated and isolated areas.
The 250-V, 125-V, and 28-V batteries are rated 1326, 2320, and 800 ampere hours, respectively, at the 8-hour rate of discharge.
Each charger maintains a floating charge on its associated battery, and is capable of supplying the required equalizing charge when necessary. Each 125-V and 28-V Battery System (one battery, two chargers, and one switchgear unit) has a ground detection system, undervoltage alarm relay, and de voltmeters and ammeters.
Each 28-VDC charger is equipped with an ac failure relay.
Loss of ac input and/ or de output is annunciated in the Control Room.
Each Unit 1 125-VDC battery charger is equipped with a loss of AC voltage alarm.
Each Unit 2 125-VDC charger is equipped with a summary trouble alarm which indicates AC Power Failure, High Voltage Shutdown, No Charge and High/Low Voltage.
Alarms from both Unit 1 and Unit 2 battery chargers are printed in the Control Room.
Each 125-VDC battery is connected to its associated switchgear through a
disconnect switch and protective fuses.
The 250-V AND 28-VDC batteries are connected to their associated switchgear through protective fuses.
distribution switchgear consists The de 8.3-17 SGS-UFSAR Revision 27 November 25, 2013
of metal-clad structures, each with an ungrounded main bus, and 2 pole air circuit breakers.
During normal operation, the de load is fed from the battery chargers with the batteries floating on the system.
Upon loss of de power from a battery charger, the de load is drawn from the batteries.
The batteries are sized for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of operation after a loss of ac power, based upon the required operation of the de emergency equipment.
If all offsite power is lost, the battery chargers are energized from the emergency diesel generators and resume their function automatically.
8.3.2.3 Station Battery Monitoring Two chargers, each capable of 100-percent normal load, are provided for each 28-V and 125-V de battery.
Each normal charging source supplies the continuous de loads and maintains a float charge on the battery to ensure the capability of each battery to deliver its emergency de requirements.
The 28-V and 125-V chargers are fed from the vi tal ac buses.
Each 28-V and 125-V battery is fed from two separate vital buses.
One charger is under administrative control to assure that the 230-V ac buses will not become interconnected.
One 250-V de charger is provided due to the nature of the 250-V de loads, with a provision to tie in the other unit's 250-V charger, if needed.
Each of the 6 batteries per unit is continuously monitored in the Control Room for voltage and discharge current.
Listed below are all the monitoring devices associated with each battery.
A brief description of the function of each device and its location is given.
Battery Voltmeter -
Monitors de bus voltage with continuous readout in the Control Room.
8.3-18 SGS-UFSAR Revision 14 December 29, 1995
Battery Load Ammeter -
Monitors discharge current with continuous readout in the Control Room.
Ground Detectors Monitors leakage from positive and negative buses to station ground with continuous readout in the Control Room.
In addition, local ground detection circuit is provided adjacent to each charger for test purposes.
Undervoltage Alarm -
Monitors each de bus and alarms in the Control Room when bus voltage drops below a preset value.
Charger Voltmeter - Monitors charger output voltage at charger cabinet.
Charger Alarm -
Monitors ac input to charger and alarms in the Control Room upon loss of input voltage to both 28-VDC chargers.
Each Unit 1 125-VDC battery charger is equipped with a loss of AC voltage alarm.
Each Unit 2 125-VDC battery charger is equipped with a charger trouble relay which provides a summary alarm in the Control Room if the energized charger experiences an AC power failure, high voltage shutdown, no charge or high/low voltage.
The 250-VDC chargers also have an overvoltage alarm in the Control Room should the bus voltage rise above a preset value.
DC Distribution Cabinet Undervoltage Alarm Each 28-V and 125-V de distribution cabinet is provided with an undervoltage relay which monitors bus voltage and alarms in the Control Room.
Blown Fuse Alarm -
Each battery fuse is monitored to alarm in the Control Room if the fuse should blow.
Protection against overcharging is provided within the charger itself which is a constant voltage-current limited device.
Surveillance requirements are set forth in the Technical Specifications.
The general cleanliness of battery, float charge, cell cracks, electrolyte
- leakage, ventilation equipment, c~ll to cell periodically inspected to assure good 8.3-19 SGS-UFSAR connections,
- etc, are Revision 16 January 31, 1998
service and long battery life.
- Thus, degradation can be monitore~ and rectified during surveillance and testing program.
8.3.2.4 CW Switchgear Batteries Each CW Switchgear Battery System includes one 125-V battery/
two static battery chargers, ground detection and metering cabinet.
The batteries are mounted on corrosion resistant steel racks in separate ventilated Building.
discharge.
and isolated Each battery areas located is rated 960 in the Circulating ampere-hours at the Water Switchgear 8-hour rate of Each charger maintains a floating charge on its associated battery, and is capable of supplying the required equalizing charge when necessary.
Each battery charger provides a charger failure alarm signal to the SCADA System.
