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Transcript of Az Roisman Before Presidents Commission on Accident at Tmi.Ie Bulletin 79-05A,Natural Resources Defense Council Inc 790823 Statement & Industry Response to TMI Encl
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9 Testi=cny of Anthony ::. Roisman,

.~.

Staff Attorney, Natural Rescurces Defense Council, Inc.,'

Before the i

President's Cc-d ssion en the Accident at Three Mile Island August 23, 1979 l

1 1

I i,

The natural Rescurces Cefense Council, Inc., is a nationa_,

nonprofi, tax-exampt en'iiren= ental crganization dedicated to che ecnser ration and wise use of cur natural rescurces.

i NROC has appronimately 45,000 ne=bers.

80012000oi

The enviren= ental radicactivity monitorinc procra= of ne A=plicants is inacecuate to accurately measure ene dose deliverec the pumlic curing normal and accicent conditions.

The warning and evacuation plans of the Acclicants and tne Cc==cnwealth of Pennsvl-v'nia are inacecuate and unworkable.

a No o=eratinc anc evacuation =lans are shown to ce workable en:cucn live tests.

These statements were made with reference to Three Mile Island Unit 2.

They were not made by the Nuclear Regulatcry Cc==ission or any other entity investigating the accident at Three Mile Island.

They were not made after March 28, 1979.

They were made in 1974 by the. York Cc==ittee for a i

Safe Inviren=ent and Citizens for a Safe Enviren=ent, joint intervencrs in the operating license proceeding for the TMI-2 reactor.

3cch cententiens were rejected as unsuppertable.

We new knew how very wrcng those cenclusions were, but we do not know why.

It shculd be the responsibility of this Cc==ission to answer chat questien.

Every nuclear plant new licensed te cperate has been subjected to an extensive review process censisting of a-comprehensive safety review by the Advisory Committee en Reacter Safeguards, the NRC Regulatcry Staff, the Atc=ic Safety and Licensing Scard and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appec1 Scard cric: to issuance of a construction c.ermit, and, in the case of a centested cperating license proceeding

~

such as TMI-2, all fcur of these er

ies ccnduct.i second e

2 review.

'This process is the heart of the regulation of nuclear pcwer and provides the cnly assurance to the public that if a nuclear plant is built and operated there is reasonable assurance of adequate protection for the public health and safety.

The TMI-2 accident is dramatic evidence that this process is a total failure.

Not only were specific problems new recognized as real rejected as' unsubstantiated challenges to the plant, but the principal design and opera-tional defects in the reactor itself were totally ignored.

This failure of the regulatory process to detect and correct significa2 e flaws in the design, ccnstruction and opeartion of nuclear plants is in no way limited to TMI-2.

The same failures of process are equally applicable to all nuclear plants, as can be seen from the zear disastrous fire at the 3rcwn's Ferry nuclear plant, the absence of an Emergency Core Cooling System for pirits such as Indian Point Unit 1 (265 Mwe), the inadequate earthquake design approved for the construction of the Diablo Canyon plant, the sloppy precedures to prevent worker exposures to radiation at the Kerr-McGee plutonium facility in Oklahcma, and the West Valley l

Reprocessing Plant; and the list could centinue.

A prime function of this Cc= mission should be to uncever the reascns behind the regulatory inadequacies of the Nuclear Regulatcry Commission.

The regulatory history of TMI-2 provides some valuable clues.

3 First, we should focus en the two issues which were raised and rejected -- the inadequacy of radiological =cni-toring in the event of an accident and the inadequacy of emergency planning.

In addressing radiation =cnitoring, the intervenors

~ ~ ~

focussed on the absence of active, real-time detectors to

~~

determine dese.

The cententien was rejected based en the testi=cny of witnesses offered bv. the Recula:cr~ Staff and i

the Applicant with the ASL3 making the."clicwing "inding (Metrc=clitan Edisen (Three Mile Island Unit 2) L3P-77-70, 6:IRC 1135, 1201-02 (Cece=her 19, 1977)):

With respect to eff-normal conditions that might j ustifv the evacuaticn of = embers of the public within the icw population :ene, testi=cny was offered to the effect that the environmental menitoring program is not intended for use in formulating acr in i=c.lementine. evacuation =lans.

With respect c 'b.e ab.414 v,

r.." a c _ _' ~. a_,'

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--=*___a de t a -~ ~ ~ a-to aid in evacuation plans, such detec crs would again he of licele or no value.

Instru-mentation used to determine the severity of an accident, and the need for any offsite emergency action, is 1ccated en site and is monitored frc= the reacecr cenercl rec =.

This instrumentar en =cni:crs area conditions and prccess vard '.bles such as the reac Or ecolant temperature and pressure and any abncr=al release of radicactivity.

In the event that accident cendiciens arcse for which evacuation would be an effective protective

=easure, necessary measure =ents and ccrrective actions to mitigate the consequences, inclu-d *..g.~.a - ' ' ' 1 - ' n c.= c.' 'a ' ~- a a....e - e ~. ~~

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cu'A "e re '

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10-15 minutes of the incident.

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.'.~.v. c # 'a ' -a ac 4".e detectors would register any abncr=al reading since no release frc= the centain=an: would l

as yet have occurred.

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4 of time (to allow the release and transport of radiatien emitters) would the detectors be of any use, and even then they would add nothing to the infor=atioc. that the pre-viously dispatched offsite survev. teams would not already have gathered.

Significantly, the intervencrs offerred no extensive expert testi=cny on the issue.

Equally significantly, the ASLB focussed its inquiry en the advantages of the additional monitoring equipment and not en the adequacy of the existing monitoring system.

Not surprisingly, the adequacy of radia-tien monitoring was not adequatelv. addressed because the only parties with resources sufficient to make their case were advocates of the issuance of the license and the ASL3 limited the focus of its inquiry to those issues raised by a party and not corollaries to those issu. s.

