ML18333A228

LLC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information No. 496 (Erai No. 9571) on the NuScale Design Certification Application

ML18333A228
Person / Time
Site:	NuScale
Issue date:	11/29/2018
From:	Rad Z NuScale
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of New Reactors
References
RAIO-1118-63591
Download: ML18333A228 (21)

Text

RAIO-1118-63591 November 29, 2018 Docket No.52-048 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738

SUBJECT:

NuScale Power, LLC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information No.

496 (eRAI No. 9571) on the NuScale Design Certification Application

REFERENCE:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Request for Additional Information No.

496 (eRAI No. 9571)," dated August 03, 2018 The purpose of this letter is to provide the NuScale Power, LLC (NuScale) response to the referenced NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI).

The Enclosure to this letter contains NuScale's response to the following RAI Question from NRC eRAI No. 9571:

• 14.03.07-1 This letter and the enclosed response make no new regulatory commitments and no revisions to any existing regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions on this response, please contact Carrie Fosaaen at 541-452-7126 or at cfosaaen@nuscalepower.com.

Sincerely,

~~

~~ckary W. Rad Director, Regulatory Affairs NuScale Power, LLC Distribution: Gregory Cranston, NRC, OWFN-8G9A Samuel Lee, NRC, OWFN-8G9A Cayetano Santos, OWFN-8G9A Enclosure 1: NuScale Response to NRC Request for Additional Information eRAI No. 9571 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd. , Suite 200 Corvalis, Oregon 97330 , Office: 541.360.0500 , Fax: 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com

RAIO-1118-63591 :

NuScale Response to NRC Request for Additional Information eRAI No. 9571 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvalis, Oregon 97330, Office: 541.360.0500, Fax: 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com

Response to Request for Additional Information Docket No.52-048 eRAI No.: 9571 Date of RAI Issue: 08/03/2018 NRC Question No.: 14.03.07-1 This is a follow-up on the NuScale's response dated February 5, 2018 and its supplement dated June 14, 2018, to RAI 9128, Question 19-37.

During the review of the RAI 9128 responses, the staff noted inconsistencies associated with identification of Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) associated with the Containment System (CNTS) and the Reactor Building Crane.

Specifically, FSAR Tier 1, Section 2.1, "NuScale Power Module," states, in part, the following:

The NPM performs the following nonsafety-related, risk-significant function that is verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

The CNTS supports the RXB crane by providing lifting attachment points that the RXB crane can connect to so that the NPM can be lifted.

However, the staff could not find ITAAC requirements specified for the containment lifting attachment points in FSAR Tier 1, Table 2.1-4, "NuScale Power Module Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria."

Similarly, FSAR Tier 1, Section 3.10, "Reactor Building Crane," states, in part, the following:

The scope of this section is the Reactor Building crane (RBC). The RBC is a bridge crane that rides on rails anchored to the Reactor Building. The bridge crane can travel the length of the reactor pool, refueling pool, and the dry dock. The RBC is nonsafety-related and supports up to 12 NuScale Power Modules (NPMs). The Reactor Building houses all RBC equipment.

NuScale Nonproprietary

The RBC includes the following:

RBC with auxiliary hoist below-the-hook lifting devices, including the module lifting adapter and the wet hoist.

The RBC performs the following risk-significant system function that is verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

The RBC supports the NuScale Power Module by providing structural support and mobility while moving from refueling, inspection and operating bay.

However, the staff could not find ITAAC requirements specified for the MLA in FSAR Tier 1, Table 3.10-1, "Reactor Building Crane Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria."

Therefore, NuScale is requested to add ITAAC requirements for the containment lifting attachment points in FSAR Tier 1, Table 2.1-4 and the MLA in FSAR Tier 1, Table 3.10-1. Also, as part of the response to this request, NuScale should include any applicable changes to the FSAR Tier 2 information (e.g., Chapter 14) that are used to support these new requirements.

NuScale Response:

Two new ITAAC (02.01.24 and 02.01.25) have been added to Tier 1 Section 2.1, NuScale Power Module, for the NPM lifting fixture. These ITAAC will be performed for each NPM, and include:

A rated load test of the NPM lifting fixture, including nondestructive testing of critical areas as required by ANSI N14.6.

An inspection to verify the NPM lifting fixture is single-failure-proof in accordance with ANSI N14.6.

