ML19340E165

Tech Specs 3/4.6.7 & 3/4.7.2 Re Chlorine Detectors & Main Control Room Environ Control Sys for Unit 2

ML19340E165
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	12/31/1980
From:	GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19340E157	List: ML19340E156 ML19340E165
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8101060573
Download: ML19340E165 (11)

Text

E r 4 ,

~

. ?. -

l .* . . . - _ . . - .-..,---.-...-..-.------------.a---- - - - - - - - - - - -

1 INSTRUMENTATION

, I CHLORINE DETECTORS LIMITINGbONDITIONFOROPERATION 3.3.6.7 Two independent chlorine detectors located in the main control

q. room air intake, with their alarm / trip setpoints adjusted to actuate at a chlorine concentration of e 5 ppm, shall be OPERABLE.

g APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

j ACTION:

a. With one of the above required chlorine detectors inoperable, restore the inoparable detector to OPERABLE status within 7 days or, within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, initiate and maintain h operation of the main control room environmental control system in the isolati ' mode of operation,

b. With no chlorine detectors OPERABLE, within one hour initiate and maintain operation of the main control room environmental cor. trol systems in the isolation mode of operation.

, c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

n SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.3.6.7 Each of the above required chlorine detectors shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

0 8101060 573 M.

HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-58 4

• 'l s . ,.; s ,  : ' ' .: a, ~'

• ? ? C ,# y & f % : L .): M L?~':g.g.,::- 1:.to .ma.W2:i:iJ.~. .:+-.:5.2%& ....

.Z.?;:.23 . ; %. . - '

FLL u: C.E' -

^L ,

l$hlP Uhl17 1. YEc H .5 Fe^c p gD PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.2 MAIN CONTROL ROCM FNVIRONMENTAL CONTR'" SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION .

3.7.0 Two independent main control room enviromental control (MCREC) systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one main control room environmental control system inoper-able, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,

b. With both main control room environmental control systems inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDCWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.2 Each main control rocm environmental control system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

l a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the control room 1

air temperature is < 105'F.

b. At least once per 31 days, by initiating, frem the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and

verifying that the system operates for at least 15 minutes.

c. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural main-

- tenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any venti-lation zone communicating with the system by:

- 1. Performing a visual inspection of the system and all associated components before each leak test in accordance 4 witn Section 5 of ANSI N510-lS75.

HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-6

M =. m .u. w . m - e. . s.- .w s .~. mum . mm n .,:. .v., -mn wa r

9%.p.19~werwr4:. W .9M92.:,@?i9h: ;J.;.N;

n m S" .5,;p.4:1 v. j ;:jdid3

. v= m %.d33%:Gj;Idd'$

y .., g :7,m:5 .7 ;; N48d

. 3. . @ .6'C DV

.ny

.i C~; PLANT SYSTEMS

g ;c n.. .

w 1'"d SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place testing acceptance criteria and uses the test

.,, procedures of Regulatory Positions C.S.a. C.S.c and

'm C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 1, July 1976,

. and the system flow rate is 2500 cfm + 10%.

2. .

3. Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory

analysis of a representativa carbon sample obtained in

.vdi accordance with Regulatory Positi.on C.6.b of Regulatory

-C@' Guide 1.52, Revision 1, July 1976, meets the laboratory

-x ,

testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regula-g tory Guide 1.52, Revision 1, July 1976. .

W:

4. Verifying a system flow rate of 2500 cfm + 10% during 3~'.t 1 system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI

- 1". 2 N510-1975.

Tu, m

$5'

?~

d. After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying within 31 days af ter removal that a laboratory "J analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in a T ccordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 7 1.52, Revision 1, July 1976, meets the laboratory testing

?: .

criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 1 July 1976.

0]fg{

C-

.,,;;p e. At least once per 18 months by:

i '"1 .

l $] 1. Verify!ng that the pressure drop across the combined l

HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is < 6 5.)J inches Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow l .s. -3 rate of 2500 cfm + 10%.

.v. f Yj 2. Verifying that on an isolation mode actuation test signal 2 4 from the chlorine detectors, the system automatically 7,Ei switches to the isolation mode of operation with recircula-

tion flow through HEPA filters and charcoal ads -ber banks i.Q] and that the isolation dampers close in < 7 seco .ds, c.,

j].h s' k.b ii . .

I':l'i

.s.,

.-y..

