ML19308B753
| ML19308B753 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1979 |
| From: | Barber J, Itkin I, Obrien B PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001160938 | |
| Download: ML19308B753 (85) | |
Text
__
- '.p " %,5.'I.
~
..%$[2.51.
.~
~... ^
~
,, k E'
-,w b '-
,y)_(fIe=
J.
xx
>;Y...e
~~~
~'
2;s{.
e 85.M'^ _
wL M-
?
/
- M
,. _.,, 7, O_%
[
- s. '
' 'u s
~ 1-um.
DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS l
l of the SELECT COMMITTEE ON E
THREE MILE ISLAND R
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CCMMONWEALTH OF ACN NSYLVANIA
{} () } ] h h P
c
by the DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS of the P00R ORGINAL SELECT COMMITTEE ON THREE MILE ISLAND l
BERNARD F. O'BRIEN 1 ST GISLATI E I
R IVAN ITKIN CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFETY AND TRAINING 23RD LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT 0
LE LATIVE DISTRICT L GIS DISTRICT EID BENNEIT SMEL RAPPAPORT 7TH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT 182ND LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT PARKCOHEN STEPKN R.
ED 202ND LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT 103RD LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT 9
G SLA I E DISTRICT 4
TIVE DISTRICT RCIRD R. COWELL TEDSTWAN 34TH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT 109TH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT TH G
E DISTRICT
$G VE DISTRICT R
e OCTOBER 1979
--t-w
---,--wi--,,-
2 REPORT BY THE DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS OF THE SELECT THREE MILE ISLAND COMMITTEE
- i HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ON HOUSE RESOLUTION #48 9
I r
O
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Summary of Findings / Recommendations...............................
1 IntroduCCion......................................................
7 9
I.
Background........................................................
A.
Nu cle a r Ge ne ra t io n............................................ 9 B. Three Mile Island Unit 1I......................................
9 C.
General Description of a Nuclear Reactor.....................
10 1.
Characte ris tics and Ope ration............................ 10 2.
The Light Water Reactor..................................
11 3.
Seve re Mel t do wn.......................................... 12 D.
Chronology of Events.........................................
12
)
II.
Eme rgency Response and Preparednass.............................. 16 A.
Background...................................................
16 B.
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and Bureau of Radiation Protection........................... 16 C.
G,ve rnor's Review of Eme rgency Management Laws............... 18 D.
Need for Credibility in the Gove rnor's Of fice................ 18 E.
Need to Follow the Chain-of-Command Sys tem................... 19 F.
Need f or One Reliable Public Spokesperson.................... 22 G.
Prompt Notification to Off-Site Authorities..................
22 H.
Authority of State, County and Local Governments............. 23 I.
Dedica ted Tele phone Line s.................................... 23 J.
Ag ric ult u ral P ro blems........................................ 23 K.
Othe r Deficiencies in Evacuation Plans....................... 24 L.
Bureau of Radiation Protection Appropriation.................
25 M.
Funding of State Emergency Preparedness Capabilities.........
25 III. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Radiological Emergency Re s p o ns e Pl a nni ng................................................ 2 5 IV.
Evacuation.......................................................
27 i
V.
Radiation / Health Imp,act of Three Mile Island Ac'cident............
30 A.
Ba ck g ro und................................................... 3 0 B.
Population Dose and Health Impact of the Three Mile Island Accident...................................
30 C.
Examination Taken by State...................................
32 D.
He al t h S t udi e s............................................... 3 3 E.
Po t a s s ium Io di de............................................. 3 8 VI.
I nS u ra n c e Co ve ra g e............................................... 3 8 A.
Price-Anderson Act...........................................
38 B.
Relocation Claims Paid as a Result of Three Mile Island......
40 i
O
i i
VII. Decontamination and Rehabilitation of Unit II.....................
41 A.
Background...................................................
41 B.
Fuel Handling / Auxiliary Building.............................
41 C.
Decontamination and Rehabilitation of the Containment Building.........................................
43 D.
Discharge of 4,000 Gallons of Waste Water....................
45 VIII. Waste Disposa1...................................................
46 l
IX.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Metropolitan Edison............
46 A.
Nuclear Regula to ry Commis sion................................
47 l
1.
0v e rv i ew.................................................
4 7 2.
Observations / Findings....................................
47 B.
Metropolitan Edison..........................................
49 1.
0v e rv i e w.................................................. 49 2.
Obse rva tions / Findings....................................
50 C.
Nuclear Industry.............................................
53 j
X.
News Media...........!...........................................
53 XI.
O t her Co ns i de ra ti ons.............................................
5 4 A.
State Inspectors.............................................
54 B.
Public Education.............................................
55 1.
Industry Role............................................
55 2.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Emergency Office...........
56 3.
Health Education Films and Programs.......................
56 4.
Educational Booklet.......................................
56 C.
Ce rtifica tion and Si ting.....................................
57 D.
Ha za rd Analy s i s..............................................
5 8 E.
State Licensing of Nuclear Operators.........................
58 F.
Plant Designs................................................
59 G.
Gross Receipts Tax Exclusion.................................
60 1
XII.
Extension of Committee...........................................
60 1
XIII.
Conclusion.......................................................
61
\\
ATTACHMENTS l
Attachment I
- Nuclear Plants in Pennsylvania
]
Attachment II - Summary from the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency's Logs Attachment III - Swanary of the Bureau of Radiation Protection's Activities
Summary of Findings / Recommendations I.
Conduct of Committee Brief appearances by the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor before the Committee resulted in a number of inconsistencies end conflicts in testimony; The Director of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency was not asked to reappear before the Committee as was requested by the Committee; The Committee lacked subpoena power; A request for adequate technical staffing was denied; The directives of House Resolution #48 were not fully pursued and significant issues pertaining to nuclear power were not examined; Key officials involved in the accident did not appear before the Committee.
II.
Emergency Response and Preparedness It is important for both the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and the Bureau of Radiation Protection to maintain constant and open communications with each other during a nuclear emergency.
Therefore, the Committee recommends that one person from the BRP be stationed in PEMA headquarters during a nuclear emergency.
Emergency Management has not enjoyed a presitigious position in the State.
There is a definite need to strengthen the emergency management apparatus throughout the Commonwealth.
The first order of business for any new Administration should be a thorough review and understanding of the State's emergency management laws and procedures.
It is important for the Governor's Office to maintain its credibility during a crisis and to convey to the public that it is in complete control of the situation.
The Administration failed to utilize the existing chain-of-command system to channel information to county and local emergency management officials. These officials were forced to rely on the media for information which at times was conflicting and incomplete. A timely flow of reliable information is the key to a successful response to any emergency.
Therefore, in the event of l
another emergency, the chain-of-command system must be used to transmit l
information to the local communities.
~
_1_
[
i During the early stages of the accident, conflicting and erroneous information on TMI emanated from various sources. This situation damaged the credibility of anyone in authority issuing statements on the accident. The Committee, therefore, recommends that, in the event of another nuclear emergency, one person be designated as the official public spokesperson for all parties involved in the accident.
f Prompt notification of an accident is essential to state, county and local emergency management personnel.
The Committee, therefare, requests the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and the Bureau of Radiation Protection to review the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's recently proposed notification system to insure that it will bring about prompt notification to all related off-site parties in the event of an emergency.
Act 323 should be reviewed to insure that during an emergency the role and authority of state, county and local officials are clearly defined.
To insure communications between the State and the nuclear reactor site, each Pennsylvania utility operating a nuclear reactor should be required to install a dedicated telephone line between the reactor and the State.
Evacuation plans should clearly define what a farmer should do with his livestock during an emergency.
A number of deficiencies were found in our state emergency plans.
l The Committee, therefore, recommends that Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency assess the State's overall emergency management capabilities and report its findings with its recommendations to the House Military Affairs Committee.
Three Mile Island underscored the need for the State to have adequate radiation monitoring capabilities. The General Assembly appropriated
$300,000 to allow the State to improve its radiation surveillance program.
However, almost four months elapsed before the Administration approved the use of this money.
In order to fund the needed improvements in the State's emergency management plans and in order to provide for the maintenance of these l
plans, the Committee recommends that legislation be enacted which l
would require the owners of a nuclear reactor to be assessed a one-time fee of $350,000 per nuclear reactor in the State and an annual fee of $75,000 for each reactor.
e -
III. Nuclear Regulatory Commission The NRC's performance both prior to and during the accident was poor.
The Commission needs to become a more aggressive and effective It must use proper and effective monitoring be techniques to carry out its watchdog role and its personnel must regulatory agency.
dedicated to insuring that nuclear reactors operate safely.
IV.
Metropolitan Edison Metropolitan Edison's performance during the accident was also poor.
During the initial days of the accident it either deliberately downplayed the accident or failed to understand the seve mishap.
able to manage and operate a nuclear facility.
V.
Nuclear Industry The nuclear industry in general must not rely exclusively on the NRC '
Nuclear safety is the f
to assure that nuclear safety is adequate.
responsibility of the entire nuclear industry.
VI.
Congressional Legislation In order to insure that all states have in place an effective emergency evacuation plan, the Committee recommends the adoption of S562 This bill links the use of nuclear power facilities by Congress.
with a federally approved emergency evacuation plan.
VII.
Decision Not To Evacuate In view of the information that was available and the uncertainty of the situation on Friday, March 30, the Governor's decision not ble.
to call for a precautionary evacuation at that time is questiona In the final analysis, chance, more than anything else, may have been the determining factor in enabling us to avert a potentially catastrophic occurrence.
VIII. Health Effects A federal interagency team assessing the health impact of the TMI accident has concluded that the offsite collective dose associated with radioactive material released during the period March 28 to April 7 represented minimal risks of additional health effects to the offsite population.
i The various samples of food and milk supplies taken by radiation.
Potassium iodide is used to block thyroid uptake of radioiodine Radioiodine can cause released by a postulated nuclear accident.
The Committee thyroid nodules and thyroid cancer.
_3
recommends that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare promptly develop a federal policy on the administration of potassium iodide to the public and should also develop formal guidance to state and local governments on how these pills should be stockpiled and administered.
IX.
Nuclear Liability Insurance The Committee recommends that the House Insurance Committee carefully study the nuclear liability issue to determine what approach, if any, the State should take in this area.
X.
Waste Disposal At the present time, Met-Ed has no place to ship its low-level radioactive waste. This situation plus the lack of any federal plans to dispose of high-level waste underscores the biggest problem confronting the nuclear industry today:
the lack of a firm approach j
to the radioactive waste problem.
The Committee, therefore, recommends enacting legislation which would allow the Department of Environmental Resources to impose a moratorium on new nuclear plant construction until a workable radioactive waste disposal program has been adopted by the federal government.
XI.
News Media The news media has an important responsibility to perform during any emergency.
The TMI accident accentuated the need for the media to rely more on the expertise of informed consultants during such accidents and less on the emotional response of lay persons, including media representatives themselves.
XII. Other Considerations A.
State Nuclear Inspector The Committee recommends the enactment of legislation which would j
create a state nuclear inspector for each nuclear reactor site in i
This inspector would be directed to follow the construction and licensing proceedings of the facility for the State; to make unannounced inspections of the facility, and to insure that a utility is not operating its nuclear facility in violation of its license.
B.
Public Education l
The nuclear industry, in terms that are understandable, must inform the public on all matters relating to nuclear power.
Education courses on nuclear plant hazards should be offered in the i
school districts.
In addition, health education films and programs I
should be developed for various age groups within the population.
4 Citizens living near nuclear reactors should'have information readily available that will instruct them on what to do in the event of a nuclear radiation emergency.
The Committee recommends that such information be published on the inside cover of a telephone directory.
C.
Certification and Siting Our hearings brought out the need for State Certification and Siting Legislation. The Conmittee, therefore, recommends the enactment of House Bill #42. This bill, which is currently before the House Mines and Energy Management Committee, would:
provide for open advance planning and for early site review of an electric generating facility; authorize the Public Utility Commission to determine whether or not the facility is needed; and authorize the Department of Environa' ental Resources to make an early review of the site for the proposed facility to determine whether or not the site is environmentally acceptable.
D.
Hazard Analysis We urge the NRC to act promptly on Colonel Henderson's request for a hazard analysis on every nuclear plant operating in the Commonwealth.
E.
State Licensing of Nuclear Operators Due to the lack of a sound reactor operator licensing program on the federal level, the State should consider the possibility of initiacing a State licensing program for reactor operators.
F.
Plant Designs Almost every nuclear plant operating in the country is different.
l Varying plant designs and differing operating procedures complicate staff review of these plants.
In light of this situation, the Committee urges the NRC to adopt standardized plans and specifications for the design and construction of nuclear power facilities.
G.
Gross Receipts Tax Because of the accident, the State is collecting added tax money, via the Gross Receipts Tax (GRT), from the customers of Met-Ed and l
Penelec.
The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Commonwealth exempt the customers of Met-Ed and Penelec from paying the GRT on any purchased power costs incurred by these utilities which exceed the power costs that would have been incurred if that power had been generated at the TMI facility.
XIII. Extension of Committee Due to a number of reasons, including the limited scope of our inquiry and the existence of uncontainable fission products on the Island, the Committee recommends that its life be extended until November 30, 1980.
e a
O 6
f i
~
l 1
Introduction l
On Wednesday, March 28, 1979, a major accident occurred at the Three Mile Island l
Unit II nuclear reactor, which is operated by Metropolitan Edison (Met-Ed).
L This accident has been identified as the worst accident in the history of l
commercial nuclear reactors in the United States. On April 24, 1979, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives adopted House Rtaolution #48 which created a select committee to examine matters related to that nuclear accident.
Specifically, this committee was charged with the following responsibilities:
"... conduct a comprehensive inquiry into the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island facility and into other r;1ated matters in order to review the need for additional safety and regulatory procedures, to study the effectiveness of existing civil defense, emergency preparedness and evacuation procedures; to determine methods for improving coordination between Federal, State and local units of government in the event of nuclear accidents; to review the potential for health and safety hazards; I
to examine the roll of nuclear power in meeting the energy needs of the Commonwealth..."
Pursuant to this resolution, the Committee met on 21 occasions receiving input primarily from state and local officials on the emergency response capabilities of the State during this.tcrident.
The Committee also received testimony from GPU/ Met-Ed officials, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) officials, representatives of the insurance industry, representatives of the news media, and individuals residing near the damaged nuclear reactor.
Before we proceed with the findings of our investigation, the Committee feels it important to document a number of problems that surfaced during the course of our examination which impeded our ability to carry out the directives of House Resolution #48. These problems, as listed below, pertain to the manner in which the Committee conducted its investigation:
Both the Governor of Pennsylvania and the Lieutenant Governor appeared briefly before this Committee on May 10, 1979. Their appearance was so short that many of the Committee members did not have an opportunity to question them. As a result, a number of inconsistencies or conflicts in testimony has surfaced which the Committee was not able to resolve.
These conflicts are more fully documented in the ensuing pages.
Colonel Oran Henderson, Director of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA), also appeared before the Committee on Thursday, May 10, 1979, and gave testimony which directly conflicted with the Governor's testimony on the subject of evacuation.
Colonel Henderson was scheduled to appear before the Committee on the following day, May 11.
However, in the interest of digesting the information that it was receiving on this subject, the Committee voted in favor of excusing Colonel Henderson from testifying on the lith and moved that he be called back at a later date.
Colonel Henderson was never asked to reappear before the Committee and, consequently, this conflict in testimony still exists.
l l
l
_7_
House Resolution #48 did not grant this investigatory committee subpoena power.
The Democratic members of this Committee were continually frustrated in their attempts to have the House of Representatives grant the Select Committee this basic power.
On May 29, 1973, the House, by a partisan vote, denied to suspend its rules to permit the consideration of a resolution which, if adopted, would have granted the Committee subpoena power.
In addition, House Resolution #95 was introduced by Representative Bernard O' Brian and other members of the Committee which provided subpoena power for the Three Mile Island (TMI) Committee.
This bill was referred to the Rules Committee on June 11, 1979.
As of this writing, no action has been taken on House Resolution #95.
On Wednesday, May 23, 1979, the TMI Committee approved the creation of two subcommittees:
Subcommittee on Reactor Safety and Training, and Subcommittee on Hazardous Waste and Waste Disposal.
q Representative Ivan Itkin was appointed Chairman of the Subcommittee on Reactor Safety and Training.
This Subcommittee was directed to:
"... inquire into the current program for reactor safety, the need for different or additional safety features, the design, construction and operation of the TMI plant, the current program
)
of operator and employee training and the need for additional training or more rigid standards for personnel certification.
The Subcommittee will also inquire into the present i
licensing requirements for nuclear facilities, including public hearings on same and the State's input into such hearings as well as the State's input into matters regarding safety and training."
For the Subcommittee to pursue this mandate, Representative Itkin requested a staff of knowledgeable technical personnel to conduct the inquiries, to draw up this phase of the, report, and to advise the Subcommittee and the full Committee members as to recommendations that they should adopt.
(It should be noted that no staffing was provided to Representative Itkin.) Representative Itkin's request was denied.
Consequently, with this lack of technical expertise, the Connittee was unable to pursue the technical and complex issues relative to the Unit II malfunctions and its future safety and the training of onsite personnel.
i One of the directives of H.R. #48 was to examine the role of nuclear l
power in meeting the energy usede of the Commonwealth.
This responsibility cannot be effected by the Committee.
Although che Committee held numercus hearings, we did not receive direct i
I testimony from qualified individuals on this subject.
One person who may have been able to shed some light on this issue, Robert Shinn, Executive Director of the Governor's Energy Council, was scheduled to appear before the Committee.
However, for some reason that has not been explained to the Committee members, his appearance was cancelled.
A number of state and federal officials who were directly involved in responding to the TMI accident did not appear before the Committee.
These officials included: Joseph Hendrie, Chairman of the NRC; Joseph Califano, former Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare; Jay C. Waldman, Executive Assistant to the Governor; and Paul Critchlow, the Governor's Press Secretary.
The failure of these officials to appear before the Committee further stifled our inquiry.
There were a number of issues rtlating to nuclear power that the Committee did not examine. One of these issues was the decommissioning of nuclear power plants.
Decommissioning involves the proper retiring of a nuclear power plant at the end of its useful life or licensing period while preventing any health and safety problems stemming from radiation and contamination. Among the questions associated with decommissioning are:
Procedures available to effect decommissioning; The overall cost of decommissioning; and The proper method of funding the decommissioning expenses.
The accident at TMI underscored the problems associated with cleaning up the remains of nuclear activities. Although the question of whether TMI 2 will ever be restarted has not been answered at this time, this reactor, as well as every other reactor across the State and country, will inevitably face the prospect of being decommissioned.
i Since Pennsylvania has 11 nuclear reactors either operating or under construction, the decommissioning issue is extremely important and critical to us.
We, therefore, believe that the decommissioning issue should have been studied by the Committee.
l l
I.
Background
A.
Nuclear Generation There are 70 nuclear power reactors licensed by the NRC currently operating in the United States. There are 11 nuclear power plants either operating or under construction in Pennsylvania.
(Refer to Attachment 1)
In 1978, nuclear power generated about 14% of Pennsylvania's electrical capacity and supplied about 13%
of U.S. electrical energy.
B.
Three Mile Island Unit II Three L le Island is located in the Susquehanna River, Londonderry Township, Dauphin County, about ten miles south of Harrisburg.,
l It took over eight years and over $700 million to construct TMI Unit II.
It went into commercial operation on December 30, 1978.
Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) was the nuclear steam supply system designer and Burns and Roe designed the reactor. The reactor has a capacity of about 900 megawatts and was operating at nearly full capacity--97%--when the accident occurred.
The nuclear reactor is owned jointly by Met-Ed, 50%; Pennsylvania Electric (Penelee), 25%; and Jersey Central Power and Light Company, 25%; all wholly owned subsidiaries of General Public Utilities (GPU).
It is operated on behalf of the GPU System companies by Met-Ed.
According to a Fact Sheet put out by this company, Met-Ed:
" serves about 352,000 customers in all or parts of 14 eastern and south central Pennsylvania counties.
Customers live in a 3,274 square-mile area extending from near the New York line in Eastern Pennsylvania north of the famous Pocono Mountains and Lehigh Valley, through the heart of the Pennsylvania Dutchland in Berks and Lebanon Counties and the historic York and Adams Counties to a few miles west of Gettysburg along the Mason-Dixon Line.
This well-balanced mixture of industrial, urban, suburban and rural territory includes the cities of Easton, Lebanon, Reading, and York,159 townships and 97 boroughs."
