ML19327B673

Technical Evaluation Rept for Dcrdr at Boston Edison Co, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.

ML19327B673
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	10/03/1989
From:	SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP. (FORMERLY
To:
Shared Package
ML19327B674	List: ML19327B673 ML19327B676
References
CON-NRC-03-87-029, CON-NRC-3-87-29 SAIC-89-1145, SAIC-89-1145-R01, SAIC-89-1145-R1, NUDOCS 8911060165
Download: ML19327B673 (16)

Text

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SAIC 89/1145 REVISION 1 TO THE TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT FOR THE DETt.! LED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW AT BOSTON EDibON COMPANY'S PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION October 3,1989 i.

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Prepared for:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. 2055E Contract NRC 03 87-029 Task Order No. 35 ph f9kJ Oh01bb W N

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/ t TABLE OF CONTENTS  !

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Seetion EIAt f 1

1.0 INTRODUCTION

, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 1  !

2.0 EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2.1 Establishment of a Qualified Hultidisciplinary Review Team . 2 2.2 System function and Task Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 L

2.3 Comparison of Display and Control Requirements with a Control i Room Inventory ....................... 5 2.4 Control Room Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 i 2.5 Assessnent of Human Engineering Discrepancies (NEDs to Determine Which Are Significant and Should Be Corrected). . . 8 i

2.6 Selection of Design Improvements .............. 9 ,

2.7 Verification that Selected Design Improvements Will Provide i the Necessary Correction .................. 10 -

' t 2.8 Verification that the Improvements Will Not Introduce New '

, HEDs ............................ 10 2.9 reordi<.ation of Control Room Improvements with Changes From ,

Other Proqrams, such as the Safety Parameter Display System,  !

Operater " raining, Regulatory Guide 1.97 Instrumentation, and Upgrcded Emergency Operating Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . Il

3.0 CONCLUSION

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REVISION 1 TO THE i TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT FOR THE i DETAILED CONTROL ROON DESIGN REVIEW  ;

PROGRAN PLAN, REVISION 2 AT BOSTON EDISON COMPANY'S l PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1.0 INTRDDUCTION i

This report documents Science Applications International Corporation's f technical evaluation of Boston Edison Company's Detailed Control Room Design {

Review (DCRDR) Program Plan, Revision 2, submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory l

, Comission (NRC) on July 24,1989 (Reference 1). The licensee submitted the l DCRDR Program Plan, Revision 2, in order to describe the changes made in the  ;

Program Plan, Revision 0, submitted to the NRC in October 1983 (Reference 2) and Program Plan, Revision 1, submitted in August,1984 (Reference 3). The purposes of this technical evaluation were:  !

o To assess the adequacy of the Program Plan with respect to '

completing the nine DCRDR requirements identified in NUREG 0737 Supplement 1 (Reference 4), j l \

l ,' o To assess the adequacy of the licensee's program to meet the NUREG-l 0737, supplement 1 DCRDR requirements, given that the licensee l planned to take credit for previous DCRDR work completed.

L L 1.1 Background ,

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j The following is a chronological list of major milestones to date in the L Pilgrim DCRDR.

1932: Program plan for conducting the DCRDR submitted by Licensee.  :

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1481: NRC staff comments on program plan issued (Reference 5).  !

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Alli: Program plan, Revision 1 submitted by Itcensee t

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3Z81: Summary report on the DCRDR submitted by licensee (Reference  !

6). l H/J1: In Progress audit of DCRDR findings conducted by NRC staff.

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1/11: Safetyevaluationreport(SER)issuedbytheNRC, documenting i open items and requesting date for submittal of a supplemental f summary report on the completion of those items (Reference 7).

