ML19283B768
| ML19283B768 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1979 |
| From: | Mcduffie M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GD-79-705, NUDOCS 7903190263 | |
| Download: ML19283B768 (102) | |
Text
C9&L Carolina Power & Light Company March 15, 1979 FILE: NG-3514(B)
SERIAL: GD-79-705 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTENTION:
Mr. T. A. Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324 LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPP.-62 "dRE PROTECTION PROGRAM
Dear Mr. Ippolito:
On March 9, 1979, representatives from Carolina Power & Light Company et with members of your staff and the NRC Fire Protection Review Team for our Brunswick Steam Electric Plant t.o discuss the status of fire protection modifi-cations. At the conclusion of that meeting, CP&L agreed to provide specific information requested by the NRC staff as soon as possible. Subsequently, on March 12, we were notified by the NRC project manager that any delay beyond March 15, 1979, in submitting the requested informaticn could result in a day-for-day delay in issuing the necessary reload license amendment for Unit No. 1 startup. We are providing as enclosures to this letter information requested by the NRC staff.
Attachment No. 1 provides a review of modifications that will and will not be completed prior to startup of Unit No. 1 and Unit No. 2.
In addition, specific dates are provided for completion of those modifications that will extend beyond the startup of each unit. Attachment No. 2 responds to the questions containad in your letter of February 27, 1979, and includes all the responses your staff requested by March 15.
Attachment No. 3 responds to new information requested by your staff during the course of the March 9 meeting.
Attachment No. 4 contains the proposed Technical Specifications pages to reflect all of the fire protection modifications.
It should be noted that for those modifications which will not be completed prior to startup, the Technical Specifications have been provided with a conditional date to reflect the com-pletion dates. These modifications and their safety implications were evaluated 790319o E 3
- ~
411 Fayetteville Street
- P. O. Box 1551
- Raleigh. N C..'7607 nuwtur
. gammaa 3.
4
'Mr. T. A. Ippolito, Chief March 15, 1979 by the NRC in its Safety Evaluation Report issued in November, 1977. The proposed Technical Specifications provide operability and surveillance requirements for these modifications.
In addition, the change to Table 6.2.2-1 adds one additional non-licensed operations personnel to the minimum shift complement to incorporate a requirement for remote shutdown capability.
In accordance with 10CFR50.90 and 2.101, it is requested that the operating licenses for BSEP Unit Nos. 1 and 2 be modified to incorporate the preposed Technical Specifications contained in Attach-ment No. 4.
Since these Technical Soecification changes were required by the Safety Evaluation Repott issued by the NRC, no license amendment fee is required.
If you have any questions concerning the attached information, please contact our staff.
Yours very trul.y, k k' vf M. A. McDuffie Senior Vice President Engineering & Construction DLB/mf Enclosures Sworn to and subscribed before me this 15th day of March,1979.
Yw-OE hMAnn,
Notary Public ~
g}o "58'a".e!Q My Commission Expires: October 4,1981 u
r 9.
!sOTARy}
Q 5
NUBLtC l l
3 S.
i
.0..,,,....
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant FIRE PROTECTION ATTACHMENT 1
This portion of Attachment 1 itemizes the modifications to be performed to assure safe shutdown in the event of fires occuring in areas where opposite division cables cross or are in close proximity (SER Item 3.2.2) and the modifications to be performed to assure safe shutdown of the plant in the event of a control room or cable spreading room fire (SER Item 3.1.5).
The item numbers correspond to items identified in the October 28, 1977 study, " Analysis of Safe Shutdown Capability", Books 1 and 2.
The type of modification is indicated and whether or not the modification will be completed by the end of the Unit 1 or Unit 2 outages, whichever are applicable. Justification fo. operation of the plant con-sideiing the incomplete modifications is provided.
BSEP Modification Required for Normal Shutdown from Control Room - Unit No. 1 October 28, 1977 Report - Book No. I s
Item No.
Modification Required Item Complete by End of 1979 Outace II.D.2.1 None 2
None 3
A Yes 4
A Yes 5
None 6
B,E No/Yas 7
B,E No/Yes 8
D Yes 9
B,E No/Yes 10 B,E No/Yes 11 B,E No/Yes 12 None 13 C
Yes 14 None 15 None 16 B,C,E No/Yes/Yes 17 None 18 None 19 None 20 None 21 None 22 None 23 None 24 None 25 B,E No/Yes 26 B,E No/Yes 27 B,E No/Yes 28 None 29 None 30 None 31 B,E No/Yes 32 B,E No/Yes 33 A
Yes 34 None 35 None 36 B,E No/Yes 37 B,E No/Yes 38 B,E No/Yes 39 B,E No/Yes 40 None 41 B,E No/Yes 42 None 43 B,E No/Yes 44 None 45 B,E No/Yes 46 B,E No/Yes 47 None 48 None 49 None 50 None BSEP 1, Normal Shutdown, Book 1 51 B,E No/Yes 52 None 53 None 54 None 55 B,E No/Yes 56 Non a.
57 B,E No/Yes 58 B,E No/Yes 59 B,E No/Yes 60 None 61 B,E No/Yes 62 B,E No/Yes 63 B,E No/Yes 64 D
Yes 65 B,E No/Yes 66 B,D,E No/Yes/Yes 67 D
Yes 68 B,E No/Yes 69 B,E No/Yes 70 B,E No/Yes 71 None 72 None 73 None 74 None 75 B,E No/Yes 76 B,E No/Yes 77 B,E No/Yes 78 None 79 None 80 B,E No/Yes 81 B,E No/Yes 82 B,E No/Yes 83 B,E No/Yes 84 B,E No/Yes 85 B,E No/Yes 86 B,E No/Yes 87 B,E No/Yes 88 B,E No/Yes 89 B,E No/ Yes 90 None 91 B,E No/Yes 92 B,E No/Yes 93 B,E No/Yes 94 B,E No/Yes 95 B,E No/Yes 96 B,E No/Yes 97 B,E No/Yes 98 B,E No/Yes 99 B,E No/Yes 100 None For all modifications where a sprinkler head was syecified to be located in proximity to a conduit / cable tray crossing with opposite division cables, we have committed to install a fire barrier or wrap conduits with insulation (additional information request, response #5). Thus, the absence of sprinkler heads for these areas will be offset by the inclusion of Modification E, thus BSEP 1, Normal Shutdown, Book 1 assuring safe shutdown capability is maintained for fires in the area of these crossings.
Legend: A = fuse in circuit B = sprinkler head C = reroute conduit / cable tray D = provide 3-hour barrier E = provide fire barrier or wrap conduit to protect divisional crossing BSEP Modifications Required for Normal Shutdown from Control Room - Unit 2 October 28, 1977 Report - Book No. 1 Item No.
Modifit.ation Rejuired
_ Item Complete by End of 1979 Outage II.D.3.1 None 2
None 3
A Yes 4
A Yes 5
None 6
None 7
B,E uo/yes 8
B,E no/yes 9
D yes 10 B,E no/yes 11 B,E no/yes 12 B,E no/yes 13
- ine 14 Nonu 15 None 16 B,C,E no/yes/yes 17 None 18 None 19 None 20 None 21 None 22 None 23 None 24 None 25 None 26 None 27 None 28 None 29 B,E no/yes 30 B,E no/yes 31 B,E no/yes 32 None 33 None 34 B,E no/yes 35 B,E no/yes 36 None 37 None 38 A
yes 39 None 40 None 41 B,E no/yes 42 B,E no/yes 43 B,E no/yes 44 B,E no/yes 45 None 46 None 47 B,E no/yes 48 B,E no/yes 49 None 50 B,E no/yes BSEP 2, Normal Shutdown, Book 1 51 None 52 None 53 B,E no/yes 54 None 55 None 56 None 57 B,E no/yes 58 None 59 B,E no/yes 60 B,E no/yes 61 B,E no/yes 62 None 63 B,E no/yes 64 B,E no/yes 65 B,2 no/yes 66 D
yes 67 B,E no/yes 68 B,D,E no/yes/yes 69 D
yes 70 B,E no/yes 71 B,E no/yes 72 None 73 None 74 None 75 None 76 B,E no/yes 77 None 78 None 79 B,E no/yes 80 B,E no/yes 81 B,E no/yes 82 B,E no/yes 83 None 84 None 85 B,E no/yes 86 B,E no/yes 87 B,E no/yes 88 B,E no/yes 89 B,E no/yes 90 B,E no/yes 91 B,E no/yes 92 B,E no/yes 93 B,E no/yes 94 D
yes 95 B,E no/yes 96 B,E no/yes 97 None 98 B,E no/yes 99 B,E no/yes 100 B,E no/yes 101 B,E no/yes 102 B,E no/yes 103 B.E no/yes 104 B,E no/yes 105 B,E no/yes BSEP 2, Normal Shutdown, Book 1 For all m>difications where a sprinkler head was specified to be located in proxin.ty to a conduit / cable tray crossing with opposite division cables, we have couaitted to install a fire barrier or wrap conduits with insulation (additicisl information request, response #5). Thus, the absence of sprinkler heads for these areas will be offset by the inclusion of Modification E, thus assuring safe shutdown capability is maintained for fires in the area of these crossings.
Legend: A = fuse in circuit B = sprinkler head C = reroute conduit / cable tray D = prc 71de 3-hour barrier E = provide fire barrier or wrap conduit to protect divisional crossing BSEP Modifications Required for Remote Shutdown - Loss of Control Room and Cable S-eading Rooms - Unit No. 1 October 28, 1977 Report - Book No. 2 Item No.
Modifications Reauired Item Completed by End of 1979 Outage III.D.2.1 A
Yes 2
A Yes 3
A Yes 4
A Yes 5
None 6
None 7
B Yes 8
B Yes 9
C Yes 10 D
Yes 11 None 12 None 13 None 14 None 15 None 16 None 17 None 18 None 19 D
Yes 20 D
Yes 21 D
Yes 22 D
Yes 23 A
Yes 24 A,D Yes/Yes 25 D
Yes 26 D
Yes 27 D
Yes 28 D
Yes 29 D
Yes 30 D
Yes 31 D
Yes 32 D
Yes 33 None 34 None 35 None 36 C
Yes 37 C
Yes 38 A,D Yes/Yes 39 A,D Yes/Yes 40 None 41 None 42 Ncne 43 None 44 None 45 None 46 C
Yes 47 None 48 None 49 None 50 None BSEP 1, Remote Shutdown, Book 2 51 None 52 None 53 None 54 C
Yes 55 C
Yes 56 Isolation switches, local signals, Yes power supply 57 C
Yes 58 New transmitter, power supply add Yes cable 59 Redundant instrument loop, add cable Yes 60 Redundant instrument loop, add cable Yes 61 New power supply, add cable Yes 62 Redundant instrument loop, add cable Yes 63 Redundant instrument loop, add cable Yes P
Legend: A = Install isolation switch and add cable B = Install isolation switch C = reroute cable out of cable spreading room or provide new cables D = Install isolation switch and provide local control capability BSEP Modifications Required for Remote Shutdown - Loss of Control Room and Cable Spreading Rooms - Unit No. 2 October 28, 1977 Report - Book No. 2 Item No.