C.
General Description of a Nuclear Reactor 1.
Characteristics and Operation A large, thick steel vessel holds the essential feature of a nuclear reactor, the core.
The core, which is situated in the center of the reactor, contains uranium, the reactor fuel.
Metal rods (about 1/2 inch in diameter and about 12 feet long) holding the uranium ceramic pellets are formed into fuel bundles of between 50 and 200 rods each. The rods are clad in tough stainless steel or zircoloy (a zirconium alloy) tubes. The Three Mile Island Unit #2 reactor has 177 fuel bundles, each containing 208 rods, each of which contains 200 uranium pellets.
The heat produced in a nuclear power plant results principally from fission, a physical reaction. When a fissionable atom (such as uranium -235) splits into two approximately equal parts (lightweight, unstable atoms), it releases a large amount of energy and generally one or more neutrons.
These neutrons trigger the splitting of adjacent uranium -235 atoms (i.e. when the nuclei of the fissionable uranium absorb the released neutrons), releasing more ener5y and more neutrons.
This continuous process is called a " chain reaction." The unstable atoms which are j
formed during the fission become stable by emitting radiation (either gamma rays or small particles, usually electrons) over a period of time, ranging from seconds to i
hundreds of years, depending on the type of atom.
Also present in the reactor core is the " moderator" which serves to reduce the energy of (or slow down) the neutrons released by fission so that they can be kept in the reactor as long as possible, causing another fission and increased energy release.
By absorbing the free-moving neutrons, control rod assemblies slow the fission process when they are inserted into the core.
a w:-
_a During a chain reaction, the uranium pellets heat up and the heat flows outward to the cladding.
It bacomes so hot that the pellets and cladding "would melt rapidly--without the presence of the cooling fluid (the coolant' in the TMI reactor is water) which circulates through the reactor core.
This fluid is used to produce steam which drives a turbine which in turn drives the generator that produces electricity.
Several engineered safety features are included in the basic design of a nuclear reactor. The cladding which surrounds the uranium-containing metal rods is instrumental in protecting against the release of fission products.
It also serves to prevent contamination of the cooling fluid.
The most immediate reactor safeguard is the massive reactor or pressure vessel housing the nuclear core. Weighing several hundred cons with walls six to twelve inches thick, this pressure vessel's chances of bursting are extremely slim.
The reactor vessel is itself located inside of the containment building.
This thick, air-tight shell of metal and reinforced concrete could vent and release major amounts of radioactivity only if very high pressure were built up within.it.
\\
In the event that one of the lines to or from the reactor's pressure vessel should break and release water (the most commonly used coolant in today's reactors) from the primary coolant loop (through which the water is circulated in the reactor vessel to prevent the uranium pellets from melting), the Emergency Core Coolant System (ECCS) is designed to keep the vessel flooded with water.
Some systems maintain resevoirs under high gas pressure.
The resevoirs are prevented from i
expelling their water into the pressure vessel by check valves and the higher pressure of the primary coolant loop.
Should the pressure in this loop drop sharply, the valves would open and t.he stored water would rush into the reactor vessel. Other emergency cooling systems are worked by pumps to force water from a nearby tank into the reactor.
This practice of putting equal systems or components in place to back up one another, called " redundancy," is used extensively in reactor design.
In the event of one failure, the reactor can be safely shut down.
It is the presence of a
" common-mode" failure, where a single factor or event causes the failure of more than one redundant system or subsystem, which renders an accident or transient possible.
2.
The Light Water Reactor (LWR)
The Light Water Reactor has been called "the work horse of today's nuclear electric power generation." Ordinary (or light) water acts as the coolant in both types of LWR's, the boiling water reactor (BWR) and the pressurized water l
reactor (PWR).
In the BWR, the water picks up the l
heat and boils directly to become steam.
Water in the PWR is kept under great pressure (about 2200 pounds per square inch) and in this way is kept from boiling.
This "superheated" water is run through a series of tubes which are immersed in a second, separate water system (secondary loop).
The water in the secondary loop boils to become steam (which drives the turbogenerator to produce electricity).
I
' - ~ ^
l l
l 3.
Severe Meltdown l
To prevent a minor breakdown or transient (such as a pipe leak or broken pump) from becoming a serious accident, a primary concern is to stop the chain reaction in the core by rapidly inserting neutron-absorbing control rods between the fuel elements (this is termed a " scram"). After a " scram" occurs, the new, unstable atoms created by the chain reaction will continue to decay j
and heat the fuel elements. Although this " decay" heat is only a fraction of the total heat, it is capable of boiling the water in the cooling system.
It is necessary to maintain the water level within the reactor vessel in order to keep the heat well below 5,000* F.--the melting point of the fuel.
l Should the cooling systems fail or a heat imbalance occur, the fuel elements could melt together and form a molten mass which would eat its way through the reactor vessel and the concrete floor to the ground below the plant.
In this way the radioactive elements could contaminate groundwater supplies and make their way to the surface. Recognized as the most serious pussible nuclear accident, such an event is known as a severe meltdown or more commonly referred to as the " China Syndrome."
D.
Chronology of Events The following chronology of events is based on information taken from several sources, including Preliminary Notifications and* Bulletins issued by the NRC; the NRC's Investigation Report (NUREG 0600) conducted by its Office of Inspection and Enforcement; press briefings conducted by the NRC and the Governor of Pennsylvania; NRC meetings; news articles and other published reports.
This account is solely intended to provide the reader with background information on the events that happened at TMI in terms understandable to the layman. '
i It is not to be interpreted as a conclusive report on the human, design, and mechanical failures of the Unit II nuclear reactor or the attempts by plant officials to bring the reactor to a cold shut down status.
It should be noted that all times cited in this chronology are approximate.
Chronology About 4:00 a.m. on Wednesday morning, March 28, 1979, a malfunction in the feedwater system of the Unit II nuclear power reactor at TMI occurred during operation at 97% power.
Two pumps--a condensate and feedwater pump--failed due to a malfunctioning valve.
The loss of these pumps caused a loss of feedwater flow to the steam generator and consequently caused the turbine to trip or shut down.
Normally after such an incident the reactor would scram l
(control rods would be inserted into the core), the auxiliary feedwater l
system would come on and the transient would have terminated.
l About three to six seconds into the accident, an electromagnetic relief valve on a pressurizer tank opened to relieve reactor coolant system pressure by blowing off steam inside the reactor containment building.
The NRC believed that the pressure at this time was about 2235 psi (pounds per square inch).
g
~
+
About nine to twelve seconds into the accident, the reactor itself 4
automatically tripped thereby stopping the nucinar fission process.
The reactor is tripped or " scrammed" by rapidly inserting neutron-absorbing control rods into the core between the fuel elements, thereby stopping the i
chain reaction.
About twelve to fifteen seconds into the accident, the reactor coolant system pressure was dropping, as it should have been, and was down to about 2200 psi.
It was at this point that the electromagnetic relief valve should have closed.
However, unknown to the plant operators, it remained open thereby allowing continued coolant discharge from the reactor coolant system and causing a further decrease in reactor coolant system pressure.
The failure of this valve to close would prove to j
be a critical factor in the accident sequence.
Approximately 30 seconds into the accident, all three auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically started to provide cooling water to the steam generator to supplement the shut down feedwater system.
However, these pumps were unable to supply water because the discharge valves had been manually closed prior to the accident, which was a violation of the utility's operating license.
Over the next few minutes, the steam generator, due to lack of feedwater, began to dry out.
Also, the pressurizer level indicator began to rise rapidly and temperature in the reactor continued to increase.
Two minutes inf o the accident, with the pressure falling to about 1600 psi, the Emergency Core Coolant System (ECCS) activated autcoatically and began to supply water to the core. The ECCS is designed to keep the reactor vessel flooded with water in the event that other feedwater systems fail and represents the system's last line of defense against overheating.
Approximately four to eleven minutes into the accident, the pressurizer level indicator gave erroneous pressure readings. The pressure level went off scale (high) i indicating that the reactor vessel was still filling with water. However, in truth, water levels inside the reactor vessel were dropping. During this period of time, an operator in the control room, perhaps as a result of observing the pressurizer level indicator and thus under the illusion that the pressure in the system was adequate, turned off the two pumps that drive the ECCS.
One high-pressure injection j
pump was manually tripped off line at about four minutes and 30 seconds into the accident while the second pump was tripped about six minutes later.
About seven and one-half minutes into the accident, the reactor building's sump pumps came on automatically and transferred the water on the floor of.the containment building to tanks in the auxiliary building.
Failure to suspend this operation also protad to be a mistake.
Contaminated steam from the water would later escape through a venting system.
Eight minutes into the acciaent, the valves to the auxiliary cooling system, which had been closed, were finally turned on initiating the auxiliary feedwater flow.
Around eleven to twelve minutes into the accident, the ECCS, which had been previously turned off, was manually restarted by an operator in the control room.
Also, the pressurizer level indicator came back on scale.
(.
n_
For the next 50 minutes, the system parameters began to stabilize with the reactor pressure about 1015 psi and the temperature at 550*F.
However, this stability was disturbed when an operator turned off four reactor 6
coolant pumps--two at I hour and 15 minutes and two more at 1. hour and 40 minutes into the accident. This further contributed to the fuel damage and also to the appearance of a hydrogen bubble in the reactor.
Bet 9een 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 45 minutes to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, the core began a " heat up transient."
The temperature at the top of the reactor began to rise to about 620*F and climbed off scale within 14 minutes. This should have indicated a situation where there was boiling due to either no flow or very little flow to the core.
Consequently, the reactor core became exposed and the zirconium cladding which coats the fuel rods began to disintegrate. The fuel rods began to rupture releasing fission products to the primary circuit and then to the containment.
The electromagnetic relief valve on the pressurizer, which had been stuck open for over two hours, was finally closed by the operator.
Shortly after 7:00 a.m., the radiation monitor readings in the reactor building, the auxiliary building, and the fuel handling building started increasing rapidly.
A site emergency was declared and company officials notified the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (Civil Defense). Around 7:30 a.m., a general emergency was declared by plant officials based on high radiation lavels in the reactor building.
However, all radiation monitors and radiation surveys off the site continued to indicate less than 1 mr/hr until after 9:00 a.s.
From 9:15 to 10:15 a.m., radioactivity levels of 3 to 9 mr/hr were measurea on the site, outside of the buildings.
At 7:45 a.m., the NRC's Region I, located at King of Prussia, was notified of the incident. At 8:45 a.m., a response team was sent to the site and arrived at 10:05. By 10:45, radiation lecals of 3 mr/hr had been detected 500 yards offsite.
The source of radiation was initially thought to be failed fuel. However, further evaluation led to the conclusion that the dominant releases were noble gases, particularly xenon -133, from the auxiliary building.
(Continued pumping from the containment sump had caused the radioactive waste treatment system to overflow onto the floor of the auxiliary building.)
Between 11:00 a.m. and 1:30 p.m., plant officials vented radioactive steam from the plant.
Around ten hours into the accident, a pressure spike occurred in the containment. This would indicate major fuel damage and release of hydrogen within the containment building. The pressure in the containment building automatically initiated the containment sprays.
Consequently, about 500 gallons of sodium hydroxide solution was injected before it was stopped after about two minutes of operation.
d -
Around 5:3L p.m., the electromagnetic relief valves were closed (they had been open again by the operator in an attempt to depressurize the reactor coolant system) i in an attempt to repressurize the system. This was initiated in an attempt to get the circulating pump on and to remove the heat through the steam generator, which is the normal heat flow path. This was accomplished after about 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />.
The plant essentially remained in that condition for the next several days.
During the morning of Friday, March 30, intermittent releases of radioactive gas occurred during efforts to pump the radioactive coolant water back into the containment from the auxiliary building. A plane carrying detection equipment measured radiation levels of between 300 and 1,200 millirens per hour.
Around 9:15 a.m., a recommendation was made by the NRC to State Civil Defense authorities to evacuate a ten-mile radius of the plant.
This recommendation was later rescinded by the Connaission.
At 12:30 p.m., Governor Thornburgh called a news conference and stated that:
"Bastd on advice cf the Chairman of the NRC and in the interests of taking every precaution, I em advising those who may be particularly susceptible to the effects of radiation, that is, pregnant women and pre-school age children, to leave the area within a five-mile radius of the Three Mile Island facility until further notice.
We have also ordered the closing of any schools within this area.
I repeat that this and other contingency measures are based on my belief that an excess of caution is best.
Current readings are no higher than they were yesterday.
)
However, the continued presence of radioactivity in the area and the possibility of further emissions lead me to exercise the utmost of caution."
The Governor did not lift the evacuation advisory until ten days later on April 9, 1979.
The Governor also stated that he had spoken with President Carter and the President had dispatched his personal representative, Mr. Harold Denton, Chief Operations Officer of the NRC, to supervise the operation.
At 10:00 p.m., the Governor held another news confeyence accompanied by Harold Denton.
At that time, Mr. Denton raised the probiens that the officials at the plant were having with a hydrogen bubble which existed in the top of the reactor vessel.
The bubble was hindering efforts to depressurize the system.
It posed a danger of either replacing water and exposing more of the core or of exploding.
(The possibility of a hydrogen explosion was later discounted by the NRC).
The bubble's size was calculated as 800 cubic feet (at 875 poi) at 2:40 p.m. on March 31 and recalculated as 6V1 cubic feet at 4:20 p.m.
However, over the next few days the bubble began to dissipate and l
by April 3, Mr. Denton no longer considered it a danger.
The bubble apparently was eliminated by dissolving in the coolant.
During the following weeks, NRC personnel and plant officials labored to bring the reactor to a cold shut down.. The officials used a natural circulation cooling method, a long-term cooling mode, to achieve shut down.
This method involved degasifying the system, closing the pump that brings cooling water through the vessel housing the core then allowing the reactor to cool by the natural circulation of water.
. i 4
i The switch to this natural circulation process was to have been initiated on Wednesday, May 2, 1979.
However, instrument failure (a pressurizer level instrument) prompted the NRC to make the switch on Friday, April 27, 1979, six days ahead of schedule. Victor Stallo, Mr. Denton's successor as Chief of NRC Operations at the site, said in a press briefing that the possibility of instrument failure had l
been anticipated and planned for.
He stated that there was no sense of emergency or urgency. The changeover resulted in a slight release of radioactive xenen gas to the atmosphere. However, NRC officials stated that radiation monitors showed
~
that levels were low, just slightly above the normal backgr)und levels for the area.
II.
Emergency Response and Preparedness A.
Background
The major focus of the Committee's investigation was on emergency response and preparedness. Federal, state and local officials appeared before the Committee on this subject. While the accident that we examined involved only one region of the Commonwealth, it is important to note that the situation as it relates to evacuation and emergency response procedures generally appears no better in any part of the Commonwealth.
One key factor that surfaced time and again as various witnesses testified was the serious gap in communications. We should not allow the operation of installations such as TMI without having all the links of the chain of command in place and properly used. More will be said of this in the following paragraphs.
In a number of cases there was also a conflict in statements regarding the seriousness of the accident and whether residents of the area should be evacuated.
This led the people and many state and local officials to lose faith and trust in their sources of information.
This situation crear.ed serious doubts as to the credibility of anyone in authority issuing statraents on TMI.
The lives of many residents adjacent to such a generating facility could conceivably depend on the credibility of these spokesmen.
Based on the information that we received and af ter a careful review of the proceedings, the following pages reflect the Committee's findings and recommendations relative to the issue of emergency response and preparedness.
B.
Pennsylvania Emergency lianagement Agency (PEMA) and the Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP)
In the event of a radiological emergency at a nuclear power plant, the protection of public health and safety outside the plant boundary is the responsibility of state and local governments. The two most important state agencies involved in a nuclear emergency are PEMA and BRP.
(The response by these two agencies to the TMI accident is detailed in Attachments II and III respectively.)
9 1
=.... '
The responsibility of a utility during an accident mainly includes assessing the accident; notifying state and NRC off'.cials; ettempting to mitigate or control she seriousness of the accident; reading their radiation monitoring units; dispatching radiation monitoring teams to both on aed off-site areas; and keeping i
the BRP informed of the situation.
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency PEMA is the lead agency responsible for state emergency response planning at fixed nuclear sites. Act 323 of 1978 created PEMA "to assure prompt, proper and i
effective discharge of basic Commonwealth responsibilities relating to civil defense and disaster preparedness, operations and recovery." As cited in Act 323, one of PEMA's duties is:
"To 'tepare, maintain and keep current a Pennsylvania Emergency Management Plas for the prevention and minimization of injury and damage enused by disaster, prompt and effective response to disaster and disaster emergency relief and recovery."
PEMA is also directed to respond to disasters relating to atomic energy operations or radioactive objects or materials.
Bureau of Radiation Protection The Bureau of Radiation Protection is located within the Department of l
Environmental Resources (DER).
Its role during a nuclear accident was summarized l
by Thomas Gerusky, the Director of this Bureau, when he appeared before the Committee on June 7, 1979:
"In the emergency plan that was drawn up, our agency provides the PEMA with technical advice, and is the go-between, between the technical staff at the reactor facility, and PEMA.
We do our jobs, our normal jobs that are routinely carried out by our people.
We evaluate radiation levels, make recommendations based upon preset guidelines which civil defense and PEMA have copies.
And PEMA in the plan is to do their job and that is to notify the public, notify the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, notify the state council of civil defense, or wherever they call now, I think- "
Recommendations PEMA does not have the expertise to grasp the technical developments at a nuclear plant site.
For this information, it relies upon BRP. For this reason, communications should be open and constant between these two agencies during a i,
nuclear emergency.
It is our understanding that, in the event of a nuclear emergency, BRP is directed to use the PEMA command center as its headquarters.
This directive was not followed during the TMI accident. We believe that at least one official from BRP should be at PEMA headquarters at all times during a nuclear emergency.
If this was adhered to during the TMI episode, the telephone evacuation recommendation by Harold Collins (See Section IV) could have been immediately handled and the subsequent confusion avoided.
Colonel Henderson cites as his reasons for recommending an evacuation to the
- Governor,
"...in view of no other information except the information from TMI and the BRP had not yet contacted me, that I had no coice at that particular moment but to recommend an evacuation.,
Emergency Management, formerly Civil Defense, has not enjoyed a prestigious position in both the State and political subdivision levels.
We believe there exists an urgent need to strengthen the emergency management apparatus throughout the Commonwealth. Too frequently emergency management coordinators at the county level have little or no staff or organizational depth.
Below the county level the appointed coordinator is purely a volunteer.
Act 323 designates the Director of PEMA as the principal assistant to the Chairman of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Council.
We recommend that he also be designated the principal advisor to the Governor on all civil defense and emergency disaster matters.
C.
Governor's Review of Emergency Management Laws and Procedures Appearing before the Committee on May 10, 1979, Governor Thornburgh stated that, "The moment I learned of the accident, I ordered an acceleration of an appraisal we had begun on the emergency preparedness system developed by the previous Administration in Pennsylvania."
We believe that such an appraisal should have been completed before the accident.
It is important for a new Governor to not only know what steps to take in an emergency but also to have confidence in taking those steps.
One should not wait for an emergency to occur to complete a review of the emergency preparedness system. The Committee, therefore, finds that, upon taking office, the first order of priority for any new Administration should be a review of our emergency management laws and procedures.
D.
Need for Public Credibility in the Governor's Office The Governor also stated before the Committee that:
"We regarded the public credibility in the Governor's Office as essential to our efforts to avoid a panic, as well as our efforts to implement, if necessary, an orderly evacuation."
We agree with this statement. However, the first two news conferences that the Lieutenant Governor held on March 28 did not, by any stretch of the imagination, have a caluing effect upon the masses.
It was obvious at that time that the Lieutenant Governor did not have a total picture or grasp of the situation and that the information that he was receiving was fragmented and incomplete.
Upon opening his second press conference on March 28, the Lt. Governor made the following statement:
"The situation is more cnaplex than the company first led us to believe... Met-Ed has given you and us conflicting information."
We are not raising any questions on the veracity of these statements. We are saying that these statements led to a lack of public confidence in the State's
)
ability to handle the situation. We believe that the Lt. Governor should not i
have released any information on the accident until he was certain that the information that he had was accurate.
Before making his first press conferenca, he should have been certain that he knew and understood the facts surrounding the situation.
l l
l
, l
b e
i E.
Need To Follow the Chain-of-Command System
)
Our hearings revealed that there was a total collaspe in information being filtered down to local governments through the existing chain-of-command system.
