ML19322C675
| ML19322C675 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000514, 05000515, Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/28/1979 |
| From: | Kelley C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA) |
| To: | Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322C677 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001200001 | |
| Download: ML19322C675 (10) | |
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August 28, 1979 O
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L Cornel.1 L. Bickwit J. Fitzgerald A. Kenneke S. Chilk C. Kammerer H. Denton V. Stello S. Levine W. Dircks R. Minogue
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y
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August 28, 1979 6
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chainnan Hendrie Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Bradford Conunissioner Ahearne
- ]%3ed by THRU:
James J. Cummings, Director 4:es Office of Inspector and Auditor FROM:
Corenthis Kelley, Inspector / Auditor /s/
Office of Inspector and Auditor
SUBJECT:
HEARINGS HELD BY THE PRESIDENT.'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) held its sixth session of public hearings on the campus of Georgetown University on August 21-23. This is believed by some Commission staff members to have,been the last session of public hearings.
The Commission had not voted on that measure as of the conclusion of the hearings.
This session of hearings featured the Governor of Pennsylvania, NRC officials and an attorney for an intervenor. The hearing agenda is shown as
Attachment:
1' Testifying on the morning of August 21, Pennsylvania Governor Thornburgh explained how he came about issuing an advisory ~ for pregnant women and small children on March 30.
His statements on this matter were essentially the same as those made previously by other witnesses from the State of Pennsylvania.
Governor Thornburgh told of inconsistencies and confusion in the information he was receiving prior to the arrival of Harold Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), NRC.
He added he was more satisfied with NRC as a source of infonnation af ter Friday, March 30.
Many of the Commissioners pursued Governor Thornburgh's reasons for not ordering an evacuation especially since there were inconsistencies in l
the information he was receiving. Also, many Commissioners did not l
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The Commission 2
August 28, 1979 appear to have much appreciation for Governor Thornburgh's reasons for not ordering an evacuation.
The testimony of Joseph LaFleur, Jr., Deputy Director, Office of Inter-national Programs, NRC, primarily concerned a 1974 incident at a Westinghouse plant in Switzerland and the exchange of infomation between the United States and foreign countries. The Conunission drew similarities in the Beznau incident and the event at TMI.
It was pointed out that Westinghouse did not report the Switzerland incident at the Beznau plant until April 1979.
... cording to LaFleur, Westinghouse was under no obligation to report the incident to NRC at the time it happened because the incident preceded the establishment of requirements for domestic vendors to disclose events involving reactors in foreign countries.
(See Attachments 2 and 3 respectively for LaFleur's statement and-the Westinghouse ~ report on the 1974 Beznau incident.)
The Commission asked many questions on the possible impact earlier disclosure of the Beznau incident would have had on NRC with regard to applying " coincidence logic." It was LaFleur's belief that " coincidence
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logic" would not have been eliminated in the United States in 1974 even if the Beznau incident had been reported to NRC.
LaFleur stated foreign countries are not as liberal as the United States at disclosing infomation surrounding events.at power plants.
He added that in many cases,the only way NRC gets the infomation is with a promise to protect;the confidentiality of the documents.
During his test mony, James Creswell, Reactor Inspector, Region III, NRC, related alleged frustration he experienced with trying to surface what he considered to:te serious safety concerns as a result of the 1977 i
Davis Besse incident. Creswell explained the sequence of events with regard to his efforts to surface his concerns and essentially relayed a message that NRC is reluctant to come to grips with safety issues.
Creswell used the experiences of Robert Pollard, former NRC employee, James Conran, HRR, and Daniel Sternberg, Region V, NRC, to substantiate his position.
Creswell used Conran and Pollard as examples of his feeling that to surface and actively pursue.. safety issues may ultimately mean not working for NRC or being placed iniother organizations.
He added his last perfomance appraisal was not positive and drew a subtle connection between his pursuit of trying to satisfactorily resolve his concerns and the negative corrents in his performance appraisal. Creswell said he has had no problems working for NRC since TMI.