Two new ITAAC (03.10.09 and 03.10.10) have been added to Tier 1 Section 3.10, Reactor Building Crane, for the module lifting adapter (MLA). These ITAAC will be performed once, and include:

A rated load test of the MLA, including nondestructive testing of critical areas as required by ANSI N14.6.

An inspection to verify the MLA is single-failure-proof in accordance with ANSI N14.6.

NuScale Nonproprietary

Corresponding descriptions of these four ITAAC have been added to Tier 2, Section 14.3, Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria.

Tier 2 Section 9.1.5, Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems, has been revised to include a detailed description of the NPM lifting fixture, and discussions about the ANSI N14.6 inspections and testing requirements for the MLA and NPM lifting fixture.

Prerequisite requirements were added to Tier 2 Table 14.2-52, Reactor Building Cranes Test #

52, to ensure rated load tests of the MLA and NPM lifting fixture are completed prior to conducting Reactor Building Crane preoperational testing.

Impact on DCA:

Tier 1, Sections 2.1 and 3.10, Tier 2, Sections 9.1.5.2 and 9.1.5.4, Tier 1, Tables 2.1-4 and 3.10-1, and Tier 2 Tables 9.1.5-1, 14.2-52, 14.3-1 and 14.3-2 have been revised as described in the response above and as shown in the markup provided in this response.

NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module

• The CNTS containment electrical penetration assemblies are sized to power their design loads.

• Physical separation exists between the redundant divisions of the MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits, and between Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits and non-Class 1E instrumentation and current-carrying circuits. The scope of this commitment includes the cables from the NPM disconnect box to the instrument.

• The RPV is provided with surveillance capsule holders to hold a capsule containing RPV material surveillance specimens.

• The CNTS safety-related valves change position under design differential pressure.

• The ECCS safety-related valves change position under design differential pressure.

• The DHRS safety-related valves change position under design differential pressure.

• The CNTS safety-related hydraulic-operated valves fail to their safety-related position on loss of electrical power under design differential pressure.

• The ECCS safety-related RRVs and RVVs fail to their safety-related position on loss of electrical power to their corresponding trip valves under design differential pressure.

• The DHRS safety-related hydraulic-operated valves fail to their safety-related position on loss of electrical power under design differential pressure.

• The CNTS safety-related check valves change position under design differential pressure and flow.

RAI 08.01-1S1, RAI 08.01-2

• A CNTS containment electrical penetration assembly is rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source, or a CNTS containment electrical penetration assembly is rated to withstand the maximum fault current for its circuits without a circuit interrupting device.

RAI 14.03.07-1

• The NPM lifting fixture is capable of supporting its rated load.

RAI 14.03.07-1

• The NPM lifting fixture is constructed to provide assurance that a single failure does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.

2.1.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1-4 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the NPM.

Tier 1 2.1-4 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module RAI 06.02.06-22, RAI 06.02.06-23, RAI 08.01-1, RAI 08.01-1S1, RAI 08.01-2, RAI 14.03.03-3S1, RAI 14.03.03-4S1, RAI 14.03.03-6S1, RAI 14.03.03-7S1, RAI 14.03.03-8, RAI 14.03.03-11S1, RAI 14.03.07-1 Table 2.1-4: NuScale Power Module Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The NuScale Power Module ASME An inspection will be performed of the The ASME Code Section III Design Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping systems NuScale Power Module ASME Code Reports (NCA-3550) exist and listed in Table 2.1-1 comply with ASME Class 1, 2 and 3 as-built piping system conclude that the NuScale Power Code Section III requirements. Design Reports required by ASME Module ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 as-Code Section III. built piping systems listed in Table 2.1-1 meet the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

2. The NuScale Power Module ASME An inspection will be performed of the ASME Code Section III Data Reports for Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components NuScale Power Module ASME Code the NuScale Power Module ASME conform to the rules of construction of Class 1, 2, and 3 as-built component Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components ASME Code Section III. Data Reports required by ASME Code listed in Table 2.1-2 and Section III. interconnecting piping exist and conclude that the requirements of ASME Code Section III are met.

3. The NuScale Power Module ASME An inspection will be performed of the ASME Code Section III Data Reports for Code Class CS components conform to NuScale Power Module ASME Code the NuScale Power Module ASME the rules of construction of ASME Class CS as-built component Data Code Class CS components listed in Code Section III. Reports required by ASME Code Table 2.1-2 exist and conclude that the Section III. requirements of ASME Code Section III are met.

