ML19313A259

Requests Addl Info Re Proposed Mods to Fire Protection Plan & Schedule for Implementation to Suppl 770915 Submittal

ML19313A259
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	03/07/1978
From:	Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Barton A ALABAMA POWER CO.
References
TAC-8671, NUDOCS 8712220029
Download: ML19313A259 (25)

Text

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Distribution:

NRC POR V. Moore'

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Local FDR R. Vollmer MAR 7

~478Docket File M. Ernst LWR-1 File W. Gammill Cocket No. 50-3"S R. Boyd ELD-50-364 R. DeYoung IE(3)

D. Vassallo W. " ass 4

F. Williams...Reeves J. Stolz E. Brooks Alabama Power Comcany R. Martin

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ATTH: Mr. Alan R. Bart::n Senicc Vice President E. Hylton bce:

R. Mattson J. Buchanan, NSIC 500 North 13th Street Bimingham, Alaba=a 35291 D. Ross T. Abernathy, TIC J. Knight ACRS (16) l R. Tedesco Sentleren:

H. Denton i

FIRE PROTECTION PROGP.AM (FAPJ.EY MUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AMD 2)

SUBJECT:

The Alaba:::s Power Company sutcitted by letter dated Sectember 15, 1977 j

the Farley Nuclear Plant Fire Protecti:.n Program Reevaluation which included the fire hazards analysis, the rescense to Apoendix A to Branch Technical Positicn 9.5+1 and proposed design modifications to l

allew the design of the plant to meet the guidelines in.".ppendix A to Branch Technical Position 9.5-1.

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I We have determir.ed frcm the results of our review of this infer ::atica i

and frem our site review that additional infor-natien is recuired in order for us to cc:.:lete our review: The enclosure identifies the 8

needed additional infor~ation and statas a number of staff positions 1

related to the fire protection program.

We also recuest that with respect to the modificatiens procesed for the Farley Nuclear Plant to imolement the fire ;rotection ;rograu, 1

i the detailed design cf the proposed :aodifications and a schedule for j

j their imoicaentatica be provided.

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L Sincerely.

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John F. Stolz, Ohfef Light Water Reacters Branch No. 1 Division of Frofect Management Enclasure:

Recuest for Additicnal Infor:atien 4

on Fire Protection Togram J

cc: See next page i

j' 8712220029 780307 CF ADOCK 05000348 CF i

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NRC PORM 318 (9 76) N~ACM D240 i

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l cc: George F. Trowbridge, ESq.

ggp 7 33.g Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N. W.

Washington, D. C.

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Mr. Ruble A. Thomas, Vice President Southern Company Service P. O. Box 2625 l

l Birminoham,.Alabama 35202 l

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ENCLOSURE Request For Additonal Information And Statement of Staff Pesitices for the Fire Protection Program fo,- the FARLEY NUCLEAR PLAPC 1.

During our fire protection site review, it was determined that in 4

I many plant areas tne cable separation between Train A and Train 5 is not adequate. The Farley Nuclear Plant fire re-evaluatica task-force has identified approximately 100 locaticns that require addi-1 l

tional barriers between two redundant trains. Many areas of the I

plant contain recundant safety related caDies required for safe shutJ c which are not separated by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire ratec barriers.

The marinite barriers presently installed and illustra:ed in 4

Figures 4.3 aa, 4.3-45, and 4.3 06 are not adequate to protect against ex;csure fires. A minimum or.e hour fire rated barrier 4

snould be installed to completely enclose one of tne redundant trains wherever tney are separated by less than 15 ft. (aluminum or calvani:ed l

conduit cces not meet this re;uirement), and an automatic sprinkler i

system should be installed to protect against expcsure fires in areas

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containing recuncant safe snut cwn equipment cr cables.

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Cescribe in cetail tne modifications tnat will be made in :nese 4

l areas to assure that no single event, i.e., exterrally or internally generated fire, will challenge the recundant safety trains caoles.

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2.

Verify that for any fire postulated in the fire hazards analysis, the capability exists to achieve and maintain a safe cold shut-down.

I.s order to demonstrate this capability, shcw that tne minimum required equipment, associat+d cabling and power sources are not affected by the fire.

i For all fires that preclude shutdown capability from the control rocm (e.g. in the cable spreading rcem) provide the following information:

A list of essential electrical equipment recuirec for safe snut-(a) down along with a description of tne needed remote instrumen-i l

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tation and c:ntrols.