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Creswell was queried on the approach he decided to take for trying to resolve his concerns. He stated he felt bringing his concerns to the l
l attention of the licensing boards would be the quickest way to resolve
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The Commission 3
August 28, 1979 them. He again used the experience of Sternberg to support his feelings.
(See Attachment 4 for memoranda conveying infomation to licensing boards.) When asked why he chose to discuss his concerns with Comissioners Bradford and Ahear.ne instead of Chairman Hendrie or Commissioners Gilinsky and Kennedy, Creswell responded he chose Com-missioner-Bradford because of his balance and Commissioner Ahearne because he has a reputation for pursuing technical questions.
Creswell was asked whether he thinks.it would do any good if the President's Commission would make recomendations to change the structure of NRC yet have the same people in charge; he responded, there have been many reorganizations within NRC and the Commission should study the effects of those reorganizations and judge the benefits for itself.
Jesse Ebersole, member, Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS)
NRC, testified that the ACRS relies heavily on the NRC staff for support and answers to questions. He added sometimes the answers are of low quality and gave question 6 of a list of 26 questions he raised with regard to the Pebble Springs plant as an example.
(See Attachment 5 for the list of questions.)
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Ebersole stated the safety evaluation reports (SER) are NRC's primary vehicle for bringing safety issues to the attention of the ACRS, but the SERs' tend to obscure safety issues rather than highlight them.
Much of Ebersole's, testimony related to the Michelson report'and the degree of.consid,er' tion given to the issues the report raised.
Ebersole a
stated that for personal reasons he was unable to follow up on the issues raised in the Michelson report and that he gave a copy of the report to Sanford Isr,apl, NRR, NRC.
Ebersole was asked whether NRC is sympathetic to economic concerns of licensees when it comes to et tblishing safety requirements.
He responded negatively and added that where generic issues are concerned NRC does not bring the burden to bear on licensees.
The testimony of Paul Collins, Chief, Operator Licensing Branch, Office of Assistant Director for Quality Assurance tand Operations, NRP NRC, related primarily to the training of operators and tne human /ma ine interface.
Collins stated there is no regulation requiring that severe transient information be incorporated in training programs.
According to Collins, NRC essentially leaves operator training to the licensees with a minimal amount of policing from NRC.
Collins' answers to many l
questions left the impression that NRC does not adequately evaluate the training programs of licensees or the examinations given to operators.
l He indicated that the TMI accident demonstrated a need for change in the operator training area and told of some ' things that are being done to effect that change. Collins emphasized that his staff consists of nine full-time employees and 22 part-time employees with no experience in l
operator training. He added the NRC has given some hope that this i
situation will change.
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The Commission 4
August 28, 1979 During his testimony, Roger Mattson, Director, Division of Systems Safety, NRR, NRC, responded to questions concerning many TMI-related topics. He stated the Standard Review Plan calls for isolation of containment to be triggered on two signals and that TMI-2 was not bound by that requirement at the time of the accident.
In responding to a
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question Mattson stated the case of implementing a new regulation is weighed against the incremental gain in safety.
In response to questions on the Michelson report, Mattson stated the training and procedures incorporating the issues in the Nichelson report could have prevented the TMI accident.
After an extensive line of "who recommended what" type questioning, the Comission requested written clarification on the basis for Chairman Hendrie's recomendation to Governor Thornburgh concerning an evacuation.
Mattson commented on Creswell's testimony by stating Creswell's picture is not shared by him (Mattson). He added he encourages free flow of dissenting views in his office and pointed out that a review by the U. S. General Accounting 0ffice found about 95 percent of the staff said they felt free to raise issues.
The planned hearing schedule and line of questioning were disrupted on August 23 when the President's Comission allegedly first became aware of Harold Denton's intent to resume the licensing review process.
Denton was questioped about three hours on such topics as the basis for his decision to re'comend resumption of licensing reviews, the substance of Denton's August 20 memorandum to the NRC Commissioners (see Attachment 6),
the recommendations of the Lessons Learned Task Force and whether Denton's recomendation to resume licensing reviews forecloses any recommendations that will be made by 'the various groups investigating'the TMI incident.