In a post-TMI-2 accident analysis prepared by the Offi ce of Inspection and Enforcement of the NRC (NUREG-06 00 ), in contradiction to the findings of the ASL3, they found the following (M., pp. 13, 14) :

Less than half of the portable radiation survey instru=ents were cperational.

Several installed area radiation =cniters and air-borne radicactivity =cnitors, which were not e)sential for nor=al Operations, but would have been useful during the emergency, were cut of service for repair.

Subsequently, there were several radiation

=cniter alarms indicative of an emergency situation, but no emergency was declared.

It is no answer to the prchlem exemplified by TMI-2 to require that batter and =cre

-a14 '"' a cff-site =cnitoring be previded

5 and to p cvide that public notification of an off-site emergency occur within 10-15 minutes of the initiating event.

That is cbviously closing the barn decr after the horse has escaped.

Before attempting to draw any conclusions from this first example of the breakdcwn of the regulatory process, let us turn to the second rejected intervencr centention based en the inadequacy of emergency plans.

Here the inter-vener fccussed en the need for real training for state and 1ccal efficials and the public.

In respense the Applicant, the Regulatory Staff and the Cc==cnwealth of pennsylvania produced witnesses to prove that Pennsylvania in general and the Dauphin County Civil Defense in particular had respended prc=ptly to non-radic1cgical e=ergencies withcut real drills, that in ec=bination with the Applicant all necessary =cnitoring and warning of the public would be accc=plished in suffic a"~

~d e te have an crderly evacuation d

without drills, and that the public would respond bettar to the evacuation crder if they had act been drilled because, according Oc a Staff witness (Metreeclican Edisen (Three Mile Island Unit 2), ALA3-436, 8 NEC 9, 17 (July 19, 1978)):

"the general pcpulatica reacts =cre readily, fears =cre readily things which it kncws nothing about" (Tr. 1352); and that, when confrented with such an event, a persen

" generally respcnds :o pecple whc cell him wha: Oc do :o protect his health.

It is the fear of the unkncwn that makes

[pecple] act"(ibid.).

6 In the face of this testi=cny, the ASL3 concluded that (L3P-77-70, sucra, 6 NRC at 1204, 1205-06):

We see no need to recite here -- as do the proposed findings of the Applicants, the Commonwealth, and the Staff -- those uncontradicted, descriptive characteristics of the Applicants' state of preparedness, l

nor that of the cooperating state and local agencies upon whom the success of th; emergency plans depend.

We find these

_\\.

to me adequate.

i Examination by the Intervenors and the Scard cast no doubt upon the adequacy of the ce==unications equipment and the various =cdes of cc==unicaticn.

The Board finds these matters to be satisfactory.

Furthermore, the Staff's witness cbserved that the Applicants' =cnitoring capability outside the LP" would be =cre than adequate until such time as subsequent or supple-mental monitoring teams would be available to the Cc==onwealth.

Indeed, the URC regional office itself could provide up to 20 additional inspectors, in additien to other teams frc= 3 cokhaven Laboratory and radiological teams fr = western Pennsylvania (T=. 1306-1909).

The Cc==enwealth's civil defense witnesses saw no cc=prc=ise of their cwn effectiveness of response because of their not having tech-nical knowledge and training concerning radiological matters.

Staff witnesses testified that the Cc==cnwealth's 3RE possessed the requisite radiolcgical know-hew needed to assist with procactica of the public health and safety.

The Scard finds that the evidence adequately supports the conclusion that the effectiveness of state and 1ccal officials will not be hampered by not having had tech-nical training in radiolcgical matters.

More broadly, we find that the record suppcrts the conclusica that Cententica 3, in its en-tirety, is withou: = erie, and ths: the Staff

7 has properly assessed the adequacy and work-ability of the emergency response.

We also find the amergency and evacuation plans to be both adequate and workable.

These findings must be viewed in light of the follcwing additional finding by the Scard (L3P-77-70, supra, 6 NBC at 1203):

The joint Intervenors presented no prefiled testi=cny, It was not surprising that the record suppcrted the rejection of the intervencrs' contentien when the only evidence efferred was frc= those who opposed the contention.

~4 hen the evacuation planning issue was addressed by the Appeal Board, it confirmed the evidentiary deficiency in the interveners' case and raised at least three additional readblocks to a thorough exploration of the issue.

First, it. found that evidence newly disecvered by the intervencrs which night shake the credibility of Cc==cnwealth witnesses was not ad=issible because it was based en a two-year-old publicatica and could have been explored in the hearing if the intervence had pressed the issue further when a witness they sought frc= the Cc==cnvealth inizia117 refused tc appear; second, it found that (ALAB-486, sutra 3 NRC at 23):

existing Cc==is31cn regualtiens do not require considera:ica in a licensing prc-ceeding of "the feasibility of devising an emergency plan fer the prcrection (in the event of an accident) of persons located cutside of the icw pcpulatica

=cne[;]"

and, third, it fcund that (id. ) :

8 the requirements for evacuation planning are rected in 10 CFR Part 100, and that Part 100 assu=es releases of radiation based upon a hypothetical major accident "that would result in potential hazards not exceeded by those frem any accident considered credible."

Thus, what accidents might conceivably occur at the particular plant in question is irrelevant to planning for emergency evacuation; that is based solely on the Part 100 hypothetical accident and the assumed releases of radio-activity resulting therefrc=.

In its report, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement fcund (:iUREG-0600 at pp. 5, 11-12, 13, 19, 20):

At approximately 2-1/2 hcurs into the accident, substantial fractions of the rea: tor core were uncovered and had experienced sustained high temperatures.

This condition would be ex ected to result in fuel da= age, substantialireleases of core fission products, and hydrogen generatien.

The =agnitude of these conditions were [ sic]

not recognized by the plant staff.