Modification Required Item Completed by End of 1979 Outane III.D.3.1 A
Yes 2
A Yes 3
A Yes 4
A Yes 5
None 6
Noce 7
C Yes 8
D Yes 9
None 10 None 11 None 12 None 13 None 14 None 15 None 16 None 17 D
Yes 18 D
Yes 19 D
Yes 20 D
Yes 21 A
Yes 22 A,D Yes/Yes 23 D
Yes 24 D
Yes 25 D
Yes 26 D
Yes 27 D
Yes 28 D
Yes 29 D
Yes 30 D
Yes 31 B
Yes 32 B
Yes 33 None 34 None 35 None 36 C
Yes 37 C
Yes 38 A,D Yes/Yes 39 A,D Yes/Yes 40 None 41 None 42 None 43 None 44 C
Yes 45 None 46 None 47 None 48 None 49 None 50 None BSEP 2, Remote Shutdown, Book 2 51 None 52 C
Yes 53 1:one 54 C
Yes 55 Isolation switch, local signals, power Yes supply 56 C
Yes 57 Redundant inst.ument loop, add cable Yes 58 Redundant instrument loop, add cable Yes 59 Redundant instrument loop, add cable Yes 60 New power supply, add cable Yes 61 New flow transmitter, power supply, add Yes cable 62 Redundant instrument loop, add cable Yes Legend: A = Install isolation switch and add cable B = Install isolation switch C = Reroute cable out of cable spreading room or provide new cables D = Install isolation switch and provide local control capability Fire Area:
General plant - additional items Modifications to be performed /SER
Reference:
1.
hose replacement /3.1.29 2.
lube oil piping barrier /3.1.30 3.
fuel oil impoundment /3.1.31 4.
recirculation pu=p protection /3.1.34 5.
redundant pressure sensing line for fire vater pumps (12/16/77 letter) 6.
3-hr barrier between MWT building and diesel day tank /SER, 4.3.1(2) 7.
diesel fire pump flow switch and cutoff valve /SER 4.3.l(2) 8.
A0G hose station /3.1.3 9.
Portable smoke exhausters /3.1.22 10.
alarming and periodic inspection of fire doors /SER 4.9.2 11.
flow switch for Standby Gas Treatment System Deluge System (6/23/77 Cp&L letter Modifications not Comoleted by End of 1979 Refuelinc Outace/ Completion Date 2.
lube oil piping barrier / July 1,1979 3.
fuel oil tcpoundment/ July 15, 1979 4.
recirculation pu=p protection /if required, end of 1980 outage Discussion / Justification f or Unit Startun with inco=olete Modifications:
2.
The original design for the piping barrier was determined to be unsuitable fro = a protection and also an operation and maintenance standpoint.
The barrier is being redesigned and will not be completed prior to startup of Unit 1.
A fire in this area (turbine building accessway) affecting or including-the f uel oil line would be promptly detected in the interin time until the modification is installed due to the number of people normally in this area.
The only safety-ralated equipment affected by such a fire would be the battery cables which have been rerouted into this area to circu= vent the cable spreading room fire. The other division battery will be available and capable of carrying the loads required for normal shut-down of either unit.
Thus, the safety of the plant vill not be decreased.
3.
The modification to increase the height of the dike around the diesel fuel oil tank =ay not be co=pleted prior to Unit 1 startup.
To preclude overflow of the impoundment due to water added to itght a postulated fire following rupture of a diesel fuel oil tank, the fuel oil level vill be lowered and maintained administratively at a level equal to 90% of the impoundment capacity to ensure this spability until the modification to the dike is complete.
This will provide an equivalent measure of safety.
4.
Our letter of January 17, 1979 docunented the reasons for not having the recurculation pump protection system installed by the end of the Unit 1 or Unit 2 outages.
The units will be operated v!*.h an inerted atmosphere to preclude an oil fire from developing.
Thus, this modification may be delayed without decreasing the safety of the plant.
Tire Area:
CE-1 North Cable Accessway El 23' Modifications to be Performed /SER Referenc;:
1.
3-Hr Fire Barrier /3.1.1 2.
Conduit coating /3.1.2 3.
Detectors /3.1.4 Modifications not Completed bv End of 1979 Refueling Outage / Completion Date All vill be completed.
Discussion / Justification for Unit Startue with Incomplete Modifications:
Fire Area:
CB-2 South Cable Accessway El 23' Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
3-Er Fire Barrier /3.1.1 2.
Conduit coating /3.1.2 3.
Detectors /3.1.4 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueling Outace/ Completion Date All will be completed.
Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
Fire trea:
CB-3 North Fire Tower CB-4 South Fire Tower Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Hose stations /3.1.3 2.
Fire doors /3.1.7 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueline Outage / Completion Date 1.
Rose stations / April 23, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with incomple*e Modifications:
1.
The hose stations located in the Fire Towers provide backup protection to the control room, cable spreading room, battery rooms, and cable accessways at the 23' and 49' elevations.
These hose stations will be functional and operable by the end of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 outages, providing the desired protection to these areas.
The portions of the system that will not be complete by the end of the outages will be electrical in nature, such as alarms and annunciators.
This will not degrade the capability of the hose stations to be used to counteract a fire in any of the areas.
Fire Area:
CB-5 Unit #1 Cable Spreading Room Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Add remote isolation switches /3.1.5 2.
Fire door between calbe spreading rooms /3.1.7 3.
Fire retardant coating /3.1.2 4.
Portable extinguishers /3.1.12 Y
Modifications n6t Completed by End of 1979 Refueline Outace/ Completion Date All will be completed.
Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
Fire Area:
CB-6 Unit #2 Cable Spreading Room Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Add remote isolation switches /3.1.5 2.
Fire retardant coating /3.1.2 3.
Portable extinguishers /3.1.12 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueline Outace/ Completion Date All vill be completed.
Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
Fire Area:
CB-7 1A Battery Room Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
3-Hr doors to cable spreading roors/J.l.7 1-Hr doors to other rooms 2.
Portable extinguishers /3.1.12 3.
Upgrade fire dampers /3.1.6 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueline Outace/ Completion Date 3.
Upgrade fire dampers / June 1, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startuo with Incomplete Modifications:
3.
The upgrading of the fire dampers from 1 1/2 hours to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> in the supply duct between the cable spreading room and the battery room will not be complete by the end of the Unit 1 outage.
Coating of cable spreading room cables, addition of fire doors between battery rooms, addition of hose station, portable extinguishers, and the remote safe shutdown me?.ification provide assurance that a cable spreading room fire or a battery room fire will not prevent achieving and maintaining safe shutdown of the plant.
Fire Area:
CB-8 1B Battery Room Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
3-Hr doors to cable spread room /3.1.7 1-Hr doors to other battery rooms /3.1.7 2.
Reroute divisional cable out of cable spread room /3.1.24 3.
Portable extinguishers /3.1.12 4.
Upgrade fire dampers /3.1.6 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refuelinc Outace/ Completion Date 4.
Upgrade fire dampers / June 1, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
4.
See discussion under CB-7.
The upgrading of the 1 1/2 hour damper in in the exhaust duct will also not be complete, which leads to the mechanical equipment room (CB-24). Hose stations, remote safe shut-down capability, separation of battery rooms and additional detectors provide assurance that a fire penetrating this barrier would not pre-vent safe shutdown of the plant.
Fire Area:
CB-9 2A Battery Room Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
3-Hr, 1-Hr fire doors /3.1.7 2.
Portable extinguishers /3.1.12 3.
Upgrade fire dampers /3.1.6 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refuelinc Outane/Comoletion Date 3.
Upgrade fire da=pers/ June 1, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
3.
See discussion under CB-7.
Fire Area:
CB-10 2B Battery Room Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
3-Hr, 1-Hr fire doors /3.1.7 2.
Divisional cable rerouting /3.1.24 3.
Portable extinguishers /3.1.12 4.
Upgrade fire dampers /3.1.6 Modifications not Completed bv End of 1979 Refueline Outage / Completion Date 4.
Upgrade fire dampers / June 1, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomnlete Modifications:
4.
See discussion under CB-8
Fire Area:
CB-12 North Cable Accessway, 49' Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
3-Hr fire barrier /3.1.1 2.
Conduit coating /3.1.2 3.
Detectors /3.1.4 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refuelinc Outace/Comoletion Date All vill be completed.
Discussio'4/ Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
Fire Area:
CB-13 South Cable Accessway, 49' Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
3-Hr fire barrier /3.1.1 2.
Conduit coating /2.1.2 3.
Detectors /3.1.4 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refuelinc Outane/Comoletica Date All vill be completed.
Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
Fire Area:
CB-14 Unit 1 Computer Room CB-15 Unit 2 Computer Room Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
3-Hour barrier /3.1.1 Modifications not Completed bv End of 1979 Refuelinc Outane/ Completion Date 1.
3-Hour barrier / July 27, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
1.
The metal wall separating the computer rooms from the ontrol room have been removed and replaced by a 3-hour wall; upgrading of doors and installation of fire dampers in the ventilation system will not be completed by the end of the Unit 1 outage.
Personnel are always in the control room area, detector capability is maintained for the computer room.
In addition, hose stations have been added in the fire towers which will be functional and operable and the modification to provide for remote safe shutdown in the event of a control room fire will be complete.
Additionally, portable water extinguishers have been made available.
Thus, any fire in this area would not hamper the safe shutdown of either unit.
Fire Area:
CB-16 Electronic Work Room CB-17 Kitchens CB-18 Janitor's Clonet CB-19. Visitors Gallery Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Fire detector /5.4.6 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueline Outane/ Completion Date All vill be completed.
Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
Fire Area:
CB-20 N.W. Corner Office CB-21 S.W. Corner Office Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Fire be.rrier/3.1.1 2.
Fire detector /3.1.4 3.
Hatch cover /5.4.6 Modifications not Completed by End of 1977 nefueling Outace/ Completion Date 1.
Fire barrier / July 27, 1979 3.
Hatch cover / July 27, 1079 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with incomplete Modifications:
1.
The need for this fire barrier will be eliminated since this area will be changed from an office / workroom area to an area containing logic and control cabinets for the analog pressure sensing modifications, thus making it another area of the general control room.
The office areas will be removed to another separate fire area being constructed outside the control room area on the roof of the radwaste building.
This modification will not be complete by the end of the Unit 1 outage, but protection for these areas has been improved by providing functional and operable hose stations in the fire towers, addition of detectors and portable extinguishers.
In addition, the remote safe shutdown modification will be complete, assuring plant safe shutdown in the event of a fire in these areas that affect control room habitability.
3.