1/J1 In Progress audit of DCRDR.

p 4/89: Supplemental Summary Report on the DCRDR submitted by Licensee

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I i 2481: Program Plan, Revision 2, submitted by licensee, t i

2/J1: NRC/ Licensee phone conference to discuss DCRDR Program Plan.  !

l 2.6 EVALUATION 1 1

The Pilgrim Nuclear Station DCRDR was evaluated with respect to each of  :

the nine requireraents stat 6d in NUREG 0737, Supplement 1. The review team used l i

the guidance provided in NUREG 0800 Section 18.1,., Appendix A (Reference 9) and NUREG 0700, Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews (Reference 10) in this technical evaluation, f

s 2.1 Establishment of a Qualified Multidisciplinary Keview Team  !

The organization for conducting a successful DCRDR can vary widely, but  ;

is expected to conform to some general criteria. Overall administrative leadership should be provided by a utility employee, who should be given sufficient authority to ensure that the DCRDR team is able to carry out its  !

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.: i mission. A core group of specialists in the fields of human factors engineering )

and nuclear operations and engineering are expected to participate with assistance as required from personnel in other disciplines. Human factors ,

expertise should be included in the staffing for the technical tasks. Finally, l the DCRDR team should receive an orientation briefing on DCRDR purpose and objectives which contributes to the success of the DCRDR. NUREG 0800 Section 1

18.1, Appendix A describes criteria for the multidisciplinary review team in  ;

more detail, i The DCRDR team organization and qualifications were presented in Section I II of the Program Plan. The proposed team will be under the overall leadership I of the licensee's Nuclear Engineering Department. Licensee team members will l include instrumentation and control system engineers, systems engineers, design

• I engineers, and operations personnel. -

1 Contractor personnel will include human factors engineering specialists, i operations specialists, computer specialists, panel design specialists, and other design specialists. The licensee stated on Program Plan, Page !!-1, that ,

the specific contractors had not been selected. The qualifications of the contractors, therefore, could not be evaluated. The licensee made a verbal l commitment during a September 6,1989 phone conference to notify NRC when the i human factors contractor is selected.

It was the review team's judgment that the licensee's DCRDR team structure and tark assignments as outlined in Table !! 1, were appropriate. However, the review team could not judge the adequacy of the human factors contractor because the contractor had nct been selected by the licensee.

2.2 System Function and Task Analysis The purpose of the system function and task analysis is to identify the l control roc'n operator's tasks during emergency operations and to determine the information and control capabilities the operators need in th6 control room to 3

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perform those tasks. An acceptable process for conducting the task analysis is as follows:

1. Analyze the functions performed by systems in respcoding to transients and accident. in order to identify and describe those tasks operators are expected to perform.

2. Determine what information (e.g., parameter, value, status) signals are needed to perform the task, the control capabilities needed to perform the task, and the feedback information needed to monitor task performance for each task identified in Item 1 above.

3. Analyze the information and control capability needs identified in item 2 above to determine appropriate characteristics for displays and controls to satisfy those needs.

[ The. licensee described their revised system function and task analysis methodology in Section !!!.A of the Program Plan. The upgraded plant specific emergency operating procedures derived from the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group, Generic Emergency Procedures Guidelines (EPGs) Revision 4 will be used for the analysis. This was in accordance to the task enalysis process agreed to 'in the NRC and the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group meeting in May 1984 (Reference 11).

The licensee made a commitment to conduct a system function and task analysis based on the plant specific technical guidelines, plant t.pecific l emergency . operating procedures, and associated appendices of the- emergency l operating procedures. The analyses will include all entry conditions, procedure steps, cautions, and notes.

The information gathered will be in task sequence order. The set of tasks and associated information and control requirements sorted by task sequence wn1 serve as the bases for evaluating panel layout and control display integration suitability.

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The licensee also plans to sort the tasks and operator information and I control requirements by system, function, and parameter order to facilitate the

'. verification of task performance. This will be done for every system, I subsystem, function and prameter in the task analysis data base. I y

It was the isv R.. *f,am's judgment that the licensee should meet the NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirement for a system function and task analysis.