The provision of substantive technical' support to the management team directing emergency actions en operational matters sudfered pri-

=arily as a result of cc=.cnicatica didfi-culties.

This was evidec ed in three ways:

o Infer =ation (beth data and plans) trans-

itted to offsite support, which had been hurriedly =cbilized, suffered f c

time delays.

Thus, the effsite groups were dealing with historical and limited data.

o The individuals who had to provide data to offsite groups had concurrent duties pertaining to the management of the emergency.

The emergency duties always teck precedence as would be apprcpriate.

o The physical ec==unica icns facilities vere inadequate to handle the volume of l

infor=aticn requests and transmittals t

that this kind of acciden: required.

1 I

9

9 The investigation has cencluded that these ce==unication problems are related to the misconceptien that the envelope of the

. analyzed major accidents for this facility are the limiting events.

The duration of these analyzed events are projected to occur in a relatively short time frame.

The pro-vision of the mechanisms needed to mobilize and communicate with substantial offsite technical support en a real-time basis as an accident progresses had, therefore, not been warranted as a part of emergency planning.

However, sc=e workers who would cc= prise Emergency Repair Party Teams and Radiological s

Monitoring Teams had not received adequate trainin in use of e=erc.ency survev. instru-mentation and in radiation prc:ecticn pre-cedures.

Routine retraining cf radiation /

l chemistry technicians was not up to date.

While radiation protection training of the

{

plant staff had been sufficient t: =aintain personnel radiation exposures within linits 1

l during nc =al ccerations (when radiation i

levels were icw), it had not precared workers 1

to cope with the high radia:icn levels that would scen exist inside the Unit auxiliary and fuel handling buildings.

Prior to and during the emergencv., the licensee performed his cwn ensi e personnel 1

i desi=etry program.

No cne individual was 1

assigned progra==stic responsibility for this progra=..

During the incident, sc=e rad. ation/cne=a.strv. :acnnicians crocessec.

J their cwn T'D badges.

Beginning March 29, cne radiatien/ chemistry

="- 'cian, who had not cperated the system in over a year, worked withcut precedures for over 40 continuous hours, l

In general, the licensee's ensite and offsite survey teams perferred surveys in

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appropriate areas at approprista times.

Ecwever, during a five and One-half hcur.

e." a d # -...

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Sc h cf these perieds of time were within the interval when the na3crity of the ncble gases were released and when a pit =e was well defined because of suffic 2n:

wind speed and al=cs: constant directien.

i I

10 A =emorandum from D. F. Bunch, Director, Program Supper Staff, NRR (May 9, 1979) concludes:

10 CFR Part 100 requires that the assumed fission product release used for site suitability calculations should be one "that would result in potential hazards not exceeded by those from accident con-sidered credible."

The TMI release of 13 million curies of Xe-133 is substantially greater than that which was estimated as the maximum credible release by the staff in its review of the OL for TMI-2 and is probably larger than that which would be predicted to occur in any of the site suitability analyses for plants reviewed by the staff in the last decade.

Before drawing any conclusions f cm these two rejected and subsequently verified intervenor contentions, we will turn to a second class of deficiencies in the regulatory process -- these issues which were not raised but which we new suspect were the root causes of the accident.

There is no comfort in the existence of a " Lessens Learned" task force for a technology which in the United States has over 70 operating reacecrs and nearly 70 = ore under construction or cc=mitted.

Lessens learned are supposed to be the product of a testing program, not a cc==erciali:ed techncicgy.

But of course there are those who will assert that all technelegies are subject to errors being learned after they are ec=merciali:ed --

e.e.,

the CC-10.

But for nuclear pcwer chat argument won't work.

First, the censequences of a mistake are tco catastrophic:

"We almes los Pennsylvania."

Second, tcday's reacters are being built and cperated in the face of dozens of serious

11 unresolved safety problems identified by both the NRC Staff and the ACRS.

A=cng the 30 generic safety ite=s still listed as unresolved by the AC3S are the folicwing which are relevant to the TMI-2 accident (ACRS letter to Joseph Hendrie, November 15, 1977, Status of Generic Items Relating to Light-Water Reactors: Report No. 6 (Attachment, Group II, items II-4, II3-1, IIC-1) ) :

II Ins truments To Oetect (Severe) Fuel Failures In the event of substantial fuel failure, including the pessibility of fuel melt, large a= cunts of fissica products could be rapidly released to the reacec: ccolant and possibly to the environment.

Instru-

=entation capable of early warning and timely response-may avert an inciden becc=ing an accident.

Instrumentation related to such diagnostic purposes for 14 ted fuel failure is being 4

used en = cst pcwer reacecrs.

. Further work is required Oc establish criteria for similar instru=entation for severe fuel f ailures.

II3 Cc=puter Reac c: Prceection Systa=s The proposed systems would centain sc=e types of cc=penents and subsystems not previcusly used for reacecr protection.

It is necessary that the required system reliability, both during nor=al cperation and under postulated abner =al conditiens, he established through an apprcpriate cc=binatica of tests and analyses.

While the issue cripinsted with the S&W Hv.brid conce : in is ec.ually a=..lica-ble to the Orce.csed CE and U_ ce==. uter reactor protecnicn systems.

IIC Lccking Cut Cf ECC3 Pcwer-Cperated Valves The physical locking cut of electrical sources to specific =cter-cperated valves required in the engineered safety functienc cf 2005 has been required, based en the assumptien than a spuricus i

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12 electrical signal at an inopportune ti=e could activate the velves to the adverse position; e.g.,

closeu rather than open, or open rather than closed.

While such an event has a finite probability another probability exists that the valves might be adversely positioned due to operator error.

