ML19323B703

Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Evaluation of Application for Ol.Fsar Should Be Amended to Include Encl Info & Response Submitted within Three Wks After Receipt of Ltr

ML19323B703
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	05/01/1980
From:	Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Gary R TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
References
NUDOCS 8005140101
Download: ML19323B703 (25)

Text

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TC 8

4 UNITED STATES

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e' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8 0 0514 0 / d /

sg*jj wAssisaTON, D. C. 20556

\\ m*****,e NAY 0 1 gggo Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446 l

Mr. R. J. Gary Executive Vice President and General Manager i

Texas Utilities Generating Company 2001 Bryan Tower Dallas, Texas 75201

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND STAFF POSITIONS FOR COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 Enclosed is a request for additional infcc=tian which we require to complete our evaluation of your application for operating 11 censes for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2.

This request for additional information

.and staff positions is the result of our review by the Instrumentation & Control Systems Branch, the Power Systems Branch and their respective consultants at Argonne National Laboratory. We anticipate that a limited number of additional questions will be forthcoming as the review continues. Please amend your FSAR to include the information requested in the Enclosure.

Your schedule for responding to the enclosed request for additional information should be submitted within three weeks. Should you have quest'ons concerning this request for additional informath a, please contact us.

Sincerely, Nf MO$V Albert Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

Request for Additional Information and Staff

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Positions cc w/ enclosure:

See next page

Mr. R. J. Gary Mr. R. J. Gary MAY 011980 Executive Vice President and General Manager ~

Texas Utilities Generating Company 2001 Bryan Towers Gallas, Texas 75201 Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq.

Debevoise & Liberman 1200 Seventeenth Street Washington, D.C.

20036 Spencer C. Relyea, Esq.

Worsham, Forsythe & Sampels 2001 Bryan Tower i

Dallas, Texas 75201 Mr. Homer C. Schmidt Manager - Nuclear Services l

Texas Utilities Services,.Inc.

2001 Bryan Tower Dallas, Texas 75201 Mr. H. R. Rock Gibbs and Hill, Inc.

393 Seventh Avenue New York, New York 10001 Mr. A. T. Pa'rker '

Westinghouse Electric Corporation P. O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230

, Richard W. Lowerre, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711 Mrs. Juanita Ellis, President Citizens Association for Sound Energy 1426 South Polk Dallas, Texas 75224 Geoffrey M. Gay, Esq.

West Texas Legal Services 406 W.T. Waggoner Building 810 Houston Street Fort Worth, Texas 76102 l

1 Mr. R. J. Gary ces: Mr. Richard L. Fouke Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation 1668-8 Carter Drive Arlington, Texas 76010 Resident Inspector / Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Station c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission P. O. Box 38 Glen Rose, Texas 70642 O

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j 032.0 ESTRlMENTATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS ~

QO32.56 The following significant differences have been identified 'to exist (1) between the William B. McGuire Station reference design Reactor Trip i

Systea (RTS) and the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) RTS.

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CPSES uses:

easurement.

In-line fast response thermowells for the Tcold a.

Overpower and overtemperature N-16 trips.

b.

Four segment power range neutron flux detectors.

c.

d.

Transit tLac N-16 flowmeter.

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These differences 'are a result of the " instrumentation up _ {-~ ~~

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Describe in detail the total instrumentation upgrade grade package."

package hardware to be specifically installed on CPSES and explain the safety implications of these system changes as they relate to GDCs, RCs, BTPs, and IEEE Standards with specific emphasis on the Reactor Trip System.

Reactor Trip on turbine trip.

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A The main turbine generator trip devices are located in,non-Category I structure and are not seismic qualifie,d. The response to question The reactor trip on turbine tri'p QO32.40 is not completely acceptable.

and the interface of the reactor trip system with balance of plant equip-ment circuitry is not adequately described to allow an evaluation of the Provide the design bases, detailed circuit schematic dia-acceptability.

grams, specific equipment used and an analysis of how this configuration meets.the applicable criteria listed in Table 7-1 of the SRP.

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o QO32.57 In subsection 5.4.3.2 the statement is made, "To increase reactor coolant flow measurement accuracy, an N-16 power monitor (one per loop and externally connected to the hot legs) will replace the function of the hot leg RTD manifold." ' Explain in detail how the N-16 power monitor increases reactor coolant flow measurement ac-curacy and where and how the hot leg RTDs are installed in the new configuration.

