ML19322C799
| ML19322C799 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/11/1969 |
| From: | Levine S US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Boyd R, Low L, Skovholt D US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322C797 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001240563 | |
| Download: ML19322C799 (32) | |
Text
14
/
an C-
'l)
, g UNITED STATES
, }@/
).
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION wassincTou. o.c. 2cs4s j
f June 11,1969 R. S. S cy d, AD/ RP, DFi D. J. Skovholt, AD/RO, DFi L. D. Low, Director, CO E. G. Case, Dire ctor, DFS J. A. McBride, Director, DML Direc:or("-[l l'#N s
TEF.U :
P. A. Morris, Division of Reactor Licensing REACTOR TECHNOLOGY.SORANDUM NO. 6 -- CONTROL ROOM DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS The enciesed RTM sets forth proposed guidelines with respect to.ini=um require =ents f or control roo= design considera:icts.
This infor=ation is intended :o be used in safe:y evaluations of power reactor facilities and such other f acilities as =ay be appropriate.
Cc._nents on this RTM are reques:ed on or befere July 11, 1969, in order that necessary revisions can be nade prior to further dis:ribu: ion.
A copy of any correspendence per:aining to :his R~M should be sent to C. ***. Moon, Safe:y Sys te=s Technology Branch, Division of Reac:c
'~~'
Licensing.
h
,ds 's Saul Levid Assis -: Direcur RT-391A for Reactor Technology DRL:1&?TE:0DP Division of Reactor Licensing
Enclosure:
FCM-6
- v/ encl:
C. :~,. S e ck, DR M. M. Mann. DF.
C. L. F.enderson, DR Bn:Ed!"
P00R~0RGWl
~
Assis:anc Lire ctors, CO 3 ra.ch Chie f s, CO
.'. M:Euen DPS 3 rcac.. Chie fs, DES 3ranca Chiefs DML s o n, s o 5713
n.
o issued: June ll,1969 EACT T
'2!L.. 1.J,.T.2... h. J m..W.
v CCh7ROI. ROOM DESIGN CONSIDEPATIONS I.
INTRODUCTION The purpose of this RTM is to provide =dni=== require =ents which sheuld be taken into acceen: in the evaluation of the control roe =
design for a nuclear facility against criterion 11, Par: 50, General Design Criterica for Nuclear 'over Plan: Construction Per=1ts.
T'c e require =ents were developed using the basic approach that: 7, 1.
The control ro== should be designed to allev occupancy during all accidents which have been analy:ed for the facili:y up to and including the design basis accident.
2.
If access to the cen:rol roe = is lost, it shall be pos.sible to shut the reactor down and =aintain it in a safe condition fro =
a loca:ien(s) ou: side the con ol reo=.
II.
MINIv'JM REOUIREV.EhiS r.. ~. _ _.-.._ _ - 1.
-Ra dia : ion Pro t ec tion--- - -- - - -- - - -
The con:rol roe = shall be so designed as to provide adequate radiation protection for personnel within the li=i:s defined
~
by 10 CFR Par: 20.
As established by 10 CFR 20, the, p,:,esent exposure li=it is 3 re= vhole body dose in any calendar quarter for individua:
in a restricted area.
This protect.io.n shall be designed so as to per=1: access, even under accident condi-tions, to equi;=ca: in the control roe = or other areas as necessary to shut down and maintain safe control of the facility.
The exposure lici: for the operating personnel during a nuclear inciden should not exceed 5 re= whole body dose in any calendar year.
2.
Fire Protection The cen:rol roe = design shall be such as to =ini=12e the possibili:y of fire.
Continuing occupancy where possible.
should be provided for in the case of c:n rol roe = fire or s=oke.
The con:rol roo= building ce=ponents, finish =a:erials and furnishings shall be nonce =bustible.
Ce=bustible supplies 4
m
'o.
- E~M -6 2
June 11, 1969 such as logs, records, procedures and canuals should be li=ited to the a=ounts required for plant operation.
Fire fighting equip ent including fire ex:inguishers and breath-ing apparatus should be available to the control roe =,
3.
Evacuation of Control Roe =
In the even: that it beco=cs necessary to evacuate the control roe =, it shall be possible to shut the reactor deva and cain-tain 1: in a safe condition fro = a location (s) outside the control roe =.
(a)
It should be assuuad that, during normal plant operation with all plant equip =ent operable, access to the con:rol room is lost for a relatively 1cng ti=c.
(b)
The facility should be ext =ined to assure that hot shut-down fre= full power can be ace.~:plished fro: outside the control roe = in a rela:ively shor: ti=c of the order of an hour or so.
The applicant should provide a general picn and shev that adequate instruacn:a: ion and control are available to allev the plan: to be safely placed in
._~
ho: :httdevt.-f.r.e.outside..th.e.-c.entrol.. room.
-~
(c)
The facility should be further exa=ined to assure that without necessarily adding any equip =ent, existing equip-acnt, instrumentation, penels, etc., can be =anipulated (including opening panels, ju=pering wires, etc. ) in order to achieve cold shutdown in a period of ti=e not to exceed several da}s.
The applicant should provide a general plan and shev chat it is feasible to safely bring the plant to cold shutdown fro = outside the control roe =.
(d)
The facility should be exc=ined to establish the length of ti=c that 1: can be easily =aintained in a hc. standby conditica fre: outside the cent ci roe =.
This period of ti=e should er.cced tha: in (c) above.
1:1.
ITEMS TO EE FUFN'5ED AT A LATER DA~E The folleving vill be provided at a later date:
(1) Control roe = ventilation' syste= radiation protection require =ent.
(2)
Control roo: lighting.
( 3)
Con trol roc = cen=enications.
(')
Technical bases for :he ETM.
NRC's present philosophy and criteria for control room design data display equipment and instrumentation appear in the following documents:
General Design Criteria and Control 13 - Instrumentation Cntenon IJ-Instn[r$cntatnon and con-frol Instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over their an-ticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety, includmg those variables and systems that can affect the fission proc-ess, the integrity of the reactor core. the re-actor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment and its associated systems. Ap.
propriate controls shall be provided to maintain th?se variables and systems within prescribed operatint: ranges.
General Design Criterion 19 - Control Room Cntenon 19-Control room. A control room shall be prosided from which actions can be taken to operate the nuclear power unit safely under normal conditions and to mm.ntain it in a safe condition under acci-dent conditions, including loss of coolant ae-cadents. Adequate radiation protection shall be provided to permit access and occupancy cf the cor. trol tour. undcr-actidt rit condi- - - - - -
. - - tsorn s unre persuntwi arte:vtr:c rautate:: - - -
exposures in excess of 5 rein whole body, or its tqunalent to any part of the body, for the duration of the accident.
Equipment at appropriate locations out-side the control room shall be provided (D l
e with a design capability for prompt hot shutdown of the reactor, includmg neces-sary instrumentation and controls to main-tain the unit in a safe condition during hot shutdown, and (2) with a potential capabill-ty for subsequent cold shutdown of the re-actor through the use of suitable proce-dures.
General Design Criterion 21 - Protection System Reliability and Testability Cntenon 21-Proteciton system reinabsitty and testcbility. The protection system shall be designed for high functional reliability and inscruce testability commensurate sith the safety functions to be performed. Re-dundancy and independence designed into the protection system shall be sufficient to assure that (D no single failure results in loss of the protection function and (2) re-moval from servlee of any component or channel does not result in loss of the re-quired minimum redundancy unless the ac-eeptable reliability of operation of the pro-tection system can be othersise demonstrat-ed. The protection system shall be designed to permit periodic testing of it.s functioning when the reactor is in operation. includmg a capabahty to test channels independently to determine failures and losses of redundancy that may have occurred.
.o
General Design Criterion 22 - Protection system independer e Cntenon 22-Protecticn ststem sndepen-dence. The protection system shall be de-signed to assure that the effects of natural pnenoment, and of normal operating, main-tenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions on redundant channels do not result in loss of the protection function, or shall be demonstrated to be acceptable on some other defined basis. Design tech-ntques, such as f unctional diversity or diver-saty in component design and pnnelples of operation, shall be used to the extent practi-cal to prevent loss of the protection func-tion.
General Design Criterion 24 - Separation of protection and Controi Systems Cntenon 24-Sepa ra tsors of protection and control systems. The protection system shall be separated from control systems to the extent that f ailure of any single control system component or channel, or failure or removal from service of any single protec-tion s> stem component or channel which is common to the control and protection sys-tems leaves intact a system satisf ying all re-liability, redundancy, and independence re-quirements of the protection system. Inter-connection of the protection and control systems shall be limited so as to assure that safety is not significantly impaired.
s.
7
. _. 7
____._ggg.
p 9.f g.,
Cntenon 63-Monttonna fuel and staste storen A;propnate systems shall be pro-vided in fuel storage and radzoactive waste systems and associated handling areas d) to detect conditions that may result in loss of residual heat removal capability and exces-sive radiation levels and C) to initiate ap-prcpriate safety actions.
General Design Criterion 64 - Monitoring radioactivity release:
Cntenon 64-Monitonng radtocettetty re.
leases. Means shall be provided for monitor-tng the reactor containment atmosphere, spaces containing ecmponents for recircula-tion of loss of coolant accident fluids, ef.'in-ett d:scharge paths. and the plant env??ons for radioactivity that may be released from normal operations, tricluding anticipated I
operational occurrences, and from postulat.
' ' - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
ed uclottns ~ ~ ~ ~
l
l f.
NRC's present-day review of control rooms and instrumentation is covered a
under the aegis of' Standard Review Plans:
7.1 " Instrumentation and Controls" 7.2 " Reactor Trip System" 7.3 " Engineered Safety Features Systems" 7.4 " Systems Required For Safe Shutdown" 7.5 " Safety-Related Display Instrumentation" i
7.6 "All Other Instrumentation Required For Safety" l
7.7 " Control Systems Not Required For Safety" 7-A (Appendix) - ICSB Branch Technical position 21
" Guidance for Application of Regulatory Guide 1.47" l
t ICSB Branch Technical Position 23 "Quali.fication.of_ Saf.aty.-Sele.ted Disp 1ay Instrumentation For Post-Accident Condition Monitoring and Safe Shutdown" i
r
't I
I i
u..
