ML19210C816
| ML19210C816 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/05/1979 |
| From: | Ross D NRC - TMI-2 BULLETINS & ORDERS TASK FORCE |
| To: | Reed C WESTINGHOUSE OPERATING PLANTS OWNERS GROUP |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911200149 | |
| Download: ML19210C816 (57) | |
Text
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N Distribution:
NOV 5 1979
.1r. Corcell Reed, Chaiman
.iastin;hoase Owners' 3roup Corconwealth Edison Ccepany-P. O. Box 167 Cne First flational Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60690
Dear :
'r. Reed:
" SC5dECT: E'/ALUATICt: CF SMALL-GREAK LOSS-0F-CCCLAhT ACCIDE.'iT CPEMTJR GUIDELI.1ES We nave completed our review of the small-break loss-of-coolant accident operator guidelines E-0 anc E-1 contained in Appencix A of 'aestingncuse Electric Corporation Report WCAP-3600.. Our evaluation of these guicalines is documented in Enclosure 1.
As stated in our evaluation, we have concluded tnat the guicelines E-0 and E-1, as nocified in accorcance with your letters cated Cctooer 16,13.9, Octocer 31,19i9 and ::ovember 2,1979 are acceptable for. plants having nigh head safety injection pucps similar to the 412 standard plant. A copy of the approved guidelines is provided in Enclosure 2 for your information anc use. For the case of 4-loop, 3-loop, and 221 cop plants with nominal 1400 psi range safety infection pumps,. it is cur uncerstancing that revisions to the guicelines for these plants similar to tnose provideo for the 412 stancara plant in your Oct0ber 31,19l3 and flovemoer 2,13/3 letters will be sucaittec sncrtly. Based on your comitment to provice these agreed-upon revisions to tne guidelines in a ticely manner, we find the guicelir.es for tnese plants acceptable, pending fulfillaent of this cocnitment.
All licensees of Westinghouse Electric Corpcration pressurizac watar reac:Or plants may new proceed with their cevelopr.ent of small-creak loss-of-coolant accident er.ergency ::rececures anc operator graining cased cn.tne accifiad guicalines. As incicatec on Page 5 of Enclosure 5 to Garrell 3. Eisennut's Septe-cer 13, 1973 letter to all operating nuclear power plants, implementa:icn of these procacures anc cpericor toining are to be corolatec.:/ Jececoer 31, 1373.
In the trolementation of these procecures, each licensee shall provide:
1, The : asis for the ::ressure setpoint at unich the operator is to trip the reactor ccolant ; c ps. The casts shculd incluce cefining the staa-generater safaty vahe se:pcints anc instrument ancertainties.
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.9r. Cordell Reed.2, The instrucent uncertainties involved with the HPI terminacion criteria to indicate the criteria will insure subccoled conditions.
3 Justification that the. procedures for s41:chcver free inspection to recirculation will insure that the valve realignments can ce accom-plished before the RUST is ecptied. This justification should include instr =cnt uncertainties and show that the puc;s will be protected against operating without adequate suction pressure.
.4; Licensees with 4-loop, 3-locp, or 2-loop plants with nacinal 1400 psi range safety injection Jr.ps, should snow that the peps will not be run deacheaded when in the recirculation race.
.E An indication of the typicality of the analyses documented in aCAP-9600 relative to its own plant.
Licensees will also be required to implement ecergency procedures covering the extended loss of all feedwater.inclucing pressure vessel integrity considerations l, and to revise ecergency procecures for initiating. if necessary ano monitoring natural circulaticn. including provisions for plant coolcoun.. Such procedures will be based on guicelines wnich you are developing uncer inadequate core ccoling.
As part of our audit program, we expect to examine tne procedures of lead plants in several of the classes of Westinghouse-cesigned pressuri:cd.
water reactors to assure that they have been developed in accordance with the approved guidelines We also plan to. check cut some of the procedures at a
' Jestingnouse pressurized water reacter simulator, on a schedule to ce developed later. It shoulc be noted however, that our aucit program neea not icpede
. progress towards icplecentation of approved procacures and associated training by December 31, 1979.
Sincerely, 0: iri.a1 ri:::23 tyr
- 3. F. Ross, Jr.. Director 3ulletins and Jrders Task Fcree
Enclosures:
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1363 087 EVALUATION OF WESTINGHOUSE OPERATOR GUIDELINES FOR SMALL BREAK LOCA Guidelines for Emeroency Procedures A Westinghouse Interdittplinary Task Force was formed to prepare guidelines for operators for small break loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCA's). The Task Force consisted of safety analysts, systems analysts, training personnel and other disciplines. The guidelines which were developed were reviewed and approved by the Working Group on Procedures, which is a subgroup of the Westinghouse Owners' Group.
Preliminary guidelines were submitted to the NRC staff as part of the generic report WCAP-9600, " Report on Small Break Accidents for Westinghouse NSSS System." The intent of the guidelines was for each of the utilities using a Westinghouse nuclear steam supply system to revise or develop its emergency procedures for the operators to use in diagnosing and responding to a loss of reactor coolant. The reference instructions developed by Westing-house were expanded to include all emergency events in which the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) was automatically actuated. The guidelines incluce Imediate Actions and Diagnostics (E-0), Loss of Reactor Coolant (E-1), Loss of Secondary Coolant (E-2), and Steam Generator Tube Rupture (E-3). Only E-0 and E-1 have been reviewed by the NRC staff at this time for both the 412 Standard Plant, which has high head safety injection pumps, and other plants with nominal 1400 psi safety injection (SI) pumps. The staff will not review E-2 and E-3 until after January 1, 1980.
The pnilosophy of the instructions was for the operator to respond to an event in wnicn safety injection was initiated and, following the required imediate 1365 088
. actions, to diagnose the event and perform the necessary subsequent actions.
The immediate action:i consist of verifying that the automatic actions did occur. Verification, in this context, includes performing the action manually if it did not occur automatically. These actions are intended to assure that the reactor is t.dequately shot down, that the safety injection system is performing its design function and that auxiliary feedwater is being delivered to the steam generatcrs as a heat sink for the core decay heat.
In the diagnostic procedure E-0, the operator assesses the event using reactor coolant system pressure as a key parameter.
If the pressure falls below a specified value, he must immediately trip all the reactor coolant pumps. The primary system pressure at which the pumps will be tripped will be determined based on the secondary system pressure in the following manner:
r (1) Secondary System Pressure - Based on the number and size of the secondary syste-safety valves, the secondary pressure will be established by detennining the pressure setpoint for that valve in which the calculated steam relief is less than 60% of the valve's relief rating.
If the calculated relief is greater than 60% of the rated capacity, then the next highest pressure setpoint should be used.