The Comission seemed outraged over an account of an' interview with Denton which appeared in the Washington Post on August 23 and over Denton's August 20 memorandum to the NRC Comissioners.
Denton thoroughly explained his reasoning ror his decision to resume licensing reviews and emphasized that such decisions have to be made based on what is available to him now. He pointed out that resuming the licensing process does not foreclose any future recommendations and that such recomendations.will be given complete consideration.
Denton further stated that if based on future information it is detennined that there is a need for change, revocation of a license or other appropriate action, such would be taken without hesitation.
The Comission members seemed astonished that they were not notified of Denton's intent prior to reading it in the paper or prior to the August 20 l
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The Comission 5
August 28, 1979 memorandum being placed in NRC's public document room.
This seemed to be the source of much of their dissatisfaction.
Comissioner Lewis viewed Denton's decision as an act of NRC thumbing its nose at the President's Comission. This type attitude appeared prevalent among the Comission members.
Denton pointed out that his decision to resume-the licensing process merely rescinds action he took about three months ago to put a moratorium on the licensing process pending the conclusion of the Lessons Learned Task Force investigation. He added he now has the recommendations of the task force and has incorporated them into the licensing process and on that basis decided to rescind his actions of three months ago.
Denton was asked to submit a copy of all memoranda between himself and the NRC Commissioners concerning the licensing process from the time of the moratorium until'present.
At the conclusion of intense questioning of Denton, the Commission voted unanimously to subpoena one or all of the NRC Commissioners to appear before the President's Comission on the afternoon of August 23.
The Comission members were much less emotional during the testimony of Comissioner Kennedy who testified on the afternoon of August 23.
Prior to Commissioner Kennedy's testimony, Denton was recalled and stated he was postponing action on his memorandum until the NRC Commissioners have had a chance to rdiew his proposal.
Comissioner Kennedy explained his perception of Denton's August 20 memorandum and apologized to the President's Commission for not providing the Commission a copy: prior to public release of the memorandum.
Comissioner Kennedy reiterated parts of Denton's testimony and assured the Comission that their reccmendations would be taken with complete seriousness.
He also stated he would relay the concerns of the President's Commission to the other NRC Comissioners.
(See Attachment 7 for'the Commission's request of the NRC Comissioners.)
The testimony of Victor Stello, Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC, related to many topics with emphasis on the power of the Director, Division of Operating Reactors, NRR, NRC, to grant exemptions to NRC regulations to licensees. The Commission was interested in the basis for and ~the frequency of exemptions to regulations and whether the granting of an exemption requires Commission approval.
Stello testified he believed there have been about 50 exemptions issued since the inception of NRC and that all exemptions require compensating measures to replace the application of the regulation.
The Commission asked many questions concerning an exemption. for TMI-1 to a regulation relating to the emergency core cooling system.(a copy of i
I
The Commission 6
August 28, 1979 the exemption is shown in Attachment 8). Stello was asked to submit the procedure a modification goes through and a description of any regula-tions that cannot be waived.
(Attachment 9 was entered into the record during Stello's testimony.)
Stello indicated he wished to comment on the Creswell testimony but was asked by Chairman Kemeny to submit his coments in writing.
Throughout the testimonies of NRC officials the Commission members spoke of a " mind-set" on the part of NRC officials which directed their safety-related attention to equipment / hardware.
The Commission was concerned that the " mind-set" caused NRC officials to essentially ignore the human / machine interface.
Concluding a long day of hearings was Anthony Roisman, Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, who tried to discredit NRC and the testimony of NRC officials before the President's Commission.
Roisman stated NRC frequently misleads its audience and that NRC witnesses had tried to mislead the President's Commission during their testimonies. He added NRC staff documents often contain conclusions but no analysis and that Denton's August 20 memorandum is an example of such documents.
According to Roisman, NRC is an advocate of nuclear energy and the licensing process is inadequate. He added NRC, which he is no lover of, has had its knocks because of political reasons of which it has little control.
