ML19329E828
| ML19329E828 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1978 |
| From: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Howell S CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8006180614 | |
| Download: ML19329E828 (26) | |
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Docket Nos.
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ATTN: Mr. S. H. Howell
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INIS D0duMENT CONTAlNS Vice President
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SUBJECT:
Rhyuci FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION - PART THREE
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Py letter of February 24,1978,,fomarded the first of three scheduled pshnSe,.i parts of our requests for additional information for our.FSAR. review 407. s;f of Midland Plant Units 1.& 2. sThe third part of that re ygi
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We will need complete and adequate responses to Enclosure 1 by June 2, Mbig,W i i'
1978.
If you cannot meet this date,2%fom us within seven days after
[-QF receipt of this letter so that we may revise our schedule accordingly.
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We have encountered delays in our review of instrumentation and control 43 systems and of the site security plan. We will advise you by separate correspondence of our revised schedule for these areas. We anticipate release of our initial requests for additional information regarding your Fire Protection Evaluation Report about mid-June,1978.
Please contact us if you desire clarification or other discussions of the infomation requested.
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0718 8"1 1
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Steven A. Varga, Chief 41
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Light Water Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Project Management
Enclosure:
As Stated I"A
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-E Consuiaers eower Cottgany ces:
Michael I. Miller, f.sq.
Isham, Lincoln & ideale Suite 42uo One First aational-Plaza Cnicago, 111iaois uuo70 Judu L bacon, Esq.
Managing Attorney Consutters Power Co.Tsany 212 West Micnigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 492U1 Nr. Paul.A. Perry
-Secretary Consuirers Power Company 212 W. Michigan Avenue Jackson, Micnigan 49201 Myron M. Cherry, Esq.
One.IfM elaza Chicago, Illinois du611 ilonorable Curt Scnneicer Attorney General State of Kansas Topeka, Kansas. o6612 Irving Lixe, Esq.
Reilly, Like and Scnneiuer 200 nest Main Street dacylon, dew York 11702-James A. ~ dencell, Esq.
Currie and Kencall I h Worth Saginaw Roaa
. Mialanu, Michigan. '4o640
' Louis.W. Pribila, t:sq.
Michigan Division Legal Department 47 duilding Dow Chemical USA Miulana, dicnigan 46640 Lee clute, Esq.
Micnig' n division a
Tne Dow Chemical Coinpany
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Mialand,. Michigan 4o640 6
0 ENCLCSURE l' REOUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (01's)
PART 3 0F 3' MIOLAND PLANT UNITS i & 2
-These requests for additional information are numbered such that the three digits to the left of the decimal identify the technical
- review branch and the numbers to the right of the decimal are the secuential recuest numbers. The number in parenthesis indicates the relevant section in the Safety Analysis Report. The initials RSP indicate the request recresents a regulatory' staff position.
Branch Technical Positions referenced in these requests can be found in " Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis
- Recorts for Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-75/087 dated September 1975.
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Auxiliary Systems Branch 1..
010.'38 According to Figures 10.4-10 and 10.4-13 the inadvertent closure'of AFW isolation valve IFV3875A or B (Unit 1) or 2FV3975A or B (Unit 2)
'to the unaffected steam generator following a main steam or feed-water line break inside containment would result in the loss of all Af W flow for the affected unit.
Demonstrate how your design meets this single failure criterion or revise your design as necessary to assure AFW flowLto the unaffected steam generator considering any single active failure.
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Power Systems Branch 040.0 344-1971 and 1975 for equipment Section 3.10.2.1 references IEEE Std 040.17 (3.10)
Identify the equipment that is qualified under the.
qualification.
1971 version and the equipment that is qualified under the 1975 version of IEEE-344.
Your environmental qualification program for motor operated valve 040.18 (3*II) operators does not include ' aging'.
We require aging be included In addition provide your qualification in the qualification program.
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program for safety related motors located inside and outside con-o Revise your FSAR to include this information.
tainment.