(2) Primary to Secondary Pressure Difference - To account for the pressure gradien:
needed for heat removal, pressure drop between the steam generator and safety valves, pressure drop from steam generator to measurement location, etc.,
the primary pressure for RCP trip should be the secondary pressure as established by (1) above plus 100 psi if the adjustments calculated are 100 psi or less.
If the adjustments are determined to be greater than 100 psi, the larger value should be used.
1365 089
3 (3)
Instrument inaccuracies appropriate for that time in the accident should be added to the primary system pressure value established in (2) above. The resulting pressure is the indicated primary system pressure at which the operator should trip the reactor coolant pumps.
The action regarding reactor coolant pump trip was deemed necessary by a West-inghouse analysis of delayed reactor coolant pump trip for a limited range of small break LOCAs (WCAP-9584).
If, in addition to low pressure, the condenser air ejector radiation or steam generator blowdown radiation monitor readings are abnormally high, the operator is directed to E-3, the steam generator tube rupture procedure.
If the steamline pressure is abnormally lower in one steam generator than in the others, he must assume a loss of secondary coolant. Abnormally high readings for containment pressure, containment high radiation, or containment recirculation sump levels are symptomatic of a loss of reactor coolant.
i In the diagnostic procedure, the operator is permitted to terminate a spurious high pressure injection (HPI) actuation if the primary system pressure, pressurizer level, and subcooling are within acceptable limits and there is sufficient water level in at least one steam generator and no abnormal readings for containment atmosphere monitors.
1365 090
. If HPI actuation is not spurious, the operator would proceed to the emergency procedures for one of the depressurization accidents. The core is assured of adequate core cooling in the LOCA procedure (E-1) in that the operator is prevented from terminating high pressure injection unless certain criteria are met. These criteria include:
1.
At least normal full power subcooling, 2.
Primary system pressure of 2000 psig or greater and increasing, and 3.
Pressurizer level at or above progrr.mmed no-load range, and 4.
Sufficient water level in at least one steam generator to assure a heat sink.
Similar HPI termination criteria are included in the other emergency procedures.
Recognizing that, in most instances of safety injection, the primary system will be repressurized, these criteria are necessary to allow the operator to terminate safety injection to reduce the probability of lifting the pressuriizer power operated relief or sa.'et) valves.
The criteria for the lower head SI plants are basically the same.
If the safety injection is sufficient to repressurize the plant, flow will stop when the shutoff head of the pumps is reached. The normal charging pumps and pressurizer heaters can be used to bring pressure above 2000 psig, at which time the SI pumps can be stopped.
Subsequent actions in the E-l guidelines are based on whether the plant can be repressurized.
If the plant can be repressurized, the operator is directed to' increase the subcooling to 500 F and proceed with plant cooldown while monitoring subcooling.
If subcooling cannot be maintained, HPI is reinitiated. Subsequent 1363 091 actions include switchover from injection to recirculation when the level in the refueling water storage tank (RWST) is low and hot leg injection at about 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />. The NRC staff has not reviewed the guidelines for switchover and hot leg injection, because these will be plant-specific.
Evaluation The NRC staff reviewed the guidelines with respect to critical operator actions, namely:
1.
reactor coolant pump trip.
2.
HPI termination criteria.
3.
verification of safety systems actuation.
4.
verification of a heat sink.
5.
monitoring of important system parameters.
During our review, the staff identified modifications to be made,to the guide-lines to enhance the directions to the operator. These modifications were sub-sequently incorporated in the guidelines as defined by Revision 1 (October 16, 1979) and revisions dated October 31, 1979, and November 2, 1979.
The criteria for tripping the reactor coolant pumps are consistent with the analyses presented in WCAP-9584, which have been reviewed by the staff and found acceptable.
In order to implement the criteria in individual plant procedures, each licensee must document the basis for the low pressure set point. This documentation should include defining the steam generator safety valve set points and system and instrument uncertainties associated with the plant. Based on our review of WCAP-9584 and the requirement for each licensee to justify the low pressure trip point described in the preceding section, we conclude that the reactor coolant pump trip criteria are acceptable.
1365 092
- Although we find that the reactor coolant pump trip criteria are acceptable, manual tripping of the pumps should be considered only a short-term solution. For the long-term, we will regt. ire that this trip be made automatic.
The criteria for terminating HPI flow is based on a combination of system pressure, subcooling, pressurizer level, and steam generator water level. The staff concurs that these criteria are sufficient for establishing subcooled conditions in the core so that HPI can be safely terminated without concern for detrimental voids being formed in the primary system.
In implementing these criteria, each licensee is required to document the instrument uncertainties (even in an adverse environment) to show that the criteria in the guidelines will indeed insure subcooled conditions. Based on the above requirement, we find the HPI termination criteria accep. table.
As part of the immediate actions, the operator is directed to verify that the ECCS, auxiliary feedwater (AFW), and containment isolation systems have been act-uated. We concur that these verifications are sufficient to insure minimum safeguards availability needed to mitigate small break LOCAs.
The operator is also directed to verify that he has established heat removal from the steam generator. We concur that this is a necessary instruction for mitigating small break LOCAs.
The operator is directed to monitor primary system pressure, pressurizer level, and coolant hot leg temperatures to insure that subcooling is maintained if HPI has been terminated. We concur that monitoring these system variables is sufficient to maintain adequate subcooling in the primary system.
}303 09 f-
The staff has not reviewed the guidelines for switchover from injection to rec culation or hot leg injection because these actions are mostly plant-specific instructions.
The staff requires each licensee to justify the procedures for switchover to insure that the valve realignments can be accomplished before RWST is emptied.
This justification should include instrument uncertainties and show that the pumps will be protected against operating with inadequate suction.
We will require that plants with nominal 1400 psi range SI pumps demonstrate that these pumps will not be deadheaded when in the racirculation phase.
The staff noted that the guidelines are based on obtaining at least minimum safeguards operation to mitigate small break LOCAs. We require each licensee to extend the emergency procedures to cover the loss of all feedwater.
Procedures for this degraded condition should also take into account pressure vessel integrity considerations.
The Owners' Group has comitted to prepare guide-lines for operational procedures regarding the loss of all feedwater as part of its effort on the issue of inadequate core cooling.
The staff also requires that the emergency procedures include ' instructions for monitoring and initiating (if lost) natural circulation for small break LOCAs where heat removal by the steam generators is required.
1365 094
.8-The guidelines for such procedures should direct the operator to initiate a controlled plant-cooIdown is stable system conditions can be maintained.
The staff requires that each licensee provide procedures for cooling down the plant under natural circulation conditions. These procedures should address
'boration control and monitoring, cooldown of-the pressurizer, and adequate criteria for monitoring coolout system temperatures to insure that voids do not forrt in the primary system which could inhibit adequate heat removal. As in the case of loss of all feedwater, the Owners' Group nas committed to prepare guide-lines for operational procedures regarding natural circulation and cooldown under natural circulation conditions as part of its effort on inadequate core cooling.