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2.3 Comparison of Display and Control Requirements with a Control Room Inventory The purpose of- comparing display and control requirements to a control l: 3 room inventory is to determine the availability and suitability of displays and i controls required by operators to perform theic tasks. The success of this '

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element depends on the quality of the function and task analysis and the control L room inventory. The control room inventory should be' a complete representation of displays and controls currently in the control room. The inventory should j include appropriate characteristics of current displays and controls to. allow E- meaningful. comparison to the results of the function and task analysis, g Unavailable or unsuitable displays and controls should be documented as human l engintaring discrepancies (HEDs).

- The licensee described their process for comparison of information and ,

control requirements.to the control room inventory in Section III-B. In this section the licensee described three activities: updating the control room

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iaventory data base, verification of task performance, and validation of control room functions.

T'e updated control room inventory data base described in the Program Plan  ;

did not include panei layout or control display integration characteristics ,

. Panel layout and control display integration are key elements in the comparison  :

of operator needs to .the control room inventory. It was the review team's judgment.that the comparison of the task analysis data base to the inventory 5

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data base will not result in an assessment of edeouacy of panel layout or

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control display integration. ,

The licensee's plan for validation of control room functions was described in Section III.B.3. The stated objective of thi'. activity will be to determine . ,

if the functions allocated to the control room operating crew during emergencies can be accomplished effectively within the structure of the emergency operating procedures. The licensee stated in the September 6, 1989 NRC phone conference .

that they plan to evaluate the adequacy of the control room for all tasks in the emergency operating procedures in task sequence order during this activity. The ,

adequacy of panel layout and control display integration will be evaluated  ;

during the validation of control room functions.

The verification of task performance activity described in Section III.B.2. was the licensee's process for verifying the availability and

. suitability of individual instruments and controls. Tne process described by the licensee was appropriate.

It was the review team's judgment that the combination of three activities (igventory update, verification of task performance, and validation of control room functions) would meet the NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 inventory requirement.

2.4 Control Room Survey i

The key to a successful control room survey is a systematic comparison of the control room to accepted human engineering guidelines and principles. One .

accepted set of human engineer 4g guidelines is provided in Section 6 of NUREG-0700; however, other accepted human factors standards may be chosen. .

Disteepancies shoula be documented as HEDs.

The licensee praviously performed portions of the control room survey using checklists developed from human pr.gineering criteria in NUREG-0700, the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group control room survey checklists, and Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee (NU~ ; control room survey documents.

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. g During the March 1989 in-Progress audit, the NRC team determined that the I control l room survey was incomplete in the following respects:

'o The equipment added to the control room in the last several years was not surveyed.  ;

o The computer survey was not completed.

o The He&+,ing Ventilation and Air conditioning (HVAC) survey was not

. completed.

o. The noise survey was not completed.

o Parts of the control-display integration and panel layout surveys were not completed.

5 The licensee's process for conducting additional survey work was described ,

in Program Plan Section III.C. ~ The licensee made a ecmmitment to complete the

> surveys listed above. This should result in a completed survey activity that

); meets the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. 6 l

The licensee also discussed plans for conducting an operating experience

review in Program Plan Section III.D. This may be a very useful undertaking for l' '

' the licensee, but, it is not part of the NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirement <

for a control' room survey.

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It 'fas the review team's judgment that the licensee should meet the NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirement for a control room survey when they complete the

' remaining survey ic6.vities, including: .

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o Control room updated equipment survey

.o Computer survey o HVAC survey

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o. Noise survey .

c' Panel layout survey and control display integration survey.

2.51 Assessment of Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) to Determine Which Are Significant and Should 8e Corrected

. Based on.the guidance of NUREG-0700 and the requirements of NUREG 0737, .

Supplement 1, all HEDs should be assessed for safety significance. The ,

potential for operator error and the consequence of that error in terms of plant safety should be systematically considered in the assessment. Both the '

individual and aggregate effects of HEDs should be considered. The result of

. the assessment process is a determination of which HEDs should be corrected because of their potential impact on plant safety. Decisions on whether HED>

are safety significant should not be compromised by consideration of such issues as the means and potential costs of correcting HEDs.