E

> . HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-7

s. ~ .

.h ."*

.Y$ T v ='== -- === " ~

);:dN'fing=@x=N?fINNb$NEdMg@$~N5.ij.OkyN~ w -

- /Mf:[ ~Uh.

~- - -

- ;; z ::.

-+

PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) e _

4 3. Verifying that on each of the below pressurization mode actuation test signals, the system automatically switches l

to the pressurization mode of operation and maintains the j main control room at a positive pressure of > 0.1 inch I . W.G. relative to the adjacent Turbine BuildiiIg during system operation at a flow rate < 400 cfm.

a) Reactor vessel water level-low low b) Reactor vessel water level-low low low c) Drywell pressure-high d) Refueling floor exhaust radiation-high e) Main steam line radiation-high f) Main steam line flow-high g) Control room intake monitors radiatien-high

f. Af ter each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter -

bank by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove > 9C4 of_

tne DCP when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the system at a flow rate of 2500 c fm _+ 10%.

_ g. After each ccmplete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove j

> 99% of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test tas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N5101975

while operating the system at a flow rate of 2500 cfm + 10%. _

i 1

1 A.. .

,. ~ u HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-8 c.:

b

-%. -weM _ . - - __ _ _ w- . _ _ _ __ --W

_ . . . . . .. . uu.

. nsm UmT I

}_

Acplicability -

HNP IdC# 8P80 sis m Apolicabiliev j

/ 2 -/6" N The Li=iting Cond.1:icns for The Surveillance Require =ents Opera:ica apply to the operating status of the =ain apply to the periodic tests and control roc = environ = ental exa=inations of the =ain control syste=. roe = environ = ental syste=.

Obiective Obiective The objective of the Li=iting Conditi:ns for Operation is :o The objective of the Surveillance assure the availability of the Require =ents is to verify the operability, availability or

=ain con:rol roo= enviren= ental efficiency of the =ain centrol syste= under conditions for which room environ =en=al sys:e= under its capability is required :o conditiens for which its protec: plan: operators.

capability is required to protect

, plant eperators.

Soecificatiens Soecifiestiens A. Ventilattens Syste: O=erabiliev A. Ventilatten syste: Tests Recuirerents --  ;

1. Doerability Reecire'ent -

At least once per operating a.Two independent con:r01 ::ce cycle, not to exceed 13 =enths, the folleving'shell be air tresr=ent syste=s shall den ens tra:ed:

be operable at all ti=es when -

secondary cen:ain=ent a. The pressure d: p across integri:y is required. the cc=bined EI?A However, frc= and af ter the filters and charcoal date that one circui: of the adsorber banks is less control roc = air trea::en: than 6 inches of water systa= is =ade or found to at syste= desig= flow be inoperable for any reasen, rate (+10*) .

reac:cr operatic: or refuel -

• ing operstics is permissible b. Aute=atic initiatien of only during the succeeding the control roc = air seven days.

If :he systa= treat =ent systa=.

is no: =ade fully operable within 7 days, reactor shut-

c. Each circuit shall be down shall be initiated and operated for at least the reactor shall be in cold 15 minutes each conth.

shutdown within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> and irradiated fuel d. The control roo= ventila-handling operations shall tion syste: shall be be ter=inated within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, demonstrated capable of maintaining the control * -

b.The con:rol roo= ventilation sys- roo= at a positive pressure te= shall be capable of =aintain- 11/10 inche W.G. relative ing the control roo= at a positive to the turbine b'uilding d"* pressure relative to the turbine during syste= operation building when in the pressurization at a flow rate <400 cf=. ,

mode.

cb

~

D ** "" D D }

endment No. sE . 56 3.12-1 ,

' r T.

3.12.A.2. Ferf'r: 1r- Jr> n_:, 4.12.A.? .?!*-

_ !_~_.

a. The result ef the in-p1sce a. The test: and :n :.yris

- DC? and ha's; nated hy!::- shall be perfer ed a carben tests at desi;n flers least once per operating

( on llEPA filters and chst:::1 cycle, not to exceed 1S

=enths, or after every

. absorber b:nks shall show 399" DCP reioval and 199% halopensted 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of syste= cpera-hydrocarben removal, respectively tion or following painting, when tes:cd in accordance vi h fire or che ical release in any ventila:icn tone consuni-ANSI N510-1975.

