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LER 80-073/03L-0:on 800520,during Support & Hanger Insp, Discrepancies Discovered Between as-built & as-analyzed Configurations That Could Cause Failure in Piping During Seismic Event.Deviations Will Be Modified as Required
	ML19318C352
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	06/23/1980
From:	Swearingen J; TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19318C350	List: ML19318C349; ML19318C352;
References
	LER-80-073-03L, LER-80-73-3L, NUDOCS 8007010385
	Download: ML19318C352 (5)
	v • d • e

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7 4 64 65 oG*g&thouagm EVENT CESCRIPTION AND PRO 8 A8LE CONSEOufNCES h a 2 iDuring support and hanger inspection. in accordance with NRC Confirmatiop fTTT1 I of Action letter. several discrepancies were discovered between the -

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io a i i cause a failure in the piping during a seismic eve'nt.

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CAUSE OESCntPTION AND CORREC(IVE ACTICNS 27

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Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyai nuclear Plant LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION SQRO-50-327/8073 Technical Specification Involved: 6.9 1.13.C Reported Under Technical Specification 6 9 1.13.C Date of Occurrence: 5/20/80 Time of Occurrence: 1105 EI7I Unit 1 Identification and Description of Occurrence During support and hanger inspection in accordance with NRC Confirmation of Action letter, several discrepancies were discovered between the as-built and the as-analyzed configurations. Preliminary analysis from Division of Engineering Design showed that these supports could cause a failure in the piping during a seismic event.

! Conditions Prior to Occurrence Reactor was in mode 3,4, or 5 Action Specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Met Due to Inoperable Equipment N/A.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence Improper design, installation, or modification of various supports. See attachment for details.

Analysis of Occurrence Supports could cause failure of piping during a seismic event. See attachment for details. l Corrective Action j

Supports were modified or reworked as required.

Failure Date N/A.

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SIGNIFICA!TF IIADCER DISCREPANCY CUIS4ARY

FR0 !! anger location or Fotential Fossible Effect on Plant Safety Haneer Number Number Itanger Discrepancy failure location During a Seismic Event 1 - 5 I11- 3 7 / l-80-149 Surport 1-31H-3CJT had bad The design analysis indicates This break is isolable from reactor veld =. that a failure could occur on coolant system by two check valves.

the 8" corxnon line frun MIR This could cause loss of capability pumps to the hot legs of loops for het leg recirculation with MIR 3&4 Pumps.

1-RIUH-451 1-80-150 Support 1-MIRH-451 was Hanger supported FCV-74-32. Ioss of capability of hot les recir- -

found with insulation This valve coul.1 fail. This culation with MIR. Both trains of interference. could break on the common .

RIIR can be isolated by shutting line from PJIR pumps to hot leg. FCV-74-33 and FCV-74-35. ,

1-CVCH-291 1-80-151 Hanger 1-CVCII-291 was Hanger supported the 3" line A break at this location is isolable found with a cotter pin from loop 3 to the regenerative by FCV-62-69 missing. heat exchanger at FCV-62-70.

Valve could have failed.

1-GCBH-10 1-80-152 Eottom brace of hanger Hanger suFported steam generator This hanger could cause a loss of 1-CGBli-10 was not installed. blowdown line at containment one of the steam generator blowdown penetration X-14D. valves which is a containment isolacion valve.

1-CSii-414 1-80-153 Support was not installed. Hanger is located between IB-B This could prevent train B from pro-containment epray pump and IB viding water to the spray header. Ioss .

heat exchanger between valves of one train of containment spray.

72-529 and 72-534.

l-AFDti-4 1-80-154 Hanger 1-AFDH-4 had improper lianger is located midway be- This break could cause a' loss of clearance, tween penetration X40B and the- auxiliary feedwater flow to loop 3.

first check valve before loop and cause an overall reduction in 3 feedwater line. auxiliary feedwater to other steam ,

generator.

