ML19309E623
| ML19309E623 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/19/2019 |
| From: | Charles Brown Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| Brown, C, ACRS | |
| References | |
| NRC-0573 | |
| Download: ML19309E623 (274) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards US-APWR Subcommittee: Open Session Docket Number: (n/a)
Location: Rockville, Maryland Date: Thursday, September 19, 2019 Work Order No.: NRC-0573 Pages 1-131 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
1 1
2 3
4 DISCLAIMER 5
6 7 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 8 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 9
10 11 The contents of this transcript of the 12 proceeding of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 13 Commission Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 14 as reported herein, is a record of the discussions 15 recorded at the meeting.
16 17 This transcript has not been reviewed, 18 corrected, and edited, and it may contain 19 inaccuracies.
20 21 22 23 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 + + + + +
4 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 5 (ACRS) 6 + + + + +
7 US-APWR SUBCOMMITTEE 8 OPEN SESSION 9 + + + + +
10 THURSDAY 11 SEPTEMBER 19, 2019 12 + + + + +
13 ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND 14 + + + + +
15 The Subcommittee met at the Nuclear 16 Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room 17 T2D10, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., Matthew W.
18 Sunseri, Chair, presiding.
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2 1 COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
2 MATTHEW W. SUNSERI, Chair 3 RONALD G. BALLINGER, Member 4 DENNIS BLEY, Member 5 CHARLES H. BROWN, JR. Member 6 VESNA B. DIMITRIJEVIC, Member 7 WALTER L. KIRCHNER, Member 8 HAROLD B. RAY, Member 9 JOY L. REMPE, Member 10 11 DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:
12 CHRIS BROWN 13 14 STAFF PRESENT:
15 JOHN BUDZYNSKI, NRO/DESR/SRSB 16 LARRY BURKHART, ACRS/TSB 17 DAVID DESAULNIERS, NRR/DIRS 18 BRIAN GREEN, NRR/DIRS/IRAB 19 NADIM KHAN, NRR/DE/EENB 20 JASON PAIGE, NRR/DLP/PLPB 21 SHEILA RAY, NRR/DE/EENB 22 FANTA SACKO, NRR/DE/EENB 23 ANGELO STUBBS, NRO/DESR/SPRA 24 GETACHEW TESFAYE, NRO/DLSE/LB1 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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3 1 ALSO PRESENT:
2 ETSUKO GOOD, MHI 3 ROBERT HALL, MHI 4 SHINJI KAWANAGO, MHI 5 AKIRA KIRITA, MHI 6 ATSUSHI KUMAKI, MHI 7 KENJI MASHIO, MHI 8 TAKAYUKI MORI, MHI 9 TAKAFUMI OGINO, MHI 10 HIDEKI TANAKA, MHI 11 AKIHIRO TODA, MHI 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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4 1 A G E N D A 2 Opening Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3 Review History and Future Activities . . . . . . 14 4 Design Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5 MHI 6 Chapter 8, "Electric Power" . . . . . . . . 45 7 Chapter 18, "Human Factors Engineering . . 69 8 NRO 9 Chapter 8, "Electric Power" . . . . . . . 105 10 Chapter 18, "Human Factors Engineering . 117 11 Public Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 12 Adjourn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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5 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 8:30 a.m.
3 CHAIR SUNSERI: Good morning. The meeting 4 will now come to order. This is a meeting of the 5 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards US-APWR 6 Subcommittee.
7 I am Matt Sunseri, Chairman of the US-APWR 8 Subcommittee. Members in attendance today are Ron 9 Ballinger, Harold Ray, Walt Kirchner, Joy Rempe, 10 Charlie Brown, and Dennis Bley. Let's see here.
11 Chris Brown is our Designated Federal Officer for this 12 meeting.
13 The Subcommittee will review the staff's 14 evaluation of the US-APWR topical report, the advanced 15 accumulator, along with SERs with no open items for 16 Chapter 8 and 18. Today, we have members of the NRC 17 staff and MHI to brief the Subcommittee.
18 The ACRS was established by statute and is 19 governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The 20 Committee can only speak through our published letter 21 reports. We hold meetings to gather information and 22 perform preparatory work that will support our 23 deliberations at full Committee meetings.
24 The rules for participation in the ACRS 25 meeting were announced in the Federal Register on June NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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6 1 13, 2019.
2 The ACRS section in the USNRC public 3 website provides our charter, bylaws, agendas, letter 4 reports, and full transcripts of all full and 5 subcommittee meetings, including slides presented 6 there. The meeting notice and agenda for this meeting 7 were posted on that website.
8 Portions of this meeting can be closed as 9 needed to protect proprietary information, and we will 10 have a closed meeting today on the advanced 11 accumulator information.
12 As stated in the Federal Register Notice 13 and in the public meeting notice on the website, 14 members of the public who desire to provide written or 15 oral input to the Subcommittee may do so and should 16 contact the Designated Federal Officer five days prior 17 to the meeting, as practical.
18 We have also set aside ten minutes for 19 comments from members of the public in attendance or 20 listening in to our meeting. As a result, though, we 21 have not received any written comments or requests for 22 time to make oral comments from the public regarding 23 today's meeting.
24 A transcript of the meeting is being kept 25 and will be made available on the ACRS section of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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7 1 USNRC website. We request that participants in this 2 meeting speak, please use the microphones located 3 throughout the room and speak clearly and identify 4 themselves with sufficient volume so the transcriber 5 can hear.
6 Now, we had a meeting yesterday on human 7 errors, if you will, and we learned that the most 8 error-likely situation in this room is the operation 9 of these microphones. So, think about them kind of 10 like a walkie-talkie, you've got to push the button to 11 talk and then, when you're done, push the button to 12 turn off the mic.
13 The way you do that is, if you take a look 14 at these little speakers right here. So, if you can 15 see, if the green light is on for mine. There's some 16 words at the bottom and one of the words is push. So, 17 if you push that button, the green light comes on, you 18 push it again, the green light goes off. All right?
19 All right. A telephone bridge line has 20 been established for the public to listen in. To 21 minimize disturbance, the public line will be kept in 22 a listen-only mode.
23 And also, we have MHI on their own line, 24 a separate line, of which they can interact with us --
25 or, is that right? They can interact? So, at this NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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8 1 time, if the MHI could at least acknowledge that you 2 can hear us and that we can hear you, I would 3 appreciate that. So, somebody on the MHI line, please 4 speak.
5 MR. BURKHART: Chris is opening the line 6 right now.
7 CHAIR SUNSERI: Oh, I thought you said it 8 was going to be --
9 MR. BURKHART: He's doing it right now.
10 CHAIR SUNSERI: Okay. So, we'll have to 11 -- but it will be open throughout the meeting though, 12 right? Okay.
13 MR. BURKHART: Yes, is it ready? We're 14 going to ask them to --
15 CHAIR SUNSERI: They should --
16 MR. KUMAKI: Is MHI attending on the line?
17 PARTICIPANT: Yes, thank you.
18 CHAIR SUNSERI: Okay, very good.
19 MR. KUMAKI: Do you need the name?
20 MR. BURKHART: Do you need a name?
21 CHAIR SUNSERI: Only when they speak, if 22 they could state their name.
23 (Off-microphone comments.)
24 CHAIR SUNSERI: Thank you, we can hear 25 you. To avoid disturbance, I request now that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 1 attendees put their electronic devices, like cell 2 phones, in the off or noise-free mode. And I have 3 just a few remarks before we get started with the 4 agenda.
5 So, this is going to be a review of a 6 pressurized water reactor. And the Committee has a 7 lot of experience with pressurized water reactors.
8 So, as we go through the overview, just keep in mind 9 that we are experienced in this area and you don't 10 have to emphasize every aspect of the PWR, but focus 11 on the unique aspects as it relates to this design, 12 and that will help move the meeting along.
13 As far as the Committee goes, and for the 14 Applicant, we are entering something we call the Phase 15 4 review of this application. Phase 4 means we'll be 16 looking at the staff's Safety Evaluation Report with 17 no open items, all right? So, keep that in mind as we 18 go through here, and I'll ask the Committee members to 19 think about the process-wise.
20 In some of our more recent Applicants, 21 when we enter the Phase 4, we're testing a new way of 22 doing business, right? What we are following with 23 this application is the old way of doing business, all 24 right? So, we may think about making a shift, as we 25 have done with the more recent Applicants. So, think NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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10 1 about that and we'll take comments at the end.
2 Also, there's a large amount of material 3 that's going to be presented today, and some of what 4 we're going to hear about in Chapters 8, 18, and the 5 accumulator, may be in the overview as well.
6 So, I ask members to hold your comments on 7 any material that would be related to 8, 18, or the 8 accumulator until we get to those specific chapters, 9 unless it's necessary to clarify some point or 10 something else. So, the intention is not to get into 11 the details during the overview, but we'll get into 12 details during the chapter review.
13 Something that you will see that is unique 14 today, that I've not experienced in these meetings is, 15 we have an interpreter back here and the interpreter 16 is to aid the Applicant if through my Texas English, 17 which sometimes is not completely understandable, that 18 they have to translate for the Applicant.
19 (Laughter.)
20 MEMBER BLEY: Will she do both English and 21 --
22 MEMBER REMPE: And Texas?
23 CHAIR SUNSERI: English and Texas, right, 24 yes.
25 (Laughter.)
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11 1 CHAIR SUNSERI: Right. And I've already 2 mentioned that we have MHI on the line. So, Chris, 3 you have something you want to add?
4 MR. BROWN: The MHI line, open all the 5 time?
6 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes, we want them --
7 MR. BROWN: Okay.
8 CHAIR SUNSERI: -- to be able to interact.
9 MR. BROWN: Okay.
10 MEMBER BLEY: Matt?
11 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes?
12 MEMBER BLEY: Can I ask that the speakers 13 really emphasize anything that's changed since the 14 last time around?
15 CHAIR SUNSERI: Okay, yes. And then, the 16 last point I was going to make, and I should have made 17 this during the processes, we've had extensive review 18 of this application already, and I think George is 19 going to give an overview, but we've written eight 20 letters already.
21 And we've written two letters on the 22 topics that we're going to be talking about today.
23 So, we've written letters on Chapter 8 and the 24 accumulator topical report. We held a meeting on 18, 25 but for whatever reason, we did not write a letter.
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12 1 So, that's kind of the status of where we are. I have 2 the letters here with me, if anybody wants to look at 3 them.
4 But the two points of interest that we had 5 from the last review are in the area of Chapter 8, we 6 wanted confirmation that the published reliability 7 estimates for gas turbine generator emergency power 8 supplies account for all relevant ancillary and 9 support equipment that is included in the reliability 10 for emergency use of generators. So, that's something 11 we can quiz how they do that would be different than 12 last time.
13 And then, the accumulator --
14 MEMBER BROWN: Was that the only Chapter 15 8 issue?
16 CHAIR SUNSERI: That was the only Chapter 17 8 issue --
18 MEMBER BROWN: The open phase thing was a 19 later thing that we did not review at that time, that 20 came up later, and I see the SER and the Applicant --
21 CHAIR SUNSERI: Probably.
22 MEMBER BROWN: -- covered that --
23 CHAIR SUNSERI: Probably.
24 MEMBER BROWN: -- in the revised 25 documents.
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13 1 CHAIR SUNSERI: We did have a generic 2 statement in all of them that we would anticipate that 3 any open items that the staff had would be closed, and 4 that's the case too. So --
5 MEMBER BROWN: I'd also like --
6 CHAIR SUNSERI: -- there were --
7 MEMBER BROWN: I'd like to --
8 CHAIR SUNSERI: -- a few of those.
9 MEMBER BROWN: -- comment. It was seven 10 years ago when we looked at --
11 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes, that was --
12 MEMBER BROWN: -- maybe even eight years 13 ago.
14 CHAIR SUNSERI: That was 2011.
15 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, 2010 for some of them.
16 CHAIR SUNSERI: And in 2014, we looked at 17 the accumulator and our only concern with that was 18 that we concur with the staff's recommendation to 19 increase uncertainties that are used in the loss of 20 coolant analysis for high-flow and low-flow injection 21 regimes.
22 And I'm just going to stop there, because 23 for whatever reason, we chose to write a proprietary 24 letter and this has proprietary markings all through 25 it. So, when we get to the accumulator section, I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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14 1 know I've talked to the Applicant already, they've 2 done a lot of work in this area and we'll get to hear 3 the big difference there.
4 So, any other comments before we -- all 5 right. I think that suffices for an introduction.
6 So, at this point, I would like to turn to George 7 Wunder for any opening remarks. George is the Project 8 Manager for this review.
9 MR. WUNDER: I'll be very brief. Good 10 morning, Mr. Chairman, Lady and Gentlemen of the 11 Committee.
12 CHAIR SUNSERI: That's error one.
13 (Laughter.)
14 MR. WUNDER: Good morning, Mr. Chairman, 15 Lady and Gentlemen of the Committee, Chris. I'm 16 George Wunder and I'm the Project Manager for the 17 staff review of the US-APWR design certification 18 application. Thank you for having us here today.
19 It's been a while since there was a 20 Subcommittee meeting on this design center, so I'm 21 going to give you a very brief history of the project, 22 so you understand where we are and where we plan to 23 go.
24 The US-APWR design certification 25 application was submitted at the end of December in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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15 1 2007 and it was docketed in February of the following 2 year.
3 The review progressed and SER chapter were 4 prepared. Between the summer of 2011 and the spring 5 of 2013, we held Phase 3 meetings on 14 of the 19 6 chapters.
7 On November 5, 2013, the Applicant 8 informed us that because significant resources would 9 be needed to support recovery from the events at 10 Fukushima, they were required to reduce support for 11 the design certification review. The Applicant made 12 clear their commitment to the completion of the 13 project. Since that time, the review has proceeded at 14 a slower pace.
15 In early 2018, the Applicant identified 16 some areas in which progress could be made. These 17 were the advanced accumulator, for which they had 18 recently revised the topical report, and several 19 chapters with RAIs that were either already resolved 20 or easily resolvable. And these were Chapters 5, 7, 21 8, 10, and 18.
22 The advanced accumulator safety evaluation 23 with confirmatory items was issued in June of 2018.
24 The final SER with no confirmatory items was issued in 25 June of 2019. Chapters 8 and 18 were issued in July NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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16 1 and August of 2019 and Chapters 5, 7, and 10 are under 2 staff review and we hope to bring them to the 3 Subcommittee in 2020.
4 And that's pretty much where we are. If 5 you have any questions, it's fine, and if not, we can 6 turn it over to someone more interesting and I will 7 pick up my name tag and go home.
8 CHAIR SUNSERI: All right. Thank you, 9 George. So, at this point, I'll turn to the Applicant 10 and Kumaki-san, if you're ready?
11 MR. KUMAKI: Good morning, everyone. Can 12 you hear me? I'd like to start my presentation of US-13 APWR design overview. My name is Atsushi Kumaki from 14 MHI NS Engineering. This is a subsidiary company of 15 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. And so, MHI is Applicant 16 of US-APWR design certification application.
17 And this is Mr. Joseph Tapia. He's a 18 principal consulting engineer in Mitsubishi Nuclear 19 Energy System. So, he will support my presentation, 20 if I couldn't understand, he will support. Thank you.
21 So, this is the contents of the 22 presentation today, starting from introduction over 23 US-APWR licensing activities and also, objectives of 24 today's presentation. Then, the overview of US-APWR 25 design feature will be explained.
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17 1 So, MHI submitted the application for US-2 APWR design certification in December 2007. NRC 3 performed it's safety review from that time and 4 several ACRS meetings have already been held. And so, 5 now, we are still continuing the review phase on US-6 APWR DC.
7 So, today is very comfortable for us to 8 discuss about the Chapter 18 and 8 and advanced 9 accumulator. So, before that, I will introduce an 10 interview of US-APWR design.
11 So, today's meeting objective is to 12 provide the current ACRS with US-APWR design overview.
13 So, several member has already changed, but I saw same 14 people, I'm familiar with, so thank you very much for 15 attending.
16 And also, this morning, I will present the 17 design overview. And this afternoon, other experts 18 for the Chapter 18, human factor engineering, and the 19 Chapter 8, electrical system, and also, topical report 20 for advanced accumulator, will be introduced this 21 afternoon.
22 This is a kind of conceptual sketch of US-23 APWR. It looks like very similar to normal PWR, but 24 we have, if you can see this, inside the containment, 25 the bottom, we have refueling water storage pit, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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18 1 inside the containment. It's one of our features for 2 US-APWR.
3 And it hidden here, we have advanced 4 accumulator, sorry to put figure, but we have advanced 5 accumulator inside the containment. And also, you can 6 see the Main Control Room, which is applied for the 7 digital I&C system. So, those are features on US-8 APWR.
9 The first part is a main feature of US-10 APWR. This table show the progression of Mitsubishi 11 PWR design. So, for each number of loops, two loops, 12 three loops, four loops, in pressurized water reactor.
13 So, you can see the output of power, and 14 the inner diameter of reactor vessel, a number of fuel 15 assemblies, some points of steam generator and reactor 16 coolant pump. And this is the later reference plant 17 in Japan, for those loops.
18 And at the bottom, we have APWR, it's a 19 four-loop. And this is the base of our US-APWR. So, 20 basic design concept of US-APWR is the same as our 21 Japanese APWR.
22 The new technologies of APWR are fully 23 tested and well-verified and established. So, those 24 new technologies were incorporated in also US-APWR.
25 Then, US-APWR generates 1700 megawatt class and it is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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19 1 based on the established APWR technology.
2 And those, we have some enhancement point, 3 so we take the latest technology to improve plant 4 efficiency and also, we take minor modification to 5 meet U.S. regulatory and RTT requirement.
6 For example, for U.S. regulatory, we 7 assessed aircraft impact assessment and also, security 8 assessment. And it is very good experience for us and 9 we know the U.S. regulation. And also, we consider 10 about the RTT requirements -- yes?
11 MEMBER BROWN: When you said security, was 12 that physical security?
13 MR. KUMAKI: Yes.
14 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. It wasn't cyber, it 15 was physical security?
16 MR. KUMAKI: Not cyber, no.
17 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. I just wanted to 18 make sure we understood the differentiation there.
19 Thank you.
20 MR. KUMAKI: And also, as for utility 21 requirements, we consider about the online maintenance 22 for safety system. So, we provided for that kind of 23 thing.
24 This table show the comparison of major 25 parameters among conventional four-loop APWR and the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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20 1 US-APWR. APWR generates 1538 megawatt output by large 2 capacity core and large capacity main components, such 3 as steam generator, reactor coolant pump, and the 4 turbine, and so on.
5 Then, US-APWR generates 1700 megawatt 6 output, with ten percent higher efficiency than APWR.
7 And US-APWR provides the same thermal output, 4451 8 megawatt, but its steam generator, US-APWR steam 9 generator has high performance and the large capacity, 10 comparing with APWR. And its turbine also high 11 performance, applying 74 inches across low-pressure 12 turbine blade.
13 MEMBER REMPE: But just to remind me, it's 14 been a while since we discussed this, I know when we 15 discussed the steam generator years ago, the question 16 was raised, is it as big as what was deployed or was 17 attempted to be deployed at SONGS? And the answer, as 18 I recall, was no.
19 The one in the US-APWR is smaller than 20 what was used at SONGS, the replacement, and it was 21 within your experience base, that you had used it 22 elsewhere. Is that not a correct recollection?
23 MR. KUMAKI: And after that, so we 24 examined the SONGS program and those we understand the 25 reason why the problem was occurred. So, on that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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21 1 experience, we verified our US-APWR steam generator 2 and made the design review, kind of design review.
3 MEMBER REMPE: Okay.
4 MR. KUMAKI: And so, if we manufacture 5 next year we may consider, but --
6 MEMBER REMPE: Okay.
7 MR. KUMAKI: Okay. So, as for the size of 8 steam generator, it's smaller than SONGS.
9 MEMBER REMPE: That's what I recall and 10 that it had actually been deployed somewhere else in 11 Japan too, already?
12 MR. KUMAKI: It's not in operation phase.
13 MEMBER REMPE: It is not in operation?
14 Okay, I'd forgotten some details. Thank you.
15 MR. KUMAKI: Okay. This is a comparison 16 of parameters for reactor core and internals. The 17 middle of APWR has a large capacity core, the number 18 of fuel assemblies was increased from 193 conventional 19 plan to 257 assemblies. And the neutron reflector was 20 installed for enhancement of reliability on reactor 21 vessel, especially for radiation, and also fuel 22 economy.
23 Then, US-APWR has a low power density 24 core, using 14-foot fuel assemblies to enhance fuel 25 economy for 24 months long-term operation. And NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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22 1 applying the same core thermal output with APWR, US-2 APWR could use the same design of related system, such 3 as ECCS or RHRS.
4 And the reactor vessel of US-APWR applies 5 top-mounted in-core implementation system, ICIS, to 6 enhance the reliability and the maintainability for 7 the vessel penetration on the bottom. And also, 8 comparing the conventional plant and the Japanese 9 APWR, we enhanced the checkpoint on US-APWR.
10 CHAIR SUNSERI: Let me interrupt for just 11 a sec. Just for the record, Vesna Dimitrijevic has 12 joined the Committee. Thank you, or good to see you, 13 Vesna. Please continue.
14 MR. KUMAKI: Okay. Next is the safety 15 system and I&C system. Comparison with conventional 16 four-loop plant, APWR enhanced safety by simplified 17 and reliable safety system.
18 Mechanical four-train system, with direct 19 vessel injection. And also, elimination of low head 20 safety injection pump by utilizing advanced 21 accumulators and elimination of recirculation 22 switching by in-containment refueling water storage 23 pit. So, those are the enhancement points on APWR.
24 And furthermore, US-APWR enhanced safety 25 by four-train electrical system. And also, online NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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23 1 maintenance capability, if we consider the single 2 failure phase. So, that means we provided a 50 3 percent times four trains. That means one train may 4 be failed from a single failure and one train may be 5 on the online maintenance. So, that's why other two 6 trains means 100 percent for safety capability of 7 that.
8 So, at the first summary on this 9 presentation. So, these are the main feature of US-10 APWR. Enhanced economy was achieved by large capacity 11 and high plant performance and also, high fuel 12 performance for 24 months operation.
13 Enhanced safety is achieved by improved 14 safety response by using advanced technology, such as 15 advanced accumulator or four trains. And enhanced 16 reliability was achieved by well-designed and verified 17 proven technologies.
18 So, from this slide, I will introduce the 19 US-APWR design features in a little more detail, not 20 so detail, but a little more. This is advanced 21 technology applying in US-APWR.
22 So, reactor has 1700 megawatt across large 23 capacity and also, neutron reflector. Engineered 24 safety features has simplified configuration with four 25 mechanical subsystems and also, four electrical NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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24 1 subsystems.
2 In-containment refueling water storage 3 pit, which eliminates switching of the long-term core 4 cooling. And we also applied advanced accumulator.
5 And as for steam generator, it has a high performance 6 separator and increased capacity, with compact sizing, 7 applying the triangular arrangement of tubes.
8 For I&C, we applied the full digital 9 controls and protection systems and using compact 10 console, such as these pictures. More big picture 11 will be raised later.