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The licensee described their proposed assessment process in Program Plan, I h Section'IV. The process involved i

o 4.categoriet of human engineering observations .

l o 7' categories of human engineering discrepancies i o ' Human engineering discrepancy risk ranking o Human engineering discrepancy cost impact ranking

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o -Human engineering discrepancy qualitative and quantitative cost and risk combination ranking.

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In the September 6, 1989 phone conference it was recommended to the

- licensee that to achieve the goals of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, they should focus on the following-  !

u* o safety significant HEDs o non safety significant HEDs o Justification for safety significant HEDs that are not going to be fixed.

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'- .r i it was the review team's judgment that the licensee's process for J assessing human engineering discrepancies should meet the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement, if the results of the process are focused on the above-listed three items.

2.6 Select 19n of Design Improvements The purpose of selecting design improvements is to provide means to I correct HEDs identified in the review phase of the DCRDR. Selection of design improvements should include a systematic process for the development and comparison of alternative means of resolving.HEDs. Furthermore, according to >

NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, the licusee should document all of the proposed control room changes,

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The licensee's process for selecting design improvements was described in l Program. Plan,Section IV. The proposed HED corrections included:

i o Enhancements o Design improvements l

Th licensee's process did not. include:

a o Correcting HEDs through training o Correcting HEDs through emergency operating. proceduras modifications.

The process used to define enhancements and design improvements was l

acceptable. However, it was the review team's judgment that the licensee would i not meet the NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirement for design improvements unless they included training and emergency operating procedures modifications in the plan. During the September 6,1989 phone conference, the licensee indicated that, though these modifications were noi specifically identified in the plan, '

they ,will be included in the process for selecting design improvements and addressed in the final Summary Report to be submitted to NRC.

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,- 2.7 . Verification that Selected Design Improvements Will Provide the Necessary Correction A key criterion of DCRDR success is a consistent, coherent, and effective interface between the operator and the control room. This criterion may be met  !

by effectively executing the processes of selection of design improvements, verification that sele:ted improvements will not introduce new HEDs. According ,

to NUREG 0800, techniques for the verification process might include tesurveys of panels, applied experiments, engir,eering analyses, environmental surveys, and operator interviews. The consistency, coherence, and effectiveness of the entire operator-control room interface are important to operator performance.

Thus, evalitation of both the changed and unchanged portions of the control room is necessary during the verification process.

The licensee described .their process for verifying that the proposed -

modifications' correct the original HED in Program Plan,Section V.I. The process of verification was controlled by a procedure NEDWI 392.

It was 'the review team's judgment that the licensee's process for verifying that the proposed modifications provided the necessary HED correction meItheNUREG-0737,SupplementIrequirement. l 2,8 Vertfication that the Improvements Will Not Introduce New HEDs As discussed in Sectien 2.7, the licensee did have a formal process, NEDWI 392, for verifying that the proposed improvements will not introduce new HEDs.

It"was the review team's judgment that the licensee met this NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirement.

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2.9 Coordination of Control Room Improvements with Changes From Other Programs, such as the Safety Parameter Display System, Operator Training, Regulatory Guide 1.97 Instrumentation, and Upgraded Emergency Operating E Procedures i

j Improvement of emergency response capability requires coordination of the DCRDR with~ other activities. Satisfaction of Regulatory Guide 1.97 requirements and the addition of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) necessitate

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modifications -and additions to the control room. The modifications and  ;

addition: should be specifically addressed by the DCRDR. Exactly how the I modifications are addressed depends on a number of factors including the relative timing of ~the various emergency responst. capability upgrades.

Regardless of the means of- coordination, the result should be integration of l Regulatory Guide 1~.97 instrumentation, SPDS equipment, operator training and emergency operating procedures into a consistent, coherent, and effective control room interface with the operators.

