05000289/LER-1984-001, :on 840427,relay Room Floor Fire Barrier Penetration Seal 735 Identified in Deficient Condition.No Seal Material Installed in Condulet.Seal Inspected & Repaired
| ML20092P364 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1984 |
| From: | Hukill H, Otto S GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| References | |
| 5211-84-2159, LER-84-001, LER-84-1, NUDOCS 8407060209 | |
| Download: ML20092P364 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) |
| 2891984001R00 - NRC Website | |
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At 1420 hours0.0164 days <br />0.394 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.4031e-4 months <br /> on April 27, 1984, Relay Room floor fire barrier penetration seal 735 was identified to be in deficient condition. No seal material had been installed in the condulet. A fire watch had not been established within one hour of the onset of the deficient condition, thus violating TS 3.18.7.2.
This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)(B).
The deficient condition of seal 735 is potentially applicable to similar fire seals that were required to be installed between April 1979 and November 7,1983. This is evidenced by the identification of the same deficient condition in two seals subsequent to the identification of seal 735.
Fire seals in new conduits installed between April 1979 and November 7,1983 were inspected and repaired upon discovery. The safety consequences and implication of the deficiency in the seal 735 and others which were identified during the inspection are similar. Public health and safety are not affected in any of these cases.
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PLANT OPERATItG CONDITIONS BEFORE THE EVENT The TMI-l facility was in long term Cold Shutdown with TAVG <2000F.
II.
STATUS OF STRLCTURES, C0bPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT WERE INO"ERABLE AT*
THE ST ART OF THE EVENT AND THAT CONTRISJTED TD THE EVENT Not applicable.
III.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
At 1420 hours0.0164 days <br />0.394 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.4031e-4 months <br /> on April 27, 1984, Relay Room (338 ft Control Tower) floor fire barrier penetration seal (SEAL) 735 was identified to be in deficient condition.
Seal 735 is a 3 inch core bare with a 11'4 inch conduit penetrating the seal.
A fire watch had not been established within one hour of the onset of the deficient condition.
This violated the Action Statement of Technical Specification
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3.18.7.2.
Therefore, this event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(1)(B).
A fire watch was ests.blished immediately after identification of the condition by the Shift St.pervisor.
A Priority 1 job ticket was issued and a new seal was installed inside the conduit es-l'y. on the next shift that day. The firewatch was secured following a post-installation inspection by Quality Control.
The deficient condition of Seal 735 is potentially applicable to other similar fire seals. Fire barrier seals were required to be installed during modifications prior to the uogracing of procedure M.P.1420-FB-1 " Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Repair" of Novemoer 7, 1983.
Tnese seals may not have been installed as required. Conduits installed prior to April 1979 were suoject to 100% Ouality Control inspection du-ing the initial fire ba rier sealing project.
Evidence of this potential proDiem being, ore widespread was the identification of the same deficient conoition in Seal 85, a blockout through the floor of the Engineered Safeguards Room (338 ft Control
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Tower) and Seal 1055, a blockout through the wall between the
~ Technical Support Center and 480V AC ES-IS Switchgear Room (332 ft Control Tower), subsequent to the identification of Seal 735.
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COH20NENT FAILURE DATA At the time seal 735 was to have been installed, procedure M.P.
1420-FB-1 " Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Repair" was inadequate.
The' Procedtre was not specific on the requirement to install seals within conduits that are open-ended, or had condulets, pull boxes, or terminated at terminal boxes, or any other cabinet or enclosure.
Since Noverber 7,1983, the procedure clearly states that seals are to be installed at the first opening, box, condulet, etc. on each side of the fire barrier.
Because of the deficiency in the procedure at the time of installation, tnis is considered a component failure cause code "D", Defective Procedure.
V.
AUTOMATIC OR MANUALLY INITIATED SAFETY SYSTEM RES20tGES This event is not associated with any system response.
b VI.
ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IKoLICATIONS 0~ THE EVENT
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The Relay Room contains equipment considered essential for control and monitoring.of plant parameters in the Cold Shutdown condition.
An ionization' fire detection system and a total flooding Caroon Dioxide fire stppression system with heat actuated detectors protect the Relay Room.
Both systems were available during the event.
The TMI-1 fire barrier. seal design r'equires seals in all conduits at the first opening or device on each side of the rated fire barrier the conduit penetrates.
This desigi eliminates hot gas paths in the event of fire.
The failure to seal the 1 1/4 inch conduit in the first condulet did not represent a significant threat to the integrity of the fire-rated floc slac of the Relay Room considering the availability of the automatic fire detection and suppression systems.
The safety consequences and implications of the deficiencies in seals 85 and 1055 are similar to those of the deficiency in seal 735.
Public health and safety were not affected in any of these cases.
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PREVIOUS EVENTS OF A SIMILAR NATURE LER 83-036/03L-0 and LER 83-047/03L-0 dealt with inoperable fire barrier penetration seals. The seals identified in LER 83-047/03L-0 and one seal identified in LER 83-036/03L-0 were found to have been installed without any sealing material inside the conduit. The cause of both events was that insufficient guidance was given to the worker installing the seals.
VIII.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED An inspection of new conduits installed as part of modification work subsequent to April 1979 and prior to the November 7,1983 correction of MP 1420-FB-1 was performed to provide assurance that all conduits have the required fire barrier seals installed.
Several hundred seals in all plant areas were inspected. Three conduits were found to be in violation of the design specification:
1.
Seal 770, Conduit D - no seal in the open end in the east inverter room. A fire watch was posted upon discovery.
2.
Seal 263, 3/4" Conduit item M - no seal in a pull box in Tech Support Center (322' Control Building).
3.
Seal 267, 3 1/2" Conduit item A - open end in Loose Parts Vibration Monitor Cabinet in the Tech Support Center (322' Control Building) had not been resealed.
The seals found to be in deficient condition were repaired upon discovery. The safety consequences and implications of the deficiency in these seals are similar to seal 735.
Public health and safety were not affected.
Conduit installed since Novemb'er 1983 when 100% Quality Control in process monitoring was made a requirement were also spot checked with no deficiencies found.
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Route 441 South Middletown, Pennsy!vania 17057-0191 717 944 7621 TELEX 84 2386 Writer's Direct Dial Nurnber:
June 29, 1984 5211-84-2159 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Room Mail Stop 058 Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Sir:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit I, (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 LER 84-001-01 This letter transmits Licensee Event Report (LER) No 84-001-01.
LER 84-001-00, submitted May 25, 1984, dealt with inoperable fire barrier.
penetration seals. As corrective action, an inspection of certain fire barrier penetration seals was performed.
LER 84-001-01 contains all the information previously submitted and the results of the inspection.
Public health and safety were unaffected.
This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73, using the required NRC forms (attached). NRC Form 366 contains an abstract which provides a brief description of the event. For a complete understanding of the event, refer to the text of the report which appears on Form 366A.
Sincerely, 1
. D. Hikill, Director, THI-1 HDH/
Attachment cc:
R. Conte, Senior Resident Inspector Dr. T. E. Murley, Region I, Regional Administrator J. Van Vliet, Project Manager IE-14 GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation
/