Provide drawings showing the routing ci all safety related i

cables serving the essential safe shutdown systems and e;uip-Identify their function and show tne routing to each ment.

piece of e:uipment from pcwer scurce, centrol room, and remote The drawings snould show the minimum'ptysi:al shutdown panel.

se:ara*ien distance and/ r barriers te:ween redundant electrica i

i circuitry and cable routings for each applicable system anc/cr C ntrol, instrumentation, and motive pcwer cable c mponents.

routings should be included.

L the offsite pcuer grid is nct available during (b) Assuming tna:

tne fire, provide su:Lorting information which may'te used to corclude that minimum electrical power, instrumentati:n,

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or control required for safe shutdown equipment will not te Icst as a result of the fire.

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(c) Identify and describe any changes required in the original electrical design as a result of providing the alternate safe shutdown capa-bility discussed in this question.

Confira that tne asscciated electrical design of tre corresponding

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remote shutdown instrumentation and c:ntrol canels is the same for the a

two units, or explicitly define and justify tne differences.

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Provide sufficient information to demonstrate that a fire wnich destroys

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the hot snutdown panel will.nave no acverse artect :n systems recuired for safe shutdc n.

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Verify that there are no safety-related systams wnicn are cisablec by i

.i initiaticn of a fire :rotection system, eitner by a direct interlock

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er as a result of the a $lication of an extincuisninc. acent.

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Wiring wnicn is used in a fire protection system snculd not be r:uted i-in tne same fire :ane for wnich it provides the necessary protecticn unless:

(a)

It is fully su;ervised per NFTA 72D anc is f ail safe, or i

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(c)

It is protected frcm tne effects of a fire in its fire cne Y

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-4 by a qualified fire barrier of a time rating equal to the barrier i

which defines the fire zone.

i Confirm that the Farley fire protection system meets the above I

cri te ri a.

6.

Identify those Class TE electric systems and ccmponents, required for acnieving cold shutdown, including associated circuits emanating from independent power civisions, which are spacially separated to satisfy independence criteria.

In each case, eitner demonstrate the capability of the design to withstand a single fire event, including exposura fire

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1 witncut icss of function, or modify the design accordingly. Also,

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demonstrate that the plant can be brought to a safe cold shutdown in j

the event of loss of offsite power.

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Supplement tne inferration wnich has been provided to include all j

a systems and components such as instruments and controls which are i

essential to acnieve and/or maintain cold shutdown. Also, identify I

l any of these systems and/or components whose associated electrical circuitry anc/cr cables are not redundant.

8.

Page 4-23.

Identify the source of the heat of ccmbustion values given in Section t.3.1.1.e.

Also, identify tne various types of cable insulation usec to justify using a single value in your calcu-4 l a tions.

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. MAR 7 1978 9.

Page 4-28, 368. Identify all areas which contain er expose safety j

related systems or cable in which the foamed plastic antisweat in-sulation is installed.

Include these areas in the fire hazards.

analysis and describe the necessary fire protection action.

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10. Pages 4-20, 31, 32,115, 116, and 366. Your fire hazards analysis did not consider exposure fires as they might affect redundant l

safety-related cable or equipment.

It also did not include the effect of fires in areas with fixed fire protection systems not j

functioning. Analyze the effect on safety shutdown (cold shutdown) j of fires in all areas of the plant that contain or expose cable er 1

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equi;ment required for safe shutdown (cold shutdown). Electrical j

fire sources or exposure fires should be considered. Consider as a j

fire source either cermanent or transient com ustibles, located in tne most critical area of each such room. This should be done con-i l

sidering fire crotecticn equipment (a) not functicning, and (b) functioning as designed.

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11. Page J-116.

Explain what is meant in Section 4.3.3.1.3 by "minor repairs or modifications" to system required for cold shutcown.

2 Identify any such systems wnich do not have redundant backup systems.

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MAR 7 1979.

12. Page ?-135, 368. Identify all areas wnere the compressible material (self expanding cork) was used. Provide results of ASTM E-119 type fire tests which substantiate the fire resistance provided j

1 by such an a rangement if this material is used to seal fire barrier I

1 penetrations or gaps, or cover cork with fire retardant ccating or a

bl an ket.

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13. Page 4-349, Item 4.4.2.2.