The licensee's process for coordinating the DCRDR with other programs was '

-described in Program Plan,Section VI. The licensee's process included coordination'with:

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l o Upgraded emergency operating' procedures <

a Safety Parameter Display System L o Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrumentation.

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The licensee's coordination process did not include coordination with operator training. '

The process for coordinating the emergency operating procedures, safety parameter display system, and Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrumentation with the DCRDR were appropriateMyer, it was the review team's judgment that the licensee would not meet the NVPEG-073~, Supplement I requirement unles:, they defined a process for coordinst'. - - training with the DCRDR. In the September 6, 1989 phone cor - e, t-'

.ensee indicated that operator I I i

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,, t:aining would be coordinated with the DCRDR process, though not specifically detailed in the Program Plan. The coordination of operator training with the DCRDR will be documented in the licensee's final Summary Report submittal.

3.0 CONCLUSION

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Science Applications International Corporation, under contract to the NRC,  ;

reviewed Boston Edison Company's Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan, Revision 2 for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant. The purposes of the evaluation were:

To assess the adequacy of the Program Plan with respect to

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completing the nine NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 DCRDR requirements.

i' o To assess the adequacy of the licensee program, given that the licensee planned to take credit for previous DCRDR work completed.

The review' team determined that the licensee's plan should result in a DCRDR that meets NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirements, if several items are addressed by the licensee while conducting the DCRDR:

I o' The HED assessment process should result in three specific products that are to be included in the November 1990 Summary Report:

1. List of HEDs that were assessed safety significant.

2. Summary justifications for leaving safety significant HEDs uncorrected or partially corrected.

3. List of HEDs that were assessed as non scfety signiTicant.

o The selection of design improvement methodology should includt a provision for corrscting HEDs through operator training or emergency operating procedures modifications.  ;

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l' . . 'o l The' coordination: of the DCRDR _ program with other NUREG 0737,

1. ;, k '. t. a i$upplement 1 upgrade programs should include coordination vf th l operator training.

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Q-REFERENCES l

1. Detailed' Control Room Design Review Program Plan, Revision 2, Pilgrim

_ Station, Boston Edison Company, July 1989.

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2. 3oston-Edison Company. Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan, i Attachment I to letter from W.D. Harrington, Boston Edison Company, to Domenic B. Vassallo, NRC, October 14, 1983.

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3. Boston Edison Company. Detailed Control Room Design Review Program' Plan. ]

BEC084-134, Revision 1, forwarded by letter from W.D. Harrington, Boston-Edison Company, to Domenic B. Vassallo, NRC, August 14, 1984.

4. Requirement for Emergency Response Capability. NUREG-0737, Supplement 1,  !

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y . issued by Generic Letter 82-33. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission,1982.

5. Staff coments. on the Pilgrim Station 1 Detailed Control Room Design j Review. . U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission,1984.

6. Detailed Control Room Design Review Executive Sumary Report. BECO/ESR- -)

L 1, Revision 1. Boston Edison Company, September 1984. i l I

, 7. Safety Evaluation by .the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the <

' Detailed Control' Room Design Review for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Docket No. 50 293. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission,1985.

L' 8. Detailed Control Room Design Review, Supplemental Sumary Report, Pilgrim Station, Boston Edison Company, April 1989.

L I Ctandard Review Plan of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants,

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L e App 6ndix ~ A to Section 18.1, Control Room Design Review. NUREG-0800, i p ,

Revision 0. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission,1984.  !

1. 10. Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews, NUREG-0700. U.S. Nuclear l Regulatory Comission,1981.

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11. Meeting Sumary - Task Analysis Requirements of Supplement I to NUREG-0737 o - May 4,1984 Meeting with BWR Owners Group Emergency Procedure Guidelines  ;

L and Control Room ~ Design Review Comittees. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory "

% Comission, May.1984. '

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