' cating with the sys:em,

b. The resul:t of labora:ory ,

carbon sa:ple analysis b. DOP testing shall be per-for=ed af ter cach complete shall show 20 0% : dio- '

or partial replace:ent of ac:ive methyl iodide rencval when :cs:cd in the H2PA filter bsnk or

. accord nce uith EDT-M16-lT af ter sny structural .

(25 C, 95% R.H.). = tntenance on the sys:e:-

housing.

c. Fans shall be shewn to operate within -10% c. Eslocenated hyd:: carbon ,

design f1cu when tested testing shall be perferred -

after each cocplete or in accordance with ASSI N510-1975. partial replacc ment of the charcoal adsorber hack of after any strucrur:1 enintenance on the systen hou:ing. .

( .

F i

l B. Isolatien Valva Coerability and . B. Icolntion Unive Testin-Closine Tine The control reen air intake Ihc control roe = air intaka isolation valves shall be tested fur opernbili:y every isolation valves shall be oper:ble whenever the venti- three conche and for the re-latica sys;ca is required to quired closing ti=a a: lems:

be operabic by Spacifiestion once per opera:ing cycle.

3.12. A and shall be required to be closed within seven

! seconds from receipt of an isolatien sign:1. One vsive l

I may be considered inoperab:2 G cn for a period not to exceed g'J3 cg- -

seven days. & $1 o

.. Jt ,

(

t l

Amend. r .ent No. , _, 51 3.12-2

. ~,

• LinIT:::C cc:::i:7!<.;::s ro?. G*>r.7_*cIO:: sL':tve.ILt." t'i: i. U..'I H T*:E:.7 5.

3.12.C. Redittien l'enitors 4.12.C. Radistien !!snitors The control roes air intake The control room air intake C

radiation conitors or suitable radiation monitors sh:11 be r'espective temporary units shall tested in accordance with 22 te operctle whencyc the venti- Tabic 4.2-8.

lation system is recuired to be ' -

operabic by Specification 3.12.A.1 1 except that one radistic =enitor may be out of service 30 days. ___.- .

I D. Shutdo.n teeutreecnte

-in the event that Specificaticas 3.12.A through 3.12.C ccnnot be

- ret, the reactor chall be placed in the Cold Shutdoun cendition with-

- 22l in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> or, if refueling opera-tiens are in progress, such opercs tions will be ter=inated within 22li 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. ,

E. Chlorinc. "eniters E. , Chlorine "snfrorn

1. The'.rcactor chall not have The control' roc = sir intake a coo 2nnt tenperature chlorine uenitors thc11 Le greater than 212 F unicss te.sted fer opercLility : d cali1* ration every three the centrol rocs air C intche ch1crine. :.cnitors r.or.th s .

4 or suitchic tc=porary units are operabic, except that one chlorine ronitor nay be out of service for 30 dcys.

2. In the event that f

Specificctica 3.12.E.1 cannot be cet, the centrol rec =

ventilatien systen shall be placed in the recirculation cenfiguration.

l l

. e o

(

l .

l I .

t 3.12-3 l -,- . - , _,-_.- - . - . . . - - . . . . . - . - . , . . , - . - . _ -

I

===e 3.1d) yAIs.

.. .e CC..* . .; .gi.,.

. ;fa ge. ,.

g.e o* . * , = = u.

.. g . 2, =. . .. . = ,. . S *i m . 4- ,

\

The con:r:1 re:m air trea: ment'sys:c= is designed to fil:cr :he cen::.,1 l rece str.:schere for in::2e air and/or for racirculs:ien during con:rol

. roo isolsti:n or p;cssuri:s:ica condi:1cns.

A. Ventil:tien Svstom. 0:erabili:v Recuirerents The con:rol room air :: cat = : sys:em opers:ss en emerg:ncy power and is designed':0 fil::: :he cen:: 1 reo= r::: sphere for in:ske cir and/

or recirculation during control room isolation or pressurizatica cen-diciens. The centr:1 : e= sir treatecn: sys:c= is d0 signed : Lu::-

=atic211y s:sr: upon receipt of an ini:ia:1:n signal and to align l

the sys:c= dampers to either provide for pressuri:s:Icn of the con:rol roc: or isela:1:n of :ha control ro::, depending en the source of :he ini:1 sting signal.