4. Safety-related SSC are protected An inspection and analysis will be Protective features are installed in against the dynamic and performed of the as-built high- and accordance with the as-built Pipe environmental effects associated with moderate-energy piping systems and Break Hazard Analysis Report and postulated failures in high- and protective features for the safety-related SSC are protected moderate-energy piping systems. safety-related SSC. against or qualified to withstand the dynamic and environmental effects associated with postulated failures in high- and moderate-energy piping systems.

5. The NuScale Power Module ASME An analysis will be performed of the The as-built LBB analysis for the ASME Code Class 2 piping systems and ASME Code Class 2 as-built piping Code Class 2 piping systems listed in interconnected equipment nozzles are systems and interconnected Table 2.1-1 and interconnected evaluated for LBB. equipment nozzles. equipment nozzles is bounded by the as-designed LBB analysis.

6. The RPV beltline material has a Charpy A vendor test will be performed of the An ASME Code Certified Material Test upper-shelf energy of 75 ft-lb Charpy V-Notch specimen of the RPV Report exists and concludes that the minimum. beltline material. initial RPV beltline material Charpy upper-shelf energy is 75 ft-lb minimum.

7. The CNV serves as an essentially leak- A leakage test will be performed of the The leakage rate for local leak rate tight barrier against the uncontrolled pressure containing or leakage- tests (Type B and Type C) for pressure release of radioactivity to the limiting boundaries, and CIVs. containing or leakage-limiting environment. boundaries and CIVs meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J.

8. Containment isolation valve closure A test will be performed of the Each CIV listed in Table 2.1-3 travels times limit potential releases of automatic CIVs. from the full open to full closed radioactivity. position in less than or equal to the time listed in Table 2.1-3 after receipt of a containment isolation signal.

Tier 1 2.1-12 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Table 2.1-4: NuScale Power Module Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

22. i. A CNTS containment electrical i. An analysis will be performed of the i. A circuit interrupting device penetration assembly is rated to CNTS as-built containment electrical coordination analysis exists and withstand fault currents for the time penetration assembly. concludes that the current carrying required to clear the fault from its capability for each CNTS containment power source. electrical penetration assembly listed OR in Table 2.1-3 is greater than the analyzed fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

OR ii. A CNTS containment electrical ii. An analysis of the CNTS containment penetration assembly is rated to penetration maximum fault current withstand the maximum fault current exists and concludes the fault current for its circuits without a circuit is less than the current carrying interrupting device. capability of the CNTS containment electrical penetration

23. The CNV serves as an essentially A preservice design pressure leakage No water leakage is observed at CNV leaktight barrier against the test of the CNV will be performed. bolted flange connections.

uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment.

24. The NPM lifting fixture supports its A rated load test will be performed of The NPM lifting fixture supports a load rated load. the NPM lifting fixture. of 150 to 155 percent of the manufacturer's rated capacity.

25. The NPM lifting fixture is constructed An inspection will be performed of the The NPM lifting fixture is single-failure-to provide assurance that a single as-built NPM lifting fixture. proof.

failure does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.

Tier 1 2.1-15 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Tier 1 Reactor Building Crane 3.10 Reactor Building Crane 3.10.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is the Reactor Building crane (RBC). The RBC is a bridge crane that rides on rails anchored to the Reactor Building. The bridge crane can travel the length of the reactor pool, refueling pool, and the dry dock. The RBC is nonsafety-related and supports up to 12 NuScale Power Modules (NPMs). The Reactor Building houses all RBC equipment.

The RBC includes the following:

• RBC with auxiliary hoist RAI 14.03.07-1

• below-the-hook lifting devices, including the module lifting adapter (MLA) and the wet hoist The RBC performs the following risk-significant system function that is verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

• The RBC supports the NuScale Power Module by providing structural support and mobility while moving from refueling, inspection and operating bay.

Design Commitments

• The single-failure-proof RBC main hoist is constructed to provide assurance that a failure of a single hoist mechanism does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.

• The single-failure-proof RBC auxiliary hoists are constructed to provide assurance that a failure of a single hoist mechanism does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.

• The single-failure-proof RBC wet hoist is constructed to provide assurance that a failure of a single hoist mechanism does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.

• The RBC main hoist is capable of lifting and supporting its rated load, holding the rated load, and transporting the rated load.

• The RBC auxiliary hoists are capable of lifting and supporting their rated load, holding the rated load, and transporting the rated load.

• The RBC wet hoist is capable of lifting and supporting its rated load, holding the rated load, and transporting the rated load.