The additica of a pyrocrete 3-hour barrier around the hatch covers in these areas may not be completed by the end of the Unit 1 outage.
The chances of a fire in the cable spreading room penetrating the present hatch covers has been decraased significantly by coating all cables in the cable apreading room and providing portable extinguishers and functional hose stations to serve the cable spreading room.
This, in combination with the remote safe shutdovn capability ensures that the plant may achieve safe shutdown.
Fire Area:
CB-22 Wash Room Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Ventilation damper /3.1.6 2.
Detector /5.4.6 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueline Outage / Completion Date 1.
Ventilation damper / July 27, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
1.
The ventilation damper between this area and the control room will not be installed prior to Unit 1 startup.
Fire detector will be operational, in this area, as well as hose stations and remote safe shutdown.
- Thus, a fire in this area vill not hamper safe shutdown of the plant.
Fire Area:
CB-23 Control Room Units 1 and 2
~
Modifications to be performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Fire doors /3 1.7 2.
Portable extinguishers /3.1.12 3.
Detectors in control cabinets /3.1.4 4.
Da=pers in mechanical room supply air for smoke exhaust /3.1.22 Modifications not Completed bv End of 1979 Refueling Outace/ Completion Date 4.
Dampers in mechanical room supply air for smoke exhaust / July 27, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with incomplete Modifications:
4.
Ventilation dampers to improve the capability for smoke removal from the control room will not be installed by the startup of Unit 1.
However, the availability of the remote safe shutdown system will ensure safe shutdown of the plant in the event the contrcl ro>m becomes uninhabitable as a result of not having this modification completed.
Fire Area:
CB-24 Mechanical Equipment Room 70' Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Fire detectors /3.1.4 2.
Standpipes and hose stations /3.1.3 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueline Outace/ Completion Date 2.
Hose stations / April 23, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
2.
As in other areas of the plant, the hose stations will be functional and operable if required to be used in this area. Alarms and annunciators will not be completed, which will not hamper the effectiveness of these systems.
Fire Area:
SW-1 Entire Building, 4' and 20' Elevations Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Oil curbs /3.1.9 2.
Flame impingement barriers /3.1.9 3.
Fixed suppression - both elevations /3.1.11 4.
Hose racks /3.1.3 5.
Yard hydrant / hose house /3.1.8 6.
Drainage systam (oil separator)/5.7 7.
Fixed sealed beam battery lighting unit /3.1.35 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refuelinc Outage / Completion Date 3.
Fixed suppression / July 27, 1979 4.
Hose racks / April 11, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with incomplete.-odifications:
3.
The fixed suppression syste=s for both levels of the Service Water Building will not be completed by the end of the Unit 1 outage.
However, signifi-cant modifications have been completed to improve the safety of these areas over the original plant installation.
The backup fire suppression system in the form of hose racks will be functional and operable, and this in combination with existing fire detection capabilities will ensure rapid and effective control and extinguishment of any fire in this area.
- Thus, the safe shutdown of the plant will not be hampered by the lack of operability of the fixed suppression systems.
4.
As stated above and in response to other plant areas, the hose stations will be functional and operable except for non-essential electrical portions of the system such as alarms and annunciators.
Fire Area:
DG-1 E1 -2' Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Sprinkler system /3.1.11 2.
Remote / normal shutdown /3.1.5 3.
Enclosure and fire door /3.1.1 4.
Portable extinguishers /3.1.12 5.
Hose racks /3.1.3 6.
Fire detection /3.1.4 7.
Spray shields /3.1.28 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refue'.ine Outace/ Completion Date 1.
Sprinkler system / July 27, 1979 5.
Hose racks /May 11, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
1.
The fixed suppression system for this area will not be operational by the end of the Unit 1 outage.
However, the cables in the basement area have been coated with a fire retardant material.
In addition, fire barriers to provide adequate fire protection in areas where redundant division cable trays or conduits cross will have been installed.
Portable extinguisher have been added, and hose racks will be functional and operable by the fire brigade.
This, in combination with the enclosures and fire doors on the next elevation and improvements in fire detection capabil;.ty, will provide assurance that a fire in this area vill not prevent achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions for the Brunswick Plitnt.
5.
Similar to other plant areas the hose racks vill be functional and operable by the end of Unit 1 outage. Remaining clectrical work on alarcs and annunciators will not preclude use of these systems by the fire brigade.
/
?
Fire Area:
DG-2 Unit No. 1 El 23' DG-3 Unit No. 2 DG-4 Unit No. 3 DG-5 Unit No. 4 Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Sprinkler system /3.1.ll 2.
Spray shield /3.1.28 3.
Hose racks /3.1.3 4.
Fire detection /3.1.4 5.
Barrier on electrical box /3.1.1 6.
Fire doors /3.1.7 7.
Backflow devices /3.1.10 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueline Outace/Comoletion Date 1.
Sprinkler system / July 27, 1979 3.
Hose racks /May 11, 1979 7.
Backflow devices / July 27, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with incomplete Modifications:
1.
As in the basement area of the building (DG-1), the new sprinkler systems will not be operable in the diesel generator rooms. Hewever, the hose racks will he functional and operable as a backup to the suppression systems.
In addition, the upgrading of fire doors and barriers will be functional such that each area will be adequately separated from the other, and single division capability will be realized for safe shutdown of the unit.
t 3.
Sin 11ar to other plant areas, the hose racks will be functional and operable by the end of Unit 1 outage.
Remaining electrical work on alarms and annunciators will not preclude use of these systems by the fire brigade.
4.
The backflow devices in the diesel generator drain system will not be complete by the end of the Unit 1 outage. A fire in any one of the diesel generator rooms will be promptly detected and the fire brigade dispatched to extinguish the fire.
Separation of the rooms has been improved by the addition of fire doors and barriers, and any fire fought in a diesel generator area will employ controlled amounts of water since the sprinkler systems will not be operational.
This, combined with the fact that drain backup is an unlikely occurrence in this area, provides assurance that a fire can be controlled and contained to a single diesel generator area.
Fire Area:
DG-15 Supply Air Plenum Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Ventilation Dampers /3.1.6 Modifications not Cc=oleted by End of 1979 Refueline Outate/Comolecion Date 1.
Ventilation dampers / July 27, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
1.
The. intended ventilation dampers will not be installed by the end of the Unit 1 outage.
However, a number of modifications will have been installed that make a fire being carried through this area into adjoining rooms unlikely.
The diesel generator exhaust silencers have been removed from the supply air intake area and oil retainers have been installed around the air intakes.
In addition, fire hose capability is present in these areas, and fire detectors will provide prompt notification of any fire events. With these modifications, the
~
absence of the ventilation dampers will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.
Fire Area:
DG-6 E-5 Switchgear Room DG-ll E-1 Switchgear Room DG-7 E-6 Switchgear Room DG-12 E-2 Switchgear Room DG-8 E-7 Switchgear Room DG-13 E-3 Switchgear Room DG-9 E-8 Switchgear Room DG-14 E-4 Switchgear Room Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Fire detection /3.1.4 2.
Hose stations /3.1.3 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueline Outane/ Completion Date 2.
Hose stations /May 11, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with incomplete Modifications:
2.
Similar to other plant areas, the hose racks will be functional and operable by the end of Unit 1 outage.
Remaining electrical work on alarms and annunciators will not preclude use of these systems by the fire brigade,
Fire Area:
DG-16 Fan Room Modifications to be Performed /SER neference:
1.
Oil retainer syste= on intake air filters /3.1.27 2.
Remove diesel exhaust silencers to roof /3.1.14 3.
11re detection /3.1.4 4.
Hose racks /3.1.3 5.
Ventilation dampers /3.1.6 6.
Foam system /3.1.27 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueling Outane/ Completion Date 4.
Hose racks /May 11, 1979 6.
Foam system / July 27, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startue with Incomplete Modifications:
4 Sinilar to other plant areas, the hose racks will be functional and operable by the end of Unit 1 outage.
Remaining electrical work on alarms and annunciators will not preclude use of these systems by the fire brigade.
6.
The AFFF suppression system for the air intake filters will not be completed by the end of the Unit 1 outage.
However, the oil retention system will be in place, limiting the possibility of widespread oil dispersion from the filters.
In addition, the exhaust silencers have been removed, thus reducing the fire hazard by removing a potential source of fire.
As well, hose racks, detection and dampers provide additional assurance that a fire in this area can be controlled and not prevent achieving safe shutdown of the plant.
Fire Area:
DG-19, 20, 21, 22 Tank Rooms Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Gas-Tight doors /3.1.15 2.
Foam suppression system /3.1.11 3.
Piping barriers /3.1.1 4.
Pipe penetration seals /3.1.16 5.
Coatings of roof beams /3.1.2 6.
Fire detectors /3.1.4 7.
Gas-tight manhole /3.1.22 8.
Ventilation system /3.1.22 9.
Hose station (Unit 1 Tank)/3.1.8 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueline Outace/ Completion Date 2.
Foam suppression system / July 27, 1979 9.
Rose station /May 11, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with incomplete Modifications:
2,9 The foam suppression system and the hose stations are located in the same area and will not be operational by the end of the Unit 1 outage.
However, the other modifications to these tank rooms will be completed, assuring that isolation of one tank and its associated equipment can be maintained.
This will provide assurance that a fire in any tank room will not prevent achieving sa~fe shutdown of the plant. Hose stations are available in the area of the tank rooms which can be used by the fire brigade to extinguish and control a tank room fire.
Fire Area:
AOG-3 Future Bottling Area Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Fire detection /3.1.4 2.
Ventilation damper /3.1.6 Mo,difications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueline Outace/ Completion Date 2.
Ventilation damper /date of operation of A0G following modifications Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with incomolete Modifications:
2.
The ventilation damper will not be installed by the end of the Unit 1 outage, but is not required since the system is not used during plant operation.
Fire detectors in the area will notify the fire brigade of any fires which might occur.
Fire Area:
A0G-5 Change Room Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Fire detection /3.1.4 Modifications not Completed bv End of 1979 Refueling Outace/ Completion Date Will be completed.
Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with incomnlete Modifications:
Fire Area:
A0G-8 Mechanical Room Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Fire detection /3.1.4 2.
Hose stations /3.1.3 Modifications not Completed bv End of 1979 Refueline Outage / Completion Date 2.
Hose stations /date of operation of AOG Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with incomplete Modifications:
2.
The hose stations in this area vill not be installed by the end of the Unit 1 outage.
However, since this area is not required to be operable when the A0G system is not operational, a fire in this area would not have an effect on plant safe shutdown.
Fire detectors in this area will notify the fire brigade of any fires which might occur.
Fire Area:
RB-1, General - both units Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Hose stations /3.1.3 2.
Deluge valve /3.1.26 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueline Outace/ Completion Date 1.
Rose stations - both units / April 23, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
1.
Hose stations will be functional and operable to provide suppression capability for all areas in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor buildings by the end of the unit outages.