Pressuri:stica vill be initiated up n receip: of any one of the follow-[

ing ciansis: Hi;h radia:1cn at con:rol rcen in:ske, LOCA si;nsi [

from Uni: 1 or.2, main stena line hi;h ::dia:icn from Uni: 1 or 2, main steen line hi;h flew fro = Uni: 1 or 2, or refueling floor high ,

radia: ion fres Unit 1 or 2. In this mode the nor= 1 con:rol rec = 't exhaus: fan is s:opped and cu: ride cir is :akan in through one of the chcreo:1 filters to pressuri:e :he centrol roem wi:h respect to :he ,

surroundin; turbina brildin;. ,,

Isolarien of :he control enom will be in.1:iated upen receipt of a high

chlorine concentration at the centrol reca in

ake signal. In this =ada i the control room is isolated from the corn:1 cu:sida air intake and I the control roca ate sphcre is recirculated :hreugh one of the ch::: cal l filters. The norral centrol ::cm exhuss; fan is c:cpped in this rede

alse. If ene systen is fcund

s be inercratic, th2re is no incadiate threa to personnel in the con:rol roem. The.rciore, reactor opera:i:n ,

or refueling operstica :sp centinue for 11:1ted period of time while repairs are bein; m:de.

111;h effiefency pnr:iculats air (MEPA) filter: ace inc:slied befers the charcoal adcorbers to preven: clog; int. ef the iodine adscrb.ers.

The chn:ceal adsorhers are ins:slied to reduce the po:en:ial intake of l radiofedine to the control reon. Eypass leaks;e for the, charcoal adsorbers and particul te re val efficiency for Hr.PA filterc arc de:creined by h:lecen., cd hyd re:r!.cn and 3CP, respec:1vely. tlc labora:Ory car!on sn=ple rect result: indien:c a ::dioactive mcth.l iodide receval efficiency fer enpected acciden: condi: lens. C crs-tien of the fans significiantly different fr:= :he design flow will chan;c the renova! cfficicne. ef :he itTPA fil:crs and chsrecal adscr-bers, if the perforennees arc as specified, the calculstcJ dears would be less than the slicw. ale lev.?ls n:ated in Cri:erien 19 ^~ :Sc Ceuerel Denign Criteria for ::aclan Power Plan:5 Appendix A to 10 CT; Par: 50.

9 l

O <

D o w. o 1. n

! Amendment No. 2d', 51

• 3.12-4 1 .

l

.. . -_- . - - . _ ~ - . . . .. _-. . - . .-

J . . ,

3. Isolation V-!ve & er-Silt,t*r end C!cti_9e Ti-a The centrol roca sir in:ske ic:Istion v:lves would receive si:n:lc to close froc a hi;h chlorine con:er.tra:icn in :ne con:rsi rec. :fr intake dutt. A valvo closit:g ti ? requirc ent of seven sccends or less accures : hat any chlorine detec:cd in :he intake due:, and

.  :::nspor:cd a: nereal air intake rs:: *ould not reach.the firs: 1se- .

lation valve prior to the valve being closed. The second isola:ien valve offers a considerably lenger trtr. spor: ti:2 should the firs: -

valve fail :o closs.

C. R diation Maniters i At lenst ene channel (detector) in the control roce air intake radis-l tien monit: ring system =t se be opersble a: all times for indicatien-alarn of radios::ivi:y being de en into :he sin con:rel r:::. 12in control roce in:ske air fil: ration is required when a trip signal fren the dete::ers is given via failure or pressuri:n:icn si;n:ls fr:: both I channals or a failure signsi in ene ch:nnal cod a pressuri:s: ion sign:1 in the other channel. (

D. Shutdetm. Renuirenen:s Shutdeva requiremen:s are based en the need to ensure habitabili:7 for operatiens pers:nnel during noresi plant ep: ration and subse-

quent to a pcs

ula:cd design basis accidan:.

! E. ChInrine Menitors

, At least one channel (detec:or) in :he con:rol rec = sir intahe chler:n2 conitoring syst2m cust be operable at all times for indicatien-:1:r-of ch1crine being draun into the con:rel reen. Main cor:rol roc:

isolstion frc= cc: side cir in:ske is required upon racsip: of a chierica detec:ica signal or a failure of the chlorine teni:or in either ch nnel. The chlorine =enitors are also discussed in Reft-renec 2. .

4.12 P1.I

• c?: TROL r.00:t E:r/I20:r. ::T.*.L SYSTE:t A. Ventilation Svete- Tasts .