In your submittal you state that "storage 2

of combustible materials is authorized only in areas separated from 1

safe-snutcown-related areas by approved fire walls, cocrs, and j

i ceilings." During cur site visit, we observed many instances of l

combustibles, including flammable lipuids, in rooms containing

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safe-shutdown-related cabling of both divisions.

Discuss your i

procadure for ensuring enforcement of safe storage requirements.

14 Paces 4-353 to 355, 374. Substantiate tne fire resistance capacility of the following items as tney certain to safety-related areas, or 4

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areas excesing safety-relate*d equipment, or hign hazard areas by verifying that their construction is in accordance with a particular design :nat has been fire tested, and identify tne cesign, the test j

methed used, and the acceptance criteria:

(a) Rated fire narriers, including floor anc ceiling construction and structural supports.

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1 MAP7 1973 (b) Fire dampers/fire docrs, as well as how the dampers are installed in the ventilation ducts that penetrate rated fire barriers of safety-related areas (fire doors dangers re::uired in 3 hr. rated barrier penetrations). Many decrs identified as 3 hr. rated in your submittal were found to lack rating l

labels and others were found with only 1-1/2 hour labels..

(c)

Fire barrier penetration seals arcund ducts, cipes, cables, conduit, cable trays, and in other openings, including ficer hatches.

Verify that all seals are tne same construction (material and thickness) soecified in the tests and that the penetraticn openings do not exceed the penetratien size tested. Verify

nat cables and cable trays are suoported in a manner similar to supoorting arrangements used in any tests, or verify that collaose of tr.e trays, witn the resultant load and tcr;ue en the penetratien seals, will not affect the integrity of the penetraticn seals. Thcs.e ;enetrations in rated fire barriers (walls, floors, or ceilings) which are not sealed sncui:1 ::e sealed witn material whicn will provice a fire resistance rating equivalent to that of the barrier.

(d) Describe the "fire tarriers' referred to in various areas cf your fire ha:ards analysis which are installed wnere "cable penetrations are not sealed." Include data :n the fire resis-tance rating of such seals, with reference to ASTM E-Il9 test data.

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-B-MAR 7 1978 1

(RSP)

15. Pages 4-370, 388, 389. In your submittal, you state that con-cealed spaces containing combustible material will be provided with detection systems.

In the analysis of Fire Areas No.

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44 (Control Room) and 47, nothing is stated regarding detection

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capability in the concealed space. It is our position that i

the concealed areas above the suspended ceiling; in these areas be provided with area automatic fire suppression unless all 1

cable is run in 4 in, or smaller steel ccnduit or the cables in fully enclosed raceways are internally prctecte.d by automatic fire suppression. Verify that you will comply with the position i

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stated above.

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15. Pages -375 & a-383.

During our site visit we coserved many areas wnere fire rated (leoeled) coors, dampers, and other seals were omitted from i

fire barrier penetrations. Penetrations of fire barriers in j

rooms or areas containing safety related equipment or cable I

must be sealed to provide a fire resistance rating at least

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equal to the barrier itself (this includes doors, dampers, and other seals). Verify that this will be done for all such

er.etrations which presently lack adequate cicsures.

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17. Page 4-3E5.

Indicate the lccations anc applications unere 4

PVC cable was used at Farley.

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4 13, Pages "-388, :50, 391 4

1 (a) Indicate the type and quantity of fixed manual and portable smoke removal equipment whicn you state will be available to aid the 1

5 fire brigade.

Indicate the locations of all the fixec manual a

smoke removal equipment and identify the areas served. Also indicate how smoke from potentially racicactive areas will be sampled prior to release.

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(t) Describe tne crocedure employed for heat and smcke removal using fixed or pertaole equipment in areas that house safety-1 relatec systems or campenents. Cescribe how these areas can be ventilated for manual firefignting purposes. Consicer that control er pcwer cabling for normal ventilaticn may not i

ce func :cnal in tn.ese areas.

Incluce a discussion regarcing j

l control access to :ne equipment as well as ne acility to I

handle hign tem;erature gases and particulates.

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(c) Descrice wnere tne inter'tocks er local manual con:rcis for

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resetting :ne ventilaticn systems in areas protected cy CO, 1

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systems are located. Consider the effects of ciesed damcers 1

in these areas, and indicate now nese damcers wculd be rese:

for venting the area for manual firefignting.