The battery is connected to its associated 125-V distribution panel through protective fuses and a manual transfer switch.
The manual transfer switch allows either 125-V distribution panel to be switched to the other battery if its own battery is out of service.
During normal operation, the de load is fed from the battery chargers with the battery floating on the system.
Upon loss of AC power to the battery chargers and the P250 computer inverter, the battery can supply the full P250 inverter load of 15KVA for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and the remaining DC loads for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
- 8. 3. 3 Containment Penetration/Conductor Overcurrent Protection The containment penetrations/conductors are protected by deenergizing circuits which are not required for reactor operation and by ensuring the operability of primary/backup overcurrent protective devices through periodic testing of equipment/systems.
The containment penetration/conductor overcurrent protection devices are listed in and controlled by Engineering Calculations Numbers ES-13. 010 (Q) and ES-13. 005 (Q) for Salem Units 1 and 2, respectively.
An integrated system functional test includes the simulated automatic actuation of circuit breakers to verify response times and trip setpoints.
8.3-20 SGS-UFSAR Revision 18 April 26, 2000
DIFFERENT FEEDS TO THE VITAL INSTRUMENT RUSES No. lA Vital Bus No. lB Vital Bus No. lC Vital Bus No. lD Vital Sus SGS-UFSAR Battery Feed 230V CC Feed 230V CC Feed To Power Supply To Power Supply <Emerg. Feed)
A c
B 1 of 1 A
c A
c B
Revision 11 July 22, 1991
STEP NO. LOAD DESCRIPTION 0
230 V 460 V Vital Buses 1
Safety lnj Chrg Pmp 2
Safety Injection Pmp 3
Residual Heat Removal Pmp 4
Containment Spray Pmp 5
Service Water Pump 5
AltSfWtrPmp, iffail 6
CFCUs (Low Speed) 7 Aux Feedwaler Pmp B
Control Rm A/C (Chillers) 9 Emergency Control Air Camp 10 Aux Building Exh and Sup Fans 11 Switchgear Rm Supply Fans STEP NO. LOAD DESCRIPTION 0
230 V 460 V Vital Buses 1
Safety lnj Chrg Pmp 2
Safety Injection Pmp 3
Residual Heat Removal Pmp 4
Containment Spray Pmp 5
Service Water Pump 5
All SfWir Pmp, if fail 6
CFCUs (Low Speed) 7 Aux Feedwater Pmp 8
Control Rm A/C (Chillers) 9 Emergency Control Air Camp 10 Aux Building Exh and Sup Fans 11 Switchgear Rm Supply Fans TABLE8.3-2 DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING SEQUENCE FOR LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER WITH ACCIDENT UNIT N0.1 TIME nME DIESEL 1A SEC DIESEL 18 SEC 00 00 01 01 05 05 09-10;30(1) 13 09 18 14 22 18 26 22 30 26 30 26 30 26 UNIT N0.2 TIME TIME DIESEL 2A SEC DIESEL2B SEC 00 00 01 01 05 05 09-10;30(1) 13 09 18 14 22 18 26 22 30 26 30 26 30 26 TIME DIESEL 1C SEC DIESEL2C 00 01 05 09-10;26(1) 13 18 22 26 26 26 26 TIME SEC 00 01 05 09-10;26(1) 13 18 22 26 26 26 26 The component ooo!ing pumps are manually energized during the recirculation phase only after prior reduction of the diesel load by manual shutdown of equipment not required for the recirculation phase. Prior to closing the vital bus breaker supplying the pressurizer backup heaters, the operator shall verify that the additional load will not exceed the 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> rating (2750 kw) of the diesel generator.
(1} A one (1) second containment spray pump start permissive is established followed by an end of sequence permissive.
1 of 1 SGS-UFSAR Revision 23 October 17, 2007
STEP NO.
0 1
2 3
4 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 STEP NO.
0 1
2 3
4 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 TABLE 8.3-3 DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING SEQUENCE FOR LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER UNIT NO.1 TIME TIME TIME PIESEL lC 230 V 460 V Vital Buses 00 00 00 Safety lnj Chrg Pmp Ol 01 Component Cooling Pmp 01 05 05 Auxiliary Feedwater Pmp 05 09 Service Water Pmp 09 13 09 Alt S/Wtr Pmp, If fail 14 18 14 Emergency Control Air Camp 18 Control Rm A/C (Chillers) 20 20 20 Aux Building Supply/Exh Fans 20 20 20 Switchgr Supply Fans 20 20 20 R/X Shield Vent Fans 20 20 R/X Nozzle Support Vent Fans 20 20 20 UNIT N0.2 TIME TIME TIME LOAD D~SCI<IPTIQN DIESEL 2A SEC DIESEL 2B SEC D!E;St;;L 2C S~C 230 V 460 V Vital Buses 00 00 00 Safety lnj Chrg Pmp 01 01 Component Cooling Pmp 01 05 05 Auxiliary Feedwater Pmp 05 09 Service Water Pump 09 13 09 Alt S/Wtr Pmp, if fail 14 18 14 Emergency Control Air Camp 18 Control Rm A/C (Chillers}
20 20 20 Aux Building Supply
/Exh Fans 20 20 20 Switchgr Supply Fans 20 20 20 R/X Shield Vent Fans 20 20 R/X Nozzle Support Vent Fans 20 20 20 The reciprocating charging pump, containment fan cooler units and other equipment will be manually energized as required only after prior reduction of diesel load by manual shutdown of equipment not required for long-term operation. Prior to closing the vital bus breaker supplying the pressurizer backup
- heaters, the operator shall verify that the additional load will not exceed the 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> rating (2750 kW) of the diesel generator.