Electrical modifications for alarns and annunciators vill not be operable, but will not affect the use of these hose stations.
Fire Area:
RB-1, Zone a - S.W. Core Spray Pump Roo - Unit 1 and Unit 2 RB-1, Zone b - N.W. Core Spray Pu=p Roo - Unit 1 and Unit 't RB-1, Zone c - N.E. RHR Pump Room - Unit 1 and Unit 2 RB-1, Zone d - S.E. RER Pu=p Room - Unit 1 and Unit 2 Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Fixed suppression /3.1.11 Modifications not Completed by End ef 1979 Refueline Outage /Comoletion Date 1.
Fixed suppression / July 27, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startuo with Incomplete Modifications:
1.
Fixed suppression capability will not be operational in these areas by the startup of Units 1 and 2.
However, coverage of these areas with backup fire protection measures such as hose stations is available.
In addition, any required modifications resulting from the normal safe shutdown study will have been performed, assuring that a fire in any one of these areas will not prevent the safe shutdown of the units.
Fire Area:
RB-1, Zone g Remainder of floor El 20' RB-1, Zone n Remainder of floor El 50' Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Combustible storage fixed suppressica/3.1.18 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueline Outaae/ Completion Date 1.
Fixed suppression / July 27, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startue with Incomplete Modificatious:
1.
The fixed suppression systems for these areas will not be operational by the startup of the units.
However, hose stations are available to combat a fire in these areas, fire detection has been improved to assure prompt detection of a fire, and the effects of a fire on safe shutdown in reactor building areas have been assessed and modifications performed to assure adequate divisional separation of electrical conduits and trays.
Fire Area:
RB-1 Zone k East Part of Floor El 80' Modific:tions to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Store room for water treatment chemicals, detectors, 3-hr door /3.1.18 2.
Fixed suppression at SLC Pumps /3.1.11 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueling Outace/ Completion Date 2.
Fixed suppression at SLC pumps / July 27, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with incomplete Modifications:
2.
Fixed suppression capability for the standby liquid control pumps will not be operational by the startup of Units 1 and 2.
Hose racks are available in the area to control a fire as detected by the detection system.
Portable extinguishers are also provided for use.
The SLC pumps are infrequently operated for test purposes, and there is an operator present in the locat1on. The SLC system is not required for safe shutdown in the event of a fire, and therefore safe shutdown will not be prevented by a fire in this area.
Fire Area:
P3-1 Zone m Entire Floor El 117' Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Fire detection /3.1.4 2.
Combustible storage /3.1.18 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueline Outace/Comoletion Date All will be complete Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with incomplete Modifications:
Fire Area:
RB-4 Feedwater and Steam Pipe Vault Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Fire detection /3.1.4 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refuelinc Outace/ Completion Date All will be complete.
Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
Fire Area:
RB-6 East Valve Vault Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Fire detection /3.1.4 Modifications not Completed bv End of 1979 Refueling Outace/ Completion Date Will be completed.
Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
Fire Area:
(TV.C.3.a., p. 7 and 8)
Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Add sectionalizing valves /3.1.19 2.
1 solation valves and hose connections /3.1.20 Modifications not Comoleted by End of 1979 Refuelinc Outace/ Completion Date 1.
Add sectionalizing valves / July 27, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with incomplete Modifications:
1 Most of the sectionalizing valves which were proposed to be installed will have been provided by the end of the Unit 1 outage.
Those which will not be installed provide isolation between the two turbine building tapoffs, which will have no effect on safe shutdown.
Additional sectionalizing valves for secondary feeds to the Diesel Generator, Reactor Building, Radwaste and Service Water buildings will not be complete, but water supply will be available to the buildings through other tapoffs, thus providing arsurance that hose stations will be operable in these buildings in the interim.
Fire Area:
(IV.C.3.d.3, p. 9)
Modifications to be Perforced/SER
Reference:
1.
Gas-tight nanhole cover for cable tunnel with portaile manhole exhauster/3.1.22 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueline Outace/ Completion Date Will be completed Discussion /.lustification for Unit Startur with incomplete Modifications:
Fire Area:
(IV.C.3.d.4, p. 7)
Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Control Building exhaust cowl /3.1.22 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueling Outace/ Completion Date 1.
Control building exhaust cowl / June 15, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
1.
This cowl will not be completed prior to startup of Unit 1.
- However, the remote safe shutdown modification will be completed by the end of the outzge, assuring the capability of safe shutdown of the plant should the control room become uninhabitable due to recirculation of products of combustion.
Fire Area:
(IV.C.3.d.4, p. 12)
Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Ndditional Air bottles and Air Compressor /3.1.23 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refuelinc Outage / Completion Date 1.
Air compressor / July 15, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
1.
The air compressor to provide 6-hour backup supply of air will not be complete by the end of the Unit 1 outage.
However, there are 10 air packs and 30 bottles available, assuring at least a 1-1/2 hour supply of air for fire brigade members.
In addition, the existing cascade recharging syster will provide additional capacity, although not a full 6-hour supply.
We believe this is adequate in the interim until the air compressor e installed and operational.
Fire Area:
(IV.C.3.d.5, p. 1 and 2)
Modificat.ons to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Portable lights /3.1.32 2.
Sound-powered phones /3.1.17 3.
Portabic communication units /3.1.17 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueling Outace/ Completion Date 3.
Portable commuz4 cation units /May 31, 1979 Discuasion/ Justification for Unit Startup with Incomplete Modifications:
3.
The portable communication units may not be available by the end of the Unit 1 outage.
However, the additional sound powered phones have been supplied for fire brigade use.
In addition, communications capability can be realized through the use of portable radios employed by the plant security forces.
Fire Area:
(IV.C.3.e.1, p. 2 and 3)
Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Manual stations, local alarms, control roo= distinctive and unique alarv/3.1.13 Modifications net' Completed by End of 1979 Refueling Outace/ Completion Date All will be comple,.d.
Discussion / Justification for Unit Startue with Incomplete Modificatiens:
Fire Area:
(IV.C.3.e.2, p. 4)
Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Fire barriers between fire pu=ps, driver availability alarm, sprinklers for water treatment building /3.1.ll 2.
Fire pump isolation valve /3.1.25 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refuelinc Outaze/ Completion Date All will be completed.
Discussion / Justification for Unit Smartup with Incomplete Modifications:
Fira Area:
(IV.C.3.e.3, p. 1 and 2)
Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Second water supply to DG building /3.1.20 2.
Flow alarms on sprinkler systems / 3.1.11 3.
Shields on baffles to protect equipment /3.1.28 Modifications not Completed bv End of 1979 Refueline Outage /Comoletion Date 1.
Second water supply to Diesel Generator building / July 27, 1979 2.
Flow alarms on sprinkler systems / July 27, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup wit {. Incomplete Modifications:
1.
As diseissed previously, the second water supply to the diesel generator building vill not be completed by the end of the Unit 1 outage.
- However, additions of hose stations, opgrading of fire barriers, provision of separation of redundant division cables and other modifications provide assurance that in the interim, the capability to safely shut down the plant will not be prevented.
2.
Flow alarms on sprinkler systams will not be completed until the sprinkler systems are operational.
Fire Area:
(IV.C.3.e.3, p. 3)
Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Key control, tamper-proof seals, periodic inspections /3.1.20 Modifications not Completed bv End of 1979 Refueling Outane/Comoletion Date Will be completed for operable systems Discussion / Justification for Unit Startue with Incomplete Modifications:
Fire Area:
(IV.C.3.f.14, p. 1)
Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Fire doors to loading dock /3.1.7 2.
Fixed suppression /3.1.11 Modifications not Completed bv End of 1979 Refueling Outace/ Completion Date 1.
Fire doors to loading dock / indefinite, request for deletion to be submitted 2.
Fixed suppression / July 27, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startuo with incomplete Modifications:
1.
Further study of the upgrading of the loading dock doors has revealed that vind loading criteria cannot be met for any doors which might be proposed to be installed.
Since there is adequate coverage of this area by backup fire suppression equipment such as hose stations, we believe that the intent of BIF 9.5-1, Appendix A, page 45, Paragraph D.14 is met by the existing installation and, thus, request that this modification be deleted.
2.
The fixed suppression system vill not be completed prior to startup of Unit 1.
However, hose racks, detectors and portable extingui'shers are available in the area to combat a fire. Additionally, it has been shown that a fire in the radwaste area vill not result in a release in excess of 10CFR100 limits.
Fire Area:
(IV.C.3.e.3, p. 8)
Modifications to be Performed /SER
Reference:
1.
Two AFFF portable concentrate stations /3.1.21 Modifications not Completed by End of 1979 Refueline Outane/ Completion Date 1.
Two AFFF portable concentrate stations / July 27, 1979 Discussion / Justification for Unit Startup with Incomolete Modifications:
1.
The two portable AFFF concentrate stations will not be delivered prior to the end of the Unit 1 outage.
However, the capability of existing and modified systems in the diesel generator and yard areas is sufficient to assure that safe shutdown of the units can be achieved without the need for the portable AFFF systems in the interim.
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant FIRE PROTECTION ATTACIDETI 2
BRUNSWICK 1&2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS 50-324, -325 REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1.
NRC REQUEST:
Verify that cable trays, including non-safety related trays, and stored combustibles were considered in the safe shutdown analysis as "outside sources of combustion".
(II.D.1.a and II. D. l.b)
RESPONSE
Cable trays, including non-safety related trays and stored combustibles were considered in the safe shutdown analysis as "outside sources of combustion" Trans ient combustibles were not considered in the analysis.
2.
NRC REQUEST:
Describe what situations were considered "close proximity" and were analyzed in the cable study.
(II.D 1.c)
RESPONSE :
"Close proximity" is defined as any conduit or tray which was within approximately 5'-0" horizontal separation from opposite division cable trays or appeared to be routed above opposite division cable trays.
(Distance above the opposite division cable tray is not limited to the 5'0" which would be acceptable per Reg. Guide 1.75).
Other than the Diesel Generator basement only one instance where opposite division trays were routed in close proximity to one another was determined.
This involved trays 37N/CB and 35A/CA in the Unit No. 2 Reactor Building.
A three-hour fire barrier is being provided between these trays.
2
3.
NRC REQUEST:
For this item and others where the proposed modification is to install a fuse in the circuit, provide schematics, or a representative schematic, that will show how the fuse will remove the ground but still allow operation of the required equipment (II.D.2.3, 4, 33; II.D.3, 4, 38)
RESPONSE
A 6 amp fuse has been added in the control circuit in series with the temperature switches such that a ground in the cable or the temperature switch will cause the fuse to blow.
This will isolate the temperature switches from the manual control circuitry and allow operators to start fans manually from the control rcom.
See drawing T-9527-030-El for Unit No. 1 RRR Heat Exchanger Cooling Fan LA (1A-FCU-RB) and T-9527-030-E2 for Unit No. 1 RHR Heat Exchanger Area Cooling Fan IB (IB-FCU-RB). Circuits for Unit No. 2 fans are similar to Unit No. 1.