QO32.58 The Nuclear Instrumentation System Functional Block Diagrams in referenced report WCAP-8255 do not provide the information necessary to review the use of the four section power range ionization chamber arrangement incorporated into the CPSES instrumen[tation upgrade package.

Provide a detailed discussion of the changes made to the nuclear instru,

mentation system and the RTS to incorporate this change. Also provide a

'l complete set of construction functional block and schematic diagrams of the system used in CPSES.

Explain how the use of the four section de-tectors affectithe high flux set points defined in the Technical Specifi-cations and present data that shows that the "Al" and "F(AI)" functions in the new and old systems are the same or equivalent.

i QO32.59 The figures in Section 7 of the FSAR do not cross reference Gibbs and Rill, Westinghouse or other vendor drawing numbers. For example, Figure l

7.2-1 is not referenced to the appropriate Westinghouse drawing. On l

l each figure in the FSAR that represents a drawing, provide a cross-reference to the appropriate drawing number.

QO32.60 The lists of CPSES electrical,-instrumentation and control drawings in FSAR subsection 1.7 and specifically Tables 1.7-1 and 1.7-2, are incom-plete.

For example in Table 1.7-1, Westinghouse drawings 8758D39, 5656D86 e

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e and others previously referenced and included in Table 1.7-2 are not listed. NRC requires that all safe related drawings be listed and issued in their final form after an audit is performed to assure that the information presented:

represents the most recent revision a.

b.- contains the necessary cross references includes all safety related equipment such as control board j

c.

and panel layouts, valves, motors, and instruments, and, i

permits a point by point identification from the' sensors to d.

the actuating device.

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QO32.61 The responses to questions QO32.32 and QO32.35 are not completely ac-ceptable. The NRC Standard Review Plan Table 7-1 contains the acceptance criteria for controls used to review the FSAR. The applicability of these i

criteria to specific subsections of Section 7 of the FSAR are indicated i

in a matrix listing of criteria and FSAR subs &ctions. The present Table 7.1-1 of the FSAR does not provide this detailed matrix for all subsections and particularly all of Sectio'n 7.

Provide a detailed matrix

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and identify in the table matrix where discussions on conformance to Ceneral Design Criteria, Regulatory Guides, Standards and Branch Technical Positions are located. Include in the Table Regulatory Guides 1.7,1.78, and 1.96.

QO32.62 There are several instances in Section 6 of the FSAR, for example sub-section 6.3.3.1, where statenents are included that make reference to

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instrument signals used to perform safety functions in the RTS or SIS systems as described in Section 7.

These functions no longer exist in Section 7.

Particularly, items 2 and 3 in subsection 6.3.3.1 have

1 4-evidently been replaced in Section 7.2 by other types of measurements.

Perform an audit to assure that all '[uch inconsistancies have been found and amend the FSAR to reflect the necessary changes.

QO32.63 Section 16, subsection 2.0, bases, and specifically subsection 2.2.1 of-the Technical Specification, indicates that the RTS includes Overtempera-ture and Overpower AT, Steam /Feedwater Flow Hismatch and ' Low Steam Generator Water level trips. These RTS trips are also included in Tech nical Specification Tables 3.3-1, 3.3-2, 3.3-3, and 3.3-4.

These trips are not consistant with the~ trips listed in subsection 7.2.

After an audit. is performed to locate all such inconsistancies, amend the FSAR to reflect the necessary changes.

i QO32.64 Subsection 7.3.2.1 states that "A Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been performed on a generic'ESFAS similar to CPSES" but no. reference is made to topical or other reports that present the results. Provide the results of the FHEA and describe hardware differences between the~

generic design used as the bases for the FMEA and CPSES and account for any difference due to the CPSES design.

QO32.65 The responses to questions Q32.23, Q32.36 and Q32.51 are not completely acceptable. Identify the systems required for safe shutdown and provide a consistant list of the instruments and controls required for safe shutdown in both Table 7.4-1 and the FSAR text.

QO32.66 Subsection 7.4.2 states that " Hot Standby is a safe, stable,' plant con-dition, automatically reached following a plant shutdown. Hot Standby can be maintained safely for an extended period of time.