The ACRS believes the matter should be sutdied using a systems approach, and considering such items as:

(1) the evalu-ation of the probability of a spurious signal; (2). time required to reactivate the valve operator; (3) status of signal lights when the circuit breaker is cpen; (4) the possibility of locking out in an i= proper position due to a faulty indicater; (5) other designs with i= proved reliability without leck-out; (6) the advantages and disadvantages of corrective action by an aler: cperater in case of incorrect posi-tiening vis-a-vis a system with pcwer locked out.

The NRC Staff lists 41 unresolved safety proble=s which require priority attention because their resolution eculd "(1) provide a significant increase in assurance of the health and safety of the public, or (2) have a significant i= pact upon the reactor licensing p ccess."

NUREG-0371, Vol. 1, No. 1 (November 1977)., One of the items identified by the Staff as requiring further analysis and research is " Instruments for Monitoring Radiaticn and Process Variables Curing Accidents."

To these lists of unrescived safety proble=s must be added all the new items which TMI-2 has uncovered.

The ACRS and the NRC Staff have suddenly disecvered problems never i

hefore anticipated.

The ACES lists these in its varicus interi= rescrts to the Cc==issicn and the NRC Staff lists the= in various decu=ents including the "Lassens Learned" l

e

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13 i

report.

But, as if driven by sc=e uncentrollable addiction, all these new problems and their solutions are for " manana,"

and, for the operating plants, it is business as usual.

An examination of the decket for TMI-2 does not dis-close any serious attentien havingr been given either to the

. problems previously listad as unresolved which were part of the accident or to problems which subsequently have been identified.

Thrcugh eight separate reviews by four distinguished groups of experts, the bulk of the problems which lay at the rcot of the TMI-2 accident were not even discussed, much less resolved.

Finally, in the list of my examples of the failure of the process must be included the fact that the TMI-2 accident was not new.

At least as of January 19, 1979, James G.

Kepp)~~

Director of the NRC Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement, identified the accident in a cavis-Eesse inciden: report, noted its relevance for TMI-2 a=cng others, and cbserved that there was a regulatcry requirement to notify :he ASL3 for the affected reacters.

New we have learned that similar experiences =ay have cccurred with foreign reacters.

Ncnetheless the notification was not provided and the issue was not developed in the regula: cry prcCess.

What do I see as the lessens lwarned from all of this?

They are, ! helieve, cbvicus frc= the preceding discussion:

14 I.

A regulatory process in which these participants who have substantialAf all the financial resources are in support of licensing the plant does not adequately explore all relevant

'ssues.

II.

The role of the NRC Regulatory Staff as an advocate for the licensing action is superfluous

' and ' wastes valuable talent which could be better used.

III. The only effective regulatory precess for a technology as inherently da.7gerous as nuclear pcwer is one in which substantial sums of =cney are made available to ce=petent persens who oppose the technology and who will then have both the resources and tb.e inclinatica to force out into the decision-making prccess all the potential flaws of the technology.

To i=plement these lessons requires, first, that funds he made available for the participation of cc=petent nuclear cppenents in the licensing precess for every nuclear plant, in every rulemaking and in the daily buniness of the NRC.

The ces cf such participation, even if lavishly funded, would be only a fraction of the cost which IMI-2 has caused and will cause.

Second, the NRC Regulatcry Staff should be

~

prohibited frem playing the role of an advccate in the

15 licensing process but should instead have as its sole responsibility, in addition to reviewing applications, the supplementation of the licensing hearing record with additional relevant infor=ation, irrespective o' the side which is favored by such evidence.

The Staff expertise could be called upon by any party where no ec= parable expertise ey4sted elsewhere, but, regardless of the ultimate Staff position en the =erits of the application, the Staff witness would be directed to present the truth, the whole tru h, and nothing but the truth, not to testify in support of Staff conclusiens.

These reforms would not guarantee that only safe i

nuclear plants were built and operated nor that every safe nuclear plant, if any, was built and operated.

Due process cannot guarantee perfect results any =cre than nuclear engineers can guarantee perfect reacters.

But the precass

=ust be refer =ed to increase the likeliheed that the results reached are correct.

The present system, as exemplified by TM!-2, dees not fulfill that functien.

Even issues raised by intervenors are not adequately addressed because the intervencrs are nearly always forced'te present their case withcut adequate technical expertise and withcut the assist-ance cf ccmpetent lawyers.

There are many experts who, with adequate remuneraticn could have assisted the TM!-2 intervencrs to identify all of the crucial issues and to pursue chose issues vigcrcusly with a streng, affirmative case.

~

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16 If that had happened, I am confident that there would not have been a TMI-2 accident, if for no other reason than because a well-funded opponent would have been monitoring other B&W reactors, including Davis-Bess'e.

Once the existence of a financially viable nuclear opposition is established, more experts will become available and even better opposition will evolve.

Critics of these funding proposals raise a plethora of objections, but repeatedly they return to the argument tha t funding opponents will delay the process, and delay is bad.

The argn=ent is spurious because, as the ASLA3 cbserved many years ago (Verment Yankee Nuclear Pcwer Cerecration, ALAS-124, 6 AEC 358, 365 (1973)):

. delay in the issuance of an operating licensing attributable to an intervenor's ability to present to a licensing beard legitimate cententions based en sericus safety problems uncevered by the staff would establish not that the licensing system is being frustrated, but that it is working properly.

Any delay in such a situation would be fairly attr! 2:able not to the inter-venors but to the -

readiness of the fac-lity for cpe.

n.

Celay in the issu-ance of the license is entirely appropriate

-- indeed, mandated -- in that circumstance.

In fact, the ASLAB has been highly ecmplir.entary of the efforts of intervenors in the licensing process, a ce==endation wi=F. to the best of my knowledge has never been given to either the applicant er the Staff.

Alan S.