Most of the problems that the local and county officials encountered durft.g the accidsut stemmed from a lack of information flowing down from the State.
These offic!als were at the mercy of the news media for their informatica and were constantly badgered by calls from residents asking for an appraisal of the situation.
Perhaps the ironic aspect of this situation is that the State had a proven, workable system for the passing of information from the State to the municipalities.
Kevin thlloy, the Dauphin County Director of Emergency Management, when speaking to the Committee on this system stated, "...it existed for the passing of information, it has for years, it has worked in the past.
There was no reason why it should not have been followed this time."
In fact, the Governor stated that our emergency preparedness system was wockable.
His evaluation of the readiness state of the county civil defense authorities and the performance of our emergency management personnel was a positive one. The question remains, why was this system bypassed?
This system was clearly explained by Mr. Malloy to the Committee members:
"During times of emergency, the County Office of Emergency Preparedness, which is under my direction, is the mainstream of official information and communication for emergency personnel.
Such information, is then generally channelled to the general citizenry.
Collectively, they rely on us to provide them with accurate, timely information.
For years, Dauphin County and others have operated on this basic principle through major fires, floods, plane crashes, a tornado and hazardous chemical train derailments.
It has been our standard operating procedure and has proven invaluable in completing any sudden emergency, with efficiency, safety and in a calm manner to workers and the general affected populativa-This standard operating procedure could not function effectively without the chain of command.
The accepted chain of command is local to county to state to federal.
Information and request for assistance f1:ws up or down this chain with little if any deviation.
When this procedure is followed, emergencies are handled expeditiously and professionally.
Two major violations occurred during this particular TMI incident.
The first was the lack of timely, official information.
The chain of command was disrupted because of a total breakdown in accurate and timely information irom state and federal agencies...The second major breakdown concerns the ever important decision making process. Once again it appears that agsnciss and persons trained to act in emergency situations that coald include evacuation were bypassed and some decisions and discussiona were held behind closed doors."
! l 1
l
~
T.
~ ' ' - ~
a Further on in his statement, Mr. Malloy says:
"It appears that decisions were made at the higher levels of government concerning the health, safety and welfare of the residents of Dauphin County.
We, in county and local government, were apparently excluded from that process.
Common sense would indicate that neither federal or state officials are as familiar with our county structure, as do we who live and work in this county on a daily basis.
By structure, I mean the geography familiarity of emergency personnel and the behavior and attitude of local residents.
Therefore, it is beyond my comprehension that county and lucal officials were not asked for such 1-valuable input as a part of the decision-making process."
In assessing the State's response to this accident, Mr. Malloy stated:
"...I don't feel the Governor's Office handled the information flow well at all...we were extreme.ty busy, very busy, under a lot of pressure and we did not have time to *.isten to the radic and T.V. etc.
Yet, this is the way the information sas coming out of the Governor's Office.
It was not being given to PEMA, who could have filtered it down to us.
So, information-wise frca the Govarnor's Office I feel it lef t a lot to be desired."
This lack of information was appaiently so bad that Dauphin County threatened to initiate an evacuation unless it began receiving proper information.
John Minnich, Chairman of the Dauphin County Commissioners, stated before the Committee that:
"We, actually, at the county level, because of the lack of information, because of what we could sense was building up within the population, j
we actually became so bold as to advise the Lieutenant Governor's Office l
that unless we began getting proper informatiuu we '-ere going to evacuate the county as we could do under the new act.
We were pleaded with not to take any action until t!.c rollowing morning and as a result of that somewhat bold statement we did have a visit, not only from Colonel Henderson, but from the Lieutenant Governor who came in to attempt to assure us that we would receive information timely and before it was released to everyone else. Unfortunately, I must say that did not occur."
l This lack of consideration for the responsibilities of local government and this dearth of reliable information was a theme repeated by every local and county official who appeared before the Committee.
Albert Wohlsen, Mayor of Lancaster, stated:
"During the emergency period no one from the NRC or state government bothered to call the City of Lancaster staff. On Sunday, following the incident, I initiated a call to the Office of the Governor, but was referred to a press secretary...We had to rely solely on media accounts for our information and those accounts were often misleading and conflicting."
e -
o Mr. Leslie Jackson, Director of Emergency Management for York County stated:
"...we were practically in limbo in getting information from the State and from anybody else."
Carl Lappo, Chairman of the York County Commissio'ners testified:
j "The only concern that I really, really had during that time was in I
communication.
I felt that, you know, we might have had a closer L
communication with the state offices and a little bit more information."
Jack Tracey, Chairman of Lancaster County Commissioners said:
L "The local officials need advance knowledge of the public information
[
in order that we may also be a part of the calming effect to the people within our own political subdivision who recognize our voice and respond to us...Our emergency management was tied up on a battery of phones on silly questions about news releases that continually flood in and we had to put additional phones in to try to get involved with this thing.
It completely annihilated our planning stage of this thit.g."
Jere Gonder, Director of Emergency Management for Franklit County stated:
"...if the of fices like I am responsible for know what war. going on before the press had hold of it, to keep from getting, I mean, I had hundreds of telephone calls from the public asking us and we did not know the knowledge of what they were asking because we hadn't gotten it officially."
The confusion that was generated by this lack of information and the damaging affects that it had on the populace was best summarized by Robert Reid, the Mayor of }dddletown:
"And the confusion that you had with the lack of information allowed too many people to use their imagination.
Now the average person associates nuclear power with the A bomb that was used in WW II, and this is what these people were starting to do.
They were starting to use their imagination.
They were thinking of bombs, thinking of little green men walking up 441, anything.
And this was due mainly because of the lack of communication.
The information that was being given out was contradictory and very confusing."
In appearing before our Committee, the Governor stated that, "The gathering, evaluation and cocmunication of facts are indispensible to decision-making in any i
situation." We agree with the Governor and feel that the information that he was receiving should have first been channeled, via the existing chain-of-command system, to county and local emer3ency management agencies before he held his press conferences.
Our reason for this statement'has been thoroughly documented in the preceding paragraphs.
In the event of another energency, the Committee demands the use of this proven and workable system.
l.
\\
The Committee also urges the Governor in subsequent emergency disaster operations to use the PEMA Emergency Operations Center as the focal point for the exercise of his stewardship. We believe such a course of action will better insure an overall application of the principals of coordination and communication.
F.
Need for One Reliable Public Spokesperson In the event of another emergency, one person should be designated as the public spokesperson for all parties involved in the accident.
This person's responsibility will be to provide accurate and timely information to the public and to answer any questions.
In the beginning stages of this accident, there existed a plethora of sources distributing inconsistent, incomplete, conflicting and oftimes erroneous information. This damaged public condifence and credibility in anyone issuing any statements on the accident. Public condifence was not restored until Harold Denton arrived on Friday and subsequently acted as the official spokesperson on the events on the Island.
This spokesperson should be associated with either the state or federal government.
In no instance should this person be a utility spokesperson. At this point in time, a utility spokesperson lacks the credibility and perhaps the objectivity, to evaluate and appraise the accident for the public.
In any case, TMI dramatically illustrated the need for one reliable spokesperson to act as the sole source in disseminating information to the public.
C.
Prompt Notification to Off-Site Authorities TMI also highlighted the need for prompt notification by the utility to off-site authorities whenever they encounter problems at the facility.
The trouble
~
at TMI began at 4:00 a.m. on Wednesday, March 28.
However, the State was not notified until about three hours later at 7:02 a.m.
This was neither, according to Met-Ed, a conscious delay nor a violation of any procedures or regulations.
As Herman Dieckamp, President of GPU, noted:
"There was no conscious three hour delay.
There was rather an immediate response to notifying off-site authority, the NRC and the State emergency organization immediately when the plant parameters reached the pre-determined level for signaling such problems."
Ue were also told by Mr. Jack Tracey, Chairman of the Lancaster County Commissioners, that, in June of this year, the Peach Bottom nuclear facility malfunctioned.
Lancaster did not hear of this incident until 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> after the facility was shut down for repairs.
The NRC notified Lancaster in a letter that the State was informed of this accident within one and one half hours of the NRC receiving its shut down report.
It is our understanding that the NRC has recently published proposed regulations that modify the existing notification system.
The new proposal would classify plant accidents according to four levels of severity and require that plant operators notify government officials in all cases. Prompt notification O
e j
I of an accident is essential to county and local emergency management personnel.
We ask PEMA and BRP to carefully review the NRC's proposal in this area to insure i
that it will bring about prompt notification to all related off-site parties in the event of any future nuclear incidents.
H.
Authority of State, County and Local Governments It appears that the PEMA Act #323 is unclear in delegating certain lines of authority to county and local people.
Several local officials who appeared before our Committee were confused over what power they actually have during an emergency.
For example, some officials did not know whether they could order an evacuation or d
whether they could order school districts to close.
We, therefore, recommend that the House Military Af fairs Committee review j
Act #323 of 1978 and make any necessary changes that will clearly delineate the roles and authority of state, county, and local government of ficials during an emergency or in the event of an impending one.
I.
Dedicated Telephone Lines t
i The TMI accident also brought out the need for better communication between the plant site and the State.
We, therefore, suggest that each Pennsylvania i
utility operating a nuclear reactor install a dedicated telephone line between the reactor site and the State. We also believe that any telephone conversations should be recorded in the State's office.
It is also our understanding that the NRC is now in the process of installing direct and dedicated telephone lines between nuclear plants, the NRC Operation l
Center, and their regional offices.
Such efforts will serve to improve communications between the plant site and the NRC.
j J.
Agricultural Problems It was brought out at our hearings that evacuation plans do not call for evacuation of farm animals, livestock, and poultry.
According to the testimony that-we received, this is a decision that will have to be made during the emergency based on the best information available.
The Committee does not agree.
The Committee-feels that any evacuation plan should include a number of steps to be taken by the farmer on what to do with his livestock in certain situations. Although in any evacuation plan, livestock would take second priority behind human lives, such plans would assure the farmer that his interest is being considered and, in the event of -an emergency, the State is prepared to act in accordance with that
.i interest.
- The Committee suggests that due to the magnitude of livestock numbers on many of the farms, farmers need to establish their own priorities as to which animals receive preference.
For instance, valuable breeding animals certainly should get top priority.
A percentage formula or quota should be considered.
A farmer could be given a choice of ten percent of his livestock to be evacuated l
then later, if time ~ permitted,uan additional percentage.-
i The Committee also recommends that the County. Director of Emergency j
Preparedness in cooperation with the County Extension Service and the County
- Agricultural Conservation and Stabilization Of fice prepare a list of f armers
[
' owning livestock and the approximata numbers of each.
The Committee further recommends that a survey be made in'each county as to available space for housing l
livestock in an emergency situation.- Livestock auction. centers are an example.
l
[
-23.
The same survey should also be made as to suitable livestock trucking facilities.
A copy of these surveys should then be forwarded to PEMA so they would be immediately available in an emergency. These surveys should be updated annually.
Farmers themselves need to be instructed as to what steps to take in case of an emergency such as keeping animals confined under roof, feed and water supplies, etc.
This should be, spelled out very clearly, both as to immediate action and also for situations that could continue for a week or more depending on the degree and the area exposed to radioactivity.
I We know that there is also a great deal of concern about reimbursement to farmers for losses suffered due to incidents of this nature. Under the Farm Act of 1977, the Secretary of Agriculture through the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service is authorized to compensate farmers for actual losses of milk and livestock without a ceiling on dollar amounts.
This authority expires December 31, 1981. However, there will be a new Farm Act in ef fect prior to October 1, 1981, which we feel will extend the provision relating to radioactive fall-out.
J Also, we understand that at the present time certain utilities are monitoring i
samples of farm products near both active and inactive nuclear generating facilities. The Committee feels the Department of Agriculture should be notified of any intention to take such samples and also that the Department receive the test results. Upon such notification the Department of Agriculture should also take similar samples and keep all test results on file.
K.
Other Deficiencies in Evacuation Plans l'
A number of deficiencies or other " holes" were found in our evacuation plans and emergency preparedness capabilities.
These included:
Our evacuation plan is dependent on the use of private automobiles and buses.
It is dependent on having a sufficient supply of gas.
In view of the recent gasoline shortage, steps will have to be taken to assure that sufficient supplies of gas exist to successfully effect an evacuation.
Notification of the Old Order Amish may pose a problem in the event of an emergency. These people do not have radios, telephones or televisions.
l The evacuation contingency plans at the Hershey Medical Center were l
fraught with many problems, including:
there was a number of people on life support systems and any kind of evacuation posed severe risks to those people; with respect to children in the neo-natal intensive care unit, the Hershey Hospital is only one of a few hospitals that i
have the specialized equipment required to keep them going and very few vehicles have the equipment required to transport them.
i I
l
~
The Committee asks PEMA to examine these issues and to also assess its overall emergency management capability to determine how it could be improved.
I The Committee also requests PEMA to include in its study an assessment of the emergency capability of other State agencies and the problemc that they encountered during the TMI accident. Such agencies should include the State Police, National Guard, the Health Department, and the Education Department.
The Committee also asks that PEMA, upon completion of its study, submit a report of its findings to the House Military Affairs Committee with any recommendations including the costs associated with those recommendations.
L.
Bureau of Radiation Protection Appropriation The TMI accident also highlighted the need for the State to improve its radiation surveillance capabilities. Our current environmental radiation monitoring plan is a modest one. During the early stages of the TMI accident, the State was forced to depend upon the utility for information on the levels of radiation released to the environment. The utility's radiation monitoring techniques were later criticized by the NRC.
Duning this past yeer, the Pennsylvania General Assembly appropriated $300,000 to DER to upgrade its radiation monitoring program and emergency response plan.
However, we were informed by Mr. Gerusky when he appeared before the Committee on September 20, 1979, that at that time, the $300,000 had not been approved for use:
"As you are well aware, we did receive an additional S300,000 in the budget this year. We have proposed to increase the staff by six people.
We still haven't received approval from the Budget Office to hire any individuals or to spend any of that money on the rebudget."
This money was not approved by the Administration until October 16, 1979 l
or almost four months af ter the General Assembly appropriated it.
TMI accentuated the need for the State to have an adequate radiation monitoring program. The Committee, therefore, does not understand why the Administration delayed giving its approval to BRP to spend this money.
M.
Funding of State Emergency Preparedness Capabilities As mentioned in the previous pages, the TMI accident has underscored the need to improve the State's emergency preparedness capabilities.
These improvements will cost money.
Any costs associated with these improvements should be borne by the utility companies. The Committee, therefore, recommends adopting legislation similar to legislation adopted by the State of Illinois.
This would require a one-time charge of $350,000 per nuclear reactor in the State to be paid by the owner of that reactor and an annual fee of $75,000 for each reactor licensed to operate in the State.
The money collected from these fees could then be used to upgrade and maintain our State's emergency managment and preparedness capabilities.
III.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Radiological Emergency Response Planning According to a report prepared by the General Accounting Office (GAO) entitled " Areas Around Nuclear Facilities Should Be Better Prepared for Radiological Emergencies":
"The NRC has the primary responsibility for assisting State and local governments in developing emergency response plans for radiation l l t
releases from nuclear facilities. As part of its planning assistance to states, the Commission reviews state plans to determine whether they
)
contain what the Commission considers to be essential plannin.g and i
preparedness elements."
Whenever the Commission is satisfied that a plan meets its criteria, a formal letter of concurrence with the plan is issued.
It should be noted that this is a cooperative process--the NRC has no direct authority to either require states to develop plans or disapprove state plans.
Pennsylvania has never formally submitted its emergency plan to the NRC for review. When asked why we didn't submit our plan, Tom Gerusky, Director of BRP, responded:
"We didn't feel that there was a need to submit it to NRC.
We felt we knew as much about emergency planning as they did and probably more...We felt we knew as much about emergency planning for radiation as the NRC staff that was involved in emergency planning did and our staff is comprised of certified health physicists.
They don't have any on their staff.
There was--I called some of the states-prior to TMI, I called some of the states that had submitted their plans for approval and asked them why they did it and they said it was political l
only and we didn't feel there was any reason for doing it for politics."
Prior to the accident, the NRC, due to budgetary difficulties, had problems in trying to provfde the necessary training programs for state and local governments in the emergency preparedness area.
In testimony before the President's Commission on TMI, Wil?.Aam Wilcox, Administrator of the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, stated that:
"The NRC lacks both the carrot and the stick to encourage adequate state and local governmental preparedness for radiological accidents."
In addition to monetary restraints, the Commission's attitude towards emergency response programs was not encouraging.
Speaking about this attitude towards emergency planning, Harold Denton told the Committee, "... people felt like it wouldn' t be needed.
There was a continual battle to justify the resources to go into that area.
The general feeling was that we should put more of our apples into preventing accidents and designing better and better equipment, then it was in actually assuming the accident had occurred and planning to cope with it.
I think there has been a reversal of that feeling throughout the agency as a result'of the accident."
The Commission has recently formed an emergency planning task force for the purpose of ensuring that a comprehensive and integrated emergency response capability exists at the licensee, state, and local levels.
This task force has developed additional criteria and guidance intended to upgrade and integrate the emergency response capability at these three levels.
In order to insure integrated emergency planning the.licsnsee, state and local plans will be l
evaluated collectively against NRC regulations, requirements and additional j
acceptance criteria documents developed as a result of the TMI accident.
l l
I According to Alexis Tsaggaris, Director of Site Emergency Planning for Met-Ed:
"The purpose of the task force is to ensure that the following emergency pfanning objectives are achieved:
i l
1.
Effective coordination of emergency activities among all organizationn having a response role.
2.
Early warnino and clear instructions to the population-at-risk in the event of a serious radiological emergency.
I 3.
Continued assessment of actual or potential consequences both on site and off site.
4.
The effective implementation of caergency measures in the environs; and 5.
Continued maintenance of an adequate state of emergency preparedness.
The NRC task force will conduct its review of the licensee, state and local plans for all operating reactors by using the review team concept.
Teams will be comprised of three members, an NRC individual from the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Division who will act as team leader, an NRC individua?
from the Regional Office of Inspection and Enforcement, and a consultant from the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.
Each team will be responsible for eight to nine reactor sites and will carry out its task in three phases."
One of the most important lessons that should be learned from the TMI accident is the need for better emergency planning.
It is important for the federal government to take the lead in this area and demand well developed emergency response plans from the states. There is currently a bill before Congrass, S562, which would require the shut down of all nuclear power plants that operate in a state that does not have a federally approved emergency evacuation plan in place by June 1, 1980. The bill would also deny operating permits to reactors under construction in states without emergency plans acceptable to the NRC.
This bill passed the Senate on July 17, 1979.
In light of the NRC's renewed efforts in this field and the need for better emergency response plans, the Committee urges Congress to pass this bill as soon as possible.
l IV.
Evacuation During the morning of Friday, March 30, intermittent releases of radioactive gas occurred during plant officials' attempts to pump radioactive coolant water back into the containment from the auxiliary building.
This event' generated much confusion and consternation in the area and ultimately led to an evacuation recommendation by the NRC.
According to Colonel Henderson, at 9:15 a.m. on Friday, March 30, he received a telephone call from a Mr. Harold Collins with the NRC's Emergency Operation Center. The purpose of Mr. Collins' call was to convey a NRC recommendation for a ten mile evacuation. Henderson told Collins that the State had no ten mile plan but would give consideration to a five mile evacuation and then determine whether it could be extended to a ten mile range. l l
t
Henderson then notified BRP of the evacuation recommendation that he received from the NRC. A few moments later the Governor called inquiring of Mr. Collins' reputation. According to testimony provided the Committee, Henderson responded by saying that, "...I knew Doc Collins only by reputation, that he enjoyed a fairly good reputation within our organization." Then, according to Henderson, the Governor asked if the Colonel was recommending an evacuation. According to Henderson's testimony, he responded by saying that:
"...in view of no other information and the BRP had not yet contacted me, that I had no choice at that particular moment but to recommend an evacuation."
The PEMA logs support Colonel Henderon's Natimony.
At a press conference on June 7,1979, Governor Thornburgh, in response to a question on this subject stated:
" Colonel Henderson states that I asked him for a recommendation on evacuation.
I have no such recollection.
Because logically I was on a search to find who the individual was who had, in fact, made the recommendation and he had made it to Colonel Henderson as well.
What Colonel Henderson I suggest, may misapprehend is that he was repeating to me the recommendation that he had received from Harold Collins of which I was already aware and which was the subject of this manhunt to determine who Harold Collins was and whether he represented the views of the NRC.