Pressure drop scrcss the combined HEPA filters and chsr:oal adscrbars l

of less than 6 inches of acer at :he syst.em design flow ra:e will

' indi:ste that :he fil:ars and adsarbers are not clog.-*d by execesiva amounts of foreign est:cr. A tes frequency of once per eperating cycle established systc= perfor:snee capability.

I b k endment No. '., 51 3.12-5 9

- - - - , . - . - - , . - . . . - - , . -..,-..-..n-..-, . , . - . . - , - - - .

- n

{ the,HEPA filters and chartcal Replacceent adsorbant re adsorborn neccesary to shew that can erform as evaluated.

i of Ectulatory Cuf s 1.52.should he qualified accordinc, to the rctideline of one bcd free the tray, mining ing at 1 cast two sampics.

thec adr.orbe er tr:y, pt/ing iodine renoval efficiency testin disceter and a le least tue inches of the bed. If the

in the system.should be replacadresults are unacceptable, all adsorbent l

Pesitien C.3.d of Regulatory Cuideto1.51should .

Regul tory be re j Operation of the syste the filters and adsorber systa=.cvery centh will dentnstrate operability ef l

stratas operability and re::ves the moistuce uring build-up testing.

doper: tio Ifpaincibg,fireorch:icalreleaseoccurssuch cals or foreign =aterials, the seme be perfone.:d as required for oper:tions1 use ezes, tests ysis should cheni- and s Demonstration of,the autecatic initiation capabilit ascure syste perfor= nce espability, y is ::cossary to 3.

(

_ Isolation Valve Testinq an= vyvi.allity test fut consists of a closin.;-:pening cycle.the control rcen air intake isolation val performance, thus th: expected to be used ef ten, egr they are aise not e cycle is adequete. closing time verific:tien once per opera:de

• 1.

ting C. ,

( _Radiction and chlorine (3.12.5) Senitors

( _

Bases for the control roes sir intake radiation s are spacifi- eenitor .

ficatien 3.2.H.4, and are generally discucsod Requirce:nts. Specification 4.2.

n, Sp::1- in The test er Surveillsnee D, monitors is bcsed on the sane criteria as cenitors.

_Referencen for the radictio

1. Ucleted. ~

DC C DW '

UJ '

!' l 2.

FSalt 0,ucetions 11.6.3 nnd 11.6.4 d ub '

i a

.3. .

i Systems Containing Devicec for ,

s.

Removalng of i

Amendment No. ., 51 3.12-6

- _.- . . . . _ - - _ . _. - . - - _. -. =

1 GENERAlh ELECTRIC uuctEin nowEn SYSTEMS DIVISION GENERAL ELECTRIC CCMPANY.175 CURTNER AVE., SAN JCSE, CALIFCRNIA 9512$

M/C 682 (408) 925-1822 1

4

~

l October 1, 1980 i

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccamission Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatten Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: D. G. Eisenhut, Director Gentlemen:

Suoj ect: NUREG-0660 Requirement !I.K.3.13 This letter transmits an evaluation performed by General Electric on banalf of the BWR Owners Group of NUREG-0660 recommendation II.K.3.13. The attached report presents the analyses, conclusions i

and recommendations regarding separation of the initiation levels of the Hign Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems.

i If you have any further questions regarding the BWR Owners Group response to NUREG-0660 requiremant II.X.3.13, please contact Mr. S. J. Stark (4C8) 925-1822 of my staff.

Very truly yours,

$.E m S.N.I M U, R. H. Sucnnolz, Manager d

SWR Systems Licensing Safety and Licensing Operation Attachment l

. cc: J. A. Olshinski P. W. Marriott M. W. Hodges D. 3. Waters l 0. F. Ross SWR Owners Group ht;';. :- q) Toto O 3 O VWl

[

. _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - . _____ __ - _ .._. m- ..

i i

k I

EVALUATION OF DROPOSED MODIFICATION TO HPCI and RCIC OPERATION i

I. Introduction This re: ort has been prepared as the BWR Owners' Group generic response - '

i to NUREG-0560 task item II.K.3.13 which addresses the oceration of the Hign Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) ano Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems. The text of this recuirement is as follows:

Currently, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCTC) system and

' tne hign cressure coolant injection (HPCI) system 10th initiate s i

on the same low water level signal and both isolate on the same high water level signal . The HFCI system will restart on low i water level but the RCIC system will not. The RCIC system is a l

' low-flow system wne.1 cocpared to the HPCI system. The initiation levels of the HPCI and RCIC system snould be separated so that the RCIC system initiates at a higher water level than the HPCI system. Further, the RCIC system initiation logic should be modified so that the RCIC system vill restart on low water level.