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(d)

In eacn area wnere safety-related systems or ccmccrents are 4

located, verify :nat products of ccmcustion exnausted from the f

area will not bc ex5austed tc ciner safety-relatec areas of the plent. Describe One pr0visions fcr exhausting ne smcke to safe areas (i.e., portable ducts, etc. ).

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MAR 7 1978

) 20. Pages 4-394, 395.

Verify that duct smoke detectors are installed 1

in all control room air intakes with alann and annunciation in :ne control room.

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21. Page 4-397. Verify that the breathing apparatus provided utilizes j

full face positive pressure masks. Also indicate the total number 1

of masks and spare air bottles that, rre provided for the fire trigade j

l and damage control perscnnel as well as for control room personnel I

1 as required by a cendix A.

c (RSP) 22. Page 4-399.

It is our position that sealed-beam battery pack i

lighting with individual 8 hr. minimum battery power supplies te installed in all areas required for safe shutdown, including access and egre:s routes and the control rocm. Verify that this will be provided cy Farley.

23. Pages 4-401, 402 (a) Verify that the locaticn of tne fixed repeater for portacle communications is adequate to assure communicaticn to all areas inside the plant, and that the fire brigade will be i

provided with portable racios for communication.

MAR 7 137B 4

-11 (b) In Section 4.4.t.5.4, with regard to portable radio communica-4 tion units, it should be noted that a large portion of the safety related instrumentation may be susceptible to radio frequency interference. 'de therefore, require that it be demonstrated that no degrading effects to the instrumentation f

results from the operation of any radio devices during all modes of plant operation. If degradd ng effeccs do result, the use of the radio devices should oe limited to cnly those modes of plant operation when the safety related instrumenta-P tion is not required to perform their design function.

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l Describe your resolution to the abcVe concerns.

1 24 Dages 2 004 to 003.

(a) Provice information, suppcrted where necessary by test data, i

which suostantiates that the sensitivity of fire detecticn i

devices and the number a,nd placemen: (spacing) of detectors are sufficient to provide cetector resconse in time to prevent loss of safety-related systems or conoonents. The information should include both fire protection devices used to notify l

personnel and these used to activate fire protection systems.

i (b) Provide sufficient data to show that tne conplete fire alarm system, including water flow and valve supervision, conforms to aoplicable guidance in NFPA 72D for Class A systems and in 1

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MAR 7 1978

' e NFPA 70 for Class I circuits. Include a discussion of the primary and secondary power supplies for the alarm system, and indicate how power is transferred to the secondary supply.

(RSP)

(c) Your fire protection report section 4.4.5.1.4 states tnat fire detection and actuation systems are powered from a "reliable

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120 Vac or emergency 125 Vdc electrical source." - It is ot.r position that the fire detection systen should be designed 4

such that it can be manually connected to an casite source wnich is Class 1E or automatically to a non-class TE source which satisfies the requirements of NFPA 72D section 2250 in y

the event of a sustained loss of offsite power. Provide a J

1 discussion as to how tne proposed design meets our position.

25 Peges a.c09, 410. During our site visit we noted that the fira I

nose provided in the fire hydrant houses is in individual 50 f t. rolls.

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As a minimum, the 2-1/2 in. hose should be conr.ected in or.e continuous j

length wnicn is preconnected to ne hydrant.

25. Page 0-411.

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(a) Descrite tne barriers to be constructec between tne fire ;um;s, 1

including the fire resistance rating.

1 (b) Provice information wnich demonstrates tna: the electric

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l fire pumo controller meets the requirements of li NFPA 20 for such equipment.

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(c) Verify that insulation material used under the roof of the fire pump building, meets the definition of non-combustible material in Rev.1 of RG 1.120. Otherwise replace the insulation with qualified material.

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27. Pages 4-413, 414 Appendix A requires two separate 100% system capacity tanks, and that the supply should be based on the largest expected flow rate for two hours.

You state that the largest single damand at Farley is 5,000 gpm, wnicn would 4

requi re 600,000 gal. for a 2 hr. duratio1, or two 500,000 gal.

storage tanks. Tha Farley Plant presently includes two 300,000 j

gal. tanks. However, during our site visit we were informed tnat the 5,000 gpm demand was for the non safety related water ccoling I

cowe rs. Provide the largest calculated cemanc for safety related i

l areas or areas adjacet t to safety related areas and show that tne storage capacity cc:plies with Appendix A for :nis demand.