3
4.
NRC REQUEST:
For these items and several others, the proposed modification is installation of a 3-hour fire barrier.
Provide details on the construction of these barriers (II.D.2: 8, 64, 66, 67; II.D.3: 9, 66, 68, 69)
RESPONSE :
The construction details for the listed barriers are as follows:
(a)
Item II.D.2: 8 and II.D.3: 9 - Conduit 2IA1/BB See drawing T-9527-030-S1 for conduit tabulation and drawing T-9527-030-S2 for location and barrier construction details.
(b)
Item II.D.2: 64 and II.D.3:66 - Conduit 9MV3/BB See drawing T-9527-030-S1 for conduit tabulation and drawing T-9527-030-S2 for location and barrier construction details.
(c) Item II. D.2: 66 and II.D.3: 68 - Conduit 9NI1/BA See drawing T-9527-030-S1 for conduit tabulation and drawing T-9527-030-S2 for location and barrier construction details.
(d)
Item II.D.2: 67 and II.D.3: 69 - Conduit 9N01/BB See drawing T-9527-030-S1 for conduit tabulation and location and drawing T-9527-030-S2 for barrier construction details.
4
5.
NRC REQUEST:
The proposed modification for numerous areas is to provide a sprinkler head in the area of the crossing or where redundant cables are in proximity to protect the redundant safe shutdown cabling in the area.
However, a sprinkler head may be delayed in actuating and allow damage to redundant equipment prior to the head opening. Additionally, if the sprinkler system fails to operate, the fire brigade may not respond soon enough to preclude loss of redundant cabling. To provide adequate protection, in addition to the sprinkler head, the following should be provided:
1.
At cable tray crossings where a sprinkler head is to be provided, a fire barrier should be provided between the trays at the cross-over and extending beyond the cross-over. This may be a "Marinite" or "Kao-Wool" type barrier; and 2.
Where conduit crosses or is in proximity to trays and a sprinkler head was to be provided, the conduit should be wrapped with insulation providing at least 1/2 hour rated fire protection.
This may be a "Kao-Wool" or calcium-silicate type insulation.
The installation to be used to provide the above protection should be based on tests to demonstrate the adequacy of the protection.
RESPONSE :
1.
A "Kao-Wool" or "Marinite" type barrier will be provided at tray crossings on the under side of the lower most opposite division tray.
2.
A "Kao-Wool" or calcium-silicate type wrapped insulation providing at least 1/2 hour rated fire protection will be wrapped arouna conduits where they cross opposite division trays.
3.
The material and installation used to provide the protection will be in accordance with previously tested and approved materials and installation.
S
6.
NRC REQUEST:
Provide details on the rerouting of the cable for item II.D.2.13.
This should be shown on sketches or drawings if in the same fire area as redundant cable.
RESPONSE :
Cable DS4-JE6 has been changed to cable number.7S4-JE6/1 and has been re-routed through conduits DCL1, DCM1, and DCN1 anc then through trays 48R, 48P, 48N, 48M, 48K, 48J, 48F, 48E, 48D, 48C, 48B, 48A, 6DDL, 59D, 59E, 59F and 4ET.
This routing assures that cable is in the Division I side of Reactor and is routed through Division I trays. See drawing T-9527-030-E3, Sh. 1 & 2, for details of reroute.
6
7.
NRC REQUEST:
For these items, cable routing drawings appear to show that redundant cables are in close proximity to each other.
Provide details to justify the lack of barriers and other protection for these items (II.D.2: 28, 29; II.D.3: 2, 13, 17, 28, 32, 33, 77).
RESPONSE
The separation distance from opposite division trays for the items II.D.2: 28, 29; II.D 3: 2, 13, 17, 28, 32, 33, 77) is as follows:
a.
Item II.D.2: 28 - Conduit 4CT1/CA (Division I)
This conduit is routed 7'0" above trays 40J/CB (Division II) and 41N/CB (Division II).
One foot below conduit 4CT1/CA and running parallel with conduit 4CT1/CA is a 42" wide by 24" high ventilation duct which acts as a fire barrier between the trays and the conduit.
b.
Item II.D.2: 29 - Conduit 4CT2/CA (Division I)
This conduit is routed 7'-0" above trays 40J/CB (Division II) and 41N/CB (Division II).
One foot below conduit 4CT2/CA and running parallel with conduit 4CT2/CA is a 42" wide by 24" high ventilation duct which acts as a fire barrier between the trays and the conduit.
c.
Item II.D.3: 2 - Conduit BSS1/CB (Division II)
This conduit is routed directly above trays 68U/CB (Division II) and 68S/CB (Divisicn II) and terminates at center of tray 65I/BA (Division I).
Conduit BSSI/CB is at elevation 18'-7" while tray 65I/BA is at elevation 8'-0".
Tray 68S/CB has a solid bottom.
Sprinkler head is provided at tray crossing in accordance with Item II.D.3: 105 - Trays 68R/CB, 68S/CB.
The modifications outlined in NRC Request No. 5 will also be installed, d.
Item II.D.3: 13 - Conduit 3DT1/CA (Division I)
This conduit has a horizontal separation of 8'-1" from the edge of tray 30S/BB (Division II) and is 5'-6" above tray 30S/BB.
In addition, conduit 3DT1/CA is above the HPCI room, whereas tray 30S/BB is in the Division II RRR room.
e.
Item II.D.3: 17 - Conduit 3LU2/CA (Division I)
This conduit is routed 4'-0" below tray 37N/CB (Division II); 2'-0" below tray 34J/CB (Division II) and l'-0" below 31C/DB (Division II).
Trays 34J/DH (Division II - Non Safety Related), which is l'-0" below 34J/CB, and 31C/DB are instrumentation level trays which have solid tops and bottoms and act as a fire barrier.
7
7.
RESPONSE :
(cont'd) f.
Item II.D.3: 28 - Conduit 4AH1/DA (Division I)
This conduit is routed approximately 10'-0" wes t of location shown on drawing 9527-F-3627.
Conduit 4AH1/DA is routed below tray 61A/AA (Division I) at elevation 13'-0".
It is 4'-6" west and 2'-0" below the end of trays 68U/BB (Division II), 68U/CB (Division II) and 9'-0" west of end of tray 63J/AB (Division II).
g.
Item II.D.3: 32 - Conduit 4CT1/CA (Divisian I)
This conduit is routed 2'-0" below trays 42L/CB (Division II) and 41T/DB (Division II).
Tray 41T/DB is an instrumentation level tray with a solid top and bottom.
h.
Item II.D'.3: 33 - Conduit 4CT2/CA (Division I)
This cenduit is routed 2'-0" below trays 42L/CB (Division II) and 41T/DB (Division II).
Tray 41T/DB is an instrumentation level tray with a solid top and bottom.
i.
Item II.D.3: 77 - Conduit 9TW1/BB (Division II)
Conduit is routed 6'-0" below tray 68M/CA (Division I) and 2'-0" below tray 92R/CC (BOP).
Tray 68M/CA is the lowest tray in the s tack.
We are satisfied that there is suf ficient separation between the listed conduits and the opposite division trays such that a tray fire will not a f fect the conduit.
We, the re fo re, recommend that no modification be made.
8
8.
NR,C REOUEST:
For these i te ms, the description appears to indicate that redundant diesel generators could be lost in a single fire; however, no modifications are proposed.
Clarify why no modifications are required to preserve safe shutdown capability (II.D.2.78; II.D.3.83)
RESPONSE
We have determined that " Diesel Generator No. 4" is a typographical error and should have read " Diesel Generator No. 3".
The "Use" and " Analysis" should be revised as follows:
Conduit 9VVl/CA Cables AIS-H48/3, H60-ZU6 Use Control for Diesel Generator No. 3 breaker and excicer breaker Analysis Short or open circuit could trip or prevent operation of Diesel Generator No. 3.
Field inspection indicates conduit is located in Diesel Generator Cell No. 3, not Cell No. 4 as shown on drawing Recommendation No modification required 9
9.
NRC REQUEST:
For item 94 on page II.D.61, the proposed modification is to provide a 3-hour fire barrier. Provide details to show that the barrier will adequately separate trays 37N/CB and 35A/CA where they are routed adjacent to each other.
RESPONSE
See drawing T-9527-030-S3 for details of the fire barrier between trays 37N/CB and 35A/CA. The barrier extends approximately three feet (3 ' -0")
beyond the edge of the trays except where the barrier meets a concrete wall or beam.
In these cases the barrier will be less than 3'-0".
10
10.
NRC REQUEST For various items in Sections III.D.2 and III.D.3, the proposed modification includes installation of isolation switches and some control switches for affected safety circuits. The following information should be provided for these modifications:
(a) Verify that these new devices will conform to the design criteria (FSAR) that other electrical equipment in these safety circuits were required to meet; (b) Provisions for key-locking of the switches; (c) Provisions for periodic checks of switch position; (d) Schematics to show use of the device in the circuit and identification of location of equipment and wiring (e.g., portions of the circuit loca-ted in the cable spreading room);
(e) Description of steps included in procedures to effect the alternate shutdown method; (f) Number of personnel required to perform the alternate shutdown functions; and (g) Provisions to periodically test operability of these devices, including technical specifications.
RESPONSE
(a) The control switches and selector switches utilized for the recommended isolation and control modifications are as follows:
1.
Honeywell Microswitch Type PTK and PTS 2.
General Electric Type CR2940 These switches were previously qualified for use in Brunswick safety systems and have been used in the existing Remote Shutdown System.
(b) All " Normal / Local" selector switches have key locks with the key removable only in the " Normal" position.
(c) Periodic checks of switch positions will be accomplished by routine checks of the control room boards (RTGB) by the reactor operators.
No additional checks are required for the following reasons:
1.
All isolation switches are of the key-lock type with key control being maintained by the Shift Foreman. Thus, the existing key control system provides assurance that unauthorized switch opera-tion will not occur.
2.
All isolation switches which could prevent safe plant operation if they were placed in the Local position during normal operating 11
conditions cause a loss of control room indication of the device being controlled whenever they are placed in the Local position.
Such an operation would be picked up during the operator's routine checks of the RTG Board indications.
3.
All other isolation switches control functions which are placed in the safe operating condition when the switch is in the Local position.
The functions affected are those whose operation from the control room is a convenience and not a necessity for safe operation. No periodic checks of these switches are needed.
(d) Drawings T-9527-030-E4, T-9527-030-E6, Sh. 1 & 2, T-9527-030-E8 uhow schematics of typical circuits with the addition of the isolation and control switch. Drawings T-9527-030-ES, T-9527-030-E7, T-9527-030-E9 show the wiring and location of devices for the typical schematics.
(e) The remote shutdown procedure utilizes the following steps in achieving a safe shutdown:
1 Prior to leaving the control room:
1.