In the un-likely event that access to the Control Room is restricted, the plant e

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~5-can be safely kept at Hot Standby until the Control Room can be re-

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entered by use of the monitoring indicators and controls listed in subsections 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2."

Explain in detail how long the plant can be kept at Hot Standby following a Control Room evacuation without violating the Technical Specifications. Include a detailed

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list of actions required'to place the plant in Hot Shutdown from the Hot Shutdown Panel and the instruments, controls and other devices used '

to complete this action.

QO32.67 Subsection 7.4.2 states that "The results of the analysis which deter-mined the applicability to the BOP and Nuclear Steam Supply System Safe ShutdownSystemsoftheGeneralDesignCriteriahCDC),IEEEStanda'd279-r

'1971, and applicable Regulatory Guides and other indus.try standards are presented in Table 7.1-1."

These results cannot be found in Table 7.1-i.

Provide the 'results and a detailed discussion of how tihe system required i

for safe shutdown meet GDCs 1, 19, 21, 22, 23, 26, 33, and 34; IEEE l

Standards 279 and 336; Regulatory Guides 1.22, 1.47, 1.53, 1.68 and 1.75.

4 QO32.68 State how CPSES conforms to Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident." Justify any exceptions taken or alternate methods used.

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QO32.69 Subsection 7.1.2.6 discusses the conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.47, "Bypas' sed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Cy<:tems" and states "if suitable signals are not available to provide automatic indication, a means of manually providing bypass or unoperable status indication is provided." Position C.4 of Regulatory Guide 1.47 states. that _ " manual capability should exist in the control l

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Provide a room to activate each system-1evel indicator provided."

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detailed description of the Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication System including functional block logic diagrams and electrical schematic drawings and explain how the system meets Regulatory Guide.l.47 and Branch Technical Position ICSB 21.

Justify any exceptions taken.

Provide in subsection 7.6 a detailed discussion and analysis of the in-QO32.70 strumentation insta'11ed to prevent or mitigate the consequences of:-

cold water slug injections, and; a.

b.

refueling accidents.

Also state how conformance to as requested by Regulatory Guide 1.70.

Branch Technical Positions ICSB 3, 4, and 20 is implemented and justify hiternative methods used.

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ates thac *the control systems for refueling ant ~~~

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QO32.71 Subsection 9.1.4. 5 fuel handling machines and the Fuel Transfer System (FTS) are discussed in subrection 9.1.4.2.3; Cooponent Description. ' The discussion and des-cription provided in this subsection is not in sufficient detail to allow an evaluation of the acceptability.- Provide a detailed discussion of the :ontrol systems and electrical controls for the Fuel Storage and Handling Systems, including functional logic, electrical schematic, and wiring diagrams.

QO32.72 Table 1.3-1 (Sheet 3 of 7) states that all other instrumentation systems required for safety in Section 7.6 of the Coma,nche Peak Steam Electric Stations are significantly similar in design to the W. B. McGuire Stations O

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and there were no significant differences identified. A comparison of the two stations indicate that the following systems identified in the W. B. McGuire Stations are not included in Section 7.6 of the Comanche Peak FSAR.

1.

Annulus Ventilation System 2.

Containment Spray System 3.

Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer System 4.

Ice Condenser Instrumentation 5.

Hydrogen Recombiner System 6.

Spent Fuel Cooling System 7.

Refueling Water Systen 8.

Control Equipment and Cable Rooms RVAC 9.

Groundwater Drainage System 10.

Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System i

l1'. Diesel Cenerator Cooling Water System 12.

Diesel Generator Starting Air System 13.

Diesel Generator Lubricating Oil System i

14.

Containment Pressure Control System Please correct Table 1.3-1 and further justify why these systems are not required for safety on the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station.

QO32.73 The response to question QO32.43 is not completely acceptable. Subsection 10.4.9.5 states that "Any of the following automatic actuation, signals start both motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps.

1.

Two,out of three low-low level signals from any steam generator.

2.

Trip of both main feedwater pumps 1-A and l'-B.

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3.

Blackout sequence signal.

4.

Safety injection signal.

Ihe turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is started by the following automatic actuation signals.

1.

Two out of three low-low level signals from any two steam generators.

2.

