ML19098A258
| ML19098A258 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 06/11/2019 |
| From: | Amy Snyder Reactor Decommissioning Branch |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Entergy Nuclear Operations, Exelon Nuclear |
| Lamb J, NRR/DORL/LSPB, 415-3100 | |
| References | |
| EPID L-2018-LLA-0283 | |
| Download: ML19098A258 (19) | |
Text
June 11, 2019 Mr. Bryan C. Hanson Senior Vice President Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT:
OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: CHANGE TO THE EFFECTIVE AND IMPLEMENTATION DATES OF LICENSE AMENDMENT FOR EMERGENCY PLAN AND EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL SCHEME FOR THE PERMANENTLY DEFUELED CONDITION (EPID L-2018-LLA-0283)
Dear Mr. Hanson:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 296 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-16 for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, in response to your application dated October 22, 2018, as supplemented by letters dated November 6, 2018, and February 13, 2019.
The amendment revises the effective and implementation dates of Amendment No. 294 for the site emergency plan and emergency action level scheme for the permanently defueled condition.
A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions biweekly Federal Register notice.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Amy M. Snyder, Senior Project Manager Reactor Decommissioning Branch Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Docket No. 50-219
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 296 to Renewed DPR-16
- 2. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv
- via SE memo
- via email OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPLII-1/PM NRR/DORL/LSPB/LA NRR/DSS/SCPB/BC*
NAME JLamb JBurkhardt SAnderson DATE 4/12/19 5/13/19 5/3/19 OFFICE NSIR/DPR/RLB/BC**
OGC - NLO**
NMSS/DUWP/RDB/BC*
NAME JAnderson JScro BWatson DATE 5/7/19 5/21/19 5/22/19 OFFICE NMSS/DUWP/RDB/PM NAME ASnyder DATE 6/11/19
EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC DOCKET NO. 50-219 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 296 Renewed License No. DPR-16
- 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the licensee), dated October 22, 2018, as supplemented by letters dated November 6, 2018, and February 13, 2019, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations, and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2.
Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-16 is hereby amended to change the effective date of Amendment No. 294, issued on October 17, 2018, from September 17, 2019, to June 29, 2019.
- 3.
This license amendment is effective on June 29, 2019, and shall be implemented within 30 days of the effective date.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/RA/
Bruce A. Watson, CHP, Chief Reactor Decommissioning Branch Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Date of Issuance: June 11, 2019
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 296 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-16 EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-219
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By application dated October 22, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System [ADAMS] Accession No. ML18295A384), as supplemented by letters dated November 6, 2018, and February 13, 2019 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML18310A306 and ML19044A643, respectively), Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon or the licensee) requested a change to the effective and implementation dates of License Amendment No. 294, for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (Oyster Creek) Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP) and Permanently Defueled Emergency Action Level (EAL) scheme for the permanently defueled condition.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued Amendment No. 294 on October 17, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18221A400), which was to be effective 12 months (365 days) following the permanent cessation of power operations and be implemented within 60 days of the effective date, but no later than March 28, 2021.
Amendment No. 294 revised the PDEP and the Oyster Creek EAL scheme, based on the NRC staffs October 16, 2018, approval of exemptions from specific emergency planning (EP) requirements contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.47, Emergency plans, and Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities, to 10 CFR Part 50 (hereinafter the EP exemptions). Like Amendment No.
294, the EP exemptions were to become effective 365 days after the permanent cessation of power operations.
Exelon permanently ceased power operations at Oyster Creek on September 17, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18263A163). On September 25, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18268A258), Exelon permanently removed fuel from the Oyster Creek reactor vessel.
The proposed amendment would revise the effective and implementation dates for Amendment No. 294 for the Oyster Creek PDEP and EAL scheme from 365 days to 285 days after permanent cessation of power operations.
By letter dated November 6, 2018, as supplemented by letter dated February 13, 2019, Exelon separately requested to modify the effective date of the EP exemptions to 9.38 months (285 days) after permanent cessation of power operations. To provide a complete record of the NRC staffs review, the NRC reissued the EP exemptions with the modified effective date.