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Harper TRO llanger location or Ittential Possible Effect on Plant Safety R.enber Humber Ilancer Discrepancy Failure location Durir.g a Seismic Event 1-MIRH 423 1-80-155 lianger 1-nitart-h23 was nancer supports FCV-74-33. This this break could cause the loss found in wrong location ' valve could fail. of train A of MIR.

1-Sill-808 1-80-157 !! anger 1-SDI-808 had Han6er is located between loop 1 This break could cause an unisolable' improper clearance. RCS and first check valve on leak frors the reactor coolant system.

hot leg injection.

1-AFDII-l 1-80-175 Improper clearance. Han6er is located on No. 3 Design analysis indicates'that a steam generator auxiliary break will come right at the nozzle feedwater line right at penetra- of the pen tration and would not tion X40B. affect the penetration. Ioss of auxiliary feedwater to loop 3 1-AFDit-17 1-80-175 !!ancer was inadvertently ilanger is located on the No. 3 This will cause a losof auxiliary reversed. steam generator auxiliary feed- feedwater to No. 3 steam generator water line upstream of first and reduce flow to other steam check valve. generator.

1-CCH-15 1-80-174 Support in wrong location. This line runs from FCV-72-39 A break at this location could cause to spray header train A contain- a loss of train A containment spray ment spray system, system.

1-CS11-kh 1-80-173 Support in wrong location. This line runs from FCV-72-2 to A break at this location could cause spray header train B containment a loss of train B containment spray spray system. system.

1-AFil-23 1-80-175 Improper clearance. Itanger is located on the No. 3 This will cause a loss of auxiliary steam generator auxiliary feed- feedwater to No. 3 steam generator water line upstream of first and reduce flow to other steam check valve. generators.

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SIGNIFICA!Tr HANCF.R DICCREPANCY SUittiLRY Hancer PRO llanger location or Totential Fossible Effect on Flant Safety Nur.ber Number Hang?r Discrepancy Failure location Durirg a Seismic Pyent 1-mimi-432 1-80-171 Improper clearance between Return line to refueling water A break at this location could pipe and supports. storage tank downstream of HvC-74-34 ' cause an unisolable leak to refuel-Break could occur upstream or ing water storage tank.

downstream of the valve.

1-AFDH-338 1-80-176 Improper clearance between Auxiliary feedwater line to No. 3 A break at this location could pipe and supports. steam generator just downstream cause a loss of auxiliary feed-of IfV-3-148. water to No. 3 steam generator.

1-RCH-118 1-80-177 Support was not installed Pressure relief line to the relief A relief valve opening would cause in accordar.ce with latest tank. Break occurs downstream of primary system discharge directly revision level. relief valve. into containment.'

1-AFDH-57 1-80-179 No clearance top and bottom. Auxiliary feedwater line to No. 2 less r.t auxiliary feedwater.to No. 2 steam generator inside containment. steam generator.

1-m-305 1-80-172 Support is 47" closer to Main steam line off loop i between A break at this location could cause crane wall than analysis steam generator and M IV. an unisolable blowdown of No.1 isometric shows. steam generator.

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-Sequoyah Nuclear Plant LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

. SQ,RO-50-327/ 8073 Technical Specification Involved: 6.9 1.13.c Reported Under Technical Specification 6 9 1.13.c Date of Occurrence: 5/20/80 Time of Occurrence: 1105 EDT . Unit 1 Identification and Description of Occurrence During support and hanger inspection in accordance with NRC Confirmation of Action letter, several discrepancies were discovered between the as-built and the as-analyzed configurations. Preliminary analysis from Division of Engineering Design showed that these supports could cause a failure in the piping during a seismic event.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence Reactor was in mode 3,4, or 5 Action Specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Met Due to Inoperable Equipment N/A.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence Improper design, installation, or modification of various supports. See attachment for details.

I Analysis of Occurrence l 1

Supports could cause failure of piping during a seismic event. See l attachment for details.