Blackout sequence signal from any two steam generators.

The functional logic diagrams 7.2-1 sheets 7 and 15, however, show a two.

out of four logic. In addition, an analysis is not presented on how the electrical instrumentation and control portions of the system meet the requirements of IEEE Standard 279-1971.

Af ter an. audit is made to deter-i mine which logic is correct, correct the FSAR and include the requested analysis.

QO32.7 4 Subsecti'on 10.3.2.3.1 on the Main Stearn Isolation Valves states "(For ~

1 a description of initiation logic, see Section 7.3)."

A description of the initiation logic cannot be found in Section 7.3.

Provide a descrip-tion of the Main S' team Isolation valves and provide a reference to or.

the applicable functional logic diagrams.

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040.0 POWER SYSTEMS Q040.106 We have not received your responses to Q040.44 and Q040.49 submitted to (8.2.1)

(8.2.2) you on February 28, 1979. Advise us of the date on which you intend to respond to these questions.

I Q040.107 The response to Q040.45 is not complete. The question requests (8.2.1) information about bus duct protection against single event damage to the preferred and alternate power source. The reply is that bus duct construction, separation and independence assure that a single external event will not result in simultaneous failure of of both bus' ducts. However, as can be seen on FS Fig. 8.2-11 a single fire near the west. wall of the Auxiliary Building could damage bus ducts 31, B2, and A2, resulting in a fault that would require opening the primary breakers to disconnect the primary and alternate sources of electrical power to the plant.

The

• outing of the bus duct appears to be in conflict with the requirement to have separate independent circuits to the on-site distribution systems. Provide justification for routing the bus duct in the manner shown on Figure 8.2-11.

Q040.108 The response to question Q040.63 about the separation of Class IE (8.3.1) cables is not complete. Provide drawing information showing locat' ions where one fire would damage redundant Train A and j

i Train' B cables associated with a Class 1E system.

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2 Q040.109 The response to question Q040.53 is not complete.

(8.3.1) a) Provide out of ' tolerance values for voltages on Sr.feguard buses.

b) Provide identification of relays used in the coincidence logic scheme.

c) Provide time delays assumed in the SAR accident analysis and describe how the time duration of degraded voltage condition shall not result in failure of safety systems or components.

d) Provide copy of meter and test relay procedure noted in your response which shows trip set points and time values of these voltage relays. Also state which breeker will be affected by each relay.

Q040.110 The response to question Q040.59 refers to "Section 8.3.1.1.5 (8.3.1) and the following discussion," but the discussion is not included in the response.

Provide a corrected response to this question.

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Q040.111 The response to questions Q040.66 given in FSAR 1A(B)-44 takes exception (8.3.1) to Regulatory Guide 1.108 position C.2.a(3).

The omission of the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> short term rating test conflicts with the FSAR pre-operational Test Table 14.2-2, sheet 34 which includes the complete test required by Regulatory Guide 1.108.

It also conflicts with IEEE Standard 387 which is part of CPSES Design Criteria 8.1.4.3.

We require that position C.2.a(3) be fully Therefore, revise your response to Q040.66 accordingly.

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3-Q040.112 '

Periodic testing and test loading of an emergency diesel generator in a (8.3)

RSP nuclear power plant is a necessary function to demonstrate the operability, capability and availability of the unit on demand. Periodic testing coupled with good preventive maintenance practices will assure optimum i

equipment readiness and availability on demand. This is the desired l

goal.

To achieve this optimum equipment readiness status the following require-i i

ments should be met:

1.

The equipment should be tested with a =hN=', loading of 25 percent of rated load. No load or light load operation will cause incomplete combustion of fuel resulting in the formation of gum and varnish deposits on the cylinder walls, intake and exhaust valves, pistons and piston rings, etc., and accumulation of unburned fuel in the turbocharger and exhaust system. The consequences of no load or light load operation are potential equipment failure due to the gum and varnish deposits and fire in the engine exhaust system.

2.

Periodic surveillance testing should be performed in accordance with the applicable NRC guidelines (RG 1.108), and with the recomdations of the engine manufacturer.

Conflicts between any such reconsnandations and the NRC guidelines, particularly with respect to test frequency, loading and duration, should be identified and justified.

3.