The supplemental letter dated February 13, 2019, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staffs original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on December 18, 2018 (83 FR 64894).
2.0 BACKGROUND
Oyster Creek is a facility located near the Atlantic Ocean within the State of New Jersey. The facility site, approximately 152 acres, is in Lacey and Ocean Townships, Ocean County. The Oyster Creek site is about 2 miles inland from the shore of Barnegat Bay, and approximately 9 miles south of Toms River, New Jersey, about 50 miles east of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and 60 miles south of Newark, New Jersey.
Exelon is the holder of the Renewed Facility Operating License (RFOL) No. DPR-16, issued pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, authorizing the licensee to possess and store spent nuclear fuel and greater-than-Class C radioactive waste at the Oyster Creek facility.
By letter dated January 7, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110070507), pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i), Exelon certified to the NRC that it planned to permanently cease operations at Oyster Creek by December 31, 2019. Subsequently, by letter dated February 14, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18045A084), Exelon notified the NRC of its revised plans to permanently cease operations at Oyster Creek no later than October 31, 2018.
On September 17, 2018, Exelon permanently ceased power operations at Oyster Creek, and by letter dated September 25, 2018, Exelon certified that all the fuel was permanently removed the Oyster Creek reactor vessel. Upon the docketing of the certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, as specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR Part 50 license for Oyster Creek no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel. Spent fuel will be stored on-site in the Oyster Creek spent fuel pool (SFP) and a dry cask independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) at the Oyster Creek facility.
By letter dated August 22, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17234A082), as supplemented by letters dated December 6, 2017, March 8, 2018, and March 19, 2018 (ADAMS Accession Nos.
ML17340A708, ML18067A087 and ML18078A146, respectively), Exelon requested exemptions from specific portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 for Oyster Creek.
The licensee submitted the proposed Oyster Creek PDEP to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4), contingent on the NRCs prior approval of these exemptions.
By letter dated October 16, 2018, the NRC staff granted Exelon exemptions from certain emergency plan (EP) requirements in 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, Specific exemptions, and based, in part, on the low risks associated with the Oyster Creek reactor in a permanently shutdown and defueled condition. In granting the requested exemptions, the NRC primarily relied on the Oyster Creek site-specific analyses, which provided reasonable assurance that: (1) an offsite radiological release would not exceed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase protective action guides (PAGs) at the sites exclusion area boundary for the remaining design-basis accidents applicable to the Oyster Creek facility in its permanently shutdown and defueled condition; and (2) in the highly unlikely event of a severe beyond-design-basis accident resulting in a loss of all cooling to the spent fuel stored in the Oyster Creek SFP, there would be a significant amount of time between the initiating event and the possible onset of conditions that could result in a zirconium cladding fire. This time provides a substantial opportunity for event mitigation. Oyster Creek is required to maintain effective strategies, sufficient resources, and adequately trained personnel to mitigate such an event. If State or local governmental officials determine that offsite protective actions are warranted, then sufficient time would be available for the offsite response organizations to implement these measures using a comprehensive, or all-hazards, emergency management plan (CEMP) approach.1 The Commissions approval of the requested exemptions is documented in a Staff Requirements Memorandum dated July 17, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18198A449),
responding to SECY-18-0062, Request by the Exelon Generation Company, LLC for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, dated May 31, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18030B359). With the NRCs approval of the requested EP exemptions, Exelon stated that the proposed Oyster Creek PDEP will continue to meet the remaining applicable planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
In addition to the approved changes in the PDEP, Amendment No. 294 approved an entire EAL scheme for the Oyster Creek reactor, consistent with the methodology recommended for permanently shutdown and defueled reactors, as provided in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors (ADAMS Accession No. ML12326A805). Both Amendment No. 294 and the EP exemptions were to become effective no earlier than 365 days after the permanent cessation of power operations.