I have stated the case here and before on the record and I have no desire to gather in any controversy with Colonel Henderson.
I suggest the record speaks for itself."
However, because neither the Governor nor Colonel Henderson was asked to reappear before the Committee, the record remains inconsistent.
One thing is certain, Harold Collins did make an evacuation recommendation to Colonel Henderson. Appearing before the Committee on September 12, 1979, Mr. Collins stated:
"The recommendation at the time was made by the senior management people in the center, which included Mr. Denton and I think Colonel Henderson, when I talked to him on the phone, accepted the recommendation.
Now, what transpired between Colonel Henderson and the Governor of the State, I don't know, but I think that's where it got turned around."
It should be noted that Mr. Denton and the other senior management officials subsequently rescinded their evaucation recommendation.
In his appearance before the Committee, Mr. Denton gave the following account of the evacuation recommendation and the reasons for it being rescinded:
"I think I had gone home from the response center Thursday, feeling rather sad when the accident had crested that the situation was fairly well understood and came in Friday morning to find that the situation had worsened considerably in the eyes of those of us in the emergency response By that time, we realized that there were high temperature readings center.
i above the reactor core and the steam was being super-cooled. The steam
~
was being generated in the reactor vessel because of flow blockage.
There were continuing high reports of radiation Jevels within the reactor building. We were concerned that the licensee might attempt to lower the pressure of the system in order to get on what they call the residual heat removal system, that would expand the bubble and uncover more fuel.
Then, I guess the final blow was the report came in somehow to us from our man at the site that said that there was a helicopter over the containment and just reported a reading of 1250 MR an hour.
He didn't know where it came from, how long it would continus or how it could be stopped. Putting all of these factors together and the fact that our perception of the core damage had increased markedly, the fact that there was a radiation dose that was extremely high, would have been on a class range a lot higher than what really had happened, and the uncertainty about what the real status of the core was and whether containment was leaking and when it might be terminated is what prompted me to recommend to the State an evacution in a down wind direction.
It wasn't too long after Paul made that call and we were still on the phone with people at the site, we began to get information back that the oversite doses weren't that high.
Eventually, I think within an hour, we got word that the release had been stopped.
By this time, we were on the phone with our own Commission and I think our Commissioners got on the phone with Governor Thornburgh.
I was reacting to just the increasing uncertainty about the status of the core that morning.
I recommended an evacuation based on avoiding radiation er.posure beyond that recommended by the EPA guidelines.
I have never been able to verify that 1250 reading. We did find in the records of the ploat readings of more than 350 MR by helicopter above the plant."
The BRP, after being contacted by PEMA, could not understand the basis for the evacuation recommendation.
According to testimony from Mr. Gerusky:
"Miss Reilly and Mr. Dornsife (BRP officials) contacted Mr. Collins at NRC-Bethesda to ask why the recommendation was made.
He stacad that the
" top brass" had recommended it and he was only following orders.
By that time telephone lines were tied up, and we couldn't contact anyone.
Mr. Dornsife went to PEMA headquarters directly and I went to the Governor's Office. Miss Reilly stayed in contact with TMI and the survey teams.
By that time we had radio communications with our survey teams and with the survey teams from DOE.
We both--Bill and I both recommended against evacuation due to current conditions."
1 Because the troubled reactor was brought under control, the Governor's decision not to declare an evacuation may appear to be right. Yet, when the Committee looks back to that Friday, with the information available to him at that time, his decision is questionable.
First, both state and local officials, including Dr. Wilburn, the person that the Governor directed to review the State's emergency response plan, stated, in testimony before the Committee, that a five mile evacuation could have been carried out.
Second, the venting of radiation on Fride.y morning that initiated the clamor took state and federal officials by surprise.
It ominously indicated that the reactor was still in a troubled state.
Third, the Governor's sources
e of information, by his own admission, were "not producing a clear picture of the events and condition of the site."
Fourth, at that time on Friday, as Mr. Henderson testified, we had no evacuation plans beyond a five mile radius of the plant. To say the least, it would have taken hours to formulate such a plan. Finally, we had a recommendation from the NRC that an evacuation should be instituted. Given these factors, it is also hard to argue against a precautionary five mile evacuation at that time.
In the final analysis, chance, more than anyching else, may have been the determing factor in enabling us to avoid a potentially catastrophic occurrence.
V.
Radiation / Health Impact of TMI Accident A.
Background
The " rem," or " Roentgen Equivalent Man" is the standard measurement of radiation energy.
Radiation effects on people are more commonly measured by the millirem (area - 1/1000 of a rea). The average person in the U.S. receives about 175 mrea/yr of radiation--100 mrem from natural sources such as cosmic
~
radiation, soil and building materials, natural radioactivity in the body; 72 area from medically prescribed radiation; and about 3 mrem from miscellaneous activities such as jet travel, watching T.V., using radium dial watches, etc.
l l
The main problem with low-level radiation seems to be the lack of knowledge relative to its long-term health effects.
Some scientists believe that the net detrimental effect of radiation depends on the total cumulative dose, irrespective of the rate at which it acccumulates. Others assert that harmful effects occur only when the level of intensity exceeds a certain threshold.
B.
Population Dose and Health Impact of the TMI Accident A report prepared by an interagency team from the NRC, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the Environmental Protection Agency assessed the health impact on the approximately two million offsite residents within 50 miles of the TMI nuclear station from the dose received by the entire population (collective dose).
This Ad Hoc group concluded that the offsite collective dose associated with radioactive material released during the period of March 28 to April 7 represented
(
minimal risks (that is, a very small number) of additional health effects to the offsite population.
Their data was obtained from dosimeters placed by Met-Ed before the accident, from dosimeters placed by the company af ter the accident and covering the period April 6, and from dosimeters placed by the NRC from noon of March 31 throughout the afternoon of April 7, 1979.
It should be noted that the results of an NRC Report (NUREG 0600) supports the findings of the interagency's team.
However, the NRC did note in its report that it found several inadequacies in the in plant l
radiation protection activities of Met-Ed and also criticized the measurements of l
offsite radiation levels made by the utility.
In spite of these identified flaws, the NRC report stated, "...no glaring inconsistencies have been found which would significantly alter the conclusions reached by the Ad Hoc group."
~30-
Among the findings of the interagency team, as taken from their report entitled, " Population Dose and Health Impact of the Accident at the TMI Nuclear Station," are:
The collective dose to the total population within a 50-mile radius l
of the plant has been estimated to be 3300 person-rem. This is an l
average of four separate estimates that are 1600, 2800, 3300 and 5300, person-rem. The range of the collective dose values is due to different methods of extrapolating from the limited number of dosimeter measurements. An estimate provided by the Department of Energy (2000 person-rea) also falls within this range. The average dose to an individual in this population is 1.5 mrem (using the 3300 person-rem average value).
The projected number of excess fatal cancers due to the accident that could occur over the remaining lifetime of the population within 50 miles is approximately one.
Had the accident not occurred, the number of fatal cancers that would be normally expected in a population of this size over its remaining lifetime is estimated to be 325,000.
The maximum dose that an individual located offsite in a population area might receive is less than 100 mrem.
This estimate is based on j
the cumulative dose (83 mrem) recorded by an offsite dosimeter at 0.5 mile east-northeast of the site and assumes that the individual l
remained outdoors at that location for the entire period from March 28 l
through April 7.
The estimate'd dose applies only to individuals in the immediate vicinity of the dosimeter site. The potential risk of fatal cancer to an individual receiving a dose of 100 mrem is about 1 in 50,000. This should be compared to the normal risk to that individuel of fatal cancer from all causes of about 1 in 7.
The principal radionuclides released to the environment were the radioactive xenons and some iodine-131. Measurements made by the Department of Energy in the environment, measurement of the contents of the waste gas tanks, of the gases in the containment building and the actual gas released to the environment confirmed that the principal radionuclide released was xenon-133.
Xenon-133 is a noble gas (which is chemically non-reactive) and does not persist in the environment after it disperses in the air.
It has a short half-life of 5.3 days and produces both gamma and beta radiation. The risk to people from xenon-133 is primarily from external exposure to the gamma radiation, which penetrates the body and exposes the internal organs.
Iodine-131 was detected in milk samples during the period March 31 through April 4.
The maximum concentration measured in milk (41 pCI/ liter in goat's milk, 36 pCI/ liter in cow's milk) was 300 times lower than the level at which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) would recommend that cows be removed from contaminated pasture.
Cesium-137 was also detected in milk, but at concentrations expected from residual fallout from previous atmospheric weapons testing.
No reactor produced radioactivity has been found in any of the 377 food samples collected between March 29 and April 30 by the FDA.
1 C.
Examination Taken By State On August 21,cPenrose Hallowell, Secretary of Agriculture for the Commonwealth, appeared before the Committee and highlighted the efforts that the Stage has taken 4
in determining radiation levels in our milk and food supply:
"In regard to the food supplies, especially milk, on March 29, 1979, the Department started to take milk samples on farms and from dairies within a radius of 45 miles from TMI. They were rather scattered.
These samples were analyzed for radioactive content by the Bureau of Radiological Health of the Department of Environmental Resources.
During the March 29 through April 21 sampling period, 200 samples were taken and tested.
I think it's a total now of about 350.
The highest reading found in any one sample during this period of time was 29 picoeuries per liter. These levels did not pose a health threat and no action was taken'.
The levels were below the 12,000 picoeuries per liter level at which the Food and Drug Administration would initiate regulatory action to protect the health of the consumer.
4, We are continuing to take milk samples even today for radioactive content analysis and will continue for an undetermined period of time.
Since May 4, 1979, all milk samples have contained less than 10 picoeuries per liter, the minimum detectable level of radioactivity which the equipment being used can detect wi;a any degree of accuracy.
From April 1 to April 24, 1979, 32 different food items, including spaghetti, chocolate wafers, donuts, apple pie, fresh eggs, candies, white bread, noodles, ice cream, hog and steer feed, cheese, river water, well water, tap water, corn flakes, and etc. were sampled within a 30 mile radius of TMI. A total of 350 samples were taken during this time period and all of them contained no detectable levels of radiation...
During early to mid April, grass samples were taken within a three mile radius of TMI.
Results ranged from zero to 25 picoeuries per square meter.
These levels did not necessitate the keeping of livestock off of pasture.
Even so, most livestock were not on pasture since at this time of the year, the grass has not grown enough to provide adequate feed for livestock.
Immediately following the TMI incident, we had recommended that farmers should keep their' livestock indoors and off of pasture.
This was done as a precautionary measure since we did not know what levels were present or could be anticipated.
On June 6, 1979, we took samples of fresh lettuce, radishes, rhubarb, spring onions, and fresh strawberries which were grown within a seven mile radius of TMI. All of the samples were negative for radioactive content...
Even though none of the various samples of food and related material which were analyzed required action to protect the health of the consumer and of livestock and poultry, we will continue to take milk samples and analyze them for radioactive content.
This continuous monitoring of milk should be sufficient to detect any possible contanination of foodstuffs by radioactive materials, since detectable levels of radioactivity will normally be found in milk before it can be detected in other foodstuffs."
. l
D.
Health Studies In his appearance before the Committee, former Secretary of Health Gordon MacLeod presented the Committee members with a report that summarized the activities of the Health Department subsequent to the TMI accident.
Included in this report was the following account of the State's long-range health responses to the accident:
"III.
Long-Range Responses to the Event By April 5th or 6th it became apparent that the reactor at Three Mile Island was seemingly under control and the situation had generally stabilized.
The crisis environment within which the Department had functioned during the previous week was abating, and attention turned to evaluating the public health and economic impact of the event upon the population surrounding the plant.
~
Under the Secretary's direction, Dr. George Tokuhata, Director of the Bureau of Health Research, developed an outline of possible studies to be undertaken by the Department itself, or subcontracted by the Department. While Dr. Tokuhata's staff was assessing the need for research, Dr. MacLeod and his staff began to canvass both the state and federal agencies, plus private organizations, for potential sources of funding.
To date monies have been contributed or pledged by the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta ($274,000), Department of Health, Education and Welfare - Title V ($160,000), and the Electric Power Research Institute ($200,000).
An additional $150,000 has been l
requested of the Commonwealth, and $100,000 of the National Cancer Institute. A series of research priorities have been identified and studies have been designed in response to those needs.
Although a departmental Research Advisory Committee was already
)
in existence to oversee the somewhat limited amount of research j
which is ongoing from year to year within the agency, it was felt that the national significance of the Three Mile Island research l
mandated oversight by a more broadly-based panel of nationally recognized physicians and scientists.
Consequently, on June 5,1979, 1
Dr. MacLeod named a 12-member Three Mile Island Advisory Panel on Health Research Studies and charged them with overseeing the Department of Health's conduct of the following studies:
(1) Three Mile Island Census:
On June 20, 1979, the Pennsylvania Department of Health began a special census of all persons living within five miles of TMI.
The information collected on each resident consists of basic demographic (identifying) data and exposure information (time spent in the TMI area between March 28 and April 7).
The population will be followed over a twenty-year period and monitored for cancer, genetic diseases, stress-related disorders, and other disorders and diseases.
i A staff of 150 enumerators was hired by the Pennsylvania Department of Health to canvass the TMI area. Other personnel, and procedural guidance, were supplied by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the U.S. Center for Disease Control to assist i
the research staff of the Pennsylvania Department of Health.
\\
At the time of this report, census forms have been completed on 98% of all households identified as being within the five-mile radius. The remaining 2% represe.nt temporary vacancies
]
(vacationers) and will be completed as soon as the residents return. The estimated total number of households is 13,000.
A hand count has revealed approximately 38,000 residents living within the five-mile radius.
The response of residents was excellent (less than 2% refusal);
quality control measures revealed that coverage was also very good (98% saturation).
Further, a 5% random sample verification by telephone indicated that the data is highly reliable.
Although approximately 100 families have pennanently moved out i
of the area since March 28, 1979, most of them are being 1
successfully contacted by phone. Only very few families have moved from the area because of the TMI accident.
The census data is being stored in a double-legked vault in the Department of Health, and every precaution is being taken to guard its confidentiality. A contract which has been written with Keypunch Incorporated, Allentown, Pennsylvania, for' data processing should produce a raw data tape by October 15th.
(2) Evaluation of Pregnancy Outcome:
In the two years following the TMI accident, information on t
pregnancy outcomes will be collected on all pregnancies of women living within ten miles of TMI. The information is being supplied by hospital medical records as well as from comprehensive interviews with the mothers in their homes. Data on over 160 variables will be collected; pregnancy outcome will be analyzed in relation to prenatal care, maternal characteristics and previous medical history, radiation exposure from TMI and l
other sources, and the emotional impact of TMI.
Results will l
be compared to a similar five-year study just completed in i
the Greater Harrisburg Area by the Bureau of Health Research, allowing analysis of "before" and "after" data.
The Department of Health has hired six (6) interviewers to administer questionnaires to every mother who delivers within the ten-mile radius.
The interviewing began the first week of August, with the full cooperation of all eleven (11) hospitals serving the area.
(3)
Cogenital Noenatal Hypothyroidism:
This study will be performed in conjunction with the Pregnancy l
Outcome Study. Pursuant to law, the Department of Health l
has been collecting statewide data through the Neonatal Metabolic j
Screening Program on all infants born in Pennsylvania since July, 1978. Screening data on all births to women l
living within ten miles of TMI will be compiled, analyzed, l
and compared with established statewide norms.
The children from these births will be followed and screened periodically for the development of subsequent thyroid diseases, including tumors.
Incidence rates in the impact area will be compared with statewide and other control rates.
(4) Health Behavioral Impact of the TMI Accident:
This study is a joint effort of the Pennsylvania Department of Health and the Milton Hershey Medical Center of Pennsylvania State Universit'y.
It calls for the collection of both primary data (via telephone interviews) and secondary data (via a survey of health care providers) to assess the behavioral response of residents living within five miles of TMI.
Approximately 700 persons have been contacted within a five-mile radius of TMI via random digit telephone dialing under a contract drawn with the Chilton Desearch Services of Radnor, Pennsylvania.
The subjects were asked questions dealing wit' stress-related health problems, use of health delivery systems, health costs, coping strategies, and social support systems.
Preliminary results of the primary data should be available by September 1, 1979.
Secondary data - not yet compiled - will consist of health care facility utilization following the TMI accident.
Analysis of this data will indicate to what degree unusual pressures were experienced by the health care system in the af termath of the accident.
(5) Health Related Economic Costs:
This study will concentrate on the immediate and short term excess health costs due to TMI. Two types of data sources will be utilized.
The first will be " primary data" obtained from the household survey (Health Behavioral Impacts of the TMI Accident) on personal axpenditure and loss.
Individual hospital utilization, as well as other health related costs incurred due to TMI, will be obtained from the survey.
" Secondary data" will consist of information from institutions and hospitals from which health costs will he assessed by avamining utilization patterns for physical, mental, and social health services one year prior to the event, and one year af ter.
Data sources on service utilization will include the Hospital Utilization Project, Pennsylvania Blue Cross and Blue Shield, the State Employee Health Benefits Program, the Pennsylvania Department of Health and Welfare, local social service agencies, and school,and work absenteeisa records. !
All health economic results of the nuclear accident will be viewed in terms of loss to persons or institutions resulting l
from avoidance behavior (the cost of health hazard avoidance),
and cost to the persons or institutions of increased use of health care and social services (the cost of health hazard consequences).
Department of Health researchers will be working in conjunction with faculty from Pennsylvania State University's Department of Economics.
(6) TMI Radiation Cytogenetic Studies:
This study will be conducted by a tess of researchers at the University of Pittsburgh's School of Public Health.
Laboratory studies will be performed on three (possibly four) randomly selected groups of fifty adults each.
Blood samples will be tested for chromosome breakage and other cytogenetic abnormalities.
j The contract has not yet been negotiated for this study, however, the starting date is expected to be August 15, 1979.
(7) TMI Population Radiation Dose Assessment:
The task of this project is to calculate radiation dosages for each individual recorded in the Three Mile Island Census.
This will require merging all existing information about radiation contamination, March 28 - April 7, in the area within five miles of TMI with individual evacuation information on each person reported in the census. The University of Pittsburgh will be working in conjunction with the Pennsylvania Department of Health.
The contract has not yet been drawn for this study, but the l
expected starting date is August 15, 1979.
(8) Long-Term Disease Surveillance:
l A " brain storming" session was held on June 13, 1979, with l
Department of Health staff and several State Research Advisory Committee members to discuss plans for additional TMI research.
Of special consideration were plans for the utilization of the TMI Census as denominator data for future calculations of morbidity and mortality rates.
Because the TMI census is to be operative for a variety of uses over time, it will be necessary to periodically update the data. This will involve " tracking" the residents every year (or, perhaps, every five years) for changes in addresses, names, and health status.
e 9.
Persons in the registry will be followed for at least twenty years, with their conditions being compared to standard or control populations.
The necessity for adequate controls for all research, both short-term and long-tange was addressed by the Blue Ribbon Advisory Panel at its first meeting on the fact that there was as yet no identifiable financial support for the maintenance of a control population.
More specifically, it was expected that cancer incidence would be monitored over the years by matching the TMI Census file with Cancer Tumor registry files. A cancer tumor registry, funded by the State, was to be operative in the eight counties around Three Mile Island and in five control counties around Philadelphia by 1981.
However, budgetary cutbacks within the Departzant have forced the cancellation of all such plans and, to date, neither the study nor the control population will be monitored.
A child growth and development study is also planned, with the cohort of babies born in a ten-mile radius of TMI (those in the Pregnancy Outcome Study) serving as the sample population.
Some type of enumeration of patients with thyroid disease is also anticipated for long-term surveillance, though the specifics of this proposal have yet to be developed.
No funds have been identified nor contracts awarded for any of the long-tern studies.
(9) Psychological Stress Studies:
The Commonwealth's original attempt to field a study evaluating the mental health effects of the accident at THI was unsuccessful.
The Department of Health, with the cooperation of the Office of Mental Health of the Department of Public Welfare, undertook to contract with Dr. Frederick Warheit for a psychological stress instrument to be administered to the affected population.
The work would be sponsored and funded by NIHK.
Subsequent to the meeting with the two state agencies on May 4, 1979, Dr. Warheit elected to negotiate solely with NIMH and the Welfare Department; over the course of the next several weeks the Department of Health had no further contact with the principals.
Some 6 to 8 weeks later Dr. MacLeod learned from NIMH that Dr. Warheit had elected not to respond as sole contractor for the project, based both upon his personal concerns with the scope of work and difficulties in getting his instrument accepted by the Office of Management and Budget.