12 And also, our turbine has 74-inch length 13 blade in low pressure turbine and fully integrated 14 turbine rotor.
15 MEMBER BALLINGER: When you say fully 16 integrated, does that mean mono-block?
17 MR. KUMAKI: Yes, mono-block.
18 MEMBER BALLINGER: Mono-block, not built 19 up?
20 MR. KUMAKI: Yes.
21 MEMBER BALLINGER: Okay.
22 MR. KUMAKI: So, a little detail for 23 nuclear design features. So, as I explained, we have 24 a large thermal output and low power density.
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25 1 assemblies and the 12-foot. So, you can see, the 2 bottom power density varies. So, on APWR, the power 3 density was lower than conventional, and also, US-APWR 4 more lower than APWR to perform the long-term core 5 cooling and flexibility of core.
6 So, this is neutron reflector features.
7 So, stainless steel radial neutron reflector was 8 designed to improve neutron neutralization, which 9 reduce the fuel cost and significantly reduce reactor 10 vessel irradiation compared to the conventional plant, 11 which has baffle plate design.
12 So, this figure shows the critical 13 experimental results performed in Japan. In case of 14 conventional baffle plate, the thickness almost 20 15 millimeters, that measured the reactivity gain on 16 virtual axis is quite low.
17 On the other hand, neutron reflector have 18 155 millimeter thickness, will produce high gain. So, 19 this differential gain corresponds to the saved 20 enrichment of 0.1 weight percent Uranium-235.
21 MEMBER KIRCHNER: May I ask a question?
22 MR. KUMAKI: Yes.
23 MEMBER KIRCHNER: So, when you did that, 24 how did that change your seismic design for the 25 reactor core and vessel? That's a substantial NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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26 1 increase in mass inside the vessel.
2 MR. TAPIA: We don't have the number to 3 characterize the differences between the conventional 4 and the added mass, but we'd be happy to provide that 5 in a subsequent submittal.
6 MEMBER BALLINGER: Was that baffle plate 7 -- I mean, that reflector's about six inches thick, 8 that's of the same order as the pressure vessel 9 thickness.
10 MR. TAPIA: It's thick, yes.
11 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Maybe that's just 12 something for --
13 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes, we can --
14 MEMBER KIRCHNER: -- in the future.
15 CHAIR SUNSERI: Right, we'll --
16 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Not for today.
17 CHAIR SUNSERI: -- make a note for a 18 future, that's probably Chapter 3 or 4 issue, 3 and 4, 19 yes.
20 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Thank you.
21 MR. KUMAKI: We will provide the answer 22 later. So, this slide shows the fuel design features.
23 So, as I explained previously, US-APWR applied the low 24 power density core, using the 14-foot fuels.
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27 1 using gadolinium pellet. So, gadolinium is to reduce 2 the peak linear heat rate, so it's helpful to design 3 the core under the constraint of enrichment and also 4 burnup.
5 And fuel economy was enhanced applying 97 6 percent theoretical density pellet and also zircaloy-4 7 grid for neutron economy.
8 Right part of this slide shows kind of 9 high reliability points grid fretting-resistant design 10 was fully -- by 11 grids and grid span design. The 11 grid span lengths is shorter than conventional 14-foot 12 fuel plants, which is kind, South Texas is a 14-foot 13 fuel plant.
14 And corrosion resistant cladding 15 materials, ZIRLO, and also, anti-debris bottom nozzle 16 with built-in filter were applied.
17 This is a comparison of main structure on 18 reactor internals, the particular point is upper-19 mounted ICIS. So, for conventional, they have a 20 bottom-mounted, and we changed to upper-mounted ICIS 21 to enhance the reliability and the maintainability of 22 bottom penetration of reactor vessels.
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28 1 again, but also, for neutron reflector, the bolt 2 numbers, on conventional baffle plate, they have 2,000 3 bolts. But on neutron reflector, we were reduced to 4 50. And also, the material is stainless steel 316, 5 so, it's very good for erosion.
6 This is very typical diagram on reactor 7 coolant system. So, we have four loops, four primary 8 coolant loops, each loop has steam generator and 9 reactor coolant pump, but those are the large size.
10 And as for pressurizer, we also increase the volume of 11 pressurizer to make a good response and 12 controllability on the transient of the plant.
13 This table shows a ratio of reliability on 14 US-APWR to conventional four-loop plant. So, as for 15 core thermal output, it's almost 25 percent larger 16 than conventional plant. And also, steam generator 17 heat transfer area is around two-thirds larger than 18 conventional plant, for higher efficiency.
19 And reactor coolant pump flow, 20 percent 20 larger than conventional, for larger output. And 21 also, pressurizer volume was increased around 60 22 percent, for the greater margin for transients in 23 plant.
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29 1 vessel, applying the material Alloy 690. And also, we 2 apply the vessel head plenum temperature is colder 3 than conventional plant, for the vessel integrity.
4 And reduction of weld lines, using 5 integrated forging for the manufacturing of reactor 6 vessel and neutron reflector, for the neutron fluence 7 reduced to 1,000.
8 As for CRDM, control rod drive mechanism, 9 housing, conventional plant have a canopy seal for 10 this small part. This is very weak for the stainless 11 corrosion crack and we considered the program and we 12 improved the point to eliminate the canopy seal on 13 this CRDM.
14 This is the steam generator. Steam 15 generator has high performance moisture separation, to 16 avoid turbine blade erosion. And also, we applied 17 anti-vibration bar, to avoid vibration rupture of 18 steam generator tubes.
19 CHAIR SUNSERI: So, just let me, Kumaki-20 san, just a quick question here. Back to the steam 21 generator, is this similar in flow characteristics to 22 the APWR? Which is -- you have some in service, 23 right? Some of those are in service, right?
24 MR. KUMAKI: APWR is not in service now.
25 Oh, for the standpoint of flow, it is the same.
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30 1 CHAIR SUNSERI: Okay. Thank you.
2 MR. KUMAKI: Okay. For reactor coolant 3 pump, has a large capacity and high efficiency and 4 with improved impeller and diffusor.
5 And the particular point is advanced seal.
6 This seal provides stabilization of number one seal 7 leak-off characteristics and also, extension of seal 8 life and countermeasure to station blackout. When 9 station blackout occurs, the seal injection and the 10 cooling for thermal barrier will be stopped.
11 Then, the hot and high pressure reactor 12 coolant will come up, but we need to stop for the SBO 13 phase. We made a test to endure the eight hours for 14 the SBO phase.
15 For safety system, reliable and simplified 16 design is achieved by 50 percent configuration for 17 safety injection with direct vessel injection. And 18 also, we applied advanced accumulator, which will be 19 explained in the afternoon. And also, in-containment 20 refueling water storage pit improved the reliability 21 and safety by eliminating the circulation switching.
22 So, this is a comparison between 23 conventional four-loop and the US-APWR. A four-train 24 system for the US-APWR, but conventional has a two-25 train only. And the advanced accumulator, which can NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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31 1 eliminate low head SI pump.
2 And the in-containment refueling water 3 storage pit have a higher reliability for long-term 4 core cooling. So, conventional plant need a switch 5 for the injection phase and the long-term core cooling 6 phase, but in this US-APWR, it will have an inside 7 containment RWSP, we don't need to switch the suction 8 line of injection pumps.
9 Comparison of number of each components.
10 So, US-APWR has four accumulator, each advanced type, 11 and 50 percent times four trains safety injection 12 system. And also, containment spray pump, the bottom 13 is a containment spray. It also has 50 percent times 14 four trains. And this system is used for residual 15 heat removal from the normal shutdown phase.
16 This also is high head injection system 17 design features of four independent train, without 18 interconnection between trains, because of the direct 19 vessel injection line we have. And the sufficient 20 capacity for safety injection pumps meets safety 21 injection requirement in core re-flooding stage.
22 And this is design for the common 23 containment spray system and the residual heat removal 24 systems, pumps, heat exchanger.
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32 1 function will be standby, and for plant shutdown, RHR 2 function will be operated by taking from hot leg line 3 and using pump and cooled by heat exchanger and 4 returned to cold leg.
5 So, accident phase, the refueling water 6 storage pit, this water will be taken by pumps and 7 cooled by cooler and spray from the top of 8 containment.
9 This is a figure of in-containment RWSP.
10 I think I almost explained already, so I direct to go 11 next.
12 This is the containment vessel. This is 13 very typical for conventional, we have pre-stressed 14 concrete containment vessel. I think I don't need any 15 explanation.
16 And the full layout, we applied a 17 simplified layout, placing for each corners of reactor 18 building, we placed safety systems for each corners.
19 It can be reduced about 20 percent building volume, 20 comparing with conventional plant.
21 This is an explanation for advanced 22 accumulator, but the detail will be provided in 23 afternoon, but I need to explain as necessary things.
24 So, this is injection pattern for after LOCA, large 25 break LOCA.
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33 1 So, for current conventional plant, this 2 red line is requirement for injection flow. And 3 normal accumulator will work for this blue line, for 4 conventional plant. So, injection will start, but 5 stop soon.
6 After that, to cover the requirement of 7 this red line, we have a low head injection pump right 8 here, and high head injection pump, yellow area.
9 Those will cover the requirement of injection.
10 For US-APWR, the advanced accumulator will 11 make a two-pattern flow, this blue line. So, this 12 phase, on core re-flooding phase, accumulator will 13 work for small injection flow. It will cover the low 14 head injection part, so we can eliminate this low head 15 injection pump. And after the accumulator stopping, 16 the safety injection pump, high head injection pump, 17 only work for that.
18 This is a mechanism of advanced 19 accumulator for switching. In the initial, the water 20 level is higher than the top of this standpipe. So, 21 the flow will made by main standpipe line and also, 22 side inlet line will make a large flow and the inject 23 to RCS.
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34 1 side and the inject as a small flow to reactor coolant 2 system.
3 So, from now on, several familiar system, 4 such as emergency feedwater system and also component 5 cooling water system, I will explain. But the point 6 is, all those have four trains system, 50 percent time 7 four-train systems.
8 As for the emergency feedwater system, we 9 apply the diversity consideration applying the 10 turbine-driven pump and also, motor-driven pump to 11 each. So, this system make high reliability with 12 simplified system and also, it allow online 13 maintenance, it weakens the single failure, but we 14 have two 100 percent trains.
15 I think this is kind of repeat again, so 16 diverse point of power source. And four train system 17 and also two independent feeds. I think it's enough 18 for us.
19 So, for component cooling water system and 20 also, essential service water system, we apply the 21 four-train system. For component cooling water, we 22 have four sets of pump and heat exchange and also, we 23 have two sets of surge tank. Those are available for 24 the online maintenance. And also, essential service 25 water system, the same independent four-train NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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35 1 configuration.
2 The mechanical part is over and from now, 3 I&C main features, I will explain. So, US-APWR 4 instrumentation and control system is fully digital 5 I&C system, including computerized main control board, 6 minimum conventional switches, only for regulatory 7 compliance, with is Reg Guide 1.26, the title is 8 Manual Initiation of Protective Actions.
9 And also, we have microprocessor-based 10 safety and non-safety systems, multiplex 11 communications, including Class 1E signals. It's 12 based on defense-in-depths and diversity concept, with 13 four-train redundant safety system. And non-safety 14 system also have a redundant configuration.
15 Considering the common-cause failure.
16 Diverse backup non-safety system is provided as a 17 maximum standard deviation.
18 This is a very complicated figure and very 19 detailed. It's in the DCD, but I don't want to 20 explain everything. But please look at this kind of 21 thing, only.
22 So, as for safety I&C design features, 23 protection and safety monitoring system is safety 24 features, including reactor trip and the engineered 25 safety features actuation function. And also, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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36 1 monitoring of the safety-critical parameters, 2 according to Reg Guide 1.97, which is Criteria for 3 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation.
4 We applied the four-train redundancy for 5 all safety systems and the electrical, physical, 6 functional communication and data isolation to 7 accommodate the signal interface between safety 8 systems, signal interface safety to non-safety system, 9 and also, non-safety human system interface for safety 10 functions with safety HSI.
11 Branch Technical Position 7-14, which is 12 Guidance on Software Reviews for Digital Computer-13 Based Instrumentation and Control Systems, and 7-19, 14 which is Guidance for Evaluation of Diversity and 15 Defense-in-Depth in Digital Computer-Based 16 Instrumentation and Control Systems, are taken into 17 account for software integrity.
18 Our platform for main control board is a 19 MELTAC by Mitsubishi Electric, which was qualified 20 with extensive experience in Japanese plants.
21 For non-safety I&C design features, plant 22 control and monitoring system is non-safety features, 23 including reactor turbine generator, plans of plant 24 control room monitoring, and redundant configuration, 25 functional isolation of shared sensor signals.
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37 1 Diverse actuation system is a 2 countermeasure for common-cause failure in the digital 3 safety system, according to BTP 7-19 and also, 10 CFR 4 50.62, for anticipated transient with scram.
5 Diverse automation is provided for reactor 6 trip, turbine trip, EFWS, emergency feedwater system, 7 based on actuation, are required within ten minutes of 8 an event.
9 Diverse manual controls are provided for 10 safety injection, containment vessel isolation, and so 11 on, and are critical safety functions. Diverse 12 monitoring is considered for safety critical 13 parameters.
14 So, this picture shows prototype console 15 of a main control board, with large display panel, 16 operator console, applying visual display units. This 17 control board is well considered for human system 18 interface. And that human system interface item will 19 be discussed also in the afternoon, Chapter 18 20 session.
21 So, the function of HSI system are fully 22 computerized video-based approach, integrated display 23 for monitoring and soft control, and dynamic alarm 24 prioritization and computerized procedures.
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38 1 NUREG-0711 program model, including task analysis and 2 human factor design, step-by-step prototyping and 3 verification and validation by plant operators.
4 The design basis of staff are operators, 5 supervisor, and safety technical advisors.
6 The main features are all operations are 7 available from non-safety VDUs. All safety operations 8 are performed from safety VDUs. And the inventory of 9 fixed-position HSI is minimum for convention HSI, for 10 manual system lever action, regarding Reg Guide 1.26, 11 which is Manual Initiation of Protective Actions, and 12 critical functions on bypass or inoperable status 13 regarding the Reg Guide 1.47, Bypassed and Inoperable 14 Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety 15 Systems.
16 CHAIR SUNSERI: I know you'll probably get 17 into this more later, but at this point, could you 18 just remind us what the number of staffing is? How 19 many operators, how many supervisors?
20 MR. KUMAKI: The actual operator is two, 21 one. And the supervisor is one.
22 CHAIR SUNSERI: One operator, one 23 supervisor?
24 MR. KUMAKI: Just a moment.
25 CHAIR SUNSERI: And one technical advisor?
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39 1 MR. TAPIA: We have our expert right here.
2 MR. MASHIO: My name is Kenji Mashio, from 3 MHI. I can respond your question. And so, the 4 minimum staffing we have -- this HSI control board can 5 operate by minimum one RO, reactor operator, and one 6 SRO. But based on the regulation, we have two reactor 7 operator.
8 CHAIR SUNSERI: Okay. All right. Thank 9 you.
10 MR. KUMAKI: Okay. Let's go to the 11 electrical system design features. It's very 12 conventional and we have two independent offsite 13 transmission systems. But we have a four-train onsite 14 safety power system and four-train safety gas turbine 15 generator for emergency and four-train safety 16 batteries.
17 And as for the non-safety AC power, we 18 provide, this one is a typo, so we have two non-safety 19 GTG alternate AC power.
20 This is also a very typical one-line 21 diagram on electrical system. We have safety 22 electrical, four trains, and also, we have a non-23 safety, we need to provide one more, we will have two.
24 So, this is summary of this morning 25 presentation for design overview of US-APWR. US-APWR NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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40 1 is designed on proven and reliable technologies and it 2 provides improved plant efficiency, incorporating 3 improved steam generator and turbine system.
4 It provides reduced fuel cycle costs and 5 improved operational flexibilities, by low power 6 density core, applying 14-foot fuel assemblies. And 7 also, it provides minor modification of APWR for U.S.
8 and RTT requirements, such as online power maintenance 9 and so on.
10 And also, we don't need to forget about 11 safety point, we enhanced the safety, applying the 12 four-train systems, and also advanced accumulator and 13 so on.
14 Okay. This is end of my presentation.
15 Thank you for your kind attention.
16 CHAIR SUNSERI: Thank you very much. And 17 I think the few questions that you received is an 18 indication of our depth of knowledge on the PWR and we 19 appreciate you going through this in a deliberate 20 manner. Yes, go ahead, Walt.
21 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Just a quick question.
22 So, you're using gas turbine generators both for the 23 for-safety units, as well as the non-safety. So, is 24 the plan to have significant gas storage on-hand or 25 use propane or?
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41 1 MR. TAPIA: It's actually diesel. It's 2 atomized diesel.
3 MEMBER KIRCHNER: So, you're using diesel 4 --
5 MR. TAPIA: Yes.
6 MEMBER KIRCHNER: -- as the fuel?
7 MR. TAPIA: Yes.
8 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay, thank you.
9 MEMBER BROWN: Matt?
10 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes, Charlie?
11 MEMBER BROWN: I did restrain myself a 12 little bit on the I&C. When we reviewed this back in 13 2009 and 2010, the Chapter 7 stuff, we made some 14 considerable enhancements, thought processes, over the 15 last eight years, nine years, which I will save until 16 we do the subsequent one. Just let you know.
17 CHAIR SUNSERI: I was curious about that, 18 but I thought you were --
19 MEMBER BROWN: Well, I --
20 CHAIR SUNSERI: -- paying attention to the 21 --
22 MEMBER BROWN: No, I was paying --
23 CHAIR SUNSERI: -- other comments and not 24 saying --
25 MEMBER BROWN: -- very much attention.
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42 1 CHAIR SUNSERI: -- saving it to the --
2 MEMBER BROWN: Well, it's just not 3 appropriate now.
4 CHAIR SUNSERI: Right.
5 MEMBER BROWN: It's not the right form to 6 try to address those comments.
7 CHAIR SUNSERI: Right.
8 MEMBER BROWN: So, we'll wait until that.
9 I'm just trying to give the staff a heads-up to know 10 that we will have some additional questions, when it 11 comes to that.
12 And also, MHI might just remember that 13 Member Brown restrained himself and will have some 14 questions, politely restrained himself, will have some 15 questions when we get around to Chapter 7 again.
16 Okay. Thank you very much.
17 CHAIR SUNSERI: Very good. All right.
18 So, very good. You allotted the right amount of time 19 for our questions and we didn't have very many, so 20 that puts us ahead of schedule, so thank you for that.
21 I think we should now go ahead and move forward with 22 this into the next agenda item.
23 And that would be the Chapter 8, 24 Electrical Power. And it looks like that we have this 25 set up to where we're going to have the Applicant go NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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43 1 over all of your material for both Chapter 8 and 18.
2 And then, we'll turn it over to the staff and then, 3 they will provide their response. So, Dennis, you got 4 a question?
5 MEMBER BLEY: I was just remembering, we 6 had some concerns about the operating data for this 7 kind of gas turbine. We didn't think there had been 8 a lot, so I hope you're going to address that.
9 CHAIR SUNSERI: Right. That was one of 10 our follow-up items. Okay. So, let's go ahead and 11 transition then into the next group. And thank you 12 for that, Kumaki-san. And which are going to be the 13 lead for this? Tanaka-san? Okay. So, you got 14 schooled on the microphone? Okay.
15 So, just before we get started, I want to 16 just say that we are ahead of schedule, but somewhere 17 after 10:00-ish, if there's a good point in your 18 presentation, we'll stop and we'll take a break, okay?
19 So, if you are ready, we are ready.
20 MEMBER BROWN: Could you reemphasize on 21 this chapter, I took a, I mean, I looked at the SER 22 and part of the DCD, but could they emphasize, 23 hopefully, if there's any changes from the design as 24 it was presented back in 2010 and 2011? Is that going 25 to be covered and identify differences or what's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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44 1 happened subsequent to nine years ago?
2 3 MR. TANAKA: In this presentation, I 4 explain the best point, based on the NRC comments or 5 ACRS comments.
6 MEMBER BROWN: So, you will cover 7 fundamentally emphasized differences from eight or 8 nine years ago? From the DCD to now, if there were 9 any major changes?
10 MR. KAWANGO: Yes, and my name is Shinji 11 Kawanago. And basically, we didn't change any basic 12 design of our electrical system. Only --
13 MEMBER BROWN: That's what it looked like, 14 when I looked at the basic overall diagrams, they 15 looked the same.
16 MR. KAWANGO: The same. The same. The 17 only --
18 MEMBER BROWN: The big picture overview 19 diagram, not --
20 MR. KAWANGO: No, only the changes are 21 minor change, because of the RAI by NRC, for example, 22 the open phase issue and so on.
23 MEMBER BROWN: Thank you. That's all 24 that?
25 MR. KAWANGO: Yes.
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45 1 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, that's what I 2 thought. Thank you.
3 MR. TANAKA: Okay?
4 CHAIR SUNSERI: Okay. You may go ahead.
5 MR. TANAKA: Can I start? Okay. Good 6 morning. My name is Hideki Tanaka, electrical 7 engineer of MHI. I will explain the Chapter 8 on the 8 US-APWR. First, I'll explain the presenters, Joe 9 Tapia and Shinji Kawanago, with MHI NS Engineering, 10 and myself, Hideki Tanaka, of the MHI. Okay.
11 This page shows the contents of this 12 presentation. Especially in this presentation, I will 13 explain the features of the electrical system in the 14 US-APWR and closed open items identified in SER, Phase 15 3 SER and RAIs issued after the Phase 3 SER. Okay.
16 Overview of the chapter. Chapter 8 is 17 electric power. And in this chapter, we have the 18 subsections 8.1 through 8.4.
19 The next page, this page shows related 20 document. Opposite table shows status of the DCD. We 21 issued DCD before and this is latest DCD. And number 22 two is a tracking report of the DCD. So, we -- this 23 report shows revised point from the Revision 4 DCD 24 based on the RAI responses.
25 And this table shows technical report.
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46 1 MEMBER BROWN: Can I make sure I 2 understand? The tracking report would then cover the 3 open phase circuit stuff, as opposed to the August 30, 4 2013 version? That's what I got from your comment 5 there.
6 MR. TANAKA: This tracking report does not 7 include the open phase.
8 MEMBER BROWN: It doesn't or it does?
9 MR. TANAKA: Does not.
10 CHAIR SUNSERI: They're going to do 11 something similar to other applicants and defer the 12 open circuit stuff to the COL applicant, I believe.
13 MEMBER BROWN: Well, they made some 14 comments in the SER identified that there were some 15 changes made, but then, there were the COL items for 16 some points of it. Some of the stuff looked like it 17 was okay, that they had proposed, and there seemed to 18 be a couple of items that were deferred to the COL.
19 So, I was just wondering where -- when 20 they went through the RAI response process, did 21 anything get reflected back into the DCD or was, I 22 guess we can ask the staff that also, or was something 23 actually incorporated into the DCD, one of the 24 versions of the DCD?
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47 1 RAI and also, we had RAI response, in the RAI 2 response, we clearly indicate how to change the DCD 3 itself and also the ITAAC and also the --
4 MEMBER BROWN: Right.
5 (Simultaneous speaking.)
6 MR. KAWANGO: -- and so on.
7 MEMBER BROWN: I remember some of that.
8 I also remember something being deferred, a later RAI, 9 something moving towards the COL.
10 MR. KAWANGO: Yes.
11 MEMBER BROWN: All right. I'll just cover 12 that later.
13 MR. KAWANGO: Yes. And --
14 MEMBER BROWN: That's fine.
15 MR. KAWANGO: And also, the -- and in our 16 presentation, we will explain later, including on what 17 is a COL item and so on.