Rosenthal (Chairman of the ASLAP) ir testimony before the Joint Cc=mittee en Atomic Energy, April 25, 1974, stated:

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18 "In sum, I believe that adjudicatory-type hearings with a full coc. ortunity for euhlic carticipazion are a decided asset in the ventilation of any safety or environmental qucstions which may be associated wi:h tne particular reactor under censideration.

And I am equally convinced that there is no reason why the necessary effect of this approach to licensing adjudication should he wasteful delay."

A:c=ic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, In the Matter of Consolidated Ediscn Cc=canv of New York, Inc. (Indaan

~ ~ - ~ ~ ' ~

Fo n Station, gna: No. 2), 3 AEC d50 (Nove=ner 20, 1974):

"We have in an earlier =e=crandum stated our opinica that the development of plant security requirements were influenced censiderably by the prebing questiens o f CCPI's (Citi: ens Cc==ittae for the Protection of

he Enviren=enti counsel (A A3-177, RAI-74-2, 153, 154, Fecruary 26, 1974).

We continue to adhere to that cpanion.

The responses of the applicant's wi nesses Oc that counsel's exa=inatica at the November 13, 1974 hearing, together with their responses to our questions, are one of the fcundations for cur conclusi.cn that the plan is adequate.

This constructive particip1 icn on an important issue has, in cur judgment, centributad Oc the improvement of the regulatory process, both as an aid to the adjudication of the security issues and in the develoc=ent of the overall rec.ula:Orv. rec.uire-

=ents in an evolving area.*

'.t==ic Saf.aty ind licensing Appeal Scard, In the ':

2: 2r of Ficrii.a ?cuer G Licht Ccc:any (S t.

Lucia ::uc_aar

.M.;ar 2:.an:, Jna:.:c.. ;,.c u -., 3 5, ;c: ce: 7,

.a.

o.

'Thare was need hara for careful probing of :he staff's eff:::s, and the in arvencrs helpad initia:s and cen-duc: tha: prete.

Thus, althcugh hay did nc: achieve

na ulti= ace result thay desired, the intervencrs claarly assisted in the search ic: tru h.

The ccntri-hu:acs they =ada shculd not pass unnoticat."

With a chercugh and cc=plete program to fund opponents, the opposition can and should be required to raise its objec-l tiens in the early stages of Staff and ACRS reviews,. where changes can be made a: minimal cost.

Tcday's hearing process is a culmination of a year or =cre of Staff /ACRS/ Applicant interaction from which intervenors are essentially excluded

19 by their lack of resources.

This, more than anything else, contributes to hearing delays as intervencrs voice objections for the first ti=a in the hearing process.

Today, the Staff is a vigorous advocate in the licensing process, yet the Staff almost invariably ends up supporting

~ ~

~

the position of the Applicant.

Thus, the Applicant, which already has the benefit of involuntary pay =ents by rate-payers to fund its case, is aug=ented by the Regulatory Staff with its costs paid by involuntary pay =ents by taxpayers.

As taxpayers, we can expect that the Staff will be =cre than merely an additional advocate for the Applicant in the process.

It must perfer= a function which transcends any one side in the controversy and serves instead the interests of due process by assuring the existence of a ec=plete and thercugh record.

This Staff function would reduce the actual ti=e required at hearings by Staff witnesses and would assure that all parties could draw cn the Staff expertise when needed ec address an issue, if the expertise were not c her-wise available.

We would all feel =cre confiden,: in the Staff pcsitions new being taken en TMI-2 were it not for the fact that i:

was the Staff who so vigorcusly supported the TM:-2 license.

This Cc==issien was appcinted in paru becsuse the NRC Staff was thcught to be eco involved to be truly cbjective.

Significantly the Staff prencuncements of mea cu1=a since TMI-2 have been limited and have not really examined the Staff cr its functions in a bread sense.

No one would expect

20 an advccate to be able to do such a searching reexamination of its own existance.

The Staff role should be changed.

In conclusion, my =essage today, =y lesson learned from TMI-2, is that this accident is by no means an isolated event to be examined and treated.

It is the latest in a long line of accidents and blunders with nuclear pcwer which are largely attributable to the over-abundance of nuclear propenents and the absence of ce=petent, well-financed nuclear cppenents in the regulatory process.

If nuclear power is so good, it should welec=e vigorcus, c==petent, and funded cpposition.

If it cannot withstand such ceposition, it should be abandened v-

'- ediately.

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3.

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damage since voids in the reactor c: clan sy::am preventad natur=i circulatien.

Acticas To Be Taken b.v Licensees:

1 For all Babccek and Wilecx pressuri:ed water reacter facilities with an cperating licanse (the acticns specified belcw repla:e these specified j

in IE Bulletin 79-05 :

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7. - For =anual valves ce manually-operated =c'er-driven valves which could ce#ea er cceprcmise the fled of auxiliacy feecwater to the steam generaters, prepare and i=plement preceduras which:

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Natural Resources Defense Council,Inc.

917 15TII STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.c. cooo5 203 737-5000 New York O$ce SSA AD OF TRt:5TEZ3

,, g New Toat. N.Y.10017 ch..rmen 212 949-0049 James Siarihail l'ke Chenman

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Michael StcIntosh Western Ofice 3' ice Chasrman 2345 YALE 8TREET Dr. George 51. Woodwell PALO ALTO. CALIF. 94306

$*ke Chestman Dr. Dean E. Abrahamson 415 327-1080 Mrs. Louis Auchtaclass Doris !. Ilistker naseri o. sus.

NRDC Says Funded Intervenors Could Have treacram A.comes.}r.

Prevented Accident at Three Mile Island Dr. Kene J. Dubos Robert W. Ci:more Iadv jadsun. D.3.E.

FOR RELEASE: August 23, 1979 Alun St. Js.senhv.Jr.

Ila-ndrom k.ean Dr. j anus La.derber;

$7E.'E[c75".jr.