Exelon submitted the present license amendment request to modify the effective date from 365 days to 285 days after the permanent cessation of power operations. Exelon also separately requested to change the effective date of the EP exemptions to 285 days after the permanent cessation of power operations. The NRC has since reissued the EP exemptions with the modified effective date.
3.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
In issuing an amendment to an operating license, the NRC staff specifies when the amendment is effective and when the amendment must be implemented. Enclosure 1 to the NRCs letter 1 A CEMP in this context, also referred to as an emergency operations plan, is addressed in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans, Version 2.0, dated November 2010 (http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf).
dated October 17, 2018, contained Amendment No. 294 for Oyster Creek. The amendment stated, in part, that:
This license amendment is effective 12 months (365 days) following the permanent cessation of power operations and shall be implemented within 60 days of the effective date, but no later than March 28, 2021.
There are no specific regulatory requirements regarding the time period for amendment effective and implementation dates. The NRC staff generally specifies an implementation period consistent with that requested in the licensees application and an effective date that is technically justified.
For Oyster Creeks Amendment No. 294, the effective date and implementation dates were predicated on approval of requests for exemptions from portions of 10 CFR 50.47, and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, which were approved on October 16, 2018.
Implementation periods, requested by licensees, may vary based on the extent of the physical changes needed to the plant and/or associated documentation that needs to be revised, but cannot occur prior to the approved effective date. Sometimes the licensee requests that it be allowed to implement the amendment during the next refueling outage to support changes that the licensee wants to make when the plant is shut down.
Because the effective date and the implementation period specified by the NRC in an amendment is considered part of the operating license, the licensee is required to fully implement the amendment no later than the date specified or be in violation of its operating license.
Any extension of the implementation period and/or a change to the effective date needs prior NRC approval as a license amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90.
4.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
By letter dated October 22, 2018, Exelon has revised its original adiabatic calculation that was approved on October 16, 2018, in the EP exemptions with the results changing from the original 365-day decay period to 285-day decay period from permanent cessation of power operations.
Exelon reanalyzed the site-specific Zirconium Fire Analysis, associated with an adiabatic heat-up, to support an implementation date for the permanently defueled emergency plan and the supporting EP exemptions of 9.38 months (285 days) after permanent shutdown, instead of the 12 months previously approved by the Commission. The licensees analysis determined that there would be a sufficient decay time, such that the hottest fuel assembly in the spent fuel pool (SFP) would not reach the zirconium ignition temperature (900°C) in fewer than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. This reanalysis modeled an increased heat capacity of the fuel assembly by incorporating variations in specific heat with temperature and an additional fuel assembly component to compensate for higher decay heat rates at the reduced decay time.
Design-Basis Accidents and Other Events In Section 5.2 of Attachment 1 to its submittal in support of the EP Exemptions, Exelon provided a summary of event analyses relevant to Oyster Creek in its permanently shutdown and defueled condition. After the permanent cessation of reactor operation and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, most of the initial conditions of accident and transient analyses included in the safety analysis report are no longer possible. The licensee identified the fuel handling accident (FHA) in the Reactor Building, where the SFP is located as the only design-basis accident scenario with the potential to result in a radiological release in the permanently shutdown and defueled state of Oyster Creek. An analysis based on the fuel handling accident was performed to determine the dose to operators in the control room and the public at the exclusion area boundary or Site Boundary) as a function of time after shutdown.
As described in the licensees supplement dated November 6, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18310A306), Exelon provided an analysis in support of the modified effective date for the EP exemptions that demonstrated that the radiological consequences of the only remaining design-basis accident with potential for offsite radiological release (i.e., the fuel handling accident in the Reactor Building, where the SFP is located) will not exceed the limits of the EPAs early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary at 33 days following permanent cessation of power operations. Exelon stated that this analysis remains unchanged. Because the requested effective date of the exemptions is 285 days following permanent cessation of power operations, the 33-day decay period necessary for the fuel handling accident dose to decrease within the EPA PAGs remains bounded.