18 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, thank you. You can 19 go on.
20 MR. TANAKA: So, this table, number three 21 is onsite AC power system calculation. This report 22 shows this and other calculations and so on.
23 And number four and number five is 24 relating to the gas turbine generator. Gas turbine 25 generator is high reliability and compact and no NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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48 1 cooling water required. So, we use gas turbine 2 generator as emergency power source, instead of the 3 diesel generator usually used.
4 MEMBER BROWN: Did you say no water is 5 required?
6 MR. TANAKA: Yes.
7 MEMBER BROWN: That's what I -- okay.
8 MR. TANAKA: Yes, air cooling.
9 MEMBER BROWN: Another memory jogger here, 10 okay.
11 MEMBER BLEY: Was that the main reason you 12 chose the gas turbine or were there others?
13 MR. TANAKA: One of the reason.
14 MEMBER BLEY: Can you --
15 MR. TANAKA: One of the main reason.
16 MEMBER BLEY: Can you go through the other 17 reasons?
18 MR. TANAKA: Yes. Gas turbine generator 19 is compact, layout space is smaller than the diesel 20 generator. And reliability is, we believe reliability 21 is higher than diesel generator.
22 MEMBER BLEY: Okay, thank you.
23 MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes, Mitsubishi is one 24 of the world's leading --
25 MEMBER BLEY: I know.
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49 1 MEMBER BALLINGER: -- suppliers of gas 2 turbines.
3 MR. TANAKA: Okay. So, gas turbine 4 generator is a first of a kind, so we performed the 5 qualification testing. So, number four and number 6 five is the qualification program and the test result.
7 Okay.
8 Next is a feature of the electric power 9 system. This page shows features on the offsite power 10 system. I would like to explain this using this 11 single-line diagram.
12 We have two offsite source. One is from 13 the RAT, this is normal preferred power source. And 14 the other, from the main transformer and -- the 15 transformer. This is alternate preferred source. And 16 these are physically separated. Okay.
17 Next page, this page shows RAI issued from 18 the -- Page 2, I will explain later. The next page --
19 CHAIR SUNSERI: If I could ask you to be 20 careful with the microphone and done shuffle the paper 21 over the speaker. It makes noise.
22 MR. TANAKA: Oh, sorry. This page shows 23 details on the onsite power system, so you don't have 24 to use this single-line diagram for this explanation.
25 Okay.
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50 1 In this figure, blue line shows Class 1E 2 system and red line shows the non-Class 1E system. We 3 have a four-train safety Class 1E system. And each 4 train has emergency power source, gas turbine 5 generator.
6 And we have a four times 50 percent 7 capacity. So, we can assume the online maintenance 8 and the single failure and even those considering, we 9 still have 100 percent of capability for the safety 10 function.
11 Also, we have two buses backed up by 12 generator. We call that permanent buses, this P1 and 13 P2. These buses can be backed up by alternative AC 14 power source.
15 Usual existing plant has investment 16 protection load, such as HVAC or pump or something 17 like that. That connected to the Class 1E bus.
18 But in US-APWR, those non-safety load is 19 connected to this permanent buses. So, in our US-APWR 20 Class 1E system and non-Class 1E system is completely 21 separate. And in SBO condition, the HVAC can be 22 connected to the Class 1E buses to cope with the SBO.
23 Okay.
24 From this page, gas turbine generator is 25 explained. And this page shows the specification.
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51 1 And unique point is the starting time. Diesel 2 generator starting time is usually ten or 15 second, 3 but the upright advanced accumulator, so the starting 4 time, requirement for the starting time is less than 5 100 second, so that we can use the gas turbine 6 generator.
7 MEMBER BLEY: On the previous slide, you 8 said you have four times 50 percent capacity. Give me 9 more details on what you mean by that. Is that on the 10 gas turbines? What do you have four times 50 percent 11 capacity on?
12 MR. KAWANGO: The meaning of the 50 13 percent is, as you know, on our --
14 MEMBER BLEY: We're talking gas turbine, 15 right?
16 MR. KAWANGO: Yes.
17 MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
18 MR. KAWANGO: No.
19 MEMBER BLEY: No?
20 MR. KAWANGO: No, no.
21 MEMBER BLEY: What are you talking about?
22 MR. KAWANGO: Basically, capacity, meaning 23 the capacity, definition of the capacity always 24 defined by what is safety load, okay? And safety 25 injection pump and CV spray pump and so on. Our NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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52 1 mechanical system is a 50 percent times four. Okay?
2 Fifty time four, our mechanical system.
3 MEMBER BLEY: Each train is 50 percent 4 times four?
5 MEMBER BROWN: You're talking about the 6 equipment that's powered?
7 MR. KAWANGO: Yes. And equipment which 8 needs power is --
9 MEMBER BLEY: So, you need, you're 10 basically saying on the safety systems, you need any 11 two trains out of four trains for safety equipment?
12 MR. KAWANGO: Any two trains.
13 MEMBER BLEY: Any two?
14 MR. KAWANGO: Two, any two. And this, 15 again --
16 MEMBER BLEY: So, that reflects back then 17 to the gas turbines as well, for the emergency gas 18 turbines, you need at least two of them working --
19 MR. KAWANGO: Yes, that's right.
20 MEMBER BLEY: -- to meet your --
21 MR. KAWANGO: That's right.
22 MEMBER BLEY: -- demands?
23 MR. KAWANGO: Yes.
24 MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
25 MR. KAWANGO: That's right.
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53 1 MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
2 MR. KAWANGO: Yes.
3 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. That's -- it was a 4 little too general for me, that's why I asked.
5 MEMBER BROWN: Can you back up to that 6 Slide 13? You say a short-time rating of 4950 kW, two 7 questions. I want to get them clear. How long is 8 short-time? That's question one. Is that five 9 minutes? Is it 30 minutes? Is it -- how long can you 10 overload it at 4950? If you --
11 MR. KAWANGO: I suppose --
12 MEMBER BROWN: -- don't know it, that's 13 okay.
14 MR. KAWANGO: I suppose your question is 15 related to the overload and the capacity and based on 16 IEEE requirement?
17 MEMBER BROWN: I -- let me back up. All 18 you've listed here is the capability to run short-time 19 rating at 4950 kW, as opposed to its continuance 20 rating of 4500. And so, my question is, how long can 21 you run it at 4950? How much time?
22 CHAIR SUNSERI: Charlie, aren't those 23 numbers usually related to things like starting the 24 single largest loads?
25 MEMBER BROWN: No, no, no, that's a load.
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54 1 You put a -- in other words, if you have enough load 2 that you can load it up that way before you shed, or 3 something like that. So, it's not a startup type 4 issue, that's a transient, you're talking seconds.
5 CHAIR SUNSERI: No, but what I'm saying is 6 the thing is running at 4950 or whatever and you, or 7 somewhere close to, yes, running at 4500 and you start 8 some big load, right?, and then, it's --
9 MEMBER BROWN: No, that's a starting 10 issue, not a continuance running issue.
11 CHAIR SUNSERI: But that's a short-time.
12 MR. KAWANGO: May I answer?
13 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes.
14 MR. KAWANGO: Sorry.
15 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes, please.
16 MR. KAWANGO: Yes. And simple answer to 17 you is two hours during a 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
18 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, that's fine.
19 MR. KAWANGO: Yes. That is a requirement 20 from the IEEE.
21 MEMBER BROWN: That's fine. That's fine, 22 that answers -- that's the point, two hours is a long 23 time.
24 CHAIR SUNSERI: Right.
25 MEMBER BROWN: When you do a transient and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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55 1 start a motor, you're talking seconds.
2 CHAIR SUNSERI: Right.
3 MEMBER BROWN: And it's largely not kW, 4 many times it's reactive power. If it's a current, 5 it's a current issue and you heat windings and that 6 drives your starting type issues. But this is a long 7 time type. The second question, I've now forgotten.
8 (Laughter.)
9 MEMBER BLEY: That's good, Charlie.
10 MEMBER BROWN: To be honest.
11 MEMBER BLEY: Because I have another 12 question --
13 MEMBER BROWN: I'll remember it later.
14 MEMBER BLEY: -- then, on the four 50 15 percent capacity trains. If I have a safety injection 16 pump out for maintenance in one train and I have some 17 other big load out for maintenance in another train, 18 it's possible -- what's not possible?
19 MR. TAPIA: You can't take --
20 MEMBER BLEY: Tech specs don't stop 21 something from breaking.
22 MR. TAPIA: Oh, but you said maintenance 23 for both of them.
24 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. I'm sorry.
25 MR. TAPIA: And that's --
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56 1 MEMBER BLEY: I'm sorry. You've got two 2 major loads out of service in two different trains.
3 MR. TAPIA: So, you're allowed to take one 4 train out for maintenance. And then --
5 MEMBER BLEY: I understand.
6 MR. TAPIA: And then, the design 7 assumption is that you lose another train due to 8 single failure.
9 MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
10 MR. TAPIA: So, that leaves you with two 11 50 percent capacity --
12 MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
13 MR. TAPIA: -- trains left, which is 100 14 percent. That's the design basis for the four trains.
15 MR. KAWANGO: And Joe answered you. And 16 basically, our definition is online maintenance, okay?
17 And we just observed when we have the online 18 maintenance, just we allow to have the online 19 maintenance for only one specific train, okay?
20 So, that when we have the online 21 maintenance for the safety injection pump on Train A, 22 we cannot do the online maintenance for the B Train or 23 C Train, okay?
24 MEMBER BLEY: I understand.
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57 1 --
2 MEMBER BLEY: But you could have a failure 3 somewhere?
4 MR. KAWANGO: Yes, sure. Sure.
5 MEMBER BLEY: In fact, you could have more 6 failures. When we get to the PRA, we'll dig into that 7 a little bit, but I wanted to make sure I understand 8 the definitions here.
9 MR. TANAKA: Okay. This page shows Class 10 1E gas turbine generator testing program. So, our 11 testing performed based on the Reg Guide 1.9 and IEEE 12 387, ISG-21. And we issued technical report for the 13 test program and the test result.
14 And this page shows contents of the 15 initial type testing. We performed the load 16 capability tests to demonstrate the capability to 17 carry the load.
18 And we performed the start and load 19 acceptance tests to establish the capability to start 20 and accept load within the required time period. So, 21 in this test, we performed 150 start tests. This will 22 be discussed later.
23 And we also performed the margin tests to 24 demonstrate the capability to carry the most severe 25 load plus ten percent margin.
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58 1 And in the Section 8.3, we had three open 2 items and one new RAI. This will be discussed later.
3 The next is Section 8.4, station blackout.
4 In the station blackout, we don't have -- I mean 5 offsite power, all offsite power and EPS are not 6 available, and we use alternate AC power source to 7 cope with SBO.
8 Design basis, we have diverse alternate AC 9 power source from the EPS system to minimize a 10 potential common-cause failure. And we use gas 11 turbine generator for the alternate AC power source.
12 And alternate AC power source can be connect to any of 13 the Class 1E buses. And coping duration for the SBO 14 is eight hours, in accordance with Reg Guide 1.155.
15 And in Section 8.4, we have two open items 16 and one new RAIs. So, in this section three, I will 17 explain the closed open item and the RAIs. First item 18 is regarding the open phase, the Section 8.2. We 19 received three RAI and our response is described in 20 the next page.
21 So, the detection and protection method.
22 We provide OPC detection system on the high voltage 23 side of the main transformer and reserve auxiliary 24 transformer. So, the both preferred power source will 25 have OPC protection device.
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59 1 And second item, the single failure 2 criteria. This figure shows logic of the automatic 3 protection system for the open phase detection system.
4 Left side is for the main transformer and the right 5 side is for the reserve auxiliary transformer.
6 And each system has a System 1 and System 7 2. This means redundant system. And in the accident 8 condition, this SI signal initiated, we only use one 9 protection signal, we can protect. So, we consider 10 the single failure in this protection system.
11 And this page shows the COL item and the 12 ITAAC. We have two COL item. One is determined 13 specific type of OPC detection system device. And 14 determine the setting of the device. And the second 15 item, COL item, is determine the -- served as the 16 requirement of the device. Also, we -- this table 17 shows ITAAC for the operator's protection system.
18 Okay.
19 Next page --
20 CHAIR SUNSERI: Let me stop you there.
21 So, Charlie, does that address your --
22 MEMBER BROWN: No, it covered, I read the 23 SER response and I didn't have this detail. So, that 24 was -- or at least I couldn't find it at home.
25 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes.
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60 1 MEMBER BROWN: I -- it's been accepted, at 2 least in the SER it sounded, their explanation sounded 3 reasonable.
4 CHAIR SUNSERI: Okay.
5 MEMBER BROWN: I didn't see this 6 particular detail, it just said it was going to be a 7 COL item, there it is.
8 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes. Okay. All right.
9 Thank you.
10 MEMBER BROWN: Excuse me, I didn't have my 11 phone on, did you hear me okay? Okay.
12 CHAIR SUNSERI: All right. Continue.
13 MEMBER BROWN: Thanks, Matt.
14 MR. TANAKA: Next, this page shows open 15 item regarding the degradation of the medium voltage 16 cabling on the -- around the board. So, originally we 17 didn't provide a COL item, but we revised the DCD to 18 include the COL item, to describe the cable monitoring 19 program. So, that this has been closed.
20 Next one is regarding the gas turbine 21 generator reliability. Originally we didn't provide 22 target of the reliability. So, in the diesel 23 generator, IEEE 387 has a number of starting test as 24 100 times starting test.
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61 1 the reliability target 0.975 with 95 percent 2 confidence. This come from the Reg Guide 1.155. And 3 we calculated that this starting number was a starting 4 time based on this reliability target, we decided 150 5 start is required. And we have performed this number 6 of starts.
7 MEMBER BLEY: You're not doing the PRA 8 today, but do you have any idea what the PRA used for 9 the diesel generator reliability? I bet it wasn't --
10 MR. TANAKA: Yes.
11 MEMBER BLEY: -- one minus 0.975.
12 MR. TANAKA: Yes. Actually, in the PRA, 13 we use reliability of the diesel generator for the 14 conservatism. I mean, reliability of the gas turbine 15 generator is higher, so in the PRA modeling, we used 16 higher --
17 MEMBER BROWN: Lower?
18 MR. TANAKA: -- lower, lower --
19 MEMBER BROWN: Lower reliability?
20 MR. TANAKA: Lower reliability, yes.
21 MEMBER BLEY: You didn't use something 22 lower than this? So, I think I heard what you said 23 and you said, we know that our gas turbine generators 24 are more reliable than the diesels, so we'll use the 25 diesel generator failure rate, which might be at ten NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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62 1 to the minus three. But this testing hasn't given us 2 any confidence that these are more reliable than a 3 failure rate of ten to the minus three.
4 MR. KAWANGO: We will check the number 5 with our technical report and in our technical report, 6 we calculated the actual reliability data for the gas 7 turbine generator, by using the industrial actual 8 starting and test data, and also the actual some 9 experience.
10 MEMBER BLEY: This is the 07024 report?
11 07024-P?
12 MR. KAWANGO: Yes.
13 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. I'll study that a 14 little bit more carefully then.
15 MR. KAWANGO: And, hold on, may I explain 16 a little bit?
17 MEMBER BLEY: You could explain a lot.
18 (Laughter.)
19 MR. KAWANGO: And actually we calculated 20 the reliability data by using actual data with gas 21 turbine generator and calculation result is ten minus 22 five, or something like that. Very, very low --
23 MEMBER BLEY: These are from --
24 MR. KAWANGO: Actual data --
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63 1 being used?
2 MR. KAWANGO: Yes, that's right.
3 MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
4 MR. KAWANGO: So, we discussed --
5 MEMBER BLEY: I'll read that report more 6 carefully; I haven't had a chance to study that yet.
7 MR. KAWANGO: Okay.
8 MEMBER BLEY: Thank you.
9 MR. KAWANGO: Sorry, ten minus four.
10 (Laughter.)
11 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Well, then, what was 12 the reason that you decide to use the diesel 13 generator, which are less reliable data, if you have 14 the industry data for gas turbine?
15 MR. KAWANGO: Because, yes, because we 16 discussed with NRC and, of course, maybe good way to 17 use gas turbine generator data, but we thought, we 18 conclude, that conservative data is better for use.
19 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So, did you use also 20 diesel generator common-cause data or common-cause 21 failure of the --
22 MR. KAWANGO: Yes, data factor is the 23 same.
24 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So, do you have a 25 common-cause group of six gas turbine?
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64 1 MR. KAWANGO: Oh, no, no, actually is 2 four.
3 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: And what about your 4 backups?
5 MR. KAWANGO: Backup is a completely 6 different manufacture and design.
7 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So, it's separate?
8 MR. KAWANGO: Separate, yes, that's right.
9 MR. TANAKA: Okay. Next RAI is also 10 regarding the gas turbine generator. In our 11 qualification testing, in the starting testing, we 12 performed the maintenance of the injectors every 50 13 starts.
14 But we did not provide such information in 15 the technical report and the technical specifications.
16 So, we revised the DCD to incorporate technical 17 specification service requirement for this nozzle 18 cleaning maintenance.
19 And the next one is for the battery sizing 20 calculation. We originally used the Japanese 21 experience for the battery load profile. And we 22 revised those information based on the U.S.
23 manufacturer's information in detail.
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65 1 leakage rate is 0.2 gpm. But in the U.S. industry 2 standard, NUMARC 87-00 shows 25 gpm. So, we were 3 requested to justify the difference.
4 And our response was that isolation 5 barrier stops the leakage from the number one seal and 6 only number two seal easily meets it, so this item 7 also has been closed.
8 Next one is the AAC reliability. We 9 needed to show the inspection and the testing 10 requirement for the AAC to demonstrate the 11 reliability. So, we revised the DCD to include 12 service test of the AAC and during every refueling 13 outage, we perform the loading test also.
14 And this page shows also the station 15 blackout. In the station blackout, HVAC equipment is 16 stopped, so turbine driven emergency feedwater pump 17 room temperature will be increased. So, we needed to 18 calculate the room temperature. And we provided 19 conservative assumption and it uses numerically stable 20 calculation method. So, the result, we showed 21 temperature is below the 175 Fahrenheit during the 22 coping period.
23 Okay. Summary --
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66 1 where they're located, they do need ventilation for 2 operation? And how about ventilation in your switch 3 gear room?
4 MR. TANAKA: In the gas turbine generator 5 room, we have ventilation.
6 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: But is it required?
7 I mean, your ventilation is component cooling water 8 cooled?
9 MR. TANAKA: Oh, no, no.
10 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: What is it? Is it 11 --
12 MR. TANAKA: Yes, no cooling water 13 required.
14 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: No, no, you don't 15 need the cooling for gas turbine, I got that, it's a 16 huge advantage. Now, I wonder if you need 17 ventilation, maybe on the other second, you need 18 cooling for the room?
19 MEMBER BLEY: If the room heats up, air 20 cooling may not work so well.
21 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Yes.
22 MR. KAWANGO: And our answer, regarding 23 room of the gas turbine generator, we needed to have 24 the fan, cooling fan, only fan. We don't need to have 25 the actually the air conditioner and a --
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67 1 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: But did you do 2 calculation to prove?
3 MR. KAWANGO: Sure, sure, sure, we --
4 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: How about for your 5 switch gear room, where your AC buses are?
6 MR. KAWANGO: We need --
7 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Or especially --
8 MR. KAWANGO: Yes, we need to have 9 ventilation cooling system, which needed to rely on 10 cooling water, yes.
11 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So, my question for 12 you is in the case of the blackout, station blackout, 13 do you need the cooling water? Can you survive --
14 because if you need ventilation where your buses are, 15 then you do need cooling water and then, you need the 16 service water.
17 MR. KAWANGO: I needed to answer be 18 careful, but based on the requirement of the 10 CFR 19 50.63, okay, 50.63 we will start this alternate AC 20 power source within one hour, okay? Within one hour.
21 So, during this one hour, just from the station 22 blackout starting and this one hour duration, okay?,
23 we evaluate the room temperature of the, of course, 24 the switch gear and also, the I&C control room and the 25 turbine room, feedwater pump room.
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68 1 And we calculate and evaluate that is 2 within design temperature, we calculate. And after 3 the one hour, of course, we can start the alternate 4 gas turbine, alternate AC power source as alternate, 5 to supply the essential bus, so we can use the cooling 6 water and also, the ventilation system and so on.
7 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So, your backup can 8 supply everything HVAC coolers, the- service water --
9 MR. KAWANGO: Yes, that's right.
10 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: -- cooling water?
11 MR. KAWANGO: That's right.
12 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So, they're not --
13 they're the same size as your regular gas turbines?
14 MR. KAWANGO: It's bigger, a little bit 15 bigger.
16 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: A little bigger?
17 MR. KAWANGO: Yes.
18 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: All right.
19 MR. TANAKA: Okay. So, summary, all open 20 items with Phase 2 SER have been closed. And 21 additional three types of the RAIs have been closed.
22 That's all. Thank you for attention.
23 CHAIR SUNSERI: Well, I think Charlie 24 left, I suspect he had a bio break.
25 (Laughter.)
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69 1 CHAIR SUNSERI: He had questions about the 2 break process. Well, let me ask the other members if 3 you have any questions for the MHI folks? Nothing 4 else? Dennis? Vesna? Joy? I think, I know Charlie 5 had some questions about the I&C infrastructure. Is 6 that in a different chapter? That's 7? Oh, okay.
7 All right, then.
8 Well, I suppose we are done with this one 9 then. Thank you. And we will, at this point, while 10 we transition to the next group, which will be Chapter 11 18, we'll take a break. So, we'll come back at 10:30 12 and reconvene. So, we are recessed until 10:30.
13 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 14 off the record at 10:14 a.m. and resumed at 10:31 15 a.m.)
16 CHAIR SUNSERI: Okay. We're going to 17 reconvene the meeting now. And this will be the start 18 of Chapter 18 presentation by the Applicant.
19 MR. MASHIO: Good morning, ladies and 20 gentlemen. I'm Kenji Mashio from MHI. I present 21 Chapter 18, Human Factors Engineering Program. And I 22 lead this presentation, but as a person sitting here, 23 Bob Hall and Joe Tapia, help your question me that you 24 may have.
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70 1 presentation. First is the structure of the 2 submittal. Second one is basically our basis for the 3 US-APWR HFE application. And also, I'm talking about 4 HFE program management.
5 CHAIR SUNSERI: I know your speaker is on, 6 but could you move it a little closer to you, you're 7 kind of soft spoken.
8 MR. MASHIO: Okay. So, first, structure 9 of the submittal. So, as explained in Chapter 8, we 10 submit DCD Revision 4 and tracking, update tracking 11 report. In addition, for the Chapter 18 mockup we 12 submit and docket. This mockup, is purpose of this 13 mockup to consolidate all associate mockup for the 14 Chapter 18 and submit by the data.
15 And we have technical report, based on the 16 human factor engineer program plan. And so, I have 17 one program management plan and eight HFE program 18 implementation plan.
19 And we also have our imaging -- our 20 document, which is not docketed, but audit by NRC 21 staff. And the topical report, this describes our US-22 Basic HSIS, which I explain in detail later.
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71 1 plan and eight implementation plan.