Since that time the Office of Mental Health of the Department of Public Welfare has been engaged in a series of deliberations with Dr. Evalyn Bromet, a psychiatric epidemiologist at the.
- ~
Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic in Pittsburgh.
The Department of Health has not been a part of these negotiations, though a draft protocol was presented to departmental staff at a special meeting on August 2,1979.
It is presumed that the final protocol will be presented to the Advisory Pansi at its September 12th meeting."
E.
In his appearance before the Committee, Dr. MacLeod also spoke on the use of potassium iodide as a protective agent against the accumulation of dangerous radioactivs materials by the thyroid gland:
" Gentlemen, I must impress upon you that potassium, in the form of an iodide or possibly an todate, is really the only medicine that has proven to be an effective preventive agent against one of the long term harmful effects of radioactivity."
The former Secretary of Health further stated, that:
"...had we experienced the massive fellout that many people feared would result from the TMI accident in the first few days, we would have been without this important medicine.
Sadder yet to say, we still don't have any supply of potassium iodide in the event of another nuclear accident."
l The Committee recommends that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare promptly develop a federal policy on the administration of potassium iodide pills to the public.
This agency should also develop formal guidance to state and local governments on how the pills should be stockpiled and administered.
If HEW does not move quickly to develop its policy on this subject, then the*
Pennsylvania Health Department should make its own determination on whether the State should have a stockpile of potassium iodide available at each nuclear site in the Commonwealth and how such a plan should be administered.
VI.
Insurance Coverage A. Price-Anderson Act In September,1957, Congress enacted the Price-Anderson Indemnity Act (P.L. 85 - 256). This Act provides a system of private funds and government indemnity totalling $560 million to pay public liability claims for personal injury and property damage resulting from a nuclear accident.
The following is an overview of the Price-Anderson Act as prepared by the NRC:
"Under the Price-Anderson Act (which is a part of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954) there is a system of private funds and government indemnity totalling $560 million to pay public liability claims for persocal injury
~
l and property damage resulting from a " nuclear incident." The Price-Anderson Act, which expires August 1,1987, requires licensees of large commercial nuclear power plants to provide proof to the NRC that they have financial
protection in the form of private nuclear liability insurance, or in some other form approved by the Commission, in an amount equal to the maximum amount of liability insurance available from private sources.
That financial protection, $475 million at the time of the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident on March 28, 1979, consists of primary private nuclear liability insurance of $140 million provided by two insurance pools, American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) and Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters (MAELU) (which was increased to $160 million on May 1, 1979--
except for TMI) and a secondary layer.
In the event of a nuclear incident causing damages exceeding $140 million, each commercial nuclear power plant licensee would be charged by the insurance pools providing the insurance a prorated share of damages in excess of the primary insurance layer up to $5 million per reactor per incident. With 67 large commercial reactors now operating under this system, the secondary insurance layer totals $335 million.
Thus, the two layers of insurance at the time of the TMI accident totaled $475 million. The difference of $85 millica between the financial protection layers of $475 million and the $560 million liability limit established by the Price-Anderson Act is provided by government indemnity. Government indemnity will gradually be phased out as more commercial reactors are licensed and licensees participate in the second layer of *.nsurance. When the primary and secondary layers by themselves provide liability coverage of $560 million, government indemnity will be eliminated.
The liability limit--now $560 million--would thereaf ter increase in increments of
$5 million for each new commercial reactor licensed to operate."
The cost of the above coverages to the utility is as follows:
Metropolitan Edison pays $490,000 annually for the primary liability coverage.
Each of the reactor owners pays $6,000 annually per reactor for the secondary coverage.
However, this is simply to cover the insurance pools' potential " temporary liability" since they would assess each licensed reactor in the event of a loss.
The federal government bills Metropolitan Edison and other reactor owners
$6.00 per " megawatt thermal" or a total of about $5,400 for the federal government coverage.
In addition to the above coverages and costs, Met-Ed has $300 million in property damage protection.
(It should be noted that the estimated cost to decontaminate and reactivate the damaged reactor is $400 million.) For this coverage, Met-Ed pays $1.3 million annually.
To summarize the premium aspects, Met-Ed pays approximately $1.8 million annually for insurance on the plant.
This cost is then calculated as a " business expense" and passed on to consumers.,
- 1 B.
Relocation Claims Paid As a Result of TMI On Saturday, March 31, the Nuclear Insurers set up emergency headquarters at the offices of the U.S. Fidelity and Guarantee in Harrisburg. According to Mr. Harvey Bartle, Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner:
"The Insurers, af ter discussion with General Public Utilities and
~
Metropolitan Edison, had made a decision to provide advanced payments to those persons asked to relocate. The basis for the advanced funds ranged from $10 a day for food and lodging for a child staying with relatives to $90 a day for a family with one child staying at a motel.
Additional funds were allowed for each additional person. Later, when the relocation directive was lif ted, Nuclear Insurers notified the persons who had relocated to file for additional travel expenses as justified and for wage losses suffered during the relocation...
j As of August 10, 1979, 3,751 relocation expense and wage loss claims have been paid by the Nuclear Insurers for a total of $1,298,324.
In addition..there have been approximately 15 class and individual n'etions filed against the General Public Utilities and Metropolitan Edison.
There have been 27 claims filed by governmental agencies as well as some 113 claims by businesses. At this time, many of these claims have not specified the amount of damages suffered. None of the claims have as yet been paid or rejected by the Insurers.
It may well be a number of years before we know the outcome of these lawsuits and claima.
There has been and surely will continue to be much discussion on the appropriate mechanism to provide nuclear contamination protection."
In regards to the question of nuclear liability insurance, it appears that the State has at least three options available:
1.
It could require that all homeowner policies include coverage for losses resulting from a nuclear incident. Presently, all policies exclude coverage in such event.
The questions customarily raised about this coverage ares (a) Administrative costs.
(b) Capacity of the industry to provide the coverage.
(c) Spreading of insurance cost to power users rather than homeowners.
2.
It might take no action itself, allowing Price Anderson to be the sole deteeninant of reimbursement.
3.
It could urge repeal of Price Anderson or modification.
The Committee, therefore, recommends that the House Insurance Committee carefully study the nuclear liability issue to determine what approach, if any, the State should take in this area. ~
j
VII. Decontamination and Rehabilitation of Unit II A. Background According to William Kuhns, Chairman of the Board of GPU, the TMI accident:
"...has left us with quantities of radioactive fission products that are contained within the reactor containment building and the auxiliary building.
Ihese materials are contained with less long-term reliability than would have been present in the absence of the accident.
These materials should be moved from TMI and placed in storage or disposal facilities specifically designed and licensed for that purpose.
We are convinced that the removal of these materials from TMI is in the best interests of the neighbor of the plant."
Decontamintion of Unit II involves two areas:
1.
Cacontamination of the fuel handling building and the auxiliary building 1 2.
Decontamination and rehabilitation of the containment building.
B.
Fuel Handling / Auxiliary Building There is over 400,000 gallons of water in the auxiliary and fuel handling building at TMI that must be decontaminated.
The presence of this water presents a continual radiation hazard within the plant and increases the chances of worker overexposure. There is also a potential for a release of radioactive material to the environment at any time. According to Harold Denton, the risks from the cleanup operation to the public outside the plant is very small.
Furthermore, he stated before the Committee that he would like to see this water cleaned up as soon as possible.
Robert Arnold, Vice President of GPU and Senior Vice President of Met-Ed, appeared before the Committee on September 6, and gave the following account on how Met-Ed proposes to decontaminate the water in the auxiliary and fuel handling building:
" Decontamination involves two processes: collection of the radioactive fission products that are dispersed in the stored water into a form that is suitable for ultimate disposal, and cleanup of surface contamination on structures and equipment.
There are currently close to 300,000 gallons of water in the auxiliary building that need decontamination.
Our plans for decontamination of that water are just about complete; they involve the use of a system known as Epicor-II, which has been specifically drM3 iud for treatment of the auxiliary building water. Use of this sv4s % auuits approval of the NRC. An environmental assessment recentJ3 hsyd is the NRC staff, endorses the use of Epicor-II for the decogt aid 56"on task.
The assessment is now available for public comment.
E2is;s.seu.,;at does not address the disposition of the water af ter processi 3 through Epicor-II.
The disposition of the water will be the subject of a sepfrate environmental i
assessment to be issued by the NRC later this year.
As a result of decontamination activities, relatively large quantities of solid wasta material will be generated.
These materials must be transported to one of the three licensed waste repositories.
We intend to ship the waste materials generated during the TMI cleanup to the facility located in Ranford, Washington.
Depending on the treatment processes chosen and the amount of materials that are gathered during decontamination, we expect that over the next three to four years we may make upwards of 2,000 waste shipments; under " worst case" assumptions there could be as many as 3,000 shipments. The decontamination of the water in the auxiliary building and fuel handling building will generate waste materials requiring approximately 200 shipments."
Speaking on the use of the Epicor-II System to process the contaminated water in the auxiliary building, Harold Denton testified that:
"There is about 300,000 gs11ons of water in the auxiliary building and that is the water that the system we have named Epicor was designed to process and clean up.
The staff has done an assessment of the use of Epicor, compared Epicor to other ways of cleaning up that water and decided that was the proper chemical treatment unit to process that water.
Our assessment is out for public comment.
I guess my view is I would like to see that system go into operation as soon as possible, start cleaning up that water. The water that it produces, which would meet drinking water standards, could be stored on-site without being released. So the use of Epicor doesn't mean that the waser results from the use will necessarily be released at that time.
We have a separate assessment underway as to what type of release minimizes the public risk; whether it should be released in the Susquehanna, ocean release, evaporated release to the atmosphere. And once that is completed, that would be made available to the public for comment.
But the presesce of that water in the building presents a continual radiological hazard within the plant. And as you may know, there have been occasional overexposures of people resulting in part due to the fact that that water is still there awaiting clean up.
I am interested l
l in getting Epicor on line, getting it in use while we await final decision on what to do with the water that is processed."
The problems that the contaminated water pose both to on-site workers and the people living near the plant was also addressed by Tom Gerusky when he appeared before the Committee on September 20:
"The problem at Three Mile Island is it's going to be there and it's going i
to cause people to be concerned until the reactor core has been removed and gotten out of there.
There are problems right now of possible very high exposures to the people working there.
There is a potential for a release of radioactive material from the environment at any time.
It's very very small but there is a potential because there is a lot of radioactive or radioactivity in the plant and I would like to see that plant cleaned up as soon as possible."
On September 16, 1979, the NRC Commissioners unanimously approved the use of the Epicor-II system to decontaminate the water in the auxiliary and fuel handling buildings.
Because of the potential danger that this water presents, the Committee concurs in the Commission's decision.
C.
Decontamination and Rehabilitation of the Containment Building In regards to decontaminating and restarting the Unit II reactor, Bob Arnold i
provided the Committee with the following information*
"The lower level of this building is now flooded with about seven and a half feet of contaminated water, or approximately 550 to 600,000 gallons.
On the order of 100,000 gallons of additional contaminated water are contained in the reactor coolant system.
The water on the floor of the containment building and in-the reactor coolant system is too heavily contaminated to be treated using the Epicor-II system.
Instead, we are expecting to process it by means of a system under development by Chem-Nuclear Systems, Incorporated. We also have an evaporator system being designed which will be suitable for processing this water.
Again, none of this water will be treated until the necessary NRC approvals have been received.
In addition to removing and processing the water in the containment building and the reactor coolant system, it will be necessary to decontaminate the building surfaces and equipment, remove the fuel from the core, and examine and repair or replace the systems and equipment within the building.
To determine the best way in which these tasks could be accomplished, we commissioned Bechtel Power Corporation, a leading engineering and construction firm in the nuclear power industry, to prepare a scoping study on these tasks. I have with me copies of an initial report issued by Bechtel under this contract, which I offer as Exhibit 1 to my testimony.
Exhibit I covers only phase 1 of a three phase effort. Phase 1 ends when decontamination has progressed to the extent that access to the reactor vessel head area is feasible.
Phase 2 will encompass removal of the head, removal of the fuel, decontamination of the reactor cooling system and inspection of the reactor cooling system components.
Phase 3 involves the rebuild of the unit for service.
Bechtel has also provided a preliminary assessment of potential cost schedule for all three phases, which I offer as Exhibit 2.
I will not dwell at length on these exhibits since you will have the opportunity to examine their full contents.
Suffice it to say that the technical report contains a plan for the re-entry and decontamination of the containment building based upon calculated levels of contamination r
l in the building. The analysis yielded a range of values for the degree of contamination existing in the building, going from a "best" to a
" worst" case through a "most likely" intermedicte estimate.
I must caution that the results of the Bechtel study are preliminary in nature because the containment building has not been entered since the accident and there are uncertainties about the level of radiation and the condition of the facilities within the building.
Some of these uncertainties will soon be dispelled, for we recently obtained a sample of water from the reactor building floor, and the sample is at this time being analyzed.
l i
~43-
Results of the analysis should be available by the end of this week.
We expect that the analysis results will confirm our estimate that the release of fission products from the core was not as extensive as in the " worst case" postulated by Bechtel and may not be even as severe as Bechtel's mid-range scenario.
The Bechtel study does not cover the decontamination of the auxiliary and fuel handling buildings.
The significant milestones and associated dates identified by the company and by Bechtel are generally as follows:
1.
Decontami
- 1on of the auxiliary building to permit its normal occupancy ay the fall of this year.
i 2.
Removal of the containment building water by late in the first quarter of 1980.
3.
Initial entry and commencement of remote decontamination of the building in the spring of 1980.
(I should point out that initial entry into the containment building may take place in advance of remote decontamination.)
4.
Following its entry and remote decontamination, the containment building will be accessible for hands-on decontamination, and we anticipate the cleanup of the building to the point of being able to reach the top of the reactor vessel will take approximately a year.
Thus, in the spring of 1981, we expect to commence the removal of the reactor vessel head to gain access to the core.
5.
Completion of removal of the fuel from the core will take at least six months and would be completed by the fall of 1981.
6.
Once the fuel is removed, we will be able to decontaminate the reactor cooling system, inspect its major components and detecnine the degree of damage to the reactor cooling system piping and the thick-wall vessels. This effort would take us into the fall of 1982.
l 7.
Finally, it will take approximately nine months to repair or replace I
the systems and equipment damaged as a result of the accident.
Thereaf ter, Unit 2 should be ready for restart in the summer of 1983."
The costs associatid with decontamination and reactivating TMI-II are estimated to be about $400 million. As previously mentioned, the plant is insured for property damage up to $300 million. According to a news release put out by GPU:
"To the extent that this coverage might be exceeded, GPU will be seeking assistance from the government and the industry in areas where the technical information obtained can be of wide value.
Amortization of any remaining excess costs for rate making purposes will also be sought.
Some of the expenditures involved in returning the Unit to service are expected to constitute plant improvements and be capitalized and recovered over the life of the facility.
The Company emphasized that the amount of loss, if any, resulting from the TMI accident is not presently determinable."
1 When Harold Denton appeared before the Committee, he stated that the NRC had not yet received Met-Ed's plans for re-entering and cleaning up the damaged reactor.
He did state that he plans to issue a new set of regulations that would prevent Met-Ed from venting the gas in the containment building until the NRC has had the opportunity to do a complete study on this issue:
"I plan to issue a new set of licensed conditions for the Unit 2 in the near future and would include in those licensed conditions specific prohibition against any release of the gases in the containment, so-called venting of the containment, until such time we have had a chance to do a complete safety analysis and environmental study on that.
So I don't see us authorizing any entry or release of the gases or water that is in the containment for some time."
D.
Discharge of 4,000 Gallons of Waste Water from TMI in Susquehanna River On July 25, 1979, Met-Ed discharged 4,000 gallons of waste water from TMI Unit I into the Susquehanna River. According to published reports, the water was discharged without being tested and was done without the approval of the NRC officials at the site.
Robert Arnold, during his appearance before the Committee, stated that the water was not discharged without previously being tested and the discharge was not initiated without the knowledge of the NRC representative on site.
He then gave the Committee the following account of this incident:
~
"All discharges of water from TMI are controlled by formal, approved procedures that specify the sampling and analysis operations ". hat must be performed and the approvals that must be obtained betu;e discharge can take place. A few days before this particular discharge, a recommendation had been made by a NRC representative on site in the course ai conversation with Met-Ed staff that one additional test, known as gross beta analysis, not required by Met-Ed's Technical Specifications or operating procedures, be performed prior to the discharge of waste water from the radioactive waste treatment systems.
The Mec-Ed employees who talked to this NRC representative did not take issue with his reconnendation and the company does not take issue with it.
Company personnel did not immediately initiate changes to the procedures that control discharges.
Other Met-Ed personnel, unaware of the NRC representative's recommendation, performed all tests required by the plant's Technical Specifications and on the evening of July 25, 1979, notified the NRC representative on site (who was a different individual from the one making the test recommendation) that the discharge would be initiated.
The following morning, the NRC representative who made the recommendation came on site and learned that water was being discharged into the river. He inquired whether the recommended gross beta analysis had been performed.
He was told that it had not.
He then requested that the discharge be stopped pending performance of the gross beta analysis. This was done and the analysis was performed on a sample taken i
just prior to commencing the discharge.
Results of the gross beta analysis verified that the water was indeed suitable for discharge."
\\
When asked for their evaluation of this incident, both Harold Denton and John Collins (NRC Deputy Director of Recovery Operations at TMI) stated that it was a breakdown of communications among NRC people on the Island.
They further stated that this incident prompted the NRC to set up an organizational hierarchy to prevent the reoccurrence of such an incident.
VIII. Waste Disposal It was brought out at our hearings that there are only three commercial burial grounds in the country that are accepting low-level radioactive waste products-Hanford, Washington; Beatty, Nevada;l and Barnwell, South Carolina.
Shortly after the TMI accident, the Governor of South Carolina prohibited the burial of any waste from the TMI Udit 2 reactor within the borders of his state.
Consequently, Metropolitan Edison (Met-Ed) has been forced to ship its wasta to the Washington site. However, because some of the waste arriving at the site is not being properly packaged and is leaking, the Governor of this state has closed the Hanford site until the federal government is able to assure her that future shipments will be properly packaged.
(It should be noted that the leaking shipments did not involve TMI waste.) Since the other two sites will not accept any waste that was to go to the Washington site, Met-Ed has no place to ship its low-level radioactive waste and must wait until the Governor of Washington lif ts her order or the Department of Energy allows the company to send its waste to one of its installations.
l This situation plus the lack of any clear cut decision by the federal government on viable radioactive waste plans for high-level waste underscores the biggest problem confronting the nuclear industry today--What to do with the waste product? As long as this issue remains unsolved and we still lack a firm approach to the waste problem, the Committee feels that it would be unwise to approve new nuclear plant construction. Therefore, the Committee recommends enactment of legislation which will allow the Department of Environmental Resources (DER) to impose a moratorium on new nuclear plant construction in Pennsylvania until a workable radioactive waste disposal plan has been adopted by the federal government. There are two bills in the House--H.B. #990 and S.B. #600--which, among other things, would give this authority to DEL, The Comnittee, therefore, feels that these bills should be considered immediately.
IX.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Metropolitan Edison As previously mentioned, the denial of a technical staff by the House Majority Leadership prevented the Committee from performing an in-depth study of the issues relative to nuclear safety.
Consequently, we have also been unable to adequately assess both Met-Ed's and the NRC's response to this accident.
Nevertheless, we have been able to make a number of observations on both the agency and the utility.
These points are documented below.
1 Subsequent to our hearings, the Governor of Nevada ordered the Beatty site to close because of the potential datger that leaking radioactive packages presented to the area.
I.
p a
mm A.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1.
Overview Since 1946, when the first Atomic Energy Act was passed, the federal government has exercised exclusive control over the production and use of atomic energy through the Atomic Energy Council (AEC). With the passage of the Energy Reorganization Act in 1974, the AEC was abolished and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was established as the agency responsible for the regulation of nuclear power reactors.
The TMI accident dramatically highlighted the deficiencies of this Commission.
Although the final verdict is still "out" on the Commission's performance both prior to and during the nuclear accident, the preliminary reports and testimony received from the several committees examining the TMI accident have indicated that the Commission's regulatory performance to date has been extremely poor.
An aggressive, thorough and effective regulatory commission is necessary to insure the safety of commercial nuclear reactors.