Corrective Action Supports were modified or reworked as required.

Failure Date N/A. l l

SIGNIF1 CANT HANGER DISCREPANCY CtH4A14

"-~ Hanger FR0 llanger Location or Poteatial Fossible Effect on Plant Safety Number Number llanaer Discrepancy Failure Incation During a Seism.ie Eve t 1-SI1!-397 1-80-149 Support 1-SIII-3'// had bad The design analysis indicates This break is isolable from reactor welds. that a failure could occur on coolant system by two check valves, the 8" common line from MIR This could cause loss of capability pumps to the hot legs of loops for hot leg recirculation with MIR.

3&4 pumps.

1-MIRIT-451 1-80-150 Cupport 1-MIMi-451 was' !! anger supnorted FCV-7h-32. Ioss or capability of hot les recir-found with insulation This valve .:ould fail. This culation with MIR. Poth trains of interference. could break on the common MIR can be isolated by shutting line from MIR pumps to hot leg. FCV-74-33 and FCV-74-35 1-CVCII-291 1-80-151 11 anger 1-CVCH-291 was !! anger supported the 3" line A break at this location is isolable found with a cotter pin from loop 3 to the regenerative by KV-62-69 missing. heat exchanger at FCV-62-70.

Valve could have failed.

1-SGB!!-10 3-80-152 Bottom brace of hanger IIanger supported steam generator This hanger could cause a loss of '

l-00211-10 was not installed, blowdown line at containment one of the steam generator blowdown penetration X-14D. valves which is a containment isolation valve.

1-Csir 41h 1-80-153 Support was not installed. langer is located between IB-B This could prevent train B from pro .

containment spray pump and IB viding water to the spray header. Ioss heat exchanger between valves of one train of containment spray.

72-529 and 72-534.

1-AFDif-4 1-80-154 11 anger 1-AFD!I-b had improper llanger is located midway be- This break could cause a loss of clearance. tween penetration X40B and the auxiliary feedwater flow to loop 3 first check valve before loop and cause an overall reduction in 3 feedwater line. auxiliary feedwater to other steam generator.

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Manger pao Hanger Iceation or Tbtential rossible Effect on Flant safety framber Number Hansrer Discrepancy Failure location During a Seismic Drent 1-IDIRH-423 1-80-155 lianger 1-mint k23 was ' Hanger supports FCV-7k-33. This h is break could cause the loss found in wrong location valve could fail, of train A of RRR.

1-SDI-808 1-80-157 IIanger 1-sin-808 had Hanger is located between loop 1 This break could cause an unisolable ,

improper clearance. BCS and first check valve on leak from the reactor coolant system. >

hot leg injection.

1-AFDH-1 1-80-175 Improper clearance. Hanger is located on No. 3 Design analysis indicates that a steam generator auxiliary break will come right at the nozzle feedwater line right at penetra- of the penetration and would not tion Xh0B. affect the penetration. Ioss of auxiliary feedwater to loop 3

.j 1-AFDH-17 1-80-175 Hanger was inadvertently Hanger is located on the No. 3 This will cause a los of auxiliary reversed. steam generator auxiliary feed- feedwater to No. 3 steam generator water line upstream of first and reduce flow to other steam i check valve. generator. .

5 1-CSH-15 1-80-174 support in wrong location. This line runs from FCV-72-39 A .reak at this location could cause

'4 to spray header train A contain- a loss of train A containment spray ment spray system. system.

1-CSH-kk 1-80-173 Support in wrong location. This line runs from FCV-72-2 to .A break at this location could cause .

spray header train B containment a loss of train B containment spray j spray system. system, t i

1-ATH-23 1-80-175 Improper clearance. Hanger is located on the No. 3 This will cause a loss of auxiliary steam generator auxiliary feed- feedwater to No. 3 steam generator .i '

water line upstream of first and reduce flow to other steam check valve. ~ generators.