The following Regulatory Guides have been identified as being 040.19 (8.0) applicable for Midland Plant.
- a. RG 1.53, Rev. I
- b. RG 1.118 We require that the reccmmendations included in these regula i
tory guides be satisfied in your design or provide a descript and justification of the alternate criteria you intend to use.
l Provide the Your description of offsite power system is incomplete.
040.20
.(8.2) following additional information:
A description of the number of right-of-way; number, type an 1.
height of towers per right-of-way; and the number of circu tower connecting the Midland Plant to the grid.
per.
2.
Assurance that the physical separation of offsite circuits one and two (where they share a ccmmon carridor) is sufficient so that it will not jeopardize the independence of these circuits.
040.21 Your grid reliability study results does not include any load flow (8.2) chart or frequency and voltage deviation curves to demonstrate that your system is stable for (1) the loss of the unit generator, (2) the loss of the largest system load, and (3) the loss of the most limiting transmission line.
Include this information in the FSAR.
(SRP 8.2, Parc III, item f).
040.22 Provide physical layout drawings of the circuits that connect the (8.2, 8.3) onsite distrioution system to the preferred pcwer supply and plant and layout drawings depicting the physical separation between redun-dant portions of the onsite distribution system, as requested in Sections 8.2 and 8.3 of the Standard Review Plan.
040.23 Identify all systems and components for which heat tracing is (7.0, 8.3) required and must be maintained during both normal operation, and shutdown cooling.
Describe separation and redundancy of circt:itry and power supplies for essential heat tracing service.
Provide the results'of a review of your operating, maintenance and 040.24 (7.0, 8.3) testing procedures to determine the extent of the usage of jumpers l
'or other temporary forms of bypassing functions for testing or maintenance of safety related system.
Identify and justify Pro-any cases where the use of the above methods cannot be avoided.
vide the criteria for any cse of jumpers for testing.
. 040.25 With respect to the application of single failure criterion to (7.3,8.3) manually-controlled, electrically-operated valves, list all valves for which Branch Technical Position EICSB #18 may apply and provide a schematic diagram showing the design feature for meeting this position.
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It is not clear from the description provided for the controls for 040.26 (6.3,8.3)
(RSP) isolation valves as to how the requirements to prevent overpressuriza-tion of the DHR system and the requirement of the DHR system to achieve cold shutdown will be accomplished in the design, in the event of a single electrical failure in the DHR suction line motor-operated valves.
It is the staff's position that the design of the DHR isolation valves be made to conform to the requirements of GDC 34, both in the decay heat removal mode function and while preventing overpressurization of the CHR system.
Provide a design of the CHR isolation valves to meet the above stated staff requirements.
Provide the following additional information with regard to con-040.27 (8.3) tainment electrical penetrations:
type of protection provided to assure thac missiles inside a.
the containment will not jeopardize the safety of the plant.
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4 provisions for fire detection and protection at the penetration areas.
b.
physical spacing with relation to any piping runs c.
040.28 Your design of penetration overload protection is unacceptable (8.3)
We require that the following requirements (RSP) in its present form.
of of IEEE-279 should be satisfieu with regard to the protection the electrical penetrations:
The system shall, with precision and reliability automatically a.
disconnect power to the penetration conductors when currents through the conductors exceed.the preset limits.
All source and ' feeder breaker overload and short circuit pro-b.
tection systems are qualified for the service environment including seismic.
The seismic qualification for non-Class lE circuit breaker protection systens should as a minimum assure that the protection systems remain operable during an operating base earthquake.
The circuit breaker protection system trip set points must c.
be ccmpatible with the capability for test and calibration.
Provisions for test under simulated fault canditions should
- be provided.
No single failure shall cause excessive currents in the d.
penetration conductors which will degrade the penetration seals.
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. Signals for tripping source and feeder breakers shall be e.
independent, physically separated and powered from separated sources.
Modify your design to include the above requirements.