• Load path RBC welds are inspected.

• Load path RBC wet hoist welds are inspected.

RAI 14.03.07-1

• The MLA is capable of supporting its rated load.

RAI 14.03.07-1 Tier 1 3.10-1 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Tier 1 Reactor Building Crane

• The MLA is constructed to provide assurance that a single failure does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.

3.10.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 3.10-1 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the RBC.

Tier 1 3.10-2 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Tier 1 Reactor Building Crane RAI 14.03.07-1 Table 3.10-1: Reactor Building Crane Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 The single-failure-proof RBC main An inspection will be performed of the The RBC main hoist is single-failure-hoist is constructed to provide as-built RBC main hoist. proof.

assurance that a failure of a single hoist mechanism does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.

2 The single-failure-proof RBC auxiliary An inspection will be performed of the The RBC auxiliary hoists are single-hoists are constructed to provide as-built RBC auxiliary hoists. failure-proof.

assurance that a failure of a single hoist mechanism does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.

3 The single-failure-proof RBC wet hoist An inspection will be performed of the The RBC wet hoist is single-failure-is constructed to provide assurance as-built RBC wet hoist. proof.

that a failure of a single hoist mechanism does not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.

4 The RBC main hoist is capable of lifting A rated load test will be performed of The RBC main hoist lifts, supports, and supporting its rated load, holding the RBC main hoist. holds with the brakes, and transports a the rated load, and transporting the load of 125 to 130 percent of the rated load. manufacturers rated capacity.

5 The RBC auxiliary hoists are capable of A rated load test will be performed of The RBC auxiliary hoists lift, support, lifting and supporting their rated load, the RBC auxiliary hoists. hold with the brakes, and transport a holding the rated load, and load of 125 to 130 percent of the transporting the rated load. manufacturers rated capacity.

6 The RBC wet hoist is capable of lifting A rated load test will be performed of The RBC wet hoist lifts, supports, holds and supporting its rated load, holding the RBC wet hoist. with the brakes, and transports a load the rated load, and transporting the of 125 to 130 percent of the rated load. manufacturers rated capacity.

7 Load path RBC welds are inspected. An inspection will be performed of the The results of the non-destructive as-built RBC. examination of the RBC welds comply with American Society of Mechanical Engineers NOG-1 Code.

8 Load path RBC wet hoist welds are An inspection will be performed of the The results of the non-destructive inspected. as-built RBC wet hoist. examination of the RBC wet hoist welds comply with American Society of Mechanical Engineers NOG-1 Code.

9 The MLA is capable of supporting its i. A rated load test will be performed of i. The MLA single load path elements rated load. the MLA single load path elements. support a load of 300 to 305 percent of the manufacturer's rated capacity.

ii. A rated load test will be performed of the MLA dual load path elements. ii. The MLA dual load path elements support a load of 150 to 155 percent of the manufacturer's rated capacity.

10 The single-failure-proof MLA is An inspection will be performed of the The MLA is single-failure-proof.

constructed to provide assurance that as-built MLA.

it will not fail in a manner that results in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load.

Tier 1 3.10-3 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel Storage and Handling General Design Criterion 2 is considered in the design of the OHLHS including the ability of structures, systems, and components in the RXB and OHLHS to withstand the effects of earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches. The OHLHS is located in the Seismic Category I Reactor Building (RXB). The RBC, the Module Lifting Adapter, and the RFT are designed to retain their load before, during, and after a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The CFT and the module inspection rack are designed to ensure that their structural failure or interaction cannot degrade the functioning of Seismic Category I SSC during or after an SSE. Refer to Section 3.2 for information pertaining to safety, seismic, and quality classification of SSC.

General Design Criterion 4 is considered in the design of the OHLHS. No safety-related or risk-significant SSC are affected by load drops because the RBC is designed to meet single-failure-proof requirements in accordance with NUREG-0554 and supplemented by ASME NOG-1 (Reference 9.1.5-3). In addition, the OHLHS is protected from the effects of external missile hazards by being located inside the RXB. Dynamic effects associated with missile impact are provided in Section 3.5.

General Design Criterion 5 is considered in the design of the OHLHS. The RBC is used to move each NPM for refueling. However, only one NPM can be moved at a time.

Codes and standards associated with the design of the OHLHS are presented in Table 9.1.5-1, along with OHLHS system design information. Section 9.1.5.3 contains detailed information on the safety evaluation for the OHLHS.