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Number Number Hanger Discrepancy Failure Ioention During a Seismic Event 1-NIPJi-432 1-80-171 Irproper clearance between Return line to refueling water A break at this location could pipe and supports. storaEe tank downstrea:n of HVC-7h-34. cause an unisolable leak to refuel-Break could occur upstream or -ing water storage tank.

downstream of the valve.

1-AFDII-338 1-00-176 Improper clearance between Auxiliary feedwater line to No. 3 A break at this location could-pipe and supports. steam generator just downstream cause a loss of auxiliary feed-of ICV-3-148. water to No. 3 steam generator.

1-RCH-ll8 1-80-177 Support was not installed Fressure relief line to tne relief J. relief valve opening would cause -

in accordance with latest tank. Break occurs downstream of primary system discharge directly

. revision level. relief valve. into containment.

1-AFDH-57 1-80-179 No clearance top and bottom. Auxiliary feedvater line to No. 2 Ioss at' auxiliary fe'edwater to No. ~ 2 steam generator inside contain:nent. steam generator.

1-70-305 1-80-172 Curport is 47 closer to .41n steam line off loop 1 between A break at this location could cause crane wall than analysis steam generator and ICIV. an unisolabh blowdown of No.1 isometric shows. steam generator.

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CAUSE DESCntPTICN AND CORREC(IVE ACTIONS 27

- frTTI I A complete report will be provided to NRC prior to initial criticality. I E I All deriations which could cause pipe failure during a seismic event t (II'D I will be modified as re$uired. l LLi.U I l s . 1 1 :

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NAufon,nt,AnEn James D. Swearingen , '$l$'-842-6967 .

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Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah Nuclear Plant LER SUPPIBEITAL INFORMATION SQRO-50-327/8073 Technical Specification Involved: 6.9 1.13.C Reported Under Technical Specification 6.91.13.C Date of Occurrence: 5/20/80 Time of Occurrence: 1105 EDT Unit 1 Identification and Description of Occurrence During support and hanger inspection in accordance with NRC Confirmation of Action letter, several discrepancies were discovered between the

< as-built and the as-analyzed configurations. Preliminary analysis from Division of Engineering Design showed that these supports could cause a failure in the piping during a seismic event.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence Reactor was in mode 3,4, or 5 Action Specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Met Due to Inoperable ",uipment N/A.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence L proper design, installation, or modification of various supports. See attachment for details.

Analysis of Occurrence Supports could cause failure of piping during a seismic event. See attachment for details.

Corrective Action Supports were modified or reworked as required.

Failure Date N/A.

SIGNIFICA!rf itAMCER DIOCREPANCY SUWARY

" Hanger location or Potential Possible Effect on Plant Safety Hanger FRO

. Number munber fianger Discrepancy }ailure Incation During a Seismie Event ,

1-SIH-397 1-80-149 SuFport 1-ClH-397 had bad The design analysis indleates This break is isolable from reacter velds. that a failure could occur on coolant system by two check valves.

the 8" cocmon line from MIR This could cause loss of capability pumps to the hot legs of loops for hot leg recirculation with MIR 3 & h. pumps.

l-RI!!UI-451 1-80-150 cupport 1-MIRH-451 vss llanger supported FCV-74-32. Ioss of capability of hot les recir-found with insulation This valve could fail. 'Ihis culation with MIR. Both trains of interference, could break on the common RHR can be isolated by shutting line from MIR pumps to hot leg. FCV-74-33 and FCV-74-35.

1-CvCH-291 1-80-151 Fanger 1-CvCH-291 was llanger supported the 3" line A break at this location is isolable found with a cotter pin from loop 3 to the regenerative by FCV-62-69 missing, heat exchanger at FCV-62-70.

Valve could have failed.

1-SGBH-10 1-80-152 Bottom brace of hanger Itanger supported steam generator This hanger could cause a loss of 1-SGBH-10 was not installed, blowdown line at containment one of the steam generator blowdown penetration X-lhD. valves which is a containment isolation valve.