Recent operating experience has demonstrated that electrical equip-040.29 (8.3) ment associated with Class lE de power systems may be incorrectly rated or qualified for the high voltages which may exist during battery charging operations.
In this regard provide the design bases and criteria used to protect against overvoltage during the batte.y r
charging operation.
In addition describe the type of charger over-current protection provided in your design.
The transfer of manual control for safety related equipment shows 040.30 (7.5,8.3) that in some cases, the switches used to effect the transfer also remove the automatic actuation capability as well as transferring the manual control from the main con;rol room to another location.
Identify, all safety-related components (such as motors) for which the above applies and provide the bases and design criteria for this design.
Also, state any design features (such as keylock switches or enclosures) which are provided to add assurance that-these transfer or alternate control switches are in the corrent position during plant operations.
_s.
Discuss the consequences resulting from the interruption of power 040.31 (8.3)
-to engineered safety features at any time during an accident Include in the discussion such subjects as load shed-sequence.
ding, sequencing of loads on emergency diesel generators, effects on control logic, power to engineered safety features Show whether or not the engineered safety feature sys-pumps etc.
- tem recover automatically given this situation.
Provide a discussion of your criteria for the underground ' cable 040.32 (8.3) ins +.allation for Class lE systems.
In addition, discuss how the Class lE underground cable system design conforms to the following:
Quality standards, as required by the Commissicn's General Design a.
Criterion (r.5C 1).
Seismic Category I classification, as required by GDC 2.
b.
Minimization of the prooability and effects of fires, as c.
. required by GDC 3.
Compatability with the environmental conditions associated with d.
all modes of operation and appropriate protection against events and conditions outside the nuclear unit, as required by GDC 4.
Sufficient Independence and redundancy to satisfy the onsite e.
power system requirements dictated by GDC 17.
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f.
Prevention of a common failure mode of the redundant cable sys-tems for any design basis event including rain and floods, as required by IEEE Std 308 Section 5.2.1.
Preclusion of the utilization of directly buried g.
conduits under roadways.
Include the above information in your FSAR.
The information regarding the onsite communications system (Section 40.33 9.5.2) 9.5.2) does not adequately cover the system capabilities during transients and accidents.
Provide the following information:
(a)
Identify all working stations in the standard plant design where it may be necessary for plant personnel to communicate with the control room or the emergency shutdow.1 panel during and/or following transients and/or accidents (including fires) in order to mitigate the consequences of the event and to attain a safe cold. plant shutdcwn.
(b)
Indicate the maximum sound levels that could exist at each of the above identified working stations for all transients and accident conditions.
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(c)
Incicate the types of communication systems that will be available at each of tne a:ove identified working stations.
(d)
Indicate the maximum background noise level that could exist at each working staticn and yet reliacly expect effective ccm-munication with the control rocm using:
1.
the page party ccmmunications system, and 2.
any other adcitional ccmmunication system provided that working station.
(e)
Describe the performance requirements and tests that the above inplant working stations c:mmunication systems will be required to pass in order to be assured that effective ccmmunication with the control recm or emergency shutdown panel is, possible under all cc.nditions.
(f)
Discuss the protective measures taken to assure a functionally ocerable onsite communication system.
The discussion should include the censiderations given to c:mponent failures, loss of power, and the severing of a communication line or trunk _
as a result of an accident or fire.
020.34 Identify the vital areas and ha:ardous areas where emergency lighting (9.5.3) is needed for safe snut: wn of tne react:r and the evacuaticn of l
1 personnel in the event of an accident (inclucing fire).
Taculate i
the lighting systems provided in your cesign to accommodate those areas so icentified.
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' 040.35 Section 9.5.4, Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer (9.5.4)
System (EDFSTS), does not reference ANSI Standard N195, " Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators".
Indicate if you intend to comply with this Standard in your design of the Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System; other-wise provide justification for non-compliance.
(SRP 9.5.4, Part II, Item 6).