In addition to meeting the general design criteria
)
, present-day control rooms and instrumentation are required to meet the following NRC require-ments: copies of which are attached to this enclosure:
" Bypassed and Inoperable Status I di n cation for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems" (May 1973)
" Assumptions for Evaluating the H bi a
tability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room during a
_ Postulated., Hazardous-Chemical Release" (Jun
~~
" Protection of Nuclear Power Pla t C
~
n ontrol Room Operation Against an Accidental Chlorine Release (Rev.1, January 1977)
" Instrumentation for Light Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following An Accident" (Rev.1, August 1977)
POOR ~0RIGINAL
t 5 - Control Room De. sign / Approval / Acceptance,*as presently understood control room designs are developed by the utility in conjunction with the architect-engineer - under the. broad NRC guidelines described in Item 4 above.
The utility apparently has the overall veto power -
as they are the customer.
The NRC looks at specific equipment in accordance with the afore-mentioned GDC's, RG's, SRP's, and does not look at overall control room design or " human factors engineering." The bulk of these detailed reviews are done by NRR's Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch of DSS with secondary review responsibilities held by the Auxiliary Systems Branch, Containment Systems Branch, Reactor Systems Branch, Power j
Systems Branch, Quality Assurance Branch, Mechanical Engineering Branch, and the Core Performincs'B'rshch.
The reviews are done from the early CP application stage through the final granting of the operating license.
L-
6.
What were and are NRC requirements (or limitations on) use of computers for alarms, display, etc.
The NRC has not permitted the use of computers to alarm or display the status of system variables for the purpose of diagnosing departure from safety limits that would require manual operator action to mitigate the consequences of an event.
Computer use for such diagnostics has generally been discouraged because of the stringent qualifications and independence requirements imposed upon systems required for sa fety.
Seismic qualification, quality control, and redundancy require-ments make the use of computers impractical from an economic standpoint.
I Diagnostics (alarms, display) for manual operator actions t'o mitigate the consequences of an event must be hard wired and meet all the quali-fication requirements imposed on systems important to safety.
The use of computers has been permitted for monitoring safety systems variables, through qualified isolation devices, for normal plant con-trol within the hard-wired safety limits. Thit use of computers has not been within the NRC staff's scope of review because normal plant control systems are not assumed to interact adversely with systems important to safety negating their proper response.
Therefore, diagnostics (alarms, displays, etc.) for operator actions has been limited to the needs of the individual licensee and his plant operational philosophy.
4 E %
2
- Regarding 14RC's requirements on alarms, and display instrumentation the licensee is guided by General Design Criterion (GDC) 13 "Instru-mentation and Control." Regulatory Guide (G.G.) 1.47 " Bypassed and and Inoperable Status Indication for fluclear Power Plant safety System "
and R.G.197 " Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled fluclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Corditions During and Following an Accident."
- . asep '
=*M4,#
e 4
9 5
5 1
i b
e t
7.
Prepare lists of:
Tines When Instruments were Disbelieved by Doerators 1.
One pressurizer code safety valve tail pipe high temperature alarm with RCDT pressure at 12 psig and increasing should have alerted operator to continuous flow of primary coolant to RCDT.
2.
The pressurizer level was generally increasing during the 1-4 minute time frame and this is the indication that controlled operator response.
The decreasing prinary system pressure was not believed as an indicator of water inventory.
3.
Same as 1 above.
4.
RCS hot leg temperature reached saturation with pressure.
Should have indicated to : operators that voids existed in system.
5.
Reactor building level alarm (10. min. 48 sec.) should have told operator a leak existed in system.
6.
Increase in RB pressure of about one psi at 14 minutes should have indicated leak.
7.
Loop flow indication -- slow reduction in flow from about 2 min.
to'15 min. should have indicated presence of voids.
8.
Intermediate cooling water radiation monitor alaras were believed to be due to high background radiation levels-61 minutes.
l l
l l
1
2 9.
Operators were unable to' account for increased reactor building tenperature,. should have indicated leak.
10.
bhen loop B RCPs were turned off at 74 minutes, OTSG pressure dropped f rom 960 psig to 140 psig in 18 minutes.
This should have.indichted presence of voids in loop and lack of backflow.
- 11. At 81 minutes, operator requests computer printout of pressurizer relief and safety valve outlet temperatures.
Takes no action based on high temperature readings.
12.
RCS sample shows a factor of 10 increase in activity at 90 minutes.
Apparently not attributed to fuel ~ failure even through a crud burst or iodine spike in a "new" plant is very unlikely.
- 13. All radiation nonitors exhibiting substantial ranp increase at 100 minutes should have indicated fuel damage.
14.
RCS hot and cold leg temperatures diverged widely with the hot leg reaching superheated conditions.
Should have indicated core uncovery. to operators (~103 minutes).
15
. Station manager did not believe direct readings of incore thermo-couples which were reading as high as 2620'F (4-5 nrs.).
.16.
R3 experienced pressure spike of about 28 psig initiating RB spray.
Indication believed to be " noise" or electrical problem
.and not indicative of real pressure.
Recognition of H2 burning did not occur.
o.-
3 b.
Times when Instrumen' 2*'on was Inadequate 1.
Instruments in the condensate polisher resin transfer system nay have been inadequate in that water was able to enter the compressed air system.
2.
Alarm Printer output for nakeup punp 1 A,1B, and 1C status (norm /
trip) found to be reversed due to software error, potentially misleading operators who read printout.
3.
No emergency feedwater flow indication, operators assumed flow because punps were running. Relied upon water hammer noise for flow indication.
4.
Accuracy of pressurizer level instrumentation Because of the nature of the TMI-2 accident, the pressurizer level did not accurately represent the water levels in the RCS. The indications of high pressurzer level apparently misled the operators into believing that the RCS was full of water throughout the accident; thus, actions to refill and cool che core were not believed to have been needed.
5.
Computer storage and printout capabilities The alarm computer printout located in the control room began experiencing significant backups early in the accident, and was actually out of service for some time period. No permanent storage in the cocputer occurs, so that when the printer is out of service, information is lost corpletely. As a result of these problens, the computer apparently was of little value to the operators.
~ '.
4 6.
Operators misinterpreted SRM count rate increases (more than 2 decades) as a concern for criticality and borated system.
Rate increase was apparently due to uncovering of core.
7.
Instrumntation Ranges Various important instrumnts in the control room had ranges of indication which were quickly exceeded, so that inadequate or misleading information was presented to the operator.
RCS hot leg temperature sensors, core exit thermocouples, and many radiation monitors experienced this problem.
8.
Instrumentation environmental qualification Some instrumentation which was significant in controlling and unaerstanding tnis acclaent experie6cEd bnWro~ mental conditions n
beyond their design basis.- Pressurizer level sensors were sporadically failing throughout the accident; apparently some Reactor Building radiation monitors also failed.
9.
PORY status instrumentation In the Till-2 contrcel room, the position of the PORY is indicated by a light.
Since this light actually indicates that the electric power to the valve has been removed, it does not indicate the physical position of the valve. Thus the operators were led to believe by the PORV indicator that the valve had reclosed when in fact it remained open, causing the loss of RCS coolant.
5 10.
No reactor vessel water level indication in all PlRs, water level in the RCS is measured in the pressurizer.
Thus in an accident such as that at TMI-2, when phenoanna such as that discussed in 2.3.3 occur, an accurate measure of water level in the vessel and core is not available.
11.
No remote visual observation equipnant No remote visual equipment such as television cancras are installed in the Reactor Building of any PWR; so no visual indication of the status of euipment, etc. was available to the operators in the TMI-2 control room.
s
=w
=..-
,o
Describe manuals and procedures operators at TMI-2 had availablee 8.
Did they use any-such procedures in this case?
The sets of' procedures'in the control room.that re' late to plant operation are broken into several categories:
administrative procedures, normal -operating procedures, instrumentation and control procedures, electrical systems, abnormal operations (which include turbine trip-and reactor coolant pump emergencies), emer-gency operations (which include loss of coolant, excess radiation levels, loss of feedwater, reactor trip and pressurizer system failure),
i '
Primarily, tne operator would be expected to refer to the abnormal operation and emergency operation procedures for. an accident.
- . ---- ----4he -foilerting specific-prcsedures--were-applicable during the accident:
1 1.
Emergency Procedure 2202-2.2, Rev. 3 10/13/78 Immediate actions were apparently followed by operators following loss of main feedwater flow although some actions.
.were delayed because of the rapid. sequence of events.
~
2.
Emergency Procedures 2203-2.2 Rev. 7 10/25/78 - turbine trip Immediate actions were apparently followed by operators following turbine trip.
Operator checked status of emergency feedwater but did not notice block valves closed.
This was a crucial l
point in the accident.
Plant parameters would indicate that EFW, flows were being throttled by operators even when OTSG level could.not be maintained and was falling.
p; 3. : Emergency Procedure 2202-1.1 Rev. 6 10/25/78 - Reactor Trip-Immediate _ actions were'apparently followed by operators following reactor trip.
Several of the procedure steps could not be accomplished because of plant _ conditions and a lack of understanding of what was happening' by the operators; i.e.,
maintain pressurizer level at 100 inches.
4.
Emergency Procedure 2202-1.3-Rev. 8, 5/12/78
- Loss of Reactor Coolant / Reactor Coolant System Pressure.
With two major exceptions, the majority of the immediate and followup actions for the Loss of Reactor Coolant / Reactor. Coolant
,y3;gg,,ressure were faticact.--The upcrators throttled the HPI 3
because they did not perceive a loss of coolant problem. Also, the reactor coolant pumps were not tripped when pressure dropped to 1200 psig.
5.
Other procedures involved included:
.a.
Abnormal-Procedure 2203-1.1 - Loss of Boron Moderator Dilution b.
2102-3.3 - Decay Heat Removal.VA OTSG 2103-1.4 - Reactor Coolant Pump' Operator c.
d.
2104-4.1 - Miscellaneous Liquid Rad Waste Disposal e.