However, the findings of the investigatory committees have revealed a complacent, almost lax attitude by the government regulators towards the operation of nuclear facilities.
Indeed, although we lacked the technical staff to thoroughly review this issue, we were still able to identify a number of glaring inadequacies on the part of the Commission:
a recommendation that was made previous to the TMI accident relative to improved communications between nuclear reactors and the Commission was not effected; an event that occurred at a nuclear reactor in 1977 which had the same initial accident scenario of the TMI accident was not properly interpreted and pursued; the operator training process was virtually paid lip service. An NRC official freely admitted before the Committee that they are learning about nuclear reactors from experience.
A nuclear reactor uses a fuel that is potentially more dangerous than any other element every used by man for this purpose.
Trial by error in this particular arena can prove to be catastrophic and is simply and obviously not a proper learning process.
2.
Observations / Findings NRC Response - A special investigation staff of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation has analyzed the NRC's activities following its notification of the TMI accident.
Numerous problems were identified by this group, including:
i The early indicators of the severity of the accident were not properly perceived or interpreted by NRC personnel; 4
Although major damage to the nuclear core at TMI occurred during Wednesday, March 28, the Executive Management Team at NRC's Incident i
Response Center did not formally discuss evacuation of the area around
)
the plant on that day; and 1
l The scope of the NRC's Response Planning was inadequate.
+
\\
Davis-Besse Incident - On September 24, 1977, an accident occurred at the Davis-Besse nuclear plant in Ohio. The initial sequence of events of this accident 4
was similar to the beginning of the TMI 2 accident. The major difference between these two accidents was that the operators of the Davis-Besse plant realized a relief valve was stuck open within 20 minutes of the accident while it took the TMI operators well over two hours to make this correction.
It was brought to the attention of the Committee that, prior to the TMI accident, both Babcock and Wilcox and NRC inspectors had studied the Davis-Besse event but their observations were not relayed to other Babcock and Wilcox licensees.
The GPU officials who appeared before our Committee stated that if they had been informed of the facts behind the Davis-Besse incident, the accident at TMI would probably have been less severe. Harold Denton stated before the Committee that, in retrospect, the NRC should have recognized the potential for the accident at TMI from the events that occurred at the Davis-Besse plant.
Communication Problems - Communication problems existed between the plant site and the NRC headquarters during the first few days of the TMI accident.
The transcripts of the meetings of the NRC Commissioners which were held during the TMI accident clearly point out the communication problems confronting the Commission.
On Friday morning, March 30, during a discussion with NRC staff, Joseph Hendrie, Commission Chairman, made the following rea. ark:
"We are operating almost totally in the blind, his (Governor) information is ambiguous, mine is non-existent and--I don't know, it's like a couple of blind men staggering around making decisions."
In fact, it was this gap in communications that. led to the evacuation recommendation by the NRC senior management officials on Friday morning.
- However, communication problems of this nature were experienced previously by the Commission.
As was noted by the special investigation staff of the U.S. Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation:
" Communication difficulties between the plant and NRC headquarters similar to those experienced at TMI existed during the March 22, 1975 fire at the Brown's Ferry nuclear plant.
Subsequent analysis of the Brown's Ferry fire led to recommendations within the NRC and agreement among senior NRC staff officials on the need for direct communication links between operating reactors and the NRC. At the time of the accident, these recommendations had not been adopted or presented to the Commission, apparently due to the belief within the agency that incident response had a low priority."
Operator Training - The Commission's attitude towards operator training resembled its attitude on emergency response--an almost blind faith belief in the safety of the reactor.
In describing the Commission's attitude on training operators Mr. Denton stated:
"In looking back I think the thought process that must have gone on was that machines were so well designed that the people who were trained and hired to run the machine were able to operate under normal conditions, that the machine would not get in trouble itself.
In other words, the machine would currently not require a great deal of skill and place l
a lot of demands on operators."
e..
On May 15, 1979, the General Accounting Office issued a report in response to a request from U.S. Senator Richard Schweiker for a prompt analysis of the NRC's program for licensing nuclear power plant operators.
One of the findings of this report was that:
i
...While the principal causes of the TMI nuclear accident areetentative, documentation shows that human / operator error has occurred at other commercial nuclear power plants. According to the Commission's statistics, human error accounted for 18% of all reportable incidents in 1978, with specific operator error accounting for one-third of the percentage."
This report offered the following conclusion:
"Although the Commission is still analyzing thu causes and effects of Three Mile Island nuclear accident, it is clear that human / operator errors have been a problem at other nuclear power plants.
Based upon our lidted review of the Commission's operator licensing program, and upon the ne ber of human / operator error-related accidents in the past, we believe that the operator licensing program should be completely reevaluated.
Commission officials have agreed that a complete reevaluation of the operator licensing program is needed, and.have acknowledged that such an evaluation will be made."
B.
Metropolitan Edison 1.
Overview Met-Ed's performance during the TMI accident may have reinforced the stereotype of the electric utility executive as holding the economic interest of the company over all other concerns. We are not saying that this was the case; we are saying that this is the image that was projected to, or was perceived by, the public.
During the initial days of the accident, Met-Ed acted in an irresponsible manner. They either deliberately 6,nplayed the accident or failed to understand the severity of the mishap. This has not yet been determined.
Either case, however, is a serious indictment against the company's ability to manage and operate a nuclear facility.
It is important for any utility opera.:ing such a facility to not only convey to the public that it is capable but also to assure them that it holds their health and welfare paramount to any other concern. Met-Ed failed to do this and consequently has lost all public confidonce and trust. The onus is now on Met-Ed to rebuild its public image and to prove to the public and the regulators that is is able to manage and operate a nuclea; facility.
The NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) has been closely examining the TMI incident to determina if Met-Ed violated its operating license.
In its report on the investigation, IE did identify a number of potential non-compliance items and they are now being closely reviewed by the Commission.
Because of the Committee's lac of technical staff, we must defer to the Commission's final decision on this subject
^ Subsequent to our hearings, the NRC fined Met-ED S155,000 for seven i
violations of the Commission's rule.
It should be noted that further penalties i
including the modification,' suspension or revocation of Met-Ed's license, could be also levied by the NRC on the utility.
The IE report also identified six major areas of inadequacies which either served as the causes of the accident or contributed to its severity.
These included:
1.
Equipment performance (failures and maloperation).
l l
2.
Transient and accident analyses.
(
3.
Operator training and performance.
4.
Equipment and system design.
5.
Information flow, particularly during the early hours of the accident.
6.
Implementation of emergency planning.
l l
The report further stated that:
l "Perhaps the most disturbing result of the IE investigation is confirmation of earlier conclusions that the Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident could have been prevented, in spite of the inadequacies listed above. The design of the plant, the equipment that was installed, the various accident and transient analyses, and the emergency procedures were adequate to have prevented the serious consequences of the accident, if they had been permitted to function or be carried out as planned."
As we mentioned in Section V of this report, the IE investigation was also critical of Met-Ed for its inadequacies in its radiation protection and monitoring activities.
2.
Observations / Findings Conflicting Statements - As soon as the Lieutenant Governor opened his 4:30 p.m. press conference on Wednesday, March 28, 1979, with the remark that Met-Ed had been putting out conflicting information, the utility's credibility and public image began to rapidly dissipate.
In the next few days, Met-Ed did nothing to help its image or restore its credibility.
According to Governor Thornburgh, "The company issued statements in the early days that proved to be something less than accurate, and its credibility as a reliable source of information eroded ra'.her quickly."
The Governor further stated that:
"The first incident that caused ut, to rethink the reliability of information turnished by the utility was on Wednesday after they had advised the Lt. Governor and he ' sad advised the press, and then the press the public, that there had been no release of radiation on site and thereaf ter we discovered through DER, that a substantial release had taken place on Wednesday at the very time that the Lt. Governor was extending that advice."
e,
l The Governor was not the only official in Pennsylvania who began to question the veracity of Met-Ed's statements. The Mayor of Middletown, Mr. Robert Reid, told the Committee that he was in contact with a Met-Ed official around 11:15 a.m.
on Wednesday morning, March 28, and was told that no radiation had been released to the environment.
Immediately following this conversation, Mr. Reid walked to his car, and, as he told the Committee members:
"...I turned on my radio, and the announcer said that radiation particles had been released.
Now, that's 20 seconds after the man told me that there..."
Severity of the Accident - During the early days of the accident, it appears that Met-Ed officials attempted to underplay the full extent of damage er were totally blind to the early indicators of the severity of the accident. On Wednesday af ternoon, March 28, 1979, John Herbein, a Vice President of Met-Ed, stated to the news media that the plant was in a safe condition and that there may be some minor radioactivity in the plant.
He further stated that the plant would be operational in several days or, at most, a few weeks.
Mr. Denton was informed of these press statements when he appeared before the Committee and was asked to comment on them.
He stated:
"...However, in looking back, there were several indicators early on of severe core damage. You may recall the fact that the exceedingly high temperatures were reported to people in the control room, even Wednesday morning.
Temperatures were in excess of 2,000*.
Then there was the question of hydrogen burning and containment pressure spike that I heard that day.
There were several indicators on Wednesday that in hindsight and in today's view, it could have been recognized early on as indicating damage.
These were inexplicably, in my view, overlooked or felt to be erroneous; wnich to each one, there was some explanation as to why it should probably be disregarded.
If you look at the total chain of information that was available and the hindsight that I got today, it's not clear why the extent was not more readily recognized."
Testimony has surfaced recently which indicates that some Met-Ed officials were aware of the severity of the accident on Wednesday, March 28.
The investigation staff of the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation stated that:
"Two other significant indicators of the severity of the accident--specific in-core temperature readings and the occurrence of a large increase or
" spike" in the containment building pressure--were not received by the Incident Response Center (NRC officials) on the first day.
Evidence has been presented to the investigation staff that both indicators were known to some utility personnel at the site, and that evidence of the containment pressure spike may have been shown to an NRC inspector at the site."
i '
i It should also be noted that Joseph Marrone, General Counsel for the American Nuclear Insurers, testified before the Committee that af ter consultation with Met-Ed officials on Thursday, March 29, the Nuclear Insurers decided to open an office in the area:
"I had with me an engineer, one of our nuclear engineers. We asked them (Met-Ed Officials) to describe what was taking place because we wanted to make an assessment with respect to whether or not we should put an emergency office in place. We spent several hours reviewing events with them.
Things were still uncertain.
I had several conversations with the claims advisors, our claim advisors, telephone conversations and it was decided that it looked as if things were serious enough so that we should be prepared in the event that an evacuation would take place."
Mr. Marrone went on to say that:
"...but we felt that after our discussion with then that the accident was potentially serious.
It was conceivable that an evacuation might be desirable or ordered and that we should take the steps to prepare for that, if that should be realized. We knew there was a chance that we l
might be spending time and energy for something that might not come to pass.
l We felt that we should be prepared. We had long prepared for just such an t
emergency. We have this manual prepared for many years with respect to l
responding to an emergency. We felt that we should to through the steps necessary to be ready, should an evacuation be ordered.
It was judgment we made."
This is important in view of the fact that this "potentially serious" aspect of the accident was not reflected in any press releases put out by the utility nor was it, to the best of our knowledge, communicated to state officials.
Advanced Notification of Radiation Release - It is also not clear whether Met-Ed informed the State or the NRC in advance of the radiation release on Foiday morning.
In response to a question on this subject, Tom Gerusky stated:
"No.
We knew after the read--we were told the readings were going up from the plant and our people were out monitoring ws were also told that venting would be over shortly."
On this question, William Dornsife stated:
l "Not before, well they say that this is, their telling us they notified I
off-site agents but we have no recollection of that occurrence."
Asked if the NRC was notified in advance of the radiation releases, Mr. Denton responded:
"I don't know whether we were or not.
It's been alleged that some of the operators in--that NRC persons at the station early Friday morning was l
informed.
I have asked our inspection office to attempt to verify that.
Today, they have not been able to establish, from their interview that we were."
C.
Nuclear Industry This final point refers to the nuclear industry in general.
According to Dentoa, it seems that the industry has not taken the initiative in promoting nuclear safety. They have been content to sit back and take their cue from the NRC. Speaking on this subject, Mr. Denton stated:
"My own view is that industry had adopted a policy that if the NRC didn't require it, they weren't going to make the change.
So they would report these unusual occurrences (Davis-Besse incident) as they happened, but they would sit back themselves and unless we issued a directive from Washington saying put it another pump, change that procedure, do this, they were not going to commit any funds to do it."
During a speech before the Edison Electric Institutes on June 12, 1970, NRC Commissioner Richard Kennedy stated that:
"With that complacency came the conventional wisdom that the regulators were responsible for nuclear safety. Today, I hear repeated cries for increased federal intervention to assure adequate safety. We regulators i
have a job to do, but let me suggest, if all reliance for safety is to be placed on the regulator, we are not going to have much of a technology.
Indeed, we are not going to have much of an industry.
Safety, in the last analysis, must be paramount in the minds of those who conceive the l
nuclear facility, in the plans of those who design it, in the equipment of those who construct it, and ultimately, in the practices and procedures of those who operate it.
Safety is the responsibility of the industry.
It is not and cannot be wholly the province of the regulator. And the industry should not rely upon the regulator to assure that safety is adequate.
For, unless the industry i
cultivates a skeptical attitude, demanding the highest order of safety and giving safety the highest priority in all stages of the process, uncertainties will persist about whether it is truly safe."
X.
The News Media During any emergency, it is the news media's responsibility to continually inform the public of the status of the situation.
This information must be disseminated in such a manner that it neither overplays nor underplays the situation.
The consequences of either action are obvious.
During the TMI accident, a majority of the news coverage was objective and informative. The local coverage, in particular, proved to be capable and cautious.
Unfortunately, a certain amount of " sensationalism" was allowed to appear in print d.
I l
l and in the broadcast media.
While the contents of most news articles were I
factual and temperate, some were seriously flawed by apocalyptic headlines:
1 l
" Experts Converge at Nuclear Facility in Effort to Avert Catastrophe Amid Risks, Uncertainties" or Race with Nuclear Disaster." Threats of an impending meltdown kept several hundred thousand persons on tenterhooks throughout the proceedings and the media took great pains, it appears, to detail the potential horrors and subsequent deaths and mainings that could occur over a wide radius if the ultimate meltdown took place.
One story by a metropolitan newspaper told of a farmer living near the TMI plant who had reportedly suffered widespread stock damage since the plant opened.
Reports of dead cattle from mysterious reasons, grass that didn't grow, stillborn calves and other incidents were reported, with no explanation of the cause.
To date, no followup story has appeared on whether autopsies were performed on the animals, whether the deaths were actually caused by radiation or some other means.
As a consequence, the final chapter of the story is still hanging in limbo, as are the people who read the original story.
Metropolitan newspapers, sensing a sensational once-in-a-century story, assigned droves of reporters to the TMI coverage. Almost none of them had any knowledge of the nuclear energy industry.
There were sports reporters, society reporters, obit writers and any other number of newspeople who were as familar with the parlance of the nuclear energy industry as the average private citizen.
Yet they composed reams of copy containing words like " rem," " millirem," " roentgens,"
and the like.
One of the lessons learned from TMI is the need for the media to rely more on the expertise of informed consultants during such accidents and less on the emotional response of lay persons, including media representatives j
themselves.
\\
It would be well for the news media to reread and recheck all of their stories--in print, on TV and on radio--and analyze them for accuracy.
It should also be noted that the news media, which since Three Mile Island has become the self-appointed guardian of the people's safety as f ar as nuclear energy is caccarned, showed very little inclination towards launching thorough probes of the nuclear industry prior to the accident.
Peraaps some soul-searching analysis on the part of the executives who decide priorities will reveal that the news media is as guilty of reacting to crisis situationa as the legislature and other public officials are often accused of doing.
l XI.
Other Considerations A. State Inspectors A suggestion was made to the Committee by William Dornsife, the nuclear engineer for BRP, to have one state nuclear engineer for each nuclear site in Pennsylvania.
The Committee agrees with Mr. Dornsife's suggestion and proposes to submit legislation which would direct the BRP to hire a nuclear engineer for each reactor site in Pennsylvania. Thic would necessitate the hiring of five engineers to serve as inspectors at the following nuclear sites:
Susquehanna, Limerick, Beaver Valley, Peach Bottom and TMI.
9 4
The primary responsibility of the nuclear inspector would be to represent the State in the nuclear facility's construction and licensing proceedings.
After the plant is in operation, the state inspector would also have the authority to accompany federal nuclear inspectors on their inspections of the plant and he will also be empowered to make unannounced inspections on his own initiative.
He can also bring to light any violations in the utility's operating license that are not uncovered by the NRC and petition the NRC to shut the facility down until these violations are corrected.
In addition, he can insure that the regulators are doing their job properly.
In times of emergency, this person could be immediately dispatched to the site and keep the State informed, on a timely basis, of what is being done to improve the situation.
Because of his familiarity with the plant, he could serve as the State's coordinator for information and disseminate it to the decision-makers. The inspector would represent a credible and technical source at the plant site and his presence should help to improve the communication gap which existed during the TMI accident.
This person will not be a resident engineer.
He will either be housed in one of BRP's regional offices or in Harrisburg.
This requirement is necessary to avoid a situation in which the engineer develops a " cozy" relationship with the utility.
B.
Public Edification on Nuclear Emergencies / Emergency Preparedness 1.
Industry Role In testifying before the TMI Committee, Mr. William Kuhns, Chairman of the Board of CPU, stated that:
"We must also vastly improve the ability to communicate with the public in terms that are understandable.
The neighbors of nuclear plants tend to gain greater understcrding of the workings of the plants so that they can better interpret what is being said. They need a better understanding of radiation and the relationstJp between intensity and health effects.
The public needs to be able to ascess this hazard just as they assess all other hazards that modern life presents."
We concur with Mr. Kuhns' statement on this subject and ask that Met-Ed and the other utilities in the State with nuclear reactors move aggressively and objectively to edify the public on matters relevant to nuclear power. As NRC Commissioner Richard Kennedy stated in a speech on June 12, 1979:
i "The need is clear. Those concerned with the future of nuclear power must do a better job of eaucating the public to both its benefits and its risks.
The dangers of tornadoes and other natural calamities are evident and understood.
In the case of the people of Middletown, some of whom were advised to leave their homes, the potential danger was invisible and, therefore, created all the more anxiety...
Before Three Mile Island, the majority of the general populace accepted nuclear power essentially on faith.
For the future, much more will be l
needed.
In the words of Congressman George Brown, 'You will do much l
better for your industry to let it all hang out--the good and the bad '
The public must be informed in plain English, so that everyone understands. ~Far too often, the nuclear story has been told in language well designed for the doctoral dissertation, the laboratory, or the technical meeting.
But it has been language which makes no sense to anyone but a nuclear physicist. Like it or not, nuclear physics is not a widely understood discipline.
Questions of radioactivity and radiation effects simply are not widely understood."
2.
NRC Emergency Office In his appearance before our Committee, Harold Denton stated his preference for locating office space in the vicinity of THI and to staff it with NRC personnel.
The NRC staff will then be accessible to the public and would be able to answer any f
questions that may arise on a day-to-day basis as the clean-up events at TMI unfold.
q We feel that this is a good idea and urge that it be effected as soon as possible.
We also believe that the NRC should consider this to be a requirement when responding to any future nuclear accident.
3.
Health Education Films and Programs Perhaps the best way to inform the people living near nuclear facilities i
about nuclear plant hazards, emergency action and how to prepare themselves in the event of a radiation release is to start in the schools. Years ago, according to Colonel Henderson, the Commonwealth had a course of 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in the public school system entitled, "Your Chance To Live".
For various reasons, this program was replaced in most school districts.
It is our understanding that PEMA has now made a formal request to the Education Department to have this course reintroduced.
The Committee asks the Education Department to seriously consider this request or institute a new program in the schools on this issue.
It is also our understanding that the Health Department and the Department of Education are working together to develop specific health education films and programs for various age groups within the population.
The Committee supports these efforts.
4.
Educational Booklet Approximately three years ago, PEMA drafted a booklet entitled, "What You l
Should Know About Nu.-lear Radiation Incidents". PEMA's intention was to distribute this booklet to those people living within five miles of a nuclear power plant.
However, according to Colonel Henderson, it was not published because of lack of concurrence on the part of the BRP.
Mr. Gerusky, Director of BRP, stated that, l
while he didn't oppose releasing such a pamphlet, he did think that it could have l
been improved upon and he communicated his suggestions to Mr. Henderson.