O'40.36 Figure 9.5-31, Emergency Diesel Engine Fuel Oil Piping Schematic, (9.5.4) shows that the filter and strainer on the engine have differential pressure switches to sense a high pressure drop.
In section 9.5.4 indicate if these will be monitored and if there will be alarms locally and in the control room.
The duplex strainer for the auxiliary module does not show a differential pressure switch.
Indicate the means for monitoring this strainer for cleanliness.
(SRP 9.5.4, Part III, Item 1).
040.37 Figures 9.5-25 and 9.5-31 do not show and section 9.5.4.5 does not (9.5.4) discuss any instrumentation for measuring temperature and flow rate for the emergency diesel engine' fuel oil system.
Provide in-formation showing the means for monitoring temperature and ficw rate and.any alarms provided.
Also provide information on the means for-monitoring the pressure level.
(SRP 9.5.2, Parc III, Item 1).
~ Discuss the means for detecting or preventing growth of algae in 040.38 (9.5.4)
If it were detected, describe the the diesel fuel storage tank.
methods to be provided for cleaning the affected storage tank.
(SRP 9.5.4, Part III, Item 4).
Discuss what precautions will be taken in the design of the fuel 040.39 (9.5.4) oil system in locating the fuel oil day tank and connecting fuel oil piping with regard to possible exposure to ignition sources such as open flames and hot surfaces.
(SRP 9.5.4, Part III, Item 6).
Identify all high and moderate energy lines and systems that will 040.40 (9.5.4)
Discuss the measures (9.5.5) be installed in the diesel generator room.
(9.5.6) that will be taken in the design of the diesel generator facility (9.5.7)
(9.5.8) to protect the safety related systems, piping and components from the effects of high and mcderate energy line failure to assure availablity of the diesel generators when needed.
(SRP 9.5.4, Part III, Item 8 SRP 9.5.5, Part III, item 4, SRP 9.5.6, Part III, item 5; SRP 9.5.7, Part III, item 3; SRP 9.5.8, Part III, item 6c).
Assume an unlikely event has occurred requiring operation of a 040.41 l-(9.5.4) diesel generator for a prolonged pericd that would require replenish l
l ment of fuel oil without interrupting eperation of the diesel gen-
' Whit provision will be made in the design of the fuel erator.
oil storage fill system to minimi:e the creation of turbulence Stirring of of the sediment in the bottom of the storage tank.
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. this sediment during addition of new fuel has the potential of causing the overall quality of the fuel to bec0me unacceptable and could potentially lead to the degradation or failure of the diesal generator.
Discuss the provisions made to assure the quality of the stored fuel 040.42 (9.5.4) oil meets the minimum requirements at all times.
(SRP 9.5.4, Part III, Item 4).
Provide information that shows that fuel oil day tank associated 040.43 (9.5.4) with each diesel generator is located at an elevation to assure slight positive pressure at the engine pumps.
(SRP 9.5.4, Part III, Item Sc).
In section 9.5.4.2 it is mentioned that the four fuel storage 040.44 (9.5.4) tanks (35,000 gal. each) are not located in a Seismic Category I structure but are buried undergrcund.
Indicate how they are de-signed to withstand a seismic event.
(SRP 9.5.4, Part III, Item 2).
Discuss the nearness and the means available for supplying additional 040. 45
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fuel oil in a timely manner when needed.
T 040.46 Section 9.5.5.2 states that diesel generator coolant water system (9.5.5) includes a turbocharger air ccoler, lube oil cooler and a jacket water cooler and figure 9.5-25 shows some of the temperatures and Provide information on the individual flow rates for these components.
component heat removal rates (STU/hr), flow (lbs/hr) and temperature for both the tube and shell sides and the total differential heat removal rate required.
(SRP 9.5.5, Part III, Item 1).