Preventive maintenance should go beyond the normal routine adjustments, servicing and repair of components when a malfunction occurs. Preven-tive maintenance should encompass investigative testing of components m

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e l which have a history of repeated malfunctioning and require constant attention and repair. In such cases consideration should be given to replacement of those components with other products which have a record of demonstrated re*.1 ability, rather than repetitiva repair and maintenance of the existing components. Testing of the unit after adjustments or repairs have been made only confirms that the equipment is operable and does not necessarily mean that the root cause of the problem has been eliminated or allevaiated.

4.

Upon completion of repairs or maintenance and prior to an actual start, run, = and load test a final equipment check should be made to assure that all electrical circuits are functional, i.e., fuses are in place, switches and circuit breakers are in their proper position, no loose wires, all test leads have been removed, and all valves are it. the proper position to permit a manual start of the equipment.

After the unit has been satisfactorily started and load tested, re-turn the unit to ready aute= tic st:ndby service and under the con-trol of the control room operator.

Provide a discussion of how the above requirements have been implemented in the emergency diesel generator system design and how they will be.

considered when the plant is in commercial operation, i.e., by what means will the above requirements be enforced.

Q040.113 The diesel-generator is rated at 7000 kW at 0.8 power factor (8750 KVA).

(8.3.1)

The connected load shown in Fig. 8.3-6 is 9098 kW with motor load com-prising 4564 kW (5500 HP) and a transfomer load of 4534 kW (5334 KVA) and the total load listed in Table 8.3-1 is 8134 kW.

Provide the detailed calculations showing how the 6465.5 kW " Total Load on Diesel Generator" shown at the and of Table 8.3-1 was computed.

~5-Q040.ll4 The FSAR does not identify any auxiliary system as being vital Provide a list

-(8.3.1) to the operation of Class 1E loads and systems.

of vital supporting systems required for the proper functioning of the Class lE system.

(Rev.: SRP 8.3.1, Part III, item 6, Vital Supporting Systems.)

Q040.115 Provide name of manufacturer and model number for diesel engine and (8.3.1) generator.

Furnish data on operating features including loading characteristics, loading profile curves, voltage and frequency recoveringcharacteristicscurves,andexcitathonsystemresponse time to load variations. Additicaal drawing information is required to review the starting initiating circuits; manual and automatic sequential loading and unloading circuits; interrupting capacity 1

of switchgear, load centers, control centers, and distribution panels; grounding requirements; and electrical protective relaying circuits including their coordination, relay setting, and assigned control power supplies for each load and each diesel-generator.

(Ref.: SRP 8.3.1, Part III, item 4.)

Q040.116 Provide information needed to complete technical specification (8.3.1) surveillance requirements in FSAR section 3/4

• 2, items

4. 8. 2. 3. 2 a. 2, b.1, and c. 3.

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. Q040.u7 Provide a detailed discussion (or plan) of the level of training (8.3) proposed for your operators, maintenance crew, quality assurance, and supervisory personnel responsible for the operation and maintenance of the emergency diesel generators.

Identify the number and type of personnel that will be dedicated to the operations and maintenance of the emergency diesel generators and the number and type that will be assigned from your general plant operations and maintenance groups to assist when needed.

In your discussion identify the amount and kin,d of training that will be received by each of the above cat'egories and the type of ongoing training program planned to assure. optimum availability of the emergency generators.

Also discuss the level of education and minimum experience requirements for the various categories of operations and maintenance personnel associated with the emergency diesel generators.

Q040.118 The FSAR section 8.3.1.1.12 states that a ground fault condition in the 480 volt system or in the Diesel Generator system is annun-ciated in the Control Room. Describe where in the distribution sys-tem the ground fault will be detected and which signals w111 be transmitted to the control room. What action is to be taken afte.-

the signal is received in the Control Room?

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Q040.119 Fig. 8.3-8 shows that the main circuit breaker IEB3-1 on the 480 vo{t safeguard bus is tripped by two feeder OC relays (devices 50/51 & 50/51 )

1FNAV3 1FNC31 after a time delay. Provide the basis for not providing trip of the main breaker from overcurrent on the fire punp feeder. The same comments apply to buses 1EB1, 1EB2 and 1EB 4.