2202-1.5 - Pressurizer System Failure
- 9..As of now, what do we know about ways in which the control room design, or layout itself, may have contributed to this accident? List or describe and discuss briefly-each such way.
There are a number of ways in which the control room design and layout may have contributed to the accident.
The significance of such con-tribution is not yet fully understood and is being addressed as part of this overall investigation.
The following is a listing of those areas which currently are considered to be of potential significance.
(1)
From the initiation of the accident, hundreds of alarms were received and annunciated in the control room.
Because of the large number of alarms, the operators were not able to screen the alarms and to use them as a diagnostic tool in understanding what had happened and was in the. process
._.gf. happening. -Therc-diagnostsi tharefore; relied primarily r.
upon indications on the instruments in the control room.
This was essentially the same as there not being any alarms available to the operators, and, of course, the large number of alarm indications were a confusion factor which may have made it more difficult for the operators to arrive at reasoned decisions.
The number of alarms in the control room the lack of prioritization of alarms, and the_ grouping of alarms, do not appear to have been optimized to aid the operators in understanding
-the more important aspects of any given event.
(2) -There was no indication of auxiliary feedwater flow to the
Thus, the operator was forced to visit the feedwater panel three times before diagnosing a lack of feedwater flow.
The first time, after a few seconds, he verified the pumps running.
The second time, as level was t
O dropping through 30 inches, he verified the control valve
. opening.
It was not until the third time, when generator levels had dropped to 10 inches that a lack of auxiliary feedwater flow was diagnosed.
(3) The demand light on the PORV, as opposed to a flow switch or absolute valve position indication, played a role in misleading the operator into thinking the PORV was closed.
Alternate indications although ambiguous, were adequate in hinusight to indicate that the valve was open and, apparently, they were checked several times but not believed due to a combination of:
a.
Confusion.
Hundreds of alarms.
Operators believed the 0
tailpipe temperature was 235 but the computer was telling 0
._ _ ____them 2.85 F.__Jhe_. valve _wopld_ normal _ly 1ift for this transient and heat the tailpipe somewhat.
The valve had U
been previously leaking and the tailpipe was f s 190 F prior to the transient.
b.
Misinfonaation and lack of discipline to follor prescribed emergency procedures.
Operators believed that if the valve were truly open temperatures would be much higher, 0
on the order of 500 F.
In fact, about 285 F is as hot as the tailpipe can get.
Procedure indicates it should be 0
U isolated if over 130 F normal reading and/or if over 200 F.
l c.
General reluctance to isolate the valve becouse they did not want to rely on and cause the safety valves to actuate.
The approach was followed despite indications of water in
-containment sump and ruptured drain tank.
(It is not clear whether or not drain tank indications were actually checked).
I
,jV
~(4) The reactor coolant draintank perimeters do not alarm on the alarm panels'in the immediate view of the operators.
To determine if there is an alarm on the reactor coolant draintank annunicator the operators must clear all audible alarms on the, front panels.
A knowledge of the alarm status of the PORV and more easily understood alarm indication may
~
have helped the operators to diagnose this condition earlier in the accident.
(5) The fuel handling building exhaust radiation monitors showed ramp increases in iodine readings at about 18 minutes into the accident.
The reactor building exhaust radiation monitor increased by a factor of about 10.
These instruments are located on the lower part of the vertical back panel and operators standing at the front panels are not able to view these trends.
If the operators could have been more fully aware of the magnitude of the increase in radiation readings as they were occuring, they may have better understood that fuel damage was actually occuring early in the accident.
(6) 'The operators relied.upon the direct reading gauge for Th in the primary system.
This gauge was not able to read the temperatures that were actually seen by the system and pegged out high early in the accident.
There was, however, a strip chart recorder " primary system temperatures" #10 which is located on the back row of the vertical panels.
This recorder clear _ly shows Th temperatures in the 700 to 800 degree F range.
If the operators had been fully aware of this. indication,it may have permitted.them to appreciate early in the accident that there were superheated conditions in
,.N the system.
(7) The control panels are not layed out in such a way that normal status is easily descernable.
The valve position indication for example, indicates open-close and if it is required for normal or safe operation that certain valves be open and certain valves be closed then you will have some red and some green indications.
Such a display
'is not conducive to recognizing misalignments.
If the panels were arranged such that abnormal alignments were easily indicated, then it is unlikely that the feedwater block valves would have remained in the block conditions (assuming that they were inadvertantly left in that condition from some previous operation).
(8) The instruments in the control room are generally.small and
~ ~ difficbl L to-~resi from~the~ position that an operator would
>-.. _.. _ _ _ _._. ^ ^~
nonnally stand to observe the process of an accident.
In order to clearly see what an instrument is reading the operator must approach that instrument closely.
In addition, many of these instruments record on.i chart, however, the window which shows the recording 1s very small and recording speed is very slow such that the following of any trends is extremely difficult. A control room which had easily seen instrumentation which recorded trends in a clear fashion would likely have permitted a much clearer understanding of the events that had taken place and would perhaps have permitted the operators to appreciate the seriousness of the condition and to take the appropriate corrective action.
There is a proliferation
g,..
.o of non-critical information displayed adjr. cent to those displays
~
and-controls which assume major importance during emergencies yet all presentations appear equally important as displayed.
(9)
There was no' indication of the level of the water ir,the RCS.
Although other indications were ~available which indirectly pro-vided course infonnation on the water level, the operators were not able to properly interpret their indications. The presence of a reactor vessel water level gauge would_ likely have resulted in the operators taking actions which prevented significant core damage.
4,
- - _. - -.. -. - - - - - - -. - -... - ~ ~,.
_.d
f v
ATTACHMENT To ENCLOSURE 3 IEEE - 279, Regulatory Guides, TMI-2 PSAR
@ ',@ f. %. @. M.o', W, %. 9.e. M.r w. 6..','.f...//J Q. @5.. 1. [.: 5':
t WM. 4..F. L..}W..F.p,R..- lb
- .....&. J.,c),?
.,M.,.';
QCG M.h,f.@o@NJM,W I p,. G.,.,.. e' ? ? M :s & m. Q~ r.3 6 s
,s.%.Q.~?. ? ;r,g *'+. C.c', W y % :,W..
f.t
'Q.7l.%.. ".l.a fD'R'd.
2..v.
..a,p. v::,'(;
- s. *s. u.
c.
.t.
Q.,,.,. 'T.,, y %..s. y.,~ 7.n~
ul *[*.r' ;.,. c. '..L. V'.% k*y;.}'.
w C 'f' *;.y~s..*. '+ L. :.1J*;**2C P c:*<-;pf'^:,Q % ~4*# f,.'
".C
. f; e ~. '
,r o..
s Q}N:k '*<h e.g
-..s n n.,.=.. q.
- n t?,',*'% g:1
- W.
- ~~w**
a 1v OQ; ; --
- .. 'l'c c X'
.* C..C.r ; ';<,...e) '
~
'.9 ~ r #.*t' Q ge # ***t-;
f M.3.'./.n. s.
- ,,9,m.
Q"'M,?er
,r,; %r.,...., J.'.
..r.'.',
.m c. ruI A-t
.M s,.=*-..
p.... v.p...s,...,.t,O.?.e.
o s
- ... ( *w= n. =.
- n. 9,
.T.,
- w.. wm. ~, > 7 *s,.. yf r%w g.5 n... /,.g,.,.
, n.-w s
~
, n r
w.a.,,.
..g 8<-
7w.
.y m../. '., s.,w~* *.>.*, r.w &.tv?.,s r.e.m... %.3. a. ':, 3.<.~p~...
- u..,.
,s s -
.,9.m ?.g. r,v,J,.}.,s,a e., )
6.
.. 4.. (,
~ ',d
. s,.(. @. j, a
.a
-p.
d a. m
- .ky. e.
. L.s l.v. e..
J,,.,
- f a-o..
, -...,;r. 2 3
12.. a.
s ~
.......;***..! p v-.,e.s
- v. y s
.f.t-n..,. c,w...
.o.
- c,. O.s.
e.
. *. v.... :),. e..,,1.;n 1s.mf.: a,e, p
..g-p :. w.,o.t ::
o, n.. a. _,,.. o..,5
.,'.r'...
.. w p
.e~.
,w n v
y..
.. e
.,,.ry....
.,... -.,..Ms... m.
. a
- y.s. s.s a 1r *.
- s.,. y. b.. o.-.
m).
,,-v.
y,, v.
- ;x_v...p,,
,., e. s,a c s 4.,., J
..Aa
,:v..
a
...k.,.c...,....&.
.,r;;yg,m ;;m *, g,3 t.n,.o..,., o m p %..',
- p..
' e.,
)
..s r",
p.
.r
,r
, y' A w.. t; w%..,.,_.,...
c.
./..:, e,,,..o.~., y u.s...u %,
...,'.,.s.....<.
7
, e.
w
...gyG,,U..ST 3 96. o..
.ca
.w. -..,,. c~ :c. w......
.s.y;n.%., y....,. s
...,,. - r. - p:.m p.. c. W >. t.,,,-, ?, s.
.i
,.,..s,..,.
+
y,...,,....s A
y
.'..e't...
..w..e..e. s. : e
- e.
- A,.
r
.:. p
- w.... ;c.
,,, p Y.p +Q.',, e #. o. '%.'.'A n l,~;. *.b.,7.;*c,,e...Q",.tlQ.. b ' ' '.,'. J.
- . s
,e
~a...-
r c..
?
. ~.
- s.. :, q t,J',..y :. M..,. m.. L N.
.?'
.;f u 9 t
- ' a,.~ 4 %. ;..... s,a ;* 7',%.}*v..~.. ?ryf,. @la ;'.;f.Q. :*%y.'t
.c..'.' >
t Q?,
q c
- t. j
,t e*,p u.r :......,c...a. Ja c. *f.. % *.
wr
<.o
.. %..,.. :.pe ( p n
,... ~,.
,.+j'.
qf) 3'., :17.y ? )Q t 's.j; :;L'D 'fl%.-Q.Q'p 4& q.,,,;, y:u.