Conclusion Based on our review, we conclude that the guidelines E-0 and E-1 as revised by the Owners' Group letters dated October 16, 1979, October 31, 1979, and November 2,1979 are acceptable for plants having high head safety injection pumps similar to the 412 standard plant, provided that licensees implement the
- requirements noted above when they develop their procedures. For the case of 4-loop, 3-loop, and 2-loop plants with nominal 1400 psi range safety injection pumps, the Owners' Group has committed to submit revisions to the guidelines for these p ints which are similar to those provided for the 412 standard plant in the Owners' Group letters dated October 31, 1979 and riovember 2,1979. Based on this commitment, we find the guidelines for these plants acceptable, pending sutraission of such revisions, subject to the requirements on individual licensees identified above.
1365 095
412 STANDARD PLANT REFERENCE EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS Revisien 1 September 25, 1979 with Revised Pages
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dated October 15, 1979, October 29, 1979, and November 2, 1979 This document contains Emergency Instructions for the Model 412 Standard P1 ant and is intended to provide guidance in the preparation of Emer-gency Operating Procedures for individual plants.
It is r.ct likely that these instructions will apply in their entirety to any specific plant design and adaptation will be required.
1365 096
l.
ATTADestT A (1)
Secondary Systne Pressure. Based on the number and size of the secondary system safety valves, the secondary pressure trill be estabitshed by determining the pressure setpoint for that velve in tBrfch the calculated steam relief is less than 805 of the valve's rel16f rating.
If the calculated relief is greater than 605 of the rated capacity, then the next highest pressure setpoint should be used.
, (t) primry__to secondary Pressure Difference - to account for the pressure gradient needed for heat renoval, pressure drop between the steam generator and safety valves, pressure dron from steam generator to measurement location, etc., the prinses pressure for RCP trip should be the Secondary pressure as established by (1) shove pia 100 psi if the adjustments calculated are 100 psi or less.
If
~ the adjustments are ' determined to be greater than 100,,st, the larger value should be used.
(3) instesuant inaccurecies appropriate for that time in the loss of toolant accident should be 4dded to the primry system pressure value established in (2) &bove. The resulting pressure is the indicated prisery tysten pressure at which the operator should trip the reactor coolant pumps.
1365 097
Revision 1 412 STANDARD PLANT E-0 EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS IMMEDIATE ACTIONS AND DIMNOSTICS This instruction presents the automatic actions, the immediate operator actions and the diagnostic sequence which is te be followed in the identification of the followir.g:
1.
Spurious Actuation of Safety Injection 2.
Loss of Reactor Coclant 3.
Loss of Secondary Coolant 4.
Steam Genera;cr Tube Rupture The reactor automatic protection equipment is designed to safely shut
'down the reactor in the event of any of the above emergencies. The safety injection system is designed to provide emergency core cooling and boration to maintain the safe reactor shutdown condition. These plant safeguards systems operate with offsite electrical power or from onsite emergency diesel-electric power should offsite power not be available.
In the subsequent documents in this series (E-1, E-2 and E-3), instruc-tiens for recovery from the event are presented for each particular accident.
E-0(HP)-1 1363 098 O
Revision 1 B.
SYMPTOMS NOTE:
The process variables referred to in this Instruction are typically monitored by more than one instrumentation channel. The redundant channels should be checked for consistency while performing the steps of this Instruction.
The following symptoms are typical of those which may arise in a plant which is undergoing a loss of reactor coolant, loss of secon-dary coolant or steam generator tube rupture (one or more symptoms may appear in any order):
Low Pressurizer Pressure Low Pressurizer Water Level Hign Pressurizer Water Level High Containment Pressure High Containment Radiation High Air Ejector Radiation High Steam Generator Blowcown Radiation Steam Flow /Feedwater Flow Mismatch Letdown Isolation / Pressurizer Heater Cutout low Low Reactor Coolant System Average Coolant Temperature h
E-0( HP)-2 1363 099
Aevision 1 Reyfsed 11/02/79 Nigh contatraent Rectreu14 tion Surio Water Level Low Steam 11ne Pressure (one or all Steam 11nes)
Low Stems Generator Water Level Increasing Steam Generator Water Level Rapidly changing Rear cor coolant System Average Coolant Tempera-ture Increased Charging Flow High $ team Flow (one or al15 team lines)
Migh Contatrument Humidity High Containment Temperatura low Feedwater Pump Discharge Pressure ICTE:
The pressurizar water level indication should theys be used in conjunction with other specified reactor coolant system indi. cations to tvaluate system conditfens and to initteta manual operator actions.
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IMPEDIATE ACTIONS 1.
Conditions warranting reactor trip or safety injection any be characterized by 4 huinber er anomalows tituations er unusual Instrument Indications.
4.
If the plant 15 in a condition for which a reactor trip is warranted and an autorsatic reactor trip has not yet occurred, manually trfp the reactor.
Continue sonttoring plant conditions as shown in Figure 1.
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O b.
If the plant is in a condition for which safet injection is warranted and an automatic safety injection has not yet occurred, manually initiate safety injection.
2.
Verify the following actions and system status:
a) Reactor trip and turbine trip have occurred.
b)
Bus voltages indicate that the busses are energi:ed and all intended loads are being powered.
c) Feedwater Isolation has occurred.
d) Containment Isolation Phase A has occurred.
e) Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps have started and the Auxiliary Feedwater System valves are in their proper Emergency Align-ment and are fully open or fully closed as acprocriate.
f)
Safety Injection Pumps have started and the monitor lights indicate that the Safety Injection System valves are in the proper safeguards position.
g) Service and Com;cnent Cooling Water Pu=os have started.
h) Containment Ventilation isolation has occurred.
E-0(HP) 4 1363 101
Revision 1
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Other essential equipment as required by the specific plant design has been put into service.
3'.
If any of the above automatic actions have not occurred and are required, they should be manually initiated.
Verify the following:
a)
Safety Infection flow from at leart one train is being delivered to the reactor coolant system when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is below the high head safety injection pump shutoff head.
If not, attempt to operate equipment manually or locally.
b)
Auxiliary Feedwater flow from at least one train is being
- " delivered to the steam generators.
If not, attempt to
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operate equipment manually or locally.
NOTE:
Only' after steam generator water level is established above the top of the U-Tubes, should the Auxiliary Feedwater System Flow be regulated to maintain required level.
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E-0(HP)-5 A e
Revision 1 Revised 10/29/79 D**
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c) Verify that heat is being removed frem the reactor plant via the steam generators by noting the following:
a) Automatic steam dump to the condenser is cccurring; b) Reactor coolant average temperature is de:reasing towards
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programmed no-load-temperature.