Section 9.5.5.2 indicates that diesel jacket water cooler is supplied 040.4 7 (9.5.5)
Section 9.2.1 indi-on the shell side by the service water system.
cates that the service water pump pit normally receives water supply from the cooling towers and that an engineered safety features actuation signal (ESFAS) will automatically shift to the water supply from the Provide the results of an analysis which takes into account cooling pond.
the time lag when switching the supply of jacket cooling water to the diesel generator from the normally used water from the cooling towers to the source of water from the cooling pond.
The concern is that there may be a reduced amount of water supplied during this period that may cause engine overheating.
Discuss the affects of the above to the per-formance of the diesel engine.
040;4 8 The-diesel engine generator sets should be capable of operation at (9.o.c) less than full load for extended periods without degradation of performance or reliability.
Provide a discussion of your diesei engine operation parameters, including minimum load requirements, and relate
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i this to. anticipated minimum loads under accident recovery conditions and during accident standby operation when offsite power is available.
_ SRP 9.5.5, Part III, Item 7).
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040.49 You state in section 9.5.5.2.that the diesel generator cooling (9.5.5) water system includes a surge tank (standpipe) with makeup water from the demineralized water system.
The surge tank will provide a reserve to compensate for system changes in volume and any minor leaks during operation.
The surge tank will also maintain the required NPSH on the system circulating pump.
The surge tank makeup water supply comes from the non-safety grade demineralized water system.
Demonstrate that the surge tank size will be adequate to maintain the required NPSH and makeup water for seven days continuous operation of the' diesel generator at maximum rated lead, or provide a seismic Category 1, quality group C makeup water supply the surge tank.
Provide information on the emergency diesel engine cooling water 040.50 (9.5.5) system water chemistry and indicate how this compares with the manufacturers recommendations.
(SRP 9.5.5, Part III, Item ic).
Provide.a discussion of the measures taken in the design of the 040.51 (9.5.6) standby diesel generator air starting system to preclude the fculing of the starting air valve or filter with contaminants such as oil carry over and rust.
(SRP 9.5.6, Part III, Item 1).
Provide symbols on Figure 9.5-27, Emergency Diesel Generator ' Start-340.52 (9.5.6) ing System, to designate the seismic design bcundaries of the
- different portions of the system.
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040.53 For the diesel engine lubrication system in section 9.5.7 provide (9.5.7) the following information:
- 1) deffne the temperature differentials, flow rate, and heat removal rate of the interface cooling system external to the engine and verffy that these are in accordance with recomendations of the engine manufacturer; 2) discuss the measures that will be taken to maintain the required quality of the oil, including the inspection and replacement when oil quality is degraded; 3) describe the protective features (such as blowout panels) provided to prevent unacceptable crankcase explosion and to mitigate the consequences of such an event; and 4) describe the capa-bility for detection and control of systen leakage.
(SRP 9.5.7, Part II, Items Ba, 8b, 8c, Part III, Item 1).
040.54 The P&ID (figure 9.5-28) for the diesel gererator lube oil system (9.5.7) does not show means for monitoring and alarming for high and low oil level anywhere in the system including the engine lube oil system reservoir.
Provide in the discussion and on the P&ID the means for indicating and alarming for high and low oil level.
(SRP 9.5.7, Part III, Item le).
5 Discuss the design precuations that will be taken to prevent entry of deliterious materials in the engine lubricatien oil system due to operator error during recharging of lucricating oil or normal operation.
(SRP 9.5.7, Part III, Item ic).
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15-040.56 Figure 1.2-27 shows the diesel generator building plan and elevation (9.5.8) and illustrates the arrangement of the comeustien intake and exhaust system.
However, it does not clearly show the details of the labyrinth arrangement for admission of intake air.
Indicate if the labyrinth arrangement for intake air is dependent upon actua-tion of flow control devices (louvers, dampers) (SRP 9.5.8, Part III, Item 4).
040.57 Figure 1.2-27 shows the arrangeme t of the diesel engine exhaust (9.5.8) vent pipes above the diesel generator roof.
This portion of the exhaust vent system is not shown protected frem tornado missiles.
Justify your design or provide missile oratection.