't 1-C011114 4 1-80-153 Support was not installed. Itanger is located between IB-B This could prevent train B from pro-containment erray pump and IB viding water to the spray header. Ioss heat exchanger between valves of one train of containment spray.

72-529 and 72-53fs.

1-AFDH!6 1-80-15!4 Hanger 1-AFDH 14 had improper Hanger is located midway be- This break could cause a loss of clearance, tween penetration Xh0B and the auxiliary feedwater flow to loop 3 first check valve before loop and cause an overall reduction in 3 feedwater line. auxiliary feedwater to other steam generator.

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OIGNIFICANT !!AGER DISCPIPANCY SUt5%RY s, 11 anger PRO .

Ilanger location or Ibtential Ibssible F.ffect on plant'Eafety.

Number Thamber liancer Discrepancy Failure Ioestion Durina a Seismie Ihrent 1-PJIn!! 423 1-80-155 IIanger 1-RIIRII h23 was 11ancer eupports FCV-74-33. This '

Ihis break could cause the loss found in wrong location valve could fail, of train A of RHR.

1-3111-808 1-80-157 lianger 1-3111-808 had Hancer is located between loop 1 This break could cause an unisolable -

in: proper clearance. RC3 and first check valve on leak from the reactor coolant system.

hot leg injection.

1-AFDH-1 1-80-175 In: proper clearance, lianger is located on No. 3 Design analysis indicates that a steam generator auxiliary break will ecme right at the nozzle feedwater line right at penetra- of the penetration and would not tion X40B. affect the penetration. Ioss of auxiliary feedwater to loop 3 1-AFDil-17 1-80-175 IIanger was inadvertently llanger is located on the No. 3 This will cause a losof. auxiliary reversed, steam generator auxiliary feed- feedwater to No. 3 steam generator water line upstream of first and reduce flow to other steam check valve. generator.

CSH-15 1-80-174 support in wrong location. This line runs from FCV-72-39 A break at this location could cause-to epray header train A contain- a loss of train A containment spray ment spray system. system.

1-CSII-hb 1-80-173 support in wrong location. This line runs from FCV-72-2 to A break at this location could cause - .;

spray header train B containment a loss of train B containment rpray i spray system. system. ,[

c 1-AT11-23 i-SN175 Improper clearance. IIanger is located on the No. 3 This will cause a loss of auxiliary steam generator auxiliary feed- feedvater to No. 3 steam generator >

water line upstream of first and reduce flow to other stema ,

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SIGNIFICA!Tf HANGER DISCRETANCY SUlfM lia;.cer FR0 Ilanger location or Ibtential Possible Effect on Flant Safety.

Number Number Hanger Discrepancy Failure location During a Seismic Event 1-RIIR!i !*32 1-80-171 Improper clearance between Return line to refueling water A break.'at this location could pipe and supports. storage tant downstream of HVC-74-34. cause an unisolable leak to refuel.

Break could occur upstream or ing water storage tank..

. downstrea a of the valve.

1-AFDIl-338 1 80-176 Improper clearance between Auxiliary feedwater line to No. 3 A break at this location could nipe and supports. steam generator just downstream.. cause a loss of auxiliary feed.

of ICV-3-148. water to No.'3 steam generator.

1-ECll-118 1-80-177 Support was not installed Pressure relier line to the relief A relief valve opening would cause in accordance with latest tank. Break occurs downstream of primary system discharge directly revision level. relier valve. into containment.

1-AFD11-57 1-80-179 No clearance top and bottom. Auxiliary feedwater line to No. 2 Ioss at auxiliary feeduster'to'No'. 2-steam generator inside containment. steam generator.

14C-305 1-80-172 Support is 47 closer to Main steam line off loop 1 between A break at this location could cause crane wall than analysis steam generator and ICIV. . an unisolable blowdown of No.1 isometric shows. steam generator.

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