NOTE: Atmospheric steam dump will be biccked by an existing
" Turbine Tripped" condition.
If condenser steam dump has been blocked due to a control malfuncticn er loss of the " Condenser Available" conditien, de:ay heat removal will be effected by autcmatic actuation of the steam generator power-operated relief valves, or, if these prove ineffective, the steam generat:r c:de safety valves.
In this event, steam pressure will i
be maintained at the set pressure of the c:ntrolling valve (s) and reacter coolant average temperature will stabilize at approximately the saturation temperature for the steam pressure being maintained.
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1365 103 e
We E-0(HP)-53
m 4.
Whenever th,e Containment Hi-2 pressure setpoint is reached, verify that the Main Steam Isolation Valves have closed.
If not, manually close the Main Steam Isolation Valves from the Control Board.
5.
Whenever the Containment Hi-3 pressure setpoint is reached, verify that the following have occurred:
a) Containment Spray is initiated b) Containment Isolation Phase 3 is initiated If not, manually initiate Containmen Spray and Containment Isolation Phase B.
D.
ACCIDENT DIAGNOSTICS (Refer to Figure,2) 1.
Evaluate reactor coolant pressure to determine if it is low or decreasing in an uncontrolled manner.
If it is low ce decreas-ing, verify that:
a.
all pressurizer spray line valves are closed and b.
all pressurizer relief valves are closed.
E-0(HP)-o 1365 104
?
Revision 1 Revised 10/29/79 If not, manually close the valves from the Control-Board.
If the RCS pressure is above the low pressure reactor trip setpoint a'nd is stable or increasing, go to STEP 7.
2.
Stop ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps after the high head safety injection pump operation has been verified and when the wide range reactor coolant pressure is at (plant specific pressure derived from method in Attachment A of letter CG-17).
CAUTION:
If component cooling water to the reactor coolant pumps is isolated on a containment pressure signal, all reactor coolant pumps should be stopped within 5 minutes because of loss of motor bearing cooling.
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CAUTION:
If the reactor coolant pumps are stopped, the seal injection flow should be maintained.
NOTE:
The conditions given above for stopping reactor coolant pumps should be continuously monitored throughout this instruction.
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3 E-0(HP)-7 1365 105
Revision 1
- 3. IF the condenser air ejector radiation or steam generator blow-down radiation monitor exhibit abnormally high readings, AND containment pressure, containment radiation and containment recirculation sump level exhibit normal readings, THEN go. to E-3, " Steam Generator Tube Rupture."
- 4. E the steamline pressure is abnormally lower in one steam generator than in the other steam generators, THEN go to E-2,
" Lass of Secondary Coolant."
5.
E containment pressure, OR containment radiation CR containment recirculation sump levels exhibit either abnormally high read-ings or increasing readings, THEN go to E-1, "Less of Reactor Coolant".
NOTE:
For very small breaks inside the containment building, the containment pressure increase will be very small and possibly not recognizable by the operator. For very small breaks the containment recirculation su=o water level will increase very slowly and early in the tran-sient may not indicate a level increase.
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- These steps may be interchanged.
E-0(HP)-8 1365 106
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6.
Jf the containment pressure, containment radiation AND contain-ment recire'ulation sump water level continue to exhibit stable readings in the normal pre-event range, THEN go to E-2, " Loss of Secondary Coolant".
7.
In the event of a spurious safety injection signal, the sequence of reactor trip, turbine trip and safeguards actuatien will occur.
The operator must assume that the safety injection signal is non-spurious unless the following are exnibited:
a.
Normal readings for containment temperature, pressure, radiation and recirculation sump level AND b.
Normal readings for auxiliary building radiation and ventilation monitoring ANO c.
Normal readings for steam generator blowcown and condenser air ejector radiation.
Ji all of the symptoms a through c above are met and when the f ellowinc d througn f are exhibited:
d.
Reactor coolant pressure is greater than 2000 psig and increasing AND E-0(HP)-9 1365 107
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Revision 1
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Pressurizer water level is greate'r than programed no load water 'leve l* A.'l0 f.
The reactor coolant indicated subcooling is greater
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than(insertplantspecificvalueofsubcoolingequal to full power normal operation).
_,,g._' Water level in at least one steam generator is in the narrow l 'o/s e range span, er in the wide range span at a. level sufficient,,
to assure that the U-tubes are covered
- NOTE:
Pressurizer water level should trend with reactor cool-ant system temperature.
If the pressurizer water level is lost enough to prohibit pressurizer heater operation, re-establish water level by operating the charging sys-tem.
Energize the heaters.
THEN:
Th.~ Reset safety injection and stop safety injection pumps not l ' h. ?
needed fer nornal chareine and F.CP seal injecticn flow.
CAUTION:
Automatic reinitiation of safety injection wil1 not occur iof~,
since the reactor trip breakers are not reset.
CAUTIC'!:
Subsequent to this Step, should loss of offsite power occur, canual action (e.g., manuai safety injection iog initiation) will be required to load the safeguards
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equipment onto the' diesel powered emergency busses.
E-0(HP)-10
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[_'i.' Place all safety injection pUin(ps noi needed to provide l
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. normal changing flow in standby mode and maintain operable
. s'afety injection ficapaths.
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Injection Tank and establish nomal charging flew.
k.
Reestablish normal makeup and letdown (if letdown is l
unaffected) to maintain pressurizer water level in the normal operating range and to maintain reactor coclant pressure at values reached when safety injection is terminated.
Ensure that water addition during this process does not result in dilutien of the reacter coolant system boron concentration.
l'.
Reestablish operation of the pressurizer heaters.
When l
-",reacter ecolant pressure can be controlled by pressurizer heaters alone, return makeup and letdown to pressurizer water level control enly.
NOTE: E after securing safety injection and attempting to
' ~~
transfer to nomal pressurizer pressure and level con-trol, reactor coolant pressure drops belcw the low pres-surizer pressure setpoint fer safety injection actuation E if pressuri er water level drops belew IC% of span, M the reactor c:olant Tg > nemal full pcwer T,
g 1 AEN SAFE'Y IL'ECT:C'; MUST BE VANUALLY ?E!"ITI ATED.
The 4
cperator must rediagnose clant conditiens and proceed to the appropriate caryncy insru::icn.
1365 109 f_nf3Di_11
Revision 1 Revised 10/29/79 NOTE: Jf,after securing safety injection and transferring the plant to' normal pressuri:er pressure and level control, the reactor coolant pressure does not drop below the low pressurizer pressure setpoint for safety injection actu-ation AND the pressurizer water level remains above 10%
span, AND the reactor coolant indicated subcooling is greater than (insert plant ;pecific value of subecoling based on full power normal operation),
THEli go to the abnormal operating instructions.
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Revision 1 412 STANDARD PLANT E-1 EMERGENCY INSTRUCTION LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT A.