l of 1 SGS-UFSAR Revision 22 May 5, 2006
SGS-UFSAR TABLE 8.3-4A CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES -
UNIT 1 This Table Deleted.
(See Section 8.3.3) 1 of 1 Revision 14 December 29, 1995
SGS-UFSAR TABLE 8.3-4B CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES -
UNIT 2 This Table Deleted.
(See section 8.3.3) 1 of 1 Revision 14 December 29, 1995
Time Interval 0 -
1 1 -
30 30 -
60 60 -
120 28-VDC Time Interval 0 -
1 1
30 30 60 60 -
120 SGS-UF'SAR TABLE 8.3-5 28-VDC Battery Load Profile SGS - Unit No. 1 Total Load Cycle {Amperes)
Battery 1BTRY1ADE 150.3 136.5 133.3 127.9 Battery Load Profile Total Load Cycle Battery 2BTRY2ADE No. 2A 160.6 129.6 126.6 124.7 1 of 1 Battery lBTRYlBDE 166.0 172.8 155.8 120.7 (Amperes}
Battery 2BTRY2BDE No. 28 166.0 171.5 166.3 125.1 Revision 19 November 19, 2001
Time Interval (Minutes) 0 -
1 1 -
30 30 -
60 60 120 Time Interval
{Minutes) 0 -
1 l -
30 30 -
60 60 -
120 SGS-UFSAR TABLE 8.3-6 125-VDC Battery Load Profile SGS - Unit No. 1 Total Load Cycle (Amperes)
Battery Battery lBTRYlADC lBTRYlBDC No. lA No. lB 565.27 667.38 237.17 299.46 238.22 300.91 238.22 300.91 125-VDC Battery Load Profile SGS -
Unit No. 2 Total Load Cycle (Amperes)
Battery 2BTRY2ADC No. 2A 561.34 249.10 250.15 250.15 Battery 2BTRY2BDC No. 2B 659.02 297.02 298.47 298.47 1 of 1 Battery lBTRYlCDC No. lC 579.24 381.74 381.61 381.61 Battery 2BTRY2CDC No. 2C 539.25 340.85 340.78 340.83 Revision 18 April 26, 2000
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STATION POWER TRANSFORMER 13.8-4.16 kV 16.11122.4128 MVA REVISION 15 JUNE 12, 1996 13kV South Ring Bus Diagram Updated FSAR FIG 8.3-2a
SGS-UFSAR Figure F8.3-3A intentionally deleted.
Refer to plant drawing 203001 in DCRMS Revision 27 November 25, 2013
SGS-UFSAR Figure F8.3-3B intentionally deleted.
Refer to plant drawing 203062 in DCRMS Revision 27 November 25, 2013
SGS-UFSAR Figure F8.3-4 intentionally deleted.
Refer to plant drawing 203002 in DCRMS Revision 27 November 25, 2013
SGS-UFSAR Figure F8.3-4A intentionally deleted.
Refer to plant drawing 203003 in DCRMS Revision 27 November 25, 2013
SGS-UFSAR Figure F8.3-4B intentionally deleted.
Refer to plant drawing 203063 in DCRMS Revision 27 November 25, 2013
SGS-UFSAR Figure F8.3-4C intentionally deleted.
Refer to plant drawing 602939 in DCRMS Revision 27 November 25, 2013
Figure F8.3-5 Sheets 1 & 2 of 2 intentionally deleted.
Refer to plant drawing 211370 in DCRMS SGS-UFSAR Revision 27 November 25, 2013
Figure F8.3-6 Sheets 1 & 2 of 2 intentionally deleted.
Refer to plant drawing 211357 in DCRMS SGS-UFSAR Revision 27 November 25, 2013
Figure F8.3-7 Sheet 1 of 2 intentionally deleted.
Refer to plant drawing 203007 in DCRMS SGS-UFSAR Revision 27 November 25, 2013
Figure F8.3-7 Sheet 2 OF 2 intentionally deleted.
Refer to plant drawing 223720 in DCRMS SGS-UFSAR Revision 27 November 25, 2013
Figure F8.3-8 Sheets 1 & 2 of 2 intentionally deleted.
Refer to plant drawing 203008 in DCRMS SGS-UFSAR Revision 27 November 25, 2013