2 And this PMP and IPs address specific HFE 3 activities and provide detailed methodology for those, 4 addressing the criteria in Chapter 18. And all our 5 PMP and IPs have same configuration with the document 6 from Section 1 through Section 8. So this, NRC staff 7 is really reviewing information for each section.
8 And regarding the procedure development 9 and training program development, these element are 10 addressed by the Chapter 13 review. And we have one 11 COL item for the human factor performance monitoring.
12 So, audit, NRC staff audit the following 13 design. So, one is HSI design style guide, which 14 applied the HSI designer developed the screen design 15 as a HSI design based on the style guide. And the 16 feature is comply with NUREG-0700.
17 And also, staff reviewed OER result and 18 this include US-Basic HSI. So, this include not only 19 the U.S. OE, but also the Japanese operating 20 experience. So, I will talking later.
21 And a topical report, this topical report 22 actually has been approved and the SER was issued.
23 But in this presentation, this topical report is vital 24 source for the US-APWR application, because this US-25 Basic HSIS is applied for the US-APWR HSI design.
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72 1 And this summary report we resubmitted 2 after completion with HFE activity. And OER is basic 3 HSI portion has been completed. But the rest of the 4 plant-specific US-APWR application will be 5 implemented.
6 We have two ITAACs. First ITAAC is we 7 conduct integrated system verification, which ensures 8 operator performance is stable and that there are no 9 failure criteria which touch on the human engineering 10 discrepancy issue.
11 And also, we have another ITAAC. This is 12 as-built control room design actually installed in the 13 site, according to the design specification feature, 14 which are being verified using the ISV.
15 CHAIR SUNSERI: So, I'm actually going to 16 ask my colleague Dennis over here, is that typical for 17 that control room design to be part of the ITAAC? It 18 just seems like it would be a design qualification.
19 MEMBER BLEY: Yes, I don't remember for 20 sure. If you go across the design certs, on a lot of 21 them, they weren't as far along when they got here as 22 this plant was, on having its control room design 23 pretty well along. So, I don't think there's a 24 standard thing, but I don't remember the ITAACs, so 25 I'd have to go back and --
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73 1 CHAIR SUNSERI: No, no, that's okay. It 2 just kind of stood out to me, but if it doesn't to 3 you, that's fine.
4 MEMBER RAY: Well, it would depend, I 5 think, Matt, on what credit was taken for the benefits 6 that they're describing there. And that's -- I can't 7 imagine, but normally, I agree with you, it would be 8 unusual to have it be an ITAAC.
9 MR. TAPIA: There are similar types of 10 ITAACs with regard to the structures of the reactor 11 buildings and such. Such as the thickness of the wall 12 is inspected and conforms to the design. So, this is 13 not unlike some of those ITAACs.
14 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes, no, I probably 15 understand that Joe. I guess, it just, in my mind, if 16 I look at these two together, it seemed like Item 1 is 17 just, there's nothing wrong with it, it's just that 18 whoever's building it is going to assume all the risk 19 for any problems with it, right? Thank you. You can 20 continue.
21 MR. MASHIO: This picture shows basic 22 process. So, first, our topical report describes US-23 Basic HSIS and feature applied to the US-APWR HSI 24 design process.
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74 1 which includes a program management plan and eight 2 implementation plans. And those document is docketed 3 and reviewed by NRC staff.
4 And then, after implementation plan have 5 been approved, then we implement it based on these 6 implementation plan. Then, after we complete 7 implementation, then we will submit to a docket as a 8 summary report.
9 And so, I'm going to the next topic for 10 the HFE program management plan. The US-APWR HFE 11 program management plan is in accordance with NUREG-12 0711 Revision 2. And this HFE program assures HFE, 13 human factors principles satisfy applicable regulatory 14 requirements.
15 And following are HFE element covered by 16 our US-APWR HFE program. And as notes show, procedure 17 development and training program has been reviewed by 18 Chapter 13. And COL applicant will address human 19 performance monitoring program as COL items.
20 The next, this picture shows the overall 21 process for the HFE. And blue portion are covered by 22 the US-Basic HSI process, which described in our 23 topical report. And the green portion are covered by 24 US-APWR DCD and the technical report, as 25 implementation plan.
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75 1 So, I focus on the green portion, because 2 this blue portion has been approved by the -- so, now, 3 I focus on the green portion.
4 So, HFE will be implemented based on the 5 US-APWR plant design and then, we build US-APWR 6 inventory, featuring our control and monitoring and 7 information, is actually contents of the systems and 8 the plans.
9 But in other hand, we also utilize US-10 Basic HSI. This is generic HSI functions, such as 11 around present or plant operator interact with 12 systems. Such kind of basic functions is utilized and 13 incorporated for the U.S. HSI design, here.
14 And this is standard portion, but we have 15 some site-specific information, we also integrate as 16 site-specific inventory information. And then, we 17 conduct V&V. Then, we implement the design.
18 CHAIR SUNSERI: So, back on that one, is 19 it fair to say that the blue part of this diagram is 20 basically done now? That work is complete and --
21 MR. MASHIO: Yes.
22 CHAIR SUNSERI: Okay. So, when you were 23 in the middle block there, U.S. operator assessment of 24 US-Basic, there's a step leading into that, I think 25 I'm missing it here, but the translation, U.S.
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76 1 conversion --
2 MR. MASHIO: Here?
3 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes. Was there any 4 significant -- what was significant about that? I 5 mean, was there any significant way? It's not just 6 converting metrics and units, right? There's some 7 fundamental principles, right?
8 MEMBER BLEY: This was a big deal, we 9 talked about it a lot at the last meeting. In fact, 10 Bob Hall gave us a couple of technical papers that 11 described the process. I'll let them talk about it, 12 but it was a whole lot more. I think they first tried 13 that and then, that didn't work.
14 And then, they did some more work, and 15 then, they found just the whole operating practice 16 over here affected how you have to set this up. So, 17 it was a major conversion, but you guys ought to talk 18 about it some.
19 MR. MASHIO: Yes, actually, this -- I will 20 touch on this issue in the later, because my 21 presentation covers some US-Basic HSI design process.
22 So, I talk later.
23 But in summary, we tested with U.S.
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77 1 the U.S. operator framework and Japanese operator 2 framework. So, we had a gap and we resolved gap and 3 incorporated design procedures and training.
4 CHAIR SUNSERI: Okay, that's good. I can 5 --
6 MR. MASHIO: Okay.
7 CHAIR SUNSERI: -- I'll be patient.
8 MEMBER REMPE: I can't remember what we 9 discussed back then, but just from my -- a question 10 has been running through my mind since I read this 11 chapter. Is MHI a member of the PWR Owners Group?
12 Other design centers are.
13 MR. MASHIO: No, we are not member of the 14 PWR Owners Group.
15 MEMBER REMPE: So, there's a lot of 16 things, especially when you talk about accident 17 management procedures, that I would envision that the 18 COL applicant surely would want to be a member of it.
19 And that -- how does one convey, or is it 20 appropriate to convey that as part of the design 21 certification, that one would -- I mean, there's been 22 a lot of things that have happened over the years, 23 that it would seem prudent, or is that just beyond the 24 scope of the design certification? You see what I'm 25 saying?
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78 1 CHAIR SUNSERI: It's an interesting 2 question, yes, I see what you're saying.
3 MEMBER REMPE: Especially with what 4 happened with the post-Fukushima actions.
5 CHAIR SUNSERI: So, that may be --
6 MEMBER REMPE: I don't know who answers 7 that question, but --
8 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes, I don't know who, 9 right.
10 MEMBER REMPE: -- it's something that, 11 when I was reading this, I was wondering about that.
12 And maybe I'll ask the staff about that, unless MHI --
13 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes, or maybe --
14 MEMBER REMPE: -- has a response.
15 CHAIR SUNSERI: -- direct it at Joe, maybe 16 that would be something that might be worthy to think 17 of going forward, when you get a U.S. customer or 18 whatever, how are they going to stay plugged in with 19 the PWR fleet, if you will.
20 MR. TAPIA: I understand the question.
21 And typically, the PWR Owners Group is comprised of 22 utilities, not designers. And the functions there 23 would be incorporated, I believe, into the COL 24 applicant's documents.
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79 1 on my part here and thinking out loud about the answer 2 to your question. But I would imagine that the COL 3 applicant would apply all of those PWR Owners Group's 4 inputs into their application.
5 MEMBER REMPE: I would hope so, especially 6 during operation. And it's my experience that there 7 are other design centers who are actually leading 8 members of the Owners Groups over the years. And it's 9 good to have that industry interface. But anyway, 10 that's just an observation.
11 CHAIR SUNSERI: Well, yes, well, we kind 12 of evolved over the years, I mean, as there were three 13 different distinct vendors, right? You'd just see the 14 combustion engineering owners group, Westinghouse, and 15 GE. But as the industry consolidated, it just turned 16 into the PWR Owners Group and the BWR Owners Group, 17 right?
18 And so, this would almost be like taking 19 it back to the old way, where there were separate NSSS 20 vendors with their own design. But I don't know, I'd 21 have to think about it a little.
22 MR. TAPIA: We haven't had that 23 interaction --
24 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes.
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80 1 guess, is the answer, from our perspective, at this 2 point.
3 CHAIR SUNSERI: Okay.
4 MEMBER REMPE: Okay. Thank you. It's 5 just something that's been running through my mind.
6 MR. MASHIO: Okay. May I go to the next 7 slide?
8 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes.
9 MR. MASHIO: Okay. So, the scope of the 10 HFE program management plan include following subject, 11 based on the NUREG-0711 review criteria.
12 And the second bullet means this HFE 13 activity methodology is described in the 14 implementation plan and each element if we complete 15 activities and we submit document and submit by staff 16 as a summary report.
17 The next couple of slide include 18 assumptions and constraint. And first, US-APWR HSI is 19 based on the application US-Basic HSI. And so, this 20 generic HSI technology is combined with specific HSI 21 Inventory for the US-APWR plant design, to create US-22 APWR HSIS.
23 And the third bullet is, if we have some 24 or any other site-specific information, we integrate 25 the same into our site-specific HSI.
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81 1 And fundamental design assumption and 2 constraint is, again, we utilize our US-Basic HSI and 3 so, this RO, the one RO and one SRO can operate all 4 condition, including the postulated accident. But 5 again, this morning, I explained based on the 6 regulatory requirement, we accommodate two operators 7 in the control room.
8 And the next is scope of the planned 9 facility. So, this is not only the MCR, but also the 10 other HSI which our operator staff can interact. But 11 other facility, we utilize our graded approach. So, 12 we take our graded approach to the implement HFE 13 process to other facilities.
14 So, that all for the PMP. And then, I'm 15 going to explain about US-Basic HSIS. And again, this 16 US-Basic HSI feature is described in the topical 17 report. And this contains our concept of operation 18 and the other HSI key feature.
19 And in appendix, there are some history of 20 the development of Japanese PWR control room, which is 21 starting point to develop the US-Basic HSI, which I 22 explain later. And we also have our V&V experience in 23 Japan in the Appendix B and US-Basic HSI design 24 process described in the Appendix C.
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82 1 element Japanese Basic HSIS as starting point to 2 create US-Basic HSIS. And Appendix A contains 3 information about Japanese Basic HSIS and development 4 history.
5 And the Japanese HSI is composed with 6 Basic HSI and HSI Inventory. This HSI Inventory is 7 developed as part of our US-APWR DCD, in accordance 8 with US-APWR HFE program.
9 So, this is a general process to develop 10 the US-Basic HSI and the site-specific HSI 11 development. And the first Phase 1 are described in 12 topical report. This is like translation from our 13 Japanese Basic HSI to the US-Basic HSIS.
14 And the Phase 2 is, this is development of 15 plant-specific, which is US-APWR application 16 inventory, which combined with US-Basic HSIS. And the 17 Phase 3 is confirm site-specific assumptions of Phase 18 2, or make minor changes, if needed.
19 And Phase 1, this is US-Basic HSIS design 20 process. So, we separate several subsidiary process, 21 which is Phase 1a and 1b. And the 1a is just a 22 convert from the Japanese language or in general 23 unique signs to the American style.
24 And then, we also implement, for the U.S.
25 operating procedures. And also, we incorporate the OE NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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83 1 result to the US-Basic HSI preliminary design 2 specification. Then, we developed the simulator.
3 Then, we had a test with U.S. licensed operators, 4 using the U.S. operating procedures.
5 Then, there are many comments regard our 6 human factor discrepancy. Then, we address those 7 discrepancy and to change the design specification.
8 So, one of the major comment is computer-9 based procedure functions, because this Japanese style 10 of the operation is different from the U.S. operating 11 style. So, we adjust CBP functions and format. So, 12 again --
13 MEMBER BLEY: Could you tell us a little 14 the second test, that you made the changes on the 15 simulator?
16 MR. MASHIO: Yes. So, we also changed the 17 simulator, because we need to verify the operator 18 performance using the dynamic simulator. So, we also 19 made a change for the dynamic simulator and test again 20 in the Phase 1b. And to confirm the design change 21 specification is appropriate one.
22 So, as described here, we invited eight 23 crews in Phase 1a, and five crews in Phase 1b, to 24 verify HSI.
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84 1 operators?
2 MR. MASHIO: That's correct. And again, 3 this Phase 1 Alpha is, we identify the difference, 4 then we improve the design to adjust U.S. operation 5 scheme.
6 And during the review, we coordinate, 7 organize multi-disciplinary, such as not only HFE 8 person, also the associated member, such I&C, plant 9 operations, system engineers. And the results of 10 those are implemented in the various points.
11 And the operating experience sources 12 include NUREG/CR-6400, each required by NUREG-0711.
13 And we mentioned that we also reviewed our INPO 14 database, also the Japanese OE sources.
15 And these HSIs are experiences, very 16 limited for the nuclear industry, so we decide other 17 non-nuclear industries, such as airplane or trains, 18 both U.S. and Japan.
19 And all of OE information is screened by 20 the HFE related issue, such as human error type, 21 training type, procedure type thing. We analyze which 22 are causes. Then, we reflect the design. So, those 23 document is documented internally and NRC staff is 24 audit that document.
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85 1 concept of operation. So, I just explain the key 2 feature. So, the normal MCR mode, so this slide will 3 be -- may send a different message, but I just collect 4 by brief.
5 So, this control room console can conduct 6 one operator, one RO and one SRO can operate all 7 remote. But based on the U.S. regulation, we staff 8 two RO and one SRO and one STA. So, that means the 9 next is --
10 MEMBER BLEY: Excuse me, when you did 11 that, did you layout a division of responsibilities?
12 We usually see one RO focused on the primary systems 13 and another on the balance of plant and electrical 14 plant. Did you do that or is it up to the COL to 15 figure out what to do with the extra operator you 16 have?
17 MR. MASHIO: Yes, actually, the scenarios 18 for the, to test it is, we utilize U.S. operating 19 procedures, which basically is we split the role. One 20 RO responsible for the reactor side and another RO is 21 responsible for the turbine side. So, we, basically, 22 we use normal U.S. configuration, I think. But in 23 addition, that we also tested just one operator, using 24 he responsible for both side.
25 MEMBER BLEY: Everything?
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86 1 MR. MASHIO: Yes, yes. So, but --
2 MEMBER BLEY: Any difference in the tests?
3 MR. MASHIO: Different --
4 MEMBER BLEY: Results of the tests?
5 MR. MASHIO: Yes, different, yes. This 6 HSI VDU is integrate. And so, this reduce operator 7 work, physical workload. And so, basically, he can go 8 through one-by-one, based on the SRO's direction. So, 9 it's -- we verify they could go through it.
10 But challenging thing is for the dedicated 11 HSI condition, so normal operating, non-safety VDU is 12 not working, then they switch to the safety VDU only.
13 This is challenging for the operators to mitigate the 14 accident.
15 But they -- we have some modification, 16 such as -- this is very detailed. But we made a 17 change with the safety VDU HSI design, we verified 18 they can complete accident mitigation using only 19 safety HSIS.
20 MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
21 MR. MASHIO: So, yes.
22 MEMBER BLEY: Thank you.
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87 1 of the operator console.
2 Then, behind that, supervisor console, SRO 3 can sit here. And we have SRO -- STA can sit and he 4 can advise control room staff, in case of the 5 accident.
6 And we also have diverse HSI panel here.
7 So, all these HSIs down, as a common-cause failure, 8 then they move to here and to cope with the accident 9 using these panels.
10 MEMBER BLEY: There were some interesting 11 tests done at Halden, I wonder if you were privy to 12 those, where they took the shift technical advisor, 13 the STA, and had him in sort of this configuration.
14 And then, they moved him separate from all the other 15 people, just observing.
16 And they got some very interesting results 17 on the effectiveness of the STA under those different 18 circumstances. You might take a look at that, I think 19 you might find it interesting. It's been about four 20 years ago, yes. I can give you a contact over there.
21 MR. MASHIO: Okay. Can I go to next 22 slide? So, this computer-based HSI provide operation 23 display and it features fundamental interface.
24 Basically, operator can touch on the display and all 25 action can be conducting using VDU.
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88 1 And the operator workload is reduced, 2 providing the information at the integrated display.
3 And they cannot movement inside the console. So, they 4 just utilize VDUs in front of him. So, those 5 workload, these functions can, one RO operate whole 6 remote.
7 And diverse HSI also have some operating 8 supporting function. So, these are computer checking 9 status, plant status, then provides information to the 10 operators. And this operating supporting function 11 also contributes workload as well and also reach our 12 ends.
13 And the large display panel provide -- I 14 can show this picture. So, we have -- this is 15 pictures of the control room. And this one is the 16 large display panel. And we have three fixed display 17 and one variable display.
18 So, this fixed area, all major 19 information, such as, you can see these are primary 20 power systems and the turbine and the generator 21 system, all important parameters can be shown in this 22 fixed display. And all alarms is pop-up in the fixed 23 display. So, the operator can view this information 24 over other information.
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89 1 display feature the operator console, also the 2 supervisor console, can display here. So, this can 3 allow MCR staff has the same information and use them 4 to communicate with each other.
5 So, I explained those. And in this 6 control room, we also have paging feature, all 7 facility from MCR. Also, we have intercom functions, 8 which are communication from between MCR staff and 9 LOCA staff.
10 And they are not in this picture, but we 11 also have maintenance console, which can use during 12 the periodic maintenance or shutdown condition. And 13 the tagging feature also implemented in this diverse 14 HSI.
15 So, I think that that's all. Yes. That's 16 all our presentation.
17 CHAIR SUNSERI: That's the end? Okay. We 18 had a lot more slides in the material that was sent to 19 us.
20 MR. MASHIO: Yes, I think I --
21 CHAIR SUNSERI: Seventy.
22 (Simultaneous speaking.)
23 (Laughter.)
24 CHAIR SUNSERI: Now we can ask all kinds 25 of questions. Okay. So, thank you. We'll ask the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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90 1 members if you have any additional questions?
2 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: I'm just curious, 3 did you have to provide the list of important human 4 actions from your PRA Chapter 19 in Chapter 18?
5 MR. MASHIO: Yes. Yes, we documented and 6 we collect all our list of significant actions from 7 PRA --
8 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Right.
9 MR. MASHIO: -- and HRA, yes.
10 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So, do you remember, 11 like ad hoc, which actions seem to be important?
12 MR. MASHIO: Yes. One was, this is steam 13 generator activation of the ruptured SG, this one --
14 yes.
15 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: For the steam 16 generator tube rupture?
17 MR. MASHIO: Tube rupture, yes.
18 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: How about switching?
19 You don't have to switch to recirculation, so there is 20 nothing in the LOCA which is important?
21 MR. MASHIO: Yes, LOCA is no, I think 22 there's no action. In the large LOCA, it's automatic 23 function, such as SI injection by automated, so 24 they're not necessary for the operator action in the 25 LOCA.
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91 1 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: And those gas 2 turbines, can they be manually loaded?
3 MR. MASHIO: No, gas turbine also 4 automatically started, initiated.
5 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: But do you credit 6 the manual backups of the recovering power or loading 7 the --
8 MR. MASHIO: Yes, in general, yes, 9 basically, this is safety interlock, so they are not 10 necessary to take manual action, yes. But if -- we 11 also consider the degraded HSI mode, which is if, you 12 know, our system is not functioning, such as common-13 cause failure, then we --
14 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: You go to recovery?
15 MR. MASHIO: Yes, yes.
16 CHAIR SUNSERI: Dennis, did you have 17 something?
18 MEMBER BLEY: I didn't, just checking 19 things.
20 CHAIR SUNSERI: All right. Any other 21 comments?
22 MEMBER BROWN: Yes.
23 CHAIR SUNSERI: Charlie?
24 MEMBER BROWN: I've got to find it now.
25 You had a slide we talked about how the operators --
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92 1 CHAIR SUNSERI: Mic.
2 MEMBER BROWN: I'm sorry, mic. There was 3 a slide where you talked about how the operators 4 accessed the VDUs. Ah, here it is, it was Slide 36.
5 I'm going backwards now to eight years ago, when we 6 first looked at this, because they're the same, it's 7 the touch screens. And have you all got any of these 8 touch screen control panels in service anywhere in 9 actual plants today.
10 MR. MASHIO: Yes, actually, Tomari 11 Industry, this latest three-loop plant in Japan, 12 utilize this touch screen based --
13 MEMBER BROWN: How long have they been in 14 service?
15 MR. MASHIO: This commercial operation is 16 2009, December.
17 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, about ten years --
18 MR. MASHIO: Yes, yes.
19 MEMBER BROWN: -- ago, then?
20 MR. MASHIO: Yes, but after the Fukushima 21 accident, Tomari Industry also stopped and is 22 currently --
23 MEMBER BROWN: I lost track of what you 24 just said.
25 MR. TAPIA: They shut down.
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93 1 MR. MASHIO: Shut down, yes.
2 MEMBER BROWN: After what? After 3 Fukushima?
4 MR. MASHIO: After Fukushima, yes.
5 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, so that was 2011?
6 MR. MASHIO: Yes.
7 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. My memory's locator 8 bits are not working real well right now. The reason 9 I ask is, I hate touch screens.
10 (Laughter.)
11 MEMBER BROWN: Personal opinion, based on 12 experience, that every time I've touched one thing, 13 all of a sudden, the screen disappeared and something 14 else popped up.
15 How much -- did you all get any feedback 16 in that period of time? It says you have two ways of 17 doing it, either by touching a screen or clicking, so 18 I presume you click on it with a mouse of some kind 19 like this?
20 MR. MASHIO: Yes, actually, I had some 21 interview with, actually the Comanche Peak person 22 participated in the test and I remember their feedback 23 for the touch screen is very efficient.
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94 1 but this touch screen feature, we made the text, this 2 is, I think, 2008 or 2009, maybe ten years ago. Even 3 though ten years ago, these touch screens are 4 efficient, so, this accuracy to pointing.
5 MR. TAPIA: He's also asking about, do you 6 have feedback from the Japanese operators?
7 MR. MASHIO: Yes. Sorry. So, in the 8 operating plant in Japan, actually, I did not go to 9 the interview for them, so actually I have no 10 opportunity to get feedback from them.
11 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, all right. That's --
12 MR. MASHIO: Yes.
13 MEMBER BROWN: -- fair answer. I just, 14 it's just a particular -- I've watched a few where 15 people's laptops and they touch and all of a sudden, 16 things move around.