In testimony before the President's Commission on o caea the Accident at Three Mile Island, Natural Resources 5','"cNrIS.I'cn, Defense Council Staff Attorney Anthony Z. Roisman stated r/

cur:es s. rmn=ei that the most important lesson learned from the Three

[",7j,",8 Mile Island accident is that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's process for licensing nuclear reactors is sarance nonetecer J. wi ure '""

"a total failure."

jean C. hhm aru 4'ntnew North $ermo,4r. J r.

P'"$.1.Td",,

According to Roisman, during TMI-2's operating d 'd'.

license proceeding, " specific problems now recogniced neur:ce Ataru n,mn as real (were] rejected as unsubstantiated challenges ex uer,,u,:a '

to the plant," and "the principal design and operational 1 h' " ^"2 '",ur defects in the reactor itself were totally ignored."

ua.ume o.a Roisman contended that "(al prime function of th:..s Commission should be to uncover the reasons behind" this failure.

Tracing the history of the unsuccessful efforts of citizen opponents of D1I-2 to raise substantial issues about the adequacy of evacuation planning and radiatien monitoring, Roisman noted that "(n]ot surprisingly, (these issues werel not adequately addressed because the only parties with resources sufficient to make their case were acvocates of the issuance of the license."

Roisman further charged that post-TMI-2 reviewers are not investigating the real problems.

The key to the mistakes made at TMI is not what happened at the time of the accident but hcw such a flawed plant every got licensed.

"Through eight separate reviews by four distinguishad groups of experts, the bulk of the problems which lay at the rect of the TMI-2 accident were not even discussed, much less resolved," Roisman said.

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.cv,sw ad?:yr

2 In order to improve the licensing process, and thereby prevent future TMIs, Roisman proposed that " funds be made available for the participation of competent nuclear oppo-nents in the licensing process for every nuclear plant, in every rulemaking and in the daily business of the NRC.

The cost of such participation, even if lavishly funded, would be only a fraction of the cost which TMI-2 has caused and will cause."

He also proposed that "the NRC Regulatory Staff should be prohibited from playing the role of an advocate in the licensing process but should instead have as its sole responsibility, in addition to reviewing applications, the supplementation of the licensing hearing record with additional relevant information, irrespective of the side which is favored by such evidence."

He noted that under the present system "the Applicant, which already has the benefit of involuntary payments by ratepayers to fund its case, is augmented by the Regulatory Staff with its costs paid by involuntary payments by taxpayers."

If the TMI-2 opponents had been adequately funded, said

Roisman, "I am confident that there would not have been a TMI-2 accident, if for no other reason than because a well-funded opponent would have been monitoring other B&W reactors, including Davis-Besse" (where a similar accident was reported in January 1979).

Finally, Roisman, referring to the TMI-2 accident as "the latest in a long line of accidents and blunders with nucles: power" attributable to a lopsided licensing process, challenged the nuclear industry to test the strength of its case in fair hearings against financially viable opponents.

"If nuclear power is so good, it should welcome vigorous, competent, and funded opposition.

If it cannot withstand sucn opposition, it should be abandoned -- b=nediacaly."

i L

o e

WHAT IS THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY DOING NOW?

More information for media representatives attending the hearings of the President's Commission on Three Mile Island.

In the wake of Three Mile Island, the electric utility industry, coupled with reactor manufacturers, architects and engineers, has intensified its efforts to evaluate and improve nuclear operations, safety, operator training and public information.

Some of these efforts are outlined in the attached report, " Industry Response to Three Mile Island."

The industry is not standing still.

In light of the energy crisis, new energy policies and increased public concern about nuclear power in particular, the industry must continue to assure that nuclear power is safe, reliable and econc,mical. And, the industry must provide, openly and honestly,.as much information as possible to the public.

For details on any of the items outlined on the attached report, and for names of non-industry experts who are willing to speak to the media about energy, contact:

Edison Electric Institute, 828-7584 Mike Segal,!dtAu l$1! 0 CUT OW

% Atomic Industrial Forum, 654-9260, Ext. 22$

Jim Ghiotto, Committee for Energy Awareness, 296-1304 l

INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO THREE MILE ISLAND Committee for Energy Awareness 1899 L St. NW, Suite 605 Washington, D.C.

20036 I

(202) 296-1304 I

INDIVIDUAL COMPANY Immediate response to the Three Mile Island incident began on the individual company level at each of the country's nuclear utilities as soon as bulletins about the accident began to arrive.

Task forces were formed with the purpose of studying TMI events and relating the lessons learned to each individual utility's own nuclear plants.

Communications with both empicyees and the public began inmediately, to report on and interpret what was happening at TMI, so employees and the public would not have to rely totally on media reports for information.

Overall, since the accident, operator training on the individual company level has been reviewed and incroved where needed, new training simulators have been put on order and emergency communication plans have been drafted.

Some companies are planning emergency drills with local civil defense and other state officials.

COOPERATIVE Convinced that what could be done on the company level was only a small percentage of what the industry as a whole could do to assure the safety of nuclear power after TMI, utilities, reactor manufacturers, architects and engineers began pooling their efforts.

The Edison Electric Institute (EEI) Board of Directors established the Floyd Lewis Committee, an ad hoc oversight committee designed to help coordinate the entire industry's post-TMI efforts.

A Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) was established under the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) at the request of the utility industry with the purpose of carrying out a detailed technical analysis of what happened at TMI.

NSAC is to interpret the lessons to be Icarned about TMI and about nuclear reactors in general and make sure that information and other safety information can be efficiently communicated in the industry.

NSAC has already:

completed and distributed a second-by-second technical se-quence of TMI events.

worked on setting up a clearinghouse for nuclear safety information.

It is designed to help coordinate the activities of NSAC with those of the President's Commission on the Investigation of Three Mile Island, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of

~

Energy, Congressional inquiries and utility and nuclear industry trade publications.

has decided to help fund a series of health studies on the long and short term physical and psychological offects of TMI on people who live within a five mile radius of the plant.