Indicate hcw the demand was calculated.

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(RSP)

28. Pages a-415, 425.

It is cur positicn that hydrants should be a

i provided so that effective hose streams can be used in totn the river water and service water buildings. Hydrants and hose j

houses should also be located inside the security fence in' the i

vicinity of the diesel generater building. Cescribe hcw you i

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s will comply with this position.

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(RSP)

29. Pages A al7, 418.

1 (a) It is our position that presence of the motor operated valves, set to close at 2200 gpm in the fire headers wnich supply the auxiliary building, is not acceptable. To 2

have fire fignting operations interrupted due to the valve h

.closing could create a serious delay at a critical time l

in the firefighting process. Describe now you will ccmply with this position.

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(RSP)

(b) It is our position that the fire 'protection systems within the auxiliary building be cross-connected and should have s

additional valves installed so that a single break will net impair both sprinkler and standpi:e hose systems in i

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Describe how you will campiv with this ;osition.

any area.

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Pages " 417, 418. Verify tnat eacn automatic sprinkler system t

and standcipe system is equipped with a waterficw alarm wnicn i

alarms in control roca.

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31. Page 4-419.

Confirm nat trouble alarms for these valves wnicn are monitored electrically scund in the control room as well 1

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as locally.

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32. Pages 420 to t25.

7 Verify that tne fire,;mps can crovide the recuired ficws j

j and pressures including 750 gpm for manual hose streams i

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yAR 7 1973 e

with cne puma out of service; c nsider any friction and elevation pressure icsses.

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• a-*z:, -co, e"-/, anc ~ire n*rea 1-:- (2 ::-).

It is Our position a--

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i that permanent manual fire suppression capability, in the form of i

stacdpipe hose stations, be provided inside containment. Descrite he'., f:u will c;;ply with this position.

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(a) Provice the Halon and CO system desi;n criteria, inclucing 2

c ncentration, scaking time, and allcwance for leakage for i

i these areas wnich are protected by total ficoding systems.

Sufficient information snould be proviced to allow verifica-1 1

I tion of the desicn c:ncentration anc scak time. Alsa

revide informaticn

: de cr.strate nat tr.e Halen er CD, a

4 systems w1,i

e errective agair.st tne potentisi tires, 1

i including deep seated cab,.e :.Tres, in eacn area. e rovide i

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i (b) For these areas describe the provisicns f:r :arsenr.el access folicwing system discharge to permit anual firefignting.

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MAR 7 1G78 f

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i (c) Verify that tne detection systems usec to actuate the Haien and CO systers a re alarmed and annunciated in the control 2

room ince endently of the suppressicn system actuation.

ld) Indicate for each system those items which are mOnitored and 4

alarmed in the controi ream.

(e) Describe tne administrative procedures whicn govern and J

monitor ne disarming cf C0 systems wnenever ;ersonnel are 3

in areas sc protected.

(RSP) 35.

Page A *a3.

The diagrams provided with your submit:ai do not indicate compliance with NFPA 10 for portable extinguishers. It is cur position

...at portable extinguisners be installed in ac:nedance with NFFA 10, inclucing Class A cacacity and travel distance in all areas of :ne plant. Verify :na: installation of porticle extinguisners wili c mply with tne requirements Of NFPA 10.

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NOTE: The follcwing ;uestiens :n dividual fire areas all a:ply

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e;ually :: 'Jnits 1 and 2 unless otherwise noted.

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Fire Area No. 2.

Your fire hazard analysis s tates 'that the d:ors j

between each RHR pump room and tne corridor are non-rated watertign*

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doors, and Figure 4.3-5 indicates that the doors are 1-1/2 and 3 hr.

ratec fire doors. These decrs, the door to the RHR Heat exchanger recm, and the door between Fire Areas No. I and No. 2, should be 3 hr. rated fire dcors. Verify the rating of each coor.

37.

Pages 4 aa5, 125, and Fire Area No. 55 - Containment.

(a) Provide a scnematic Of the oil Ocntainment and collection sys-tem which is pro csed, and indicate where the collection tank will be located.

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.l (b) Containing a fire within ::ntainment is no: sufficient to pre-l clude loss of redundin: cable or system.

escribe how a fire in :ne containment, will be extinguished. c:nsicering access, ventilation, and time delay due to lack cf aut;matic i

i sucaression systems in the c:ntainment.

