05000289/LER-1977-001, Forwards LER 77-001/01T.Provides Supplemental Info

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Forwards LER 77-001/01T.Provides Supplemental Info
ML19261F171
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 02/18/1977
From: Arnold R
METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19261F172 List:
References
GQL, NUDOCS 7910250583
Download: ML19261F171 (4)


LER-1977-001, Forwards LER 77-001/01T.Provides Supplemental Info
Event date:
Report date:
2891977001R00 - NRC Website

text

NHCrose ;c5 U.S. NUCLE A R H E f~ U L A Tu a Y GloN oCCKET NUMBER 50-289 c2.rn NRC DISTRIBUTION FoR PART 50 DOCKET MATERI AL

"'bEbE!iTREPORT FROM:

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Metropolitan Edison Company 2/18/77 2c RECEivEo R. C. Auuld/ Reading, Pa.

o Mr. J. P. O'Reilly 2/2S/77

[ LETTER ONoToRIZEo PROP INPUT FORM NUMBE R oF COPIES RECEIVEo

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-.0 cop" One signed CESCRIPTioN E N C LoSU R E Ltr. trans the following:

Licensee Event Report (R0 50-289/77-1/1T) on 2/3/77 concerning the "A'.' Diesel Generator not starting in the event of an offsite power loss without an ES signal.....

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Three Mile Island Unit No. 1 NCrfE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS FOR ACTION /INFORMATION 3/2/77 RJL i

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY

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a Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director

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J,D 631 Paric Avenue

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Dear Sir:

Docket :Io. 50-239 Operating License :Io. DPR-50 This report is being submitted on February 18, 1977 in accordar.ce with the February 16, 1977 telephone conversation between Mr. W. E. Fotts and Mr. A.

Fasano.

In accordance with the Technical Specifications of our Three Mile Island :Iuclear Station Unit 1 (TMI-1), we are reporting the following reportable occurrence:

(1) Report :Iumber: 77-1/1T

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(2a) Required Report Date:

2/16/77 s

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(2b) Date of Occurrence: 2/03/77

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(3) Facility: Three Mile Island :Tuclear Station - Unit II

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':h kt-g si (h) Identification of Occurrence:

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o Title:

The "A" Diesel Generator vould not start in the_ c.ver,t o% [a[

offsite power loss vitliout an EU signal.

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A reportable occurrence as defined by Technical Specification

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6.9 2. A(2) in that there was a less of diesel generator "A" while Diesel Generator "3" was out of service for its annual inspection thus leading to cperation of the unit with a parameter subject to a limiting condition less conservative than the least conservative aspect of that limiting condition for operation established in Tc.5nical Specification 3.7.2.C.

(5) Ccnditions Pricr te Occurrence:

Pover:

Core: 995 RC Temp: 579 ?

Elec: Sh3 We FR2R Level'. 211 inches 1481 OM RC Pressure: 21T2 psig PRCR Temp: 6h5 F RC Flow: 138x100 lbs/h:

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Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director 6.

Description of Occurrence:

On 2 February,1977, it was determined that the ">

_asel Generator would not have successfully started in the event vr loss of offsite power unless an Engineered Safeguards (ES) signal was present. The Oil Pressure Low Speed (OPLS) pressure switch was found to be stuck. When the OPLS switch failed to operate before the crank timer operated, it caused a start failure signal that tripped the generator.

If an ES signal had been present this trip signal vould have been defeated and the diesel vould hace successfully started.

A start failure occurred on 31 January 1977 when the "A" Diesel was being manually started. A subsequent test was successful and the "A" Diesel was declared operable. On 1 February 1977 the "A" Diesel was successfully started; however, on 2 February 1977 the GPLS pressure switch was found to be stuck. During the period of time that the CPLS switch was (or may have been) stuck the "B" Diesel was tagged out-of-service for annual inspection.

When the "B" Diesel was tested, the OPLS pressure switch operated; however, the cranking timer operated just before the GPLS switch and a start failure occurred.

I =ediately the cranking timers on the "3" Diesel Generator vere set to approximately ten (10) seconds and the "B" Diesel was tested satisfactorily.

The stuck pressure switch on the "A" Diesel Generator was corrected and the cranking timers were set to approximately ten (10) seconds.

The "A" Diesel Generator was then tested satisfactorily. The total elapsed time frc= the time the "A" diesel generator was determined to be inoperable on 2 February until both diesels were returned to service was 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

7 Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

This event has been determined tc have been caused by mechanical binding of the GPLS switch parts of the "A" Diesel Generator. Slow cperation of the OPLS switch and a timer setting at the lov end of the tolerance caused the "B" Diesel Generator failure.

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director 8.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The Engineered Safeguards equipment is normally supplied by offsite power. In the event of an Engineered Safeguards actuation with loss of offsite power, the CPLS pressure switch failure would not have prevented the "A" Diesel from performing its function.

One diesel generator is adequate to provide power under the above condition.

If the loss-of-offsite power was not accompanied by an FS signal, then a loss of power concurrent vith failure of bcth diesel generators may have occurred.

Both of the above conditiens have been analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report.

It is concluded that the event did not result in a threat to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel.

9

Corrective Action

In addition to the corrective action described above:

The present OPLS pressure swit :0 vill be replaced. The surveillance procedure will be changed to require increased timer settingc unless the new switches have significantly shcIter operating times.

Centrary to the telegram on February 3,1977, the OPLS switch vill be replaced with the same type of switch.

10.

Failure Data:

Fairbanks Morse Diesel Generator, 3000 kw 0PLS Pressure Switch - Ccnsolidated Ccntrols Corporatien Bethel, Conn.

Part No. 21AlELO253-3, range 0-25 psi

Similar Events

None Sincerely, e

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R. C.larnold Vice President RCA:DGM:rk