PURPOSE The objectives of these instructions are to specify required operator actions and precautions necessary to:
1.
Verify and establish short term core rJoling to prevent or minimize damage to the fuel cladding and release cf excessive radioactivity.
2.
Maintain long term shutdown and cooling of the reactor by recirculation of spilled reactor coolant, injected water and containment spray system drainage.
B.
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS Refer to section on Immediate Actions of E-0, Immediate Actions and Diagnostics, if not already performed.
P C.
SUBSECUENT ACTIONS CAUTION:
Molitor RWST level closely.
If RWST level decreases rapidly such that the RWST low level alarm apoears imminent, go directly to step 5.
E-1(HP)-1 1363 113
Revis.
' Revised 11/G; f.AUi!Gt:
The diesels should not be operated at idle or einlass lead for extendeid periods of time.
If the diesels are shut dcun, they should be prepared for restet.
NOTE: The operator thould verify that the Post Accident Monitoring (PAlt) instruments are operating and recording.
These Instru-I ments lactude wide range RCS temperature and pressure, steam pressure, staan generator wster level, containsent pressure.
N)f$T water level, condensett storage tank Water level, pres.
turizer water level and boric acid storage tank mater level.
NOTE: The process variables referred to in this Instruction are typically' monitored by more than one instrostatation channel.
f The redundant channels should be checked for consistency chile Iperforming the steps of this Instruction.
(
NOT!! heactor coolant system isolation valves (LSIV) are optional tquipment on the Westinghouse 5tandard plants.
IF 4 plant ts to equipped, the use of L%IV's is not currently Fr. commended I
,0 wring the ceurse of this Instruction.
My trse of L31V's must justified on a.Dlant specific basis.
NOTE: ha pressurizer meter lays 1 indication should aheys be used in conjunction w1Un other specified reactor coolant system indications
- to evaluate system conditions and to initiate manuel Operator actions.
E-1(HP)-2 p*@@*g*g,;g=
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Revision 1 1.
As the water level (PAMS) in the refueling water storage tank decreases under the action of the safeguards pumps, check that the recirculation sump water level instrumentation indicates an increase in water level in the sump.
If a sump water level increase is not evident then a re-evaluation of the symptoms in E-0 must be conducted.
Regulate the auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators to restore and/or maintain an indicated narrow range water level (PAMS).
If narrow range water level increases in an unexplained manner in one steam generator, go to E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
NOTE: Monitor the primary water supply (Condensate Storage Tank) for the auxiliary feedwater pumps and upon reaching a low level, switch over to an alternate water supply source.
2.
Close all pressurizer power operated relief valves and backup isolation valves.
3.
NOTE:
The conditions given below for termination of safety injection should be continuously monitored throughout this instruction:
E-1(HP)-3 1365 115
N RevistNn1
," ~ '-
,'," Revi s ed 10/29/79 Ensure that containment isolation is maintained, i.e., not reset until such time as manual action is required on nec-essary process streams.
I=$
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~.
(A) Reactor coolant pressure is greater than 2000 psig and increasing, AND (B) Pressurizer water level is greater than 50% of span, AND (C) The reactor coolant inc'icated subccoling is greater than (insert plant specific value of subcooling based on full power normal operation), AND T(0)WaterlevelinatleastoneSteamGeneratorisinthe l'
narrow range span, or in the wide range span at a
~
level sufficient to assure that the U-tubes are covered.
THEN:
~
,__,(E) Reset safety injection and stop safety injection l '*
pumps not needed for normal charcino and RCP seal injection flew.
t CAUTIC":
Autematic reinitiation of safety injection will not occur
, since the react;r trip breakers are not reset.
f E-1(HP)-4 j3636
nev nion 1 Revised 10/29/79 CAUTIO!!: Subsequent to this Step, should loss of offsite power occur, manual action (e.g., manual safety infection lo,.c. initiation) will be required to load the safeguards equipment cnto the diesel powered emergency busses. '/ '(F) Place all safety injection pumps not needed to provide normal charging flow in standby mode and maintain operable safety injection flowpaths. . (G) Isolate safety injection flow to RCS Cold Legs via l' /: Boron Injection Tank and establish normal charging flow. CAUTION: If reactor coolant pressure drops below the low pressurizer pressure setpoint for safety injec-tion or pressurizer water level drops below 20% of span following termination cf safety injection flow or the reactor coolant TH >N rmal Full Power T lo/: MANUALLY RE!!!ITIATE safety injection to establish reacter coolant pressure and pressurizer water level. Go to Section D of E-0 to reevaluate the event, unless this reevaluatien has' already been performed. ~. t E-1(HP)-5 jj7
Revised 10/29 _.,H) Reestablish normal makeup and letdown (if letdown l ( is unaffected) to mainta'in pressurizer water level, in the normal operating range and to maintain reactor coolant pressure at values reached when safety injection is terminated. Ensure that water addition during this process does not result in dilution of the reactor coolant system baron con-centration. ~ ~(I) Reestablish operation of the pressurizer heaters. l When reactor coolant pressure can'be controlled by pressurizer heaters alone, return makeup and let-down to pressurizer water level control only. (J) Monitor either the average temoerature indication of core exit thermocouples (if available) or all wide range reactor coolant temperature Tg (PAMS) to verify tnat RCS temperature is at least 50*F less than saturation temperature at RCS indicated pressure. If 50*F indicated subcooling is not present, then attempt to establish 50 F indicated subccoling by steam dump from the steam generators to tbc con-denser or the atmosphere. CAUTION: If steam dump is necessat,, ; educe the steam generator pressure 200 psi below the lowest steam safety valve setpoint and maintain a reactor coolant coolcown rate of no more than 50*F/HR, consistent, with plant make-up capability. If 50 F indicated subcooling cannot be established or maintained, then nanually reinitiate safetv ' injection. Go to Section D of E-0 to re-evaluate t the event, aless this re-evaluation has already been perforred. oc o D g-E-1 ( P.? ) -6 b.. ow a = 1365 118
Revision 1 Revised 10/29/~ (K) Perform a controlled cooldown to cold shutdown l conditions using Normal Cooldown Procedures if required to affect repairs. Maintain subcooled' conditions (at least 50*F indicated subcooling)in I the reactor coolant system. If subcooled con-ditions cannot be maintained, go to Step 4. 4. If the conditions for terminating safety injection in Step 3 are not met, maintain necessary safety injection pumps opera-ting. If any safeguards equipment is not operating, attempt to operate the equipment from the control room or locally. Effect repairs if necessary. If reactor coolant pressure is I above the low head safety injection pump shut-off head, manually reset safety injection so that safeguards equipment can be controlled by. manual action. Stop the low head safety -~ injection pumps and place in the standby mode. CAUTIO'i: 'a'henever the reactor coolant pressure decreases below the low head safety injection shutoff head, the low head safety injection pumps must be manually restarted to deliver fluid to the reactor coolant system. o go o g v y nA ~ o wM.onlAL 't ,,6:3