These suggestions were not incorporated and the booklet was never distributed.
PEMA has now updated that booklet and it has been distributed to all Met-Ed customers. Philadelphia Electric has also distributed it to its customers within a ten mile radius of their Peach Bottom Plant.
In addition,, Pennsylvania Power and Light (PP&L) has supplied these two utilities with a list of their customers in the l
1
vicinity of TMI and Peach Bottom.
Met-Ed and Philadelphia Electric will then mail these booklets to these individuals. Duquesne Light also plans to distribute these pamphlets and a sufficient supply of these pamphlets are available for residents within a ten mile radius of both the Berwick and Limerick nuclear plants.
PEMA has also sent these books to the counties for, distribution to the municipalities.
While the Committee does not disagree with the publication and dissemination of this information, we are concerned that some people, af ter receiving this booklet, may throw it away or lose it.
The Committee, therefore, recommends that PEMA work with the Bell Telephone Company to determine the possibility of enclosing these booklets inside a celephone directory or publishing this information on the inside cover of a telephone directory. We understand that PEMA has, on its own initiative, received a firm commitment from the telephone industry to commence, on or around, January 1,1980, publishing emergency instructions in the telephone directories issued after the above cited date. The Committee applauds this effort and recommends that PEMA_ continue to work closely with the telephone industry to update emergency information on a regular basis.
C.
Certification and Siting These hearings also brought out the real and urgent need for State certification and siting legislation. With this in mindr the Committee recommends the adoption of H.B. #42, which provides for the certification and siting of new electric generating facilities in Pennsylvania.
j Although there exists a comprehensive licensing process for power plants on the federal level, we do not believe that the federal government should be the sole authority on the siting of power plants.
We think that the State should be able to make its decisions on whether or not the facility is needed and whether or not the proposed site is acceptable. House Bill #42 would permit this while minimizing duplication with the federal process.
House Bill #42 also secures public and governmental participation in the first two phases of the siting process. Presently, the decisions on the need for a facility and the initial selection of a site are made solely by utilities.
H.B. #42 allows the State and the public to actively participate in these proceedings.
House Bill #42 authorizes the Public Utility Commission to determine whether or not a facility is needed.
The Commission's decision is to be made only after public hearings have been conducted on this subject.
The determination of need is essential and the crucial first step in the siting process because once this is determined a means of satisfying that need is new or additional generation.
Additional generation will mean higher rates for customers and necessary regulatory approval of the financing of the construction until completion of the plant.
Therefore, a determination of need by an appropriate state agency, after public input has been given, should be a requisite part of the siting process.
H.B. #42 also empowers the Department of Environmental Resources to make an early review of the proposed site and to determine whether or not the site is environmentally acceptable.
Such a decision can only be made after public hearings have been held ca the subject. At the present time there are no l
regulatory or governmental reviews or approvals required for the initial j
selection of a site per se.
Bringing the government and the public into the
[
process at such an early time will provide them with adequate opportunities to l
participate in a timely fashion in decisions that would ultimately affect their interests. Also, although early site approval would not obviate the necessity for securing various local, state and federal permits and approvals which are now required, it may help to expedite the acquisition of these permits.
D. Eszard Analysis In draf ting plans for an emergency response, Colonel Henderson testified that:
"At the present time, one of the big factors in any kind of a planning is the basis for your planning.. We are trying to force the Nuclear Ragulatory Commission for giving us a hazard analysis for each of the power plants l
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, which takes into consideration i
l the kind of situations and the probability of those situations and l
takes into consideration the weather and the terrain data.
So, we can L
see in black and white why we need to figure on a five mile, a three l
mile or a ten mile or a hundred mile evacuation.
This is something we l
have never had before.
It's something that it appears the NRC is not very well equipped to provide, but it's something that we are insisting that they do provide."
The Comeittee feels that Colonel Henderson has made a valid request and we urge the NRC to proceed on this as soon as possible. This can be done in conjunction with the Governor's request to the NRC to inspect every reactor located in Pennsylvania, and to assure him, if it can, that the TMI accident shall not be repeated.
E.
State Licensing of Nuclear Operators The State should consider the possibility of initiating a program of state licensure for the operators of nuclear facilities.
It was brought out at our hearings that the NRC's program in this area has not been as aggressive as it should have been.
Furthermore, a report by the GAO concluded that the NRC's operator licensing program should be completely reevaluated.
The report found that the Commission has no minimum eligibility requirement for either the licensed operators or the senior operators (those individuals who direct the activities o,f licensed operators).
In' addition, the report found that a person who possesses a high school diploma or its equivalency may be allowed to operate a plant. The GAO report raises the question of whether a high school graduate is suited to operate the controls of nuclear power plants.
The Committee feels that the high school curriculum does not provide the technical information necessary to provide a prospective plant operator with an understanding of the complexities of a nuclear power plant. We feel additional education on the college level should be a prerequisite for the licensing
~
of a plant operator.
As was previously mentioned, the Committee did not pursue this issue.
We, therefore, recommend that if the Committee fails to review this issue in more detail, then the F.Juse Mines and Energy Management Committee should study this question.
Included in this examination should be the practicality of having a similar licensing program for the management of utilities who j
operate a nuclear plant.
l
l It is our understanding that the P.U.C. has initiated a full-scale management audit on the owners of TMI: CPU, Met-Ed, and Penelec. These audits will be used by the Commission to determine the extent to which the utility management has contained costs, developed reasonable long and short-range plans for the firm's continued operation, provided proper service to the customers it serves, and provided proper management and organizational structure. The Committee commends the Commission for their ef forts in this area l
and recommends that they examine the internal management activities of other Pennsylvania utilities.
i F.
Plant Designs According to Harold Denton, almost every nuclear plant operating in the i
country is different and has evolved in a different direction. This is what complicates NRC staff review of these plants.
In retrospect, Denton maintained, it would probably have been advantageous to have built more plants that were identical.
This would have allowed the staff to develop more experience on these plants.
Speaking on this subject before the Edison Electric Institute on June 12,1979, NRC Commissioner Richard Kennedy stated:
"Another issue that has come into better focus as a result of TMI is the long-standing debate as to whether standardization of nuclear power plants improves or hinders reactor safety.
In the past, some have argued that encouragement of standardization by the regulators would be promotional and might even inhibit adoption of essential safety features. They asserted that errors once made would be perpetuated and proliferated.
In my judgment, the lessons learned from TMI have served to undercut this line of reasoning.
The incident highlights for us the problems caused by widely varying plant designs and differing operating parameters and procedures. To quote one NRC staff expert on the subject:
'The combinations of designs, procedures, setpoints, response to transient, etc., for all plants, PWR and BWR, is staggering.' With specific reference to Three Mile Island, oae view has been expressed that:
'(M) any of the initial difficulties faced in coping with the TMI accident would have been reduced had TMI been one of a family of standard plants under a standardization policy implemented with a high degree of l
discipline; standardization provides a policy and framework for the staff and the industry to know, understand, and model l
the response of plant systems, and thus, to quickly and effectively analyze differing situations.'"
t l
1 _
l In light of this, the Committee urges the NRC to adopt standardized plans and specifications for design and construction of all future nuclear power facilities.
Mr. Denton has stated that the NRC is learning from experience. We feel that tinkering with a nuclear plant is'too dangerous. Therefore, we urge the Commission to develop standardized plans and specifications that will assure us that operating a nuclear energy facility will be reasonably safe.
G.
Gross Receipts Tax Exclusion We feel that the Commonwealth should be prohibited from imposing the
- l Gross Receipts Tax (GRT) on any revenue resulting from higher replacement energy costs incurred by Met-Ed and Penalec as a result of the accident at TMI.
We believe the customers of Met-Ed and Penalec should be exempted from paying the GRT on any purchased power costs incurred by the utilities which exceed the power costs that would have been incurred if that power had been generated e
at the TMI facility. Although th c.RT is assessed on the utilities' gross revenue at a rate of 41/2%, the utt.ities are allowed to pass it on to their customers.
Both Met-Ed and Penelee have been purchasing more expensive energy to replace the power that would have been generated at Three Mile Island.
Consequently, this higher replacement energy cost has resulted in
~
higher utility revenue.
Since the GRT is applied on a company's gross revenue, the amount of tax money collected by the State from the consumer has also increased. The Committee, therefore, believes that these customers should be exempted from absorbing this added tax increase.
XII.
Extension of Cocmittee It is our recommendation that the Committee should continue to exist beyond its current expiration date. We have a number of reasons for this recommendation.
First, the Select Committee on TMI has until October 24, 1979, to submit its report to the House of Representatives.
An extension to this deadline will provide the Committee with an opportunity to react to the findings and recommendations of the President's Commission on TMI.
The Commission is scheduled to issue its report in late October and, in all likelihood, will be a thorough and comprehensive study of the accident. Keep in mind that the Select TMI Committee is essentially the only Pennsylvania body directed to comprehensively investigate the TMI accident. Therefore, if the Committee folds on October 24, there will be no official entity to represent the Commonwealth on this issue. Also, the Committee should be in a position to respond to the recommendations that will be made by the TMI l
study cr,amittee that has been appointed by Governor Thornburgh. The Committee should de able to digest, study, and integrate the recommendations of these two comittees into its final report.
i 1
l -
t
1 i
Second, as mentioned in this report, we are dissatisifed with the scope of the Connittee's inquiry. We failed to examine many vital issues relative to nuclear power and we should pursue these issues.
Finally, as long as there remains uncontainable fission products on Three Mile Island, we cannot in good conscience terminate the Committee.
Critical decisions will be made and actions taken on the TMI site concerning waste management and disposal in the months ahead.
We can perform an extremely valuable oversight role by keeping abreast of these decisions.
The safety and welfare of our citizens require no less action.
l Speaking in reference to the accumulated waste products on TMI, Harold Denton said:
"We are going to have a potential for these problems as long as we have as much contaminated water there with relatively volatile fission products in it."
l Like Harold Denton, we too should be concerned about being on top of these types of problems.
In view of these reasons, we recommend that the life of this Committee be extended until November 30, 1980.
XIII.
Conclusion The TMI nuclear accident will serve no purpose unless we are able to learn from it.
Within the next several months, the Committees and Commissions examining this accident will issue their findings and recommendations.
Both the NRC and the nuclear industry must thoroughly review these findings and recommendations and act upon them.
The recommendations that this Committee made are thoroughly documented within the body of this report. However, we cannot offer a definitive statement on the causes of the TMI accident and we are not able to issue a conclusive statement on the role of nuclear power in meeting the energy needs of the Commonwealth. The scope of the Committee's inquiry prevented us from doing this.
It has not, however, deterred us from making a number of observations on this energy source:
First, if nuclear power is to be continued, then the public must be assured that nuclear facilities will operate safely.
Second, both the NRC and the nuclear industry must improve upon their track record.
The use of nuclear power should be contingent on the existence of an aggressive and rigorous regulatory agency. The NRC must have in place proper surveillance and effective monitoring techniques to carry out its watchdog role and its personnel must be dedicated to insuring that nuclear l
facilities will operate safely.
The nuclear industry itself must l
become more frank and candid with the public on all matters relating to nuclear power.
In addition, it must seize the initiative and improve upon its safety record.
Finally, there will be many lessons learned from the TMI accident.
Perhaps the most important lesson is that nuclear accidents can indeed happen.
Both the Commission and the nuclear industry must*
proceed with this assumption.
At a news conference on April 3,1979, Harold Denton reported that the hydrogen bubble in the reactor vessel had dissipated to the point that it no longer posed a problem. When asked for the reason for its disappearance, l
he stated:
i "I think it was a little bit because of our actions and maybe a little bit of serendipity...A little bit of luck and a little bit of forethought..."
Chance, more than anything else, may very well have been the determining factor in enabling us to avoid a potentially catastrophic occurrence at TMI.
Hopefully, everyone will learn from this accident, and, in the event that another accident should occur, man, not luck, will be able to resolve it.
For the history of mankind has shown us that fortune is no man's ally, i
l l
l
(
l i
(
e e
Nucicar Planta in Pennsylvania: Operating or Under Construction Attachment I On Line Megawatt Plant Operating Utility Date Capacity Location Type 2/Manu f ac turers3 Shippingport Duquesne Light 1957 90 Shippingport LWBR/W Bn ver Valley I Duquesne Light 1976 852 Shippingport PWR/W Beaver Valley II Duquesne Light 19841 852 Shippingport PWR/W Three Mile Island I Metropolitan Edison 1974 819 Middletown PWR/B&W Three Mile Island II Metropolitan Edison 1978 906 Middletown PWR/B&W Pacch Bottom II Philadelphia Electric 1973 1065 Peach Bottom Township BWR/GE Peach Bottom III Philadelphia Electric 1974 1065 Peach Bottom Township BWR/CE 1
Limerick I Philadelphia Electric 1985 1065 Pottstown BWR/CE 1
Limerick II Philadelphia Electric 1987 1065 Pottstown BWR/GE 1
Su quehanna I Pennsylvania Power and 1981 1050 Berwick BWR/GE Light Company Surquehanna II Pennsylvania Power and 19831 1050 Berwick BWR/GE Light Company 1
2 3 eactor Manufacturers:
Projected On-Line Date Reactor Types:
R BWR - Boiling Water Reactor B&W - The Babcock & Wilcox Company PWR - Pressurized Water Reactor GE - General Electric Company LWBR - Light Water Breeder Reactor W
- Westinghouse Electric Corporation e
Attachment II i
EXCERPTS From The PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGDfENT AGENCY'S ACTIVITY' LOGS March 28 to April 5 e
6 a
9 6
m m
March 28,1979 0702 Call from Shift Supervisor at Three Mile Island stating they had an. emergency in reactor No. 2 which has been shut down.
There is a high level of radiation in the Reactor Room but no off-site release. He requested that the Bureau of Radiation Protection (DER) be notified and return the call, t
Called Bureau of Radiation Protection at 787-2480 Notified William Dornsife, Duty Officer, Bureau of Radiation 0725 Dick Lamison, Operations Officer PEMA, relayed message from l
PEMA watch officer that TMI had declared a " site emergency" as of 0702 hours0.00813 days <br />0.195 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.67111e-4 months <br />. The report concerned Reactor No. 2, that TMI was reporting some radiation in Reactor Room. However, it was being contained and no off-site releases.
Reactor had been shut down.
0732 Received call from the Duty Officer stating that he had received an emergency notification from Three Mile Island. A high level of radiation had been noted in Reactor Room No. 2.
Reactor had i
been shut down.
No off-site problems noted.
The Duty Officer I
had not yet notified York County, PEMA Director and Central Area in the emergency call sequence.
He was informed that the Operations Officer would take care of the notification.
j 0735 Call from Shift Supervisor, TMI, indicating change of alert status to general alert situation.
Reactor had tripped because I
it " failed-to-fuel". Small off-site release reported in direction f
of 30 degrees.
0736 L'amison advised that TMI had declared a " general emergency".
l The reactor had failed to fuel and a small off-site release experienced towards 30 degrees. He was in process of notifying CER, Dauphin, York and Lancaster. Requested Operations to obtain latest weather report from NWS and HIA. Winds reported light and variable.
l 0738 Notified Margaret Reilly, Bureau of Radiological Protection (DER) at 787-2480 of TMI General Alert Situation and requested instructions on recommended action.
07'O Attempted to telephone the Lt. Gov. Spoke to on-duty PSP trooper and was infonned Lt. Gov. enroute to office. Offi ce did not answer.
I 0745 Called Governor at mansion and related incident.
Directed to work through Lt. Gov.
j 0745
~ Call from Margaret Reilly, Radiological Protection stating that there was a 10 mr/hr off-site release in direction of Brunner Island and Goldsbore. High levels of radiation in olant.
- Further, it was advisable to make preparations for oossible evacuation from Brunner Island and Goldsboro -- but not to execute evacuation.
i a
t-0752 Notified York County Director of need to make preparations for possible evacuation of Brunner Island and Goldsboro.
0815 Call from M. Rellly, Bureau of Radiological Protection, stating that problem was isolated in Unit 2 steam generator, which was leaking. All releases have been contained. No outside implications.
Advised to release imposed alerts for possible evacuation.
0820 Ir. formed Lt. Gov. of incident.
Discussed Press Conference on energy matters scheduled for 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br />.
Proposed Lt. Gov. might want me present..Lt. Gov. considered it would detract from purpose.
0835 Call from M. Reilly, Rad. Prot, stating that NWS meterologists are tracing and forecasting winds.
Situation currently normal.
Venting of system anticipated later in the day which would be under stringent control.
1 0900 All State Agencies were notified that emergency situation was under i
control and it was emphasized that there were no outside implications.
They were further informed of the possibility that when the generator was repaired there may be some release of gases, but that as far as can be determined there would not be outside implications.
1300'/
Accompanied Lt. Gov. to Governor's Office.
Bill Dornsife, Bureau 1345 of Radiation Protection, OER, explained situation and events to Gove rnor. Assured Governor we could execute 5 mile evacuation.
1600 Mark Knouse directed I report to Lt. Gov.'s Office for briefing Ly NRC personnel. Craig Willianson accompanied me.
Met Rep-resentative Bill DeWeese and was ushered into Lt. Gov.'s Office.
Meeting apparently underway some time.
2035 Call from Rad. Prot., DER (Gerusky) that reactor coming under control. The pumps were working and the pressure was rising.
Further advised that the situation should be normal in a few hours.
l l
l
March 29,1979 0115 Call from Rad. Protection, DER (Ms. Reilly) who furnished information that reactor expected to be in desired heat and pressure range within one-half hour.
0140 Call from Rad. Protection, DER indicating that progression of the cooling process to the desired temperature and pressure had faltered.
If no improvement, they will revert to ventilation once more.
0240 Called Rad. Protection, DER (Ms. Reilly) for latest status.
She informed again that progress in the favored mode of cooling had hit a " snag".
If no improvement soon, they would have to rescrt to ventilation again.
0245 Called Rad. Prut., DER (Mcdonald) for update on Three Mile Island situation.
DER states no change in the interrupted progression to the " favorite cooling mode".
Mcdonald further stated that 5 of 6 milk samples showed no iodine. One sample from a farm in the middle of the plume showed slight traces of fodine. We will be informed of any changes.
0555 Called Rad. Prot., DER (Gerusky) for Three Mile Island update.
He stated there is no change from previous report. They have not gone to ventilation, rather, they are using another system to cool the unit down.
1230 Called Gerusky, Rad. Prot., DER for readings at Three Mile Island.
Readings of less than.5 mr/hr on-site and 3 mr/hr beta gamma (1 mr/hr gamma) near the reactor as of 1200 also, a reading of 1 mr/hr at Goldsboro as of 1130.
1430 Called Rad. Prot., DER, for latest radiation monitoring levels.
100 mr/hr at 500' above the facility, 8 mr/hr at 4 miles away (aerial).
Plume extends 16 miles by 10 miles wide to the NNE.
Dispersing well. Ground.25 mr/hr.
2230 Call from DER, Rad. Protection, clarification of procedures.
System is ventilating rather than venting. Auxiliary building -
Fresh air in, old air out - Filtered some rad. gaseous.
Pumps non-working - should be cooled in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, DER - NRC continue to sample air.
No chance of core melt down now.
Seems to be secure but continue to be alert - at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> more.
Next update tomorrow morning - 1 or less mr.
In plant hot in spots.
Some decontamination - Met-Ed performed in. professional manner.
Air sample - 1 mr 10 miles;.1 mr 16 miles.
NRC & Brookhouse open 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Reactor coming under control.
l l
l l
j l
1 l
'~
March 30, 1979
' 0730 DER, Rad. Prot. call in SITREP - Same mode being utilized to cool system - pressure high - one release of liquid waste next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> low level Xenon.
0835 Operations (Dick Lamison) infor'ed me that TMI had issued a m
" general emergency" condition with a reported 1.2 R release reading from 600' above the stack, that TMI was evacuating non-critical personnel and recommended we be prepared for evacuation.
0840 Lt. Governor informed of the general emergency condition.
0840 Call from Three Mile Island control room - release in progress began at 0832. A Site Emergency has been declared.
Reading 14 MR at site fence.
600 ft. 1.2 r/hr. (1200 MR/MH) over facility.
0840 Call from Jim Floyd (TMI) -- uncontrolled release -- please call Radiological Health need help -- may have to evacuate down wind -- reports winds 340 degrees SE -- will remain in l
contact with this agency.