9.1.5.2 System Description 9.1.5.2.1 General Description The OHLHS includes equipment designed to handle critical loads in areas containing safety-related equipment that could be potentially impacted by the drops of such loads. The design of the OHLHS equipment, in conjunction with procedures and safe load paths, ensures the safe movement of critical loads. Safe load paths and heavy load exclusion zones are defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for a load drop on irradiated fuel in a reactor vessel or spent fuel pool (SFP), on safe shutdown equipment, or that impacts an NPM.

Figure 9.1.5-1 and Figure 9.1.5-2 show safe load paths and heavy load exclusion zones for the movement of the OHLHS.

The largest load handled is the NPM that is flooded to the pressurizer baffle plate prior to being moved for refueling using the module lifting adapter. The flooded NPM has an effective weight of 786 tons when buoyancy effects are taken into account. The total weight imposed on the crane is 837 tons at the highest lift point.

The area of the plant where this load is handled is in the RXB between the operating bay (reactor pool), refueling area, and dry dock.

The major OHLHS components are:

• RBC RAI 14.03.07-1

• NPM lifting fixture Tier 2 9.1-68 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel Storage and Handling failure proof underhung monorail type hoist. The auxiliary hoist rail is mounted off the outer surface of each bridge girder. The auxiliary hoists provide a method for the RBC to lift and carry lower weight items. The auxiliary hoists are single-failure proof to ensure that any failure of the load path component does not result in an uncontrolled load. The auxiliary hoist also contain a load weighing assembly that monitors for slack rope, high loads, and broken ropes. The hook height and hard-wired limit switches for overspeed and upper and lower limit constraints. Design requirements associated with the RBC auxiliary hoist are specified in Table 9.1.5-1.

Module Lifting Adapter The welded-construction MLA provides the connection method for the RBC to lift and carry the NPM from the operating bay to the refueling bay and dry dock. The module lifting adapter is depicted in Figure 9.1.5-4. The MLA is designed as a single-failure-proof lifting device in accordance with the requirements of ANSI N14.6 (Reference 9.1.5-1).

RAI 09.01.05-2, RAI 09.01.05-3, RAI 09.01.05-4, RAI 09.01.05-5, RAI 09.01.05-6 The MLA is designed with dual load paths consisting of four lifting arms that interface with the four lifting lugs on the NPM. The MLA attaches to the RBC hook eye with a pinned clevis that is designed to the 10:1 safety factors of the ultimate strength of material. The MLA engagement is mechanically and electrically locked when carrying a load to prevent inadvertent disengagement.

RAI 09.01.05-2, RAI 09.01.05-3, RAI 09.01.05-4, RAI 09.01.05-5, RAI 09.01.05-6 The four pins that engage the NPM lifting lugs are engaged with actuators. The engagement is confirmed by travel limit switches and visual indication. The MLA instrumentation and power is provided through the RBC instrumentation and power system.

RAI 14.03.07-1 NPM Lifting Fixture RAI 14.03.07-1 The welded structure comprised of the NPM lifting lugs and top support structure diagonal lifting braces together constitute the permanently installed NPM lifting fixture. The NPM lifting fixture ends at the weld between the diagonal braces and the platform mount pad.

RAI 14.03.07-1 The NPM lifting fixture is designed with dual load paths per the requirements of ANSI N14.6 as a single-failure-proof lifting device.

Wet Hoist The wet hoist is the main below-the-hook structure for lifting equipment underwater. The wet hoist is designed to be single failure proof in accordance with requirements in Table 9.1.5-1. It consists of two redundant open kinematic loops Tier 2 9.1-71 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel Storage and Handling Operator training, handling, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection provide reasonable assurance of a reliable operation of the handling system.

COL Item 9.1-7: The COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will provide a description of the program governing heavy loads handling. The program should address

• operating and maintenance procedures

• inspection and test plans

• personnel qualification and operator training RAI 09.01.05-2, RAI 09.01.05-3, RAI 09.01.05-4, RAI 09.01.05-5, RAI 09.01.05-6

• detailed description of the safe load paths for movement of heavy loads 9.1.5.4 Inspection and Testing Preoperational inspection and testing of overhead cranes is governed by ASME NOG-1.

Non-destructive examination of critical crane structural welds is performed in accordance with ASME NOG-1. Tests include operational testing with 100 percent load to demonstrate function and speed controls for bridge, trolley, and hoist drives, and proper functioning of limit switches, locking, and safety devices. A rated load test is performed with a 125 percent load.