Beyond Design-Basis Accidents The NRC staff evaluates the ability to mitigate beyond design basis events considering the time available to implement measures to maintain the fuel cool or, if necessary, implement an appropriate emergency response. The NRC staff uses an assessment of the adiabatic heat-up to determine the available time because it is generally limiting. The NRC staff uses a time of greater than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> to support a finding of special circumstances related to the emergency planning regulation exemptions. The heat-up time calculated the time to reach temperature 900 degrees Celsius (oC), which is equivalent to 1652 degrees Fahrenheit (°F) as the temperature where runaway oxidation (zirconium fire) is expected to occur, as defined in NUREG-1738, Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, issued February 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066).
By letter dated October 22, 2018, Exelon requested a change in the implementation date of the emergency plan amendment from 12 months (365 days) to 9.38 months (285 days) after permanent cessation of power operations. By letter dated November 6, 2018, Exelon supplemented the request, with a request to modify the effective date of the EP exemptions to 9.38 months (285 days) after permanent cessation of power operations. The licensee justified the shortened delay to implement the PDEP and EAL scheme amendment by re-evaluating the decay time necessary to ensure a 10-hour heat-up time from normal fuel temperatures to the temperature associated with runaway zirconium oxidation. The changes in the calculation involved a decreased decay heat rate for the limiting fuel assembly and a change in the heat capacity of the fuel assembly by assuming that additional components of the fuel assembly would heat-up uniformly with the fuel. The NRC staff determined that an effective heat transfer path would be necessary to allow the additional components to heat uniformly and requested additional information justifying the uniform heat-up.
In response to the NRC staffs request for additional information dated January 24, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19025A117), justifying the assumption of uniform temperatures within the analysis boundary, Exelon provided a revised calculation in Attachment 2 to the letter dated February 13, 2019. This revised calculation limited the additional components that would heat-up uniformly with the fuel to the fuel assembly channel box assembly in the region of the fuel at elevated temperatures where radiative heat transfer would be effective and decreased conservatisms in the calculated heat capacity by modeling the change in specific heat of fuel assembly materials as temperatures increase.
To demonstrate the reduced 9.38-month decay would be adequate to reduce the heat rate from the limiting spent fuel bundle, the licensee presented an evaluation of the length of time (in hour increments) it takes for uncovered spent fuel assemblies in the SFP to reach the temperature at which the zirconium fire could result. The calculation used an assumed initial temperature, calculated specific heat values as a function of temperature within the heated length of the assembly, and a calculated decay heat rate for the hottest fuel assembly. From this information, the licensee determined the time to reach 900 °C, which corresponds to runaway cladding oxidation and the potential for a large radiological release.
The initial fuel assembly temperature for the heat-up analysis is assumed to be uniform and 125 °F, which is the maximum initial pool temperature shown in Oyster Creek Technical Specification 5.2.1. The heatup time is assumed to start when the SFP has been completely drained, which is conservative relative to the actual conditions following a rare and challenging event that could lead to a loss of SFP water. For these events, water would be expected to be present for a significant time, considering the large volume of water initially in the pool, and absorb much of the decay heat generated during that time. The adiabatic assumption assumes there is no air cooling of the assemblies, since natural circulation flow paths are not credited and assumed blocked. These assumptions eliminate other mechanisms in which decay heat would be transferred away from the fuel bundle either by convective heat transfer or by the boiling of SFP water. The analysis also does not credit the full mass of material found in the bundle as the thicker corners of the fuel channel are not included in the calculation of the channel mass.
Also, the mass of the upper and lower stainless-steel tie plates is not included but could provide a conductive heat pathway for some of the decay heat.