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o (a) It is Our pcsition that the ;eripheral r00ms in the control room c mplex (offices, kittnen, etc.) should be se;arated fr:m the control r cm by nonc ::ustible ::nstruction aith a fire resistance rating of 1 hr. and extending to the underside Of i

the floor a:ove. These areas snculd be pr0:ec:ed by an auto-I matic succression sys tem. Describe how you will ccm:1y with this posi tion.

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-la-4 MAR 7 1978 (b) Appendix A requires that sacke detectors be provided in cabinets or consoles in the control rocm wnich contain redundant cabl es. Verify that detectors will be pr0vided as required.

i (c) A:pendix A states that all cables that enter the centrol roca should terminate there, and that no caole should be routed through the control rocm fr:m One area to another. As stated in ycur submittal, instrument and control cables are routed along the c0ntrol rocms perimeter wall between adjacent

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elevations. Cescribe the fire protection provi:ed for these cables or re-route these cables through other. areas.

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(d) It is cur position that at least one additional water pressure extinguisher and two Class C type extinguisners be pr:vided in

ne controi rocn. As a minimum, portable extinguisners sncula be proviced in the c;ntr:1 r:cm.n accertance with "7?A 10, including travel distance. Refer to Pace 4 243 Question.

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(e) Althougn nct menti:ned in your description of Fire Area No. 44, l

the diagrams indicate that a 3 hr. rated fire doce closes an i

opening between the control reca and the storage area in Unit 2 (Fire Area No. 2-43).

Verify that tnis is tne' case.

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1 MAR 7 1978 1

(RSP)

(f) The fire hose s tation propcsed in Room 415 of Fire Area.No. 47 (Unit 1) will not be sufficient for coverage of the contrci room.

It is cur position nat a fire hose station be 'provided near an access to the Unit 2 side of the control rcem, fed from the Unit 2 fire protection standpipe system. Describe how you will comply with tnis position.

39. Pages :-;51 to 253 anc Fi rta Area NO. 50 - Caole Spreading Recm.

4 (RSP)

(a) It is cur positicn that a fixed waterspray system be provided in each cable screading reca as either the primary or backup fire suppression system.

If used as a backup system to an autcratic total ficoding gaseous suppression system, actua-tien may be by manual means. Cescrite how you will ccmply wi th tnis posi tion.

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l (b) During our s1:e visit we coserved that the cable spreading l

room ceiling is supported :n structural steel beams with I

sprayed-cn firecrcofing material.

It was also notec that the fireproofing material was scraped off in some areas.

Verify that the entire system of steel beams will be checked and that all areas where the fireproefin; material has been l

Scraped off cr otherwise remcVed will be sprayed to restcre I

the depth-of-ccver required. Refer :: puesticns on ?ages

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-363 365 regarding fire resistance rating of this ceiling.

7 i

4 i

. Yn. -,

• cl K i i

I (c) Discuss tne need for an additional access c;eninc to the :able f

1 spreading rocm which would be separate from the two d:crs

't f

i which Open onto the same dead-end hallway (Fire Area No. a2).

~

I The present access to the area f r firefignting is limited to a single access d:cr to the hallway (Fire Area No. 22) which contains tne two access dcors to the carie spreading I

room.

RSP 20.

Pages :-454, a55, and Fire Areas No. 13, 19, 21, 23, al, 55A, 555, t

and ESC - Switchgear Rc ms.

It is cur ;csition that ger.eral area j

\\

l automatic sprinkler systems should be ir.stalled for switchgeer r00ms 1

I.

a wnich contain redundant safety-related equipment Or cable recuired for saTe snutdown. nefer to cuest;.On concerning pages -.;,.,.c,I, 1

E

-, e.

ar.c -ci.

vestrice how you w1 s t ccm:iy #1:n tnis ;csi : On.

c (RSP) al. Pages 0 055, 59, and Fire Areas 50. 55A Ciesei Genera

Or Area.

i (RSP)

(a) Diagram 2.3-19 and your cescripti n cf Fire Zones 55A, 5, and d

.".e n. r. s " e.o = a r...e s a....a s

2.. a c

4.. a j e... w, '.... a.

providec witn decrs. It is Our pcsition :na: 3 hr. rated Class A labeled fire d:Ors should be provided in :ne fire barrier c;enin;s te:Ween thes,e areas. Describe h:w you will c =:iy with this pcsiticn.

e

--. si]

..,4~t.=,.,"- s.