.g., *
.., y:;
- _....,,
1,. '.LQ.
4.p p 7.,...*
- s e n. z.,
-1%
..r
.r.
y w
,.a,,
.yp Y* 's*hC '; $?v d** '... q ~ y., ns. c.t.., s
-s,. s,.
f %Ui ' eY.: $ki
..g&.'.- ;.. ;... e :.
.,n 2
,..e
. v x...
a
- il.Q T.$.p&<*! ;.;;;} N.;;4 J. ;-?ir'w.'.t**.
'.e f..* vr :
....,c,?,y.%,.;.,, ': Lj n.,%.. s. * *6
'[;. 2,C Q '., ; *
~.q.
. t.., J.
, e.,, F..'.m..
P.
.n.. '>.- m...
5.,.L.g\\.is.. :,*,9.,, %r'.
..,,... r,...,p. :..f ' h. e y T.'
s;
.g m.,,
c... s ?.,... c.
,, ; w.., s....,a.....><m.d.,,. y..
u,
....,,.?,<,..>.
...,..w
.;... m.,
y,,6, m.w'a.g;*M,i.p'p,:
,4
- ... g - ~e n....
y,~,.x.v. c.,<..
- w x...,,.m..y -
.-Yrzu,,.,
e, d.*s %;;,n=f. M,e. 4 - *J..
e....,.
- p,,!4%y?'.
.r,
~.
.. r n.
,'a r '; %e,.g.
- gg. Q.fsas.* 7 q, s s*
w... -..
..us e.
m.
+.
'u
't h - '
&,. Q.h,,.-l.
J',
G ;rd.L rm eas Nst newoMea,.'e',.Lf.k W{'
- .. o.
J s
,m a
4.
'ar E.
. _. - j a MMQ4t Q'J;l,w S ud va
.. ~,
I
,.4.*.,..lm.
y,',*
s(@..x n g 4
/ -
.a
.., ~
. a-
- ... ~.
.... J -
.r
<o r.
=.
e g
-.,. v..w. 2.M.~:
.a se,
u.,
....",,,m.
- z. s.
f
... - =,..
.s,.
e,,.. s 7. e. 4 - :*4
- =
...'..'t
-p.
,t
/
.r
.a.
T._.'.,,...
y g...
?.<....; J.
.n.e;.
.e e
f n
,p
"... t;..,.jr.f d.
u,.. k ',
=
n
.p.ya 1 roposec
<~.
n,u s u r u..ena or n
m.. --
.. -. r.3.,....,.
~...4
~.. ;..... m,. ~........
L i..M. O,
.,. :. i.. ^
i,.. ' L..,(: 3..,-
NUCLEAR Pr FER PL/WT
- s
, c..,.~.
c.
. ~i
.,O - ? 'f,,
...'/.
.. p \\.
rP,,
rnr AT 7
r m*g ig y i
8 =
. O.
g.
- ;..g.
j % J.3 y. g
[ giy
...,..w.....
.s...
a
...,.... ~/...:-.~.
.,.p~..-
....o
,w
..k..,....
.:<...u..
... ; ~ a. ;.;_., --
, :a:...
..,. ~. - -.
~ c. :...
~.,.
.......~ :
.m (Iffecth e :lupust 30,1968)
- e., Q.. r? '..:.5.,. -
3,y
...,p... v.y.
e
- r.,=,.3.m...n.r.%..,
I
..e
\\
'~
L.,.
l,'
I O
\\/
j g
-.:. :,..m... s.
-...... s. 1
/
. ~
. ~, -
J'\\
- Os G:
O
{}
f.
.. '.i,b:,.,1
. ss g.~
r,.
\\ >
. /
r-
.. : ' ',. -....~.; ;",:, ~.
M' a
s
. e,v-n s
1
/
(W t-r
- r. g ;}
(%
1 ji p'
/
e'.
\\
(.",.. i En.
.. -.by-m m' j
) V
\\
y
'A
/
g
'. '. l, <.
p
\\ iM a q\\
i
/
.s.
/
. m..
v i
s-U
./,/
- 1...-.
n. '. v. 4 1
y
.yj
,1
~
-% 7"*."".*3;"P W**P.,'P.*.y* *gf e./ r*WT* *:8*T%.0.-r'.pra -wrsm'.*.s n* Lw.4.e. ww<>.e>*M +c'we rt:tre an. ;m== =,.e a &.,
e
=. s v===r e
.,.s
...;....,...c,
., ~..,.. -
s.,.
s.~,..,,......,
.f..s..n.
.. s.....-.y7,..
. -....
- r.:.. <..., o.. n. m.,
.~
.. ~.
3....s
+....
- s.,
.4,.
, t.,.... m..,. u.
~,.,.,.,.,.rg.
..x.a...
.* -.^..,...:
- : n.,) L..,. g;, _,...
v
.s...
...v
.. ~....
, s v>
..... -. ~
.. v. t s.
, f'.,',,s;.n.?S. LW.' % a,~ s k. f, :'. ".,,,<..'.u...k'
,Y:.-
. n ;;*. 'j,: *~,,~..
, " ;,..'. r-... of,.,; *,., z
,a, '; a s,;.- Q ::...r,.. ', r_ g.;
. p%.x :
....-.9..
..., c ' '. t
.>.7 o.,.
......n.'.aW', t. S &,
Q. l[ Q l.k,sC f'.',.I.].. '^ *,.... v't.;W,:;,]V o aiij?, kY j'Q* ';4
-l,.'-..
%,e.
?"p.. *.,
?.
- * * "Ty-*,.*,,,.-
., '. -.'; - h,.. ' b." h '"d.~ - gl.'l'.hl.
w.* % V t
.......'. $ f.v:,Q., *U.J.*f.,. a.
I*
? - ' S *.*V.
- ,,).
.,~*.t..e.....]
- ~..,'..
-i
- *% v....., *., r..
e ~.
- q.,. Q+. :,.,..,. <
.-.s.-
,,ttu; - '
....='.c...v.......,.2. o,t,y..,
.-t..-
- . h.s..s'"
- ,
.=..s.:.-~ g,3..,.,, m..
-e
- a. a-
..v s
-c
., c a.
3,'-.
.'..c.1 1lJ
.i s t e,-'s ;, * *:.% : *W g;m:#s** &
'.*',,.,*ta*
.e,-
-r
- y,.~,7*..... *.. -..
.^
....~.. *,:v. p..,.,n~ p ~..*.~.* ~,.
s
.w.
/ *v v -
mu
- y.
(,. ;..'..
T:
- p:
2.._. v.. r. s r... 9 s.
. O.'
lm..
- u,,., l.1. _ -
w,.,., < 7 3 3,.t :.-.._., g e, (. >
~..
h.3
. ; =.; y
." ~ ;,,-:1
- y.. --
,Y c.g.* =', *: '
- g.l* 'l n *.*ll-Y., ; (l 's N. T * * *, * 't.*. %'i. 3,o s. : *:] ;;:L. -) -; \\. T' r g....... -
.isw e..
. s 1-
,(
- -. ; s. a>a. ~.g,., '. 'g*?.#*
W Q;* r *'\\Q 5 4 *..tt '. Q ')4. ',~' njQ^ *4'&.,}.* '.%. *
?. ;~ V a', '.",*:
- s. e,,,
- e..n..:, '/. 7 Q.
e. s.,.s,. &. y.a r p -*:s ',l>.+;;. * *. '..". ;;J.,,. :;;.-..'.'.A.',..rr,.,.:.-.
' i..
~.
.,. n.M:..
~..
. :2-G
~.7**:'Q e W., /"d-: s
..
- 3.9. e ?-e J.
. W J '4C.
< : r :=. s. (.. ',G*. b '
l
...>, s..e.. v..e, y., :. u.-ses. e..a. s. y *,.'. . ~0.. ~.. c,,
~.
.>:.~<*s...s. r, y r u m ~<.p y v.., .?, ..... e y,. r* '. y. = s. .g....e.,
- w., :r.gr Q
.. c. - n.~ c .... w r.e. >. s. m: v... y.,.n '.,,.... ~. ~.-.~..:,, y. a.,.2 ;.; .y...e s. ;-r.. i,... - ? o.,, n,. :.,._
- c..
.uu..
- i. > 9,...
.,~ m.,.,- s
- t...
-s :,... n, n -,. w. .....,. w. s....,,... :... n,.....,c....,.,.. .. ~...... s. r .. w. c w.. .-..,.a.,.-c ~-,x...-,n.-.a...-.~.,---,n...u--,z..r.... - -. ,:. w.
- .~.n.
..n, a.: .. m.v. 7,v.,-.
- a... u ;, w. s. r..~_
,.~._. s.
- W n
. y. ,w..r. .~
- u. M.,. :r,. ~. e
.. w. h.,s.1 ;n. '-... v :,.. v., '.:t.... -~~
- v.. c.
-- ;: ~.. .. n, w *.. -.,. e.. : -. T... .. :..n.v.. . e...... p. ~. y ~..-:..- L.. ..v .m...,....n.,..., - ~.. _... w - o. _a ....,...e. ~.-= m n <..w i. -, w.. ..s '. r ;;' ::: ? = Ac. n - p g.... s.....6... v.... ~_ - e.c, : M. 2.c. ' e -a
- p. '.p.
,..r..., . g..e.. <',,.. 3.. cy 7.. fwm;^ p. 'm.,-,. V... ..;w- ....g. ; s % v. . [. =,..4. .l%. .... s.. s %:.s .) ?[_ 7;f.c. * .. -. i...-u-7 f: a.a...:r...~:.v '* * '.. 1.T* ',. '. W ; s. 4**: ' /s'.,- ~ %. ~. ;. r' *.,,,,.. ::.. g.w'll). + 4-;-.,".;,. :.,'
- % ? **
,1- *2, '*.. n a e.:. : w'. *...~...3, ~=~. ., s r~ u v e y.... :....... - w : - v.n ~ w
- z. : ~
- ?.W*-*-
r n. s Vs* g +,' g...
- J'
- . h.g.,.T. u.a.'s*f...s.a?