- z. i g i.3 E-1(HP)-7
Revision 1 Revised 10/29/79 5. Stop'ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps after the high head safety injection pump operatien has been verified and when the wide range reactor coolant pressure is at (plant specific pressure derived frcm method in Attachment A of letter 0G-17). , CAUTION: If cceponent cooling water to the reactor coolant pumps is isolated on a containment pressure sig-nal, all reactor coolant pumps are to be stopped within 5 minutes because of loss of motor bearing cooling. CAUTION: If reactor coolant pumps are stopped, the seal injection flow should be maintained. NOTE: The conditions given.above for stopping reactor coclant pumps should be continuously monitored throughout this instruction: 6. In the case of a break characterized by reactor coolant pres-sure quickly decreasing below steam generator pressure, go to step 7. In the case of a break characterized by a slowly decreasing reactor coolant pressure or stabilized reactor coolant system pressure above the lowest steam system safety valve setpoint, (clant soecific) psig, the following addi- 'tional m nual actions should be taken to aid the cooldown and 1 depressuri:ation of the reactor coolant system: / D*7D "D YK f .v b . ll N l E-1( HP) -8 o
Revision 1 Revised 10/29/79 a. If the main condenser is in service, open at least one main steamline isolation vaTves or bypass valves and transfer the steam dump control to steam header pressure control and dump steam to the condenser to lower the reactor conlant temperature (PAMS) and consequently the reactor coolant pressure. b. If the main condenser is not in service, dump steam to the atmosphere with the steam relief valves to lower the reac-tor coolant temperature and consequently the reactor cool-ant pressure. o o Ju o Ju 2..k inLa CAUTION: Reduce the steam generator pressure 200 psi below the lc. west steam system safety valve setpoint and main:ain a reactor coolant cooldown rate of no more than 500F/HR, consistent 'with plant make-up capability. t 7. Go to the Cold leg Recirculation Instruction presented in Table E-1.1. Note, if the reactor coolant system pressure is above the shut.off head of the high head safety injection pumps, staa these pumps ar.d place them in a standby made prior to transfer to cold leg recirculation. CAUTION: The cold leg recirculation crocedures are different for each plant ECCS design..The plant specific procedures should be incor-corated in Table E-1.1. TdTE: If RWST low level alarm is not imminent, '~ then consideratien shculd be given.to t performing a proliminary evaluation of the piant status in Steps 9 and 10. 1-365.121 E-1(HP)-9
Revised 10/29/79 8. If containment spray has been actuated, and if the containment pressure is reduced to nominal operation containment pressure, reset containment spray. Spray pumps should be shut-off and placed in the standby mcde with cperable flow paths. 9. Periodically check auxiliary building area radiation monitors for detection of leakage from ECCS during recirculation. If significant leakage has been identified in the.ECCS, attempt to isolate the leakage. The operator must maintain recirculation flow to the RCS at all times.
- 10. While the plant is in cold leg recirculation mode, plant operators should make provision for an evaluation of equipment in the plant.
I This evaluation should include the primary safeguards equipment e.g., RCS pumps and valves, emergency diesels, containment f an coolers, etc. and support equipment e.g., ECCS HVAC equipment, diesel fuel supply, diesel start air supply, sampling of RCS for baron concentraticn and fuel damage, sampling of containment atmo-sphere, sampling of recirculation sump, etc. Adjust recirculation sump pH, if required. ~ 11. Pricr to the time specifie- "or the plant for the switchover to the hot leg recirculation mode, the operator in the control roc = should: ~ T / I-1(h?)-10 a ,36,3 122 i
Revision 1 a.- Ensure that control room valve switches are aligned in the proper positions for cold leo recirculation mode. b. Re-energize the breakers, as required, for valves needed to effect switchover to the hot leg recirculation mode. ]2. At (olant soecific) hours after the accident, realign the safety injection systems for hot leg recirculation. Go to Table E-1.2. CAUTION: The hot leg recirculation switchover procedures are different for each plant ECCS design. The plant specific procedures should be incorporated in Table E-1.2. 13. Continue to implement the hot leg recirculation mode of cool-ing. 14. Recovery procedures for the particular event must be develeped and implemented to effect plant return to service. E-1(HP)-11 1365 123
Revision 1 TABLE E-1.1 COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCH 0VE9 INSTRUCTIONS PRERE0VISITES AND PRECAUTIONS: A. Prior to receipt of the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Low Level Alarm restart any safety injection pump not operating and reset / defeat the safety injection signal. Also open component cooling water (CCW) valves to Residual Heat Removal (RHR) heat exchangers if these valves are not interlocked to open automatically. B. The Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Low Level Alarm signifies automatic initiation of colo leg recirculation. The containment recirculation sump valves will imediately start to open automat-ically. C. IMMEDIATELY perform all steps given below when the recirculation sump isolation valve position lights indicate that the valve is fully open. D. Do not close a RWST/RHR pump suction valve unless the corresponding recirculation sump valve is open. E. All operator actions must be performed expeditiously, in a precise, orderly sequen:e. Do not interrupt this operation entil all actions are comoleted. When both trains are initially available and a valve E-1(HP)-12 1363 124
Revision 1 TABLE E-1.1 (Continued) fails to respond or to complete its demanded operation, postpone any corrective action until the subsequent operational steps are per-fermed. F. IMMEDIATELY stop any pumps taking suction from the RWST on receipt of a RWST empty alarm. Complete the switchover steps listed below, then restart required pumps. OPERATIONAL STEPS (NO SINGLE FAILURES): STEP 1 a) Close the RWST to low head safety injection pump suction isolation valves b) Close the high head safety injection pump miniflow valves c) Close the low head safety injection crossover isolation valves STEP 2 a) Open parallel valves in the high head safety injection and charging safety injection pumo common suction header. E-1(HP) 13 1363 125
Revision 1 T89LE E-1.1 (Continued) b) Open the low head safety injection to high head safety injection and charging / safety injection pump suction isolation valves c) After completion of the 6t;ve steps VERIFY that the two high head safety injection pumps and the two charging / safety injection pumps are receiving suction flow from the low head safety injection pumps. CAUTION: Do not perform the following steps until the above verification is made. STEP 3 a) Close the RWST to high head safety injection pumo suction valves b) Close the RWST to charging / safety injection pump suction isolation valves STEP 4 The utility should provide spray system switchover procedures and integrate them into this instruction. E-l(HP)-l* 1365 !M