040.58 Indicate which system components in the diesel generator air intake (9.5.8) and exhaust system that are exposed to atmospheric conditions (ice, freezing rain or snow) and discuss how tnese components are protected from possible clogging during any operating condition (SRP 9.5.8, Part III, item 5).
040.59 Describe the sensors and alarms provided in the design of the (9.5.8) diesel engine ccmbustion air intake and exhaust system to warn the operator when design parameters are exceeded.
(SRP 9.5.8, Part III, item 1 & 4)..
es.
040.60 Discuss the possible effects on diesel generator operation (such (9.5.8) as reduced power capability, difficulty in starting) during an event in which there is an ingress of gases (mentioned in section 2.2 and listed in Table 6.4-3) into the diesel generator intake.
Use the 100". release column in table 6.4.3 and justify that there will be satisfactory diesel generator operation.
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040.61 Expand yourdiscussion of the turbine speed control and overspeed (10.2) protection system.
Provide additional explanation of the turbine and generator electrical load following capability for the turbine speed control system with the aid of system schematics (including turbine control and extraction steam valves to the heaters).
Tabulate the individual speed control protection devices (normal, emergency and backup), the design speed (or range of sceed') at which each device begins operation to perform its protective function (in terms of percent of normal turbine operating speed).
In order to evaluate the adequacy of the control and overspeed protection system provide schematics and include identifying numbers to valves and mechanisms (mechnical and electrical) on the schemaics.
Describe in detail, with references to the identify-ing numbers, the sequence of events in a turbine trip including response times, and shcw that the turbine' stabilizes.
Provide the results of a failure mode and effects analysis for each of the over-speed protection systems.
Show that a single steam valve failure or failure of any h.igh. or moderate energy line cannot disable the turbine overspeed trip frcm functioning.
(SRP 102, Part III, items 1-4). '
In section 10.2.3.5, Inservice Inspection, you state that the main 040.62 (10.2) steam stop and control, reheat stop, and intercept valves are exercised as required by closing each valve and observing the valve position indicator that it moves smoothly to a fully closed position.
Also indicate the frequency in time that this observa-tion is made.
(SRP 10.2, Part II, Item 5b).
040.63 Describe with the aid of drawings, the bulk hydrogen storage (10'. 2 )
Include facility including its location and distribution system.
the protective measures considered in the design to prevent fires and explosions during operations such as filling and purging the generator, as well as during normal operations.
040.64 In section 10.2.2.2 it is stated that "The stop valves are tied (10.2) together after the seats with an equalizer pipe".
Explain the purpose for the " equalizer pipe".
040.65 Figures 10.3-1 and 10.3-2 show the main steam supply system for (10.3) units 1 and 2 and figure 10.1-1 and 10.1-2 show the process flow diagram for the steam and power conversion systems for units 1 and 2.
It appears from these diagrams that the steam from the stean; generator "a" and steam generator "b" is not manifolded before entering the high pressure turbine.
However, there appears to be an interconnection around the normally open intertie valves 059 and 060.
Provide a discussion to explain the means of manifolding the steam from steam generator "a" and steam generator "b".
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. 040.66 Referring to figure 10.1-1, explain the operational consequences (turbine and process requirements) if one of the normally open 4
unit 1 intertie valves. (valves number 059 and 060 from figure 10.3-1) is inadvertently closed.
040.67 Referring to figure 10.1-1, explain the purpose of the dashed line (10.3) between the stop valve and the control valve.
It does not appear that this line is also shown in figure 10.3-1.
040.68 Provide a discussion to explain the large difference shcwn in (10.4.1)
Table 10.4-1 for Unit 1 between the exhaust steam flow to the condenser, 2,035,259 lb/hr and total condensate outflow 7,312,293 lb/hr.
These figures do not appear to be censistent with those in table 10.1-1 even when taking into account the additional steam flows to the hp and 1p evaporators and the flow to the reheaters and steam jet air ejectors.