17 And these are dedicated, they're fixed 18 screen panels, as you all have described them, I just 19 went back and looked at the DCD, okay. So, it's not 20 like a smartphone, where things are sliding all over 21 the place. So, I was just curious as to, number one, 22 the sensitivity to the touch.
23 MR. HALL: Let me talk about the testing 24 we did during --
25 MEMBER BROWN: Oh, that would be --
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95 1 MR. HALL: -- that Phase 1a and b.
2 MEMBER BROWN: -- if you have some, that 3 would be nice.
4 MR. HALL: And there are a number of 5 papers out there. There was a test report written, 6 but it was never submitted to the NRC, but there are 7 papers out there, Dennis referred to one of them.
8 They sent -- just staying with the touch screen. U.S.
9 operators, all from Comanche Peak --
10 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
11 MR. HALL: -- Phase 1 had 22 of them, 12 because we were looking at two operators versus one 13 operator, very little difference between the two.
14 Phase 2, we did ten operators, we never doubled up on 15 the -- ten people from Comanche Peak.
16 As far as the touch screens were 17 concerned, the first go around, there were questions 18 and concerns. And the questions and concerns were 19 size of the touch --
20 MEMBER BROWN: Fat fingers versus small 21 fingers.
22 MR. HALL: Exactly -- on the screen. And 23 touching what you thought you were touching, but not.
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96 1 were made and during the Phase 1b tests, resolved.
2 So, the outcome of all of those tests had very 3 positive operator response to how the screens 4 functioned.
5 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
6 MR. HALL: But some of your questions, and 7 what happens on my Apple Watch, those were 8 investigated and changes made. Because I touch on the 9 wrong things too.
10 MEMBER BROWN: Well, when I go to the 11 grocery store here, I have to get a number for the 12 deli section, and there's a little touch screen and 13 you'll touch, nothing happens. I have to touch it 14 eight, nine, ten times, put my whole hand on it, still 15 doesn't go.
16 MEMBER BLEY: Lick your finger.
17 MEMBER BROWN: That doesn't work either, 18 but that's -- I don't want to do that the third or 19 fourth time --
20 MEMBER BLEY: I will tell you --
21 MEMBER BROWN: -- because I don't want to 22 get other people's germs.
23 MEMBER BALLINGER: Have you thought about 24 there being a no-fly list at your grocery store?
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97 1 on that one.
2 MEMBER BLEY: I'm going to give you 3 another example. Out at Palo Verde, they tried one of 4 these glass-top simulators and put their whole control 5 room simulator on it. And they ended up liking it so 6 much, they bought about 20 of them, put them all 7 around the plant, so people could run the simulator 8 anywhere. And they've had no trouble with it.
9 MEMBER BROWN: That's good.
10 MEMBER BLEY: They've really --
11 MEMBER REMPE: Did it ever lock up and 12 they had to reboot? Or did they -- was that part of 13 your testing?
14 MR. HALL: It never did in reality, but we 15 forced some things such as that. What we did is, the 16 first time around, and please don't quote me on the 17 exact numbers, but the first time around, I think we 18 ran six scenarios, with secondary and tertiary 19 failures built into them.
20 Second set of tests, we ran I think eight 21 scenarios, again with anything from a screen lock-up 22 to total loss of display systems to alarm lock-ups, et 23 cetera. And ended up with quite good responses, if 24 you look at the test results.
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98 1 and reboot? Or what did they do? Go to an alternate 2 screen?
3 MR. HALL: Typically, go to an alternate, 4 unless in fact everything locked up at once. And we 5 looked at response times for deciding whether the 6 screen had in fact locked up or not.
7 We didn't -- initially, it was, you didn't 8 realize the screen was locked up until you touched it 9 and nothing happened. We changed that and put an 10 indication, where you could see a heartbeat, that it 11 was or was not functioning, things like that.
12 MEMBER REMPE: Okay, thanks.
13 MEMBER BROWN: The other reason for my 14 question was that I was in the Naval Nuclear Program 15 and we had great debates, starting from 1970, there 16 weren't touch screens in 1979, shows you how old I am, 17 but as we transitioned up to the later classes of 18 ships, the ones that we started developing in the late 19 '90s, before I retired in '99, we were still having 20 all control functions with switches, so that you could 21 maintain a touch-feel for where they were, as opposed 22 to selecting actual control functions.
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99 1 whether it's a reactor coolant pump or a safeguard 2 pump or feed pump or et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
3 Now, I don't know what they're doing on the new plant, 4 I don't remember reviewing that.
5 But I do know there was a lot of very, for 6 the sailors, since actions are happening very, very 7 fast in some of the submarines, well, in all of the 8 submarines or the carriers, that you wanted -- this 9 way, they could have the touch, actual positional 10 feel, and know whether they were in slow, fast, 11 intermediate, or what have you.
12 So, I was just curious what you experience 13 you had. So, that was the purpose of my question.
14 Thank you for your elucidation.
15 CHAIR SUNSERI: Any other member comments?
16 MEMBER BROWN: And Dennis's feedback.
17 CHAIR SUNSERI: Any other comments? Okay.
18 So, wrapping up the section with the Applicant. I 19 recorded two items that I think we'll give to you as 20 part of follow-ups for future presentations.
21 The first one will be, and I'm not sure 22 where, I'm just going to throw these out and you'll 23 decide when you hear the topic, but it's either going 24 to be Chapter 3 and 4, and it will be the follow-up on 25 the seismic analysis of the reactor vessel due to the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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100 1 increased mass of the neutron reflector.
2 The second item will probably be a Chapter 3 7 discussion, but I just want you to be aware that, 4 since we reviewed the digital I&C system in the first 5 go round, there's been some lessons learned in our 6 area, and we have developed some principles of 7 operation around digital systems.
8 I think there's five principles. You 9 talked about two of them, defense-in-depth and 10 diversity, there's others. So, I would commend you to 11 emphasize how you're addressing these principles in 12 your presentation when you come to Chapter 7 on 13 digital I&C. And Charlie can give you the five 14 principles.
15 MEMBER BROWN: Of course. There was a 16 staff engineer, NRC staff, asked also what I was 17 talking about, so I explained it to him during the 18 break.
19 The point is, we've been emphasizing five 20 fundamentals in developing the architecture. You have 21 an architecture defined in your DCD and it's amplified 22 by one of your topical report or technical report, I 23 can't remember what the term is, which I just went 24 back and looked at also.
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101 1 deterministic processing, diversity, and defense-in-2 depth, and control of access. We didn't cover -- the 3 control of access wasn't amplified as much back in 4 2010 and 2011 as they are today.
5 Largely, that was -- you have networks in 6 your plant and the networks communicate exterior to 7 the plant. And the point of that was that protection 8 systems and safeguard systems, outputs, can go to the 9 control room, which is internal to the plant.
10 But when you go to networks that have 11 external access out to the internet world, they should 12 be, any information passed on should be hardware-13 based, one-way communications, not software controlled 14 firewalls.
15 And we've emphasized that pretty strongly, 16 just from a -- it's a control -- forget cyber, that's 17 a whole 'nother world. This is strictly access 18 control. And so, and I explained that to him.
19 The other point was watchdog timers and 20 how they communicate. You do have a whole section on, 21 or there is a section on, I went back and checked this 22 also, just to make sure, on watchdog timers, in your 23 tech topical report on the MELTAC platform.
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102 1 that we'll probably bring up. So, I presume you'll 2 have people that can discuss that at that time.
3 That's all I want to make sure we cover. Okay?
4 CHAIR SUNSERI: You don't have to get back 5 to us, it'll just be part of your presentation.
6 MEMBER BROWN: That's right. You don't --
7 I'm not expecting anything, other than --
8 MR. TAPIA: Is that the same for the first 9 one on the seismic --
10 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes.
11 MR. TAPIA: Okay.
12 CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes.
13 MR. TAPIA: So, I don't owe you anything?
14 CHAIR SUNSERI: You don't owe us.
15 MEMBER BROWN: No.
16 CHAIR SUNSERI: I don't recall --
17 MR. TAPIA: Just be sure we cover that.
18 CHAIR SUNSERI: -- anything that you owe 19 us as a result of Chapters 8 or 18.
20 MR. TAPIA: Understand, thank you.
21 CHAIR SUNSERI: Okay.
22 MEMBER BROWN: I'll amplify one other 23 thing on the watchdogs. If you look at the last 24 projects that we looked at, the new design certs, you 25 have to vote on trip signals from each of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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103 1 independent channels.
2 And there's -- you use a processor for 3 that as well, it's not an analog voting, like the old 4 days. So, if they lock up, the watchdog timer needs 5 to detect that.
6 And all your tech report says, it says 7 there's a failure. It doesn't say what is processed 8 as a failure, what does that do? Does it send a trip 9 out as one of the trips to the reactor trip breaker, 10 the two out of four that runs for that, or not? Or is 11 it just an alarm that goes to somebody?
12 For the safeguards part, you obviously 13 don't want to start safeguard systems. But for 14 reactor trip, you really need to initiate a reactor 15 trip for that one channel, just to make sure -- as 16 well as an alarm.
17 So, that's kind of the context. And we'll 18 bring that up when we get to that particular chapter 19 review.
20 MR. TAPIA: Understand your comment.
21 MEMBER BROWN: And there's no feedback you 22 need to do anything right now, you got totally clear.
23 MR. TAPIA: Sure.
24 MEMBER BROWN: Okay?
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104 1 right now on this very item.
2 MEMBER BROWN: And I did explain that to 3 one of the staff, who knew exactly what I was talking 4 about.
5 MR. TAPIA: Thank you.
6 MEMBER BROWN: All right.
7 MR. TAPIA: We'll be prepared.
8 MEMBER BROWN: Thank you.
9 CHAIR SUNSERI: All right. So, we've 10 completed this agenda item. Mashio-san, thank you for 11 your presentation, very good.
12 And what I would like to do is, it's a 13 little too early to break for lunch, so I'd like to 14 have the staff come up here and present the Chapter 8 15 SER. It's only a few slides and I think we might be 16 able to get through that. Then, we will break for 17 lunch.
18 So, George, as you're getting together 19 here, I would also think that, depends on how fast 20 this goes, we might just roll into 18, and I don't 21 know if we can complete that.
22 MR. WUNDER: Okay.
23 CHAIR SUNSERI: And then, if we could, I 24 mean, the advantage to that is, that's a perfect 25 breaking point for the public session and we can close NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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105 1 the public and go into closed session after lunch for 2 the accumulator.
3 MR. WUNDER: We've got the people here and 4 we're ready to do it, if that's your desire.
5 CHAIR SUNSERI: Okay. We'll see how this 6 goes, all right?, the first chapter. And whenever, 7 you just let us know when you're ready.
8 MR. WUNDER: Okay. I got the button this 9 time, I made a little note there, so that I'd remember 10 it.
11 One of the challenges we face when we 12 resume work on a safety evaluation that's been idle 13 for some time is that the technical staff who worked 14 on the document may have moved on to other positions.
15 One of the things that makes us such an effective 16 agency, though, is that not only do we have first-rate 17 talent, but we have a very deep bench.
18 And in the case of both Chapters 8 and 18, 19 the principal contributors for the Phase 2 review have 20 moved on. So, we went to the bullpen. Sheila, Nadim, 21 and Brian all have a wealth of experience as technical 22 reviewers and they have a complete mastery of the 23 subject matter. And I will leave it now in their 24 capable hands.
25 CHAIR SUNSERI: Well, you have an NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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106 1 advantage over us, when the ACRS members leave, they 2 just leave, right?, there is no bench for us.
3 (Laughter.)
4 CHAIR SUNSERI: So, go ahead, please.
5 MR. KAHN: Thank you, George. As George 6 mentioned, my name is Nadim Khan. The US-APWR 7 electrical power system consists of --
8 CHAIR SUNSERI: Is your -- yes, could you 9 pull that a little closer, please?
10 MR. KAHN: Okay. The US-APWR electric 11 power system consists of the offsite power system and 12 the AC and DC power system.
13 During the staff's review, there were two 14 open items. Both issues were closed in Phase 4 and 15 today, I will discuss the open items and the 16 resolution of these items. The open items are related 17 to open phase condition and GTG reliability.
18 The first open item is regarding the open 19 phase condition and the staff's position is outlined 20 in BTP 8-9. BTP 8-9 discusses the electrical power 21 system's design vulnerability due to an open phase 22 condition in the offsite electrical power system.
23 The staff requested the Applicant explain 24 how its electrical system design would detect, alarm, 25 and respond to an open phase condition. The NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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107 1 protection features for the open phase condition per 2 BTP 8-9, the Applicant provided COL Item 8.212, in 3 which the COL applicant is to determine the type of 4 open phase detection and protection system and address 5 the guidance in BTP 8-9.
6 The staff determined that COL Item 8.212 7 will ensure that the COL applicant will determine an 8 open phase detection and protection system that meets 9 the guidance in BTP 8-9, including detection, alarm in 10 the main control room, and protection features, in 11 that the Class 1E medium voltage buses will transfer 12 to a power source without an open phase condition.
13 DCD Tier 2 Section 8.2 includes a general 14 description of the criteria for addressing OPC. Since 15 the Applicant has provided a COL item, ITAAC, and tech 16 spec to ensure the open phase detection and protection 17 system provides detection, alarm in the main control 18 room, and protection features, the staff finds this 19 issue closed.
20 With that, I will turn it over to Sheila.
21 MEMBER BROWN: Before you leave --
22 MR. KAHN: Yes?
23 MEMBER BROWN: -- oh, jeez, I lost it.
24 Oh, here it is. In your SER, which I can't find now, 25 oh, there it is, I'm recollecting this, my notes are NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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108 1 crummy, you made the -- in your evaluation of the open 2 phase, you summarize their response to you all.
3 And I thought, in their response, they 4 identified that the present design would do a certain 5 amount of things, but there were a couple of items 6 that you all identified in a follow-up RAI that it 7 wouldn't and that they would -- and their response 8 was, that's what they would incorporate.
9 Is my -- in other words, it's not like 10 they're totally devoid of any open circuit protection 11 going into this. So, the current design had some 12 features.
13 MR. KAHN: Yes, there is protection for 14 the high side.
15 MEMBER BROWN: For the high side, that's 16 what I thought. And then, they said that in the --
18 MEMBER BROWN: Both the RAT and the UATs?
19 MR. KAHN: So, the main transformer is on 20 top of the UATs.
21 MEMBER BROWN: Yes.
22 MR. KAHN: So, there's protection on the 23 high side of the main transformer and the RATs --
24 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
25 MR. KAHN: -- which is a non-Class 1E.
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109 1 And then, they proposed to use the undervoltage 2 detection system on secondary side of the UATs and the 3 RATs.
4 MEMBER BROWN: That's already existing?
5 MR. KAHN: Yes.
6 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. It's already there?
7 MR. KAHN: Yes.
8 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
9 MR. KAHN: But when you use undervoltage 10 detection system, there isn't a change in voltage 11 magnitude, but there is a change in the phase.
12 MEMBER BROWN: That's what I remember you 13 discussed, the phase shift that you get and --
14 MR. KAHN: And that's why -- and they will 15 have a COL item that will address how to -- the 16 protection on the secondary side --
17 MEMBER BROWN: All right. So, it will --
18 MR. KAHN: The UAT and the RAT.
19 MEMBER BROWN: I got it. That's -- all 20 right. So, that's a loose end. In other words, they 21 were kind of covered, but not totally covered?
22 MR. KAHN: Yes.
23 MEMBER BROWN: And that's fundamentally 24 what the COL item covers?
25 MR. KAHN: Yes.
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110 1 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, thank you.
2 MS. RAY: Any other questions?
3 MEMBER BROWN: No.
4 MS. RAY: All right. Thank you. My name 5 is Sheila Ray and I will be presenting the second item 6 on GTG reliability.
7 MHI proposed the use of gas turbine 8 generators as the Class 1E emergency power source for 9 the onsite AC power systems. GTGs have not been used 10 in the operating fleet as Class 1E power sources.
11 Therefore, there is no operating experience and no 12 reliability data for the U.S.
13 In the absence of operating experience and 14 reliability data, the staff requested the Applicant to 15 perform type tests to ensure the GTGs will perform 16 their intended function and achieve their target 17 reliability level.
18 MHI discussed the qualification 19 methodology and initial type tests for the GTGs in 20 Technical Report MUAP-07024. Specifically, the type 21 test includes load capability testing, start and load 22 testing, and margin tests, per IEEE standard 387-1985, 23 as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.9.
24 The Applicant documented the successful 25 qualification of the Class 1E GTGs in Technical Report NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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111 1 MUAP-10023. MHI successfully performed 150 start and 2 load acceptance tests of the GTGs.
3 The report demonstrated that the GTGs were 4 able to start and ready to accept load well within 100 5 seconds, which is the GTG start time used in the 6 accident analysis. The successful starts satisfy the 7 reliability criterion of 0.975 with 95 percent 8 confidence.
9 In conclusion, the staff finds that the 10 Applicant's approach to demonstrating the Class 1E GTG 11 reliability is adequate, considering compliance with 12 GDC-17, conformance to Reg Guide 1.155, as well as 13 successful qualification via type testing. This 14 concludes the staff's presentation.
15 MEMBER BROWN: I guess one question, when 16 you -- and this is my interpretation of what you're 17 saying, to make sure I understand it. You said it was 18 they did the 150 starts and ready to accept load 19 within 100 seconds, fine. Did they actually apply the 20 load within 100 seconds? Full load?
21 MS. RAY: I will have to go back and 22 check.
23 MEMBER BROWN: Being ready to accept it is 24 one thing, being able to accept it is another.
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112 1 have load banks, so they may have put load on. I 2 would request the Applicant, if they have any 3 information.
4 MEMBER BROWN: The rating of these is 50 5 --
6 MS. RAY: It's 4500 kW.
7 MEMBER BROWN: Forty-five hundred, that's 8 right, thank you.
9 MS. RAY: Right. And then, 4950 for the 10 short-time.
11 MEMBER BROWN: That's overload, but, I 12 mean, you should be able to start.
13 MS. RAY: Correct.
14 MEMBER BROWN: And I don't know what the 15 maximum, whether they -- do they time the loads coming 16 in? Or is it based on applying -- I'm going back to 17 my Navy experience, because I just, if I had a 450 kW 18 turbine generator set or a 1000, we applied the full 19 load to it.
20 MS. RAY: Right. So, they also did 21 another test, this is a test not required by IEEE 387, 22 but recommended by the manufacturer, where they loaded 23 the GTG from 25 percent to 100 percent and also 24 checked the reject of that load. So, they would have 25 done loading 75 percent all the way, and 100 percent NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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113 1 --
2 MEMBER BROWN: That's starting at 25?
3 MS. RAY: Right.
4 MEMBER BROWN: They started -- so, they 5 already -- my point was, if you have to time your 6 loads, if you have to have a timed load application, 7 that's fine, I don't have a problem with that. But 8 that ought to be explained and at least identified so 9 a COL doesn't not understand that when they actually 10 do their plant design.
11 MS. RAY: The technical report, the second 12 one, and I believe also the first one --
13 MEMBER BROWN: This is the 23, right?
14 MS. RAY: The 23, and I believe the 07024, 15 showed the loading sequence for all of the trains of 16 the GTG. So, it's very clear for the COL applicant, 17 the timing and amount of load being applied.
18 MEMBER BROWN: So, it doesn't have to --
19 these, then, would not be designed to accept a full 20 4500 kW load instantaneously?
21 MS. RAY: Instantaneously, no.
22 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. So, that's --
23 MS. RAY: It's sequenced on.
24 MEMBER BROWN: All right. And when -- I 25 don't know what you all's requirements are, but I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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114 1 presume that means when it's loaded, the deviation 2 from the final allowable steady-state frequency and 3 voltage, it has to -- you can dip only a certain 4 amount out of the band and you have to recover, I 5 don't remember what the IEEE specs are.
6 MS. RAY: That is correct. There is a --
7 MEMBER BROWN: And then, you have to 8 recover within a couple of seconds or something like 9 that.
10 MS. RAY: That is correct. And the second 11 report, the 10023, demonstrated that, that they were 12 able to, I believe they were able to come back to 13 nominal voltage and frequency within approximately 14 four seconds.
15 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. All right. Okay, 16 you answered my question.
17 MS. RAY: Okay.
18 MEMBER BROWN: Thank you.
19 MS. RAY: Thank you.
20 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: But if you have the 21 second test, where they loaded, to show the disconnect 22 and connect and sequence of load, then they have some 23 running data too, right? The diesel generators always 24 have a problem with the first hour of running. So, 25 did they have any -- this is all starting failure NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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115 1 data, which you presented here, right? Did you have 2 any running failure data?
3 MS. RAY: I do believe the -- there is an 4 initial test program where they will run the GTGs two 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> short-time, 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> continuous.
6 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay.
7 MS. RAY: So, there are tests where they 8 will be demonstrating the GTG that is actually 9 installed. Does that answer your question?
10 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Yes, that answer my 11 question. I was just wondering, would that data be 12 available to look in that way. Because it will be 13 interesting, because we do have a gas turbine, not as 14 a safety system, but we don't have good data for it.
15 MS. RAY: Correct.
16 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Yes.
17 MS. RAY: And I believe at the COL stage, 18 I believe there are ITAAC for the GTG.
19 MEMBER BROWN: The way I -- I'm sorry, are 20 you finished?
21 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Yes.
22 MEMBER BROWN: My interpretation of that 23 is, they ran tests on gas turbine generators that they 24 have. When the COL, if you actually go build one of 25 these, that doesn't mean they're going to get the same NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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116 1 gas turbine generator, it might not be available 2 anymore. So, they'll develop one, but it has to meet 3 these requirements.
4 MS. RAY: Correct. The --
5 MEMBER BROWN: Is that -- okay.
6 MS. RAY: The DCA will say, these are the 7 ratings that I request. The COL applicant, if they 8 use a different manufacturer, then they would have to 9 show qualification testing.
10 MEMBER BROWN: If it's different from the 11 one that was tested via these --
12 MS. RAY: Correct.
13 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. Thank you.
14 CHAIR SUNSERI: Did you have any other 15 material?
16 MS. RAY: No, that was all we had. Any 17 other questions?
18 CHAIR SUNSERI: Any other questions from 19 the members? Okay. Well, then, I guess, we thank you 20 for that presentation. And we will take Chapter 18 21 now.
22 MS. RAY: Thank you.
23 CHAIR SUNSERI: Thank you. No, no, no, 24 we're going to roll into Chapter 18 and see how far we 25 get. We may break, we'll probably go -- if we don't NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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117 1 finish by 12:30, we'll break for lunch at 12:30. No, 2 no, just the public part.
3 MR. WUNDER: Okay. I guess we're ready to 4 move on to Chapter 18.
5 CHAIR SUNSERI: And we're ready for you.
6 MR. WUNDER: I guess we're ready to move 7 on to Chapter 18 and the man without a name card is 8 Dr. Brian Green.
9 DR. GREEN: I had written down my 10 introductory notes here and I had good afternoon, but 11 I've got to adapt, so good morning, everybody. I'm 12 Brian Green, I'll be summarizing the Chapter 18 review 13 today.
14 I played a small role in this review.
15 Actually, I was on the acceptance review and then, I 16 went to NRR for a while, and now, I'm back. So, I'll 17 do my best to represent the material the staff did 18 here. All right.