Revision 1 TABLE E-1.1 (Centinued) NOTE: For plant designs which utilize only the spray system heat exchanger to remove energy from the containment recircula-tion sump the spray system must be operated during the long term even if it was not automatically actuated. VERIFICATION: STEP 5 After completing the preceding steps, verify that the safety injec-tion system is aligned for cold leg recirculation as follows: a) One low head safety injection pump is delivering from the con-tainment recirculation sump directly to two reactor coolant system cold legs and to the suction of two charging / safety injection pumps. b) The other low head safety injection pump is delivering from the containment recirculation sump directly to two reactor coolant system cold legs and to the suction of two high head safety injection pumps. P c) The two high head safety injection and two charging / safety injection pumos are taking suction from the low head safety injection pumas and are delivering to four reactor coolant system cold legs. 136.i iN E-1(HP)-15
Revision 1 TABLE E-1.1 (Continued) d) The suction paths from the RWST to all safety injection pumps have been isolated. e) If containment spray is required, verify that flow is being delivered. STEP 6 If the system alignment has been verified go to E-1 Step 9. If any f ailures have occurred, proceed to contingency actions. t CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 1. CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUMP VALVE FAILS TO OPEN If a containment recirculation sump valve cannot be opened, stop the corresponding low head safety injection pump and verify that: a) One low head safety injection pump is delivering flow to two reactor coolant system cold legs and to the suction of the two high head safety injection and two cha; ging/ safety injection pumps. b) The two high head safety injection and the two charging / safety injection pumos are delivering to four reactor coolant system cold legs. E-l(HP) 16 i365 128
Revision 1 TABLE E-1.1 (Continued) 2. LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF ELECTRICAL POWER NOTE: If the single active f ailure is the f ailure of one of the emergency diesel generators to start in conjunction with a LOCA and a loss of offsite power, electrical power would not be available to one of the vital safeguard busses. As a consequence, all engineered safeguards equipment assigned to that corresponding electrical power train would not be available for operation until power could be restored to that bus. The instructier, for switchover to cold leg recirculation, assuming a train f ailure, is essentially the same as the instruction above, which assumed no single failures. The operator could follow the above instruction with the understanding that those valves, without power, do not have to be repositioned. The following instruction is provided to illustrate the similarity between the instruction which assumes no single f ailures, and an instruction which assumes one complete electrical power train f ailure. For this instruction, it is assumed that Train B f ailed simultaneously with the loss of reactor coolant. It should be noted that if a train f ailed subsequent to the initiation of the "S" signal addi-tional steps may be required. For example, if no failure is assumed, the parallel suction valves in the line E-1 (HP)-17 1363 129
Revision 1 TABLE E-L1 (Continued) from the RWST to the charging / safety injection pump suction header would open on an "S" signal. Should a subsequent f ail-ure of one of the. electrical trains occur, one of the parallel suction valves could not be closed from the main control bo ard. Therefore, positive isolation of the RWST to charging / safety injection pumo suction path would have to be accom-plished locally. OPERATIONAL STEPS: ( Assume only Train A available) STE9 1 a) Close the RWST to low head safety injection pump suction isolation valve b) Close the high head safety injection pump miniflow valves c) Close the low head safety injection crossover isolation valve STEP 2 a) Open one of the parallel valves in the high head safety injection and charging / safety injection pump common suction header E-1(HP)-18 i365 130
Revision 1 TABLE E-1.1 (Continued) b) Open the low head safety injection to charging / safety injection pump suction isolation valve After. completing the above steps, verify that the one high head safety injection pump and one charging / safety injection pump are receiving suction flow from the one operating low head safety injection pump. Caution: Do,not perform the following steps unless the above verifica-tion is absolute. STEP 3 a) Close the RWST to high head safety injection pump suction valve b) Close the RWST to charging / safety injection pump suction valve VERIFICATION: STEP A Af ter completing the above step, verify that the safety injection system is aligned for cold leg recirculation as follows: E-1(HP) 19
Revision 1 TABLE E-1.1 (Continued) a) One low head safety injection pump is delivering from the containment recirculation sump to two reactor coolant system cold legs and to the suction of one high head safety injection and one charging / safety injection pump. b) The one high head safety injection and one charging / safety injection pu=p are taking suction from the low head safety injection pumps and are delivering to four reactor coolant system cold legs. c) The suction paths from the RWST to all safety injection pumps have been isolated. d) If containment spray is required, verify that flow is teing delivered. STEP 5 If the system alignment in Step 4 has been verified, go to E-1 Step 9. If any f ailures have occurred, attempt to operate the e4Joment manually and locally. E-1(HP)-20 1365 132
Revision 1 TABLE E-1.2 HOT LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER INSTRUCTIONS NOTE: Hot Lee Recirculation Phase - At approximately 24 hours after the accident, hot leg recirculation shall be initiated. The following manual operator actions are required to complete the switchover operation from the cold leg recirculation made to the hot leg recirculation mode. In this instruction it is assumed that both electrical power trains A and B are available and that all safety injection pumps are operath j. (No single f ailure has occurred). If f ailures have occurred continue through the instruction to contingency actions. OPERATIONAL STEPS BASED ON NO SINGLE FAILURE Steo 1: Tenninate low head safety injection pump flow to reactor cool-ant system cold legs and establish low head safety injection flow to reactor coolant system hot leg by perfanning the fol-lowing actions: a) Close the low head safety injection cold leg header iso-lation valves b) Open the low head safety injection crossover isolation valves c) Open the 1cw head safety injection leg header isolation valve 1365 133 E-1(HP)- 21
Rev1slon 1 TABLEE-1.2(Continued) Steo 2: Termir.e it high head safety injection pump flow to reactor cool-ant system cold legs and establish high head safety injection flow to reactor coolant system hot legs by perfoming the fol-lowing steps: a) Stop high head safety injection pump no. 1 b) Close the corresponding high head fafety injection cross-over header isolation valve c) Open the corresponding hot leg header isolation valve d) Restart the high head safety injection pump no. 1 e) Stop high head safety injection pu=p no. 2 f) Close the corresponding high head safety injection cross-over isolation valve g) Close the corresponding high head safety injection cold leg header isolation valve h) Open the cor esponding high head safety injection hot leg header isolation valve
- 1) Restart the high head safety injection pump no. 2 P
1363 134 E-1 (HP)-22