0915 Harold Collins, NRC Operations Center, recommended we evacuate to ten miles.
)
0917 Lt. Governor informed of NRC recommendations.
v 0922 Notified Tom Gerusky, DER, Rad. Protection, of Collins, NRC call recommending evacuation of 10-mile area. Requested l
information on what action to take. Gerusky acknowledged, l
he questioned why Collins would be calling us.
Indicated his facts would not justify recommended action, but that he would look into matter and get back to us.
Acknowledged.
0945 Governor asked dependability of Collins.
Informed Governor that based upon past experience, he is reliable and enjoys a good reputation. Governor asked for a recommendation.
Recommended 5-mile evacuation.
l 1000 Dispatched Craig Williamson to Governor's Office. Governor held Press Conference, 1025 hours0.0119 days <br />0.285 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.900125e-4 months <br />.
Issue 10 mile precautionary stay indoors, 5 mile pregnant women and pre-school children evacuation.
1015 Directed Lamison to expedite direction to Dauphin, Lancaster, York and Cumberland to commence planning for 10 mile evacuation, however, Governor would make decision.
m e
-~
March 30, 1979 1040 Informed Lt. Governor of approximate population densities 5 MILE = 26,000 and 10 MILE = 136,000.
1046 Called risk counties on following advisories:
inform population via TV and radio that a general evacuation is not in progress. People within a 10 alla radius of TMI advised to stay inside until noon.
1150 Lt. Governor advised that the Governor had issued a pre-cautionary warning for indoers uniti 12 noon in the 10 mile area. Schools to be closed i.; 5 mile area.
12Gu Advised the six risk counties of lifting of stay inside advisory for all people within 10 mile radius of TMI.
1400 Harold Collins, NRC - SITREP and asked how securely we felt about capability to evacuate.
Advised optimistic to evacuate three counties up to 5 mile radius.
1700-2230 Directed by Lt. Governor to report to Governor with map of affected area. General discussion of evacuation plan, Dr. MacLeod on health matters, Till Dornsife on site problems (DER), etc.
Harold Denton arr td approximately 2015 sours and gave preliminary assessment. The 20 mile evacuation, first surfaced. Did not attend Press Conference. Governor gave me a copy of memorandum noting White House communication and the dispatching of McConnell and Adamsek.
Introduced McConnell to Governor.
1 9
G
March 31, 1979 0001-0200 Called all county directors and informed of necessity to plan out to 20 miles. PEMA and DCPA perscenel are present in each county and can be used for any task.
Requested identification of un-met needs prior to 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />.
0519 DER Rad Protection Officer - reports no change in status since Gov's Press Confa'!ance Friday p.m.
East and West Shore circuits showing extremely low levels of radiation
(.01
.02 mr/hr).
1630-1730 Met in Gov's Office and listened to report (telephone) from Chairman Hendrie, NRC; (1635 hours0.0189 days <br />0.454 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.221175e-4 months <br />). Described efforts to manipulate bubble.
Evacuation must be a consideration, clearly downwind on a quadrant.
20 mile evacuation based on broad weather patterns.
Prudent to continue present position towards pregnant women and pre-school aged children. Must continue evaluation.
I Conditions better today than before. No radical predecures contemplated.
Increase capabilities with Feds. Discussed two critical points - only bubble discussion came through.
1900 Called Commissioner Dunn at home and stressed need for PSP coordination with six affected counties.
1904 TMI has closed vent which will produce a burp at 7 p.m.
monitoring readings should go up - nothing to worry aboat.
o l
l I
9
April 1, 1979 0830 Mark Knouse, Lt. Gov's Office, informed me to standby with Bob Adamcik for a meeting with the Governor. Meeting initially scheduled for 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br />, then 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br /> and subsequently following departure of President - no meeting called.
0930-0945 Dr. MacLeod held conference call, John Pierce, Lt. Governor's Office, Dick Boardman, DER, (later Tom Gerusky and Margaret Reilly) and PEMA. An Anthony Robbins, Director NIOSH and a John Cohn were advising of previous experience VT., Col.
proposing 1 1/2 mile evacuation since engineers TNI were conducting experiment.
1300 Mark Kaouse requested a map for Lt. Governor showing 20 mile line, hospitals, evacuation routes and school locations.
2000-2300 Governor's mansion for briefing by Governor, Bill Dornsife, Tom Gerusky, Dr. MacLeod and Lt. Governor.
Governor reviewed PI scheme and indicated necessity to remove or send home two PEMA people.
a l
April 2, 1979 1020 Informed by Mark Knouse that a Gene Isenberg, White House staff, had passed on that neither a Governor's emergency declaration nor a State request was necessary to receive full Federal assistance.
1C20-1100 Lt. Gov. conducted staff meeting in Secretary Wilburn's office including Dr. MacLeod, Gen. Scott, FDAA, DCPA, PEMA.
1130 NRC operating center suggested that under present conditions, a 2-8 hour notice could be given for any protective action required.
1300 Wayne Britts, NRC Opr. Center, advised bubble was almost depleted and requested unofficial estimates of our evacua-tion times for the 5-10 and 20 mile area.
Gave him a rough estimate of 3 x 7 to 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
1800 Lt. Gov. conducted staff meeting in Secretary Wilburn's office including Secretary of Health, DMA, FDAA, DCPA, PEMA.
i w
S t
e 9
l 1
April 3, 1979 i
0945 Harold Collins, NRC Opr. Center, advised that Chairman NRC (Hendrie) had met with Governor and evidenced some concern regarding our ability to respond to any evacuation based upon quadrant scheme.
I agreed quadrant scheme could not be expected due to public preception of the 5, 10 and 20 mile plans.
1230 Commissioner Minnich advised that his opposite number in other 5 counties were concerned absence of PI program and he was preparing letter to Governor.
1300-1345 Lt. Gov. conducted staff meeting in Secretary Wilburn's office with primary attention towards use of thyroid prophylaxis.
1530 Kevin Molloy, Director, Dauphin, reported serious problem with PI.
He is having a meeting with his CD and local government officials and can't cover the lack of public information any longer.
1930 Lt. Gov. called reference critically of school buses.
Informed him of importance.
Told to stand by telephone.
2030 Called Governor's switchboard for whereabouts Lt. Gov. -
told he was in conference.
2200 Called Governor's switchboard for whereabouts Lt. Gov.
unknown. Continued to stand by.
4 7_m y-y T--"
A I
April 4,1979 0815 Called Lt. Gov, and asked if he still wanted me to " standby" per his instructions April 3rd,1930 hours0.0223 days <br />0.536 hours <br />0.00319 weeks <br />7.34365e-4 months <br />. Appeared he had forgotten.
4 t
I
.,k e
U l
k 9
~
April 5, 1979 0830 Met with Cols. Brooks and Brown, MD Civil Defense and discussed general situation and their preparation for York and Lancaster.
1100 Visited Lt. Gov meeting in Secretary Wilburn's office.
Asked for 15 minutes with Lt. Gov. and advised to secure appointment from Brenda, appointment secretary.
Saw Governor briefly.
1720 Attempted to clarify report that Governor would release pregnant women, etc. to return to 5 mile area. Patty (?)
Governor's Press Office was to respond - no reply.
l
- g i
l i
I l
l
Attcchment III i
The following is taken from a letter dated June 18, 1979, to the President's Commission on the accident at IMI from Thomas Gerusky, Director, Bureau of Radiation Protection, which details BRP's activities during the IMI accident:
1.
Enclosed is a copy of the Bureau's response plan for Three Mile Island.
The General Plan was rewritten in 1977.
The Three Mile Island Annex was written in 1974.
All Annexes to the Plan are written in " Draft" form since they are routinely changed to update personnel and telephone numbers. The original " Pennsylvania Plan for the Implementation of Protective Action Guides" (PAPIPAG) was written in 1973.
It was completely revised in 1977. This plan is intended to address Bureau operations only.
2.
This organization was contacted by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) duty officer (Clarence Deller) at 7:03 a.m. on March 28.
The Bureau's duty officer for the month was William Dornsife, Nuclear Engineer, who was at home at the time.
Mr. Dornsife was informed that IMI had contacted the PEMA duty officer at 7:01 a.m. and that a site emergency had been declared. TMI had requested that the Bureau call Unit 2 control room as per standard procedures.
Mr. Dornsife first contacted NW. Margaret Reilly, Chief, Division of Environmental Radiation, to inform her of the 5
incident and request that she and other staff members proceed to the office immediately. At approximately 7:05 a.m. Mr. Dornsife called the TMI switchboard and was unable to be connected to the Unit 2 control room. He was contacted at home by Unit 2 control room at 7:06 a.m.
In general, they stated that a site emergency had been declared, high radiation levels were present in the plant and that they may have had a small loss of coolant accident.
The leakage was stopped and the plant was stable and being cooled normally.
In addition, on-site surveys found no detectable radiation levels above background.
Other information relative to plant status was obtained to assure that conditions wcra stable. No recommendation was made for protective actions for off-site populations. While on the phone, Mr. Dornsife remembers hearing a public address announcement to evacuate the fuel handling and auxiliary building. He was then transferred to a plant health physicist who verified out-of-plant radiation levels.
l The individual then said he had to go- "I'll call you back"-and hung up.
Mr. Dornsife proceeded into the office as per the plan.
4
By that time, Ms. Reilly had contacted Thomas Gerusky, Director of the Bureau, to inform him and to request that he leave for the office.
She also called Kevin Malloy, Dauphin County Emergency Management Director, to inform him of the accident and suggest that he head for his office.
Mr. Thomas Gerusky was the first to reach the office, contacted 'IMI at 7:25 a.m. by telephone and established an open line with Unit 2 control room.
Ms. Reilly arrived momentarily and Mr. Dornsife followed within s..
10 minutes. A summary of the information obtained from the control room (taken from notes and recall) is as
+
follows:
There was a site emergency at Unit 2-steam
' f' ^.
generator failure, primary to secondary leak
- I, and loop isolated. At approximately 7
- 30 a.m.
a general emergency was declared because of a high reading of 800 R/hr in the reactor contain-ment building. The unit has been shut down, t'aere was some failed fuel, the high pressure injection system was initiated, some primary coolant was lost and high radiation areas in the auxiliary building.
With the dome monitor reading 800 R/hr, the procedure is to estimate off-site doses in the event of a leak in the containment building. Assuming a 0.2% leak rate and the wind out of 300, the estimated exposure on the west side of the river was 10 P/hr from a reference containment atmosphere mix. A State Folice helicopter was at the site and the Bureau requested that 'DiI survey teams be flown across the river to establish the exposure rate, i
I 1
Meanwhile, other Bureau of Radiation Protection staff were
'in contact with the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency to notify them of the reactor condition, that an evacuation of an area southwest of the plant in York County (between Goldsboro and York Haven) was a possibility and that York j
County should be alerted. A few minutes later it was verified r
that no radiation levels above background were detectable.
PEMA was so notified.
Following this information, we notified other staff members and the Department administration of the accident and present conditions.
We alerted the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture, Division of Milk Sanitation, of the event.
,)
Ua htd inerned during ths Chinoco fellout spisod2 of 1976 that telephones would be tied up, that the press would be contacting us and that communications would be a problem.
We maintained the open line with the site and contacted i
the Department's Public Information Officer to handle press inquiries.
Our regular clerical staff was experienced in responding to public inquiries and had all press calls referred to the Public Information Officer.
At approximately 9:00 a.m., Mr. Charles Meinhold, Director of Health and Safety at DOE's Brookhaven National Laboratory and head of the Federal Interagency Radiation Assistance Program Team at BNL, contacted us by telephone to state that their team was ready to assist us at our request. At that point, no off-site problems were occurring so we told them to hold until we had more information. At about 11:00 a.m.
we requested assistance.
At 9:00 a.m., Mr. Dornsife was requested by the Deputy Secretary
^
to go to Lieutenaar Governor Scranton's office to brief him on the situation and to participate in a press conference at 10:00 a.m.
He contacted Gary Miller, IKI station superintendent, to be updated on what had occurred.
Mr. Miller's briefing of Mr.
Dornsife is reconstructed (based partly on notes and partly on memory) as follows:
At about 0400 a turbine trip occurred at 98% power.
As designed, the reactor tripped and all safeguard systems, including high pressure inj ection, actuated automatically when required.
There was a violation of technical specifications, specifically that the anviliary feed system block valves were initially closed.
The electromatic relief valva on the pressurizer lifted and did not recet; however, the indication in the control room (electrical signal to valve) let the operator to oelieve it hare reclosed.
The block valve downstream or the relief valve is now closed.
The pressurizer may have gone solid and low pressure in the reactor coolant system probably caused flashing and steam bubbles in the system. This may have led to a temporary loss of main coolant circulation.
There was a possible primary to secondary leak in the "3" steam gen stor which has been isolated, j
The boron concentration in the primary has 'veen diluted to about 100 ppm. This may have been caused by secondary to primary feedback through the leaking steam generator when the system was pressurized.
There has been a slight amount of failed fuel.
The exact magnitude is not certain at this time--it may have been only some gap activity.
The reactor building dome bonitor was reading 600R/hr and the reactor building pressure l
was about 1 psig.
The fence post dose was less than l
1 mrem /hr.
The wind is currently blowing to the west l
about I to 2 mph and they are sending monitoring l
teams to Goldsboro.
l l
l l
At approximately 10:45 a.m. the utility notified us that
~
radiation was being detected off-site and that exposure rates were 3 mr/hr or less. A Bureau radiation monitoring team was sent out to verify the TMI readings.
Similar levels were observed.
We were concerned about the probable presence of radioiodines in the plume.of radiogases from the plant.
The DER Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) was not equipped to do mobile in-the-field airborne iodine estimates.
(We did have a fixed monitor at the Observation Building which we chose to leave in place for a historical sample.) TAI field teams were out, though, making these measurements according to plan. Several of their field estimate samples were suggesting I-131 conenetrations of up to tens of thousands of picoeuries per cubic mater. Unconfirmed, this concentration range would suggest an eventual (days) need for protective actions against inhalation with plant deterioration and a signif-icant impact on fresh fluid milk production and use.
'~
Since the backgrounds at the facility had ur dw>standably increased, Mr. Dubiel, LMI health physicist asmed if we 3
would recount the samples in our labs at Harrisburg. We agreed.
The samples were transported by helicopter to the helipad at Holy Spirit Hospital and thence to the lab by BRP staff.
Spectrum analysis, using GeLi detector, 3
indicated no I-131 (sensitivity at about 10 pC1/m ),
we c
began to suspect the current direct exposure mode to be noble gases with little, if any, I-131.
This was consistent with knowledge that the dominant source was the water on the aux building floor and the existent charcoal filters on the aux building vent.
We advised the Agriculture Department that milk sampling should begin with farm sampling of milkings of Wednesday evening (3/28) and Thursday morning (3/29).
The results of the analyses of those samples showed milkborne I-131 to be in the range of tens of picocuries per liter--hardly an acute contaminating episode. The sampling of fresh milk continues.
For the remainder of the first day-ground surveys performed by teams from this Bureau, DOE, NRC and utility confirmed that the off-site levels of radioactivity were in the range of about.1-10 mrem /hr (B-Y).
Occasional higher levels were observed on site, in the plume and in relatively stagnant pockets due to the materological condition.
The meterological conditions during the first few days were such that the wind speed was very low and the direction was variable.
Therefore, very little dispersion was occurring and pockets of noble gases with higher than average radiation levels were not uncommon near the site.
l t
t e
.. - - ~
Reports from the site and from the NRC I&E teams which had arrived first after 10:00 a.m. confirmed that the primary curce of radioactive releases were noble gases which were being offgassed from reactor co:4nt water which had been pumped from the reactor building sump to the autiliary building sump tank and that the sumps had 'verflowed onto the floor. Prior to this it tc4 been suspecad that the main source of. release had been the v=ui.lus or steam from the "A" steam generator directly to the atmosphere which had occurred most of the morning.
During that morning, the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Plant e-
.e staff called offering assistance, as did the State of New Jersey and Pennsylvania State University.
Levels of radioactivity in the environment remained at or l,
below 3 mr/hr throughout tiv. next day with some occasional F-high reading found on s N and in the plume. Helicopter surveys were being partcomed by the ARMS aircraf t which l
,e '.
came with the DOE teams. Levels detected in the plume right over the release stack ranged up to 3000 mr/hr (B-Y).
i On Friday morning, March 30, released from the plant increased due to venting of gases from the make-up tank.
Levels as high as 20-25 mr/hr (B-Y) were observed for a short period of time just off-site. One helicopter reading
/.
of 1200 mr/hr (B-Y) was found at 600 feet, 300 feet above l,,..,,.;
the reactor building and in the plume. DOE teams and Bureau
)
l ' -
- . r teams.were measuring ground level radiation levels off-site as was the NRC and the utility.
The Bureau received a call from PEMA stating that " Doc" l,..
Collins of.NRC-Bethesda had called them reconnending l1x evacuation out to ten miles downwind because of the 1200 mr/hr
+ - - - - -
reading. We advised PEMA that off-site readings did not
~
Judicate a need for evacuation and that the plant had stated thct the venting should be over shortly.
' Ms. Reilly and Mr. Dornsife contacted Mr. Collins at NRC-
-~'
Bethesda to ask why the recommendation was made. He stated that the " top brass" had recommended it and he was only Ar.,
following orders. By that time telephone lines were tied up, and Mr. Dornsife went to PEMA headquarters while Mr.
Gerusky went to the Governor's office. Ms. Reilly stayed in contact with DfI and the survey teams. Both Mr. Dornsife and Mr. Gerusky recommended against evacuation due to current conditions.
l l
Radiation levels off-site steadily decreased to 1 mr/hr or i
less during the day.
Some intermittent readings were higher in the immediate vicinity of the site and on-site.
Levels remained at that point until they declined to background much later. in the episode.
)
(
i f
Effective March 28, 1979, the Bureau of Radiation Protection office went on a 24-hour schedule. The Bureau has a full-time Harrisburg staff of 19 including four laboratory i
personnel. Good working relationships had been long i
established with the NRC Region I office, with the DOE emergency teams and with the utility's radiation protection organization.
7ellowing the March 30 episode, additional EPA, HEW, DOE and SRC health physics personnel were involved in environmental radiation surveillance activity.
The operation of the Bureau became one of collecting and analyzing data and making racemmendations based upon the data. Assistance in operations was gained from other prograz. personnel in the Depa.mt and the Laboratory.
The 3creau stayed on a 24-hour schedule for approximataly two weeks, a 12-hour schedule for the third week, and back to normal for the r - in4ng time.
On Friday, May 30, 1979,
.he 3ureau Nuclear Engineer was assigned to the Three Mile Isla=d Site on a 12-hour-a-day basis to keep the Governor's l
Office and this 3e eau informed of any activity which could ca=se off-site problems. Dedicated telephone lines were installed in our office with the NRC Region I trailer, NRC headquarters, DOE operations at the Harrisburg-York State Airport, and the FDA Bureau of Radiological Health. On about April 1,1979, representatives from NRC, DOE and FOA vere located in our Harrisburg office as liaison persor. el to collect and relay information with their respective organizations.
Tater releases were also a problem and additional monitoring was required.
The Department's Bureau of Water Quality W-agement, the Bureau of Radiation Protection and USEPA
- ombined resources to provide a water sampling and analysis program. A copy of that program is attached.
~
Activities wound down slowly until the reactor was placed in a natural circulation cooling mode. With the " crisis" over, the Bureau continues a long-term operation to monitor he environment during the recovery stage.
3.
Co:c: ants
~here is no doubt that there was a lack of understanding of the scope of the problem during the first days of the accident.
It was known that some fuel cladding failure had occurred but
_he extent of core damage was not known until later.
Off-site consequences were initially caused because of contaminated water being pumped from the containment to the auxiliary
)
building and the sumps overflowing. Other releases resulted when venting of radioactive gases occurred prior to hooking i
up a line to return the gases to the containment building.
's l
l l
I
Based on the monitoring information that we had received throughout the accident, we felt assured that the maximum accumulated off-site dose to any individual would not have exceeded 100 mram. This was a factor of ten below the EPA protective action guidelines upon which our plan was based and where we were prepared to take protective actions to limit further off-site cumulative dose.
After the decision was made to move the NRC headquarters staff to Middletown and to set up an adequate communications system, the problems became more solvable and calmness returned to the area. There was a serious problem in consnunications from the facility, to the Commonwealth and Federal officials and to the general public.
This was, partially resolved when the decision was made to issue press statements from either the Governor's Office or NRC-Middletown.
)
.2 h
l i
l e
W
. -