19 Staff's review of the US-APWR was somewhat 20 unique from the design certifications of applications 21 that preceded it. This is because MHI submitted MUAP-22 07007, the topical report which describes a generic 23 human system interface platform for NRC review, in 24 addition to the application materials that are 25 typically submitted for design certification.
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118 1 The generic platform described in the 2 topical report was reviewed by the staff and it was 3 concluded that it conformed to NUREG-0700, the staff 4 guidance that the staff uses to assess the design of 5 human system interfaces.
6 The submission of the topical report 7 describing the generic platform was unique from 8 previous design certifications. The DCD describes a 9 human factors design program that will be used to 10 build upon the generic HSI platform described in the 11 topical report.
12 Staff reviewed MHI's human factors program 13 and found that it conformed the NUREG-0711, the staff 14 guidance for reviewing human factors programs.
15 While reviewing the transcripts of the 16 previous ACRS meeting, I noticed there was a fair 17 amount of confusion as to why there was a need for a 18 human factors program, if the staff had already 19 reviewed the human system interface platform described 20 in the topical report.
21 I think Kenji did a great job of 22 describing that this morning. I prepared a slide to 23 discuss it and I'll dig into it, but if you feel 24 you've heard enough of it, we can move on.
25 So, the initial APWR design is being NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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119 1 licensed and constructed in Japan. The design was 2 created using a process that is similar to the one 3 described in NUREG-0711. This design process helps to 4 ensure that designers conduct appropriate human 5 factors analyses, design activities, evaluations, and 6 implementation activities that focus on human 7 performance.
8 The adequacy of the HFE activities 9 associated with the Japanese HSI design was not a 10 significant consideration in the staff review.
11 However, the staff acknowledges that these design 12 activities provided MHI with an early opportunity to 13 identify and resolve potential issues with the 14 Japanese HSI design. This is shown in the first arrow 15 on the graphic above.
16 Since the Japanese predecessor design was 17 created using good human factors principles, it forms 18 a solid baseline for the US-APWR design, with regards 19 to the human performance.
20 MHI recognized that some aspects of the 21 predecessor design did not universally apply to 22 operators in other countries. In other words, some 23 modifications were necessary for the US-APWR to 24 support U.S. operators and to comply with U.S.
25 regulations.
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120 1 Some examples of these changes include 2 converting units to U.S. standards, translating and 3 adapting procedures to English and to the U.S. concept 4 of operations, as well as other considerations.
5 Topical report refers to these activities 6 as Phase 1a, which I think of as Americanizing the 7 Japanese design, and Phase 1b, which is used to 8 resolve any issues associated with these 9 modifications. You'll find this is demonstrated in 10 the second arrow on the slide in front of you.
11 What is more similar to the other design 12 certifications that you've reviewed before is the 13 third arrow here. And that's the third iteration, 14 where MHI will conduct the activities described in the 15 DCD and the implementation plans.
16 The outcome of this process will be the 17 US-APWR human system interface design. The activities 18 conducted during this iteration are in many ways 19 similar to the activities conducted by previous design 20 certification applicants.
21 These activities are the primary focus of 22 the staff's review that we're discussing today.
23 Activities include a variety of human factors analyses 24 and design activities that guide the development of 25 the US-APWR human system interface inventory.
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121 1 In addition, a series of verification and 2 validation tests will be used to provide performance 3 based data to confirm that operators can safely 4 operate the plant.
5 Moreover, MHI provides yet another 6 iteration of design activities and evaluations during 7 a future site-specific design phase, which will 8 consider any unique aspects associated with a 9 particular site. And that's illustrated in the fourth 10 arrow.
11 As you can see, MHI's design of HFE 12 processes started long before the design certification 13 process and it continues after the design 14 certification is over. The iteration is, in my 15 opinion, a strength of the processes they have and 16 it's one of the human factors principles described in 17 0711.
18 A few -- the topical report has already 19 been approved, but I want to summarize it briefly 20 here.
21 At the time that the Phase 4 SER was being 22 written, the US-Basic Human System Interface was, I 23 believe to be the most detailed design description 24 that the staff had seen at this point. Many years 25 have passed since then, so things are a little NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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122 1 difficult to describe.
2 But part of that, staff had to rely 3 primarily on reviewing implementation plans, 4 essentially promises about how the plan will one day 5 be designed. So, in a sense, the fact that the 6 topical report was available to us, we actually got to 7 see it interact with the design in way we hadn't had 8 yet.
9 Staff conducted an audit of the HFE design 10 descriptions and found that they were consistent with 11 NUREG-0711. This provided confidence that good human 12 factors design principles were applied to the US-Basic 13 HSI.
14 Some brief comments about the design 15 certification. Design certification review builds 16 upon the US-Basic HSI described in the topical report 17 by completing the work according to the implementation 18 plans that are in the DC.
19 The staff reviewed the implementation 20 plans to ensure they met the acceptance criteria in 21 NUREG-0711 and to ensure that they were consistent 22 with the high level descriptions in the DCD. The 23 ITAAC described in Tier 1 helped to ensure that the 24 activities described in the implementation plans are 25 conducted appropriately.
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123 1 This slide has a summary, I know it's a 2 little bit of an eye chart here. These are -- this 3 demonstrates the 12 different elements of the human 4 factors review, as described in 0711. This basically 5 just shows what level of interaction the staff has had 6 with these different elements.
7 For instance, the HFE program management 8 plan is a complete element, we don't expect to do any 9 future work with that. We have several implementation 10 plans, which is consistent with what we've seen in 11 previous reviews.
12 The procedure development and training 13 program development were reviewed under Chapter 13.
14 There's significant overlap between these two 15 technical areas, so that was done to reduce 16 redundancy.
17 And the human performance monitoring is a 18 COL action item.
19 There are no open items and there are no 20 confirmatory items in Chapter 18.
21 In conclusion, the topical report 22 describes an acceptable generic platform called the 23 US-Basic HSI. This basic design will be iterated upon 24 using the implementation plans incorporated by 25 reference in the DCD, which the staff has found NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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124 1 consistent with the applicable guidance.
2 The implementation plans provide the staff 3 with confidence that future iterations on the basic 4 HSI will be consistent with the state of the art human 5 factors principles, as required by 10 CFR 50.34 and 6 other U.S. regulations.
7 In addition, ITAAC are used to verify that 8 the human factors practices described in the DCD and 9 implementation plans produce adequate results that are 10 ultimately incorporated into the final US-APWR design.
11 This concludes my prepared remarks. Have 12 you got questions?
13 CHAIR SUNSERI: So, there was a -- thank 14 you, Dennis. There were two ITAACs that the Applicant 15 discussed. One dealt with essentially confirming the 16 design aspects of the human system interaction, which 17 is going to be done very near the operational phase, 18 right --
19 DR. GREEN: That's right.
20 CHAIR SUNSERI: -- this ITAAC? And then, 21 the second one, I think was confirmation that the 22 installed equipment conformed with the design, right?
23 So, two would, in my mind, normally be separated in 24 time, but they've been put together --
25 DR. GREEN: Yes.
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125 1 CHAIR SUNSERI: -- in some way. What's 2 your thoughts on that?
3 DR. GREEN: Well, and I was looking at it 4 too, as you brought up the question earlier. They can 5 be separated in time and I think that's why there are 6 two of them.
7 The first one, and I'm sorry, I don't have 8 this on a slide, the first one that MHI had showed had 9 a reference to the integrated system validation, which 10 is the testing.
11 It's controlled by one of the 12 implementation plans, where they would take the final 13 design and the simulator and run it through a bunch of 14 scenarios, to make sure that the operators can do the 15 things that they claim that they can do.
16 So, the first one references the 17 integrated system validation. So, they're looking to 18 make sure that those results are adequate and that 19 those tests are run appropriately.
20 The second one is based on design 21 implementation, and this is focused more on the as-22 built design, so that, in the case that there is some 23 distance in time between an integrated system 24 validation is run and when the as-built is done, the 25 design implementation implementation plan -- I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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126 1 apologize for the clumsy terminologies, it's really 2 difficult to say implementation twice in a row --
3 CHAIR SUNSERI: That's all right.
4 DR. GREEN: -- but that's what it's 5 called. It basically is a check to make sure that the 6 assumptions that you validated in the ISV remain true 7 at the as-built.
8 So, let's say the design looks one way on 9 paper, when they put it in the simulator and then, 10 they run the tests and everything looks good. And 11 then, you get into the building and something needs to 12 change.
13 The DIIP, or design implementation 14 implementation plan, the second ITAAC, is a 15 reconciliation to make sure that they go back to the 16 ISV, make sure that those assumptions remain true, and 17 if they don't, then maybe a design change is warranted 18 or additional testing.
19 So, that's why there are two that look 20 kind of similar, it's to address that potential impact 21 in time.
22 CHAIR SUNSERI: I mean, I was just 23 thinking a bit more simplistically, like you buy a 24 digital system or whatever and there's usually a 25 factory acceptance test and a site acceptance test.
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127 1 And that's -- I was kind of equating those two ITAACs 2 as a similar kind of thing, but you described it very 3 well though, I think it's different in my mind.
4 DR. GREEN: Yes, they look kind of similar 5 in the wording, the ITAAC wording is always a bit of 6 -- it's a very specific thing. And I agree, it looked 7 a little -- I could see why you had the question you 8 have.
9 CHAIR SUNSERI: Okay.
10 DR. GREEN: But the intent behind them is 11 different.
12 CHAIR SUNSERI: Okay, thanks. That clears 13 it up for me.
14 MEMBER REMPE: So, I have a question that 15 I raised with the Applicant that I'd like to discuss 16 with you, too, about the fact that they have the 17 procedures -- and maybe this comes under Chapter 13 18 and your statement about state of the art human factor 19 principles, and thinking about the follow-up about 20 what's happened with the severe accident management 21 guidelines, as well as some of the accident management 22 procedures.
23 The fact that there's not an owners group 24 membership with MHI, and maybe this comes up solely 25 with the applicant, but where they have developed NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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128 1 procedures to pass off to the applicant already, that 2 I guess you've reviewed, right?
3 DR. GREEN: I'm not sure specifically what 4 the staff reviewed, I'd have to go look back into 5 that. But there is not a requirement for them to have 6 the procedures done at the time of the design 7 certification.
8 MEMBER REMPE: And some people do pass it 9 off to the applicant, but it almost --
10 DR. GREEN: Right.
11 MEMBER REMPE: -- sounded like, from what 12 I read in this chapter, that they had done a lot of 13 their procedures. They explicitly stated it in 14 Chapter 18.
15 DR. GREEN: Yes, I'd have to go back and 16 look at it. I mean, my understand was that during the 17 Phase 1a, the Americanization, that there was some 18 consideration of that done. I wasn't part of that 19 team, so I'm not sure to what degree that is complete.
20 MEMBER REMPE: They split the load for the 21 operators, they mentioned too.
22 DR. GREEN: Yes. So, part of Chapter 13, 23 at a COL stage is where they would look at final 24 procedures. So, we're looking at, in Chapter 18 25 space, it's more of a preliminary set, that may NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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129 1 change. And then, there are validation processes for 2 those down the line.
3 MEMBER REMPE: And would the staff not be 4 a bit concerned that they don't have any membership in 5 an owners group? And I mean, the reactor oversight 6 process is where one would be reviewing the severe 7 accident management guidance. Is there a way to 8 encourage the applicant to belong to an owners group 9 of some sort?
10 DR. GREEN: I don't know of one, I mean, 11 I think there would be benefit to it, I don't know 12 that there's a means to force them to join one. But 13 I don't --
14 MEMBER REMPE: If there's no --
15 DR. GREEN: -- a lot about that.
16 MEMBER REMPE: Yes, I guess you'll get it 17 with the ROP then, is how you would deal with it. I 18 just was curious on the process.
19 DR. GREEN: I'm unsure how to -- of the 20 full answer to that.
21 MEMBER REMPE: Okay, thanks.
22 CHAIR SUNSERI: Any other member 23 questions? All right. So, thank you, Dr. Green, for 24 the presentation, very helpful. And we have no other 25 questions. So, at this point in time, I'd like to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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130 1 turn to the public.
2 So, first, we'll ask the members of the 3 public in the room for comments and then, we'll turn 4 to the phone line. And while we're doing this, I'll 5 ask for the phone line to be open.
6 So, for members of the public in the room, 7 if you want to make a statement, please come up to the 8 microphone, state your name and make your statement.
9 All right. There are none. So, now, we will turn to 10 the public phone line.
11 If somebody is on the public phone line, 12 could you just speak up, say you're here, just so we 13 know the line is open. Once we confirm the line is 14 open, we'll ask for comments. Anybody on the public 15 line?
16 So, I will just go ahead and assume it's 17 open and ask for comments. Any comments on the public 18 line? Okay. We're going to close the public line.
19 And with no other questions, we've completed the 20 agenda now through the opportunity for public 21 comments.
22 What we're going to do is take a break for 23 lunch. We're going to resume at 1:00 and we will 24 start with the advance accumulator. Applicant will go 25 first and then, the staff. And those will be a closed NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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131 1 session, due to protection of proprietary information.
2 All right. We are recessed until 1:00.
3 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 4 off the record at 12:03 p.m.)
5 6
7 8
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US-APWR Design Overview September 19, 2019 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
UAP-HF-19001-0
© 2019 MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD. All Rights Reserved.
Presenters Atsushi Kumaki MHI NS Engineering Co, Ltd.
Joseph Tapia Mitsubishi Nuclear Energy Systems, Inc.
UAP-HF-19001-1
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Contents
- 1. Introduction and Objectives
- 2. US-APWR Design Overview
- Main Features of US-APWR
- US-APWR Design Features
- 3. Future Plan UAP-HF-19001-2
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Introduction The US-APWR Design Certification (DC) application was submitted in December 2007.
The safety review by NRC has progressed, and several ACRS meetings have been held in the past.
After Fukushima in 2011, MHI has concentrated the resources to support domestic plant restarts and the slowdown of US-APWR DC activities is still needed.
UAP-HF-19001-3
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Todays Meeting Objectives To provide the current ACRS with US-APWR design overview To provide the ACRS with details on
- Chapter 18 (Human Factor Engineering),
- Chapter 8 (Electrical System) and the
- Topical Report for the Advanced Accumulator UAP-HF-19001-4
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US-APWR Design Overview UAP-HF-19001-5
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Main Features of US-APWR UAP-HF-19001-6
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Progression of Mitsubishi PWR Designs Steam Output of Number of Reactor Number of Fuel Generator/ Reference Electric Loops Vessel Assembly Reactor Coolant Plant Power Pump Tomari Units 1 & 2 600 MWe I.D. 11.15 ft 121 (Commercial 2 Loop Standard Class (3.4 m) Assemblies Operation : 6/1989 &
4/1991) 900 MWe Tomari Unit 3 I.D. 13.12 ft 157 3 Loop Standard (Commercial Class (4.0 m) Assemblies Operation : 12/2009)
Genkai Units 3 & 4 1200 MWe I.D. 14.44 ft 193 (Commercial 4 Loop Standard Class (4.4 m) Assemblies Operation : 3/1994&
7/1997) 4 Loop 1500 MWe Larger Capacity Tsuruga Units I.D. 17.06 ft 257 with the same 3&4 (APWR) Class (5.2 m) Assemblies concept (Under licensing)
UAP-HF-19001-7
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US-APWR Design Basis Basic design concept of US-APWR is the same as APWR New technologies of APWR are fully tested, well-verified and established US-APWR, 1700MWe class, is based on the established APWR technology with Latest technologies to improve plant efficiency Minor modifications to meet U.S.
Regulatory and utility requirements UAP-HF-19001-8
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Comparison of Main Features Plant Parameters and Major components Conventional APWR US-APWR 4 Loop Electric Output 1,180 MWe 1,538 MWe 1,700 MWe Class Core Thermal Output 3,411MWt 4,451 MWt 4,451 MWt Steam Generator Model 54F 70F-1 91TT-1 Tube size 7/8 3/4 3/4 Reactor Coolant Design Flow 93,600gpm 112,000gpm 112,000gpm Pump Turbine LP last-stage 44 inch 54 inch 70 inch class blade APWR 1538MWe output is achieved by large capacity core and large capacity main components such as SG, RCP, turbine, etc.
US-APWR 1700MWe class output is achieved from a 10% higher efficiency than APWR.
- Same core thermal output with APWR
- High-performance, large capacity steam generator
- High-performance turbine UAP-HF-19001-9
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Comparison of Main Features Reactor Core and Internals Conventional APWR US-APWR 4 Loop Core Thermal Output 3,411MWt 4,451 MWt 4,451 MWt Core NO. of Fuel Assem. 193 257 257 and Fuel Latice 17x17 17x17 17x Fuel Active Fuel Length 12ft 12ft 14 ft Baffle/former Reactor internals Neutron Reflector Neutron Reflector structure In-core Instrumentation Bottom mounted Bottom mounted Top mounted APWR Large capacity core by increasing number of fuel assemblies Installation of neutron reflector to enhance reliability and fuel economy US-APWR Low power density core using 14ft. fuel assemblies to enhance fuel economy for 24 months operation Enhanced reliability and maintainability of reactor vessel by top mounted ICIS UAP-HF-19001-10
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Comparison of Main Features Safety system and I&C Conventional APWR US-APWR 4 Loop Safety Electrical 2 trains 2 trains 4 trains Systems Trains Mechanical 2 trains 4 trains 4 trains HHSI pump 100% x 2 50% x 4(DVI) 50% x 4(DVI)
Systems LHSI pump 100% x 2 - -
ACC 4 4 (Advanced) 4 (Advanced)
RWSP Outside CV Inside CV Inside CV Containment Vessel PCCV PCCV PCCV I&C Control Room Conventional Safety I&C Conventional Full Digital Full Digital Non-Safety I&C Full Digital APWR Enhanced safety by simplified and reliable safety systems
- Mechanical 4 train systems with direct vessel injection design
- Elimination of LHSI pump by utilizing advanced accumulators
- Elimination of recirculation switching by In-containment RWSP US-APWR Enhanced safety by 4 train safety electrical systems Enhanced on line maintenance capability UAP-HF-19001-11
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Results of US-APWR Design Features Enhanced Economy Large capacity and high plant performance High fuel performance for 24 months operation Enhanced Safety Improved safety response by using advanced technologies Enhanced Reliability Well designed and verified proven technologies UAP-HF-19001-12
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US-APWR Design Features UAP-HF-19001-13
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Advanced Technologies Reactor Engineering Safety Features Simplified configuration 1700 MWe class large capacity with 4 mechanical sub-systems Neutron reflector In-containment RWSP SH Advanced accumulator SH RV ACC SH ACC SH RWSP Turbine 74 inch-length blades Steam Generator in LP turbine Fully integrated LP High performance turbine rotor I&C separator Low Pressure Increased capacity Digital control Turbine with compact & protection sizing systems Generator Compact console High Pressure Turbine UAP-HF-19001-14
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Nuclear Design Features Large thermal output and low power density US Current 4 Loop Plant APWR US-APWR 257F/As 257F/As 193F/As Large Low Output Power 12ft 14ft 12ft Density 3,565MWt 4,451MWt 4,451MWt 5.7kW/ft 5.3kW/ft 4.6kW/ft UAP-HF-19001-15
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Improved Core Design Neutron Reflector Saves Uranium 2.0 Measured Reactivity Gain Enhanced 1.6 Reflector Saving 1.2 Critical
(%k/k) 0.8 Experimental results 0.4 Saved Enrichment
~0.1wt% U-235 0.0 20 50 80 110 140 mm 1 2 3 4 5 in Steel Reflector Thickness Conventional Neutron Reflector Baffle plate UAP-HF-19001-16
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Fuel Design Features Enable Flexible Core High Reliability Operation Grid Fretting Fuel Active Length : 14ft Resistant Design Fuel Rods Array : 17x17 (Shorter Span Length*2 Higher Gadolinium with 11 grids & Grid Spring Design)
Content Pellet (10wt%)
Enhance Fuel Economy Corrosion Resistant Cladding Material (ZIRLOTM)
Higher Density Pellet (97%T.D.*1) Anti-debris bottom nozzle with built-in filter Zircaloy-4 Grid (for Neutron Economy)
- 1 T.D. :Theoretical Density
- 2 compared with conventional 14ft Fuel UAP-HF-19001-17
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Reactor Internals Design Comparison of main structures b)
Upper Mounted ICIS a)
Core Barrel Core Barrel a),b)
Core Baffle Neutron Reflector Lower Core Plate a)
Lower Core Lower Core Support Support b)
Tie Plate Diffuser Plate Bottom Mounted a) Large Core and Reflector Conventional US-APWR ICIS b) Reliability and Maintenance 4 Loop Plant UAP-HF-19001-18
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Reactor Internals Design Enhanced performance Large volumetric core structure Neutron Reflector for fuel cost reduction Large reactor internals for large output Cooling holes Enhanced reliability Core 8 ring Neutron Reflector for simplified structure barrel blocks Number of bolts 2,000 50)
Lower Improved Tie Plate for stabilized flow core plate UAP-HF-19001-19
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Reactor Coolant System Design concept of the RCS Basic configuration is the same as conventional 4 loop Pressurizer Relief Tank Pressurizer Relief Tank plants M M M M Pressurizer Safety Valve Large main components Steam Generator Pressurizer with large thermal output Reactor Coolant Steam Generator Reactor Coolant Pump and high efficiency Pump Enhanced plant response and controllability with large Steam Generator Steam Generator volume Pressurizer Reactor Coolant Pump Reactor Coolant Pump Reactor Vessel UAP-HF-19001-20
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Reactor Coolant System Larger main components Larger diameter and height of Reactor Vessel with enhanced reliability Larger heat transfer area in SG contributes high efficiency Larger reactor coolant flow rate of RCP with 8000 HP motor Enhanced plant response and control Larger Pressurizer volume provides greater margin for the transients Conventional Specifications US-APWR Ratio 4 Loop Plant Core thermal output 4,451MWt 3,565MWt 1.25 SG Heat transfer area 91,500ft2 55,000ft2 1.66 Reactor Coolant Flow 112,000gpm 93,600gpm 1.20 Pressurizer Volume 2,900ft3 1,800ft3 1.61 UAP-HF-19001-21
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Reactor Vessel / CRDM Enhanced reliability Reactor Vessel CRDM housing Elimination of canopy seal Vessel head Vessel head nozzle material: plenum Alloy 690 temperature:
Tcold Reactor Vessel:
Reduction of weld lines using integrated forging Neutron reflector:
Reduction Canopy seal of Vessel for Latest 4 Loop US-APWR fluence plant (Reduce to 1/3) UAP-HF-19001-22 UAP-HSW-6005-22
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Steam Generator Design Features Primary separator Secondary High performance moisture separators separation Moisture carry over at SG outlet:
Primary less than 0.1% separators Anti-vibration Bar Sets of 5 V-shaped AVBs with 10 support points of the outer most tube Anti-vibration bars Tube material Alloy 690 Tube OD 0.75 inch U-tubes Tube arrangement triangular Tube pitch 1 inch Heating surface 91,500 ft2 UAP-HF-19001-23
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Reactor Coolant Pump Improved hydraulic performance Large capacity and high efficiency Flywheel by improved impeller and diffuser
- Pump Efficiency : Over 85%
- Flow Rate : 112,000 gpm/loop
- Head : Approx. 310 ft Advanced seal Stabilization of No.1 seal Shaft Seal leak-off characteristics Assembly Extension of seal life Diffuser Countermeasure to station-blackout Casing Impeller UAP-HF-19001-24
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Safety Systems Simplified and Reliable Safety Systems Safety systems with enhanced redundancy and independency Reliable and simplified design is achievable by 50%x4 configuration for Safety Injection (HHSI*)
Pumps in conjunction with adoption of Direct Vessel Injection (DVI) design High Head Safety Injection Utilization of Advanced Accumulators Accumulators with function of Low Head Injection Pumps In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Pit Improved reliability and safety by eliminating recirculation switching UAP-HF-19001-25
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ECCS Configuration Conventional 4 Loop PWR US-APWR 2 train 4 mechanical train 4 train (DVI)
SH Higher Reliability SH Simplified Pipe Routing Advanced Accumulator RV Elimination of LP SH SH RV SH ACC ACC In-containment RWSP SH Higher Reliability RWSP ACC Accumulator HP High Head SIP LP Low Head SIP SIP Safety Injection Pump CSP Containment Spray Pump SH Spray Header RV Reactor Vessel RWSP RWSP Refueling Water Storage Pit UAP-HF-19001-26
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Comparison of ECCS Equipment Conventional US-APWR 4 Loop Plant Accumulator 4 4 (conventional type) (advanced type)
SI Pump
- High Head Pump 100%x2 50%x4
- Low Head Pump 100%x2 (used also as RHR)
CS Pump 100%x2 50%x4 (used also as RHR)
UAP-HF-19001-27
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Design feature of high head injection system 4 independent trains without Inside of C/V 1 of 4 trains interconnections between trains C/L H/L Sufficient capacity of safety injection R/V pumps Meets the safety injection requirement in core reflooding stage RWSP SIP Conventional Reason and/or Item US-APWR 4 Loop Plant Advantage
- Enhance the reliability Train 4 train 2 train
- Provide On-line Maintenance under single failure High head DVI Loop injection
- Eliminate recirculation Inside CV Outside CV Storage Pit switchover UAP-HF-19001-28
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Design Feature of CSS/RHRS Common CSS and RHRS Pumps /
Spray Header Heat exchangers 1 of 4 trains CSS and RHRS are not required for operation at same time Normal operation: Stand by as CSS H/L R/V C/L CS/RHR Hx LOCA: Operated as CSS Plant shut down: Operated as RHRS CS/RHRP Pump suction and discharge valves are interlocked for prevention of human errors RWSP Conventional Reason and/or Item US-APWR 4 Loop Plant Advantage
- Enhance the reliability Containment 4 CS/RHRP 2 CSP
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In-containment Refueling Water Storage Pit Located at the lowest part of containment Provides a continuous suction source for both the safety injection and the CS/RHR pumps
( Eliminates the switchover of suction source )
4 recirculation sumps are installed RWSP RWSP RWSP Recirculation Sump Recirculation Sump UAP-HF-19001-30
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Containment Vessel Design Robust and reliable pressure vessel with steel liner Equipment hatch Design Pressure 68 psig Maximum Allowable 0.1 percent / day Leakage Rate Dome Buttress Personnel hatch 149 2 ID 226 5 Cylinder Base mat UAP-HF-19001-31
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Simplified Layout for Safety Systems Lay down safety equipment at corner area of reactor building just close to RCS loops Building volume / piping quantity is reduced Building volume (per kW) was reduced about 20% in US-APWR by total plant effective layout 236 ft (72m ) 230 ft (70m )
328 ft ( 100m ) 308 ft ( 94m )
Effective layout Safety for safety equipment systems room Current 4 Loop Plant US-APWR UAP-HF-19001-32
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Advanced Accumulator Automatic Switching of Injection Flow Rates Elimination of Low Head Injection Pumps Improvement of reliability Reduction of total capacity of safety injection pumps Substitution for RHR function by CS* Pumps/Coolers Containment Spray Current 4 Loop plant US-APWR Blow Down Blow Down Core Reflooding Long-Term Cooling Core Reflooding Long-Term Cooling
& RV Refill & RV Refill Accumulator Flow Accumulator Flow Injection Flow Injection Flow Low Head Injection Pump Requirement for Requirement for Injection Flow High Head Safety Injection Flow Injection Pump Injection Pump Flow Time Time UAP-HF-19001-33
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Mechanism of Advanced Accumulator Flow damper passively switches the flow rate.