These changes have the potential to reduce the number of chal-lenges to the HPCI system and could result in less stress on the r vessel from cold water injection. Analyses should be performec to evaluate these changes. The analyses snould be sucmitted to

' the NRC staff and changes snould be implementec if justified by

ne analyses.

4 II. Conclusiens This report presents the analyses, conclusions, and reccmmendations regard-ing separation of the initiation levels of the HPCI and RCIC systems. As previously confir ec by discussions with the staff on June 13 and 17 (Ref-erence 1), the fundamental issue of the separation requirement is the potential benefit of reducing the number of thermal cycles on the reactor vessel and internals resulting from HPCI operation. Thus, the evaluation which follows concentrates on thermal cycle analyses of RCIC and HPCI system operation.

i The most severe thermal cycle dut to RCIC and HPCI initiation at the

' current low water level se coint is assessed and compared to the thermal i

cycle analysis for the limiting reactor components. Operating plant ex-perience is evaluated to estimate the frequency of occurrence of HPCI and RCIC initiations. Basec on the foragoing, it is concluded that the current design is satisfactory, and a significant reduction in i.hermal cycles is not necessary.

The potential for reducing thermal cycles by separating the RCIC and HPCI initiation setpoint is also examined. The results of these analyses indi-cate that no significant reduction in thermal cycles is achievaale by ses- ~

arating ne setooints.

] l l

)

4 k

r*

, Page 2 l II. Conclusions (cont)  ;

i An analysis which evaluates the proposed logic change for the RCIC system automatic reset / restart has also been comoleted. This evaluation concludes l '

that sucn a change would be both beneficial and achievable. This analysis and cenclusion will be documented in a separate report as discussed in a telecon with the NRC (Reference 2). .

III. Evaluation of Thermal Cycles due to HPCI and RCIC Actuation The analyses presented are for typical BUR /3 and 4 designs where the HPCI and RCIC systems inject via the feecwater spargers. Later plant designs

' (BWR/5 and 6) have separate injection locations for the RCIC and HPCI/HPCS systems and are less limiting in comoarison to the typical BWR/3 and 4 configuration. Differences in the thermal fatigue analyses are identified wnere accropr m.e.

j Chacter 15 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) examines costulated

~ plant transients. Examination of these events has identified transients wnich result in the loss of feedwater, including the loss of feedwater t'ansient, as resulting in the most limiting thermal cycle due to HPCI and RCIC actuation.

i The cortions of the reactor vessel and its internals which may be affected l by operation of HPCI and RCIC are the reactor vessel shell, core shroud, j

and feedwater no::les and soargers. Thermal fatigue analyses show that the limiting reactor component is the feedwater nozzle for all plants equipped ,

with HPCI and RCIC systems. The feedwater sparger is exposed to thermal cycles resulting from HPCI and RCIC operation as well as feedwater tempera-ture changes during daily and weekly power swings. HPCI/HPCS and RCIC in-jection locations on plants that do not inject through the feedwater system are not exposed to temperature variations, during daily and weekly power swings.

Uoon loss of feedwater, the temperature of the feedwater sparger and the 4

no::les approacnes the normal reactor operating temperature. Initiation of

! HPCI and RCIC at low water level then cools the sparger and nozzle. The most severe thermal cycle identified by anlaysis results in a temperature t

change from 5500F (reactor operating temperature) to 500F (HPCI/RCIC injec-tion temperature). This temcerature change is included in the loads assumed in fatigue analysis based on normal operation (which itself includes many cold water injections) as well as expected transients and other postulated j events. The duty imposed on the feedwater no :le frcm all causes is summed to obtain a calculated fatigue usage of 0.95, which is less than the limit of 1.0. The design basis includes 70 thermal cycles due to HPCI and RCIC injection of the type described. The calculated fatigue usage of these cycles is 0.16, or about 177, of the total fatigue usage. An evaluation for plants with other RCIC and HPCI/HPCS injection locations results in a calculated total fatigue usage of fless than 0.2. It should be noted that i

there is no significant thermal effect on the reactor vessel shell due to the operation of HPCI and RCIC for any plant configuration.

i D*"]D o o Ju o T]@ .AlnLa

Page 3 III.