.w a :.e 'w or. w". - '= ~- Y
- '".'v
.m s ' ~'.; ~--- * *~6 I'
- 2.
.*,.e*+ .~ ..,.. ~,. ~s*' G -:=. . ::: s, p:: h:r.1: =* 4 : n s s e l.a, ; m-9 p.* i r.*,h.7 g ,. -*. ~ r,,,.'... ~ '. ;. . ~, . ~ w..s,. e y., g g a s ) - o..,,; -1 : n,w e m w.1../.p. e m.i. : i.. es.>
- s g - _9 m,?,:w.-_
c- ,y,%. b q -*"/.;m...,>.M.,5. EAc,- mm,= ice *w -W: n.:.5 %. T-M,s.m p' # a..f. c. =-:h. e. g, q;, f7- % y.
- k. '.:
. yC v s*.,.* %* s. v
- 10 CD'4 ?..;; ~n.,;.4*.
,,....C.. ys,; LJ. *.
- Y, ; s -~ ~
~ 5M*L-fr- =.r s r?WT.cjC* : ;,a %':.M.~..;.~.... 4.r' lw*&.* *
- s,'..M G.. ' ~ -
7 a.Ruu.. o. ba rt-p p%' &.~..M. c...Ot ~'"w. ;M::; p:.g. _.P: .:gM..i . r,. s.~4 .~.. rp :o e 3,. ~n 3... x.,.~..,-. :,,r:w;a r,'.~... -.... :. ::n.7-;*.... 3, ~'..*i'... '..:* *
- n.. e.;.n.;.+: s, v. <:,w: ~.:,:y--
p': *.... - W~.,, 4... s.. '
- ~. Q
....;,.; ; -......V m. * : '. *. - 2 m. ;.. * . 4 h.
- -. >.. ~.
t< ..-s... . c.~ .. -~ -. '. ~, . a. . ~.. ge - . x. .?_.. ;, 3.. s..... ~ ... - = *,,,. _,. _
- h
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEMS e
- 1. SCOPE
- 3. DESIGN BASIS rhefe Criteris establish minimum requirements for the A speciSc protection system design basis shall be pro-
'cty-rehted functional performance and reliability vided for each nuclear power phnt. The information protection systems for sintionary, land-based nuclear thus provided shall be avaibble, as needed, for makin-ctors prcducing steam for electric power generation. judgments on system functional adequacy. If!!! ment of these requirements does not necessarily The design basis shall document as a mwnum, the y establish the adequacy of protective system func. following: al performance and reliability. On the other hand' ( ) the plant condit. ions which require protective action, 'ssion o(f any of these requirements will, in most in nces, he an indict. tion of system inadequacy. For pur- (b) the phnt variables (e.g., neutron flux, coohnt flow, ses of these Criteria, the nuclear power phnt protection pressure, etc.) that are required to be monitored in tem encompasses all electric and mechanical devices order to provide protective actions; d circe:try (from sensors to actuation device input (c) the minimum number and location of the sensors su'als) invoh;ea,m generating those signals associated required to monitor adequately, for protective func-th the protective ftmetton. These signals include those tion purposes, those phnt variables listed in 3(b) at actuate reacter trap and that, in the event of a se-that have a spatial dependence; a:s reactor accident, actuate engineered safegur.rds (d) prudent operational limits for each varhble listed in en as containment tschtion, core spray, safety inject:on, 3(b) in each applicable reactor cperation mode; csure reduction, and r.tr cleng. (c) the mr.rgin, with appropriate interpretive im ormat,on, i between each onerational limit and the level con-sidered to mark 'he onset of unsafe conditions;
- 2. DEFINITIONS t
The dcnnitions in this Section estab!ish the meanings (f) the levels that, when reached, will require protective words in the context of their use m these Cntena. system action; E., System. Wrere not otherwise qualified, the word (c) the range of transient and steady-state conditions ystem, rciers to tne nuclear _p_ower_. _h.nt. protectio:i-of both the energy supplv and the environment (e'g p ~ ~ stem, as dcEncd m. the scope section of these Criten,a-volta;;e, frequency, temperature, hum.dity, pressure, i 2 Channi. An arrangement of components and vibration, etc.) durin; normal, abnonnal, and ac-cident circumstances throu;;hout which the system odules as required to generate a single protective action must perform; pal when required by a phnt condition. A channel es its identity where sin;;le action signals are combined. (h) the malfunctions, accidents, or other unusual events (e.g., Ere, crplosion, missiles, li;;htning, flood, earth-3 - Module. Any assembly ofinterconnected components quake, wind, etc.) which could physically damage hich constitutes an identiSab!c device, instrument or protection system components or could cause en-ece of equipment A module can be disconnected, re_ v ronmental chan;;es leading to functional degrada-oved as a unit, and replaced with a spare. It has de-tion of system performance, and for which provisions .ble performance characteristics which permit it to muet be incorperated to retain necessary protection tested as a unit. A module could be a card or other system action; basse=bly of a br;;ct device, provided it meets the quirc:nents of this d:Enition. (i) minimum perionnance requirements including the fol! W""~
- 4 Co=ponents. Items frcm which the system is r.s-
- 1) system response times; kmbled (e.g., resistors, capacitors, wires, connectors, O system accuracies; nsisters, tube.3, switches, springs, etc.).
- 3) ranges (normal, abnormal and accident conditions)
>5 Protective Action. An action initiated by the protec-of the ma;;nitudes and rates of change of sensed .on system when a limit is exceeded. A protective iction variables to be accommodated until proper con-kn be at channel or system IcVel. clusion of the protection system action is assured. Note ne devekpment of the rpecise information to be use:I in 4 Pictective Function. A systcm protective action fclhent cf the abcvc req:urements is not within tlic scope cf these 'hich resuhs from the protect.-ive action of the channels Cnteris. ne derdcpment of standud criteria and requirtments rehtin:: to the determj.gsticra cf such design basis infornatien as nitcrin~ a particubr phnt condition. unnfe ecndittens recxrm rrotective functions. phnt vuiables to be menitored. operadant.1 firait mu;-ins, ret points. etc., are under J a ype Tests. Tests mage on one or more units t midwin -m.btr;c.;.n Nucleu society siendardt subcommi:ve crify cdeqt:acy ci design. 4. 3 P00lf DR GINAL== ( the remainin;t portions of the protection system shaU
- 4. ni:OUIREMENTS independently meet the requirements of para;;raphs 4.1 beneral Function,1 Require ent. The nuclear power and 4.2.
. 4.1 plant protection sv.*'n shah, witn prec:non and reh-initiate appropriate protective 4.S Derivatien of System Inputs. To the extent fer.sible acticn whenever a p! ant condition monitored by the and practical, protection system inpu nbility, automatjeally symm rearhed a pre et level. This reqlirement applies frem si:;nals which are direct measures of the des variables. fcr the fuU range of conditions and performance enumer-ated in 3(g)' 3(h), and 3(i). 4.9 Capability for Sensor Checks. Means shall be pro-Single yallure Criterion. Any single failure within vided for checking, with a high degree of confid 4.2 the protertion system shall not prevent proper protection operational availability of each system input reactor operation. system r,.ction when required. This may be accomplished in various ways, for ex-1,a.3 qle islure" i:cludes such events z.s the shorting or c,v;-cirealti=g of intereennectmg signs! or pcwer esbles. It also ample: i=:Rh ride credAle r:2.lfuncticas or events that catue a number t=odule, er chsene! fdlures for (a) by per=rb.:n;; the mom.tored van. ble; or a c' e....ecae :121 competent, e :s:de, the overhest=g of an amplifier mod 'e is a 'yi=g!e failre" (b) within the constraints of paragraph 4.11, by intro ue :hoch sever 1 tra nster !silures result. Slechscie:.1 camage to a m,de smith wotdd be a " single fsilure" altho;;; teveral cha:Dels duc.ing and varyin;;, as appropriate, a substitute cdght become involved. input to the sensor of the same nature as the meas-Quality of Components and Modules. Components ured variable; or 4.3 nnd modulc3 shall be of a quality that is consistent with (c) by cross checking between cha=els that bear a minimum maintenance requirements and low failure known relationship to each other =d that have rr.tes. Quahty levels shall be achieved throu;;h the spec-read-outs available. iEcatica of requirernents known to promote hi;;h quality, Capability for Test and Calibration. Capability 4.10 such as requirements for design, for the derating of com-shall be provided for testing and calibrating channe punents, for in=ufacturing, quality centrol, inspection, and the devices used to derive the final system output calibmtion, and test. sinnal from the various channel signals. For those parts u 4.4_ Ecui: ment Qualification. Type test data or reason-og the system where the required interval between testing ~ able engineering extrapolation cased on test-data' shad lilf Elds'tliah~ the no mal time interval between plant be r.vaihble to verify that eqaipment that must opemte shutdowns, the e shall be capability for testin;; durin;; f to provide protection system action w1U meet, on a con-power ope = tion. tintdn;; basis, the performance requirements dete=ined Ch=nel Bypass or Removal from Operation. The 4.11 to be necessary for achieving the system requirements. system shall be designed to per: nit any on Attentic is directed pa-ticularly to the requirecents of be maintained, and when required, tested or calibrated .Yert: 3 (p r.ed 3 (i). durin;; power operation without initi. ting a protective - All protecticn system channels funct. ion. Durin;; such opemtion the act.:ve parts c,. t. ne e5 Ch=nel Integn.ty. <han be c.es:*-ned to maintain necessarv functional cap-system s a.,. c:. themselves continue to meet the s.in;;1.e t 3 enc.le)re-failure critedon. ability under extremes of conditions (as apph. oOne-out-of-two,, systems are pemitted latin = to cavironment, energy supply, malfunctions, Exceph.ce. : and ace,: cents. to violate the single failure criterion during cha=e1 by-ass provided th.t acceptable reliabi'ity of operation 1.*c.'re Sw especialle the require =ents d:::=ented in response "F - ("' 3 'y" e.ed (i)' can be ethenvise demmstrated. For eneple, the bypass 33(<": " ' 4.6 Channul Independence. Channels that provide time interval required for a test, calibration, or main si~nals ice the same plant protective function shr.!! be inde-ten =ce ope = tion could be shown to be pendent nnd physicauy separated to ceremplish de-the probability of failure of the active c be commensurate with the probability of failure of the coupling cf the effects of unsafe environmental factors, "cne-out-of-two" system during its normal interval be-clectric transients, and physical accident consequences documented in the design basis, and to reduce the likeli-tween tests. c hood of interactions between channels during maintenance 4.1:! Operat,=g B passes.Where opentm, a req =rements operat. ions or in the event of channe. ma,ranction. necesitate automat:c or manual byp.ss of a protective t Control and Protection System Interaction. Where a function, the desi;;n shall be such that the bypl be removed automatically wheneve pe=issive con-4.7 p! ant condition that requires protective action can be ditions are not met. Devices used to achieve autom brou;;ht on by a failure or malfunction of the control removal of the bypass of a protective function are system, and the same failure or malfunction prevents of the protection system and must be designed i proper action of a protection system channel or channelscnce with these Crite:ia. i desiened to protect against the resultant unsafe condition, I 4 P00R OR GlEL- . -e. ...... s r-t ammt ci s.u manual actuation. $ leans shall he provided for e part of the syrtem has been bypassed or deliberately manual initiation of protection system action. Failure
- dered inoperative for any purpose, this fact shall be in an automatic protection circuit shall not prevent the atinuously indicated in the control room.