Nitrogen Nitrogen Injection Water Main stand Injection pipe Water Side inlet Flow Damper Flow Damper Side inlet Large Flow Rate Reduced Flow Rate UAP-HF-19001-34
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Emergency Feedwater System Design concept of the EFWS Achieve high reliability with simplified systems Allow On-Line Maintenance assuming single failure Feature of the EFWS M M M M Independent 4 train system 2 safety grade water sources Diverse power sources for the pumps M M Cross connection inlet and outlet of the pumps (normally isolated)
UAP-HF-19001-35
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Emergency Feedwater System 4 train configuration allows simplicity and high reliability 4 pumps with diverse power sources
- 2 motor-driven pumps
- 2 turbine-driven pumps Cross connection inlet of the pumps allows On-Line Maintenance (OLM) 2 safety grade independent feedwater sources Two 50% capacity emergency feedwater pits Cross connection inlet of the pumps backs up each feedwater source Conventional Reason and/or Item US-APWR 4 Loop Plant Advantage A pump is allowed OLM System Configuration 4 train 2 train under the single failure M/D EFWP: 2 M/D EFWP: 2 Emergency Feedwater Pump Diverse power sources T/D EFWP: 2 T/D EFWP: 1 2 independent pits Emergency Feedwater Source 2 1 (backup available)
UAP-HF-19001-36
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CCWS & ESWS (Component Cooling Water System
& Essential Service Water System)
Design concept CCWS and ESWS constitute a safety cooling chain Achieve high independency and high reliability Allows On-Line Maintenance assuming single failure UAP-HF-19001-37
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Component Cooling Water System Component Cooling Water System 4 safety train configuration Separated into 2 independent sections even in normal operation
- OLM available in each train
- 2 train safety components (e.g.;SFP Hx.) are supplied with cooling water from 2 of 4 safety trains UAP-HF-19001-38
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Essential Service Water System Essential Service Water System Independent 4 train configuration CCW Hx UHS Service Water Pump UAP-HF-19001-39
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I&C Main Features Full Digital I&C System Computerized main control board Minimal conventional switches, only for regulatory compliance Micro-processor based safety and non-safety systems Multiplexed communication including class 1E signals Based on Defense-in-Depth & Diversity concept 4 train redundant Safety System configuration Redundant configuration for Non-Safety Systems Maximum standardization with diverse back-up Non-Safety System for CCF (Common Cause Failure)
UAP-HF-19001-40
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I&C Overall Architecture UAP-HF-19001-41
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Safety I&C Design Features PSMS: Protection & Safety Monitoring System Reactor Trip and ESF Actuation Functions Monitoring of the Safety Critical Parameters (RG 1.97)
Control of ESF, Safe Shutdown and Important Interlocks 4 train redundancy for all Safety Systems Electrical, physical, functional, communication and data isolation to accommodate Signal interface between safety systems Signal interface safety to non-safety systems Non-safety HSI for safety functions with safety HSI Integrity of software per BTP 7-14 and BTP 7-19 Qualified platform with extensive experience UAP-HF-19001-42
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Non-safety I&C Design Features PCMS: Plant Control and Monitoring System Reactor, Turbine / Generator, BOP control & monitoring Redundant and fault tolerant configuration Functional isolation of shared sensor signals from PSMS with Automatic Signal Selector (for compliance with 10CFR 50 Appendix A GDC 24)
DAS: Diverse Actuation System Countermeasure for CCF in the digital safety system (according to BTP 7-19 for Software CMF & 10CFR 50.62 for ATWS)
Diverse automation: Reactor Trip, Turbine Trip, EFWS (based on actuations required within 10 minutes of event)
Diverse manual controls: SI, CV Isolation, etc.
(diverse component level actuation for critical safety functions)
Diverse monitoring: Safety critical parameters (diverse signal processing and HSI) UAP-HF-19001-43
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HSI System Computerized Main Control Room Large Display Panel Operator Console Fixed Position HSI Safety VDU Alarm VDU Operation VDU (Non-Safety)
UAP-HF-19001-44
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HSI System Design Features Functions of HSI System (Human System Interface System)
Fully computerized video based approach Integrated display for monitoring and soft control Dynamic alarm prioritization & computerized procedures Development Process (NUREG 0711 Program Model)
Task analysis and human factor design Step by step prototyping and V&V by plant operators Staffing Operator, Supervisor & Safety Technical Advisor Main features All operations are available from non-safety VDUs All safety operations from safety VDUs Minimum inventory of Fixed Position HSI
- Conventional HSI for manual system level actuation (RG 1.62)
- Critical Functions & Bypass or Inoperable Status (RG 1.47)
UAP-HF-19001-45
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Electrical System Design Features 2 independent offsite transmission systems 4 train onsite Safety Power Systems 4 train Safety Gas-Turbine Generators (GT/G)
Starting time requirement is extended with GT/G Higher reliability and easier maintenance than DG 4 train Safety Batteries 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> capability for loss of AC power Supplies power to equipment that must be energized prior to starting time requirement of GT/G One non-safety GT/G alternate AC power Supplies power to equipment required during SBO Starting time requirement : 5 minutes Manually connected to safety bus at SBO initiation UAP-HF-19001-46
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Electrical System Diagram Main Transmission Line Auxiliary Transmission Line Main Transformer Reserve Circuit Breaker Transformer Circuit Breaker Safety Main Transformer House-Service Transformer Electrical Generator Circuit Breaker Reserve Transformer Main Turbine Generator G
Non-Safety Buses A safety B safety C safety D safety 6.9kV Bus 6.9kV Bus 6.9kV Bus 6.9kV Bus 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 A Emergency B Emergency C Emergency D Emergency Gas-turbine Gas-turbine Gas-turbine Gas-turbine Non-Safety Generator Generator Generator Generator Gas-Turbine Generator A safety B safety C safety D safety 480V Bus 480V Bus 480V Bus 480V Bus (Load Center) (Load Center) (Load Center) (Load Center)
Safety 480V Safety 480V Safety 480V Safety 480V Motor Control Motor Control Motor Control Motor Control Center Center Center Center A A1 B B1 C C1 D D1 A DC125V B DC125V C DC125V D DC125V Bus Bus Bus Bus A-Inverter B-Inverter C-Inverter D-Inverter A AC115V Bus B AC115V Bus C AC115V Bus D AC115V Bus UAP-HF-19001-47
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US-APWR Overview US-APWR is designed on proven and reliable technologies and provides:
Improved plant efficiency incorporating improved steam generators and turbine system Reduced fuel cycle cost and improved operational flexibilities by low power density core with 14 ft.
fuel assemblies.
Minor modifications of APWR for U.S. utility requirements.
UAP-HF-19001-48
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US-APWR Design Certification Application Tier 2: Chapter 8 September 19, 2019 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
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Presenters Joseph Tapia Mitsubishi Nuclear Energy Systems, Inc.
Hideki Tanaka Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD.
Shinji Kawanago MHI NS engineering Co, Ltd.
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Contents
- 1. Overview of Chapter
- 2. Features of Electrical Power System
- 3. Closed Open Items and RAIs
- 4. Summary
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- 1. Overview of Chapter
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- 1. Overview of Chapter Title of Chapter Chapter 8: Electric Power Scope of Chapter According to RG 1.206 and SRP, Chapter 8 consists of following subsections:
8.1 Introduction 8.2 Offsite Power System 8.3 Onsite Power Systems 8.3.1 AC Power Systems 8.3.2 DC Power Systems 8.4 Station Blackout
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- 1. Overview of Chapter DCD Issue Submittal
- No. Rev. Document Title MHI Ref.
Date Date 1 - 4 DCD - Aug. 30, 2013 UAP-HF-13212 2 - 0 DCD Revision 4 Update Tracking Report - Mar. 14, 2014 UAP-HF-14025 Technical Reports Issue Submittal
- No. Rev. Document Title MHI Ref.
Date Date 3 MUAP-09023 1 Onsite AC Power System Calculation Aug. 2013 Sep. 3, 2013 UAP-HF-13221 4 MUAP-07024 3 Qualification and Test Plan of Class 1E Gas Sep. 2012 Sep. 28, 2012 UAP-HF-12270 Turbine Generator System 5 MUAP-10023 7 Initial Type Test Result of Class 1E Gas Dec. 2013 Dec. 18, 2013 UAP-HF-13311 Turbine Generator System
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- 2. Features of Electrical Power System
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- 2. Features of Electrical Power System Offsite Power System (8.2)
Design Features The two (2) sources of offsite power provide:
1.) Normal Preferred Power from Reserve Auxiliary Transformers (RAT) 2.) Alternate Preferred Power from Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UAT) thru Main Transformer The two (2) offsite power supply circuits are independent and physically separated.
Either offsite power supply circuit has the capacity for normal operations and Design Basis Events (DBE) to comply with the applicable GDCs.
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- 2. Features of Electrical Power System Transmission System1 UAT1,2Unit Auxiliary Transformer 72MVA UAT3,4 Unit Auxiliary Transformer 53MVA Spare RAT1,2 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 72MVA Main RAT3,4 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 53MVA Transformer Transmission System2 (MT)
UAT1 UAT2 UAT3 UAT4 RAT1 RAT2 RAT3 RAT4 Generator Load Reserve Break Switch Unit Auxiliary Transformer Auxiliary Transformer Main Turbine Generator G G
13.8kV N1 13.8kV N2 Non- Safety Non - Safety Bus Bus Class 1E (Safety Related) Buses Non Class 1E (Non Safety 6.9kV A 6.9kV B 6.9kV P1 6.9kV P2 6.9kV C 6.9kV D 6.9kV N3 6.9kV N4 6.9kV N5 6.9kV N6 Safety Safety Non - Non - Safety Safety Non - Non- Non- Non -
Related) Buses Bus Bus Safety Safety Bus Bus Safety Safety Safety Safety Bus Bus Bus Bus Bus Bus A - EPS B - EPS A - AAC B - AAC C- EPS D- EPS Figure-1 Main One-Line Overview
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- 2. Features of Electrical Power System Offsite Power System (8.2)
Closed Open Items and RAIs (discussed later in detail)
RAI on 8.2 Bulletin 2012-01 Protection against OPC (Open Phase Condition)
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- 2. Features of Electrical Power System Onsite Power System (8.3)
Design Features Four train Class 1E AC electrical power systems Each train includes an independent Class 1E GTG as its emergency power source On-Line Maintenance with Single-Failure Criterion remains satisfied Permanent buses supplied from Alternate AC Power Source (AAC-GTG)
Non-safety related loads are electrically separated from class 1E buses.
Required non-safety related loads are supplied from AAC during LOOP AACs provide power to all SBO required loads to bring and maintain the unit in safe-shutdown.
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- 2. Features of Electrical Power System Transmission System1 UAT1,2Unit Auxiliary Transformer 72MVA UAT3,4 Unit Auxiliary Transformer 53MVA Spare RAT1,2 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 72MVA Main RAT3,4 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 53MVA Transformer Transmission System2 (MT)
UAT1 UAT2 UAT3 UAT4 RAT1 RAT2 RAT3 RAT4 Generator Load Reserve Break Switch Unit Auxiliary Transformer Auxiliary Transformer Main Turbine Generator G G
13.8kV N1 13.8kV N2 Non- Safety Non - Safety Bus Bus Class 1E (Safety Related) Buses Non Class 1E (Non Safety 6.9kV A 6.9kV B 6.9kV P1 6.9kV P2 6.9kV C 6.9kV D 6.9kV N3 6.9kV N4 6.9kV N5 6.9kV N6 Safety Safety Non - Non - Safety Safety Non - Non- Non- Non -
Related) Buses Bus Bus Safety Safety Bus Bus Safety Safety Safety Safety Bus Bus Bus Bus Bus Bus A - EPS B - EPS A - AAC B - AAC C- EPS D- EPS Figure-1 Main One-Line Overview
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- 2. Features of Electrical Power System Class 1E Gas Turbine Generator Specifications/Ratings Gas Turbine Ratings Continuous Rating: 4500 kW Short time Rating : 4950 kW Generator Ratings Continuous Rating: 4500 kW / 5625 kVA Power Factor of 0.8 6900 Volt; 3 Phase, 60 hertz Start time
< 100 Seconds start time
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- 2. Features of Electrical Power System Class 1E GTG Testing Program Regulatory guide 1.9 Application and Testing of Safety-related Diesel Generators in Nuclear Power Plants IEEE 387 IEEE Standard Criteria for diesel Generator Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
ISG-21 (Draft)
Interim Staff Guidance On the Review of Nuclear Power Plant Designs using a Gas Turbine Driven Standby Emergency Alternating Current Power System MHI Technical Report (Qualification Test Plan and Initial Type Test Result)
Qualification and Test Plan for Class 1E Gas Turbine Generator System : MUAP-07024 Initial Type Test Result of Class 1E Gas Turbine Generator System : MUAP-10023
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- 2. Features of Electrical Power System Class 1E GTG Initial Type Tests Load Capability Test IEEE 387 6.2.1 To demonstrate the capability to carry rated load Start and Load Acceptance Test IEEE 387 6.2.2 To establish the capability to start and accept load within the required time period.
150 Start Tests Margin Test IEEE 387 6.2.3 To demonstrate the capability to carry the most severe load step + 10%
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- 2. Features of Electrical Power System Closed Open Items and RAIs (discussed later in detail)
Open Item 08.03.01-1 :
Maintenance and Testing of Inaccessible Cables Open Item 08.03.01-2 :
Gas Turbine Generator Reliability (GTG)
Open Item 08.03.02-1 :
Battery Sizing Calculations RAI on 8.3.1.4.4.2 Conformance with RG 1.9 GTGs qualification test which was stopped every 50 starts to perform maintenance
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- 2. Features of Electrical Power System Station Blackout (8.4)
Basic Concept for Coping with SBO The AACs are available in the event of SBO, when all offsite power sources and EPSs are not available to bring the unit to a safe shutdown condition and maintain that status Design Basis Diverse AACs to minimize the potential for common cause failures between EPS system The non-class 1E AAC is a packaged gas turbine-generator connected to a 6.9kV AC Permanent bus AAC can be aligned to any of the 4 class 1E buses in response to an SBO AAC supplies safe shutdown loads during the SBO coping period (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />)
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- 2. Features of Electrical Power System Closed Open Items and RAIs for Section 8.4 (discussed later in detail)
Open Item 08.04-1 :
RCP Seal Leakage Rate Open Item 08.04-2 :
AAC Power System Periodic Testing RAI on 8.4.4.3 Station Blackout Coping Analysis (Effects of Loss of Ventilation)
Justification of stable operation of the TDEFW pumps for one hour without room cooling
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- 3. Closed Open Items and RAIs
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- 3. Closed Open Items and RAIs RAI on 8.2 Bulletin 2012-01 RAI 1017-7058, Question 08.02-17 Response to NRC RAI RAI 1096-8266, Question 08.02-18 US-APWR DCD Section 8.2, ITAAC RAI 1100-9574, Question 08.02-19 and COL Item were revised.
Protection against OPC (Open More detail design information is as Phase Condition) (Bulletin 2012-01) follows;
- Concerning Bulletin 2012-01, Design Vulnerability in Electric Power system, (ADAMS ML12074A115) related to the recent operating experience that involved the loss of one of the three phases of the offsite power circuit (single-phase open circuit condition) at Byron Station (1) Detection and Protection Method (2) Single Failure Criteria (3) COL and ITAAC
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- 3. Closed Open Items and RAIs MHI Response (1) Detection and Protection Method OPC detection systems are provided on the high voltage side MT and RAT.
(2) Single Failure Criteria OPC detection system has redundancy.
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- 3. Closed Open Items and RAIs (3) COL Item and ITAAC COL items on detail designs and surveillance requirement were added DCD section 8.2.
One ITTAC was added Tier 1 of DCD.
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- 3. Closed Open Items and RAIs Open Item 08.03.01-1 Maintenance and Testing of Response to NRC RAI NO.10 Inaccessible Cables REVISION 4
- Generic Letter 2007-01 guidance on US-APWR DCD Section 8.3.3 and preventing the degradation of Subsection 8.3.1.1.9 were modified to medium voltage cables that are include COL Information Item; installed in underground duct bank. "The COL Applicant is to describe the
- The applicant has not provided a cable monitoring program for COL Information Item for this. underground and inaccessible cables within the scope of the maintenance rule.
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- 3. Closed Open Items and RAIs Open Item 08.03.01-2 Gas Turbine Generator Reliability Response to NRC RAI No.394-3048 (GTG) MHI has developed one technical
- Technical Report MUAP-07024-P, report Initial Type Test Result of Class Rev. 2, provides technical 1E Gas Turbine Generator System information about the GTG and their (MUAP-10023).
qualification plan, but does not provide type test data that supports MHI performed 150 start and load reliability target. acceptance tests of the GTGs with zero failures. These tests prove that the GTGs satisfy the reliability criterion of 0.975 with 95 percent confidence.
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- 3. Closed Open Items and RAIs RAI on 8.3.1.4.4.2 Conformance with RG 1.9 RAI 818-5872, Question 08.03.01-42 Response to NRC RAI RAI 876-6210, Question 08.03.01-43 US-APWR DCD Section 8.3.1.1.3.9 RAI 962-6578, Question 08.03.01-46 and Technical Specification
- The qualification testing was Surveillance Requirement stopped every 50 starts to perform (SR) were revised to perform fuel maintenance on the injectors, but nozzle cleaning as a maintenance this information was not provided in activity. MUAP-07024-P and MUAP-the submitted technical reports 10023-P were revised to include a (MUAP-07024-P (R2), MUAP- summary of the fuel nozzle cleaning 10023-P (R3)) and Technical procedure and parameters monitored Specifications. during the qualification testing.
- The applicant to provide information to support that the scheduled maintenance activity conducted, the fuel nozzle cleaning, was part of the test procedures.
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- 3. Closed Open Items and RAIs Open Item 08.03.02-1 Battery Sizing Calculations Response to NRC RAI No.388-2858
- The applicant indicated that its MHI provided detailed information assumptions for the types of loads regarding current for loads included in were made based on Japanese the battery sizing calculations. The experience and products. calculations factored US
- The applicant agreed to provide a manufacturers' information and more in-depth explanation of this differences from the Japanese issue which will be incorporated in manufacturers.
the upcoming DCD revisions US-APWR DCD Table 8.3.2.1 was revised.
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- 3. Closed Open Items and RAIs Open Item 08.04-1 RCP Seal Leakage Rate Response to NRC RAI No.419-3126
- The applicant has stated that : The MHI answered that the isolation valve leakage of reactor coolant through stops the leakage in No. 1 seal and the the seals of each RCP is assumed leakage from the No. 2 seal is limited.
to be 0.2 gpm. Therefore, the total loss of coolant inventory within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from the seals on all four RCPs is expected to be 48 gallons.
- The applicant needs to justify the deviation from industry standards for its RCP design by actual test results or demonstrate that the design can cope with the higher leakage rate.
