ML19276F346

LER 79-004/03L-0 on 790211:suction Isolation Valve Mo 2-1001-50 Failed to Close from Control Room.Caused by Failed Circuit Breaker in Valve Motor Control Center. Valve Taken Out of Svc for Repair During Outages

ML19276F346
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	03/06/1979
From:	Tietz G COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML19276F341	List: ML19276F340 ML19276F346
References
LER-79-004-03L-03, LER-79-4-3L-3, NUDOCS 7903290035
Download: ML19276F346 (2)

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-! L While the shutdown coolino mode of RHRS was being taken off. suct'nn i nnlation I The safety implications i J! valve MO 2-1001-50 failed to clo_se from the control room.

9 L of this occurrence are minimal due to the fact the second isolation _ valvem _0 M 2-1001-47J

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,,y out-of-service, closing the valve. During an outage when the valve can be appropriately operated and tested, the necessary repairs will be made.

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l. LEL NUMBER: LER/R0 79-04/03L-0

11. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station Ill. FACILITY NAME: Unit Two IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-265 V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On February 11, 1979, Unit Two was i ; the REFUEL mode and the shutdown cooling mode of RHRS was operating. At 10: 30 a.m.,

the control room operator was taking shutdown cooling off when he discovered that the suction valve, M0 2-1001-50, would not close from the control room. Upon notifying the Shift Engineer, it was decided to take the valve out-of-service by tripping the breaker and thus closing the valve. The second isolation valve, M0 2-1001-47 was also closed. There has been no previous occurrences of this nature irvolving the M0 2-1001-50 valve.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The safety implications of this occurrence are minimal due to the fact the second Isolation valve, M0 2-1001-47, in the shutdown cooling suctic, line was fully operable at all times.

Therefore, had a Group 11 isolation signal occurred the 47 valve would have isolated the line.

Vll. CAUSE:

The initial investigation indicated that equipment failure was the probable cause of this occurrence. A contact in the valve breaker was not operating properly. During a future maintenance outage, a full investigation of the problem and the necessary repairs will be completed.

Vill. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to take the valve out-of-service electrically, closing it. During a maintenance outage, when the valve can be appropriately operateJ and tested, the necessary repairs will be completed. Until that t ime , p ri ma ry containment isolation is assured by the closure of M0-2-1001-50, and the operabili ty of valve M0-2-1001-47