05000321/LER-1981-025-01, /01T-0:on 810402,nonseismic & non-Class IE Valves & Associated Controls Found in Plant Svc Water Sys.Caused by Error in Initial Design.Power Removed & Measures Taken to Prevent Inadvertent Closure of Valves

/01T-0:on 810402,nonseismic & non-Class IE Valves & Associated Controls Found in Plant Svc Water Sys.Caused by Error in Initial Design.Power Removed & Measures Taken to Prevent Inadvertent Closure of Valves

ML19350D408
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	04/09/1981
From:	Coggin C GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19350D407	List: 05000321/LER-1981-025, Forwards LER 81-025/01T-0 05000321/LER-1981-025-01, /01T-0:on 810402,nonseismic & non-Class IE Valves & Associated Controls Found in Plant Svc Water Sys.Caused by Error in Initial Design.Power Removed & Measures Taken to Prevent Inadvertent Closure of Valves
References
LER-81-025-01T, LER-81-25-1T, NUDOCS 8104150444
Download: ML19350D408 (2)

LER-1981-025, /01T-0:on 810402,nonseismic & non-Class IE Valves & Associated Controls Found in Plant Svc Water Sys.Caused by Error in Initial Design.Power Removed & Measures Taken to Prevent Inadvertent Closure of Valves

Event date:
Report date:
3211981025R01 - NRC Website

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8 60 68 COCnE T NUVD EM 68 h9 EVENT OATE 74 7b REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCHIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEouENCE$ h O 2 blh il e S.huldmin for refuelino. the site was notified of a condition wherel O a Ithe valves and the associated _ controls that allow PSW discharoe into the 1 [cire. water flume and the river were nonseismic and nonclass IE on HNP-11 0 4 O s land HNP-2.

As a result of this it is possible to postulate that during al O o (seismic event both valves could close. thus causino a loss of both PSWI 10171Idivisions to all components exceot the DGs.

This is a nonrecetitive I

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There were no effects on public health and safety.

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The desian will be chanced td l

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LER #:

50-321/1981-025 Licensec:

Georgia Power Company Facility Name:

Edwin I. Ilatch Docket #:

50-321

Narrative

Report for LER 50-321/1981-025 The site was notified on 4-2-81 by the AE of a potential prob-lem in the plant service water systems for IINP-1 and IINP-2.

The design of the system on both units requires the PSW system effluent to be discharged to the circulating water fiume via MOVs N71-F201 and 2N71-F013 and to the river via MOVs P41-F303A and 2N71-F012.

The probica which has been identified is that the subject valves are not seismic class 1

and the associated motors and controls are not class IE.

Because the valve controls are not class IE, it is possibic to postulate that during a scismic event both valves in either or both units could inadvertently close causing a loss of PSW flow to l

all components except the emergency diesel generators.

It is not considered credibic to assume that both lines will be blocked due to a mechanical failure of the valves.

The most probabic failure mechanism of the valves during a

scismic event is a loss of power in which case the valves will fail "as is".

The possibility of simultaneous closure of both l

valves in either unit is very remote but, nevertheless, is possible.

The systems are operated in manual with valves N71-F201 and 2N71-F013 fully closed and valves P41-F303A and 2N71-F012 throttled open unicss system chlorination is under-way in which case the valves positions are reversed.

In order to assure that both valves on cach unit will not be closed during plant operation the power has been removed from the valve operator.

Also, administrative controls have been established as a temporary measure to maintain the valves in a position that will ensure an availabic flow path.

The design will be changed to make this a permanent resolution, and an update report will be submitted.

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