(s

..4.,....,. Avs. a.4..n 3..

.. e.4 4. =.c,3 c ;

s

.6.

1

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MAR 7 I378 1 (c) Your submittal implies that tne total flooding C0 suppres-y sion system for the day tank room is part of the diesel generator room system. Verify if :nis is true, and indicate if any of the heat detectors used to actuate the system are located in the day tank room.

42.

Page a-451.

Describe the barriers and fire rating wnich vill be installed for the boric acid transfer pum:s and service water pum:s.

43.

Pages 0o2, a63, and Fire Areas No. 3g and 2', - New Fuel and Spent a

l Fuel Pcol Areas. Appendix A re: mmends cut matic fire date::icn and portable fire extinguishers to be installed in these areas.

Indicate b:w Farley will be upgraded to comply witn this guideline.

I i

J.

Page 472.

Indicate One lccatiens to be used to store dry ion 4

exenange resias during resin :nangecut.

Cescrite One fire dete:-

i tion and suppression provided f:r nese areas.

r r

l I

(RSP)45.

Describe the ty;e of aut:matic water su;pressi.1 system :: te in-i i

stalled in Fire Areas 3, g, 22, 30, and 31.

It is our pcsition that au:cmatic water suppression also be installed in catie chase fire area No.13. Modify ycur design at:crdingly.

and., - Cab.te iunnels.

,(:u state :.,.a: manua,i

.i re r, reas.lo. s -

r.

J o.

/.

i tackuc su:cression f:r tnese areas would be roviced :y the yard hydrants.

Indicate the location of access c enings which would l

allow the fire trigace to utilize hcse lines :nnectad to yard i

i d

i j

1 22-MAR 7 1978 q

hydrants in combating a fire in the caole tunnels.

i (RSP)

C7.

Fire Area No. a.

It was cbserved during our site visit that the d uct chase which extends fr:m this level to tne 155'-0" level near column line "5" is partially enclosed cn upper levels witn metal walls.

It is cur positicn that this duct chase be encicsed on all upper levels with at least 3 hr. fire rated walls.

Des:ribe hcw you will comply with this position.

l

1. 3-Fire Area No. S.

Describe tne fire retardant ccating :: be used to 1

t cover the access naten to this cable chase tr:m recm aas

..rire r

Area Mo. 41).

Indicate, witn reference to test data, tne fire i

resistance rating to te acnieved.

?

(?SP)

1. 9-Fire Areas ::. 9 and 22.

It is cur pcsition that tne ::enings in tne wall betaeen trese tao #ire areas sr.culd se sealec to pr0vide i

3 hr. fire resistence. 0escribe how you will c:mply with tnis 1

pos i ti on.

1 v

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i I

i i

i a

i l

MAR7 1979 23 -

50. Fire Areas No. 30 and 31. Describe the fire retarcant coating to be used to cover tne steel access hatch to each of these cable cnases from Room 235 IFire Area No. 23). Indicate, with reference to test data, the fire esistance rating to be achieved.

(RSP)

51. Fire Area No. 47.

Due to the comoustible material stored in room aCA, it is our position :nat an automatic sprinkler system be installed in room 40a and that at least two additional standpipe hose stations be installed in fire area no. 47 to provide hose coverage to all areas.

This hose is in addition to the hose proposed for room 415. Describe now you will comply with tnis position.

52 The penetration from the cable chase (Fire Area No.13) to the turoine building nas an c;ening wnicn is apparently sealed on eacn side witn

~

a steel clate. Provide sufficient infcrmation to verify that this is ecuivalent to a 3 hr. fire carrier or uograce the seal to 3 hr. rated cons tructicn.

53. Provide additional infomaticn to describe One precedures usec to control or ccnduct the following fire protection acministrative or training activities:

(1) Fire Srigace Training, (2) Control of C::coustioles, (3) Ccntrol of I;nition Sources ; anc ( -) Fi re Fi;nting P rocedures. The infomation should summarize tne scc::e of eacn con-trolling procecure and demonstrate that they are responsive to :ne latest su;plemental guidance en these activities ceoviced to you under seperate cover in a document entitled "Nuclear Plan: Fi re P nD-tection Functicnal Responsibilities, Administrative Centrols and Quality Assurance dated June f.,1977.