Initiate manual scram.
2.
Trip the turbine.
3.
Shut the main steam isolation valves.
NOTE: An alternate means of achieving the above actions is given should inadequate stay time prevent their being accomplished prior to control room evacuation.
11 Evacuate the control room and proceed to the appropriate remote shutdown panel (s).
iii Assemble at the appropriate remote shutdown panel (s) and do the following:
1.
Assign operators to each remote shutdown station.
2.
Provide the operators with a copy of the procedure, the keys for the appropriate switches, and a sound-powered phone head-set.
3.
Issue fuses and fuse pullers to replace any blown fuses at the remote shutdown stations.
4.
Send the operators to their assigned stations.
5.
Establish communications between all r2 mote shutdown
- stations, iv Achieve shutdown as follows:
1.
Utilize RCIC and the manually operated relief valves to maintain level and pressure and to achieve heat removal.
2.
Utilize RHR to maintain proper torus temperature.
12
3.
When pressure and heat load permit, shift RHR to tae shut-down cooling mode and secure RCIC.
4.
When temperature reaches 212*F, open the head vent.
5.
Operate shutdown cooling as necessary to maintain reactor in cold shutdown.
NOTE: The procedure specifies the maximum allowable cooldown rate and provides a graph for maintaining a cooldown plot.
It also provides an azimuthal diagram of relief valva discharge locations so that uniform heat distribution in the torus can be achieved.
(f) The number of personnel required for remote shutdown is as follows:
1.
For one unit - 5 people 2.
For two units - 9 people Technical Specifications for Units 1 and 2 will be revised to show the required number of personnel in accordance with the number required to achieve remote safe shutdown on both units.
(g) No provision for periodically testing the remote shutdown devices is planned. All of these devices will be operated as part of the acceptance testing for the modification package concerned. There is no technical specification requirement for testing the existing remote shutdown system on a periodic basis; hence, no such technical specification will be generated for the modified system.
13
11.
NRC REQUEST The analysis for certain redundancies indicates that safe shutdown will not be affected if certain operator actions are taken. These required actions should be included in appropriate operating or emergency pro-cedures as described in the following:
(a) For Items 13 and 14 in III.D.2 and Items 11 and 12 in III.D.3, required operator actions to shed non-critical DC battery loads for fires in these areas should be included in procedures; (b) For Items 33 and 34 in III.D.2 and Items 33 and 34 in III.D.3, required operator actions to transfer switchgear control circuits to a different power supply for fires in these areas should be included in procedures; (c) For Items V.C.1.a(3) and V.C.1.b(3), required operator actions to isolate the service water supply ta the reactor building closed cooling water heat exchangers should be included in procedures.
RESPONSE
(a) The non-critical DC loads have been identified and instructions for shedding them will be included in the appropriate pre-fire plans.
(b) Each piece of emergency switchgear (E-1 through E-8) is equipped with an automatic bus transfer device which will pick up the alternate control power source if the normal supply is lost.
Thus, no manual action is required and no procedures are needed.
(c) The required operator actions for isolvidon of tha service water supply to the reactor building closed cos Ling water heat exchangers will be included in the pre-fire plans ?2ther than in emergency procedures, since this isolation is appropriate only in a fire situation.
14
12.
NRC REQUEST:
For Items 58 through 63 of III.D.2 and Items 57 through 62 of III.D.3 provide details on the redundant instrument loop and power supply, including the following:
(a) Verify that these new devices will conform to the design criteria (FSAR) that other electrical equipment in these safety circuits were required to meet; (b) Schematics to show function of these circuits and identification of location of equipment and wiring (e.g., portions of the circuit located in the cable spreading room).
RESPONSE :
(a) The safety design criteria for the reactor vessel instrumentation is outlined in Section 7.8.4 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
The requirement is that (a) the instrumentation provide the operator with sufficient indication of reactor core flow rate, (b) provide the operator with sufficient indication of reactor vessel water level, (c) provide the operator with sufficient indication of reactor vessel pressure and (d) provide the operator with sufficient indication of nuclear system leakage.
The redundant loops have been designed to provide the operator with the folicwing information at the Remote Shutdown Panel:
(1) Reactor Vessel Pressure - Item 58 of III.D.2 and Item 57 of III.D.3 (2) Reactor Vessel Level - ltem 59 of III.D.2 and Item 58 of III.D.3 (3) RHR Flow - Item 60 of III.D.2 and Item 59 of III.D.3 (4) RHR Heat Exchanger Dif f. Press. - Item 61 of III.D.2 and Item 60 of III.D.3 (5) RHR Head Spray Flow - Item 62 of III.D.2 and Item 61 of III.D.3 (6) Torus Level - Item 63 of III.D.2 and Item 62 of III.D.3 (7) Drywell Pressure - Item 63 of III.D.2 and Item 62 of III.D.3 These variables are continuously monitored and indicated at the Remote Shutdown Panel so that in case of a fire or any hazardous conditions in the control room the operator can remotely monitor these parameters for a safe reactor shutdown.
The new instruments have been purchased to the same specifications as the existing duplicate equipment to ensure that the calibration ranges, setpoints and seismic requirements are identical.
The instrumentation 15
12.
NRC REQUEST:
(Cont'd) and applicable design specifications are as follows:
Item New Fire Protection Spec.
Existing Applicable Design Spec.
Transmit te rs 9527-038-252-51 9527-01-252-51 Power Supply 9527-038-252-32 9527-01-252-51 SQR Extractors 9527-038-252-52 9527-01-252-51 Level Switch 9527-038-252-52 9527-01-252-4 Instrument Valves 9527-01-248-52 Tubing & Fittings 9527-01-248-51 Instrument Cable 9527-01-113-10 NOTE: The existing applicable design specification is referenced in the new fire protection specification.
(b) Functional details and location of equipment is shown schematically on d rawing 9527-030-E10.
Each sensor (transmitter) is to be piped in parallel and calibrated to same cange as its existing counterpart wnich provide identical information to the control room. Cable separation is to be provided so that a fire in either the control room or cable spreading rooms will not impair operator's ability to safely shutdown the reactor from the Remote Shutdown Panel.
16
13.
NRC REQUEST:
Various items in III.D.2. and III.D.3. indicate that a new cable will be provided.
Verify that the new cable will be routed independent of the cable spreading room.
RESPONSE
In all cases where it was recommended that a new cable be provided, this cable was routed through trays and conduits which were ind eendent of the cable spreading room.
An example of this has been transmicted to you previously in our March 1,1979 letter as Response to Item 3.1.24, Battery Room Cables.
17
14.
NRC REQUEST:
Items IV.C.l(f) and IV.C.2(e) indicate that 3-hour barriers will be provided for the instrument racks in the Division II RHR rooms for each unit or the racks will be relocated.
A tele-con with CP&L personnel indicates that the racSc are being relocated.
Provide details on the new location of the ir.strument racks to show that a fire in the Division II RHR rooms will not af fect operation of the HPCI pumps for either unit.
RESPONSE
The new location of the instrument racks is shown on drawing T-9527-030-E11.
The HPCI instrument rack H21-P034 contains two (2) pressure switches (E41-N012B and E41-N012D) for HPCI turbine exhaust diaphragm high pressure isolation.
To prevent HPCI turbine trip due to a fire in the Division II RHR room the rack has been relocated from the Division II RHR room to the inside of HPCI room.
18
15.
NRC REQUEST Items V.C.la(2) arl V.C.lb(2) indicate that manual transfer switches will be provided to transfer certain Division I motor operated valves to a Division II power supply. The following information pertaining to this modification should be provided:
(a) Details to show that a single failure, such as failure of the manual transfer switch, will not incapacitate Division I and Division II power supplies; (b) Verify that these new devices will conform to the design criteria (FSAR) that other electrical equipment in these safety cir cuits were required to meet; (c) Provisions for key-locking of the switches; (d) Provisions for periodic checks of switch position; and (e) Schematics to show use of the device in the circuit and identification of location of equipment and wiring (e.g., portions of the circuit located in the cable spreading room).
RESPONSE
(a) The capability to transfer the power supply for RHR Suction Isolation Valie Ell-F009 was designed to assure that a single failure during normal operation would not incapacitate both Division I and Division II power supplies. This was accomplished by the following means (refer to drawing T-9527-030-E12):
1.
Cable DP3-FGG is normally de-energized and is only energized when the power transfer is initiated.
2.
Cable DP3-FG6 is isolated from MCC Bus 2XB by two devices--the 100 a circuit breaker (52) and the contactor (42),
3.
The contactors in compartments "FN6" and "FGG" are electrically interlocked such that they both cannot be closed at the same tima.
4.
A single control switch in compartment "FN6" (CS-FN6) controls contactors in compartment "FN6" and "FG0" and can energize only one contactor at a time.
(b) The devices utilized to accomplish the transfer are as follows:
1.
Motor Control Center Compartments - General Electric Type 7700 2.
Control Switches - Honeywell Microswitch Type PTK 19
These devices were previously qualified for use in Brunswick safety systems.
(c) The control switclies have key locks with the key removable only in the "2XA" position.
(d) Since the keys for the control switches can only be removed in the "2XA", or normal position, periodic verification of the pressure of the key in the possession of the shift foreman will serve as verifica-tion that the switches are in the correct position.
(e) Drawing T-9527-030-E12 is a schematic of the equipment utilized in the transfer scheme. The transfer is manua'1y initiated by the operator following a step by step key controlled administrative procedure. All equipment is located in the reactor building except for the following devices which are located in the control room:
1.
Control Switch 2-A71-CS-S9 2.
Relay K29 3.
Relay K53 4.
Indicating Light DS27 5.
Indicating Light DS28 6.
Fuse F44/lA 7.
Fuse F45/lA The above devices are isolated from the circuitry by means of selector switch RS ""
- I
" "Y S*
AG
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant FIRE PROTECTION ATTACHMENT 3
16.
NRC REQUEST:
Verify that where cable is being rerouted or new cable added, the cable study information was used to determine new location so that maximum separation is maintained.
RESPONSE :
As modifications are made to the safe shutdown systems, the " Analysis of Safe Shutdown Capability" report is reviewed to assure that the modification does not negate the results of the study and that sufficient separation is maintained between opposite division raceways.
As an example, the Division II battery feeds rerouted out of the cable spreading room were required to cross the Division I tray system in the Unit No. 1 Reactor Building.
To assure that a Division I cable tray fire would not affect the Division II battery feeds, the battery feeds were routed in cor_duit a minimum of 4'-0" below the Division I cable trays 37R/DA, 37M/CA and 31L/CA.
A recent modification replaces most of the safety related pressure switches and level switches with analog transmitters.
During design review of the completed modification, the new conduits ind cables were checked to assure that the separation criteria of the study were met.
17.
NRC REOUEST:
The details on water damage protection (Item 3.1.2B of the SER) provided in the CP&L letter of March 1, 1979 describe the design of various protective shields.