Q040.120 Tou state in Section 4.8.2.3.2(d) of the Technical Specification "At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is adequate to supply and maintain in OPERABLE status all of the actual emergency loads for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when the battery is sub-jected to a battery service test.'

It is our position that during the above mentioned test, the battery capacity is adequate to supply and maintain in OPERABLE status all of the actual emergency loads for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. This is also addressed in Standard Technical Specification under section 4.8.2.3.2(d).

Modify Surveillance Requirements as mentioned in your Tech Spec under section 3

4.8.2.3.2(d) accordingly. Also, correct FSAR section 8.3.2.1(2a) where you state "Each battery is capable of carrying the essential load con-tinuously for a period of four hour in the event of a total loss of onsite and offsite AC power.

Q040.123 You state in section 8.3.1.1.11(3a) "During testing, the D/G is paralleled (8.31 with the offsite source. Should there be a DBE during these periods, separation of the two sources is established by automatic tripping of the incoming 6.9 kv offsite source breaker by an 's' signal."

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Explain why you are tripping the incoming offsite source breaker by an

's' signal.

It is our position that during test, the receipt of an

's'

' Safety Injection) signal, D/G breaker la automatically tripped and restored to standby status. Incoming 6.9 kv offsi::e source breaker, if it is connected to the bus, shall stay connected. Revise your FSAR accordingly.

Q040.12?

State whether, during combined unit operation, when one unit is in (8.1) start-up mode and the other unit tripped with loads automatically transferred to the startup transformer, the 6.9 kv ESF buses with associated circuit breakers and startup transformer are capable of carrying the full load or not.

Q040.123 Question Q040.64 requests a description of the control circuitry shared (9. 5.1) by the control room and the hot shutdown panel (HSP).. The response is not complete because it describes the fire protection for the area, but it does not discuss the separate routing of cables which serve the same control circuit.

Provide a complete description of the control methods incorporated to pre ent a single event from affecting both the control room and the HSP.

Also describe how the HSP will be able to assume control of the shutdown.

equipment in case the control room must be evacuated.

Identify the loca-tion of de switches that transfer control of equipment from tLe control room to the HSP.

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. Q040.12 4 Figure 9.5-52, sheet 2 of 2 shows a drip waste tank with a symbol of the (9.5.4)

(17A-1) right side indicating that it is not designed to ASME Section 3 and a conflicting symbol of the lift side indicating that it is designsd to ASME Section 3.

Clarify this drawing to represent the design correctly.

Q040.125 Discuss the precautionary measures that will be taken to assure (9.5.4) the quality and reliability of the fuel oil supply for emergency diesel generator operai. ion. Include the type of fuel oil.

impurity and quality limitations as well as diesel index neber or its equivalent, cloud point, entrained moisture, sulfur, particulates, and other delitarious insoluble substances; procedure for testing newly delivered fuel, periodic sampling and testing of on-site fuel oil (including interval between tests), interval of time between periodic removal of condensate from fuel tanks and periodic system inspection. In your discussion 1

include reference to industry (or other) standard which will be followed to assure a reliabla fuel oil supply to the emergency generators.

(SRP 9.5.4, Part III, items 3 and 4).

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Q040.126 The response to,Q040.26 and Q040.87 contains a discrepancy in (9.5.7) the Lube Oil Cooler heat exchanger data, FSAR Table 9.5-17.

The shell inlet temperature is not consistent with the temperatura differentials. Review the data and provide a corrected table.

Also section 9.5.7.2 states that administrative measuras will be taken to maintain oil quality.

State what administrative measures will be taken to preserve oil quality.

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Q040.12 7 Several fires Lve occurred at some operating plants in the (9.5.7) area of the diesel engine exhaust manifold and inside the l

turbocharger housing which have resulted in equipment unavailability.

The fires were started from lube oil leaking and accumulating on the engine exhaust manifold and accumulating and igniting inside the turbocharger housing. Accumulation of lube oil in these areas, on some engines, is apparently caused from an excessively long prelube period, generally longer than five minutes, prior to manual staring of a diesel generator.

I This condition doas not occur on an emergency start since the prelube period is minimal.

When manually starting the diesel generators for any reason, to minimize the potential fire hazard and to improve equipment availability, the prelube period should be limited to a==v4=um of three to five misutes unless otherwise recommended by the diesel engine manufacturer. Confirm your compliance with this requirement or provide your justification for requiring a longer prelube time interval prior to manual starting of the diesel generators. Provide the prelube time interval your diesel engine will be exposed to prior to manual start.