The RBC is inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with ASME B30.2 (Reference 9.1.5-5). This inspection requirement reduces the probability of a load drop due to a malfunctioning RBC that could result in a release of radioactive materials from damage to irradiated fuel, a criticality accident, or damage to essential safe shutdown equipment that could cause unacceptable radiation exposures.

RAI 14.03.07-1 Testing of the MLA is conducted per ANSI N14.6. Rated load testing of single load path portions, such as the main pin, is performed with a 300 percent load. Rated load testing of dual load path elements, such as the four paddles and pins that interface with the module lifting tabs, is performed with a 150 percent load. Operational testing is conducted per the requirements of ANSI N14.6, and includes annual NDE and dimensional checks.

RAI 14.03.07-1 Testing of the permanently installed NPM lifting fixture is conducted per ANSI N14.6. A rated load test is performed with a 150 percent load. Operational testing is conducted either annually or before each use per the requirements of ANSI N14.6, and includes annual NDE and dimensional checks.

RAI 09.01.05-2, RAI 09.01.05-3, RAI 09.01.05-4, RAI 09.01.05-5, RAI 09.01.05-6 Inspection and testing of special lifting devices are in accordance with ANSI N14.6.

Inspection and testing of lifting devices not specially designed are in accordance with ASME B30.9.

Tier 2 9.1-78 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel Storage and Handling RAI 09.01.05-2, RAI 09.01.05-3, RAI 09.01.05-4, RAI 09.01.05-5, RAI 09.01.05-6, RAI 14.03.07-1 Table 9.1.5-1: Heavy Load Handling Equipment Design Data Equipment Rated Design Code Single- Seismic Maximum Maximum Maximum Capacity Failure-Proof Category Traverse 1 Lift Height Hoist Speed (Tons) Speed1 (fpm) (fpm) (ft)

RBC Main Hoist 850 ASME NOG-1, Yes I 30 2 50 Type I RBC auxiliary hoists 15 ASME NOG-1, Yes I N/A 252 / 373 65 Type I MLA 790 ANSI N14.6 Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A NPM lifting fixture 790 ANSI N14.6 Yes I N/A N/A N/A Wet hoist 250 ASME NOG-1, Yes N/A N/A 4 75 Type I Traveling Jib Crane 2000 lbs ASME NUM-I, No II 30 21 40 Hoist (1 ton) Type II Notes:

1. Bridge, trolley, and hoist speeds are within the recommended ranges of ASME NOG-1.

2. With load on the hoist

3. Without load on the hoist Tier 2 9.1-84 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel Storage and Handling RAI 09.01.05-2, RAI 09.01.05-3, RAI 09.01.05-4, RAI 09.01.05-5, RAI 09.01.05-6, RAI 14.03.07-1 Table 9.1.5-2: Reactor Building Crane Special Lifting Devices Lifting Device Description Module Lifting Adapter The module lifting adapter is a 4 arm, lifting device that engages 4 lifting lugs located on the top support platform on the upper NPM. This adapter moves the NPM from the dry dock to the refueling pool and into the operating bay.

NPM Lifting Fixture The NPM lifting fixture consists of the NPM lifting lugs and top support structure diagonal lifting braces that are used to lift the NPM, and is permanently attached to the NPM.

Reactor Vessel Internals Lifting Adapter The reactor vessel internals lifting adapter is designed to handle the core support assembly and lower riser assembly. This adapter is a 4 arm lifting device that engages to the core support assembly lower locking mechanism and the lower riser assembly trunnions for installation and removal from the lower RPV.

Lower Vessel Lifting Adapter The lower vessel lifting adapter is a 4 arm lifting device that interfaces with the outside diameter of the lower RPV and lower CNV bolting flanges. This adapter is used to lower the lower RPV and lower CNV into the reactor pool.

Tier 2 9.1-85 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program RAI 14.03.07-1 Table 14.2-52: Reactor Building Cranes Test # 52 Preoperational test is required to be performed once unless otherwise noted in the test.

The RBC system is described in Section 9.1.5 and the functions verified by this test are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The RBC supports the NPM by nonsafety-related, risk-significant Test #52-1 providing structural support and Test #52-2 mobility while moving from refueling, inspection and operating bay.

2. MAE bolting supports the CNT by nonsafety-related Test #52-2 providing material handling to allow for disassembly and reassembly of the CNV lower flange.