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- 3. Closed Open Items and RAIs Open Item 08.04-2 AAC Power System Periodic Testing Response to NRC RAI No.683-5251
- The applicants DCD states that the During the quarterly surveillance test, AAC power system will be the AAC is started and brought to inspected and tested periodically to operating conditions. Additionally, demonstrate operability and during every refueling outage, the AAC reliability. generator is tested by performing a
- The inspection and testing will be timed start and rated load capacity conducted by the COL applicant test. Testing and maintenance of the over the lifetime of the NPP, AAC is evaluated under the reliability therefore, the DCD should include assurance program and the these inspection and testing maintenance rule program as requirements as a COL Information described in the DCD.
Item.
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- 3. Closed Open Items and RAIs RAI on 8.4.4.3 Station Blackout Coping Analysis RAI 938-6535, Question 08.04-16 Response to NRC RAI RAI 991-7026, Question 08.04-17 The heat-up analysis is based on conservative assumptions and uses a (5) Effects of Loss of Ventilation numerically stable calculation method.
- Justification of stable operation of The TDEFW pump room air the TDEFW pumps for at least one temperature remains below the 175 oF hour without active room cooling acceptance criterion up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after a complete loss of cooling under SBO, which covers the coping period.
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- 4. Summary
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- 4. Summary All open Items with Phase 2 SER have been closed.
Open Item 08.03.01-1 Open Item 08.03.01-2 Open Item 08.03.02-1 Open Item 08.04-1 Open Item 08.04-2 Additional RAIs have been closed.
RAI on 8.2 Bulletin 2012-01 RAI on 8.3.1.4.4.2 Conformance with RG 1.9 RAI on 8.4.4.3 Station Blackout Coping Analysis
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Presentation to ACRS Subcommittee Chapter 18 September 19, 2019 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
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Presenters
- Lead Presenters
- Joseph Tapia, Principle Consulting Engineer, MNES
- Kenji Mashio, Engineering Manager, MHI
- Robert E. Hall, Consultant, MHI/RTS
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Contents
- 1. Structure of the submittals
- 2. US-Basic HSI
- 3. US-APWR HFE Program Management Plan
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- 1. Structure of the submittals
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Document Lists (1/2)
DCD Issue Submittal
- No. Rev. Document Title MHI Ref.
Date Date 1 - 4 DCD Aug. 2013 Sep. 10, 2013 UAP-HF-13212 2 - 0 DCD Revision 4 Update Tracking Report - Mar. 14, 2014 UAP-HF-14025 3 - - DCD Markup - Jun. 4, 2014 UAP-HF-14042
- DCD Tier 1 Section 2.9 Markup
- DCD Tier 2 Chapter 1 Markup
- DCD Tier 2 Chapter 18 Markup Technical Reports (1/2)
Issue Submittal
- No. Rev. Document Title MHI Ref.
Date Date 4 MUAP-09019 5 Human Factors Engineering Program Aug. 2014 Aug. 22, 2014 UAP-HF-14047 Management Plan 5 MUAP-13005 1 Operating Experience Review Implementation May 2014 Jun. 4, 2014 UAP-HF-14042 Plan 6 MUAP-13007 1 Functional Requirements Analysis and May 2014 Jun. 4, 2014 UAP-HF-14042 Function Allocation Implementation Plan 7 MUAP-13009 1 Task Analysis Implementation Plan May 2014 Jun. 4, 2014 UAP-HF-14042
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Document Lists (2/2)
Technical Reports (2/2)
Issue Submittal
- No. Rev. Document Title MHI Ref.
Date Date 8 MUAP-10008 4 Staffing and Qualifications Implementation May 2014 Jun. 4, 2014 UAP-HF-14042 Plan 9 MUAP-13014 1 Human Reliability Analysis Implementation May 2014 Jun. 4, 2014 UAP-HF-14042 Plan 10 MUAP-10009 4 Human-System Interface Design May 2014 Jun. 4, 2014 UAP-HF-14042 Implementation Plan 11 MUAP-10012 4 Human Factors Verification and Validation May 2014 Jun. 4, 2014 UAP-HF-14042 Implementation Plan 12 MUAP-10013 4 Design Implementation Implementation Plan May 2014 Jun. 4, 2014 UAP-HF-14042 MHI Internal Documents Issue Submittal
- No. Rev. Document Title MHI Ref.
Date Date 13 JEJC-1763- 2 HSI Design Style Guide May 2008 -
1001 14 7DS-UAP- 0 Operating Experience Review Results Aug 2014 -
20140002
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Document Lists (2/2)
Topical Report Issue Submittal
- No. Rev. Document Title MHI Ref.
Date Date 15 MUAP-07007 6 Human-System Interface System Description May 2014 Jun. 4, 2014 UAP-HF-14042
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1.1 Technical Reports (1/3)
Technical Reports The US-APWR HFE submittals prior to design certification cover the HFE program management plan (PMP) and 8 HFE element IPs;
- HFE Program Management Plan
- Operating Experience Review (OER)
- Functional Requirements Analysis and Function Allocation (FRA/FA)
- Task Analysis (TA)
- Staffing and Qualifications (S&Q)
- Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)
- HSI Design (HD)
- Verification and Validation (V&V)
- Design Implementation (DI)
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1.1 Technical Reports (2/3)
The PMP and IPs address specific HFE activities and provide detailed methodologies for addressing review criteria The PMP and IPs each follow the same outline as defined below; Section 1: Purpose Section 2: Scope Section 3: Methodology Overview Section 4: Methodology Section 5: Implementation Team Section 6: Results Summary Report Content Section 7: NUREG-0711 Compliance Evaluation Section 8: References
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1.1 Technical Reports (3/3)
HFE activities related to procedure development and training program development are addressed by programs discussed in Chapter 13, Conduct of Operations COL Items COL Applicants address the HFE requirements associated with Human Performance Monitoring
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1.2 Supporting Documents For audit Following supporting documents were not docketed but audited by NRC staff; HSI Design Style Guide OER Results
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1.2 Supporting Documents Topical Report Human-System Interface System Description, MUAP-07007, Revision 6, May 2014 Purpose/Key issues Document and obtain an approval of the US-Basic Human-System Interface (HSI) System (HSIS), incorporating HEDs identified through testing performed with U.S. licensed operators Introduced US-Basic HSI simulator Formed the foundation of the HFE Implementation Plans (IPs)
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1.3 Future Submittal & ITAAC (1/2)
Results summary reports will be submitted following the completion of each HFE activity;
- OER (The Basic HSIS OER completed)
- FRA/FA
- TA
- S&Q
- HD
- V&V
- DI
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1.3 Future Submittal & ITAAC (2/2)
ITAAC, DCD Tier 1 Section 2.9 Table 2.9-1 (UAP-HF-14042)
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analyses
- 1. The Control Room 1. An Integrated System 1. All pass/fail criteria design incorporates Validation (ISV) test will associated with each human factors be performed in test scenario are engineering principles accordance with the passed either on initial that minimize the Human Factors performance of the potential for operator Verification and scenarios or following error. Validation remediation of failures.
implementation Plan.
- 2. The as-built Control 2. An inspection of the 2. The as-built Control Room Human-System as-built Control Room Room Human-Interface is consistent Human-System System Interface with the final validated Interfaces will be conforms to the design specifications. performed. validated design with no configuration deviations.
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1.4 Summary of Document Structure US-Basic HSI Plant Specific Design Application Licensing Phase Design Phase Topical Technical Results Report Reports Implementation (Implementation Summary Plans) Reports Docket/ Docket/ Audit/ Docket/
Audit Audit Audit Audit Audit Inspection Audit/
Audit Inspection
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- 2. US-APWR HFE Program Management Plan
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The US-APWR HFE program implementation is in accordance with NUREG-0711, Revision 2, Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model, issued February 2004.
The HFE program assures that the HSI reflects modern human factors principles and satisfies the applicable regulatory requirements.
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The following HFE elements (as defined in NUREG-0711, Revision 2) are covered by the US-APWR HFE Program:
- OER
- FRA/FA
- TA
- S&Q
- HRA
- HD
- Operating Procedure Development*
- Training Program Development*
- V&V
- DI
- HPM**
- Procedure Development and Training program development will be reviewed in Chapter 13, Conduct of operation
- COL applicants will develop HPM program
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Japanese Operator Assessment (approximately 200) Development of US-Basic HSIS Development of US-APWR HSIS US Conversion Japanese (e.g., English Design Process -Basic translation, HSIS anthropometrics, etc.)
US-Basic US Operating HSIS Test Experience Facility US Operator Review Implementation Assessment and Assessment US-Basic HSIS of US-Basic of HSIS Design HSIS Changes Assessment HSIS HED Procedures Processing US-APWR US-APWR HFE Planning and Verification US-APWR HSI Design Plant Analysis &
Inventory Design Implementation Design (OER, FRA/FA, TA, S&Q, & HRA) Validation US-APWR Site Specific Inventory
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The scope of the HFE PMP includes:
- HFE design team and organization, roles and responsibilities
- HFE process and procedures
- HFE issues tracking (HED process)
- HFE technical program
- Combined license (COL) information For HFE activities completed within the scope of the US-APWR design, the program element methodology is described within an implementation plan (IP) and the element is documented in a results summary report (ReSR) as per the IP.
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Assumptions and Constraints Identification The US-APWR HSIS is based on application of the US-Basic HSIS, which establishes the generic monitoring, alarm, control, and computerized procedure technologies to be employed in the MCR for all plant systems.
The generic HSI technologies of the US-Basic HSIS are combined with the specific HSI inventory needed for the US-APWR plant design to create the US-APWR HSIS.
The development process for a US-APWR site-specific HSIS confirms or changes the HSI inventory to reflect a site-specific plant.
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Assumptions and Constraints Identification (Cont.)
A fundamental design assumption and constraint of the US-Basic HSIS that also applies to the US-APWR HSIS is that the plant can be operated with minimum operation staff, one RO and one SRO in the MCR during postulated plant operating modes.
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Applicable Plant Facilities MCR Remote shutdown room (RSR)
Technical support center (TSC)
Local control stations* (LCSs)
Emergency operations facilities* (EOFs)
- Portion of stations or facilities
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- 3. US-Basic HSI
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3.1 Documentation (1/2)
Documentation of US-Basic HSI features and functions Submitted as a topical report, MUAP-07007 The document structure:
Concept of Operation Control room layout Display overview and display navigation Operational VDU display Safety VDU Alarms
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3.1 Documentation (2/2)
Computer-based procedures Large Display Panel Automatic Checking of Actuations Diverse HSI Panel History of Development of Japanese PWR Main Control Room by Mitsubishi and Japanese PWR Power Utilities (Appendix A)
HFE V&V Experience in Japan (Appendix B)
US-Basic HSIS Evaluation Program (Appendix C)
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3.2 Background/Development Basis
Background
MHI used the foundational elements of the Japanese-Basic HSIS as a starting point to create the US-Basic HSIS, applying combinations of design review, redesign, and design validation through a phased implementation Appendix A contains information about the Japanese-Basic HSIS &
development history
- Developed Japanese-Basic HSIS with Japanese utilities from 1987 to 2003 with guidance from NUREG-0711 and NUREG-0700
- Japanese operators were involved in conducting V&V
- Introduced Japanese HSIS to Japanese latest plant design and MCR modernization
- No performance issues identified
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3.3 Structure of the HSIS The Japanese HSIS, as applied in the U.S., is comprised of;
- The Basic HSIS
- The HSI Inventory (i.e., controls, displays, alarms) which will be developed as a part of the plant-specific analysis phase of the HFE design program The HSI Inventory is developed as part of the US-APWR DC in accordance with the US-APWR HFE program
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3.4 Phased Implementation Phase 1 (Topical Report scope)
Translated the Japanese-Basic HSIS to the US-Basic HSIS Phase 2 Develop an application specific (e.g. US-APWR) inventory, which will be combined with the US-Basic HSIS to yield an application specific design Phase 3 Confirm the site-specific assumptions of Phase 2 and/or make minor site specific changes to finalize the application design
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3.5 Phase 1 the US-Basic HSIS implementation Phase 1 Translated the Japanese-Basic HSIS to the US-Basic HSIS Phase 1a
- Addressed language, engineering units, anthropometric changes to the consoles for American body types
- Adopted the US-style step-by-step operating procedures
- Made improvements identified from completing the OER program element from NUREG-0711 which included U.S.
nuclear plants and additional, generic, digital HSI technology experience Phase 1b
- Resolved deficiencies from Phase 1a, validated design changes, and updated Section 4 of the topical report (Revision 2) to reflect these changes
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3.6 The US-Basic HSIS test In Phase 1a and 1b, the tests were implemented using the
- US-Basic HSIS simulator
- Static portable HSIS analysis tool U.S. licensed operators participated in dynamic testing: 8 crews (22 persons in total (Phase 1a)) and 5 crews (10 persons (Phase 1b))
Went through seven scenarios that included normal and emergency events under normal as well as degraded HSI conditions Phase 1a results identified difference between Japan and U.S.
operation style and identified design improvements documented via HEDs An expert panel (HFE, I&C, plant operations, US-APWR systems engineers) was organized to resolve HEDs Phase 1b tested design changes
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3.7 The US-Basic HSIS OER OE Sources include;
- NUREG/CR-6400, HFE Insights For Advanced Reactors Based Upon Operating Experience,
- INPO database
- Japan Nuclear Technologies Institute (JANTI) Nuclear Information Archives (NUCIA) database
- Issues obtained from non-nuclear industries (similar HSIS technologies) in U.S. and Japan Findings were evaluated and included in the US-Basic HSIS
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Presentation to the ACRS Subcommittee Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
US-APWR Design Certification Application Review Project History and Recent and Future Actions George Wunder - Lead Project Manager September 19, 2019
Project History - US-APWR Design Certification Review Application submitted December 31, 2007 Application docketed February 29, 2008 Phase 3 meetings held on between summer 2011 and spring 2013 On November 5, 2013, applicant announced reduced support Applicant made clear their commitment to completing project Review has continued at reduced pace since 2013.
Recent and Future Actions In early 2018 applicant identified areas for progress Applicant revised advanced accumulator (MUAP-07001) topical report Applicant identified Chapters 5, 7, 8, 10, 18, for Phase 4 completion Advanced accumulator SER with CIs submitted June 2018 Advanced accumulator Cis closed June 2019 MUAP-07001, Chapters 8 and 18 submitted June-August 2019 Chapters 5, 7, and 10 under review for 2020 Subcommittee meeting
3.8 US-Basic HSI Design Features 3.8.1 Concept of Operation (1/6)
The concept of operation is addressed in Section 4.1 The US-Basic HSIS addresses the following subjects:
- Crew composition
- Roles and responsibilities
- Personnel interaction with plant automation
- Use of control room resources by crewmembers
- Methods used to ensure good coordination of crewmember activities, including non-licensed operators, technicians, and maintenance personnel
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3.8 US-Basic HSI Design Features 3.8.1 Concept of Operation (2/6)
Operating crew composition
- The normal MCR staffing consists of one RO and one SRO
- The normal MCR staff is supplemented by one additional SRO and one additional RO that will be at the plant to accommodate unexpected conditions
- While the HSIS is designed to support the minimum MCR staffing described above, the space and layout of the MCR are designed to accommodate the foreseen maximum number of operating and temporary staff The S&Q IP handles further staffing levels for the US-APWR
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3.8 US-Basic HSI Design Features 3.8.1 Concept of Operation (3/6)
MCR personnel allocation
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3.8 US-Basic HSI Design Features 3.8.1 Concept of Operation (4/6)
The computer-based HSIS provides operational visual display units (VDUs) as the fundamental interface. The operator monitors plant status and initiates actions from a VDU by touching or clicking on the appropriate sections of the screen The operators workload is significantly reduced by providing relevant process control information in integrated displays on the VDUs and utilizing a compact console that minimizes required operator movement The HSIS also provides operational support functions that utilize the computer to consolidate large amounts of data into meaningful displays Section 4.1 identifies further specific interfaces and responsibilities between the crew and the HSIS
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3.8 US-Basic HSI Design Features 3.8.1 Concept of Operation (5/6)
Control Room Crew coordination with the HSIS
- Control Room Crew coordination with the HSIS is described in each HSI design feature
- The Large Display Panel (LDP) provides Spatially Dedicated Continuously Visible (SDCV) information to the operation personnel to enhance situation awareness
- Helps operators maintain continuous awareness of overall plant status and critical status changes
- The secondary purpose is to help the operations staff coordination and communication by providing a common visualization of plant information
- The Operator Console provides all monitoring and control functions which are available in the MCR so that ROs can perform all operation tasks using the Operator Console from a seated position
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3.8 US-Basic HSI Design Features 3.8.1 Concept of Operation (6/6)
- The Supervisor Console, located behind the RO, provides the same display set as those on the Operator Console, without control functions
- The STA console provides the same display set as those on the Operator Console, without control functions as well
- Each console has paging phones and internal phones to communicate with local staff
- Maintenance console, which is a temporary console (disconnected from the digital data communication bus during normal plant operation) used to support an additional operator in the MCR for tests during plant shutdown conditions and periodic inspections
- Tagging feature on the O-VDU and physical tag for local component are also addressed to support maintenance activities between MCR crew and maintenance staff
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3.8 US-Basic HSI Design Features 3.8.2 The US-Basic HSIS Overview US-Basic HSIS simulator
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3.8 US-Basic HSI Design Features 3.8.3 Large Display Panel (1/4)
LDP provides plant overview information and alarms to enhance MCR staff awareness of the plant status (i.e., presents spatially-dedicated continuously visible (SDCV) critical safety and power production functions with supporting component status and parameters and is the apex of entire HSI information hierarchy)
LDP provides computer aided operators support information; i) OK monitors (computer checking relevant component status at Reactor Trip, ECCS, CV isolation, etc.,)
ii) Critical safety function status iii) Bypass or inoperable status indication (BISI) along with safety signals (e.g., Reactor Trip, ECCS, CV isolation)
Additional detailed information is displayed in the O-VDU screens
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Presentation to the ACRS Subcommittee Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
US-APWR Design Certification Application Review Safety Evaluation with No Open Items: Chapter 8 ELECTRIC POWER September 19, 2019
Technical Topics Section 8 - Electric Power Technical Topics
- US-APWR electric power system comprises of the following systems:
Offsite power system Onsite AC power system, including 4 Class 1E trains each with a Class 1E Gas Turbine Generator (GTG), and Alternate AC source Onsite DC Power System, including 4 trains of Class 1E 125Vdc
- Staffs review:
In the Phase 4 review the staff concluded that the DCD application, Chapter 8 met all applicable regulatory criteria.
In particular, the staff will discuss the closure of the following open items:
GTG Reliability September 19, 2019 Chapter 8, Electric Power 2
Technical Topics Section 8 - Electric Power Open Item #1: OPC
- Design criteria to address OPC includes:
- Detection
- Alarm
- Response to a open phase conditions OPC protection features per BTP 8-9
- COL Item 8.2(12) requires the COL applicant to identify the type of open phase detection and protection (OPDP) system.
September 19, 2019 Chapter 8, Electric Power 3
Technical Topics Section 8 - Electric Power Resolution of Open Item #1 COL Item 8.2(12) will ensure that the COL applicant will determine an OPDP system that meets the guidance in BTP 8-9 including detection, alarm in the main control room (MCR), and protection features in that the Class 1E medium voltage buses will transfer to a power source without an open phase condition.
DCD Tier 2, Section 8.2, includes a general description of the criteria for addressing OPC.
ITAACs were added to verify that:
- The OPDP system can detect an open phase condition.
- Class 1E medium voltage buses are automatically separated from the degraded offsite source, transferred to the alternate power source or onsite standby source.
TS were modified to incorporate surveillance requirements for OPC protection.
September 19, 2019 Chapter 8, Electric Power 4
Technical Topics Section 8 - Electric Power Open Item #2: GTG Reliability MHI proposed the use of GTG as the Class 1E emergency power source.
The challenges of this proposal included:
- First of a kind application in the nuclear fleet, therefore there was no operating experience
- No reliability data available In absence of operating experience and reliability data, the staff requested the applicant to perform type tests to ensure GTGs will perform their intended function and achieve their target reliability level.
September 19, 2019 Chapter 8, Electric Power 5
Technical Topics Section 8 - Electric Power Resolution of Open Item #2 The GTGs have been qualified for Class 1E application using methodology and assumptions in Technical Reports MUAP 07024-P, Qualification and Test Plan of Class 1E Gas Turbine Generator System.
The applicant documented the successful qualification of the Class 1E GTGs in Technical Reports MUAP-10023-P, Initial Type Test Result of the Class 1E Gas Turbine Generator.
The result presented in Technical Report MUAP-10023-P states that to satisfy the starting reliability of 0.975 with 95 percent confidence, 150 start tests should be performed with no failures.
- MHI performed 150 start and load acceptance tests of the GTGs.
- The staff finds that these tests prove that the GTGs satisfy the reliability criterion of 0.975 with 95 percent confidence.
In conclusion, the staff finds that the applicants approach to demonstrating Class 1E GTG reliability is adequate, considering compliance with GDC 17, conformance to RG 1.155, as well as successful qualification via type testing.
September 19, 2019 Chapter 8, Electric Power 6
Mitsubishi APWR Design Certification Review SER Chapter 18 Human Factors Engineering Program Presentation to the ACRS Subcommittee September 19, 2019
Chapter 18 Review Team Technical Staff
- Brian Green, Ph.D. NRR/DIRS/IRAB Project Manager
- George Wunder, NRO/DLSE/LB3
Overview
- The HFE design described in the Topical Report MUAP-07007 conforms to NUREG-0700.
- DCD Scope conforms to NUREG-0711, revision 2
- Implementation plans are complete
- Level of detail is sufficient to assess implementation effectiveness
- ITAAC are used to verify acceptable results
- Final design results are provided for the following HFE elements: HFE Program Management, Operating Experience, Human Reliability Analysis
Overview: Iteration is Key FINAL DESIGN ITERATION with
- Phase 3a/3b NUREG-0711
- Design, BASIC DESIGN verify/
- Phase 2a/2b PLATFORM validate, and PREDECESSOR
- Implementation
- Phase 1a/1b implement DESIGN Plans (IPs) used
- Topical Report site-specific
- Designed using to analyze, MUAP-07007 aspects process like design,
- Americanizing
- Operator NUREG-0711 verify/validate the training
- Development of predecessor HSI inventory design
Topical Report Comments
- At the time the Phase 4 SER was written, the US-Basic Human-System Interface (HSI)
System was the most detailed design description staff had reviewed.
- Audit and review of the HFE design descriptions verified the design conforms to NUREG-0700 (HSI design guidelines).
- Full scope simulator was used effectively in the design process.
Design Certification Comments
- Reviewed to ensure the Implementation Plans were included by reference and there were no inconsistencies with the Implementation Plans.
- Includes ITAAC to confirm adequate completion of Implementation Plans.
Implementation Plans HFE Area Level of Review HFE Program Management Complete Element Operating Experience Review Implementation Plan Functional Requirements Analysis and Function Allocation Implementation Plan Task Analysis Implementation Plan Staffing and Qualifications Implementation Plan Human Reliability Analysis Complete Element Human-System Interface Design Implementation Plan Procedure Development See Chapter 13 Training Program Development See Chapter 13 Human Factors Verification and Validation Implementation Plan Design Implementation Implementation Plan Human Performance Monitoring COL action Item
Status of Open/Confirmatory Items
- There no Open Items.
- There are no Confirmatory Items.
Conclusions
- The topical report describes an acceptable generic platform referred to as the US-Basic HSI.
- Implementation Plans provide confidence that iteration on the US-Basic HSI will be consistent with state-of-the-art human factors principles and US regulations.