Q040.12 8 Your response to question 040.90, relative to the two 6" light (9.5.8) guage vent pipes to the atmopshere from the diesel engine lube oil sump tank and crankcase is not complete. Discuss the effect of a tornado missile striking these lines. If these lines were pinched closed what affect would this have on the diesel generator operation.

If the affects would be adverse, provide means for protection of these lines.

. Q040.129 Your response to Q040.97 refers to revised Section 10.2.2.12. That (10.2) section does not appear in the FSAR. Provide the information requested originally in the referenced question.

Q040.13 0 All the information requested in Q040.94 was not provided in (10.2) your answer. Specifically, provide schematics and accompanying 1

narrative to describe in detail the sequence of events in a turbine trip including response times; show that the turbine stabilizes.

l Q040.131 Tour response to Q040.95 is incomplete. As requested earlier, (10.2) provide a listing of those components of turbine protective systems that can be tested with the turbine operating at rated load. Include in the listing the proposed frequency of such'

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tests..

I Q040.132 SRP 10.2, Part III, item 2c' calls for a mechanical turbine (10.2) overspeed trip device, and item 2d a backup electrical trip device. Justify omission of the backup electrical overspeed trip device. If arguments are made that the two mechanical (centrifugal) devices meet the intent of the SRP for redn=Amace and independence, provide a failure mode and effects analysis of the mechanical devices, including considerations of common-mode failures.

Q040.13 3 Provide details on how the excess flow control valve responds (10.2)

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to a break in the hydrogen supply line inside the turbine building and automatically isolates the supply.

Q040.13 4 The turbine control and stop valves are exercised biweekly (10.2)

(FSAR Section 10.2.3.6).

SRP 10.2, Part II, item $b recommends a minimum _veekly test frequency. Justify your deviation from the SRP acceptance criterion.

Q040.135 Describe how the turbine overspeed test during refueling would (10.2) be conducted (FSAR Section 10.2.3.6).

Also state whether such a test will, in fact, be performed.

Q040.136 As explained in issue No.1 of NUREG-0138, credit i i taken for-(10.3) all valves downstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) to limit blowdown of a second eteam generator in the event of a steam line break upstream of the MSIV.

In order to confirm satisfactory performance following such a steam line break provide a tabulation.and descriptive text (as appropriate) in the FSAR of all flow paths that branch off the main steam lines between the MSIVs and the turbine stop valves. For each flow path originating at the main steam lines, provide the following information:

a) System identification b) Maximum steam flow in pounds per hour c) Type of shut-off valve (s) d) Size of valve (s) r

. i e) Quality of the valve (s) f) Design code of_ the valve (s) g) Closure time of the valve (s) h)' Actuation mechanism of the valve (s) (i.e., solenoid operated, motor operated, air operated diaphragm valve, etc.)

Motive or power source for the valve actuating mechanism.

i) termination of steam In the event of the postulated accident, flow from all systems identifisd above, except those that can be used for mitigation of the accident, is required to j

For these systems l

bring the reactor to a safe cold shutdown.

describe what design features have been incorporated to assure closure of the steam shut-off valve (s). Describe what operator actions (if any) are required.

If the systems that can be used for mitigation of the accident are not available or decision is made to use other means to shut down the reactor describe how these systems are secured to assure positive stesa shut-off.

De_ scribe what operator actions (if any) are required.

If any of the requested information is presently included in the FSAR text, provide only the references where the information may be found.

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. Q040.13 7 Provide a sketch showing the integrally grooved tubesheets of the (10.4.1)

Unit No. 1 main condenser (FSAR Section 10.4.1.1.3); the sketch should show how the plenum is pressurized after installation and during operation, as well as the leak-detection (i.e., floemeter) instrumentation. Also state why the Unit No. 2 condenser does not have this feature.

Q040.138 Discuss the measures taken for detecting, controlling and correcting (10.4.1) condenser cooling, water leakage into the condensate stream. Provide the permissible cooling water inleakage and time of operation with inleakage to assure that condensate /feedwater quality can be maintained within safe limits (SRP 10.4.1, Part III, item 2).

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