3. MAE bolting supports the RPV nonsafety-related Test #52-2 actively by providing material handling to allow for disassembly and reassembly of the RPV lower flange.

4. The CNTS supports the RBC by nonsafety-related, risk-significant Test #52-1 providing lifting attachment points Test #52-2 that the RBC can connect to so that the module can be lifted.

Prerequisites

i. An RBC site acceptance test has been completed and approved.

ii. A rated-load test has been completed and approved on the RBC on the following equipment in accordance with ASME NOG-1 paragraph 7423.

a. RBC main hoist

b. RBC auxiliary hoists

c. RBC wet hoist iii. A rated-load test has been completed and approved on the following equipment in accordance with ANSI N14.6.

a. Module lifting adapter

b. NPM lifting fixture iv. Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify RBC controls that limit RBC Actuate or simulate actuation of the RBC Local visual observation indicates that motion and speed. interlocks contained in Table 14.2-52a. the interlocks limit RBC motion and speed.

ii. Verify RBC remains in current Initiate the following real or simulated Local visual observation indicates that position on loss of control or power signals: the bridge, trolley, main hoist, wet hoist, or seismic event. i. Loss of control. auxiliary hoist trolley and auxiliary hoist ii. Loss of power. brakes are set.

iii. Seismic switch actuation.

iii. Verify each RBC instrument is Initiate a single real or simulated The instrument signal is displayed on an available on an MCS or PCS display. instrument signal from each RBC system MCS or PCS display, or is recorded by the (Test not required if the instrument transmitter. applicable control system historian.

calibration verified the MCS or PCS display.)

Tier 2 14.2-120 Draft Revision 3

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report RAI 06.02.06-22, RAI 06.02.06-23, RAI 08.01-1S1, RAI 08.01-2, RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2, RAI 14.03.03-3S1, RAI 14.03.03-4S1, RAI 14.03.03-6, RAI 14.03.03-6S1, RAI 14.03.03-7, RAI 14.03.03-7S1, RAI 14.03.03-8, RAI 14.03.03-9, RAI 14.03.03-9S1, RAI 14.03.07-1 Table 14.3-1: Module-Specific Structures, Systems, and Components Based Design Features and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference(1)

ITAAC No. System Discussion DBA Internal/External Radiological PRA & Severe FP Hazard Accident 02.01.01 NPM As required by ASME Code Section III NCA-1210, each ASME Code X Class 1, 2 and 3 component (including piping systems) of a nuclear power plant requires a Design Report in accordance with NCA-3550. NCA-3551.1 requires that the drawings used for construction be in agreement with the Design Report before it is certified and be identified and described in the Design Report. It is the responsibility of the N Certificate Holder to furnish a Design Report for each component and support, except as provided in NCA-3551.2 and NCA-3551.3. NCA-3551.1 also requires that the Design Report be certified by a registered professional engineer when it is for Class 1 components and supports, Class CS core support structures, Class MC vessels and supports, Class 2 vessels 14.3-14 designed to NC-3200 (NC-3131.1), or Class 2 or Class 3 components designed to Service Loadings greater than Design Loadings. A Class Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and 2 Design Report shall be prepared for Class 1 piping NPS 1 or smaller that is designed in accordance with the rules of Subsection NC. NCA-3554 requires that any modification of any document used for construction, from the corresponding document used for design analysis, shall be reconciled with the Design Report.

An ITAAC inspection is performed of the NuScale Power Module ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 as-built piping system Design Report to verify that the requirements of ASME Code Section III are met.

Acceptance Criteria Draft Revision 3

Table 14.3-1: Module-Specific Structures, Systems, and Components Based Design Features Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference(1) (Continued)

ITAAC No. System Discussion DBA Internal/External Radiological PRA & Severe FP Hazard Accident 02.01.23 NPM Section 6.2.6.5.2 Preservice Design Pressure Leakage Test provides the test requirements for a preservice design pressure leakage test of the CNV. The test verifies no observed leakage at the CNV bolted flange connections under design pressure.

The test may be performed any time after manufacture of the containment vessel, prior to the NPM being placed into service.

02.01.24 NPM Section 9.1.5.2.2 discusses that the NPM lifting fixture represent a X single-failure-proof lifting device in accordance with the requirements of ANSI N14.6.

As described in Section 9.1.5.4, the NPM lifting fixture is load tested to 150% (+5%, -0%) of the manufacturer's rating in accordance with ANSI N14.6. As part of the rated load test, critical areas of the NPM lifting fixture, including all load-bearing welds, will undergo nondestructive testing as required by ANSI N14.6.