] manual actuation of protecth e functions. Manual actu- ,,c ation shall require the open of a minimum of equip-
- 4 Access to Means for Bypassing. The design shall ' ment.
Ymit the administrative control of the means for man-lly bypaning channels or protective functions. 4.18 Access to Set Point Adjustments, Calibration, and Test Points. The design shall permit the administrative c nu acms au pr tective action set point adjust- )5 Multiple Set Points. Where it is necessary to change a more restrictive protective action set point to pro-ments, module calibration adjustments, and test points. l le adequate protection for a particular mode of oper-4.19 IdentiScation of Protective Actions. Protective ac-on or set of operating conditions, the design shall pro-tions shall be indicated and identified down to the channel le positive means of assuring that the more restrictive level. ~ . point is used. The devices used to prevent improper use 4.20 Infor=atica Read-Out. The protection system 7 le<s restrictive set points shall be considered a part of th atectica system and shall be des:gned m accordanc shall be designed to provide the operator with accurate, ~
- b the other provisions of these Criteria regarding per-complete, and timch information pertinent to its own mance and reliability.
status and to p! ant safety. The design shall minimize the development of conditions which would cause meters, 6 Completion of Protective Action OnceItIsInitiated
- 8' #*
8' " # #**'
- E
.c protection system shall be so desm.ned that, once mdications confusing to the operator. !!ated, a protection system action shall go to com-4.21 System Repair. The system shall be designed to tion. Return to operation shall require subsequent facilitate the recognition, location, replacement, repair, 'iberate operr. tor action. or adjustment of ma' unctioning components or modules. J P00RORGNAL I o N 'v ^ 5; r g, i ~ N, .. m. _ m...~ w.. w...e.......e yg,1:.-1:g preven p ver s atic design phil:sephy, al'. ::::re'. staticas, svitches, \\ gg:--o3 e s, 4. A..,...s. 3 A e.w.- 4.< -.4-. A4g.s y.-y . e e e,- ** e --a .e
- ar*. uy, c,v-
= ~.. 1.e, c
- a..o,.. -,.
2. U '. 2.". ' ' ' e.'.- e 4.. c-a.- Cc-. o.' d 1 y :: ecessa y = =aintai: suclear uni safe c: ditices after a less-of-coolan %g. ,, :;.. 2....s..,, w d .e
- 4. 4.d.a.e
..".a. a. a..... ' ' ' y.' -.'. a. d...-.' .-.c=. Cw-....'s g.d w s,.... n 1.4. e.ge.st, /. e..g.g 3 -gy %.g .n e. g. g A. g. ...y .. a -y C....On s.a-o u. .r - a... ..'.e s~j s.e =.- ~~.. ~..' ' a.'. ^ ~. s.~.~..'..~.'.' v e... e. s...e.a a. '.. - C C. ~ ~ ' s g C.- ^...e.. l 1 I ~ w. a i. .?.n. v. r ". m. w.n. ...... 1 ..., gg gk.g", 4 .4 a.1h, y.4 _33 %_e g,.s.g .A s w. e-. t e .w . a. C.. a Ca s.. .d..e e...,
- 4. c, c.e t.tn.e.
2
- 2..,.4..
.~.-s.~... al s *. e ad*J - s *.a* e C a.* #.# '..d..s. W. #...e-oy... y..-. .,,.k. .h., .a.. ,i 3.._eA.*.g*.,.e ....g.4 a.a J.4 *J a g, .k.. -...e..a.,.e. 4.1 *- h.e .a. y.. ...g ..., 4 9 _, w a..g .y..... a. - g 4. g.k.. .-a_s Cy..'.*..*.**. N. a. se . ~.... '.. ' * -. '. e a-'* *..e'*
- d s0
.p . ;.. -..g. .j e g..... 1. ".s e d. .w,. .A .'.". a....... s .. ~. ~. ~.. - *.. '. ' .e.... s .' "... e #- C.. 1" .....e .3. .f 4 .w. 4. a. .i.._, ye. s.e s..*. s -.A. ,.....g .. aw ..- y ._ se.., .w. ....,.,.. wess .y...w .s.....,.....a. ...a .....-e. .e _-,. 4.,, - d.' s,.' c.~, s."..'._' ' e ' ' a d c e. o.e- .,e 4.,,.....y.,..,
- s...A..
... s.,,. 4. _3 _, ba.#.. a d '~, s '.., s.. a ' e.".. se.- .~ .,.e , s....". ".. ar s ar '..s a. d '..a..c.y.-...'.<..a_'~, s e..4 .d.-." ' <.. w..'d...,- d y
- a...,.... u... a -...
.w. .,....._.n... a,... s.o.,,.a. s.. 4. .,..i.c ...-.. : u. m. -,.. r.m.v. m.,.. e. 2.m., /~' ... _. co.. . ~.. ...e. rue.ecessary infor=atica for ::u:ine== 1: ring of the nuclear stea= supply sys:e= and the bal=ce of the pla=: vill be displayed ce the cperator's censole and :he ...a...s ,.,e .<,.3.3 wCo As.CC3.ec ka. we., .s.e C. .O.3 .C T,-.<- a..w-d<sp.,ay ,C ...,. ui.... .m.e,uen..' e-r.' -v. e d c..- .au..' e b a s.d s, o - g. e *.e -..dve equ.4-e. w. .s r.-- ~ quickly needed in case of an e=ergency, vill be cou=:ed en the desk-type c: sole r sec .d s. S.e c o. d e. s a d a-d ' a"'.. - '. u-. d..,- e - ".# e... vi.'.' ke..t.n.ed c-
- n' e v.
s..,...,.. .4 e.. <. g..- a.e4 u e-4 A... u. c .g., g. .r..n...,.,. .se y--- A ....J. ..., g o., a. k. gg 4 .J.4. .e.*..a. g o.J .e.... .a a. 7 9..g.
- e. A.
. 4 e J.*.. A..J. . g *. g.... sA 3.7.. f.--. g.. g .y ... 4.,..d. ' M ng, q A .e. .y..= a. [ y o.
- g..% 4 e..k. _g..
%. 6..J. %.. . %.. C p,., .n n. g n... t.
- a. 4 =. a..
8 3. 7 A. ^# "J..*4.-. y.. w. g. N ,3 2,. a.*... /., -... e.,.. 4 9.1 '. a. a'.'a.#.'
- k..' a
.#.. *".a. - ^ ". *. '. -.. '. ' '. '. - - .#0'* al' -a 3 3.. y. .e.-a., f.e~,n -.e..-4, cA 2,, .i,. J v, A.-, a.. 4.... 4s .....S .ee. e. .e.. a ..i.. ,w f....w. .w. .. s4 -yg.,....- 24 - 3.. J., a.2 4. 2 . s.. _a_ . A a.. ..t... ec .1.,. , 4.s.u..'.. s. y... 3 g y. .c gn .v. a v =.*.m*.=.v.s "v. e 4 %. 9. ga .e n 2.4 %. 7..o'2 -.. d
- 3..d 9 i
- k. m.
4 a.a a. g.e 3..a
- b..
aa.. a.7
- a..o 4
.. =.-- 4 y. .6.. 44,
- y.
u c.ge.g f 4.4 4. g g. .,. o. g..k.. A %.y 77 -f .e......ga.-. a A.4%.3. .a.. %...J..'24 ..ygen.n. 4 3.1 e
- g...,
%. e .4 4 4.e... A..r.. + b.. e44 g. 4. C- ..g e.. e.... gg, .. 3 g 1 *.. .w ja. ....3 n,A43.3. 3 1., s..a..*.3 s e s C,l,. A e A. j -y .g wy. a 4 g 4.,.. c.gg 6,.o.u s. w -o. .g .ie.. .e.r s..e.k. y;. y. .w --, A.s ..e A4.J g
- g.. y a.se..
y.-. s. .b v......a.
- 3.,.
=,.,,,e.- i. a . -. *....e... w. ..A 4, a3. 3 s..... e. . a. _9 9 7 ..e..a.A . 4. 6... A.
- 2....
fa.. .y.... 2 ..e,. s..y-sa.g.. -. a. A... u......' .n.. n e
- g... 4. u.
7... g... w .. w n,.e.. .~.~..4.,.4m.... a.. u. ,1.s wy ....C.. .4, L___ v O.g... .c areas C the plant. ACCustical phC es vill be supplied in areas vhe e the bach-d grCun. Cise level is high. Batter /-pCvered ;Cr able radio eeui,.-est vill be s a.,.,.ab.';.e 2 -.' e clan *..'C- -...a1 a:d ~. ~.. g-. - -y "- ee. P. C-- '..' ~. *. * *.. C ".*..* '. de th e plant v11.'. be thrCush the full periCd leased lines Cf the telephC=e cC=pa=y eF.- ', Me'.. Ed. MChile Ra:iiC Syste=. 7.h.5 CCCUPMCY The CC trC1 rCC= vill be designed so that sa'e CCCupa:Cy C # the CC trC1 rocs *' < . ~.. v.'n_ k,e use& '.o..a.<.*. m- # ,.u. gen 1 ~.d**.*C s v*.'1 be ass - ^-. m'd.=~v~.a*.e s*.* =..' d.' - a.< 9 . o.e.s..s. ,44 g.4.. C...' *.Vels
- ... *he **.*.*C.'
