05000285/LER-1980-019-03, /03L-0:on 800904,seismic Pipe Restraints SIS-62 & SIS-7 Were Inadvertently Made Inoperable at Same Time. Restraints Were Being Upgraded in Response to IE Bulletin 79-14.Restraint SIS-7 Was Immediately Made Operable

/03L-0:on 800904,seismic Pipe Restraints SIS-62 & SIS-7 Were Inadvertently Made Inoperable at Same Time. Restraints Were Being Upgraded in Response to IE Bulletin 79-14.Restraint SIS-7 Was Immediately Made Operable

ML19351D687
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	10/03/1980
From:	Despain D OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML19351D683	List: 05000285/LER-1980-019, Forwards LER 80-019/03L-0 05000285/LER-1980-019-03, /03L-0:on 800904,seismic Pipe Restraints SIS-62 & SIS-7 Were Inadvertently Made Inoperable at Same Time. Restraints Were Being Upgraded in Response to IE Bulletin 79-14.Restraint SIS-7 Was Immediately Made Operable
References
IEB-79-14, LER-80-019-03L, LER-80-19-3L, NUDOCS 8010140485
Download: ML19351D687 (4)

LER-1980-019, /03L-0:on 800904,seismic Pipe Restraints SIS-62 & SIS-7 Were Inadvertently Made Inoperable at Same Time. Restraints Were Being Upgraded in Response to IE Bulletin 79-14.Restraint SIS-7 Was Immediately Made Operable

Event date:
Report date:
2851980019R03 - NRC Website

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l NRC FORM 366 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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6G 61 DOCKET NUMSER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE do EVENT oESCRIPTioN AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h io i:t i During normal operation, seismic pipe restraint SIS-62 was inadvertently made in-i operable while restraint SIS-7 was inoperable. Having these two seismic restraints io i3i ;

inoperable at the same time is in noncompliance with Technical Specification 2.18 l

io iai l lo isI i " Shock Suppressors". The restraints were being upgraded in response to NRC IE Bul- ;

io is i l letin 79-14.

Restraint SIS-7 was immediately made operable to ensure compliance l

l0;7ll with the Technical Specifications.

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4,7 40 41 42 43 44 47 33 44 33 36 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 11 io!i With one snubber (SIS-7) already incoerable, as allowed by the Technical Soecifications, work was allowed to start on a secona Tech. Spec. snuocer ($15-62) cecause it was li ii i i oriainally thought to be coerable while uocradina succort SIH-61. to which SIS-62 is 1 i,#3i l attached. After Quality Control cuestioned SIS-62's operability, further analysis byl 6,,3i l Generating Station Engineering concluded SIS-62 would be unable to functi'on as' recuirpd anc was calleo inoperaole tnus causing two snuceers to ce inoperaoie at tne same time.

Restraint SIS-7 was immediately made coerable thereby bringing the plant back into l

11 : 41I Compliance witn tne Tecnnical Sp cifications.

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LER No.80-019 Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station Unit No.1 Docket No. 05000285 ATTACHMENT NO. 1

Safety Analysis

Snubbers are designed to prevent unrestrained pipe motion under dynamic loads as might occur during an earthquake or severe transient, wnile allowing normal thermal motion during startup or shutdown. The consequences of an inoperable snubber is an increase in the probability of structural damage to piping as a result of a seismic, or other event, initiating dynamic loads.

Upon examination of the area around SIS-62, it was noted that SIS-197, SIS-198, SIS-199 and SIS-200 are all north-south restraints very nearby on the.same line and were in place at the time in question. These restraints l

are on valves HCV-385 and HCV-386. SIS-199 is only 8" from SIS-62.

In the engineering judgement of the Generation Station Engineering Department, these restraints provide the same function as SIS-62 and that even with SIS-62 inoperable, the pipe to which is was attached would remain intact l

even in the unlikely event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA).

In effect, l

the only inoperable restraint at the time was SIS-7.

l Immediately after it was determined that snubber SIS-62 should be declared inoperable, action was taken to return one of the snubbers to an operable status. Since SIS-7 was the easier of the two to repair, it was returned to an operable status thus ensuring compliance with the Technical Specifications. '

Since no event occurred which would have caused failure of the snubbers, their supporting members, or the associated piping, the health and safety of the public was not adversely affected by this occurrence.

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LER No.80-019 Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station Unit ilo.1 Docket No. 05000285 ATTACHMENT NO. 2

Corrective Action

As a result of this incident, the method of preparing work / design packages for IE Bulletin 79-02 and 79-14 work which would involve more than one Technical Specification snubber at a time, will include a more detailed review by everyone involved.

Reviews will be made by the District's Consulting Engineers, Gilbert Commonwealth, the District's Generation Station Engineering (GSE) Department, appropriate members of the plant staff and plant Quality Control. Any work that would result in more than one Technical Specification snubber being inonorable at a time will not be allowed.

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4 LER No.80-019 Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station Unit No.1 Docket Ho. 05000285 ATTACHMENT NO. 3 Failure Data This is the first instance at the Fort Calhoun Station during IE Bulletin 79-02 and 79-14 work in which two Technical Specification snubbers have been unknowingly made inoperable at the same time.

Technical Specification snubbers found inoperable as a result of IE Bulletin 79-02 and 79-14 inspections are documented in Licensee Event Reports (LER) 79-20, revisions 0,1 and 2.

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