Verify that such shields will be installed over all MCC's, switchgear, control panels, or similar equipment susceptible to water damage located in area with sprinkler protection where this equipment may be required for safe shutdown.
RESPONSE
The safety related equipment required for safe shutdown located in areas with sprinkler protection was reviewed for succeptibility to water damage and that equipment which could fail because of a sprinkler operation will be protected by a spray shield.
The following safe shutdown equipment is to be protected by shields:
Eauipment Location a.
Motor Control Center IPA Service Water Building - El. 20'-0" b.
Motor Control Center IPB Service Water Building - El. 20'-0" c.
Motor Control Center 2PA Service kater Building - El. 20'-0" d.
Motor Control Center 2PB Service Water Building - El. 20'-0" e.
Motor Control Center DGA Diesel Generator Building - El. 23'-0" f.
Motor Control Center DGB Diesel Generator Building - El. 23'-0" g.
Motor Control Center DGC Diesel Generator Building - El. 23'-0" h.
Motor Control Center DGD Diesel Generator Building - El. 23'-0" i.
Engine, Generator and Exciter Control Panel - DG1 Diesel Generator Building - El. 23 *-0" j.
Engine, Generator and Exciter Control Panel - DG2 Diesel Generator Building - El. 23'-0" k.
Engine, Generator and Exciter Control Panel - DG3 Diesel Generator Building - El. 23'-C" 1.
Engine, Generator and Exciter Control Panel - sG4 Diesel benerator Building - El. 23'-0"
17.
EESPONSE :
(cont'd)
Location m.
Neutral Grounding Trans fo rme r F13 - DG1 Diesel Generator Building - El.
2'-0" n.
Neutral Grounding Trans former F14 - DG2 Diesel Generator Building - El.
2'-0" o.
Neutral Grounding Trans former F15 - DG3 Diesel Generator Building - El.
2'-0" p.
Neutral Grounding Transformer F16 - DG4 Diesel Generator Building - El. 2'-O
q.
Potential Transformer F22 - DG1 Diesel Generator Building - El.
2'-0" r.
Potential Transformer F23 - DG2 Diesel Generator Building - El 2'-0" s.
Potential Transformer F24 - DG3 Diesel Generator Building - El 2'-0" t.
Potential Transf ormer F25 - DG4 Diesel Generator Building - El. 2 '-0" u.
Current Transformer F26 - DG1 Diesel Generator Building - El.
2'-0" v.
Current Transformer F27 - DG2 Diesel Generator Building - El.
2'-0" w.
Current Transformer F28 - DG3 Diesel Generator Building - El. 2'-0" x.
Current Transformer F29 - DG4 Diesel Generator Building - El.
2'-0" In addition, Motor Control Center IXL in Unit No. 1 Reactor Building -
El. 20'-0" and Motor Control Center 2XL in Unit No. 2 Reactor Building -
El. 20'-0" were shielded to limit damage from sprinklers in area.
Brunswick Steam Elec:ric Plant FIRE PROTECTION ATTACEfENT 4
TABLE 3.3.5.7-1 FIRE DETECTIO:: I::STRCE::TS I!!STRUIE iT LOCATIC:!
MI!!IMLH II;STRUME:TS OPERA 3LE FLA?E HEAT SMOKE 1.
Reactor Building # 1 l
Zone 1
-17' 0
0 0
Zone 2
-17' 0
0 1
Zone 3
-17' 0
0 6
Zone 4
-17' O
O 6
Zone 5 20' O
O 7
Zone 6 20' 0
0 9
Zonc 7 20' O
O 6
Zone S 50 0
0 5
Zone 9 50 0
0 7
Zone 10 S0' 0
0 6
Zone 11 80' O
O 6
Eone 12 98' 0
0 3
Zone 13 117' 0
0 1
Zone-14 117' O
O 35 Zone 16 77' O
O 3
2.
Control Building Zone 1 70' 0
0 7
Zone 2 49' 0
0 5
Zone 3 49' 0
0 5
Zone 4 49' 0
0 12 Zone 5 49' O
O 14 Zone 6 49' O
O 1
Zone 7 23' O
O 1
Zone 8 23' O
O 1
Zone 9 23' O
O 15 Zone 10 23' 0
0 14 Zene 11 23' 0
0 1
Zone 12 23' O
O 1
Zone 13 49' O
O 10 Zone 14 49' O
O 10 3.
Diesel Generator Building Zone 1 2'
O O
7 Zone 2 2'
O O
7 Zone 3 50' 0
0 6
Zone 4 23' O
O 3
BRD SWICK - DiIT 1 3/4 3-60
TABLE 3.3.5.7-1 (Continued)
INSTRU'!ENT LOCATIC':
MINIMDt INSTRUME':TS OPERABLE FLAME HEAT SMOKE Zone 5 23' O
O 1
Zone 6 23' O
O 1
Zone 7 23' 0
0 1
Zone 8 23' O
O 1
Zone 9 23' 0
0 1
Zone 10 50' 0
0 6
4.
Service Water Building Zone 1 4'
O O
6 Zone 2 20' O
O 5
5.
A00 Building Zone 1 20' 1
0 0
Zone 2 20' 1
0 0
Zone 3 20' 1
5 0
Zens 4 37' - 49' 1
6 0
BRUSSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 3-61
.m... _ ;
.w EPAY A*.T]/0R SPRINKLER SYSTEMS LIMITINC CC::DITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7.2 The following spray and/or sprinkler systems shall be GPERABLE:
Diesel Generator #1 Preaction System - Diesel Generator Building a.
b.
Diesel Generator #2 Preaction System - Diesel Generator Building Diesel Generator #3 Preaction System - Diesel Generator Building c.
d.*
Diesel Generator #4 Preaction System - Diesel Generator Building e.*
South Cable Spread Area Sprinkler System - Diecel Generator Building f.* North Cable Spread Area Sprinkler Systen - Diesel Generator Building g.
Two Standby Gas Treatment Train lA Deluge Systems - Reactor Building #1.
h.
Two Standby Gas Treatment Train 13 Deluge Systems - Reactor l
Building #1.
1.*
Area Sprinkler System - Reactor Building #1.
.j.
Sersice Water Pump Area Sprinkler System - Service Water Building k.*
Service Uater Cable Spread Area Sprinkler System - Service Water Building.
1.*
Drumming Room Sprinkler Syste= - Radwaste Building Makeup Uater Treatment Area Sprinkler System - Pakeup Water
=.
Treatment Building APPLICASILITY:
Whenever equipment in the areas protected by the spray anc/or sprinkler systems is required to be OPERABLE.
ACTION:
With one or more of the above required spray and/or sprinkler a.
systems inoperable, establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for the unprotected area (s) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; restore the system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Cormission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days out-lining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.
b.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- Conditional date for implementation of these Technical Specifications: July 27, 1979 B R'J:5.iICK - L;IT 1 3M 7-38
TABLE 3.7.7.4-1 FIRE HOSE STATIO:S LOCATIO:
ELEVATION HOSE RACK #
Unit :o. 1 Reactor Bldg. *
-17' l-RB-19
-17' 1-RB-20
-17' 1-RB-24
-17' 1-RB-25
-17' 1-RB-26 20' l-RB-21 20' 1-RB-22 20' l-RB-23 20' l-RB-27 20' 1-RB-28 20' 1-P3-29 50' 1-P3-30 50' 1-RB-31 50' l-RB-32 50' l-RB-33 50' 1-RB-34 50' 1-P3-35 67' 1-RB -4 8 A
[
80' 1-P3-3 6 80' l-RB-39 80' l-RB-41 80' 1-RB-43 80' l-RB-44 80' l-RB-45 98' 1-RB-37 l
117' 1-P3-3 8 117' 1-RB-4 0 117' 1-RB-42 117' 1-RB-46 117' l-RB-4 7 117' 1-RB-48 A0G Building 23' 2-A0G-57 23' 2-A0G-58 23' 2-A0G-59 23' 2-A0G-60 37' 2-AOG-62 l
49' 2-A0G-61 Radwaste Building
-3' DJi-4 9
-3' RW-30
-3' RW-51 23' RU-52 23' RU-53 23' RW-54 23' RW-55 23' o.W-56 BRU:iSWICK - l'::IT 1 1/4 7-42
TABLE 3.7.7.4-1 FIRE HOSE STATIONS LOCATION ELEVATION HOSE RACK #
Diesel Generator Building **
2' DGP-1
'2' DGB-2 2'
DGB-3 23' DGB-4 23' DGB-5 23' DGB-6 23' DGB-7 23' DGB-8 23' DGB-9 50' DGB-10 50' DGB-ll 50' DGB-12 50' DGB-13 Service Water Building 4'
SW-1 20' SW-2 20' SW-3 Control Building 23' l-CB-1 49' l-CB-2
- Conditional date for implementation of these Technical Specifications:
April 23, 1979 Conditional date for implementation of these Technical Specifications:
May 11, 1979 Conditional date for implementation of these Technical Specifications:
April 11, 1979 ERUSSWICK - U':IT 1 3/4 7-42a
PLA!!T SYSTEMS FOM! SYSTEMS
- LIMITING C0!.*DITIO:: FO? OPERATIO:i 3.7.7.5 The following foam systems shall be OPERABLE:
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Tank Area System with:
a.
1.
The concentrate proportioning and storage subsystem OPERABLE with 240 gallons of concentrate.
2.
Each tank room subsystem OPERA 3LE.
b.
Diesel Generator Air Filter System with:
1.
The concentrate proportioning and storage subsystem OPERABLE with 40 gallons of concentrate.
{
2.
Each air filter subsystem OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: Whenever the Diesel Generators are required to be OPERABLE.
ACTION:
i With any one tank room subsystem inoperable, verify the opera-a.
bility of the backup foam hose reel within one hour, b.
"ith any onc air filter systc: inoperable, verify the operability i
of the backup foam hose reels within one hour.
With any inoperability other than as defined in items a and b c.
above, or with one or more of the concentrate proportioning and storage subsystems inoperable, verify the availability of backup fire suppression equipment for the unprotected area (s) within one hour; restore the system to OPERA 3LE status within 14 days l
or, in lieu cf any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, i
prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.
d.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.
Conditional date for implementation of these Technical Specifications:
July 27, 1979 BRU';5 NICK - UNIT 1 3/4 7-42b l
l 3
e
PLA:T SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)
SUFNEILL/d:CE REOUIREMENTS i
4.7.7.5 Each of the above required foa= systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 12 months by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
b.
At least once per 18 months:
1.
By perforcing a system functional test which includes sicu-lated automatic actuation of the system, and:
I a)
Verifying that the automatic valves in the flow path actuate to their correct positions on a simulated actuation signal, and j
b)
Cycling each valve in the '. low path that is not testable during plant operation through at least one co=plete cycle of full travel.
2.