14.3-24 This ITAAC test may be performed any time after manufacture of Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and the NPM lifting fixture (at the factory or later).

02.01.25 NPM Section 9.1.5.2.2 discusses that the NPM lifting fixture represents a X single-failure-proof lifting device in accordance with the requirements of ANSI N14.6.

An ITAAC inspection is performed of the NPM lifting fixture to verify the existence of dual load paths.

This ITAAC inspection may be performed any time after manufacture of the NPM lifting fixture (at the factory or later).

Acceptance Criteria Draft Revision 3

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report RAI 09.01.04-1, RAI 09.05.01-6, RAI 14.03.02-1, RAI 14.03.02-2, RAI 14.03.03-1, RAI 14.03.03-6, RAI 14.03.03-7, RAI 14.03.03-8, RAI 14.03.07-1, RAI 14.03.09-1, RAI 14.03.09-2, RAI 14.03.09-3, RAI 14.03.12-2, RAI 14.03.12-3 Table 14.3-2: Shared/Common Structures, Systems, and Components and Non-Structures, Systems, and components Based Design Features and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference(1)

ITAAC No. System Discussion DBA Internal/External Radiological PRA & Severe FP Hazard Accident 03.01.01 CRH Testing is performed on the CRE in accordance with RG 1.197, X Demonstrating Control Room Envelope Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors, Revision 0, to demonstrate that air exfiltration from the CRE is controlled. RG 1.197 allows two options for CRE testing; either integrated testing (tracer gas testing) or component testing. Section 6.4 Control Room Habitability, describes the testing requirements for the CRE habitability program. Section 6.4 provides the maximum air exfiltration allowed from the CRE.

In accordance with Table 14.2-18, a preoperational test using the tracer gas test method demonstrates that the air exfiltration from the CRE does not exceed the assumed unfiltered leakage rate 14.3-56 provided in Table 6.4-1: Control Room Habitability System Design Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Parameters for the dose analysis. Tracer gas testing in accordance with ASTM E741 will be performed to measure the unfiltered in-leakage into the CRE with the control room habitability system (CRHS) operating.

03.01.02 CRH The CRHS valves are tested by remote operation to demonstrate X the capability to perform their function to transfer open and transfer closed under preoperational temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions.

In accordance with Table 14.2-18, a preoperational test demonstrates that each CRHS valve listed in Tier 1 Table 3.1-1 strokes fully open and fully closed by remote operation under Acceptance Criteria preoperational test conditions.

Preoperational test conditions are established that approximate design-basis temperature, differential pressure, and flow Draft Revision 3 conditions to the extent practicable, consistent with preoperational test limitations.

Table 14.3-2: Shared/Common Structures, Systems, and Components and Non-Structures, Systems, and components Based Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Features and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference(1) (Continued)

ITAAC No. System Discussion DBA Internal/External Radiological PRA & Severe FP Hazard Accident 03.10.09 RBC Section 9.1.5.2.2 discusses that the MLA is a single-failure-proof X lifting device in accordance with the requirements of ANSI N14.6.

In accordance with ANSI N14.6, and as described in Section 9.1.5.4 the portions of the MLA that are single load path are load tested to 300% (+5%, -0%) of the manufacturer's rating. As part of the rated load test, critical areas of the MLA, including all load-bearing welds, will undergo nondestructive testing as required by ANSI N14.6.

The portions of the MLA that are dual load path are load tested to 150% (+5%, -0%) of the manufacturer's rating in accordance with ANSI N14.6. As part of the rated load test, critical areas of the MLA, including all load-bearing welds, will undergo nondestructive testing as required by ANSI N14.6.

This ITAAC test may be performed any time after manufacture of 14.3-77 the MLA (at the factory or later).

Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and 03.10.10 RBC Section 9.1.5.2.2 discusses that the MLA is a single-failure-proof X lifting device in accordance with the requirements of ANSI N14.6.

An ITAAC inspection is performed of the MLA to verify the existence of the single-failure-proof features described in Section 9.1.5.2.2: (a) dual load paths consisting of four lifting arms, and (b) a pinned clevis used to attach the MLA to the RBC hook eye that is constructed to the 10:1 safety factors of the ultimate strength material.

This ITAAC inspection may be performed any time after manufacture of the MLA (at the factory or later).

Acceptance Criteria Draft Revision 3