The licensees heat up analysis was performed with a spreadsheet to calculate the time to reach the 900 °C (1652 °F) temperature. For this analysis, the specific heat for uranium dioxide and the Zircaloy-2 cladding mass were calculated at fixed time intervals (or time steps), as assembly temperature increases. The calculation determines the increase in temperature over sequential time steps of 0.025 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />. The specific heat capacity is determined based on the temperature determined after the previous time step. The specific heat capacity values increase with temperature over the range from 300K (80 °F) to 1,173K (900 °C). These specific heat capacities at various temperatures of zircaloy-2 were determined by interpolating values developed in NUREG/CR-6150 Revision 2, SCDAP/RELAP/MOD3.3 Code Manual:
MATPRO -A Library of Materials Properties for Light-Water-Reactor Accident Analysis, dated January 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010330424). The uranium dioxide specific heat values were calculated using the approach found in NUREG/CR-7024, "Material Property Correlations: Comparisons between FRAPCON-3.4, FRAPTRAN 1.4 and MATPRO" dated March 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11101A012). The NRC staff reviewed the licensees correlation of specific heat values to fuel assembly temperature and compared it to other industry information specific to zircaloy and uranium dioxide. The NRC staff found the values reasonable.
In the calculation, the licensee assumed an adiabatic envelope around the active fuel region of the assembly, where all components heat-up uniformly with the fuel pellets and cladding. Only the masses within the active fuel region (fuel pellets, cladding, water rods, and pin spacers) were initially modeled. When the bulk temperature reaches 580 °F, the licensee incorporated the fuel assembly channel heat capacity in the model by adding its mass to that of other zircaloy components. Since radiative heat transfer between the fuel rods and the channel is a function of the difference between the fourth power of the absolute temperatures of the involved components, the elevated temperature helps ensure the channel temperature would increase uniformly with the components in the fuel region. At this temperature, substantial heat may be radiatively transferred to the channel with a relatively small temperature difference. Therefore, the analysis assumption that the components heat uniformly would be reasonably satisfied.
Heat absorbed by the channel at lower temperatures was neglected because the radiative heat transfer path requires a substantial temperature difference at those lower temperatures and no other credible heat transfer path to the channel is available.
The thermal capacity of the fuel assembly was calculated based on the dimensions and materials used for the Global Nuclear Fuel GNF2 fuel assembly design. The licensee described that the final Cycle 26 contains full core of GNF2 fuel. As specified in the analysis, the worst case (hottest) bundle was defined as the assembly with the maximum calculated burnup, minimum initial enrichment, and maximum inventory of uranium. The decay heat was evaluated using the ORIGEN-ARP code for the hottest bundle discharged at the end of Cycle 26 for cooling times from 9 months to 5 years. Fuel properties are assumed to be those of uranium dioxide fuel pellets and the zircaloy2 cladding.
The NRC staff concluded that the adiabatic heat-up calculation provided an acceptable method for determining the minimum time available for deployment of mitigation equipment and if necessary, implementation of offsite protective actions by government officials using a CEMP (all-hazards) approach. Therefore, the NRC staff found that after 9.38 months (285 days) decay, more than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> would be available before a significant offsite release could begin and Criterion 2 (Section 5.0) of NSIR/DPR-ISG-02, Interim Staff Guidance Emergency Planning Exemption Requests for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, would be satisfied.
Technical Conclusion The NRC staff reviewed the calculation to verify that important physical properties of materials were within acceptable ranges and that the results were accurate. The NRC staff determined that physical properties were appropriate. Therefore, the NRC staff found that after 9.38 months (285 days), more than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> would be available before a significant offsite release could begin. The NRC staff concluded that the adiabatic heat-up calculation provided an acceptable method for determining the minimum time available for deployment of mitigation equipment and, if necessary, for offsite governmental officials to implement protective measures for the public using a CEMP (all-hazards) approach.
5.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the New Jersey State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment on April 3, 2019. The State official had no comments.
6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment relates to changes in recordkeeping, reporting, or administrative procedures or requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding published in the Federal Register on December 18, 2018 (83 FR 64894). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
7.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors: Steve Jones and Gordon Curran, NRR/DSS Date: June 11, 2019