By inspection of the spray headers to verify their integrity, i
and j
i 3.
By inspection of each spray no::le to verify no blockage.
4.
By conducting a performance evaluation of the concentrate.
l i
l I
l i
9 l
l ERUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 7-42c t
B BLE 6.2.2-1 MIf11 MUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION:
Condition of Unit 1 - Unit 2 in CONDITION 1, 2 or 3 LICENSE APPLICABLE I
l OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS CATEGORY 1, 2, 3 l
4&5 SOL **
2 l
2*
l OL**
3 l
2 Non-Licensed 4
I 3
i Condition of Unit 1 - Unit 2 in CONDITION 4 or 5 LICENSE APPLICABLE I
CATEGORY OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3 4&5 SQL**
2 1*
OL**
l 2
2 Non-Licensed l
3 3
g Condition of Unit 1 - No Fuel in Unit 2 LICENSE APPLICARIE CATEGORY OPERATIONAL C0flDITIONS 1, 2, 3 l
4 f. 5 50L l
1 I
1*
OL 2
1 Non-Licensed 2
1
- Does not include the licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator Limited to Fuel Handling, supervising CORE ALTERATIONS.
- Assumes each individual is licensed on both plants, e Shift crew composition, including an individual qualified in radiation protection procedures, may be less than the minimum recuirements for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements of Table 6.2.2-1, BRUNSWICX-UNIT I 65
TA3LE 3.3.5.7-1 FIRE DETECTION I:iSTRL'!!ENTS INSTRUMENT LOCATION MINIMet INSTRLTENTS OPERAELE FLAME HEAT S!iOKE 1.
Reactor Building #2 Zone 1
-17' 0
0 0
l Zone 2
-17' O
O 1
Zone 3
-17' O
O 6
Zone 4
-17' 0
0 6
Zone 5 20' O
O
~7 Zone 6 20' O
O 9
Zone 7 20' 0
0 6
Zone 8 50 0
0 5
Zone 9 50 0
0 7
Zone 10 80' 0
0 6
Zone 11 80' 0
0 6
Zone 12
'98' 0
0 3
Zoni 13
'117' O
O 1
Zone 14 117' O
O 35 Zone 16
'77' O
0 3
~ 2.
Control Building Zone 1 70' O
O 7
Zone 2 49' O
O 5
Zone 3 49' O
O 5
Zone 4 49' 0
0 12 Zone 5 49'
.0 0
14 Zone 6 49'
.0 0
1 Zone 7 23' 0
0 1
Zone 8 23' 0
0 1
Zone 9 23' 0
0 15 Zone 10 23' 0
0 14 Zone 11 23' 0
0 1
Zone 12 23' 0
0 1
Zone 13 49' 0
0 10 Zone 14 49' 0
0 10 3.
Diesel Generator Building Zone 1 2'
O O
7 Zone 2 2'
0 0
7 Zone 3 50' 0
0 6
Zone 4 23' O
O 3
BRUNS *iICK - UNIT 2 3/4 3-60
TABLE 3.3.5.7-1 (Continued)
I!!STRO:ENT LOCATIC::
MINDfDi INSTSL?tE!!TS OPERA 3LE FLA'4E HEAT SMOKE Zone 5 23' O
O 1
Zone 6 23' O
O 1
Zone 7 23' 0
0 1
Zone 8 23' 0
0 1
Zone 9 23' O
O 1
Zone 10 50' 0
0 6
4.
Service Water Building Zone 1 4'
0 0
6 Zone 2 20' O
O 5
5.
A0G Building Zone 1 20' 1
0 0
Zone 2 20' 1
0 0
Zone 3 20' 1
5 0
Zone 4
~37' - 49' 1
6 0
i 3RD:St?ICK - UNIT 2 3/4 3-61
PLANT SYSTOIS SPP.AY A'ID/OR SPRINKLER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7.2 The following spray and/or sprinkler systems shall be OPERABLE:
Diesel Generator #1 Preaction System - Diesel Generator Building a.
b.
Diesel Generator #2 Preaction System - Diesel Generator Building Diesel Generator #3 Preaction System - Diesel Generator Building c.
d.* Diesel Generator #4 Preaction System - Diescl Generator Building a
e.*
South Cable Spread Area Sprinkler System - Diesel Generator Building f-f.* North Cable Spread Area Sprinkler System - Diesel Generator Building g.
Two Standby Gas Treatment Train 2A Deluge Systems - Reactor Building #2.
h.
Two Standby Gas Treat =ent Train 2B Deluge Systems - Reactor l
Building #2.
1.* ' Area Sprinkler System - Reactor Building #2.
'j.
- Service Water Pump Area Sprinkler System - Service Water Building k.*
Service Water Cable Spread Area Sprinkler System - Service Water Building.
g-
'l.
- Drumming Room Sprinkler System'- Radwaste Building
- ett, s
e.
Makeup Water Treatment Area Sprinkler System - Makeup Water m.
Treatment Building APPLICABILITY:
Whenever equipment in the areas protected by tne spray
,7 and/or sprinkler systems is required to be OPERABLE.
Ap ACTION:
With one or more of the above required spray and/or sprinkler a.
systems inoperable, establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for the unprotected area (s) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; restore the system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Conmission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days c.-
lining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.
b.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- Conditional date for implementation of these Technical Specifications: July 27, 1979 BRGSWICX - C IT 2 3/4 7-43
TABLt 3.7.7.4-1, FIRE HOSE STATICt!S LOCATIO!!
ELEVATIO!i HOSE RACK d Unit !!o. 2 Reactor Bldg. *
-17' 2-P3-19
-17' 2-P3-20
-17' 2-RB-24
-17' 2-RB-25
-17' 2-RB-26 20' 2-RB-2:
20' 2-RB-22
.3 m 20' 2-RB-23 A.
20' 2-RB-27
~
20' 2-RB-28
'.s.
20' 2-P3-29
.'),
50' 2-RB-30 IN -
50' 2-RB-31
[
50' 2-RB-32 50' 2-RB-33 50' 2-RB-34 50' 2-RB-35 67' 2-RB-48A l
y j.
80*
2-RB-36 80' 2-RB-39 80' 2-P3-41 80' 2-RB-43 80' 2-RB-44 80' 2-RB-45 98' 2-RB-37 l
.cW 117' 2-RB-38
',(('
117' 2-RB-40 117' 2-RB-42 117' 2--F3-4 6 117' 2-RB-47 117' 2-Rb-48 A0G Building 23' 2-A0G-57
'/,
23' 2-A0G-58 1
23' 2-A0G-59 23' 2-A0G-60 37' 2-A0G-62
(~
49' 2-A0G-61 Radwaste Building
-3' RW-49
- 3 '-
RU-50
-3' RW-51 23' RW-52 23' RU-53 23' RW-54 23' RU-55 23' RW-56 BRUNSWICR - UN'T 2 3/4 7-47
TABLE 3.7.7.4-1 FIRE HOSE STATIC::S LOCATIO:!
ELEVATIO!:
HOSE RACK #
Diesel Generater Building 2'
DGB-1 2'
DGB-2 2'
DGB-3 73' DGB-4 23' DGB-5
'23' DGB-6 23' DGB-7 23' DGB-8 23' DGB-9 50' DGB-10 50' DGB-ll 50' DGB-12 50' DGB-13 Service Water Building 4'
SW-1 20' SW-2 20' SW-3 Control Building 23' 2-CB-1 49' 2-CB-2 Conditional date for implementation of these Technical Specifications:
April 23, 1979 Conditional date for implementation of these Technical Specifications: May 11, 1979 Conditional date for implementation of these Technical Specifications:
April 11, 1979 BRlTSWICK - U';lT 2 3/4 7-47a
PLANT SYSTEMS FOAM SYSTEMS
- LIMITING CONDITION FOR OFERATION 3.7.'7.5 The folloving foam systems shall be OPERA 3LE:
a.
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Tank Area System with:
[],
1.
The concentrate proportioning and storage subsystem OPERABLE with 240 gallons of concentrate.
I g.,
2.
Each tank room subsystem OPERABLE.
M
. 1. ;
b.
Diesel Generator Air Filter System with:
1.
The concentrate proportioning and storage subsystem OPERA 3LE with 40 gallons of concentrate.
'S 2.
Each air filter subsystem OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: Whenever the Diesel Generators are required to be OPERABLE.
ACTION:
l a.
With any one tank room subsystem inoperable, verify the cpera-I bility of.the backup foa= hose reel within one hour.
l oi" -
b.
With any one air filter system inoperable, verify the operability i
of the backup foam hose reels within one hour.
7 c.
With any inoperability other than as defined in items a and b above, or with one or more of the concentrate proportioning and s
storage subsystems inoperable, verify the availability of backup fire suppression equipment for the unpro* acted area (s) within
- ~
ene hour; restore the system to OPERABLi status within 14 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.
t d.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable..
Conditional date for implementation of these Technical Specifications:
July 27, 1979 j
l BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 7-47b I
PLA.T SYSTD'S LI?iITI?!G CC:'DITIC" FOR OPEPATIC:I (Continued)
SUR7E!LLA::CE EIOUIEC:E::TS l
4.7.7.5 Each of the above required fea= syste=s shall be de=enstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 12 onths by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one a,=plete cycle of full travel.
b.
At least once per 18 :onths:
1.
By perfor=ing a syste= functional test which includes si=u-lated auto =atic actuation of the syste=, and:
a)
Verifying that the autocatic valves in the flow path actuate to their correct positions on a si=ulated I
actuation signal, and b)
Cycling each valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation through at least one co=plete cycle of full travel.
i 2.
By inspection of the spray headers to verify their integrity, j
and I
3.
By inspection of each spray no::le to verify no blockage.
4.
By conducting a perfor= ::: evaluation of the concentrate.
i l
I I
/-
TABLE 6.2.2-1 MINIMUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION =
Conci tion of Unit 2 - Unit 1 in CONDITION 1. 2 or 3 LICENSE APPLICABLE CATEGORY OPERATIGI,AL CONDITIONS '
l. 2, 3 4&5 50L**
2 1
2*
l OL**
i 3
2 Non-Licensed I
4 3
Condition of Unit 2 - Unit 1 in CONDITION a or 5 LICENSE APPLICABLE CATEGORY OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS i
1, 2, 3 A&5 SQL**
2 1*
OL**
2 2
Non-Licensed 3
3 Condition of Unit 2 - No Fuel in Unit 1, j
LICENSE APPLICABLE CATEGORY OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2. 3 a&5 i
SOL i
1 l
1*
OL I
2 1
Non-Licensed i
2 1
- Does not include tne licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator Limited to Fuel Handling, supervising CORE ALTERATIONS.
- Assumes each individual is licensed on both plants.
= Shif t crew comoosition, including an individual cualified in radiation protection procedures, may be less than the minimun recuirements for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements of Table 6.2.2-1, BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 6-5
___