Roisman's testintony was filled with, what he termed, incdequacies of NRC and he offered his prepared statement for the record (see Attachment 10).
During the lunch brea'k"on August 22 and 23, Chairman Kemeny held press conferences.
Kemeny answered many questions posed by the press.
In responding to one question, Kemeny stated if the NRC Commissioners should decide to go ahead with the licensing process as recommended by Denton, the President's Commission may decide to provide President Carter with interim recommendations.
In his answer to another question, Kemeny said he is suspicious that there is intentionai significance to the timing of releases of major NRC documents on the hearing days of the President's Commission.
Kemeny indicated that if NRC officials such as Denton, were reading the transcripts of the Comrais.; ion's hearings they would know that the President's Commission's silence did not give consent in the case of the lessons Learned Task Force report.
Attachments 11-14 were available in the press room during the hearings.
Attachments:
As stated cSove.
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'PF:. s President's Commission bh ~
on the Accident at Three Mile Island L,.'
2100 M Street, NW WasnmgCn. OC L'lO37 w
FOR IM.VIDIATE P2EEASE CONTACT:
Mary Beth Franklin, Wilra Hill, Holly Chaapel August 15, 1979 (202) 653-7677 AGENDA SET FOR COMMISSION HEARINGS, AUGUST 21-23 The agenda for the August 21-23 public hearings of the President's Cc==ission on the Accident at Three Mile Island is as folicws:
Tuesday, Aucust 21, 1979, 9:00 a.m.
10:30 a.m.
Richard Thornburch - Governor of Pennsylvania Wednesday, Aucust 22, 1979, 9:00 a.m.
6:00 p.m.
Joseph D.
LaFleur, Jr. - Deputy Director of Office of International Prcgrams and Assistant Director for International Cccperation, Nuclear Regulatory Cc= mission (NRC)
James S.
Creswell - Recctor Inspector, Regicn !!!, NRC Jesse C.
Ehersole - Member, Advisory Ccmmittee on Reactor Safeguards, 21RC Paul F.
Collins - Chief, Cperator Licensing Branch, Office of Assistant Director for Quality Assurance and Operations, NRC Rccer J.
Mattsen - Director, Divisien cf Systems Saf t-ty, Of fice of Nuclear Reacter Regulatien, NRC
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Thursdar, Aucust 23, 1979, 9:00 a.m.
- 1:00 p.n.
Marcld R.
Centen - Oirec cr, Office of Nuclear Reacter Regu_ation, :iRC Vicecr :tello, Jr. - Director, Office of Inspection anc Enforcement, NRC Anthony Z.
Roisman - Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council The hearings will be held in the Hall of Nations, Edmund Walsh Building, Georgetown University, N Street, N.W.,
between 36th and Prospect Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
Commission Chairman John G. Kemeny will meet with reporters during the lunch break on Wednesday, August 22, and after,he hearing adjourns on Thursday, August 23.
A press room, with typewriters and telephones, will be maintained throughout the hearings.
Reisman is expected to present a prepared statement.
Copies of it and any materials introduced in o the Ccmmission's hearing record will be available to reporters at the time of their presentation.
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ISSUES OF DIR'S DURING RECENT YEARS HAVE BEEll ADDRESSED Ill WIS COUNTRY AfD OVERSEAS WITH THE BENEFIT CF BILATERAL INTERNATI0fML CCNSULTATION BETWEEN THE US AND OTHER CCUNTRIES EXPERIENCitG SIMILAR PROBLEMS.
A WORD ABOUT THE QUESTION OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE: A SMALL PART-I BELIEVE ABOUT FIVE PERCENT-CF WE FOREIGN INFORMATION WE RECEIVE IS GIVEN TO NRC ONLY UNDER THE CONDITICfl THAT IT f0T BE FUBLICLY DISCLOSED. OTHER CCUflTRIES DO NOT HAVE THE SAFE RULES AS NRC REGUIRING FUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF REGULATCRY Af0 SAFETY INFORf%TIOfl.