The first study, to define the population, is underway.

Interviewers are asking people who live in the area about their health histories and activities the i

I l

t

(

O day of the accident and for nine days thereaf ter.

Future studies include a pregnancy outcome study, long-term disease surveillance, a health benavioral study, a radiation dose assessment study, and a cyto-genic study.

The studies are coordinated and executed by the Pennsylvania Department of Eealth.

Dr. Leonard Sagan, director of biomedical studies at EPRI, is a member of the advisory panel.

NSAC's director is Dr. Edwin L.

Zebroski, head of Systems and Materials Department in the Nuclear Power Division at EPRI.

Staff includes both nuclear experts from EPRI and industry experts.

An Institute for Nuclear Power Operations is also being formed by the industry.

It will establish standards for performance in operation of nuclear plants a..l will devise an auditing system for utilities to use in reviewing their own nuclear operational and management performances.

INPO will be an independent organization which will have the benefit of oversight by prominent educators, scientists and engineers from outside the industry.

INPO will cooperate with the NRC and other government agencies and laboratories, but will maintain its own identity and independence.

Its formation is being directed by Dr.

Chauncey Starr, Vice Chairman of EPRI.

INPO will build on strengths that already exist in individual utility programs.

The Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF), recognising that timely and constructive industry response to TMI is very important, has formed a Policy Committee to consolidate its approach.

Under the Policy Committee are a number of subcommittees, which will face the critical issues of TMI.

The subcommittees include Emergency Response Planning, Operations, Systems and Equipment, Post-Accident Recovery, Safety Anaysis Considerations, Control Room Considerations and Unresolved Generic Issues.

Six reactor ownere groups have been formed.

They will allow for deeper analysis and improved models of the behaviors of reactors made by each of the six different manufacturing companies.

Several of the groups, including owners of Westinghouse, combustion l

Engineering and General Electric reactors, have already met.

General l

Electric and Babcock & Uilcox owners are each forming two separate groups, one covering rezctors presently licensed to operate and j

the other consisting of utilities owning units awaiting operating licenses or construction gemmits.

l The American Public Power Association (APPA) Board of Directors voted May 11 to estaclish a Nuclear Power Task Force.

The Task Force met May 31 and endorsed a resolution which recognized

the need for an open fact finding investigation of TMI, the requirement t

that public health and safety be properly protected, the desireability of utility industry study of the accident through EPRI, the require-ment that consumer interest in continuation of present and planned

~

nuclear power plants be recognized and the necessity to disclose candidly to the public the full costs and all benefits of the continued use of nuclear power.

In addition, the Task Force made a number of recommendations on other issues, including preservation of all energy options, upgrading training, and crisis management.

The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) has mobilized to support the industry's post-TMI efforts.

The NRECA is cooperating with EEI and EPRI efforts and is attempting to communicate all findings to its directors throughout the industry.

A committee of industry financial specialists is cooperating to form a mutual insurance plan.

The plan would apply to extraordinary costs in the event of a future nuclear accident and would help ease the financial impact of a prolonged nuclear shutdown on consumers and investors.

Several utility communications excerts have develooed an emercen:v communications plan which consists of a set of comprehensive guidelines tnat will help provide logical, practical means of getting information out to the public quickly and factually.

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UI.!!TEDSTATES CURRENT EVENTS I'UCLEAR REGULATORY POdi!ER REACTOgg comission THIS C0 PILATIOT: 0F SELECTED EVEt:TS IS PREPARED TO DISSEMIllATE IllFORMATI0t! Ot: OPERATI!;G EXPERIEt;CE AT fiUCLEAR PCHER PLAtlTS Ill A TIMELY mat:llER Afi0 AS OF A FIXED DATE.

THESE EVEtiTS ARE SELECTED FROM PUBLIC It:F0PRATI0t1 SOURCES. f;RC HAS, OR IS TAKIttG C0ttTIIUOUS ACTIO1 ON THESE ISSUES AS APPLICABLE, FROM Att ItiSPECT10ft A!!D EllFORCEMEtti, LICEttSING AfiD GEliERIC REVIEW STANDPOIllT.

1 SEPTBER - 31 CCT0EER 1977 (PUBLISHED DECEMBER 1977)

OPERATOR ERROR On January 11, 1977 while the Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1 was nparating, water frca the Refueling Water Storage Tank was pumped into the containment thrcugh the centainment spray header due to an operator error.

Duri:1g the performance of a quarterly test of the safety injection and centainment spray pumos, the operator noticed an increase in the contair. ment sump level approximately ten minutes af ter the low pressure safety injection pump had been started.

Approximately 3300 gallons of water had been pumped to the containment.

About cne minute later the ventilation isolation actuatien sicnal was received.

At this time the operator reali cd ne had failed to follow the sur-veillance procedures and had left tne discharge valve of the icw head safety injection pump open. He i=ediately secured the pump.

The Reactor Coolant System was checked for leakage and containment entry was made approximately one hour later.

Inspection revealed that a discharge frem the containment spray nozzles had occurred.

A few minutes later power reduction was started.

A second containmant entry was made about an hour later, after containment air samples confirmed that a full face mask would provide adequate respiratory

. protection for the levels of radioactivity in the building.

A detailed inspection revealed no sericus deficiencies and no electrical grounds; the pcwer reduction was terminated at a power level of 83%.

Although the operator had not folicwed the procedure and the discharge valve was open, the centainment spray header isolation valve (HCV-345) e ee=

and the low pressure safety injection to containment spray headerThe cross-connect valve (HCV-335) should have prevented the event.

electric / pneumatic converter on HCV-345 had failed and both red and green position indication lights were on, indicating the valve was partially open.