CC_" a# ". "'v#-"" "s p C*..%.. *..#C a.' a*. *. #. d a...*. w w C .a s. J
- e..
%.. 4. g. *.*. ed. d.#.* *. '.' *. '.".*.e.#.-~ all sC"%-**s d.#.&*d.a: ^ ^.*. *C.i ~..w .. g. w .w . w. e. w.... _, ~c.o.s _.., eg. w.- *..'*.s.2. '..g-a.C"w-da"a ..a. ' Cd." C _" C". 4. - a ax- _._.- w y, c. w.* ' w al ac..* de.".. v4_"...C.. x.-. a. d. ', ~- (.'...' "d.d.g-4..g..ss and eg~. ~. s s ), ~ vhich is apprC '--tely the yearly cuarter-dCse permitted in 10 CyR 20. Gas = asks a a. o.ug .. C*. e ".*.
- Ve e ~ " *.~, ~.".. v... k. e ~,. ~e. '. d* d. #.Cr
,e.~.C -=.' e..~. e. '. g- ..'. as-*...g .w. .,...1 C., .w. g.s. gy..g..w e L c.g. 4i... a.7 9/. / ".
- V e
.b..' g.'. e - - e d da*. #.C= 1a.V a..'.s a* ~. - y .w. .w. ...i .C". ".. *. C".'..*...'.- V *..- *..# '. a*.
- C..
s"g.'.*. e ". d.' ' k e. C*=*.# d.e.d "#
- b.
z ,.a
- s. a. 4.
A...g .n,.e. g A. g.. 4,.e c.3 ~, e. .%..y t. g a.e.g. 4.n.* he .gg. e.C,..ue C..- A. fr..y..-. a.3.- ".. b e.-...d.--"_' a. e d * '.--u?. a%.. C.' "~. e and. .%. -., a.' .'.'.'.*. e. s. e.g...Cy 3 34 w.J ...e i s se..cy Agg. a g ..g y.
- a. a3
.g~ 4...J.e C. a .#.#.-a..#.* '. b. C *.*.. C.'." ** C-v#. ' ' 'e "#*ed. " g- ' k.e g.. o- .eC , y4. . egg.e g. w .g a. rw. ,.e .. 1 r.. .,..c..,.4. . 4_77 % e n..e sL.c. 4%.1 P.b ..-.,e 4 3s. ...w. -a.. w .a. -C. c... e.7 ggb.i.S ..A gy.4. e.w.s.,p .a ya e. ya39 w.e ...$..oC.eA. ...e. .e ..g w.
- 4. s i.c..bg.
kgy._ .g.e...> e,. k.. e7.,-..eg Es '.*. s.*. # '." e d ~.~.s"w.'.'.*.*.d..="".e.- y ="b.'.' ~ a~. '. ~.~.= h.. h C 2 a..d.. w
- Ca'..' e =~~ g~'.. =. =..= s a' s s C ' E* ' C...
.i a*.. ~ ~..e '. =.. ' =. ~ ~. ~ - '. -
- e ne.&,....., assCC.4 4
.:..w 1 4.. J,. "a.a, 194.7 a ..a ..e.... ..s e A.
- 4...w.
ye. * * %.e C. -***'.
- ^
-w ....s*.-"....-. A.. r.a. w.. r. 4 %._1. go..'.4.g gue.w. gg 7.g3, .... 4 ry. .....3, ...,e.go 3,._wn. gig, y. .4.71 k.g 14 -4. g A..c.w. o4-.A -.~ ...a .eC. Cfe. ..#*"s. y .~ s n ..g e. .k. c e. +. 1 ~ yd. n b.. e 4 41.*s g %. g.e. 4 b.ie.e.. .#.4 w ..v J 4e.w..J ...g.. .g. .e. n ....,.e .et. ...,,a. 4s.k.e e. a. * * % e. .,.a. A. A.. .A.3-~. .g . = f... ,...1 . ~..e.?.. %. .....4.A g. g*;
- 4
.3 og g.. a '.#.#.' *. d.
- e. sC g.
.. g ....,, w., 3 se. + ,e .A
- 4., e s.. e g. 4 -. 4, h e....e,w 4..u.g.
...g %. .g ~.g "e* a s "~" hs an d -"..*. e ".. #. V e *..' *.*..M..." g- ".O y""."".. #. #. e #,.. g a s.. C 9.. .e. --, %.s i. E. e 4.,.1 a 4.o. c.d.4.. *w. ...? .g ..w. .._. 4. _? _1 w. e g.
- ..g 4 _.. k..
.e .e *. 3,... 33, 7
- C a. d * '- *.*.,
." -"als d.#%~.~~s, etc.
- a...;
.y - e. gyd gi e,.%.7._ g .-...J,..A .e.. 3
- 1. e 4
e.. . g,. g...C .w -g..- e 1* C.., C.e .._%.. c. 4 %. 7. .. e
- a.,.1,
.la. e A. 4, .w . e,..e... a..... C.e a.. a e. e. ._3. e.. C a. C....a g .y
- m. n.a sO.4. ~. a
- a. w,. c.). i
\\.. -L ".'s.. 1., .,.s. 7. -.g
- 4. g,1,.,.49a-s.e g.e..
4%.,u.e> SC
- ..".a*.
.#.#."". Cul# **"*'.#'.'e.',,", *c w. o ..4.. %... r g., g e.4 4.e 3 *- * **. a. d, 'JCd d. '.O ^# 3"*..*. **2. .. : '.# * "..d a. ^a*..*+,, .f..
- - ~
.,..na. v... e.,v a, a 3.u.n. a. s,n. k. e. e e E. .. 4 & u
- a..e.t c y 4
. t., u..
- m. e.-
s.. wr ..g .g. ,,,. 1 4 ..s.. .a...,. VCu'd '.e "* C"*ed k" " e "'C**#'a*~# 3 ' * ** e" * /" ...g . r w- - -- ~~~
- s. e 7e.a.sa.te
,.n.e. E a C*..u.e. C .. 2 .e s.e....c. %e CC.e..,. 1 CC Q a E,.a3 g -- ~...... ..w. _ e. e. a. a.s. *..*.. a.." *. y e f. e. 2.e.. e >., g f .e ga.e... c. e .y.e. .e e.. = 1 ...A .e ..etgu y #....,,. ? CC.. 4.s b..e.Ab*ie. .w, .
- 4,.
3.,y. ...
- k.a.
s, s c a. .. C.s .k. ...9 Cs-en.... C.,.., a *./, ...a.
- u..,...... 4 s.9 a
.a .t,n.n].., *s e u.,. .r M
- e..a. m...a..
L.s. e -is t -.. s.e Ae, a. ~. .~ ---.m 4, 1.....e s.e C..t..... E.
- .4.r, e 9 e s.
..k.e C~..1 .C .k. w e C.C.... yill g + n g. e.~ e."". &*.*. C." a .e y ". C"E hu*.*.C3 and qU.ak..'."s ..-u"
- h e
- C.
3. "y f.. #.*. #. C" ' # "" *. 3 C. "yCVe". d ~ ** d . e
- o. s..,. 9..., 9 4 a.4
,. C .O .,4 .s.a. .k. r., ..C.1 . d a, b... se. 4 ,0 ?..a .h.e ra..X....e. saA.e, e S,.a. e.'.w......., ~... ....a s.4 ....,....a
- 3 g e. e -. C,.a.
- g....,.
4,..
- 9.g.. gg...,d.
e.
- k. 4, go.
a ...yf .e-.,
- u.. 4.k.e
.1. ,s. . 4.......e,7 9 Cad ".#.*' '.e".'.*"..".#*".*.d. a"*..*.**.*.#.'"/' ..w f.-. .e,.. *w.oc t 4. E...r4 7 4 a ]. .. ~. C. e.,..,
- 6. e
- s.., u
.,. e e . C S.,.. .~ .w .f O
- s..
f. a. C',*..***..*..**e*d.'~
- e."#.C " *.ka
- . C110'. #..*g~ ""***d."~"*."
"g".#.^..*
- '"V'.*o~ *.be
~ g.w.. .w a ..1 ..C (., y
- 3. u
......... r. e a...a, g,, ? -~. -- i -.o.~J ..r .r i, (g) N. 4., -.4 .e.,.a.g.e g.g. . ~. y y (3'.) N. 4.. L,,.. C;* 0013. ,....G. .y y { (L). 4 p.ak e", --- e.. In r. /..C ) C.'.
- e..' e.' a...d..-".. va.',ve.
i ( 4., ) C' a. s e *.'. e -. c...-.. C.'.a..
- e a._'
..., " ~ -. ".a'.e. I a k ("T) C10se the renC Cr CCCis:; pu=p seal ':Jen'C ater valves. i l i n,. ) .v e.et,. e.,.... s..e.,. ..,.e 3.y.,-- ..4.,. s y .a . w.. _ge.,.....a.,,.._.,,,.. .,.-,.a., 3 s... -. -- ..g,,ye ga. _e i .w.. C,.ed .,... w....,.,.... *.. a. ,-s I i t,9 ) .e., e e.
- s. e..
. e.,.,. .......,. s).. s. e m,,. C=. a a e. ..-.v.. ...C J g,. 4 .,.w. ... w<.. s. gg *..cw.-.4 . a.. s e *. a : d * *4 # 'es** ..... ~... */ r 4 , i, . C *. bu e C*., e c'". .' "; " ~. e.*.
- G "u.##.# * # * * * ' " '.#'.".