IN FACT, SCPE FOREIGN GOVERNMEflT AGENCIES ARE NOT PEPJ41TTED TO MAk6 PoALE Pft!!! AGE CERTAlti CLASSES OF INFOPJ%TICNp0 FE( Call GIVE US SUCH IflFCRf%TICN SCFETIPES ONLY UfEER BE C0f0ITION WAT WE AGREE TOT TO DISCLOSE IT PUBLICLY.
WE RECEI'E SCME INFORf% TION Uf0ER WIS CONDITICN.
!F WE CHOSE NOT TO ACCEPT M
WIS C0falTION, THE( WCULD TOT GIVE IT TO US AT ALL AIO WUS WCULD DEFRI'E g
OURSELVES CF THE BENEFIT OF IT Ill CUR SAFET( WCRK. WE GEllERALLY WOULD CHOOSE iN5Te43 TO ACCEPT SUCH CCNFIDENTIAL IfiFCPf% TION AND TO PROTECT IT.
I SHOULD f0TE W AT, DESPITE ITS CCNFIDENTIALIT/ SUCH INFCRt% TION CAN ALERT US TO NEd SAFETY ISSUES OR, CCF3!NED WITH DCMESTIC IflFOPJ% TION, CAft TEACH US l'GRE ABOUT KfCdN PRCBLEMS.
WE, OF CCURSE, ARE FREE TO USE THE INFORf%TICN AS A BASIS FCR INSTRUCTICNS TO CUR LICEllSEES TO TAKE C$iAlfPPRECAUTICNARY MEASURES, IF THAT IS DEEi'ED iJ (T14 43L D b cCO e F pJ6t-O c e Q G M C6 APPROPRIATE. WE MIGHT F.JsIIIIET BE DETAILS CR EVEN i--%w*c 0F A FCREIGN
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r ACCIDENT, IF NECESSARY/ BUT THIS WCULD f0T DETRACT FRCM TAKING ACTIONS Ifl TriE US CN BE BASIS OF THAT INF0FFATICN.
IN SUPPARY, I 3ELIEVE EAT EFFECTIVE IflTERNATICNAL RELATICNSHIPS ARE BEING DEVELOPED Ill CUR EXCHANGES CF SAFET/ INFORf%TICN.
I HCFE THAT AS TriE EXO%fiGE SYSTEM IS PERFECTED, FCREIGN CCNTRIBUTICNS CAN BE IllCREASED TO THE PO!flT WHERE FULL USE CAft BE f%DE CF ALL SIGNIFICAtlT FOREIGft EXPERIENCE.
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IE. CHAIPPN1, LADIES NO GBITLEf'EN OF BE FRESIDENTIAL CCfHISSION:
! Uf0ERSTN0 TODAY I #4 TO PROVIDE It4 FORT %TICfl ON THE IriTERtlATICNAL RE!.ATIqfG PROGRN4 0F BE NRC, ESPECIALLY AS IT PERTAltS TO BE EXCHANGE OF REACTCR OPERATING EXPERIENCE WIE THE OBER COUNTRIES.
OVER 1HE PAST SEVEPAL YEARS, BILATERAL EXCHANGE ARRN4GEMENTS HAVE BEEN SIGNED WITH17CCUNTRIES. WESE ARRANGEMENTS CCNTAIN C0tHIFENTS FOR THE TWO PARTIES TO CCOPERATE IN SHAR!ilG REGULATORY IrlFCRf% TION. THE 17 EXCHAtlGE ARRANGEAENTS 4R&w MME M r INCLUDE Cy WIm JAPAtl, GEFFAf#, FRANCE, SWEDSt, ITALY, SPAIN NO SWI'!2ERLAND, IN SHORT THE WESTERN CCUNTRIES HAVIf1G EXTENSIVE LIGHT WATER REACTCR EXPERISiCE.
Ut0ER 'IHESE ARPAtEEPENTS WE CCNDUCT A CCNT!?:UING DIALOGUE CCNCERfilfG SAFETY PROBLEPS M1D ISSUES. WE EXCHANGE SCORES OF TECHNICAL VISITS EACH YEAR AND HUNDREDS CF REPORTS NO OBER CCWUNICAT10tG.