Prior to the event the auxiliary Building Equipment Operator had taken local control of the valve in an attempt to Af ter about 1/2 inch of stem travel, the completely close the valve.

operator removed the valve pin and the valve went back to its previous The third valve-(HCV-335) position as demanded by the valve positioner.

in the incident had a leakage problem that had been previously identified but no corrective action had been taken.

The pneumatic relay on valve HCV-345 was replaced and valve HCV-335 Valve HCV-344 and HCV-345 are now required to be placed repaired.

in the test mode prior to operating the icw pressure safety injection pump or contain spray pump for testing.

This made along with verifi-cationofanannunciatorwillensurethatbothofthegevalvesare in the fully closed position prior to pump operation.

VALVE MALFUNCTIONS i

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Primary System Depressurization On September 24, 1977, Davis Jesse Nucl ar Pcuer Station Unit No. 1 experienced a depressurization wnen a pressurizer power relief valve failed in the open position.

The Reactor Coolant, System (RCS) pressure was reduced from 2255 psig to 875 psig in approximately twenty-one (21) minutes.

At the beginning of this event, steam was being bypassed.to the condenser and the reactor thermal pcwer was at 263 M'.1, or 9.5%.

Electricity was not being generated.

The following systems malfunctioned during the transient:

Steam and Fee.dwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS).

a.

b.

Pressurizer Pilot Actuated Relief Valve.

No. 2 Steam Generator Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Governor.

c.

The event was initiated at 2134 hours0.0247 days 0.593 hours 0.00353 weeks 8.11987e-4 months , whan a spurious " half-trio" occurred in the SFRCS, resulting in cicsure of the No. 2 Feedwater Startup Valve and loss of ficw to No. 2 Steam Generator.

Approxi-mately one minute later, low level in the No. 2 Steam Generator caused a full SFRCS trip. closing the Main Steam Isolation Valves e

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and the low pressure safety injection to containment spray header cross-connect valve (HCV-335) should h?ve prevented the event.

The electric / pneumatic converter on HCV-345 had failed and both red and green position indication lights were on, indicating the valve was partially open.

Prior to the event the auxiliary Building Equipment Operator had taken local control of the valve in an attempt to completely close the valve.

After about 1/2 inch of stem travel, the d

operator removed the valve pin and the valve went back to its previous position as demanded by the valve positioner.

The third valve-(HCV-335) in the incident had a leakage problem that had been previously identified but no corrective action had been taken.

The pneumatic relay on valve HCV-345 was replaced and valve HCV-335 repaired. Valve HCV-344 and HCV-345 are now required to be placed in the test mode prior to operating the low pressure safety injection pump or contain spray pump for testing.

This mode along with verifi-cationofanannunciatorwillensurethatbothofthegevalvesare in the fully closed position prior to pump operation i

VALVE MALFUNCTIONS

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1.

Primary System Depressurization li On September 24, 1977, Davis _Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit i

No.1 experienced a depressurization wnen a pressurizer power relief valve failed in the open position.

The Reactor Coolant, System (RCS) pressure was reduced from 2255 psig to 875 psig in approximately twenty-one (21) minutes.

At the beginning of this event, steam was being bypassed to the condenser and the reactor thermal power was at 263 MW, or 9.5%.

Electrici ty was not being generated.

The following systems malfunctioned during the transient:

Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS).

a.

b.

Pressurizer Pilot Actuated Relief Yalve.

No. 2 Steam Generator Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Governor.

c.

The event was initiated at 2134 hours0.0247 days 0.593 hours 0.00353 weeks 8.11987e-4 months ,' when a spurious'" half-trip" i

occurred in the SFRCS, resulting in closure of the No. 2 Feedwater i

Startup Valve and loss of flow to No. 2 Steam Generator.

Approx 1-t mately one minute later, low level in the No. 2 Steam Generator caused a full SFRCS trip, closing the Main Steam Isolation Valves l

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The reason for the spurious " half-trip" of the SFRCS has not yet been determined. An extensive investigation revealed several loose connections at terminal boards, but nothing conclusive.

Investigation into the failure of the pressurizer pilot actuated relief valve revealed that a "close" relay was missing from the control circuit.

This missing relay would normally provide a

" seal-in" circuit which would hold the valve open until the s

pressure dropped to 2205 psig. Without the relay the power relief valve cycled or.n and closed each time the pressure of the RCS went above o-below 2255 psig.

The rapid cycling of the valve caused a %ilure of the pilot valve stem, and this failure caused the pr.er relief valve to remain open.

It was determined that the aux.iliary feed pump did not go to full speed because of " binding" in the turbine governor.

The transient was analyzed by the USSS vendor and determined to be within the design parameters analyzed for a rapid depressurization.

With exception of the above noted malfunctions, the plant functioned as designed and there was no threat to the health and safety of the general public.2-3 2.

Feedwater Isolation Valves On two occasions in July, at the Trojan nuclear plant, a hydraulic feedwater isolation valve failed to close upon receipt of a close signal. All other equipment required to operate, functioned

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normally.

The first failure, July 6,1977, had been attributed to an improperly assembled solenoid in the hydraulic actuator.

Investigation of the second failure indicated that b::th events were due to a lack of sufficient hydraulic pressure.

Failure of the valve to close was caused by the pressure regulator leaking and failing to close down to regulate the pressure.

This caused the hydraulic system on the valve to be drained down to a point that the valve would not operate.

Inspection of the regulator revealed that a locking screw on the regulator adjusting

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kneb was loose and would allow the knob to vibrate to any position.

With the regulator improperly set it would not close down to regulate pressure and would allow the hydraulic fluid to drain before the hydraulic operator could function.

A similar problem was discovered on two other valves, although the maladjustment was not sufficient to prevent these valves from operating.

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ML19322C688

Text

itted to offsite support, which had been hurriedly =cbilized, suffered f c

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