&. *. C.*." c aC *. C * ..y .a ....4 .e.u.... a s..,. g.....,.4.,. C. e. 4 _..s go.u... g ggs.., ..,.1 n. e g. T s g. y ,w.......,. u..a.,. e. . w.e.._ e "..."a. d ,, g . w . C. y %". *. 'g .. a ~ ~ - uni ..,..4
- b. a.
- " * ".~ " ~" "s"
"."~"'. #..". e D;"g"" 53.'. V E.' ". a. 5. y.. ..C"u w. e., 3 ,.... 1....3 g. . k. e .w.., w.. .-,..1 ,... e " C.".* V.# ~..".b..- a a *.'*...#.C"..*.*.*.#. 'C e ".3 c. d E.a...4.. l' , a. .e.w** e.4-- 4 . h.
- m. e.. C S 1,.. e.
a s .w d .. r J " r - ~ ~ ~ - .r.* s.,., e .. s... 3.4..is s.e ..e4...a. J...e-. 4 J e.e.w. C,.,.4 s4.94.,.. C. ...,n. s = e . a C, e. 6.,.... a-a .w .j i f .4 .. C., f.. 4. .- o i f. g.,... e g.d.., %w.. .e.. E
- C " E*- ' e *.* ". ". S "
a.~a. e..a. a. ".. .g r a aa s a4 4.r.,
- S,.,..,..
y ,4s..i., . b. e o * ".* ' C.* #..* *. d. ".r"a..".'~..#".". n
- '"**e *a"**CLS '.# '.i 5.,, e
. ~. ~.~ . ~.. 2s...e. .n .u. e..... 1 ..C a a g.pg *) .lf./, .% W;h.'*t y, i*[g w.. f...,4 a.Y 9 e -.6 ..s.. n.. v a.;.,/._ S, A. S C 4 %. A. 4. +ke .ec.A.n. 5 ghwCy., yb. 4.w 4.99 k.e .eA. "a L.a.19 ", - t ==
- r.. - ~.
of g . a.., s. e.,.. 4..,. A. 4.*.w. w e. A a.e ..-we yw.a., h 4 4.,
- s.
e.. P 7 ...e C, . 1....S. -- or..... .s yy . % c. eu.e -. 4 ..,.e.1 a.i.7..e ..w 4 c h. k.g~y. gs.e,
- e. e *n -
.C *w. -.4. a.a. 4._ c o .w 7 7 -=* a.. o .g-y7.. ..w.. d 4.
- k. e'.' * ' S e C *y *_
- 4.*.t-C.# * '
- S e " 2.lv a. s 'J.*..'.a."*.
a ~f. ~~y .= *t a e.1.'"- a w .A . 4.. s. e... e .~ a y..... % geb ge. c. x g,'$g g C. '. h. 9e.y.t..gga .
- gyk. 4..
J4 x y. . h.e,,,.,,, A. e. S e m,, e,=.1 4 ~. y~ w i.. - e. , y.4 9 9 pC.1 9 e..d...e...- s, yb d.e.k (.._. e..=. ni9y.= e. 4 *.. A. yJ. *- b 4... h. e e,.. *. e, 7 4* e ,.=w. ---.w.. aA 4. am. e. e.. A.,
- e..
sH.+..% Cu* " A fe C.
- %. e. Ce...e.1 ee.
%. e, ee. t..A.e A a.1.r. o a+., 1 e., c n
- 4.= e
.**.. *
- C*g
- ..,m.,.,.A.*.m.S aw e *.C
% c .s= #,w' **=. A *. n.*.
- *% d o h.
- k..
+%. . e. n..n 4 e. * . +. a f.. y-a a.
- c... S.e..
4.
- e...,. C 9.79
.. ~.. n. .e*.**..**C"C'.~"**. "U*..*.*.
- a~a.***."~**..
--7 . e e.A a a. e,. .= g.. e en.. y...w-C. d. Stee.- reSSure. ..n e .,,e3.. .c e.-....,.we -- e. .c.
- ,... a. 4.
e.Ie + e... a- ..-. es .s n...X.Cv eA. y.....C S
- 4...=e C...C, e..-.-
e.. e.... 4 .u. e.. -.4. . A. 4, ng....e. u. g. A .s
- 4.*..b.d-.
- e *.
4. ..g3 4 n eS " "~A
- ".a. " e C .*. S. d..
C.# a a.....-. 7. -,,, ' - - - . 4. % 4 m. .. a w. w.A4*4.e..e
- b g*.
- n..o n.e e *. ae.o.s
- 4. e.
e.# .g g e..*.e.1 .m.e
- b
....S. e
- bp
.-.. g cw -..e an-g Se*#."'M " a*.*.*." a., a.".#**#..'."3 a'.'..'.g**.*. *#**- k.a.*.*.*e.*"*.*.*. d a. '.'.d5.4 * ** ~. ~ a. C. g y e A.. e, e.4.%, e d a b ".*7 a. '**"g S o..e.. o =. A
- w.
1.a *." P 1, A..==,.*..=..,
- b..
.C*. e. c 9
- b.=.
... w "g . ~ ...g ya .y
- 7... =. g
.J. g... Je.
- m. e.
7
- 4...
- 9.y
.g.4.. h. 4
- b.
r.1 %. e,.,.. e. ~ A r '.~7'**.#.C'.*. a
- " a.
.'.'k.~.a.*.**y'
- y* * 'a"' *. C a=%._..
..J. 9 *_ s.",. ,' h e.'.g= e g*. d *., b. '1*. *C 'f*.. a 7 ac#, .eb.**J,.*...' .,4 ..J e.,.=i. . e 4. A.,.._ A_ n.=.. w...,. w e. 4 e..
- 4. e.
e. . n. c.. a . e = .a g .w ~. - - - .. a c, ,4 ._ X*, e. ~e e. 3.1. g., wg3.g s...y g,_.._.,.. A.,. e.. %. .w .w A.4
- 4. e..,
4. .w. .g f e.
- e., n." A e,
4 2 e r. e. u. ...e.., .43" u 4 .a... 4. S. .. a. 4,...... o.A. C...~ ~. u. C., e - -,.. a. A. g s.u 4.e . n e % 4. '. 4.,.., a %.o4 e..g ~.u...
- r. e n_* e ys...
n.eeA4 4. .e g A. g3., .4.~~_ .a 7 .g g.. ...4.u. J ,,4 e...A C. 3.. o o .C 3 e. n, A. n..~.e.., C,. - e.u. e _,,. 4 P.=.. 4 . u... C C. ~ e..CV.Ame A.. 1 .47-s d 4 e,. ...,. 4. C,., .A O. .,.1 4 = 7 .g7.. a, ,r.._ .O.w. 4 S., _-..,. 4, .c, A e.n. 4
- s..
. A. 4. ,, w..-. A
- w.,
.w. .5 a ~. ..,,..e ._7 A ,.e. .1 .,..4..
- 4..
.w. .s -gy g. 4.e.e. ., p e. ..g e,,, r,, e,,.1 a n.. A.4 .w, .3 %.. gg. 4 .4
- 4 4
e1.. og em m.,. .r ( .. m.4., s,.. a -,,.4.e ,...e 4 A a.. I e.,,.. C, e, r. a..,...... . t.. D .n.. e. .......s. n,.,g4.94 .,. _..., - S *. a*. # '.' S **#.'_'
- e
'7.' ',',,", #. # a. d. ~.~"a..a. " " e _# '" *
- S e S _-' 7.' d..d' #. a_ e, ',,,,,....,,. '.
d s. --7.ia
- P'.*.*a.
S *..i a. *.*. C *. S, .... e S a's**.*.#',-a.*.*. S u "' ". .'.S
- 4 a S *. e
- a. '.' ' "r * *" *.* *.. *.*,
e., g 9 4,... e
- g a.
-e .c ~... .....s. a
- ,='.~
i.e., a e *
- a. a. * = 1 4.
e i. a.A A 4
- 4,= *=,
.*a. '."'b.._ ,=,..*.==.9 4'..== a. *. J..e *. S .E ** 4
- 4. c.*. A e*,.
-..3..../ 4,...,... 4.w. 4.... .A g, e.... e.,...,..*S ".****C". 24 .4.-* .~_ ~..g %+ 6 g 8 3f i 8" #)
- 5. e.' 4..e p l".
. s 3. .g .f. .p.
- . %f y g*g
y ;.'. -t . m -y} g r
- '..f y
e% c= trol. Sufficient indica: Ors and alar =s vill be previ'.ed sc that the central c....-o '.~,~~-. c y e -= *. - '. s - ' e avar a c " s'. ~. = '.-'.'.'....s.4...'.'d..~.s~.---.e ~. ecstrol staticas. J. h.7 SAFT."Y 77.G?.IS l De pri=a:/ cbjectives in the ec=tr:1 rece laycut are :: previde the necessary ..-o's .o s'.ar., cr.-" e, and..e k " *. d..v
- .b e... ~..'...- un..
.-d. *. *'* su'."d..d.a.,- d- ~ for:Etics display and alar: "Oni*criE to insure safe a {_ reliable cperatic: .n ~ _,,--. E.n.a a a.<.f;.. x..at <n-g. .e. r. e n. t,,._-.LS<s..<,, u.e.<ye .c -;.<._ ~ y n. .. e.,. < ~/.a.~ a... an.<a....e a.a...s.
- n. e,.,y,_
c,.u.,. .. a
- a..,
.e 3....,. sgg. /.*.g. ....,e.<. c'.. =. .~~.~.~..~.1 ~.~.~ Er'. "..' ' '
- e.' e s.' - ~ ^ ~..~ '- * -
= ice the ti=e required fer *he opera *cr to evaluate *he syste= perfer-a-ce ...a.e g. <.a,,, .. c.a s. a...ces. .~,/ ge, < g. <..s.e.--_ ...e. e. a e._ ___c n. a_t. a..c.s..<,, ,...a .a be alar =e_d. s.o. t_h.at the cc. eratcr =ay take ceirective actic: usinS_'the :: trcl s jrevidedc the ccatr:1 ;E el. 4 i
- - ^ * * *
~%_ I i 1 l PDDR BRIGlR i l l l 7-38 m.