WE ALSO EXCHANGE INFORMATICt1 CN INDIVIDUAL CPERATING EVE?fTS AND INCIDENTS.
IN THE U.S., BE SYSTEM OF REPORTIflG e/EtrTS, USING THE LICENSEE EVEffT REPORTS (LER),Wri!CH ARE PADE A PATTER OF PUBL;IC RECCRD, JS WEU ESTABLISHED.
A CCMPUTERIZED/l @CF THESE EVBITS IS SEf1T MCNEL TO EACH OF THE ARRAfGB'ENT COUNTRIES.
ALTHCUGH FOREIGN CCUNTRIES DO NOT CCLLECT AND PROVIDE TO US CCPPARABLE IriFCR-f%TICfl IN A FCRi%T SIMILAR WAT CF THE U.S. l.ER SYSTEi WE DO RECEIVE FRCM SCFE A SIGNIFICANT APCUNT CF INFCFFATION CN THEIR OPERATIfE EVB4TS, ESPECIALLY THOSE CF RELATIVE SIGNIFIC4 CE. THIS IfiF0FFATIC.N IS DISmISUTED TO INTERESTED NRC STAFF CFFICES. ERCUGH EIS RCUTE THE EXPERIEi;CE CF PNN IPPCP.TN4T CVERSEAS OPERATI!G E/EffiS HAS BEEN SHARED WITH NRC. SE/ERAL IPPCRTNIT GEi;ERIC SAFETY
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The following statement was issued by the Westinghouse Electric Corp.
at its headquarters in Pittsburgh this af ternoon (Wednesday, Aug. 22):
In 197h, Westinghouse received a report from the Swiss utility NOK that the Beznau reactor nea Baden, Switzerland, had undartone a transient as a result of the trip of one of the main turbines which generates the electrical trip output of ths plant. This turbine /msulted in the oper Ation of the press.-
urizer power-oprated relief valw. When a mechanizal failure of one of the relief valves caused it to remain open, the op3rators recognized the situation and isolated the open relief valve within 3 to h minu*as, according to established procedures.
The pltat was shut down, necessary inspections and repairs made, and the plant returned to operation. During this event and follcwing it there was no violation of established procedures and all safety systees operated as exp cte d.
Based on the Swiss ut*Miina utility's report and evaluation by West-inchouse engineers, it was concluded that there was no gensric safety issue raised by this event. Therefore, Westinghouse did not report the event to the NRC.
Contact:
Gons Curella, Westinghouse, h12-255-5666 a
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- yeptem.b.er.4., 1974) ce : F. Noon (with att.)
Ref
- SA/251 H. Cordle (with att.)
D. ten Wolde (with att.)
- lu M:!5 :::.r.no COMM:ssion
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A. Hall (with att.)
...t.. 2J. /.f.77 T. Currie (with att. ) *
..;:: --; vik IM J.P. Lafaille (with att.)
R. Galletly (Jith att.)
R. Lehr (with att.) Pitts.
J.D. Mcadco (with att.) Pitts.
A. Weaving (w/o att.)
W.B. Thee (w/o att.)
R.L. Cloud (with att.)
W.'Rockenhauser (with att.)
SU3 JECT : TEC!iNICAL REPORT ON NOK 1 INCIDENT OF AUGUST 20, 1974 References (1) Telex SE-G-74-135 (8/28/74) to NC by H. Cordle (2) Letter (S/27/74) NF.A-3940 frcm L. Earshaw.
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You will find attached the technical report en NCK 1 Incident of August 20, 1974 prepared by WNE inspection tea:n who went to Be:nau en August 23.
This report, which should be sent to Se:nau, surnarizes our observations on the course of the transient, the damage as we viewed it, our calcula:1cns and conclusions.
Despite what is indicated in the referenced (2) letter, in order to have a =cre ec=pletc report, we added sc=e reccecend-ations for future changes.
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