Revision 1 TABLE E-1.2 (Continued) VERIFICATION: STEP 3 After completing the above steps, verify that the safety injection system is aligned to hot leg recirculation as follows: a) Both low head safety injection pumps are aligned to deliver flow directly to the two reactor coolant system hot legs via the single low head safety injection hot leg header while each high head safety injection pump is aligned to deliver flow to the two reactor coolant system hot legs via two separate and redun-dant high head safety injection hot leg headers. b) The low head safety injection pumps continue to provide suction flow to the high head safety injection and charging pumps. c) The charging pumps continue to provide flow directly to the four reactor coolant system cold legs. d) If containment spray is esqt ired, verify flow is being delivered. STEP 4 If the system alignment has been verified go to E-1 Step 13. If any f ailures have occurred, proceed to contingency actions. E-1 (HP)-23 g }}}
Revision 1 TASLE E-1.2 (Continued) CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 1. LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF ELECTRICAL POWER: In the event that a single f ailure had resulted in a complete loss of power to one of the electrical power trains in conjunction with a LOCA and a loss of off site power, the hot leg switchover procedures would require some operations to be performed outside the main con-trol room, unless power could be restored to the f ailed train during the 24 hour cold leg recirculation phase. These operations, outside the main control room, would be necessary to open a hot leg isola-tion valve and to close a cold leg isolation valve. In both cases this can be accomplished either by manually operating the valve or by disconnecting the power to the valve from the failed train and temporarily connecting it to the avaiTable power. In the following steps, it is assumed that train B f ailed simul-taneously with the a;cident. OPERATIONAL STEPS ( Assume only Train A Available) STEP 1 Terminate low head safety injection pump flow to reactor coolant system cold legs and establish low head safety in.-tion flow to reactor coolant system hot legs. E-1(HP).24 1363 136
Revision 1 TABLE E-1.2 (Continued) a) Close the low head safety injection cold leg header iso-lation valves NOTE: Since it is assumed in this case that train B has failed, power to close one isolation valve may not be available. This valve could be closed manually or it could be closed remotely by disconnecting it from train B and temocrarily connecting it to train A. b) Open the low head safety injection crossover isolation valve c) Open the low head safety injection hot leg header isolation valve NOTE: Since it is assumed in this case that train 3 has failed, power to open this valve may.not be avail-ab l e. This valve could be opened manually or it could be opened remotely be disconnecting it from train B and temporarily connecting it to train A. STEP 2 Terminate hign head safety injection pump flow to reactor coolant system cold legs and establish high head safety injection flow to reactor coolant system hot legs: 1365 137 E-1(HP)-25
Revision 1 TABLE E.1-2 (Continued) a) Stop the Train A high head safety injection pump b) Close the corresponding high head safety injection crossover header isolation valve c)' Open the corresponding high head safety injection hot leg header isolation valve d) Researt the Train A high head safety injection pump. STEP 3 Go to E-1 Step 13. If any f ailures have occurred, attempt 'a operate the equipment manually or locally. 1365 138 E-1(HP)-25
WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS GkOUP PRINCIPAL CONTACT LIST
- r. Alan R. Barton Mr. George T. Berry, Executive Director 3enior Vice-President Power Authority of the State of New York Alabama Power Company 10 Columbus Circle P. O. Box 2641 New York, N. Y 10019
'r. J. A. Jones MR. F. P. Librizzi, General Manager
- enior.Vice-President Electric Production, Production Dept.
Carolina Power & Light Company Public Service Electric & Gas Company 336 Fayetteville Street 80 Park Place, Room 7221 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Newark, N. J. 07101 1r. Cordell Reed Mr. W. L. Proffitt Assistant Vice President Senior Vice-President - Power Commonwealth Edison Company Virginia Electric & Power Co. P. O. Box 767 P. O. Box 26666 Chicago Illinois 60690 Richmond, Virginia 23261 Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr. Mr. S 1 Bu p in, Executive Vice-Presiden: Wisconsin - Meric Power Company Vice-President 231 West Me %n Street Consolidated Edison Company Milwaukee, W1.v.nsin 53201 of New Yor.k, Inc. New York, N. Y. 10003 '~" Mr. Eugene R. Mathews, Vice-President Power Supply &, Engineering Mr. C. L Odnn, Vice-President . Wisconsin Public Servi.ce Corporation i Operations Division h"$"x[h P" e consin 54305 nue Pittsburgh, PA. 15219 Mr. Robert H. Groce, Licensing Engineer Yankee Atomic Electric Company 3r. Robert E. Uhrig. Vice-President 20 Turnp1ke Road Advanced Systems and Technology ,elestboro, Mass. 01581
- lorida Power & Light Co.
3 O. Box 529100 Mr. W. G. Couns11, Vice-President liami, Florida 33152 Nuclear Engineering & Operations Connecticut Yankee Atcmic Power Co. 1r. John Dolan, Vice-President 0 Bx indianaandMichiganElectricCompany necticut 06101 .ndiana and Michigan Power Company . 0. Box 18 Mr. Leon D. White, Jr., Vice-President 3owling Green Station Electric & Steam Production
- ew York, New York 10004 Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rechester, N. Y. 14649
- r. L. O. Mayer, Manager Jclear Support Services Mr. James H. Drake, Vice-President 55 'c1e tN1 8thbo" S uthern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue-P.O. Box 800
'inneaspolis, Minnesota 55401 Rosemead, Cal 1Tornia 91770
- r. Charles Goocwin, Jr.
3sistant Vice-President artland General Electric Company 21's.W. Salmon Street }36r) l39 -:rtiand, Oregon 97204
Herman Thrash . Husai,,n Alabama Power Company ..kee Atomic Electric Company 600 North 18th Street .. Turnpike Road P. O. Box 2641 istboro, Massachusetts 01581 Birmingham, Alabama 35291 ~ % W. Wells George Liecler
- rth ast Utilities Florida Power & Light Co.
.. Box 270 irtford, Connecticut 06101 P. O. Box 529100 Miami, Florida 33152
- bert W. Jurgensen
.erican Electric Power Service Corp. Mark Marchi I Broadway Wisconsin Public Service Corp. .aw York,'New York 10004 P. O. Box 1200 Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305 . Ji Cahill 'cnsolidated Edison F. Pat Tierney, Jr. - Irving' Place Northern States Power Co. .aw York, N. Y. 10003 Route 2 Welch, Minnesota 55089
- eter W. Lyon
- ower Authority of the State of New York Roger Newton Wisconsin Electric Power Co.
'O C:lub. bus Circle ,ew York, New York 10019 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201 John A. Ahladas Cordell Reed 'lirginia Electric & Power Company Commonwealth Edison Co. One James. River Plaza ~~' P. O. Box 767 3 O. Box 26666 One first National Plaza Richmond, Virginia 23261 Chicsgo, Illinois 60690 {rankP.Librizzi Daniel I. Herborn
- ublic Service
- lectric & Gas Co.
Portland General Electric Company 121 West Salmon Street war ersey 07101 Portland, Oregon 97204 SJerry G. Haynes S uthern California Edison Co. ar i na ower & Light 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 9177G kalign N Carolina 27602 J. J. Carey i s & Electric Co. 2"CjesgeLigM 77 Beale Street San Francisco, California 94106 h$i:$ingho ~ PA. 15077
- der: Mecrecy Bill Layman
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3412 Hillview Avenue Ei East Avenue
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