Provide a flow balance diagram to the condenser similar to the diagram (figure 1) provided in PSAR amend-ment no. 11, dated 5/1/70.
040.6 9 In section 10.4.1.4 you have discussed tests but not. inspection.
g (10. 4.1 )-
Prgvide information on inspections as per regulatory guide 1.70.
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-Discuss the effect of main condenser degradation (leakage, vacuum, 040.70 (10.4.1) loss) on reactor operation.
(SRP 10.4.1, Part III, Item 1).
040.71-Discuss the possible mechanisms for hydrogen production in the (10.4.1).
secondary side water and provide the expected production rate of hydrogen in SCR4.
Discuss the effectiveness of the means to prevent' hydrogen buildup.
(SRP 10.4.1, Part III, Item 7).
m 19 Discuss the measures taken to prevent corrosion / erosion of con-040 72 (10.4.1)
(SRP 10.4.1, Part III, Item 1).
denser tubes and ccmponents.
Indicate what design provisions have been made to preclude 040.73 (10. 4.1 )
failures of condenser tubes or components from turbine by-pass blowdown.
(SRP 10.4.1, Part III, Item 3).
040.74 Assure that a high energy line failure of the turbine by-pass (10.4.4) system (TBS) will not have an adverse effect or preclude opera-tion of any safety-related turbine overspeed protection components or systems located close to the TBS.
(SRP 10.4.4; Part III, Item 4).
040.7.5 Provide the results of a failure mode and effects analysis to (10.4.4) determine the effect of malfunctions of the turbine by-pass system on the operation of the reactor and main turbine generator unit. (SRP 10.4.4, Part III, Item 4).
040.76 In your response to question 040.ll,with 3 items relating to (10.4.10) the-feedwater required the folicwing additional information j
is requested:
For Item 1, indicate where the originating source is for the demineralized makeup water supplied by Dow.
For Item 3, indicate what the effect of a sudden cut off of the 40% tertiary feedwater supplied by Dow would have on the reactor system.
'Also discuss the effects of a sudden cut off of the total steam
-load by Dow on the reactor system.
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-m 110-1 110.0 MECHAtlICAL E!!GINELRIllG BRAtlCH 110.30 Your response to Q110.19 is not completely' acceptable.
We requsst that you clarify your response to more specifically (3.9.3)
(RSP) address the consideration of asymmetric load effects on reactor coolant system components and supports which could result from postulated. reactor coolant pipe breaks within cavities located
~ inside containment. Aopendix 110-1 describes the information that is required.
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APPENDIX 110 1 In your assessment. of potential damage to the reactor vessel, steam generator, pressurizer, and other NSSS component supports from the effects of postulated pipe breaks inside containment, consideration should be given to breaks both inside and outside of the reactor pressure vessel cavity.
This assessment should be made for all postulated breaks in high energy piping systems including but not limited to the following locations:
Reactor vessel hot and cold leg nozzle to piping terminal ends; a.
Reactor coolant pump suction and discharge nozzles to piping terminal ends;-
b.
9 Steam generator inlet and outlet nozzle to piping terminal ends.
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(Notealsothat:
postulated steam line breaks may control the design of certain steam generator supports and, therefore, must also be considered in supoort design.)
In addition, provide the following information relating to the component supports:
1.
The method of analysis for the blowdown loads indicating the direction of the thrust' load, dynamic amplification factor, if one is being used and the nature of the load time history; A description nf the supports (lower and upper if applicable) including 2.
the dimensions; 3.
Number, orientation and capacity of snubbers; 4.
The location and break area of the postulated pipe break in the reactor vessel, steam ge,nerator, or other component cavity which controls design,
.and the-resulting asymmetric loads; w
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2 5.
Load combinations that include the asymmetric loads and the method of combining loads.
The peak loads for the SSE and dynamic system loads.
associated with any postulated pipe break (including asymmetric load effects) shall be combined by absolute sum unless justification is provided for any alternative method of combination.
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