Evaluation of Thermal Cycles due to HDCI and RCIC Actuation (cont)

Operating plant experience indicates an average of approximately 1.5 RCIC and HPCI actuations per year per plant. Even if every actuation resulted in the most severe thermal transient described earlier, the thermal analysis has shown that the design is within the fatigue limit.

Therefore, the current design is conservative and minimally effected by HPCI 3nd RCIC actuation due to loss of feedwater events for all plants with HPCI/

HPCS and RCIC.

I '/ . Eval':ation of the Potential ice leducina Tnermal Cycles bv Secaration of HPCI and RCIC Initiation Setooints The ciscussicn that follows addresses the potential for reducing :ne thermal cycles due to HPCI and RCIC initiation. The transients con-sidered are those cited in FSAR Chacter 15. Two classes of transients can cause RCIC and HPCI initiation:

1.

!nitiation of HPCI and RCIC on icw water level after feecwater is tricted on high reactor water level. For Onese tr3nsients, the inventory is slowly lost dut to decay heat steam generation.

2. Initiation of HPCI and RCIC following a sudden loss of feedwater.

For these transients, inventory loss is rapid with HPCI and RCIC initiation accurring accroximately 20 seconds after event initiation.

The majority of transients from Chapter 15 which require HPCI and RCIC

initiation can te grouped into Category 1. In this case, the level de-I crease is slow because of the low power condition at the time the feed-water is tricped. A small amount of makeuo water is needed and if feed-water cannot be restored, sufficient time is usually available such that RCIC would be started manually as the water level sicoly decreases below the normal ocerating range. Since such manual actioi has been demon-strated to be successful for avoidance of HPCI actuation, it is considered sufficient and more desirable than an increase of the RCIC setooint close to the normal operating water level. If neither feedwater or RCIC is manually started, both HPCI and RCIC would automatically be initiated at l the low level setpoint.

f The second class of transient to be considered is the loss of feedwater event. Loss of feedwater flow is accorroanled oy a large and racid drop i

in water level. Low level scram is initiated in accroximately 5 seconds, with RCIC anc HPCI actuation occurring shortly thereafter. With both systems operating, water level is cuickly restored. Due to the raoidity of the transient, HPCI initiation cannot be avoided even if the RCIC set-point is raised to the normal eterating level. Therefore raising the RCIC setooint for tnis type of transient can have no beneficial effect on thermal cycles and will interfere with normal plant operation.

T D*A*D

. *ADD lW

l . * /

b Page 4 l IV. Evaluation of the Potential for Reducina Thermal Cycles by Seoaration i f o_f_HPCI and RCIC Initiation Setcoints (cont) i For both types of events, automatic RCIC operation could avoid HPCI initiation if the HPCI setpoint were lowered; however, no significant

! benefit is realized unless the HPCI setpoint is lowered to near the low-l low water level (level 1). Since the artuation of RCIC and HPCI has -

beer. previously shown to be of minimal mpact in fatigue usage analyses, and lowering of the HPCI setpoint lessens the existing margin for as-

, sura 1ce of adequate core cooling, such a separation of HPCI and RCIC settoints by lowering the HPCI ;)tpoint is not warranted.

V. Sumarv In tne foregoing ciscussion, it has been shown that HPCI and RCIC i

initiations at the current low water level setpoints is within the j design basis thermal fatigue analysis of the reactor vessel and its j internals. Separating HPCI and RCIC setooints as a means of re-

) ducing thermal cycles has been shown to be of negligible benefit.

l In addition, raising the RCIC setpoint or lowering the HPCI set oint have undesirable consequences wnich outweigh the benefit of the limited reduction in thermal cycles. Therefore, wnen evaluated on this basis, GE rec 0 mends no change in RCIC or HPCI/HPCS setpoints.

V!. . References

i. R. H. Bucnhol: (GE) letter to D. G. Eisennut (NRC) Imolementation of NUREG-0660 Requirement II.K.3.13, dated July 11, 1980 (MFN-124-8?)

l

2. R. H. Buchholz (GE) letter to D. F. Ross, Jr. (NRl:, NUREG-0660 Recuirement II.X.3.13, dated September 29, 1980 (idN-167-80) 1 l

l O

___